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  Governments	  often	  try	  to	  use	  their	  foreign	  policies	  to	  influence	  the	  choice	  of	  who	  will	  rule	  in	  other	  countries.	  	  However,	  scholars	  know	  strikingly	  little	  about	  this	  commonplace	  and	  consequential	  phenomenon,	  especially	  when	  it	  is	  scoped	  down	  to	  the	  use	  of	  diplomatic	  tools	  short	  of	  force.	  	  Indeed,	  this	  lacuna	  is	  especially	  striking	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  voluminous	  literatures	  on	  other	  forms	  of	  international	  meddling	  such	  as	  military	  intervention	  or	  coercive	  diplomacy	  for	  producing	  policy	  change.	  	   This	  project	  seeks	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  nascent	  research	  program	  on	  partisan	  intervention	  by	  drawing	  on	   the	  historical	   record	   to	  pose	   tentative	  answers	   to	   two	  pertinent	  research	  questions	  in	  the	  context	  of	  America’s	  Mideast	  policies.	  	  The	  first	  topic	  focuses	  on	  occurrence:	  when	  are	  sender	  states	  likely	  to	  engage	  in	  this	  behavior,	  and	  when	  are	  they	  less	  likely	  to	  do	  so?	  	  The	  second	  topic	  focuses	  on	  efficacy:	  when	  does	  this	  policy	  help	  achieve	  the	  sender	  state’s	  objectives,	  and	  when	  does	  it	  fail?	  	  	  	   This	   project	   seeks	   to	   answer	   these	   questions	   by	   drawing	   on	  Washington’s	  peace	   process	   diplomacy.	   	   It	   uses	   official	   archives	   and	   expert	   interviews	   to	  supplement	   the	   existing	   historiographic	   record,	   documenting	   America’s	   efforts	   to	  bolster	  perceived	  pro-­‐peace	  leaders	  in	  Israel	  since	  1977	  and	  among	  the	  Palestinians	  since	  1986.	  	  It	  also	  explores	  U.S.	  decision-­‐making	  toward	  Iran	  as	  a	  shadow	  case	  for	  leverage	   over	   additional	   study	   variables,	   along	   with	   other	   instances	   of	   outside	  intervention	  into	  Israeli	  politics	  by	  European	  or	  Arab	  states.	  	   It	   finds	   that	   the	   issue	  area	  of	   leadership	  selection	   intervention	   is	  unusually	  subject	  to	  the	  individualistic	  preferences	  of	  top	  leaders	  in	  the	  sender	  state.	  	  Because	  exceptionally	  blatant	  meddling	  of	   this	   sort	   tends	   to	  elicit	  a	  backlash,	   self-­‐admitted	  LSI	  is	  therefore	  discouraged.	   	  Instead,	  practitioners	  go	  to	  great	  lengths	  to	  maintain	  alternative	   pretenses	   that	   prevent	   revelation	   of	   their	   true	   intentions.	   	   This	  inherently	  complicates	  the	  task	  of	  legislative	  oversight,	  decreases	  points	  of	  leverage	  for	   lobbyists	  or	  working-­‐level	  bureaucrats,	  and	  magnifies	   these	   leaders’	  subjective	  interpretation	  of	  international	  circumstances.	  	  In	  short,	  LSI	  is	  intensely	  personal.	  	  Thesis	  Supervisor:	   	   Stephen	  Van	  Evera	  Title:	  	   	   	   	   Professor	  of	  Political	  Science	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  around!	  	  And	  I	  am	  even	  more	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  in	  A.P.A.	  format	  as	  a	  nod	  to	  other	  styles	  of	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   and	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   now	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   modal	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  time	  to	  live	  a	  life.	  	  This	  book	  is	  for	  her.	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   Contemporary	  diplomacy	  often	   seeks	   to	   influence	   the	   selection	  of	  who	  will	  rule	  on	  other	  countries,	  but	  experts	  know	  surprisingly	  little	  about	  this	  phenomenon.	  	  When	   do	   officials	   adopt	   this	   sort	   of	   policy?	   	   Under	   what	   circumstances	   are	   such	  attempts	  likely	  to	  succeed	  or	  fail?	  	  This	  lacuna	  is	  especially	  striking	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	   voluminous	   literatures	   we	   already	   have	   on	   various	   other	   forms	   of	   foreign	  intervention.	  	  Yet	  meddling	  aimed	  at	  leadership	  selection	  seems	  in	  many	  ways	  to	  be	  the	  most	  fascinating	  variety.	  	  This	  dissertation	  therefore	  benefits	  from	  some	  rather	  juicy,	  scandalous	  subject	  matter.	  	   This	  project	  is	  a	  disciplinary	  hybrid.	  	  It	  is	  at	  once	  a	  work	  of	  political	  analysis	  and	  diplomatic	  history.	   	  Thus,	  it	  focuses	  on	  two	  parallel	  tasks:	  building	  nomothetic	  knowledge	  about	  how	  the	  world	  works	  and	  idiographic	  knowledge	  about	  particular	  case	  episodes.	  	  It	  seeks	  to	  establish	  natural	  laws	  that	  drive	  meddling	  behavior	  across	  the	  cases	  while	  chronicling	  the	  tale	  of	  American	  intervention	  in	  the	  politics	  of	  Israel,	  Palestine,	  and	  Iran.	   	   Its	  dual	  mission	  makes	  for	  somewhat	   longer	  reading	  material,	  but	   hopefully	   it	   still	   retains	   some	   effectiveness	   at	   both	   purposes	   while	   achieving	  some	  complementarities	  between	  them.	  	   Because	   meddling	   in	   another	   political	   system’s	   leadership	   selection	   is	  inherently	  controversial,	  officials	  in	  the	  sender	  state	  go	  to	  extraordinary	  lengths	  to	  convey	   a	  persuasive	  political	  message	  while	  masking	   their	   true	   intensions	  behind	  some	  plausible	  pretense.	  	  Often,	  this	  takes	  the	  form	  of	  endorsing	  favored	  policies	  as	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a	   placeholder	   for	   endorsing	   favored	   politicians.	   	   However,	   the	   risk	   of	   leaks	   that	  would	  strip	  away	  these	  pretenses	  leads	  to	  a	  deliberative	  process	  in	  the	  sender	  state	  that	  is	  unusually	  secretive	  and	  close-­‐held.	  	   As	   a	   result,	   the	   events	   that	   are	   documented	   in	   this	   dissertation	   are	  remarkable	   in	   terms	   of	   how	   much	   discretion	   is	   exercised	   by	   a	   few	   top	   political	  leaders	  in	  the	  sender	  state	  for	  determining	  their	  nation’s	  foreign	  policy.	  	  While	  other	  issue	   areas	   might	   be	   more	   prone	   to	   structural	   pressures	   from	   the	   international	  environment	   or	   domestic	   political	   system,	   this	   kind	   of	  meddling	   is	   almost	   always	  the	  domain	  of	  the	  president	  and	  just	  one	  or	  two	  key	  advisors.	  	  And	  their	  wisdom	  or	  foibles	  often	  spell	  the	  policy’s	  eventual	  success	  or	  failure.	  	  These	  stories	  of	  political	  intervention	  are	  not	  just	  fascinating	  –	  they	  go	  all	  the	  way	  to	  the	  top.	  	  
A.	  Definition	  &	  Conceptualization:	  	   	  For	   the	   purposes	   of	   this	   project,	   I	   term	   this	   subject	   matter	   “leadership	  selection	  intervention,”	  or	  LSI	  for	  short.	   	  LSI	  is	  defined	  as	  one	  government’s	  efforts	  to	   bolster	   or	   change	   the	   character	   of	   another	   government’s	   ruling	   coalition	   using	  methods	   short	   of	   force.	   	   The	   term	   LSI	   is	   at	   times	   used	   interchangeably	   with	   the	  descriptors	   “meddling”	   or	   “partisan	   intervention,”	   which	   are	   usually	   employed	   in	  this	  particular	  sense.	  	  	   What	   does	   this	   complicated	   concept	   mean?	   	   In	   short,	   I	   use	   it	   to	   refer	   to	  instances	   in	   which	   a	   sender	   state	   tries	   to	   influence	   the	   choice	   of	   who	   will	   be	   in	  charge	  in	  another	  political	  system.	  	  Most	  often,	  this	  entails	  the	  choice	  of	  who	  will	  be	  the	  president	  or	  prime	  minister.	  	  Often,	  it	  also	  entails	  the	  selection	  of	  other	  cabinet	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ministries,	  which	  party	  will	  have	  a	  majority	  in	  the	  legislature,	  or	  which	  other	  parties	  will	  be	  included	  in	  the	  ruling	  coalition?	  	  Sometimes	  it	  involves	  efforts	  to	  reinforce	  a	  sitting	  government	  that	  is	  already	  in	  power	  or	  to	  affect	  the	  relative	  balance	  of	  power	  within	  a	  sitting	  government	  in	  the	  target	  nation.	  	   Defined	   as	   such,	   LSI	   is	   one	   subset	   of	   a	   broader	   class	   of	   behaviors	   for	  meddling	  or	   intervention	   in	   the	   realm	  of	   international	   relations.	   	  The	   relationship	  among	   these	  behaviors	   is	  best	  understood	   in	   reference	   to	   the	  2x3	  diagram	  on	   the	  following	  page	  (Table	  I),	  where	  varieties	  of	  intervention	  are	  distinguished	  according	  to	  two	  different	  dimensions.	  	  The	  first	  dimension	  entails	  the	  sender	  state’s	  objective:	  is	  it	  seeking	  to	  influence	  the	  content	  of	  the	  target	  state’s	  policies,	  the	  character	  of	  its	  government,	  or	  elements	  of	   its	  regime	   institutions?	   	  The	  second	  dimension	  entails	  the	  means	   that	   the	   sender	   state	  uses	   to	   achieve	   this	   objective:	   is	   it	   using	   force	  or	  employing	  means	  short	  of	  force,	  primarily	  applying	  the	  tools	  of	  diplomacy?	  	  
B.	  The	  Literature:	  	   This	  framework	  yields	  a	  typology	  of	  foreign	  policy	  meddling	  that	  throws	  into	  stark	   relief	   the	  meager	   amount	   of	   attention	   garnered	   by	   the	   study	   of	   LSI	   to	   date.	  	  Nearly	   all	   of	   the	   other	   entries	   in	   Table	   I	   are	   the	   subject	   of	   burgeoning	   if	   not	  overwrought	   literatures	   in	   the	   subfield	  of	   international	   relations.	   	   For	   instance,	   in	  the	   top	   left	   box	   is	   an	   entry	   for	   coercive	   diplomacy,	   also	   known	   as	   “forceful	  persuasion,”	  which	  primarily	  seeks	  to	  persuade	  another	  state	  to	  change	  its	  behavior	  by	  means	   short	   of	   force.	   	   It	  may	   at	  most	   involve	   a	   demonstrative	   use	   of	  military	  might	   but	   stops	   short	   of	   physically	   producing	   the	   intended	   result	   by	   one’s	   self.	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There	  is	  an	  enormous	  amount	  of	  research	  on	  this	  topic	  already,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  marginal	  returns	  to	  effort	  in	  this	  area	  today	  are	  arguably	  quite	  small.1	  	  
	  	  	   The	  other	  areas	  are	  also	  the	  subject	  of	  extensive	  study	  to	  date.	   	  The	  bottom	  left	   box,	   denial	   by	   brute	   force,	   is	   the	   subject	   of	   explicit	   consideration	   by	   Robert	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Instances of the voluminous literature on coercive diplomacy include: Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and 
Influence (Yale University Press, 1966); Alexander L. George, Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy 
as an Alternative to War (US Institute of Peace Press, 1991); Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, The 
Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might (Cambridge University 
Press, 2002); Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin, The United States and Coercive Diplomacy (US Institute 
of Peace Press, 2003); Wallace J. Thies, “Compellence Failure or Coercive Success? The Case of NATO 
and Yugoslavia,” Comparative Strategy 22, no. 3 (2003): 243–267; Phil Haun, “On Death Ground: Why 
Weak States Resist Great Powers, Explaining Coercion Failure in Asymmetric Interstate Conflict” (MIT 
Doctoral Dissertation, 2010). For a discussion of inferential limits to the literature, see Patrick C. Bratton, 
“When Is Coercion Successful?: And Why Can’t We Agree on It?,” Naval War College Review 58, no. 3 
(Summer 2005): 99–120. 
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Paper	   in	  Bombing	   to	  Win	   and	   also	   the	   implicit	   subject	   involved	  with	  much	   of	   the	  literature	  on	  military	   force	   and	   strategic	   studies.2	   	   The	  bottom	  middle	  box	   covers	  the	  use	  of	  force	  to	  directly	  and	  kinetically	  impose	  a	  new	  government	  on	  the	  target	  state	   and	   is	   covered	   extensively	   in	   the	   literature	   on	   covert	   intervention.3	   	   The	  bottom	  right	  box	  deals	  with	  the	  subject	  of	  regime	  overthrow,	  a	  topic	  that	  came	  back	  onto	  the	  research	  agenda	  with	  the	  George	  W.	  Bush	  administration’s	  invasion	  of	  Iraq	  and	  endorsement	  of	  a	  national	  security	  strategy	  reliant	  upon	  the	  use	  of	  preventive	  force	  in	  2002.4	  	  Finally,	  the	  top	  right	  box	  covers	  regime	  change	  by	  sticks	  and	  carrots,	  a	  much	  less	  prominent	  subject	  but	  one	  that	  has	  been	  studied	  nonetheless,	  especially	  once	  one	  takes	  into	  consideration	  the	  literature	  on	  democracy	  promotion	  as	  well.5	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See, inter alia, Robert Anthony Pape, Bombing to Win (Cornell University Press, 1996); Robert J. Art and 
Kenneth Neal Waltz, The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics (Rowman & Littlefield, 
2009); Michael E. O’Hanlon, The Science of War: Defense Budgeting, Military Technology, Logistics, and 
Combat Outcomes (Princeton University Press, 2009), chap. 2: Modeling Combat and Sizing Forces. 
3 Examples of prominent work in this area include: Gregory F. Treverton, Covert Action: The Limits of 
Intervention in the Postwar World (Basic Books, 1987); Bob Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 
1981-1987 (Simon and Schuster, 1987); Stephen Van Evera, “American Intervention in the Third World: 
Less Would Be Better,” Security Studies 1, no. 1 (1991): 1–24; Peter J. Schraeder, “Paramilitary 
Intervention,” in Intervention into the 1990s: U.S. Foreign Policy in the Third World, ed. Peter J. 
Schraeder, 2nd ed. (L. Rienner Publishers, 1992), 131–152; William Blum, Killing Hope: U.S. Military and 
CIA Interventions Since World War II, 2nd ed. (Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 2004); Stephen 
Kinzer, Overthrow: America’s Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq (Macmillan, 2007). 
4 Christopher Hitchens, “Machiavelli in Mesopotamia,” Slate, November 7, 2002; John M. IV Owen, “The 
Foreign Imposition of Domestic Institutions,” International Organization 56, no. 2 (Spring 2002): 375–
409; Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy 
(Brookings Institution Press, 2003); J. D Fearon and D. D Laitin, “Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak 
States,” International Security 28, no. 4 (2004): 5–43; James Steinberg, “Preventive Force in U.S. National 
Security Strategy,” Survival 47, no. 4 (Winter 2005): 55–72; Kinzer, Overthrow: America’s Century of 
Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq; Robert Litwak, Regime Change: U.S. Strategy Through the Prism of 
9/11 (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007); Patricia Sullivan and Johannes Karreth, “Determinants of 
Success and Failure in Foreign Regime Maintenance Interventions,” APSA Papers 2010 (2010); Alexander 
B. Downes and Jonathan Monten, “FIRCed to Be Free: Foreign-Imposed Regime Change and 
Democratization,” APSA Papers 2010 (2010). 
5 For research specifically on the use of economic sanctions or inducements to achieve regime change, see 
elements of Richard Haass and Meghan L. O’Sullivan, Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and 
Foreign Policy (Brookings Institution Press, 2000); Tim Niblock, “Pariah States” & Sanctions in the 
Middle East (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002); Meghan L. O’Sullivan, Shrewd Sanctions: Statecraft and 
State Sponsors of Terrorism (Brookings Institution Press, 2003); Gary Clyde Hufbauer et al., Economic 
Sanctions Reconsidered [4th Edition] (Peterson Institute, 2007). For some prominent works from the 
broader literature on peaceful democracy promotion, see Thomas Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad 
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   Meanwhile,	   the	   subject	   of	   leadership	   selection	   intervention	   –	   or	   partisan	  intervention,	   if	   one	  prefers	   that	   term	  –	   is	   striking	   in	   its	   absence.	   	  Very	   few	  works	  have	   sought	   to	   explore	   this	   topic	   in	   a	   comparative	   and	   systematic	   manner.	   	   One	  notable	   exception	   is	   a	   1993	   book	   chapter	   by	   Matthew	   Evangelista’s	   in	   which	   he	  traces	  the	  role	  of	  American	  foreign	  policy	  behavior	  in	  shaping	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  between	   hardliners	   and	  moderates	   in	   the	   Soviet	   Union.6	   	   Another	   is	   the	   Lebanon	  field	   experiment	   by	   Daniel	   Corstange	   and	  Nikolay	  Marinov	   in	  which	   they	   seek	   to	  determine	  the	  attitudes	  of	  Lebanese	  voters	  to	  a	  series	  of	  electoral	  interventions	  by	  hypothetical	  foreign	  powers.7	  	  To	  the	  best	  of	  my	  knowledge,	  these	  are	  the	  only	  two	  published	   works	   in	   the	   literature	   thus	   far	   that	   attempt	   to	   evaluate	   generalizable	  hypotheses	  on	  this	  issue	  area,	  and,	  despite	  their	  considerable	  merits,	  they	  certainly	  leave	   room	   for	   additional	  work	   to	  be	  done.	   	   Further,	   Evangelista’s	  work	   seems	   to	  support	   the	   idea	   that	   public	   opinion	   pressure	   and	   foreign	   policy	   lobbies	   are	   very	  influential,	  while	  Nikolay	  and	  Corstange’s	  work	  emphasize	  the	  self-­‐defeating	  nature	  of	   most	   attempts	   at	   LSI.	   	   In	   both	   regards	   this	   study	   contradicts	   the	   existing	  literature,	  limited	  thought	  it	  may	  be.	  In	  review,	  there	  is	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  research	  that	  seeks	  to	  explore	  the	  dynamics	  of	   intervention	   behaviors	   using	   diplomacy	   in	   international	   politics	   that	   seek	   use	  influence	  another	  state’s	  policies	  or	  regime	  institutions	  but	  little	  research	  on	  efforts	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(Carnegie Endowment, 1999); Michael Cox, G. John Ikenberry, and Takashi Inoguchi, American 
Democracy Promotion (Oxford University Press, 2000); Peter J. Schraeder, Exporting Democracy (Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2002); James Traub, The Freedom Agenda: Why America Must Spread Democracy 
(Just Not the Way George Bush Did) (Macmillan, 2008). 
6 Matthew Evangelista, “Internal and External Constraints on Grand Strategy,” in The Domestic Bases of 
Grand Strategy, ed. Richard N. Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein (Cornell University Press, 1993), 154–178. 
7 Corstange and Marinov, “Does Taking Sides Encourage Radicalization?: The US and Iranian Messages in 
the 2009 Elections in Lebanon.” 
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that	  seek	   to	  change	  or	  bolster	  another	  state’s	  government	  –	   the	  people	  who	  make	  those	  policies	  and	  serve	  in	  those	  regime	  institutions.	  	  
C.	  Importance:	  	   The	  reasons	  for	  this	  lack	  of	  attention	  given	  to	  LSI	  until	  now	  cannot	  be	  for	  lack	  of	  deductive	  importance.	   	  The	  framework	  embodied	  in	  Table	  I	  suggests	  that	  this	  is	  an	   analytically	   fundamental	   form	   of	   foreign	   policy	   behavior.	   	   Further,	   it	   is	   only	  natural	   that	   sometimes	   officials	   in	   powerful	   countries	   decide	   that	   the	   most	  promising	  route	  for	  achieving	  their	  goals	  winds	  through	  another	  nation’s	  domestic	  politics.	   	   Although	   this	   practice	   may	   be	   a	   violation	   of	   national	   sovereignty,	   we	  already	  know	  that	  such	  deviations	  from	  the	  principle	  of	  sovereignty	  are	  par	  for	  the	  course	  in	  contemporary	  world	  politics.8	  	   Nor	  can	  the	  lack	  of	  attention	  given	  to	  this	  type	  of	  foreign	  policy	  behavior	  be	  justified	  on	   the	  basis	  of	  being	  a	   rare	  event.	   	  Leadership	  selection	   intervention	   is	  a	  commonplace	   behavior	   in	   the	   world	   today.	   	   This	   dissertation	   alone	   documents	  numerous	   instances	   of	   such	   behavior,	   and	   it	   is	   only	   a	   limited	   subset	   of	   the	   study	  population.	  	  Elsewhere	  I	  have	  provided	  documentation	  of	  a	  range	  of	  other	  episodes	  as	  well.9	   	  Yet	  these	  are	  still	   just	  an	  irregular	  subset	  of	  cases,	  based	  on	  the	  author’s	  own	  particular	  area	  studies	  and	  case	  history	  knowledge.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton University Press, 1999); David A. 
Lake, Hierarchy in International Relations (Cornell University Press, 2009). 
9 Other notable examples not covered in this project listed with justifying source citations in a recent 
conference paper: David A. Weinberg, “Hypotheses on Leadership Selection Intervention: How Great 
Powers Pick Sides Abroad,” Conference Paper Presented Jointly to the International Security Sections of 
the American Political Science Association and the International Studies Association (October 16, 2010).  
Examples include: US-Italy (1948), US-Philippines (‘51), US-West Germany (’53), US-Japan (early Cold 
War), US-Lebanon (’58), US-Italy (‘63), US-Chile (’64), South Vietnam-US (‘68), US-Chile (‘70), US-
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   Nor	  can	  ignoring	  LSI	  be	  justified	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  it	  does	  not	  matter	  for	  the	  politics	  of	  the	  target	  polity.	  	  Not	  all	  instances	  of	  LSI	  succeed,	  but	  some	  certainly	  do.	  	  Further,	   leadership	   contests,	   including	   but	   not	   limited	   to	   elections,	   are	   critical	  junctures	   during	   which	   a	   small	   outside	   impact	   can	   sometimes	   tip	   the	   balance	   in	  deciding	   who	   will	   rule.	   	   Even	   in	   regimes	   with	   flexible-­‐term	   electoral	   institutions	  such	  as	  Israel,	  those	  new	  leaders	  then	  typically	  have	  a	  modicum	  of	  time	  in	  which	  to	  imprint	  their	  preferences	  onto	  institutions	  and	  policies,	  which	  often	  yield	  increasing	  returns	  to	  scale	  over	  time	  and	  change	  the	  capabilities,	  beliefs,	  and	  coalitions	  among	  relevant	  actors.	  	  In	  short,	  because	  leadership	  contests	  are	  critical	  junctures,	  shaping	  them	  can	  often	  leave	  lasting	  policy	  legacies.10	  Studying	   leadership	  selection	   intervention	  also	  has	  relevance	   for	  numerous	  disciplines,	  both	  within	  and	  beyond	  political	   science.	   	   It	   straddles	   the	   intersection	  between	   international	   relations	   and	   comparative	   politics,	   while	   studying	   the	  efficacy	  of	  LSI	  fits	  well	  with	  the	  evaluative	  mindset	  of	  policy	  studies.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  these	   nomothetic	   approaches,	   there	   are	   significant	   ideographic	   benefits	   as	   well,	  making	  contributions	  to	  the	  fields	  of	  area	  studies	  a	  diplomatic	  history.	  	  
D.	  Research	  Methods:	  Because	   existing	   knowledge	   about	   LSI	   is	   so	   rudimentary,	   I	   seek	   to	   address	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Chile (‘70-3), US-Greece (’74), Iran-US (‘80), US-ROK (‘80), US-Poland (‘82-89), US-El Salvador (’84), 
Israel/US-Iran (’86), US-Philippines (‘86), US-Haiti (‘87), US-Pakistan (‘88), US-Panama (‘89), US-
Nicaragua (‘89), US-USSR (late ’80s), US-Cambodia (’93), US-Haiti (‘94), US-Russia (‘96), Iran-Israel 
(‘96), PA-Israel (‘96), China-Taiwan (‘90s), US-Turkey (‘97), US-Iran (‘97-’00), EU-Austria (2000), 
US/EU/Canada-Serbia (‘2000), US-Serbia (2000s), US/EU-Ukraine (‘04), Russia-Ukraine (‘04), US-
Ukraine (‘04), US-Lebanon (‘05), US-Pakistan (‘07), India-Nepal (’08). 
10 Paul Pierson, Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis (Princeton University Press, 
2004); Giovanni Capoccia and R. Daniel Kelemen, “The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, Narrative, 
and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism,” World Politics 59, no. 3 (April 2007): 341–369. 
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research	  questions	  that	  are	  both	  fundamental	  and	  consequential	  in	  nature.	  	  Thus,	  I	  focus	   on	   explaining	   variation	   in	   two	   crucial	   dependent	   variables:	   occurrence	   and	  efficacy.	  	  The	  first	  research	  question	  asks	  why	  LSI	  occurs	  in	  some	  instances	  but	  not	  others,	  even	  in	  the	  same	  bilateral	  relationship.	   	  The	  second	  research	  question	  asks	  why	  LSI	  succeeds	  in	  some	  instances	  but	  not	  others,	  again,	  even	  in	  the	  same	  bilateral	  relationship.	  	   Of	   course,	   these	   are	   not	   the	   only	   two	   possible	   research	   questions	   worth	  asking	   about	   LSI.	   For	   instance:	   what	   explains	   the	   sender’s	   choice	   of	   particular	  intervention	   techniques	   over	   others?	   Do	   different	   tools	   entail	   different	   causal	  mechanisms	  or	  different	  rates	  of	  efficacy?	  What	  explains	  the	  sender’s	  choice	  of	  LSI	  over	  other	  forms	  of	  intervention?	  Which	  states	  are	  more	  prone	  to	  conduct	  LSI	  or	  to	  be	   the	   recipients	   of	   it?	   	   However,	   for	   the	   sake	   of	   focusing	  my	   efforts,	   I	   choose	   to	  focus	  only	  on	  the	  questions	  of	  occurrence	  and	  efficacy	  raised	  above.	  	   In	   order	   to	   devise	   answers	   to	   these	   two	   questions,	   I	   employ	   qualitative	  research	  methods,	  since	  there	  are	  considerable	  limitations	  to	  other	  techniques,	  such	  as	  statistical	  analysis.	  	  These	  limitations	  are	  caused	  by	  enumerative	  challenges	  that	  pose	  a	  high	  risk	  of	  systematic	  biases,	  including	  both	  false	  negative	  and	  false	  positive	  codings.	   	   Instead,	   I	  use	  a	  deep-­‐dive	  approach	   to	  data	  analysis,	   focusing	  heavily	  on	  internal	   validity	   in	   order	   to	   ensure	   that	  my	   inferences	   about	   particular	   cases	   are	  accurate	  and	  meaningful.	   	  Examining	  all	  possible	  episodes	  on	  a	   limited	  number	  of	  directed	   country	   dyads	   helps	   mitigate	   the	   risk	   of	   certain	   selection	   biases,	   while	  expanding	   the	   field	   of	   focus	   beyond	   a	   single	   bilateral	   relationship	   helps	   address	  others.	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   Because	  LSI	  is	  such	  a	  taboo	  topic,	  practitioners	  frequently	  face	  incentives	  to	  deny	  their	  actual	  intentions.	  	  This	  makes	  researching	  LSI	  extraordinarily	  challenging	  both	  methodologically	  and	   in	  terms	  of	  data	  collection.	   	  However,	  good	  scholarship	  does	   not	   shy	   away	   from	   important	   questions	   just	   because	   they	   are	   difficult	   to	  answer.	   	   I	   have	   taken	   substantial	   efforts	   to	   overcome	   certain	   data	   limitations	   by	  expanding	   the	   primary	   source	   record	   through	   extensive	   use	   of	   archives	   and	  interview	  techniques.	  	  And,	  where	  the	  data	  is	  ambiguous,	  I	  take	  great	  pains	  to	  report	  the	  evidence	  as	  actually	  is,	  not	  as	  I	  wish	  it	  to	  be.	  	  Hopefully,	  I	  have	  done	  a	  fair	  job	  in	  this	  regard.	  	  Data	  collection	  stops	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  George	  W.	  Bush	  administration,	  in	   order	   to	   ensure	   that	   I	   am	   not	   chasing	   a	   moving	   target	   in	   trying	   to	   explain	  developments	  during	  an	  ongoing	  presidential	  administration.	  	  
E.	  The	  Argument:	  	   I	  originally	  set	  out	   to	   test	   four	  rival	   theories	   for	  explaining	  the	  dynamics	  of	  leadership	   selection	   intervention,	   and,	   although	   I	   cannot	   speak	   to	   possible	  subjective	  biases,	  I	  tried	  to	  give	  each	  approach	  a	  fair	  hearing.	  	  What	  I	  found	  was	  that	  the	   agency	   of	   top	   officials	   in	   the	   sender	   state	   turns	   out	   to	   be	   extraordinarily	  important	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  leadership	  selection	  intervention.	   	  This	  leadership-­‐based	  approach	  did	  a	  much,	  much	  better	  job	  at	  explaining	  the	  data	  than	  other	  approaches	  that	   emphasized	   national	   interests,	   bureaucratic	   politics,	   or	   the	   preferences	   of	  lobbyists	  and	  legislators	  for	  explaining	  foreign	  policy	  outcomes.	  	   I	  attribute	  this	  outcome	  to	  the	  controversial	  nature	  of	  the	  subject	  matter.	  	  If	  conducted	  in	  the	  open,	  LSI	  would	  likely	  backfire.	  	  Thus,	  leaders	  still	  seek	  to	  meddle	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abroad,	  but	  they	  do	  so	  in	  a	  manner	  designed	  to	  minimize	  the	  risks	  of	  exposure	  from	  leaks.	   	  They	  tend	  to	  avoid	  normal	  decision	  channels,	  operating	  on	  a	  strict	  need-­‐to-­‐know	   basis	   and	   issuing	   verbal	   orders	   instead	   of	   written	   directives	   whenever	  possible.	  	   This	   decision-­‐making	   environment	   inherently	   privileges	   discretionary	  control	  of	  foreign	  policy	  behavior	  by	  top	  leaders	  in	  the	  sender	  state.	  	  Because	  formal	  channels	  are	  off	  limits,	  bureaucrats	  cannot	  build	  winning	  coalitions	  to	  advocate	  for	  their	  policy	  preferences,	  and	  they	  are	  usually	  unable	  to	  block	  such	  efforts	  because	  presidents	   simply	   leave	   working-­‐level	   officials	   in	   the	   dark	   about	   their	   true	  intentions.	  	  Occasionally	  bureaucrats	  will	  conduct	  leadership	  selection	  intervention	  without	  proper	  authorization	  from	  above,	  but	  such	  freelancing	  turns	  out	  to	  be	  rare	  and	  usually	  requires	  the	  president	  to	  be	  unusually	  detached	  from	  issue	  oversight.	  	  Under	  such	  restrictive	  decision-­‐making	  conditions,	  the	  only	  way	  officials	  can	  approve	   this	   sort	   of	   policy	   is	   if	   they	   are	   senior	   enough	   to	   dispense	   with	   formal	  procedure,	  typically	  limiting	  the	  pool	  to	  the	  president	  and	  national	  security	  advisor	  or	  secretary	  of	  state.	  	  And,	  because	  these	  individuals	  typically	  must	  not	  only	  approve	  but	  also	  initiate	  the	  effort,	  they	  thrust	  themselves	  into	  these	  situations	  on	  the	  basis	  of	   high	   resolve.	   	   This	  makes	   it	   quite	   difficult	   for	   Congress	   to	   block	   the	   president	  when	  he	  does	   seek	   to	  pursue	  LSI	   abroad.	   	  Members	  of	  Congress	   rarely	  notice	   the	  president’s	   smaller	   scale	   efforts	   to	  meddle	   overseas,	   and	   they	   are	   often	   deterred	  from	  fighting	  the	  executive	  branch	  over	  more	  drastic	  interventions	  because	  he	  can	  signal	  to	  them	  his	  determination	  and	  willingness	  to	  pursue	  such	  a	  fight.	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Finally,	   because	   presidents	   are	   encouraged	   to	   be	   so	   privative	   about	   their	  decisions	  to	  pursue	  LSI,	  they	  are	  unusually	  dependent	  upon	  their	  own	  foreign	  policy	  instincts	   and	   judgment.	   	   As	   a	   result,	   variation	   in	   LSI	   occurrence	   turns	   out	   to	   be	  somewhat	   independent	   of	   objective	   international	   circumstances	   during	   periods	  when	   practitioners	   misperceive	   the	   policy-­‐making	   environment	   or	   harbor	   strong	  feelings	  about	  their	  personal	  counterparts	  abroad.	  	  Subsequently,	  the	  efficacy	  of	  LSI	  attempts	   also	   turns	   somewhat	   on	   the	   subjective	   perceptions	   by	   these	   leaders,	  depending	  upon	  whether	  or	  not	   they	   correctly	  understand	  political	   dynamics	   and	  desires	  within	  the	  arena	  of	  the	  target	  state.	  	  
F.	  Evidence	  for	  Findings:	  	   The	  case	  histories	  in	  this	  project	  provide	  a	  broad	  swath	  of	  evidence	  about	  the	  four	  theories	  under	  consideration.	  	  I	  find	  that,	  among	  this	  data,	  the	  most	  persuasive	  evidence	   in	   favor	  of	   leadership	   theory	  at	   the	  expense	  of	   the	   three	  structure-­‐based	  explanations	   for	   foreign	   policy	   behavior	   under	   consideration	   tends	   to	   involve	  episodes	   in	  which	  the	   theories	  offer	  mutually	  exclusive	  predictions,	  allowing	  us	   to	  parse	   between	   them	  with	   the	   data.	   	   However,	   in	   addition	   to	   this	   “three-­‐cornered	  test,”	   assessing	   leadership	   theory	   against	   prominent	   rival	   explanations,	   it	   is	   also	  important	  to	  do	  a	  “two-­‐cornered	  test,”	  comparing	  leadership	  theory	  against	  the	  null	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  it	  does	  a	  relatively	  sound	  job	  on	  its	  own	  of	  explaining	  the	  cases,	  regardless	  of	  other	  prominent	  theories	  of	  causation.	  	   The	   evidence	   in	   this	   regard	   is	   quite	   remarkable.	   	   Time	   and	   time	   again,	   a	  recurring	   theme	   throughout	   all	   of	   the	   cases	   seems	   to	   be	   the	   importance	   of	   top	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leaders	  in	  the	  sender	  state	  (in	  this	  study,	  usually	  the	  United	  States)	  for	  determining	  the	   dynamics	   of	   LSI	   behavior.	   	   In	   both	   cases	   and	   non-­‐cases,	   the	   reason	   for	  occurrence	  or	  non-­‐occurrence	  of	  LSI	  can	  usually	  be	  traced	  back	  to	  the	  characteristic	  actions	   of	   either	   the	   president	   or	   one	   of	   his	   most	   trusted	   aides.	   	   And,	   although	  efficacy	   is	   subject	   to	   less	   degrees	   of	   freedom	   than	   efficacy	   (as	   is	   explained	   in	  my	  theory	   chapter),	   the	   success	  or	   failure	  of	   attempts	  at	  LSI	   also	   seems	   to	  be	  heavily	  impacted	   by	   leadership-­‐related	   variables,	   especially	   how	   well	   American	   officials	  seemed	  to	  understand	  the	  actual	  dynamics	  of	  competitive	  politics	  in	  the	  target	  state.	  	  Some	   of	   the	   most	   important	   dynamics	   for	   determining	   variation	   in	   both	   LSI	  occurrence	   and	   efficacy	   across	   the	   episodes	   seem	   to	   be:	   presidential	   passions,	  personal	   assessments	   about	   their	   foreign	   counterparts,	   personal	   distractions	   they	  may	  fact,	  their	  style	  of	  management,	  and	  even	  their	  specific	  beliefs	  about	  impending	  leadership	  contests	  abroad.	  	   Further,	   the	   theory	   stands	   up	   to	   a	   three-­‐cornered	   test	   against	   the	   rival	  explanations	  as	  well,	  which	  tend	  to	  emphasize	  domestic	  or	  international	  structural	  forces	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   personal	   agency.	   	   In	   order	   to	   give	   all	   four	   theories	   a	   fair	  hearing,	   I	   consider	   each	   theory	   in	   each	   episode	   along	   a	   range	   of	   seven	   different	  observable	   implications	   in	  order	   to	  be	  meticulous	  and	   rigorous	  about	   considering	  explanations	  other	  than	  the	  agency	  of	  top	  leaders	  in	  the	  sender	  state.	  	  Consistently,	  however,	  the	  leadership-­‐based	  explanation	  comes	  out	  ahead.	  	   Further,	  a	  number	  of	  episodes	  offer	  particularly	  stark	  grist	  for	  falsification	  of	  the	   rival	   theories.	   	   For	   example,	   if	   national	   interests	   theory	  were	   true	   –	   that	   is,	   if	  states	   made	   policy	   in	   the	   realm	   of	   LSI	   solely	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   unitary,	   rational,	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objective	   national	   interests	   –	   then	   we	   should	   expect	   to	   see	   states	   in	   similar	  circumstances	  behaving	  similarly.	  	  However,	  American	  policy	  toward	  Israel	  in	  1987	  and	  1990	  provide	  an	  excellent	  thought	  experiment	  in	  this	  regard.	  	  In	  both	  instances,	  Washington	   faced	   similar	   circumstances	   in	   Israeli	   politics,	   and	   yet	   it	   pursued	  divergent	   policies	   for	   reasons	  having	   to	   do	  with	   the	   subjective	   perceptions	   of	   the	  president	  and	  secretary	  of	  state	  at	  the	  time.	  	  	  In	   both	   instances,	   the	   United	   States	   faced	   with	   an	   Israeli	   national	   unity	  government	  incorporating	  both	  the	  Labor	  Party	  and	  the	  Likud	  Party,	  in	  which	  Labor	  endorsed	  a	  peace	  plan	  that	  had	  elicited	  surprising	  Arab	  support	  but	  was	  opposed	  by	  the	  Likud.	   	  Yet	   in	  1987,	  Ronald	  Reagan	  and	  George	  Shultz	  declined	   to	  pursue	  LSI,	  rejecting	  requests	   for	   them	  to	  do	  so	   through	  endorsing	   the	  London	  Accords,	   since	  they	  were	  not	  eager	  to	  get	  drawn	  into	  an	  intramural	  Israeli	  fight	  over	  the	  plan.	  	  Yet	  in	   1990,	   George	   H.	  W.	   Bush	   and	   James	   Baker	   pushed	   for	   the	   adoption	   of	   the	   so-­‐called	  Shamir	  Plan	  even	  after	  Yitzhak	  Shamir	  had	  abandoned	  the	  plan.	   	  They	  knew	  that	  to	  do	  so	  would	  risk	  the	  end	  of	  Israel’s	  national	  unity	  government,	  and	  that	  the	  NUG	  might	  be	  replaced	  by	  a	  coalition	  led	  by	  Labor	  or	  by	  one	  led	  by	  the	  Likud.	  	  These	  were	  highly	  equivalent	  opportunities	  with	  divergent	   responses,	  and	   I	  argue	   in	   the	  case	   histories	   that	   the	   reasons	   for	   the	   difference	   come	   down	   to	   staffing	   on	   the	  American	  side.	  The	  cases	  examined	   in	   this	  dissertation	  provide	  a	   critical	   test	  of	   the	   lobby-­‐legislative	  approach,	  which	  envisions	  U.S.	  policy	  as	  the	  result	  of	  dictation	  by	  lobbies	  and	  other	  public	  interest	  groups,	  usually	  through	  their	  supporters	  in	  Congress.	  	  This	  is	   because	   the	   U.S.-­‐Israel	   and	   U.S.-­‐Palestine	   relationships	   are	   instances	   in	   which	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lobby	  groups	  are	  seen	  as	  being	  especially	  influential.	  	  If	  the	  theory	  is	  indeed	  true,	  it	  should	   perform	   particularly	   well	   in	   these	   cases.	   	   If,	   however,	   the	   theory	   cannot	  perform	   even	   on	   its	   home	   territory,	   that	   should	   provide	   considerable	   reason	   for	  skepticism	  about	  the	  theory’s	  explanatory	  power,	  at	  least	  as	  a	  model	  for	  behavior	  in	  the	  specific	  area	  of	  leadership	  selection	  intervention.11	  	  If	   the	   lobby-­‐legislative	  perspective	  were	   true,	  we	  should	  expect	   to	  see	  very	  little	   LSI	   toward	   Israel.	   	   This	   is	   because	   pro-­‐Israel	   lobby	   has	   rather	   consistently	  opposed	   American	   intervention	   in	   either	   Israeli	   or	   Palestinian	   politics,	   believing	  that	  such	  behavior	  is	  bad	  for	  American	  interests	  and	  for	  Israeli	  interests.	  	  Yet	  I	  find	  a	  very	   high	   level	   of	   such	   behavior	   by	   the	   United	   States	   government	   over	   recent	  decades.	   	   Under	   this	   theory	   one	   should	   also	   expect	   to	   see	   some	  other	   patterns	   of	  behavior	   that	   are	   not	   borne	   out	   by	   the	   cases,	   including:	   LSI	   attempts	   being	  significantly	   degraded	   by	   opposition	   from	   Congress,	   LSI	   attempts	   being	  concentrated	   in	  periods	  of	  united	  U.S.	   government,	   and	  LSI	  being	  near-­‐impossible	  during	  the	  lead-­‐up	  to	  elections	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  	  For	  instance,	  both	  Bush	  41	  and	  Bill	   Clinton	   pursued	   especially	   dramatic	   episodes	   of	   leadership	   selection	  intervention	  during	  years	  in	  which	  they	  were	  up	  for	  reelection.	  	  	   Lastly,	  this	  project	  also	  rejects	  the	  bureaucratic	  politics	  approach	  as	  a	  model	  for	  explaining	  LSI	  behavior.	  	  The	  main	  elements	  of	  the	  bureaucracy	  which	  deal	  with	  Israeli	   and	   Palestinian	   politics	   –	   the	   Bureau	   of	   Near	   Eastern	   Affairs	   at	   the	  Department	  of	  State	  –	  tend	  to	  prefer	  frequent	  LSI	  on	  behalf	  of	  perceived	  pro-­‐peace	  moderates.	  	  And,	  although	  LSI	  is	  much	  more	  common	  than	  one	  would	  expect	  under	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Indeed, I do not seek to argue in this volume that foreign policy lobbies are inconsequential overall – 
rather that they are unimportant in the particular dimension of LSI. 
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the	   lobby-­‐legislative	   approach,	   neither	   is	   it	   regular	   enough	   to	   fit	   the	   bureaucratic	  approach	  (and,	  indeed,	  closer	  inspection	  of	  the	  case	  studies	  bears	  out	  the	  thesis	  that	  this	   variation	   is	   due	   to	   factors	   in	   the	   realm	   of	   sender	   state	   leadership,	   not	   some	  combination	  of	  these	  other,	  structural	  factors).	  	   In	   fact,	   not	   only	   does	   the	   U.S.	   government	   engage	   in	   LSI	  more	   rarely	   than	  working-­‐level	  bureaucrats	  might	  prefer,	  but	   sometimes	   it	   intervenes	   in	   the	  wrong	  direction	  relative	  to	  theory’s	  expectations.	  	  For	  example,	  this	  often	  takes	  the	  form	  of	  coming	  down	  in	  support	  of	  Likud	  politicians	  in	  Israel	  instead	  of	  candidates	  from	  the	  Labor	   or	   Kadima	   Parties	   instead.	   	   In	   1983,	   the	   Reagan	   administration	   tried	   to	  bolster	  Likud	  politican	  Misha	  Arens	  as	  a	  successor	  to	  Menachem	  Begin	  because	  he	  seemed	  more	  moderate	   than	   possible	   alternatives;	   George	  W.	   Bush	   took	   steps	   in	  advance	  of	  the	  2003	  Israeli	  elections	  that	  were	  designed	  to	  help	  then-­‐Likud	  leader	  Ariel	  Sharon	  win	  reelection.	  Not	  only	  did	  such	  interventions	  clash	  with	  the	  preferences	  of	  working-­‐level	  bureaucrats	  in	  the	  U.S.	  government,	  but	  they	  employed	  techniques	  for	  achieving	  LSI	  that	  were	   also	   unpopular	  with	   the	   bureaucracy.	   	   Bush’s	   support	   for	   Sharon	   came	  mainly	  in	  the	  form	  of	  agreeing	  to	  delay	  release	  of	  the	  Road	  Map	  peace	  plan,	  a	  step	  that	   outraged	   lower-­‐level	   U.S.	   officials.	   	   In	   1983,	   the	   steps	   used	   to	   bolster	   Arens	  involved	   approval	   of	   U.S.	   support	   for	   Israel’s	   Lavi	   fighter	   jet	   project,	   which	   was	  opposed	   by	  working	   level	   technocrats	   at	   the	   Defense	   Department	   (as	  well	   as	   the	  Defense	  Secretary,	  who	  was	  overruled	  by	  Reagan)	   for	  being	   too	  costly	  and	  not	  an	  effective	   weapons	   platform.	   	   The	   jet	   project	   was	   cancelled	   four	   years	   later	   for	  exactly	   that	  reason.	   	  Again,	   in	  1996,	  Bill	  Clinton	  sought	   to	  bolster	   Israeli	  politician	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Shimon	  Peres	  by	  approving	  the	  Nautilus	  laser	  weapon	  system	  as	  a	  possible	  avenue	  for	  defending	  Israel	  from	  missiles;	  again,	  the	  aid	  was	  one	  of	  numerous	  steps	  taken	  by	  the	  Clinton	  administration	  that	  were	  intended	  to	  bolster	  Peres	  in	  advance	  of	  an	  Israeli	  vote.	  	  Yet	  the	  idea	  had	  long	  been	  opposed	  by	  working-­‐level	  Pentagon	  officials	  for	  being	  ineffective	  on	  the	  testing	  field	  and	  for	  being	  far	  too	  costly.	  	  Years	  later,	  U.S.-­‐Israel	   cooperation	   to	   develop	   the	   Nautilus	   was	   cancelled	   for	   exactly	   the	   same	  reasons.	  In	   short,	   this	   evidence	   should	   make	   observers	   highly	   skeptical	   about	  bureaucratic	  models	   of	   LSI	   behavior,	   along	  with	   the	   other	   two	   structural	   models	  tested	   by	   this	   dissertation:	   national	   interests	   theory	   and	   the	   lobby-­‐legislative	  politics	   approach.	   	   Leadership	   theory	   provides	   a	   far	   more	   persuasive	   model	   of	  American	  behavior	  for	  explaining	  variation	  in	  both	  LSI	  occurrence	  and	  LSI	  efficacy	  across	  cases.	  	  
G.	  Plan	  for	  the	  Dissertation:	  	   The	   remainder	  of	   this	  dissertation	  proceeds	   as	   follows:	  my	   theory	   chapter,	  Israel	  cases,	  Palestine	  cases,	  an	  Iran	  shadow	  case,	  and	  conclusions.	   	   In	  Chapter	  2,	  I	  present	   competing	   theories	   about	   how	   LSI	   works	   and	   provide	   a	   framework	   for	  testing	   them	  against	  each	  other.	   	   I	   further	   justify	  my	  choice	  of	   research	  questions,	  articulate	   the	   four	   theories	   tested	   by	   this	   dissertation,	   and	   enumerate	   a	   list	   of	  specific	   observable	   implications	   that	  we	   should	   expect	   to	   see	  under	   each	  of	   those	  four	   theories.	   	   In	   the	   case	   studies	   that	   follow,	   I	   reprise	   this	   list	   of	   observable	  implications,	   methodically	   assessing	   how	   the	   theories	   stack	   up	   in	   each	   Israeli	   or	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Palestinian	   episode	   according	   to	   each	   category	   observable	   implication.	   	   It	   is	  painstaking	  work	   but	   helps	   ensure	   that	   all	   four	   theories	   get	   a	   fair	   and	   consistent	  hearing	  throughout.	  	   In	   Chapters	   3	   through	   7	   I	   set	   out	   to	   document	   the	   history	   of	   American	  intervention	   in	   Israeli	   politics	   from	   1977	   through	   2009.	   	   I	   give	   each	   presidential	  administration	  since	  Jimmy	  Carter	  a	  full	  chapter’s	  worth	  of	  analysis,	  and	  I	  document	  concurrent	   instances	   of	   intervention	   in	   Israeli	   politics	   by	   other	   governments	  (usually	  Egypt,	  Jordan,	  the	  PA,	  Britain,	  and	  France)	  as	  they	  come	  up	  in	  order	  to	  aid	  in	  boosting	  analytical	  leverage.	  	   I	   then	   proceed	   to	   the	   Palestine	   dyad	   in	   Chapters	   8	   through	   10	   in	   order	   to	  explore	   how	   observations	   from	   the	   Israel	   dyad	   stack	   up	   in	   a	   different	   contextual	  setting.	   	  Chapter	  8	  considers	  the	  era	  before	  the	  Oslo	  Accords,	  comparing	  efforts	  by	  George	  Shultz	  and	  James	  Baker	  to	  marginalize	  the	  Palestine	  Liberation	  Organization.	  	  Chapter	  9	  examines	  the	  heyday	  of	  the	  Oslo	  era	  and	  Bill	  Clinton’s	  efforts	  to	  embrace	  the	   PLO	   leadership	   atop	   the	   newly	   established	   Palestinian	   Authority	   government.	  	  Then,	  Chapter	  10	  considers	  George	  W.	  Bush’s	  efforts	   to	   fill	   the	  void	   in	  Palestinian	  politics	  after	  Oslo’s	  demise	  by	  picking	  and	  choosing	  the	  Palestinian	  leadership.	  	   The	  last	  empirical	  section	  of	  this	  dissertation	  is	  Chapter	  11.	  	  In	  it,	  I	  provide	  a	  brief	   longitudinal	   shadow	   case	   that	   musters	   existing	   published	   materials	   for	   to	  outline	  past	  U.S.	  efforts	  to	   intervene	  in	  the	  domestic	  politics	  of	  Iran.	   	  This	   includes	  both	  before	   and	   after	   the	   fall	   of	   the	   Shah.	   	   Since	   the	  purpose	  of	   this	   chapter	   is	   to	  probe	  external	  validity	  rather	  than	  to	  generate	  theory	  from	  scratch,	  my	  coverage	  of	  the	  data	  in	  these	  episodes	  is	  much	  shorter	  and	  more	  stylized.	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   Finally,	  I	  wrap	  up	  by	  offering	  some	  brief	  conclusions	  in	  Chapter	  12.	  	  I	  review	  the	  dissertation’s	  main	  arguments	  as	  well	  as	  commonalities	  and	  differences	  across	  the	  three	  dyads.	  	  I	  then	  finish	  by	  offering	  some	  lessons	  for	  both	  theory	  and	  policy.	  
	  	   34	  
	  
	   35	  
Chapter	  II.	  
~	  
The	  Theory	  	   	  	   Why	   does	   the	   United	   States	   government	   play	   favorites	   in	   another	   nation’s	  internal	  politics	  during	  some	  episodes	  but	  not	  others,	  seeking	  to	  enhance	  the	  power	  of	   one	   actor	   or	   faction	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   others?	   	   Why	   does	   the	   U.S.	   succeed	   at	  certain	  efforts	  yet	  fail	  at	  others?	  	  The	  core	  of	  this	  dissertation	  seeks	  to	  answer	  such	  questions	  by	  assembling	  a	  history	  of	  U.S.	  efforts	  to	  promote	  the	  Middle	  East	  peace	  process	  by	  meddling	  in	  the	  internal	  politics	  of	  Israel	  and	  the	  internal	  politics	  of	  the	  Palestinian	   Authority.	   	   It	   therefore	   serves	   two	   complementary	   objectives:	  documenting	  an	  important	  chapter	  of	  American	  diplomatic	  history	  and	  mapping	  out	  the	   dynamics	   of	   a	   behavior	   in	   international	   relations	   that	   is	   empirically	  commonplace	  but	  analytically	  neglected.	  This	   study	   reaches	   the	   surprising	   finding	   that	   the	   agency	   of	   individual	   top	  leaders	  in	  the	  sender	  state	  is	  critical	  for	  explaining	  outcomes	  in	  this	  particular	  issue	  area.	  	  Because	  picking	  favorites	  is	  a	  taboo	  subject,	  officials	  avoid	  the	  potential	  costs	  of	   exposure	   by	   using	   elaborate	   pretenses	   to	   mask	   their	   true	   intentions	   and	   by	  developing	  an	  aversion	  to	  formal,	  written	  process	  to	  diminish	  the	  chances	  of	  leaks.	  	  This	   tendency	   has	   the	   peculiar	   side	   effect	   of	   boosting	   the	   leeway	   of	   top	   political	  leaders	   to	   pursue	   unpopular	   or	   even	   misguided	   foreign	   policies	   while	   mitigating	  major	   structural	   forces	   such	   as	   bureaucratic	   politics,	   pressure	   from	  Congress	   and	  lobbyists,	  or	  objective	  international	  interests.	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Background	  &	  Overview:	  In	   the	   previous	   chapter,	   I	   reviewed	   the	   literature	   on	   meddling	   in	  international	  relations.	  	  I	  defined	  leadership	  selection	  intervention	  (LSI)	  as	  a	  distinct	  type	   of	  meddling	   by	  which	   by	   one	   government	   attempts	   to	   bolster	   or	   change	   the	  character	  of	  another	  polity’s	  ruling	  coalition	  using	  methods	  short	  of	  force.	  	  Further,	  I	  demonstrated	  that	  LSI	  has	  been	  understudied	  relative	  to	  the	  burgeoning	  literatures	  on	   other	   kinds	   of	   interference	   in	   foreign	   affairs,	   such	   as	   military	   intervention,	  support	  for	  coups,	  or	  state-­‐to-­‐state	  coercion.	   	  Although	  LSI	  is	  a	  commonplace	  form	  of	   behavior	   in	   contemporary	   international	   relations,	   we	   have	   little	   systematic	  knowledge	  about	  it.	  	   In	   this	   chapter,	   I	   present	   competing	   theories	   about	   how	   LSI	   works	   and	  provide	  a	  framework	  for	  testing	  them	  against	  each	  other.	  	  In	  the	  first	  section	  below,	  I	  lay	  out	  two	  overarching	  research	  questions,	  each	  addressing	  puzzling	  variation	  in	  a	  different	  aspect	  of	  how	  LSI	  operates:	  occurrence	  and	  efficacy.	   	  That	   is,	  why	  does	  LSI	   occur	   in	   some	   instances	   but	   not	   others,	   especially	   within	   a	   specific	   bilateral	  relationship?	  	  And	  why	  does	  LSI	  succeed	  in	  some	  of	  those	  instances	  but	  not	  others?	  Second,	  I	  present	  some	  competing	  theories	  that	  might	  answer	  these	  research	  questions.	   	   The	   four	   theories	   include:	   national	   interests,	   lobby-­‐legislative	   politics,	  bureaucratic	  politics,	  and	  leadership	  theory.	  	  In	  this	  project,	  I	  argue	  that	  leadership	  theory,	   which	   emphasizes	   individual	   agency,	   offers	   a	   more	   persuasive	   answer	   to	  these	   research	   questions	   than	   the	   three	   structural	   theories	   (international	   or	  domestic)	  against	  which	  it	  shall	  be	  tested.	  Third,	   I	   enumerate	  a	   list	  of	   specific	  observable	   implications	   that	  we	  should	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expect	   to	   see	   under	   each	   one	   of	   the	   theories.	   	   By	   explicitly	   drawing	   out	   how	  expectations	  vary	  across	  theories,	  I	  provide	  tangible	  guidelines	  as	  to	  which	  kinds	  of	  evidence	  should	  lead	  us	  to	  reject	  the	  structure-­‐based	  approaches	  in	  favor	  of	  agency.	  Fourth,	   I	   explain	  why	  LSI	   is	   an	   issue	   area	   in	  which	   agency	   is	   so	   salient	   for	  explaining	   behavior.	   	   I	   argue	   that	   this	   is	   due	   to	   a	   phenomenon	   I	   call	   “the	   paper	  paradox”,	  by	  which	  officials	  balance	  their	  desire	  to	  meddle	  and	  the	  risks	  of	  doing	  so	  by	  avoiding	   the	   formal	  and	  written	  channels	   through	  which	  government	  decision-­‐making	  normally	  takes	  place.	  	  When	  the	  deliberative	  process	  is	  driven	  underground,	  it	   reduces	   the	   automaticity	   with	   which	   structural	   pressures	   tend	   to	   be	   imposed	  upon	  policy.	  	  Instead,	  it	  falls	  to	  top	  leaders	  to	  determine	  whether	  and	  how	  a	  sender	  state	   engages	   in	   LSI.	   	   This	   phenomenon	   applies	   to	   both	   LSI	   occurrence	   and	   LSI	  efficacy,	  although	  for	  certain	  reasons	  it	  has	  more	  effect	  on	  the	  former	  than	  the	  latter.	  Fifth,	   I	  describe	  my	  criteria	  for	  case	  selection.	   	   I	  explain	  why	  even	  a	   limited	  number	  of	   case	   studies	   can	  provide	  valid,	   generalizable	  knowledge	  when	   selected	  using	   the	   appropriate	   logic.	   	   I	   lay	   out	   my	   general	   logic	   for	   case	   selection	   and	  demonstrate	  why	  the	  specific	  cases	  I	  study	  fulfill	  these	  standards.	  	  Inter	  alia,	  my	  case	  selection	  methods	  are	  designed	  to	  minimize	  selection	  bias;	  minimize	  erroneous	  case	  codings	   (both	   false	   negatives	   and	   false	   positives);	   provide	   a	   critical,	   easy	   test	   for	  lobby-­‐legislative	   theory	   (which	   it	   fails);	   and	   to	   maximize	   historiographic	  contributions.	  	  I	  also	  seek	  to	  assess	  external	  validity	  by	  applying	  the	  theory	  to	  cases	  beyond	   U.S.-­‐Israel	   relations.	   	   These	   cases	   include:	   incidental	   discussion	   of	  intervention	  in	  Israeli	  politics	  by	  Arab	  or	  European	  states	  in	  Chapters	  3	  through	  7,	  a	  parallel	  study	  of	  American	  intervention	  in	  Palestinian	  politics	  in	  Chapters	  8	  through	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10,	   and	   a	   shadow	   case	   exploring	   U.S.	   intervention	   in	   Iranian	   politics	   since	  World	  War	  II	  in	  Chapter	  11.	  Sixth,	  I	  touch	  on	  issues	  of	  coding	  and	  measurement.	   	  Before	  assembling	  and	  evaluating	   empirical	   evidence	   in	   the	   chapters	   that	   will	   follow,	   I	   therefore	   aim	   to	  specify	   some	   objective	   standards	   for	  weighing	   historical	   evidence	   in	   theoretically	  salient	   terms.	   	   I	   also	   conclude	  with	  a	  dissertation	   road	  map	   to	  provide	   the	   reader	  with	  a	  clearer	  sense	  of	  what	  follows	  in	  subsequent	  chapters.	  	  
SECTION	  1:	  The	  Research	  Questions	  
Since	   existing	   knowledge	   about	   LSI	   is	   so	   rudimentary,	   I	   seek	   to	   address	  research	  questions	   that	   are	   fundamental,	   consequential,	   and	  broadly	  applicable	   in	  nature.	   	   Thus,	   I	   focus	  on	   explaining	   variation	   in	   two	   specific	   dependent	   variables:	  occurrence	  and	  efficacy.	   	  Below,	   I	  explain	  why	   I	  choose	   to	   focus	  on	   these	   two	  DVs	  and	  provide	  illustrative	  examples	  to	  highlight	  puzzling	  variation	  in	  both	  categories.	  Of	  course,	  these	  are	  not	  the	  only	  research	  questions	  worth	  asking	  about	  LSI.	  	  Other	   unexplored	   topics	   include:	   what	   explains	   the	   sender’s	   choice	   of	   particular	  intervention	   techniques	   over	   others?	   	   Do	   different	   tools	   entail	   different	   causal	  mechanisms	  and	  different	  rates	  of	  efficacy?	  	  What	  explains	  the	  sender’s	  choice	  of	  LSI	  over	  more	  forceful	  forms	  of	  intervention?	  	  When	  and	  why	  do	  sender	  states	  choose	  hybrid	   strategies	   that	   combine	  or	   switch	  between	   these	   two	   types?	   	  Further,	  who	  sends	  LSI?	  	  Only	  superpowers?	  	  Only	  democracies?	  However,	   for	  purposes	  of	   rigor	   and	   concentration,	   this	  project	   leaves	  aside	  direct	  consideration	  of	  those	  questions	  for	  future	  projects.	  	  Instead,	  it	  focuses	  upon	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the	   two	  DVs	   that	   I	   believe	   provide	   the	   soundest	   foundation	   for	   policy	   knowledge	  and	  further	  research	  on	  the	  topic:	  occurrence	  and	  efficacy.	  This	  study	  does	  bear	  on	  a	  few	  other	  topics	  in	  passing	  but	  does	  not	  focus	  on	  them	  extensively.	  	  For	  instance,	  one	  could	  ask	  how	  often	  LSI	  occurs,	  along	  with	  how	  often	   LSI	   succeeds.	   	   Based	   on	   the	   cases	   covered	   by	   this	   dissertation,	   my	   rough	  answer	   to	   each	   these	   questions	   is	   “sometimes”.	   	   Sometimes	   LSI	   occurs	   during	  potentially	  enticing	  circumstances	  for	  meddling	  abroad,	  and	  sometimes	  it	  does	  not.	  	  Sometimes	   LSI	   succeeds	   at	   achieving	   its	   practitioners’	   intended	   objectives,	   and	  sometimes	  it	  does	  not.	  	  As	  vague	  as	  that	  may	  sound,	  it	  does	  provide	  limited	  support	  for	  some	  theories	  over	  others.	  	  For	  instance,	  some	  perspectives	  might	  envision	  very	  successful	  or	  near-­‐constant	  LSI	  on	  these	  dyads	  (such	  as	  models	  of	  state	  clientelism,	  
dependencia	   theory,	   and	   bureaucratic	   politics),	   while	   others	   might	   expect	   LSI	  occurrence	   or	   efficacy	   to	   be	   quite	   rare	   (such	   as	   the	   lobby-­‐legislative	   perspective	  described	  below).	  One	  thing	  I	  do	  not	  seek	  to	  achieve	  in	  this	  study	  is	  to	  build	  a	  grand	  theory	  for	  explaining	   which	   tools	   of	   LSI	   potential	   sender	   states	   adopt	   when	   and	   why.	  	  However,	  the	  range	  of	  tools	  observed	  in	  this	  study	  are	  quite	  extensive.	  	  For	  example,	  LSI	  can	  take	  place	  through	  public	  statements	  of	  praise	  or	  criticism,	  private	  electoral	  advice,	   selectively	   targeted	   treaties	   or	   aid	   as	   well	   as	   pointed	   denials	   of	   such	  measures	  to	  name	  a	  few.	  	  A	  notional	  taxonomy	  of	  common	  tools	  for	  LSI	  versus	  tools	  for	   “harder”	   intervention	   involving	   physical	   force	   is	   provided	   below	   in	   Table	   II.
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Dependent	  Variable	  #1:	  Occurrence	  What	   explains	   variation	   in	   LSI	   occurrence	   –	   that	   is,	  why	   does	   LSI	   occur	   in	  some	  instances	  but	  not	  others?	  	  To	  be	  fair,	  not	  everybody	  presumes	  that	  this	  is	  the	  case.	   	   For	   instance,	   scholars	   who	   focus	   on	   concepts	   such	   as	   dependencia,	   neo-­‐colonialism,	   and	   superpower	   control	   of	   client	   states	   tend	   to	   suggest	   great	   power	  intervention	  is	  a	  universal	  constant	  that	  is	  always	  taking	  place.1	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  if	  one	  were	  to	  judge	  only	  from	  neorealist	  IR	  theory	  or	  from	  the	  overt	  rhetoric	  of	  U.S.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Gavan McCormack, Client State: Japan in the American Embrace (Verso, 2007); Julia Sweig, Friendly 
Fire: Losing Friends and Making Enemies in the Anti-American Century (Public Affairs, 2006); Rashid 
Khalidi, Resurrecting Empire: Western Footprints and America’s Perilous Path in the Middle East 
(Beacon Press, 2005); Andre Gunder Frank, “The Development of Underdevelopment,” The Sustainable 
Urban Development Reader (2004).  For a more measured variant, see David Sylvan and Stephen Majeski, 
U.S. Foreign Policy in Perspective: Clients, Enemies and Empire (Psychology Press, 2009). 
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diplomats,	  it	  would	  seem	  that	  meddling	  might	  never	  take	  place.2	  However,	   these	  assumptions	  are	  erroneous:	   there	   is	  clear	  –	  and	  sometimes	  puzzling	   –	   variation	   in	   the	  occurrence	  of	   LSI.	   	   Throughout	   this	  project	   I	   point	   out	  numerous	   instances	   of	   LSI	   occurrence	   and	   non-­‐occurrence	   under	   comparable	  circumstances,	   including	   on	   the	   same	   two-­‐country	   directed	   dyads.	   	   For	   now,	  however,	  my	  hope	  is	  that	  a	  single	  illustrative	  example	  should	  suffice.	  Consider	  U.S.	  relations	  with	  Turkey	  in	  1973-­‐4	  when	  Turkey	  elected	  a	   leftist	  prime	  minister,	   Bülent	   Ecevit,	  who	   formed	   a	   government	   that	   advocated	   socialist	  economic	  controls	  at	  home	  and	  warmer	  relations	  with	  the	  USSR	  abroad.	  	  This	  is	  just	  the	  sort	  of	  event	  that	  one	  might	  expect	  to	  have	  elicited	  U.S.	  efforts	  to	  bring	  the	  new	  Turkish	  government	  down.	  	  However,	  this	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  have	  taken	  place.3	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	   in	  1996-­‐7	  American	  policy-­‐makers	  strove	   to	  undermine	  Turkey’s	  Islamist	  PM	  Necmettin	  Erbakan	  for	  doing	  the	  exact	  same	  thing:	  advocating	  worrisome	  but	   gradual	   domestic	   transformations	   and	   closer	   relations	  with	   sworn	  American	  enemies.	   	  Washington’s	  policy	  during	   this	  period	  sought	   to	  ensure	  close	  bilateral	   ties	   while	   preventing	   Erbakan	   from	   capitalizing	   on	   U.S.	   concessions,	   a	  policy	  that	  came	  to	  be	  known	  as	  “Turkey	  an	  ally,	  Erbakan	  no	  friend”.4	  Of	  course,	  this	  begs	  the	  question	  of	  why	  LSI	  occurred	  in	  one	  case	  but	  not	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Versions of realist theory that treat states as undifferentiated black boxes inherently assume that all 
matters of internal politics are either nonexistent or inconsequential for foreign policy behavior. See 
Kenneth Neal Waltz, Theory of International Politics (McGraw-Hill, 1979). For an apt discussion of the 
shortcomings of systemic theory with regard to internal politics of weak states, see John M. IV Owen, “The 
Foreign Imposition of Domestic Institutions,” International Organization 56, no. 2 (Spring 2002): 377–
378. 
3 Dankwart A. Rustow, Turkey, America’s Forgotten Ally (Council on Foreign Relations, 1987); Monteagle 
Stearns, Entangled Allies: U.S. Policy Toward Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus (Council on Foreign Relations, 
1992); US Department of State, “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXX, 
Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973–1976” (US Government Printing Office, 2007). 
4 Alan Makovsky, “How to Deal with Erbakan,” Middle East Quarterly (1997); Robert Satloff, “US Policy 
Toward Islamism: A Theoretical and Operational Overview,” Council on Foreign Relations (2000). 
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other,	   despite	   circumstances	   seeming	   to	   justify	   it	   in	   both	   instances.	   	  My	   tentative	  reading	   of	   the	   Turkish	   cases	   seems	   to	   support	   leadership	   theory,	   since	   a	   major	  factor	   mitigating	   U.S.	   threat	   perceptions	   about	   Ecevit	   was	   a	   personal	   connection	  between	  leaders	  that	  was	  lacking	  for	  Erbakan.	  	  Kissinger	  explains	  that	  “I	  had	  known	  Ecevit	  since	  1957,	  when	  he	  was	  a	  student	  at	  the	  Harvard	  International	  Seminar”	  and	  recalls	   that	  Ecevit’s	  political	  outlook	  had	  been	   “conventional	   left-­‐wing	  attitudes	  of	  mainstream	  European	  intellectuals	  taking	  their	   lead	  from	  Parisian	  literary	  circles”.	  	  In	   fact,	   Kissinger	   even	   comments	   that,	   “because	   [Ecevit’s]	   first	   passion	   had	   been	  poetry,	  I	  was	  hoping	  that	  he	  would	  prove	  more	  flexible	  and	  sensitive	  to	  nuance	  than	  the	  more	   traditional	  Turkish	   leaders	  who	  tended	  to	   favor	   trench	  warfare”.5	   	   I	  also	  note	  numerous	  instances	  in	  the	  course	  of	  the	  dissertation	  in	  which	  observers	  might	  have	  expected	  to	  see	  LSI	  yet	  intervention	  surprisingly	  did	  not	  occur.	  I	  find	  these	  instances	  of	  within-­‐dyad	  variation	  the	  most	  puzzling	  because	  so	  many	   country-­‐specific	   factors	   are	   already	  held	   constant.	   	   This	   sort	   of	   fine-­‐grained	  variation	   is	   also	   more	   policy-­‐relevant	   because	   it	   allows	   us	   to	   assess	   with	   some	  specificity	  whether	  LSI	  is	  likely	  to	  occur	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  bilateral	  relationship	  at	  a	  particular	  point	   in	   time,	  not	   just	  on	  average	   relative	   to	  other	  possible	  dyads.	   	  The	  question	  of	  “is	  LSI	  likely	  by	  State	  A	  toward	  State	  B	  in	  the	  near	  future?”	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  somewhat	   more	   informative	   than	   “are	   State	   A’s	   dealings	   with	   State	   B	   generally	  prone	   to	   LSI?”,	   since	   the	   latter	   question	   can	  probably	   be	   estimated	  by	   a	   tentative	  glance	  at	   the	  historical	   record.	   	   It	   is	   also	  more	  policy-­‐relevant,	   a	   key	  objective	   for	  studies	  that	  seek	  to	  produce	  applicable	  knowledge	  on	  real-­‐world	  problems.	  	  Thus,	  as	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Henry Kissinger, Years of Renewal (Simon and Schuster, 2000), 217. 
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I	  address	  this	  project’s	  first	  research	  question	  –	  that	  of	  occurrence	  –	  I	   look	  at	  both	  kinds	   of	   variation	   but	   place	   greater	   emphasis	   of	   explaining	   variation	   within	   the	  context	  of	  a	  given	  bilateral	  relationship.	  Further,	   although	   bidirectional	  meddling	   sometimes	   takes	   place	   (and	   is	   no	  doubt	  more	  common	  in	  the	  U.S.-­‐Israel	  relationship),	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  feasibility	  I	  avoid	  searching	   for	   it	   directly.	   	   I	   only	   address	   two-­‐way	   meddling	   in	   this	   project	   when	  reciprocality	  occurs	  and	  is	  pertinent	  for	  explaining	  behavior	  by	  the	  primary	  sender.	  
	  Dependent	  Variable	  #2:	  Efficacy	  In	  addition	  to	  studying	  occurrence,	  this	  project	  seeks	  to	  explain	  variation	  in	  the	   efficacy	   of	   LSI,	   why	   some	   efforts	   at	   LSI	   succeed	   whereas	   others	   fail.	   	   This	   is	  another	  dimension	  in	  which	  one	  can	  observe	  both	  variation	  and	  puzzling	  outcomes.	  	  For	  instance,	  America	  and	  its	  allies	  sought	  to	  facilitate	  the	  defeat	  of	  Slobodan	  Milosevic	  in	  the	  2000	  Serbian	  elections,	  and	  the	  prevailing	  wisdom	  seems	  to	  be	  that	  these	   efforts	   succeeded.	   	   By	   sanctioning	   the	   ruling	   clique	   and	   providing	   aid	   to	  political	  opposition	  groups,	  the	  international	  community	  helped	  skew	  Serbia’s	  vote	  toward	  Kostunica	  and	  away	  from	  Milosevic.6	  	  In	  addition	  to	  achieving	  success	  in	  the	  narrow	   sense	   of	   pushing	  out	  Milosevic,	   these	   efforts	   can	  be	   considered	   a	   broader	  policy	   success	   because	   they	   also	   helped	   advance	   democratization	   in	   Serbia	   and	  bring	  about	  a	  more	  peaceful	  environment	  in	  the	  Balkans.7	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Thomas Carothers, “Ousting Foreign Strongmen: Lessons from Serbia,” Policy Brief: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace 1, no. 5 (May 2001). Nor is this an isolated case. For a broader 
approach, see Nikolay Marinov, “Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders?,” American 
Journal of Political Science 49, no. 3 (July 2005): 564–576. 
7 As I describe below in more detail, I disaggregate efficacy into categories of “narrow” and “broad”. 
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However,	  subsequent	  efforts	  to	  isolate	  Serbian	  extremists	  have	  tended	  to	  fail.	  	  Despite	  U.S.	  insistence	  on	  boycotting	  hardline	  factions,	  such	  as	  the	  Socialist	  Party	  of	  Serbia	  and	  the	  Serbian	  Radical	  Party,	  these	  groups	  have	  not	  suffered	  as	  a	  result.	   	  If	  anything,	   their	   popularity	   increased	   since	   the	   policy	   of	   non-­‐engagement	   was	  implemented.	   	   The	   SPS	   has	   played	   the	   role	   of	   a	   kingmaker	   during	   coalition	  formation,	  and	  both	  parties	  continue	  to	  exert	  an	  influence	  on	  policy	  outcomes.8	  This	   begs	   the	   broader	   question	   of	   why	   some	   efforts	   at	   LSI	   succeed	   while	  others	  fail.	  	  For	  reasons	  I	  shall	  explain	  later,	  one	  of	  the	  reasons	  the	  Serbian	  episodes	  differ	   so	   much	   in	   their	   results	   has	   to	   do	   with	   the	   relative	   urgency	   of	   the	   policy	  endeavors.	   	   Leaders	   have	  much	   greater	   capacity	   and	  motivation	   to	   tip	   the	   scales	  during	  short-­‐term	  efforts	  (e.g.	  the	  lead-­‐up	  to	  elections	  in	  a	  target	  state)	  than	  during	  long-­‐term	  efforts	  to	  change	  the	  balance	  of	  political	  power	  in	  a	  foreign	  society.	  In	   sum,	   occurrence	   and	   efficacy	   comprise	   two	   types	   of	   variation	   that	   are	  crucial	   for	  understanding	  LSI.	   	   I	  place	  greater	  emphasis	  on	  explaining	   fine-­‐grained	  (within-­‐dyad)	  variation	  than	  differences	  across	  dyads,	  and	  I	   leave	  consideration	  of	  other	  possible	  research	  questions	  aside	  for	  another	  date.	  	  
SECTION	  2:	  The	  Theories	  
	   What	  sorts	  of	  theories	  allow	  us	  to	  make	  parsimonious	  predictions	  about	  the	  dynamics	   of	   LSI?	   	   This	   section	   offers	   four	   prominent	   theories	   of	   foreign	   policy	  behavior	  and	  tailors	  them	  to	  the	  subject	  matter.	  	  Three	  of	  them	  focus	  on	  the	  role	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Marlene Spoerri, “US Policy Towards Ultranationalist Political Parties in Serbia: The Policy of Non-
Engagement Examined,” CEU Political Science Journal 1 (2008): 25–48. 
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broad	   structural	   forces	   that	   tend	   to	   fall	   beyond	   the	   control	   of	   individual	   human	  beings:	  national	  interests	  theory,	  lobby-­‐legislative	  politics,	  and	  bureaucratic	  politics.	  	  Meanwhile,	  the	  fourth	  framework	  –	  leadership	  theory	  –	  	  places	  greater	  emphasis	  on	  the	  role	  of	  individual	  agency	  for	  explaining	  outcomes	  in	  international	  politics.	  	   I	   do	   not	   include	   an	   explicitly	   “constructivist”	   or	   “ideational”	   theory	   in	   this	  grouping	   for	   theory	   testing.	   	   Although	   models	   that	   emphasize	   normative	   causal	  factors	  comprise	  another	  prominent	  area	  of	  international	  relations	  theory,	  I	  do	  not	  believe	  that	  an	  explicit	  testing	  of	  this	  approach	  is	  necessary	  for	  this	  project.	  	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  ideational	  models	  emphasize	  factors	  that	  operate	  at	  the	  group	  level	  (i.e.	  those	  beliefs	  that	  are	  intersubjective),	  those	  beliefs	  are	  either	  too	  widely	  shared	  to	  explain	   intra-­‐dyadic	   variation	   over	   time	   or	   are	   subsumed	   in	   the	   two	   structural	  models	  already	  tested	  that	  emphasize	  the	  demands	  of	  specific	  institutional	  actors	  in	  the	  sender	  state’s	  domestic	  context.	  	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  ideational	  models	  emphasize	  individual-­‐level	  beliefs	  that	  are	  not	  widely	  shared,	  these	  factors	  are	  subsumed	  with	  success	  under	  the	  agency-­‐based	  leadership	  theory	  approach.	  I	  conclude	  in	  this	  study	  that	  leadership	  theory	  provides	  the	  most	  persuasive	  answer	   to	  my	   research	   questions.	   	   However,	   in	   order	   to	   conduct	   as	   fair	   a	   test	   as	  possible,	  I	  make	  sure	  to	  elaborate	  versions	  of	  the	  alternative	  theories	  that	  are	  well-­‐suited	  to	  within-­‐dyad	  variation	  in	  leadership	  selection	  intervention.	  	  Theory	  #1:	  National	  Interests	  Theory	  	   The	   first	   theory	   I	   consider	   here	   focuses	   on	   international	   structure.	   	   The	  preeminent	   school	   of	   thought	   in	   international	   relations	   is	   structural	   realism,	   also	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known	   as	   neorealism.	   	   It	   argues	   that	   states	   act	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   national	   interests,	  evaluating	   costs	   and	   benefits	   in	   a	   unitary,	   self-­‐interested	   manner.9	   	   However,	   I	  loosen	  some	  of	  the	  strict	  assumptions	  commonly	  employed	  by	  neorealists	  to	  ensure	  that	   the	   international	   structural	   approach	   is	   given	   as	   fair	   a	   test	   as	   possible.	  	  However,	   I	   also	   seek	   to	   avoid	  warping	   its	  meaning	   so	   far	   as	   to	   loose	   track	   of	   its	  original	  insight,	  a	  pitfall	  known	  as	  “conceptual	  stretching”.10	  	  First,	   neorealism	   tends	   to	   emphasize	   very	   slow-­‐moving	   factors	   such	   as	  polarity	  and	  the	  gross	  balance	  of	  power.11	  	  Instead,	  a	  more	  appropriate	  framework	  for	   evaluating	   fine-­‐grained	   variation	   in	   LSI	   would	   be	   to	   jettison	   this	   focus	   while	  retaining	  the	  rationalist	  roots	  of	  structural	  realism.12	  	  No	  doubt,	  slow-­‐moving	  factors	  such	  as	  polarity	   are	  worth	   considering,	   and	   I	  note	  opportunities	   to	   evaluate	   them	  when	  possible	  (such	  as	  comparing	  pre-­‐	  and	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  cases).	   	  But	  they	  would	  not	  provide	  a	  very	  informative	  basis	  for	  addressing	  variation	  within	  the	  dyads.	  	   Second,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   recognize	   that	   focusing	   on	   fine-­‐grained	   power	  balances	  would	  not	  provide	  a	  very	  useful	  alternative.	  	  In	  fact,	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  between	  target	  and	  sender	  states	  may	  be	  quite	  removed	  from	  the	  question	  of	  how	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Some notable examples of realist thinking include Thucydides, “Melian Dialogues,” in Essential 
Readings in World Politics, ed. Karen A. Mingst and Jack L. Snyder, trans. Suresht Bald (Norton, 2010), 
2–3; Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (A. A. Knopf, 1948); 
Morton A. Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics (Wiley, 1957); Waltz, Theory of 
International Politics; John A. Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics: From Classical Realism to 
Neotraditionalism (Cambridge University Press, 1998); John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power 
Politics (W. W. Norton & Company, 2001). 
10 Giovanni Sartori, “Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics,” The American Political Science 
Review 64, no. 4 (1970): 1033–1053; David Collier and James E. Jr. Mahon, “Conceptual ‘Stretching’ 
Revisited: Adapting Categories in Comparative Analysis,” The American Political Science Review 87, no. 
4 (1993): 845–855. 
11 See especially Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics; Waltz, Theory of International 
Politics; Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Cornell University Press, 1997). 
12 For the distinction between gross and fine-grained power balances, see Stephen Van Evera, Causes of 
War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (Cornell University Press, 1999), 7–11, 256. See also Marc 
Trachtenberg, “A ‘Wasting Asset’: American Strategy and the Shifting Nuclear Balance, 1949-1954,” 
International Security 13, no. 3 (1988): 5–49. 
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approach	  the	  domestic	  politics	  of	  others.	  	  Thus,	  I	  focus	  on	  interests	  instead	  of	  power	  balances	   and	   loosen	   the	   neorealist	   presumption	   that	   domestic	   politics	   should	   not	  matter.13	  Third,	  I	  choose	  to	  boil	  realism	  down	  to	  the	  logic	  of	  the	  objective	  and	  unitary	  national	   interest.	   	  One	  must	  ask	  how	  domestic	  cleavages	  in	  the	  target	  state	  impact	  the	   objective	   interests	   of	   a	   unitary	   sender	   state.	   	   Specifically,	   the	   theory	   should	  consider	  which	  political	  factions	  in	  the	  target	  state	  advocate	  policies	  that	  are	  most	  (or	   least)	   advantageous	   to	   the	   sender’s	   interests	   and	   whether	   there	   is	   an	  opportunity	  for	  the	  sender	  to	  support	  (or	  undermine)	  that	  faction.	  Thus,	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  project,	  Theory	  #1	  (national	  interests	  theory),	  claims	  the	  following:	  	   The	   main	   factor	   for	   explaining	   variation	   in	   the	  occurrence	   and	   efficacy	   of	   LSI	   will	   be	   the	   objective	  strategic	  interests	  of	  the	  unitary	  sender	  state.	  	  Thus,	  states	  should	  undertake	  LSI	  according	  to	  their	  objective,	  unitary	  international	  interests,	   and	   their	   success	   at	   doing	   so	   should	   be	   directly	   correlated	   with	   their	  stakes	   in	   the	  outcome.	   	   Institutional	  or	  personal	  biases	   in	   the	   sender	   state	   should	  not	  skew	  the	  timing	  or	  effectiveness	  of	  intervention.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 However, we should not stretch the theory too far by allowing domestic factors in the sender state to do 
most of the causal lifting.  Doing so would incorrectly attribute explanatory power to international structure 
as opposed to domestic features of the sender state, which are covered better by the theories below.  I do 
not consider more flexible versions of realism such as the neoclassical approach because I believe they 
would precipitate a test so weighted in favor of realism as to be uninformative.  Also, these variants of 
realism can explain almost any outcome and are extremely difficult to falsify as a result. For more on this 
fallacy, see Michael N. Barnett, “Identity and Alliances in the Middle East,” in The Culture of National 
Security, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (Columbia University Press, 1996), 400–450; Jeffrey Legro and Andrew 
Moravcsik, “Is Anybody Still a Realist?,” International Security 24, no. 2 (1999): 5–55. 
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Theory	  #2:	  Lobby-­‐Legislative	  Politics	  	  	   Whereas	   realism	   emphasizes	   the	   pressures	   exerted	   on	   states	   by	  international	  structures,	  liberalism	  emphasizes	  the	  importance	  of	  domestic	  political	  forces	   for	   shaping	   policy	   outcomes.14	   	   Different	   theories	   of	   liberalism	   emphasize	  different	   ways	   in	   which	   domestic	   politics	   can	   shape	   state	   behavior.	   	   The	   second	  theory	  I	  consider	  here	  is	  one	  pertinent	  variant	  of	  the	  liberal	  approach	  to	  IR.15	  	   An	   extensive	   literature	   points	   to	   the	   importance	   of	   ethnic,	   business,	   or	  foreign	  lobbies	  for	  explaining	  foreign	  policy	  choice.	  	  These	  factors	  are	  expected	  to	  be	  more	  salient	  in	  open,	  established	  democracies	  as	  well	  as	  on	  issues	  in	  which	  interest	  groups	  are	  especially	  well-­‐organized.16	   	   In	  addition	   to	   influencing	   the	  outcomes	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics,” 
International Organization 51, no. 4 (1997): 513–553. 
15 Two variants that are not tested here include arguments about democratic or commercial peace.  They 
hold that the key determinant of relations among states is either those states’ regime type or the nature of 
commercial relations among them.  However, these variants of liberalism are too slow-moving to serve as a 
strong foil for leadership theory.  I note the impact of these factors when looking between dyads instead of 
within them but focus more on other forces.  Instead, I focus on lobby groups, legislatures, and – further 
below – bureaucratic preferences. For democratic peace, see Michael W. Doyle, “Liberalism and World 
Politics,” The American Political Science Review 80, no. 4 (1986): 1151–1169; Zeev Maoz and Bruce 
Russett, “Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986,” The American Political 
Science Review 87, no. 3 (1993): 624–638; John M. IV Owen, “How Liberalism Produces Democratic 
Peace,” International Security 19, no. 2 (1994): 87–125.  For commercial peace and economic 
interdependence, see Paul A. Papayoanou, Power Ties: Economic Interdependence, Balancing, and War 
(University of Michigan Press, 1999); Edward D. Mansfield and Brian Pollins, Economic Interdependence 
and International Conflict: New Perspectives on an Enduring Debate (University of Michigan Press, 
2003); Michael Mousseau, “The Social Market Roots of Democratic Peace,” International Security 33, no. 
4 (2009): 52–86. 
16 See  Ross Y. Koen, The China Lobby in American Politics (Octagon Books, 1974); Theodore J. Lowi, 
The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States (W. W. Norton & Company, 1979); 
Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations (Yale University Press, 1982); Nicholas John Cull, Selling 
War: The British Propaganda Campaign against American “Neutrality” in World War II (Oxford 
University Press, 1996); Tony Smith, Foreign Attachments: The Power of Ethnic Groups in the Making of 
American Foreign Policy (Harvard University Press, 2000); Stephen Ansolabehere, John M. De 
Figueiredo, and Jim M. Snyder, “Why is there so Little Money in U.S. Politics?,” The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 17, no. 1 (2003): 105–130; Lawrence R. Jacobs and Benjamin I. Page, “Who Influences US 
Foreign Policy?,” American Political Science Review 99, no. 1 (2005): 107–123; Ken Silverstein, “Their 
Men in Washington: Undercover with DC’s lobbyists for hire,” Harpers 1886 (2007): 53; Trevor 
Rubenzer, “Ethnic Minority Interest Group Attributes and U.S. Foreign Policy Influence: A Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis,” Foreign Policy Analysis 4, no. 2 (2008): 169–185; John Newhouse, “Diplomacy, 
Inc.: The Influence of Lobbies on US Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs 88 (2009): 73. 
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international	  negotiations	  by	  binding	   the	  executive	  branch’s	  maneuvering	  space,17	  this	   theory	   also	   anticipates	   that	   Congress	   puts	   an	   indelible	   stamp	   on	   U.S.	  diplomacy.18	   	   And,	   of	   course,	   this	   perspective	   is	   a	   well-­‐established,	   and	   hotly	  contested,	  perspective	  with	  regard	  to	  U.S.	  policy	  toward	  the	  Arab-­‐Israeli	  conflict.19	  Since	   the	   influence	   of	   these	   groups	   is	   often	   greatest	   with	   regard	   to	   the	  legislative	   branch,	   this	   variant	   of	   liberalism	   expects	   that	   legislatures	   provide	   the	  main	  pathway	  for	  lobby	  preferences	  to	  get	  translated	  into	  policy	  choices.	  	  Under	  an	  idealized	  version	  of	  the	  theory,	  we	  should	  expect	  legislators	  to	  mimic	  and	  adopt	  the	  preferences	   of	   powerful	   lobby	   group.	   	   In	   essence,	   the	   theory	   expects	   that	  government	   is	  prone	   to	   frequent	   “capture”	  by	   lobbyists,	  via	   the	   legislative	  branch.	  	  At	   its	  most	   extreme,	   the	   theory	   considers	   presidents	   prisoners	   of	   their	   legislative	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International 
Organization 42, no. 03 (1988): 427–460; Peter B. Evans, “Conclusion - Building an Integrative Approach 
to International and Domestic Politics: Reflections and Projections,” in Double-Edged Diplomacy: 
International Bargaining and Domestic Politics, ed. Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson, and Robert D. 
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Imperfection?: Domestic Uncertainty and Institutions in International Relations (Princeton University 
Press, 1997). 
18 James M. Lindsay, “Congress and Foreign Policy: Why the Hill Matters,” Political Science Quarterly 
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19 For debates over the role and impact of the pro-Israel lobby in Washington, see Paul Findley, They Dare 
to Speak Out: People and Institutions Confront Israel’s Lobby (Lawrence Hill, 1984); Steven L. Spiegel, 
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Policy (Columbia University Press, 1994); John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, “The Israeli Lobby,” 
London Review of Books (March 10, 2006); Michael Massing, “The Storm over the Israel Lobby,” New 
York Review of Books 53, no. 10 (2006); Walter Russell Mead, “Jerusalem Syndrome: Decoding the Israel 
Lobby,” Foreign Affairs 86 (2007): 160; Mearsheimer and Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy 
(Macmillan, 2007); Robert C. Lieberman, “The ‘Israel Lobby’ and American Politics,” Perspectives on 
Politics 7, no. 2 (January 2009): 235–257; Mearsheimer and Walt, “The Blind Man and the Elephant in the 
Room: Robert Lieberman and the Israel Lobby,” Perspectives on Politics 7, no. 2 (2009): 259–273; 
Lieberman, “Rejoinder to Mearsheimer and Walt,” Perspectives on Politics 7, no. 2 (February 2009): 275–
281. 
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counterparts,	   cowed	   into	   pursuing	   a	   policy	   agenda	   designed	   not	   to	   offend	  sensibilities	   of	   the	   powerful	   and	  well-­‐organized	  who	   comprise	   a	  motivated	   “issue	  public”.	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  project,	  Theory	  #2	  (lobby-­‐legislative	  politics)	  claims	  the	  following:	  	   The	   main	   factor	   for	   explaining	   variation	   in	   the	  occurrence	   and	   efficacy	   of	   LSI	   will	   be	   the	   aggregate	  preferences	   of	   lobby	   groups	   and	   legislators	   in	   the	  sender	  state.	  	  Thus,	  states	  should	  undertake	  LSI	  only	  when	  lobbyists	  and	  legislators	  tend	  to	  desire	  it,	  and	  the	  efficacy	  of	  LSI	  should	  be	  correlated	  with	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  these	  actors	  desire	   intervention.	   	   As	   a	   result,	   lobbyists	   and	   legislators	   should	   be	   capable	   of	  undermining	   LSI	   if	   the	   executive	   branch	   conducts	   it	   against	   their	  wishes.	   	   Also,	   if	  lobbyists	   and	   legislators	   have	   an	   institutional	   bias	   regarding	   politics	   in	   the	   target	  state,	  that	  may	  undermine	  their	  own	  ability	  to	  pursue	  LSI	  effectively.	  	  Theory	  #3:	  Bureaucratic	  Politics	  	   The	   other	   variant	   of	   liberalism	   tested	   by	   this	   dissertation	   focuses	   on	  structural	  forces	  within	  the	  executive	  branch	  rather	  than	  the	  legislature.	  	  Theory	  #3	  holds	   that	  policy	  choices	   tend	   to	  reflect	  organizational	   interests	  within	  and	  across	  government	   agencies,	  with	   policy	   outcomes	   bubbling	   up	   from	  below.	   	   Individuals	  and	   their	  personal	  beliefs	   are	  not	  driving	   causal	   forces	  because,	   as	   the	  old	  maxim	  states,	  “where	  you	  stand	  depends	  on	  where	  you	  sit”.	  This	  perspective	  is	  a	  long-­‐running	  school	  of	  thought	  in	  political	  science.	  	  For	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instance,	   bureaucratic	   autonomy	   is	   a	   major	   topic	   of	   inquiry	   in	   the	   subfields	   of	  American	  and	   comparative	  politics.20	   	   It	   also	  has	  been	   shown	   to	  apply	   to	  national	  security	   affairs,	   including	   the	   Cuban	   Missile	   Crisis.21	   	   Sometimes	   bureaucracies	  appear	   to	   reign	   supreme,	   disobeying,	   delaying,	   or	   distorting	   orders	   from	   their	  superiors	  in	  government.	  	  Political	  appointees	  are	  considered	  an	  insufficient	  means	  by	  which	  top	  leaders	  try	  but	  fail	  to	  exert	  control	  over	  the	  permanent	  bureaucracy.	  This	   claim	   is	   not	   necessarily	   as	   extreme	   as	   it	   may	   sound;	   even	   presidents	  themselves	   have	   sometimes	   given	   credence	   it.	   	   For	   instance,	   Truman	   reportedly	  predicted	   that	   his	   successor	   Eisenhower	   would	   be	   shocked	   to	   discover	   the	  impotence	  of	  the	  presidency	  at	  enforcing	  compliance	  from	  the	  bureaucracy:	  “he’ll	  sit	  here	  and	  he’ll	  say	  ‘Do	  this!	  	  Do	  that!’	  And	  nothing	  will	  happen.	  	  Poor	  Ike	  –	  it	  won’t	  be	  a	  bit	  like	  the	  Army.	  	  He’ll	  find	  it	  very	  frustrating”.22	  	  This	  perspective	  has	  also	  been	  applied	  to	  studies	  of	  America’s	  approach	  to	  the	  Arab-­‐Israeli	  conflict.23	  Thus,	   for	   the	   purposes	   of	   this	   project,	   Theory	   #3	   (bureaucratic	   politics)	  claims	  the	  following:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Ezra N. Suleiman, Politics, Power, and Bureaucracy in France: The Administrative Elite (Princeton 
University Press, 1974); William A. Niskanen, Bureaucracy & Representative Government (Aldine, 
Atherton, 1971); Chalmers A. Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 
1925-1975 (Stanford University Press, 1982); Daniel P. Carpenter, The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: 
Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862-1928 (Princeton University 
Press, 2001). 
21 Graham T. Allison, “Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” American Political Science 
Review 63, no. 3 (September 1969): 689–718; Graham T. Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: 
Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Longman, 1999); Morton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and 
Foreign Policy (Brookings Institution Press, 1974); Amy B. Zegart, Flawed by Design: The Evolution of 
the CIA, JCS, and NSC (Stanford University Press, 1999). 
22 Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership (Wiley, 1960), 9 – emphasis is in 
the original. 
23 See, for instance, Robert D. Kaplan, Arabists: The Romance of an American Elite (Simon and Schuster, 
1995); Mitchell Bard, The Arab Lobby: The Invisible Alliance That Undermines America’s Interests in the 
Middle East (Harper, 2010). 
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The	   main	   factor	   for	   explaining	   variation	   in	   the	  occurrence	   and	   efficacy	   of	   LSI	   will	   be	   aggregate	  organizational	   preferences	   of	   the	   sender	   state’s	  permanent	  bureaucracy.	  	  Thus,	   states	   should	   undertake	   LSI	   only	   when	   bureaucrats	   tend	   to	   prefer	   such	   a	  foreign	  policy.	  	  The	  efficacy	  of	  these	  attempts	  should	  depend	  upon	  the	  intensity	  with	  which	   these	   officials	   want	   intervention	   to	   occur,	   and	   bureaucratic	   freelancing	  without	   senior	   approval	   should	   probably	   occur	   rather	   frequently.	   	   Also,	   if	  bureaucrats	  have	  an	  institutional	  bias	  regarding	  politics	  in	  the	  target	  state,	  that	  may	  undermine	  their	  ability	  to	  pursue	  LSI	  effectively.	  	  Theory	  #4:	  Leadership	  Theory	  	   Whereas	  the	  three	  theories	  discussed	  above	  emphasize	  vast	  and	  impersonal	  structural	   forces,	   leadership	   theory	   holds	   that	   the	   main	   determinants	   of	   political	  outcomes	   are	   the	   contingent	   choices	   of	   key	   individuals.24	   	   Leadership	   of	   this	   sort	  tends	  to	  be	  underemphasized	  in	  political	  science	  because	  it	  conflicts	  with	  the	  basic	  tenet	   that	   political	   behaviors	   are	   systematic	   in	   nature.	   	   As	   Keohane	   explains,	  political	  leadership	  is	  “a	  leading	  example	  of	  a	  subject	  that	  is	  understudied	  (relative	  to	  its	  importance)	  because	  it	  does	  not	  respond	  to	  our	  methodological	  toolbox”.25	  	   The	   fact	   that	   leadership	   is	   emphasized	   so	   much	   in	   other	   fields	   such	   as	  business,	   science,	   and	   sports	   suggests	   that	   political	   scientists	   may	   be	   missing	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 By key individuals I mean the president or prime minister of a polity and, at most, perhaps one or two of 
trusted national security aides. 
25 Robert O. Keohane, “Disciplinary Schizophrenia: Implications for Graduate Education in Political 
Science,” Qualitative Methods: Newsletter of the American Political Science Association, Organized 
Section on Qualitative Methods 1, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 10. 
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something	   important	  when	   they	   aver	   that	   leaders	   “do	  not	  matter”.26	   	  Researchers	  who	  oppose	  the	  study	  of	  individuals	  in	  politics	  raise	  two	  main	  objections,	  neither	  of	  which	  are	  persuasive	   in	   their	   severe	   forms.	   	   First,	   they	  object	   that	   individuals	  are	  too	  idiosyncratic	  to	  study	  in	  a	  systematic	  manner.	  	  However,	  as	  Byman	  and	  Pollack	  demonstrate,	  leaders	  can	  shape	  political	  outcomes	  under	  predictable	  circumstances	  and	  in	  ways	  that	  are	  generalizable	  beyond	  particular	  cases	  or	  individuals.27	  Second,	  some	  researchers	  object	  to	  studying	  leaders	  because	  they	  anticipate	  that	  the	  forces	  of	  structure	  should	  be	  large	  enough	  to	  outweigh	  the	  contribution	  of	  individuals.	   	  However,	  Samuels	   shows	   that	   leaders	   in	   countries	   facing	  comparable	  obstacles	   often	   “stretch	   the	   constraints	   of	   structure,”	  making	   stark	   policy	   choices	  that	   change	   the	   course	   of	   political	   development	   and	   leave	   behind	   a	   distinctive	  legacy.28	   	  Also,	  Mukunda	  demonstrates	  that	  unusual	  “outlier	  leaders”	  who	  sidestep	  domestic	   institutions	   for	   leadership	   selection	  often	   are	   less	   reliable	   and	   therefore	  make	   brash	   or	   innovative	   policy	   choices	   that	   differ	   from	   the	   preferences	   of	   other	  potential	  candidates	  who	  have	  been	  more	  thoroughly	  vetted.29	  Sometimes,	  one	  may	  not	  even	  need	  to	  be	  an	  outlier	  leader	  for	  individual	  traits	  to	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  policy	  outcomes.	  	  In	  her	  recent	  book	  Leaders	  at	  War,	  Elizabeth	  Saunders	  offers	  extensive	  evidence	  that	  presidents’	  decisions	  about	  where	  and	  how	  to	   undertake	  military	   intervention	   have	   been	   strongly	   conditioned	   by	   their	   long-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Gautam Mukunda, “The Paths of Glory: Structure, Selection, and Leaders” (MIT Dissertation, 2010). 
27 Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, “Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back 
In,” International Security 25, no. 4 (2001): 107–146. 
28 Richard J. Samuels, Machiavelli’s Children: Leaders and Their Legacies in Italy and Japan (Cornell 
University Press, 2005). 
29 Mukunda, “The Paths of Glory: Structure, Selection, and Leaders.” 
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standing	   personal	   beliefs	   about	   the	   sources	   of	   security	   threats.30	   	   In	   addition	   to	  beliefs,	   individuals’	   personal	   relationships,	   styles,	   and	   skills	  may	   also	   shape	   their	  behavior	  relative	  to	  how	  other	  individuals	  might	  have	  acted	  in	  similar	  positions.	  	   In	   the	   general	   sense,	   leadership	   theory	   emphasizes	   the	   importance	   of	   a	  president’s	   beliefs,	   priorities,	   and	   approach	   to	   decision-­‐making	   for	   explaining	  political	  outcomes.	   	  Sometimes	  a	  leader’s	  top	  few	  lieutenants	  also	  leave	  a	  personal	  stamp	   on	   policy,	   but	   decisions	   should	   occur	   in	   a	   top-­‐down	   manner	   rather	   than	  bottom-­‐up,	  and	  causal	  stories	  must	  be	  told	  in	  terms	  of	  individuals,	  not	  institutions.	  	  This	  perspective	  has	  also	  been	  applied	   systematically	   to	   explain	  American	   foreign	  policy	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  Arab-­‐Israeli	  conflict.31	  Thus,	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  project,	  Theory	  #4	  (leadership	  theory)	  claims	  the	  following:	  	   The	   main	   factor	   for	   explaining	   variation	   in	   the	  occurrence	   and	   efficacy	   of	   LSI	   will	   be	   the	   subjective	  perceptions	  and	  behaviors	  of	  key	  leaders,	  especially	  the	  sender	  polity’s	  head	  of	  government.	  	  Thus,	  states	  should	  pursue	  LSI	  only	  when	  their	   top	  political	   leaders	  desire	   it.	   	  The	  efficacy	  of	  those	  attempts	  should	  depend	  upon	  two	  factors:	  the	  intensity	  with	  which	  those	   actors	   desire	   intervention	   and	   their	   personal	   understanding	   of	   political	  dynamics	  in	  the	  target	  state.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Elizabeth N. Saunders, Leaders at War: How Presidents Shape Military Interventions (Cornell 
University Press, 2011). 
31 Most notably, see William B. Quandt, Decade of Decisions: American Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli 
Conflict, 1967-1976 (University of California Press, 1977); Steven L. Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli 
Conflict: Making America’s Middle East Policy, from Truman to Reagan (University of Chicago Press, 
1986); Aaron David Miller, The Much Too Promised Land: America’s Elusive Search for Arab-Israeli 
Peace (Bantam Books, 2008). 
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SECTION	  3:	  Observable	  Implications	  	   In	  this	  section	  I	  consider	  the	  range	  of	  observable	  implications	  that	  one	  might	  expect	  to	  see	  under	  each	  of	  the	  theories	  discussed	  above.	  	  This	  provides	  the	  reader	  with	  explicit,	  consistent	  criteria	  with	  which	  to	  assess	  how	  empirical	  data	  supports	  or	  contradicts	  the	  various	  theories.32	   	  I	  focus	  especially	  on	  observable	  implications	  that	   are	   mutually	   exclusive	   so	   as	   to	   help	   distinguish	   not	   just	   between	   any	   given	  theory	  and	  the	  null	  hypothesis	  but	  also	  between	  rival	  theories.33	  	   Below,	  I	  enumerate	  seven	  areas	  in	  which	  patterns	  of	  behavior	  seem	  pertinent	  for	  distinguishing	  observable	  implications	  of	  the	  theories.	  	  Those	  categories	  are:	  (1)	  perceptions	   of	   sender	   interests,	   (2)	   perceptions	   of	   close	   contests	   abroad;	   (3)	  patterns	   of	   domestic	   debate;	   (4)	   cycles	   of	   domestic	   power;	   (5)	   bureaucratic	  freelancing;	   (6)	  consistency	  of	  message	   in	   foreign	  policy;	  and	  (7)	   the	  suitability	  of	  that	  message.	   	  The	  first	  two	  categories	  focus	  on	  occurrence,	  and	  the	  last	  two	  focus	  on	  efficacy.	  	  The	  three	  in	  between	  are	  closer	  to	  auxiliary	  phenomena	  what	  we	  should	  expect	   to	   observe	   alongside	   variation	   in	   those	   two	   dependent	   variables	   if	   one	   or	  another	  particular	  theory	  is	  correct.	  
	  1.	  Perceptions	  of	  Sender	  Interests	  	   One	  factor	  that	  should	  impact	  patterns	  of	  LSI	  is	  whether	  a	  leadership	  contest	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Cornell University Press, 1997), 
104. 
33 This is akin to Lakatos’s distinction between two- and three-cornered theory testing.  See Imre Lakatos, 
“Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes,” in Criticism and the Growth of 
Knowledge, ed. Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1970). 
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in	  the	  target	  state	  is	  seen	  as	  consequential	   for	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  sender.	   	  Each	  of	  the	   four	   theories	   poses	   different	   predictions	   regarding	   how	   sender	   interests	   are	  likely	  to	  shape	  the	  incidence	  of	  LSI	  throughout	  the	  cases.	  	  For	  instance,	  if	  Theory	  #1	  (national	   interests	   theory)	   is	   true,	   sender	   interests	   should	   be	   objectively	   given.	  	  Barring	  some	  sort	  of	  extraordinary	  constraint,	  if	  the	  sender’s	  interests	  are	  at	  stake,	  we	  should	  observe	  meddling	  occuring.	  	  If	  they	  are	  not	  at	  stake,	  meddling	  should	  not	  occur.	  	  And	  states	  should	  not	  “miss	  opportunities”	  for	  pursuing	  LSI.	  Theory	   #2	   (the	   lobby-­‐legislative	   approach)	   expects	   sender	   interests	   to	   be	  viewed	   through	   the	   prism	   of	   Congress	   and	   relevant	   lobbies.	   	   Thus,	   if	   there	   is	   a	  systematic	   bias	   to	   their	   perceptions	   about	   particular	   bilateral	   relationships,	   we	  should	  expect	  that	  bias	  to	  be	  reflected	  in	  LSI	  occurrence.	   	  In	  the	  core	  cases	  for	  this	  project,	   lobbies	  and	  Congress	   tend	   to	  downplay	   the	  value	  of	  contests	   in	   the	   target	  state	  because	  they	  see	  Israeli	   leaders	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  aisle	  as	  trustworthy	  and	  good	   for	   U.S.	   interests	   but	   Palestinian	   leaders	   of	   all	   stripes	   as	   untrustworthy	   and	  bad	  for	  U.S.	  interests.	  	  	  This	   fits	   with	   the	   empirical	   record	   over	   the	   years.	   	   As	   will	   be	   explored	   in	  more	  detail	  in	  the	  chapters	  that	  follow,	  AIPAC	  officials	  have	  typically	  sought	  to	  argue	  that	   right-­‐wing	   Israeli	   leaders	   are	   just	   as	   good	   for	  U.S.	   interests	   as	   their	   left-­‐wing	  rivals	   and	   that	   there	   is	   no	   such	   thing	   as	   an	   influential,	   moderate	   Palestinian.34	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 A plethora of examples jump out upon reading AIPAC’s long-running weekly bulletin, Near East 
Report. Some older examples vis-à-vis Israel include the following: “Israeli Elections,” Near East Report 
21, no. 21 (May 25, 1977); “Near East Report,” Near East Report 22, no. 13 (March 29, 1978); “Editorial: 
Israel’s Permanent Interests,” Near East Report 25, no. 4 (January 23, 1981); “Editorial: The Elections in 
Israel,” Near East Report, no. 25 (July 3, 1981): 27; “Editorial: The Consensus,” Near East Report 27, no. 
2 (January 14, 1983); “Editorial: Begin’s Decision,” Near East Report 27, no. 35 (September 2, 1983); 
“Editorial: The Consensus”; “Editorial: What Do They Want?,” Near East Report 30, no. 28 (July 21, 
1986); “Dine: Unity to Meet Challenges (Excerpts Form the Address of AIPAC Executive Director 
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Because	   these	  actors	   tend	   to	  oppose	  American	   support	   for	  purportedly	  pro-­‐peace	  leaders	   in	   either	   Israel	   or	   Palestine,	   LSI	   should	   be	   infrequent	   on	   both	   dyads	   if	  Theory	  #2	  is	  correct.	  	   Theory	   #3	   (the	   bureaucratic	   politics	   approach)	   expects	   occurrence	   to	   be	  driven	  by	  perceptions	  within	  the	  bureaucracy.	  	  If	  bureaucrats	  have	  an	  outlook	  of	  in	  the	  target	  state	  that	   is	  biased	  in	  a	  certain	  direction,	  we	  should	  expect	  to	  observe	  a	  similar	  swing	  in	  rates	  of	  LSI	  occurrence.	  	  In	  the	  cases	  examined	  by	  this	  dissertation,	  the	  bureaucracy	  –	  exemplified	  by	   the	  State	  Department’s	  Bureau	   for	  Near	  Eastern	  Affairs	   –	   tends	   to	   see	   a	   deep,	   persistent,	   and	  meaningful	   difference	   between	   rival	  factions	   in	   the	   target	   polities.	   	   Thus,	   we	   should	   see	   very	   frequent	   LSI	   attempts	  toward	  both	  Israel	  and	  the	  PA.	  Theory	  #4	   (leadership	   theory)	   expects	  perceptions	   to	   vary	  based	  upon	   the	  subjective	   beliefs	   of	   individual	   leaders.	   	   Two	   types	   of	   beliefs	  may	  matter:	   general	  beliefs	  about	  the	  target	  polity	  or	  specific	  beliefs	  about	  individual	  counterparts.	  	  For	  instance,	   if	   leaders	   hold	   intense,	   general	   beliefs	   about	   the	   urgency	   of	   Palestinian	  self-­‐determination	   and	   Israeli	   flexibility	   in	   the	   peace	   process,	   we	   should	   observe	  them	   attempt	   LSI	   toward	   the	   PA	   and	   Israel	   at	   much	   higher	   rates.	   	   Similarly,	   the	  sender	  state	  should	  be	  more	  inclined	  to	  engage	  in	  LSI	  when	  its	  leaders	  believe	  that	  their	   counterparts	   in	   the	   target	   are	   either	   genuine	  partners	   in	  need	  of	   support	  or	  disingenuous	  obstacles	  to	  be	  pushed	  out	  of	  the	  way.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Thomas Dine),” Near East Report 32, no. 21 (May 23, 1988); “Peace Takes Precedence,” Near East Report 
34, no. 2 (January 8, 1990); “Shamir Stands Firm,” Near East Report 34, no. 8 (February 19, 1990); “What 
Next?,” Near East Report 34, no. 12 (March 19, 1990). Some examples from the Palestinian case include: 
“Sadat’s Reversals,” Near East Report 21, no. 1 (January 5, 1977); I. L. Kenen, “Converting the Enemy,” 
Near East Report 21, no. 2 (January 12, 1977); “Editorial: What Do They Want?,” Near East Report 30, 
no. 28 (July 21, 1986); “The Peace Agenda: The Palestinians,” Near East Report 35, no. 40 (October 7, 
1991); “No Concessions to the PLO,” Near East Report 35, no. 48 (December 2, 1991). 
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  2.	  Perceptions	  of	  Close	  Contests	  	   Perceptions	  of	  a	  close	  contest	  in	  the	  target	  state	  should	  serve	  as	  an	  additional	  relevant	  factor.	  	  Potential	  senders	  should	  exert	  political	  capital	  to	  shape	  a	  leadership	  contest	   in	   the	   target	   only	  when	   they	   perceive	   a	   possible	   contest	   in	   the	   offing	   for	  which	   the	   outcome	   is	   reasonably	   up	   for	   grabs.	   	  However,	   the	   theories	   differ	  with	  regard	  to	  how	  they	  predict	  this	  will	  play	  out	  in	  practice.	  	  	  Theory	   #1	   (national	   interests	   theory)	   emphasizes	   the	   importance	   of	  objective	  information	  and	  national	  interests.	  	  Thus,	  we	  should	  expect	  sender	  states	  to	  make	  decisions	  about	  meddling	   	  on	   the	  basis	  of	   all	   information	  available	  about	  objective	  political	  trends	  in	  the	  target	  state	  at	  that	  time.	  	  If,	  however,	  senders	  do	  not	  undertake	  LSI	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  rationally	  updated	  estimations	  about	  the	  likelihood	  of	  a	  close	  contest,	  then	  that	  would	  be	  seem	  to	  contradict	  the	  theory.	  	  Barring	  some	  sort	  of	  objective	   intelligence	   failure,	  LSI	  should	  be	  more	   likely	   to	  occur	  when	  an	  actual	  leadership	  contest	  is	  brewing	  in	  the	  target	  polity.	  	   The	  domestic	  structural	  approaches	  (theories	  2	  and	  3)	  do	  not	  appear	  to	  offer	  clear	  predictions	  on	  this	  variable,	  but	  Theory	  #4	  (leadership	  theory)	  does.	   	  This	   is	  because	  top	  leaders	  have	  very	  limited	  time	  and	  attention.	  	  This	  means	  that	  they	  are	  more	   likely	   to	   perceive	   an	   impending	   close	   contest	   if	   they	   care	   enough	   about	   the	  target	   state	   and	   its	   internal	   politics	   to	   be	  paying	   attention	   in	   a	   proactive	  manner.	  	  Alternatively,	   they	   should	   be	   less	   inclined	   to	   perceive	   close	   contests	  when	   facing	  extraordinary	   exogenous	   distractions	   that	   pull	   their	   attention	   in	   other	   directions.	  	  Furthermore,	   their	   subjective	   personal	   biases	   may	   lead	   them	   to	   either	   over-­‐	   or	  
	   59	  
under-­‐perceive	   close	   leadership	   contests	   that	   are	   emerging	   in	   the	   target	   state.	   	   If	  Theory	  #4	   is	  correct,	  we	  should	  also	  expect	   to	  observe	  rates	  of	  LSI	   increase	  when	  leaders	  have	  already	  manifested	  a	  strong,	  personal	  interest	  in	  the	  internal	  politics	  of	  the	   target	   state	   and	   to	   decrease	   when	   they	   are	   overwhelmed	   by	   immediate	  distractions	  such	  as	  a	  war	  or	  a	  political	  scandal.35	  	  3.	  Patterns	  of	  Domestic	  Debate	  	   The	   various	   theories	   should	   also	   lead	   us	   to	   anticipate	   different	   patterns	   of	  debate	  within	   the	   sender	   government	  when	  making	   choices	   about	   LSI.	   	   Although	  Theory	   #1	   (national	   interests	   theory)	   is	   agnostic	   about	   this	   sort	   of	   intra-­‐governmental	   policy	   debate,	   the	   other	   theories	   offer	   distinct	   and	   often	   falsifiable	  predictions.	  	   For	   instance,	   the	   domestic	   structure	   arguments	   would	   be	   supported	   if	  lobbies,	   Congress,	   and	   the	   bureaucracy	   tend	   to	   be	   both	   informed	   and	   influential	  when	   important	  decisions	   about	   LSI	   are	  being	  made.	   	  However,	   if	   top	   leaders	   are	  able	   to	  undertake	  LSI	  while	   leaving	  members	   of	   Congress	   and	   the	  bureaucracy	   in	  the	  dark,	  that	  would	  seem	  to	  support	  Theory	  #4	  (leadership	  theory)	  and	  contradict	  Theories	   2	   and	   3	   (the	   lobby-­‐legislative	   and	   bureaucratic	   politics	   approaches,	  respectively).	  	  4.	  Cycles	  of	  Domestic	  Power	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 NB Cases of war could also be consonant with national interests theory if that war changes the sender 
state’s immediate, objective interests vis-à-vis the internal politics of the target state. However, distractions 
that do not change the strategic interests of the sender are not likely to be consonant with Theory #1. 
	   60	  
	   To	  the	  extent	  that	  structural	  forces	  are	  salient	  factors,	  we	  should	  expect	  them	  to	   be	   especially	   preponderant	   under	   certain	   circumstances,	   providing	   us	   with	   an	  easy	   test	   for	   domestic	   structural	   theories	   and	   a	   comparatively	   hard	   test	   for	  leadership	  theory.	  	  If	  Theory	  #1	  (national	  interests	  theory)	  is	  correct	  that	  objective	  international	   interests	   are	   a	   crucial	   factor,	   these	   dynamics	   should	   be	   especially	  pronounced	  during	  periods	  of	  war	  or	  otherwise	  high	  threat	  in	  the	  region.	  	  However,	  this	  overlaps	  with	  the	  distraction-­‐by-­‐war	  clause	  above,	  making	  it	  somewhat	  difficult	  to	  tell	  which	  theory	  is	  doing	  the	  causal	  lifting	  under	  these	  circumstances.	  If	   Theory	   #2	   (the	   lobby-­‐legislative	   approach)	   is	   correct	   that	   lobbies	   and	  Congress	   are	   driving	   forces	   for	   LSI,	   their	   powers	   should	   be	   preponderant	   during	  periods	   of	   divided	   government	   because	   the	   executive	   is	   at	   greater	   risk	   of	   being	  overruled.	   	  Second,	  they	  should	  be	  especially	   influential	   leading	  up	  to	  most	  sender	  state	  elections	  –	  or	  at	  least	  presidential	  ones	  –	  since	  leaders	  in	  that	  state	  are	  more	  accountable	  to	  public	  pressures	  during	  these	  periods.36	  If	   Theory	   #3	   (the	   bureaucratic	   politics	   approach)	   is	   correct	   and	   executive	  agencies	  are	  the	  most	  salient	   factors,	   their	   influence	  should	  be	  even	  greater	  at	   the	  start	   of	   a	   president’s	   term.	   	   This	   is	   because	   political	   appointees,	   though	   seen	   as	  somewhat	   weak	   under	   this	   framework,	   are	   one	   of	   the	   president’s	   few	   means	   of	  imposing	  oversight	  on	  the	  bureaucracy.	   	  Before	  political	  appointees	  are	   in	  place,	   if	  anything	  the	  head	  of	  state	  should	  be	  even	  weaker	  relative	  to	  the	  bureaucracy.	  However,	   if	   we	   observe	   even	   sporadic	   instances	   in	   which	   an	   engaged	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 For similar arguments about domestic political pressure and its effect on foreign policy behavior, see 
Kurt Taylor Gaubatz, “Election Cycles and War,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 35, no. 2 (1991): 212; 
Miroslav Nincic, Democracy and Foreign Policy: The Fallacy of Political Realism (Columbia University 
Press, 1992). 
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president	  overcomes	  domestic	   structural	  pressures	  during	   these	  expected	  periods	  of	   dominant	   structural	   power,	   that	   would	   provide	   unusually	   strong	   evidence	   in	  favor	   of	   leadership	   theory	   than	   would	   have	   been	   the	   case	   under	   ordinary	  circumstances.	  	  5.	  Bureaucratic	  Freelancing	  Sometimes	  LSI	  may	  be	  deliberated	  and	  carried	  out	  without	  official	  approval	  by	   executive	   officials	   below	   the	   level	   of	   the	   president.	   	   These	   instances	   of	  unauthorized	  behavior	  provide	  us	  with	  another	  point	  of	  leverage	  over	  the	  data.	  	  In	  the	  first	  cut,	  this	  phenomenon	  indicates	  an	  upper	  limit	  on	  the	  scope	  of	  presidential	  power.	   	   If	   such	   behavior	   appears	   to	   be	   especially	   frequent,	   that	   would	   provide	  strong	   support	   for	   the	   bureaucratic	   politics	   approach.37	   	   Thus,	   it	   is	   worth	   noting	  whether	  the	  overall	  frequency	  of	  such	  behavior	  is	  relatively	  high	  or	  low.	  	  It	  is	  also	  important	  to	  consider	  whether	  the	  distribution	  of	  these	  instances	  is	  spread	  uniformlly	  across	  administrations	  or	  is	  concentrated	  only	  under	  presidents	  noted	  for	  their	  lax	  managerial	  styles	  and	  approach	  to	  oversight	  on	  bilateral	  relations	  with	   the	   target	   state.38	   	   The	   former	   would	   provide	   evidence	   for	   Theory	   #3	   (the	  bureaucratic	  politics	  approach),	  but	  the	  latter	  would	  provide	  support	  for	  Theory	  #4	  (leadership	  theory),	  suggesting	  that	  the	  president	  control	   is	  a	  prior	  causal	   factor	  –	  meaning	   that	   he	   or	   she	  must	   first	   cede	   control	   before	   other	   forces	   come	   into	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 It is also worth keeping an open mind toward the possibility of legislative freelancing by key leaders of 
Congress in a manner that is distinct from systematic legislative preferences.   
38 For a discussion of how presidential styles of management may impact foreign policy decision-making, 
see Alexander L. George, Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information 
and Advice (Westview Press, 1980). 
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  6.	  Consistency	  of	  Message	  	   The	  main	  pathway	  by	  which	  LSI	  succeeds	  or	  fails	  is	  communicative	  in	  nature.	  	  Although	   practitioners	   maintain	   the	   pretense	   that	   they	   are	   not	   seeking	   to	   affect	  leadership	  selection	  in	  the	  target	  polity,	  they	  simultaneously	  strive	  to	  communicate	  a	  message	   abroad	   that	  happens	   to	  make	   the	  protégé	   faction	   look	  more	   appealing.	  	  When	  LSI	   succeeds,	   it	   is	   because	   the	   sender	   state’s	   actions	  have	  persuaded	   swing	  voters	  or	  elite	  stake-­‐holders	  to	  shift	  their	  allegiance.	  	  Usually,	  this	  involves	  acting	  in	  a	   manner	   that	   validates	   the	   campaign	   narrative	   of	   one	   political	   faction	   at	   the	  expense	   of	   its	   rivals.	   	   Therefore,	   one	   feature	   that	   should	  make	   LSI	  more	   effective	  would	   be	   when	   messaging	   is	   consistent	   and	   clear.39	   	   In	   this	   regard,	   domestic	  structural	   forces	  seem	  most	   relevant	   in	   their	   capacity	   to	  undermine	  an	  episode	  of	  LSI	  once	  it	  is	  underway	  by	  contradicting	  official	  messaging.	  	   Because	  Theory	  #1	  (the	  national	  interests	  approach)	  emphasizes	  the	  causal	  importance	   of	   international	   forces	   over	   domestic	   ones,	   it	   expects	   that	   mixed	  messages	  should	  not	  be	  a	  serious	  impediment	  to	  success	  and	  that	  messaging	  should	  stay	  consistent	  so	  long	  as	  geopolitical	  interests	  remain	  the	  same.	  	  Domestic	  failures	  to	   arrive	   at	   a	   common	  message	  would	  be	   evidence	   at	   odds	  with	   the	   international	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 This is somewhat analogous to the extant concept in the literature on “signaling” in international 
relations, except that the target audience is not so much foreign policy-makers but rather members of the 
selectorate in the target state who determine the result of leadership contests. For some exemplary materials 
in the literature on signalling, see James D. Fearon, “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of 
International Disputes,” American Political Science Review (September 1994): 577–592; James Morrow, 
“The Strategic Setting of Choices: Signaling, Commitment and Negotiation,” in Strategic Choice and 
International Relations, ed. David A. Lake and Robert Powell (Princeton University Press, 1999), 1–38; 
Kenneth A. Schultz, Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy (Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
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structural	  approach.	  	   Theory	   #2	   (the	   lobby-­‐legislative	   approach)	   anticipates	   that	   legislators	   and	  lobbyists	  should	  be	  well-­‐positioned	  to	  undermine	  attempts	  at	  LSI	  by	  the	  executive.	  	  By	   providing	   observers	   in	   the	   target	   state	   with	   contradictory	   signals,	   they	   can	  undermine	   the	  president’s	  message	  abroad.	   	  Under	   this	   theory,	   efficacy	   should	  be	  low	   whenever	   lobbyists	   and	   legislators	   hold	   preferences	   that	   clash	   with	   the	  president’s	  posture	  toward	  politics	  in	  the	  target	  state.40	  	   According	   to	   Theory	   #3	   (the	   bureaucratic	   politics	   approach),	   one	   would	  expect	  to	  observe	  LSI	  efforts	  failing	  when	  they	  encounter	  resistance	  deep	  within	  the	  bureaucracy	   and	   to	   observe	   them	   succeeding	   when	   these	   organizational	  preferences	   align	   behind	   meddling	   abroad.	   	   In	   short,	   LSI	   efficacy	   should	   depend	  upon	  achieving	  bureaucratic	  consensus	  in	  favor	  of	  meddling.	  	   Like	   national	   interests	   theory,	   Theory	   #4	   (leadership	   theory)	   expects	   that	  domestic	  structural	  forces	  should	  not	  undermine	  effective	  messaging	  by	  the	  sender	  state.	   	   However,	   leadership	   theory	   does	   expect	   other	   kinds	   of	   domestic	   foul-­‐ups;	  they	  are	  simply	  idiosyncratic	  and	  inter-­‐personal	  rather	  than	  institutional	  in	  nature.	  	  Thus,	   the	   most	   important	   factors	   for	   achieving	   a	   consistent	   message	   should	   be	  coordination	  and	  commitment	  among	  a	   limited	  number	  of	   individuals.	   	  As	   long	  as	  the	   president	   and	   a	   few	   key	   aides	   remain	   involved	   in	   the	   issue	   –	   and	   coordinate	  among	  themselves	  to	  ensure	  they	  are	  on	  message	  –	  LSI	  should	  be	  likely	  to	  succeed.	  	  7.	  Suitability	  of	  Message	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Schultz, Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy. 
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   Finally,	   there	   is	   the	   matter	   of	   what	   that	   message	   entails.	   	   If	   the	   message	  communicated	  by	  the	  sender	  state	  is	  biased	  in	  a	  direction	  that	  diverges	  from	  ideal	  suitability	  for	  persuading	  stakeholders	  in	  the	  target	  state,	  then	  LSI	  attempts	  should	  be	   more	   likely	   to	   fail.	   	   Although	   Theory	   #1	   (national	   interests	   theory)	   expects	  messaging	  to	  be	  perfectly	  suited	  to	  sender	  state	  interests,	  the	  remaining	  theories	  do	  not.	   	   And,	   as	   noted	   above,	   Theories	   2	   and	  3	   (the	  domestic	   structural	   approaches)	  suggest	   that	   institutionally	   biased	   preferences	   may	   lead	   the	   legislature	   or	  bureaucracy	  to	  undermine	  presidential	  efforts	  at	  LSI.	  	  	  However,	   Theory	   #4	   (leadership	   theory)	   expects	   the	   main	   determinant	   of	  whether	  messaging	  is	  suitable	  or	  not	  should	  be	  the	  personal	  beliefs	  of	  top	  officials	  in	  the	  sender	  state.	  	  Thus,	  if	  we	  observe	  selection	  of	  unsuitable	  messages	  by	  the	  sender	  state,	   it	   should	   be	   attributable	   to	   top	   leaders	   in	   the	   sender	   state	   holding	   beliefs	  about	  political	  dynamics	  in	  the	  target	  state	  that	  undermine	  their	  ability	  to	  project	  an	  appropriate	   message	   with	   finesse.41	   	   For	   instance,	   later	   in	   the	   dissertation	   I	   will	  explain	  how	  brash	  statements	  about	  the	  peace	  process	  by	  Presidents	  Carter	  in	  1977	  and	  George	  H.	  W.	  Bush	  in	  1990	  may	  have	  undermined	  LSI	  efficacy	  by	  speaking	  from	  the	  gut	  when	  asked	  about	  an	  issue	  on	  which	  they	  had	  strong	  emotions.42	  	  Conclusion	  	   In	   review,	   the	   four	   theories	   tested	   in	   this	   study	   offer	   a	   broad	   range	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 For instance, in this regard we will see Presidents Carter and Bush Sr. undermine the effectiveness of 
U.S. policy toward Israeli leadership selection in 1977 and 1990.  In both instances, presidents spoke off-
the-cuff on the basis of deep-seated personal beliefs that backfired, producing leadership-struggle outcomes 
in the target state that contradicted U.S. preferences. 
42 Those issues were Palestinian statehood and settlement construction in East Jerusalem, respectively.  
More detail on these cases is presented in subsequent chapters. 
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empirical	   predictions	   for	   the	   dynamics	   of	   leadership	   selection	   intervention.	  	  Because	   they	   offer	   contradictory	   predictions	   for	   seven	   different	   aspects	   in	   the	  causal	   process	   of	   meddling,	   the	   observable	   implications	   of	   these	   theories	   should	  allow	  us	  to	  distinguish	  which	  theory	  best	  explains	  variation	   in	  LSI	  occurrence	  and	  efficacy.	  	  As	  discussed	  above,	  these	  seven	  aspects	  of	  meddling	  behavior	  include:	  (1)	  perceptions	   of	   sender	   interests;	   (2)	   perceptions	   of	   close	   contests	   abroad;	   (3)	  patterns	   of	   domestic	   debate;	   (4)	   cycles	   of	   domestic	   power;	   (5)	   bureaucratic	  freelancing;	  (6)	  message	  consistency;	  and	  (7)	  message	  suitability.	  	  
SECTION	  4:	  Why	  Agency	  Matters	  
In	   this	   section,	   I	   address	   four	   main	   points.	   	   First,	   I	   explain	   why	   certain	  features	  of	  LSI	  drive	  officials	   in	  the	  sender	  state	  to	  maintain	  pretenses	  about	  their	  true	   intentions	   when	   pursuing	   LSI	   in	   order	   to	   decrease	   the	   risk	   of	   a	   nationalist	  backlash	  within	  the	  target	  polity.	  	  Second,	  I	  explain	  why	  this	  pressure	  for	  pretenses	  impacts	  the	  deliberative	  process	  in	  the	  sender	  state,	  driving	  officials	  to	  avoid	  formal	  deliberative	  process	  in	  a	  dynamic	  I	  call	  the	  paper	  paradox.	  	  Third,	  I	  explain	  why	  this	  paradox	   often	   mitigates	   the	   three	   big	   structural	   forces	   of	   bureaucracies,	   lobby-­‐legislative	   power,	   and	   international	   interests.	   	   Fourth,	   I	   explain	  why	   these	   effects	  apply	   to	   both	   occurrence	   and	   efficacy	   but	   tend	   to	   have	   greater	   impact	   over	   the	  former	  than	  the	  latter.	  	  1.	  Pressure	  for	  Pretenses	  Why	  do	  leaders	  matter	  so	  much	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  LSI?	  	  Because	  it	  is	  inherently	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taboo	  in	  at	  least	  one	  of	  the	  two	  countries.	  	  Domestically,	  LSI	  can	  backfire	  if	  concrete	  proof	   is	   leaked	   to	  or	   subpoenaed	  by	  political	   opposition.	   	   Even	  more	   importantly,	  such	  leaks	  can	  cause	  this	  strategy	  to	  backfire	   in	  the	  target	  state,	   leading	  to	  a	  rally-­‐around-­‐the-­‐flag	   backlash.	   	   Nobody	   likes	   being	   ordered	   around	   by	   foreign	   powers,	  
especially	   in	   the	   sovereign	   realm	   of	   selecting	   one’s	   own	   leaders.	   	   This	   provides	   a	  powerful	  tactic	  for	  factions	  in	  the	  target	  state	  who	  are	  disfavored	  by	  the	  sender.	  	  If	  they	   can	   persuasively	   claim	   that	   a	   foreign	   power	   is	   trying	   to	   pull	   strings	   to	   their	  disadvantage,	  a	  significant	  portion	  of	  the	  vote	  may	  swing	  in	  their	  favor.	  	  This	  creates	  disincentives	  against	  admitting	  LSI	  in	  public.	  This	  pressure	  is	  remarkably	  persistent.	   	   It	  seems	  to	  apply	  even	  in	  countries	  where	   the	  U.S.	   is	   universally	   popular	   (such	   as	   Israel)	   or	  where	   the	   general	   public	  holds	  a	  more	  favorable	  view	  of	  America	  than	  do	  its	  leaders	  (such	  as	  present	  day	  Iran	  or	   countries	   in	   Eastern	   Europe	   during	   the	   Cold	   War).	   	   Even	   in	   the	   latter,	   when	  intervention	  verges	  on	  being	  too	  blatant	  it	  causes	  a	  severe	  enough	  backlash	  in	  elite	  politics	   as	   to	   outweigh	   any	   possible	   enthusiasm	   that	   may	   exist	   with	   the	   general	  public.	  Even	  when	  officials	  in	  the	  target	  state	  solicit	  outside	  intervention	  –	  as	  seems	  to	  be	  the	  case	  in	  many	  of	  the	  episodes	  covered	  by	  this	  dissertation43	  –	  they	  do	  so	  in	  a	  manner	   that	   reflects	   these	  pressures	   for	  pretense.	   	  They	  come	   to	  Washington	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 One relevant literature describes foreign (usually American) pressures for favorable outcomes within 
Japanese politics, a phenomenon known as gaiatsu.  However, gaiatsu can encompass pressure for many 
different kinds of desired political outcomes, not just LSI.  However, when it comes to LSI in particular, I 
believe this pressure for pretense still applies.  For some sample works on the topic of gaiatsu, see Aurelia 
George Mulgan, “The Role of Foreign Pressure (Gaiatsu) in Japan’s Agricultural Trade Liberalization,” 
Pacific Review 10, no. 2 (1997), 165-209; Leonard James Schoppa, Bargaining with Japan: What 
American Pressure Can and Cannot Do (Columbia University Press, 1997); Akitoshi Miyashita, “Gaiatsu 
and Japan’s Foreign Aid: Rethinking the Reactive-Proactive Debate,” International Studies Quarterly 43, 
no. 4 (December 1999), 695-731. 
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quietly	   request	   support	   in	   their	   intramural	   political	   battles,	   but	   rarely	   will	   they	  make	  sure	  requests	  in	  public.	  	  Sender	  state	  officials	  may	  or	  may	  not	  respond	  in	  kind,	  but	  they	  generally	  will	  seek	  to	  maintain	  pretenses	  in	  these	  instances	  as	  well.	  Furthermore,	  this	  pressure	  also	  seems	  to	  outweigh	  domestic	  incentives	  to	  be	  hawkish	   toward	   the	   target	   polity.	   	   At	   times	   there	   may	   exist	   positive	   domestic	  incentives	  within	  the	  sender	  state	  to	  pursue	  LSI	  toward	  a	  target	  state	  that	  is	  a	  sworn	  enemy.	  	  However,	  as	  I	  demonstrate	  in	  the	  Iran	  shadow	  case	  after	  1979,	  the	  backlash	  that	   acknowledged	   meddling	   would	   create	   in	   the	   target	   state	   is	   still	   usually	  sufficient	   to	   dissuade	   the	   U.S.	   leaders	   from	   pursuing	   LSI	   in	   an	   open	   and	   frank	  manner.	  	  	  Of	  course,	   the	  United	  States	  has	  often	  extended	  obvious	  support	   to	   favored	  strongmen	  before,	  during,	  and	  after	  the	  Cold	  War,	  and	  this	  is	  a	  pattern	  of	  behavior	  that	  is	  not	  unique	  to	  American	  foreign	  policy.	  	  However,	  as	  my	  pre-­‐1979	  Iran	  cases	  suggest,	  in	  order	  to	  be	  effective	  this	  support	  still	  must	  be	  extended	  in	  the	  context	  of	  elaborate	   pretenses.	   	   Most	   American	   leaders	   have	   recognized	   this	   fact,	   either	  explicitly	   or	   implicitly,	   and	   they	   adjust	   both	   their	   rhetoric	   and	   their	   deliberative	  processes	  accordingly.	  	  The	  one	  partial	  exception	   to	   this	  need	   for	  pretense	   involves	  what	   I	   call	   the	  “One	  Vote	  Problematique,”	  which	   refers	   to	   the	  dilemma	   in	  which	   the	   sender	   state	  fears	   that	   a	   victory	   by	   hardline	   challengers	   in	   the	   target	   state	   may	   cause	   such	  catastrophic	   results	   –	   usually	   in	   terms	   of	   refusing	   to	   ever	   let	   another	   leadership	  contest	   occur	   –	   that	   the	   challenger	   is	   viewed	   from	   outside	   as	   beyond	   the	   pale.	  	  Under	  such	  circumstances,	  actors	  in	  the	  sender	  state	  may	  be	  somewhat	  more	  open	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about	  their	  intention	  to	  marginalize	  a	  particular	  hardline	  faction	  in	  the	  target	  polity.	  However,	  this	  does	  not	  obviate	  the	  pressure	  for	  pretenses	  –	  it	  only	  mitigates	  in	   somewhat.	   	   Officials	   in	   the	   sender	   state	  may	   announce	   its	   intention	   to	   exclude	  terrorists	   or	   other	   extremists	   challengers	   from	  political	   contestation	   in	   the	   target	  country,	   but	   they	   still	   usually	   adhere	   to	   the	   fiction	   that	   the	   target	   country’s	  incumbent	  has	  genuine	  public	  support	  and	   is	  not	  propped	  up	   from	  outside.	   	  Thus,	  even	  in	  instances	  in	  which	  the	  pressure	  for	  pretenses	  is	  weakened	  somewhat,	  it	  still	  shapes	  public	  rhetoric	  and,	  as	  a	  result,	  deliberative	  procedures	  in	  the	  sender	  state.	  	  2.	  The	  Paper	  Paradox	  The	  pressure	  for	  pretenses	  forces	  prospective	  conspirators	  at	  LSI	  to	  confront	  a	   dilemma	   I	   term	   the	   paper	   paradox.	   	   They	   experience	   contradictory	   pressures	  between	   two	   types	   of	   incentives:	   on	   one	   hand,	   they	   seek	   strategic	   gains	   from	  “helping	  the	  good	  guys	  and	  gals”	  abroad;	  on	  the	  other,	  they	  face	  strong	  pressure	  to	  avoid	  being	  caught	  red-­‐handed.	   	  Because	  of	   these	  contradictory	  pressures,	   leaders	  still	  tend	  to	  pursue	  LSI	  but	  in	  a	  manner	  designed	  to	  balance	  these	  risks.	  The	   upshot	   of	   this	   dilemma	   is	   that	   policy-­‐makers	   develop	   an	   aversion	   to	  formal	  process.	  	  Instead	  of	  putting	  policies	  down	  on	  paper,	  they	  prefer	  to	  deliberate	  LSI	  via	  offline,	  oral	  communication.	   	  Rather	  than	  communicating	  through	  inclusive	  formal	   channels,	   they	   tend	   to	   operate	  within	   narrow	   circles	   on	   a	   “need-­‐to-­‐know”	  basis.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy,	  this	  means	  that	  written	  directives	  about	  LSI,	  when	   they	  exist	  at	  all,	   are	  classified	   “eyes	  only”	  and	  rarely	   if	  ever	  make	   their	  way	  beyond	  the	  walls	  of	  the	  White	  House	  and	  possibly	  the	  desk	  of	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State.	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This	  also	  means	  that	  communication	  of	  the	  sender’s	  preferences	  is	  done	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  is	  inherently	  ambiguous.	  	  Policy-­‐makers	  in	  the	  sender	  state	  will	  tend	  to	  express	   their	   preference	   for	   a	   protégé	   in	   the	   target	   state	   through	   the	   idiom	   of	  promoting	  favored	  policies.	  	  To	  minimize	  risks	  of	  a	  backlash,	  meddlers	  justify	  their	  firm	   or	   conciliatory	   foreign	   policy	   gestures	   in	   terms	   of	   general	   issues	   in	   bilateral	  relations.	   	   Rather	   than	   saying	   “vote	   for	   so-­‐and-­‐so	   because	   she	   is	  moderate”,	   they	  declare	   “we	   remain	   committed	   to	   supporting	  a	  policy	  of	  moderation”	  and	  provide	  financial	   aid	   or	   diplomatic	   support	   to	   perceived	   moderate	   causes	   in	   a	   manner	  designed	   to	  provide	   that	   individual	  with	   a	  well-­‐timed	  political	   boost.	   	   LSI	   is	   often	  expressed	  and	  carried	  out	  through	  such	  pretenses	  –	  a	  veneer	  of	  politics-­‐as-­‐usual.	  One	   consequence	  of	   this	  paradox	   is	   that	   it	   shapes	   the	   sender’s	  deliberative	  process.	   	   This	   is	   an	   empirical	   pattern	   I	   touched	  on	   in	   the	   observable	   implications	  sub-­‐section	   above	   entitled	   “patterns	  of	   domestic	  debate”.	   	   It	   is	   also	   a	  pattern	   that	  recurs	  in	  the	  case	  studies	  and	  my	  interviews	  with	  first-­‐hand	  participants,	  so	  I	  strive	  to	  flag	  it	  for	  the	  reader	  in	  the	  chapters	  that	  follow.	  	  3.	  How	  it	  Impedes	  Structure	  	  Not	   only	   does	   this	   paradox	   shape	   how	   the	   deliberative	   process	   unfolds,	   it	  also	  changes	  the	  incidence	  of	  deliberative	  outcomes	  on	  the	  relevant	  study	  variables.	  	  It	  blunts	  the	  impact	  that	  the	  three	  structural	  forces	  usually	  exert	  on	  policy	  outcomes	  and	  elevates	  the	  importance	  of	  agency	  for	  reasons	  described	  below.	  
<Bureaucracy>	  Bureaucrats	   are	   hindered	   from	   putting	   their	   usual	   imprint	   on	   policy	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outcomes	   for	   two	   distinct	   reasons.	   	   First,	   bureaucracies	   tend	   to	   discourage	   risk-­‐taking,44	   and	   LSI	   is	   an	   area	   in	   which	   the	   personal	   and	   organizational	   risks	   of	  punishment	   can	   be	   exceedingly	   high.	   	   This	   helps	   deter	   lower-­‐level	   officials	   who	  would	  like	  LSI	  occur	  from	  pursuing	  it	  for	  fear	  of	  punitive	  consequences.	  Second,	   because	   written	   action	   is	   often	   important	   for	   building	   a	   winning	  coalition	  across	  offices	  and	  agencies,	  the	  introduction	  of	  prohibitive	  pressures	  that	  preclude	   formal	   modes	   of	   action	   may	   militate	   against	   efforts	   to	   assemble	   strong	  bureaucratic	  coalitions	  in	  favor	  of	  LSI.	  Third,	   this	   pressure	   against	   formal	   modes	   of	   action	   also	   increases	   the	  importance	  of	  being	  able	  to	  act	  without	  formal	  inter-­‐agency	  deliberations	  –	  that	  is,	  of	  being	  a	   leader	  senior	  enough	  to	  dispense	  with	  such	  formalities.	   	  As	  a	  result,	   the	  paper	   paradox	   coincidentally	   happens	   to	   select	   for	   cases	   in	   which	   leaders	   feel	   a	  distinct	   personal	   desire	   to	   undertake	   meddling.	   	   Under	   such	   circumstances,	   it	   is	  unlikely	  that	  bureaucracies	  will	  resist	  LSI	  against	  an	  engaged	  president.45	  
<International	  Structure>	  Not	  only	  does	  the	  paper	  paradox	  preclude	  the	  bureaucracy	  from	  acting	  as	  a	  biased	   agent,	   it	   also	   precludes	   them	   from	   being	   a	   faithful	   agent	   that	   serves	   as	  transmission	   belt	   for	   international	   structural	   pressures	   should	   those	   pressures	  conflict	   with	   leader	   beliefs.	   	   When	   normal	   political	   channels	   are	   blocked,	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It (Basic Books, 
1991), 69–70, 132–133, 191–192. 
45 Indeed, one of the most consistent findings by scholars who study the nexus between presidential and 
bureaucratic power is that bureaucracies loose when the president prioritizes and is therefore willing to allot 
precious personal attention and political capital to an issue. Neustadt, Presidential Power; Stephen D. 
Krasner, “Are Bureaucracies Important? (Or Allison Wonderland),” Foreign Policy, no. 7 (Summer 1972): 
159–179; Robert J. Art, “Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Critique,” Policy Sciences 
4, no. 4 (December 1973): 467–490; Peter W. Rodman, Presidential Command: Power, Leadership, and 
the Making of Foreign Policy from Richard Nixon to George W. Bush (Random House, 2010). 
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government	   cannot	   translate	   objective	   international	   interests	   into	   policy	   choices	  with	   typical	   automaticity.	   	   If	   meddling	   is	   in	   the	   national	   interest	   but	   a	   president	  thinks	   otherwise,	   even	   a	   bureaucracy	   that	   is	   faithful	   to	   structure	   has	   difficulty	  transforming	   geostrategic	   interests	   into	   outcomes.	   	   If	   meddling	   is	   against	   the	  national	   interest	   but	   supported	   by	   the	   president,	   it	   is	   unlikely	   that	   a	   structure-­‐faithful	  bureaucracy	  will	  prevail;	  in	  fact,	  it	  may	  not	  even	  get	  to	  weigh	  in.46	   	  And,	  as	  Saunders	   demonstrates	   in	   her	   study	   of	  military	   interventions,	   presidential	   beliefs	  about	   national	   interests	   and	   the	   nature	   of	   threats	   to	   those	   interests	   are	   often	  sufficient	  to	  determine	  U.S.	  policy-­‐making	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  objective	  environment.47	  Of	   course,	   devoted	   structural	   realists	  may	   find	   it	   somewhat	   contentious	   to	  suggest	   that	   dictates	   of	   the	   international	   system	   can	   be	   eclipsed	   in	   this	   manner.	  	  However,	  if	  they	  are	  willing	  to	  entertain	  Walt	  and	  Mearsheimer’s	  thesis	  that	  the	  pro-­‐Israel	   lobby	  wields	   considerable,	   perhaps	   excessive,	   power,	   then	  deductively	   they	  should	  be	  equally	  open	  to	  my	  argument	  here.48	  	  This	  is	  because	  both	  arguments	  rest	  upon	   a	   similar	   premise:	   that	   some	   domestic	   actor	   can	   be	   powerful	   enough	   to	  capture	  and	  dictate	  the	  nation’s	  foreign	  policy	  in	  spite	  of	  objective	  national	  interests.	  	  The	   only	   remaining	   question	   then	   is	   to	   inductively	   determine	   which	   camp	   in	  American	  domestic	  politics	  is	  calling	  the	  shots.	  
<Lobbies	  and	  Legislatures>	  Lobby	  groups	  and	  legislative	  officials	  are	  also	  constrained	  in	  their	  ability	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Of course, this is not to suggest I would like to pick unnecessary fights by claiming that I know the 
objective national interests of the United States or any other country.  Rather, the underlying point is that, 
hypothetically, these effects should hold regardless of what true national interests may be. 
47 Saunders, Leaders at War. 
48 John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, “The Israeli Lobby,” London Review of Books (March 10, 
2006); John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy (Macmillan, 
2007). 
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imprint	  preferences	  on	  policy	  outcomes	  due	  to	   features	  of	  LSI	  and	  the	  consequent	  paper	  paradox.	   	  First,	   this	   is	  because	   the	  politics-­‐as-­‐usual	  veneer	  and	  the	   informal	  procedures	  used	  by	  meddling	  leaders	  exacerbates	  a	  weakness	  of	  how	  the	  legislative	  branch	  exercises	  oversight.	  Scholars	   of	   American	   politics	   have	   demonstrated	   that	   Congress	   exercises	  oversight	  sporadically	   like	  a	   fire	  alarm,	  not	  comprehensively	   like	  a	  police	  patrol.49	  	  Rather	  than	  keeping	  a	  watchful	  eye	  for	  questionable	  executive	  behavior	  of	  all	  kinds,	  members	  of	  Congress	  jump	  from	  issue	  to	  issue	  whenever	  solid	  enough	  grounds	  exist	  for	  them	  to	  make	  political	  points	  from	  grandstanding.	  	  By	  maintaining	  a	  respectable	  exterior	   pretense,	   presidents	   may	   be	   able	   to	   slip	   in	   under	   the	   radar	   and	   avoid	  detection	  by	  Congressional	  fire	  alarms	  during	  some	  of	  their	  lower-­‐key	  efforts	  at	  LSI	  (described	  as	  “petit”	  LSI	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  the	  coding	  section	  below).	  Second,	  as	  noted	  above,	  presidents	  self-­‐select	  into	  LSI	  attempts	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  resolve.	  	  This	  is	  important	  for	  instances	  in	  which	  the	  stakes	  are	  high	  and	  the	  scale	   of	   the	   effort	   would	   be	   more	   dramatic	   (a	   subset	   of	   cases	   defined	   below	   as	  “grand”	   LSI).	   	   In	   these	   episodes,	   presidents	   are	  more	  willing	   than	   usual	   to	   risk	   a	  public	   fight	   or	   to	   threaten	   one	   in	   hopes	   of	   preemptively	   dissuading	   a	   legislative	  challenge.	   	   And,	   because	   presidents	   can	   come	   up	   with	   a	   reasonable	   sounding	  pretense	   for	  pursuing	  such	  efforts	  –	  such	  as	  advancing	   the	  peace	  process	  or	  other	  acts	   of	   purported	   moderation	   –	   they	   often	   have	   a	   sound	   basis	   for	   appealing	   (or	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Mathew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, “Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols 
Versus Fire Alarms,” American Journal of Political Science 28, no. 1 (February 1, 1984): 165–179.  In 
their original argument, McCubbins and Schwartz argue that the fire alarm-like nature of Congressional 
oversight should increase the power of lobby groups over the policy process.  In general, I agree; however, 
the low-level nature of “petit” efforts by the executive should have the opposite effect on oversight. 
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threatening	  to	  appeal)	  to	  public	  opinion	  should	  they	  need	  to.50	  These	  claims	  may	  strike	  some	  as	  quite	  drastic,	  but	  my	  case	  selection	  strategy	  offers	   certain	   advantages	   for	   allaying	   these	   concerns.	   	   By	   focusing	   on	   the	  Middle	  East	  peace	  process,	  U.S.-­‐Palestine,	  and	  U.S.-­‐Israel	  relations,	  I	  rig	  the	  deck	  in	  favor	  of	  lobby-­‐legislative	   theory	   by	   looking	   at	   cases	   in	   which	   the	   theory	   should	   face	   a	  favorable,	  easy	  test.	  	  If	  Theory	  #2	  remains	  limited	  in	  its	  explanatory	  power	  relative	  to	  leadership	  theory	  even	  under	  such	  favorable	  circumstances,	  that	  should	  provide	  better	   grounds	   for	   questioning	   the	   former’s	   applicability.	   	   I	   also	  note	   instances	   in	  which	   the	  behavior	  of	  officials	  seems	  to	  match	   the	  causal	  pathways	  described	   just	  above	  to	  reassure	  readers	  about	  the	  validity	  of	  my	  arguments.	  This	  project	  does	  not	  aim	  to	  disprove	  the	  Walt-­‐Mearsheimer	  thesis,	  although	  it	   certainly	   does	   bear	   on	   it.	   	   It	  may	   be	   true	   that	   a	   deep,	   generalized	   consequence	  (unintended,	   I	   would	   argue)	   of	   America’s	   staunch	   pro-­‐Israel	   posture	   has	   been	   to	  bolster	   the	  Likud	  by	  writing	   the	   right	  a	  blank	  check	   in	   Israel.	   	  However,	   the	   tale	   I	  relate	  in	  this	  project	  demonstrates	  that	  most	  U.S.	  presidents	  have	  actually	  evinced	  a	  systematic	   preference	   for	   the	   Israeli	   left,	   not	   the	   right,	   and	   sometimes	   they	   have	  even	   been	   willing	   to	   enact	   that	   preference	   into	   policy.	   	   The	   fact	   that	   this	   entire	  history	   can	   be	   written	   on	   the	   topic	   suggests	   that	  Walt	   and	   Mearsheimer’s	   thesis	  does	   not	   offer	   the	   most	   persuasive	   explanation	   for	   this	   aspect	   of	   U.S.-­‐Israel	  relations.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  cases	  that	  I	  explore	  on	  the	  U.S.-­‐Palestine	  dyad	  do	  seem	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 For instance, consider George H. W. Bush’s preemptive threats to the legislature to avoid a fight over 
loan guarantees in 1991-2. Novel documentation of these threats are described in more detail in chapter 
three. He argued that the public would support him against Congress if he claimed the steps were essential 
for promoting peace so soon after American soldiers risked their lives to protect Israel during the Gulf War. 
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to	   fit	  with	   their	   thesis	   in	  other	  ways.	   	  Those	  cases	  suggest	   that,	  as	   long	  as	   the	  U.S.	  maintains	  lets	  the	  peace	  process	  linger,	  there	  are	  limits	  on	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  it	  can	  bolster	  Palestinian	  moderates.	  	  4.	  Weighing	  Efficacy	  and	  Occurrence	  Although	  an	  idiosyncratic	  feature	  in	  the	  issue	  area	  of	  LSI	  appears	  to	  be	  that	  the	  impact	  of	  agency	  is	  unusually	  large,	  it	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  agency	  is	  going	  to	  be	  more	   consequential	   for	   explaining	   occurrence	   than	   efficacy	   in	   ways	   that	   are	  predictable,	  consistent,	  and	  systematic	   in	  nature.	   	  At	   the	  root	  of	   this	  pattern	   is	   the	  straightforward	  notion	  that	  the	  influence	  of	  leaders	  is	  undeniably	  stronger	  when	  it	  comes	   to	   deciding	   policy	   choices	   than	   influencing	   the	   results	   of	   those	   policies	  overseas.	   	   Thus,	   leadership	   theory	   explains	   more	   of	   the	   variation	   in	   one	   of	   my	  dependent	  variables	  (occurrence)	  than	  the	  other	  (efficacy).	  This	   is	   not	   to	   suggest	   that	   agency	   is	   unimportant	   for	   determining	   efficacy,	  and	  I	  seek	  to	  argue	  the	  opposite	  in	  the	  cases	  that	  follow.	  	  However,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  consider	  why	  we	  observe	  differential	  effects	  when	  comparing	  the	  two	  DVs	  and	  also	  when	  we	   look	   from	  case	   to	   case.	   	  At	   least	   three	  patterns	   are	  worth	  noting	   in	   this	  regard.	  First,	   leaders	   find	   it	  easier	   to	  tip	  close	  scales	  than	  to	  change	  the	  underlying	  balance	  of	  power	  in	  another	  society	  (let	  alone	  their	  own!).	   	  Thus,	  they	  are	  likely	  to	  achieve	   greater	   efficacy	   in	   short-­‐term	   attempts	   at	   LSI	   that	   focus	   upon	   a	   specific,	  impending	  leadership	  contest	  such	  as	  an	  election	  than	  when	  generalized,	  long-­‐term	  efforts	   without	   a	   specific	   terminus	   in	   mind.	   	   Long-­‐term	   efforts	   are	   also	   more	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challenging	  since	  leaders	  may	  be	  tempted	  to	  underinvest	  due	  to	  wishful,	  short-­‐term	  thinking	  and	  having	  to	  maintain	  a	  credible	  pretense	  over	  a	  longer	  period	  of	  time.	  	  Second,	  attempts	  are	  only	  successful	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  the	  gestures	  made	  by	  the	  sender	  state	  bolster	  the	  narrative	  and	  internal	  standing	  of	  the	  protégé	  faction.	  	  If	  the	  sorts	  of	  gestures	  required	  to	  really	  achieve	  this	  –	  as	  is	  often	  the	  case	  in	  the	  U.S.-­‐Palestine	   dyad	   –	   would	   require	   a	   comprehensive	   reconsideration	   of	   national	  strategy,	   efficacy	   becomes	   constrained.	   	   This	   sort	   of	   gesture	  would	   involve	  much	  broader	   considerations	   than	   just	   issues	   of	   leadership	   selection	   abroad	   and	   thus	  leader	  opinions	  about	  LSI	  may	  be	  outweighed	  by	  their	  opinions	  about	  the	  process	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  Instead,	  efficacy	  decreases	  because	  the	  sender	  sticks	  with	  simpler	  gestures	  that	  do	  not	  fully	  validate	  that	  narrative.	  Third,	  it	  often	  takes	  three	  to	  tango	  in	  order	  to	  validate	  a	  political	  narrative	  in	  the	   target	   polity,	   especially	   in	   the	   realm	   of	   peacemaking.	   	   Often,	   the	   sorts	   of	  deliverables	  that	  a	  protégé	  in	  the	  target	  state	  needs	  to	  succeed	  would	  have	  to	  come	  from	  the	  other	  society	  engaged	  in	  a	  peace	  process.	  	  It	  gets	  tougher	  for	  a	  leader	  in	  the	  sender	  state	  to	  deliver	  efficacious	  LSI	  because	  officials	  in	  the	  third	  polity	  have	  a	  veto	  that	   may	   scuttle	   the	   effort.	   	   Thus,	   bilateral	   gestures	   of	   LSI	   are	   more	   within	   the	  control	  of	  leaders	  than	  those	  requiring	  results	  in	  a	  multilateral	  diplomatic	  process.51	  Fourth,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  recognize	  that,	  in	  spite	  of	  having	  intelligence	  assets	  and	  other	  material	  resources,	  leaders	  operate	  like	  most	  of	  us	  behind	  a	  sizeable	  veil	  of	   uncertainty	   regarding	   future	   political	   outcomes.	   	   Naturally,	   this	   includes	  leadership	   contests	   both	   at	   home	   and	   abroad.	   	   Even	   when	   they	   have	   reason	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 For instance, American efforts to bolster Abu Mazen at the Aqaba summit in 2003 were undermined 
because Israeli PM Sharon was dismissive and confrontational in his public address. 
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expect	  that	  LSI	  could	  change	  political	  outcomes,	  they	  cannot	  know	  for	  sure	  whether	  the	  decisive	  issue	  will	  be	  something	  in	  their	  control	  or	  not.52	  In	  sum,	  top	  leaders	  are	  especially	  influential	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  LSI	  because	  the	  risks	  of	  exposure	  leads	  officials	  to	  avoid	  pursuing	  such	  attempts	  in	  writing	  through	  formal	   channels.	   	   This	   diminishes	   the	   impact	   of	   structural	   forces	   such	   as	  bureaucratic	   politics,	   objective	   international	   interests,	   or	   lobby	   groups	   and	  legislators.	  	  Finally,	  the	  effect	  of	  agency	  is	  greater	  with	  regard	  to	  LSI	  occurrence	  than	  LSI	  efficacy,	  but	  I	  strive	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  it	  still	  matters	  a	  great	  deal	  for	  both.	  	  	  
SECTION	  5:	  Case	  Selection	  
	   The	  following	  section	  explains	  my	  logic	  for	  case	  selection.	  	  First,	  I	  review	  how	  the	   case-­‐study	   method	   can	   provide	   useful,	   generalizable	   knowledge	   in	   a	   manner	  that	   is	   accurate	  and	  analytically	   rigorous.	   	   Second,	   I	   justify	  why	   I	  have	  chosen	   the	  case	  study	  method	  for	  this	  particular	  project.	  	  Third,	  I	  present	  the	  general	  criteria	  I	  employ	  for	  case	  selection	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  findings	  produced	  in	  this	  study	  are	  as	  valid	   and	   informative	   as	   possible.	   	   Fourth,	   I	   describe	   why	   the	   specific	   cases	  examined	  in	  this	  project	  fulfill	  these	  criteria	  well.	  	  1.	  Qualitative	  Research	  Methods	  	   Social	   science	   research	   seeks	   to	   establish	   basic	   facts	   about	   how	   the	  world	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 For instance, American efforts in 1996 to help Labor leader Shimon Peres at the polls probably helped 
bolster him at certain key points in the election campaign.  However, President Clinton could not have 
foreseen that an Israeli bomb aimed at Hezbollah but accidentally falling on a refugee site in Lebanon 
would swing the Israeli-Arab vote against Peres and place him behind Bibi just prior to elections. 
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works.53	   	   In	   order	   to	   establish	   laws	   about	   human	   behavior,	   scholars	   engage	   in	  theory	  testing,	  putting	  forward	  empirical	  evidence	  for	  evaluating	  the	  persuasiveness	  of	  prospective	  explanations.	   	  Of	  course,	   this	   is	  not	  always	  a	  simple	   task	  –	  scholars	  must	  try	  to	  give	  rival	  theories	  as	  fair	  consideration	  as	  possible	  –	  but	  theory	  testing	  remains	  their	  main	  preoccupation.54	  	   Of	  course,	  unlike	  in	  the	  hard	  sciences,	  in	  social	  science	  it	  is	  quite	  difficult	  to	  conduct	  true	  “experiments”,	  since	  application	  of	  the	  treatment	  effect	  is	  often	  beyond	  the	   control	   of	   researchers	   or	   unethical	   because	   it	   would	   cause	   harm	   to	   human	  subjects.55	  	  Instead,	  we	  tend	  to	  rely	  on	  observational	  studies	  of	  past	  events	  that	  are	  quasi-­‐experimental	  instead.56	  	   Within	  the	  realm	  of	  quasi-­‐experimental	  methods,	  there	  are	  a	  range	  of	  viable	  methodologies.	   	  For	  instance,	  one	  prominent	  technique	  for	  testing	  political	  science	  theories	   uses	   quantitative	   statistical	   methods	   to	   examine	   patterns	   among	   many	  different	  data	  points	   at	   once.	   	  Another	  prominent	   technique	  uses	  qualitative,	   case	  study	   methods	   to	   focus	   more	   deeply	   on	   causal	   processes	   in	   fewer	   cases.	   	   Thus,	  quantitative	  studies	  that	  examine	  are	  often	  described	  as	  “large-­‐n”	  (where	  “n”	  is	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Such research strives to produce “general statements about social phenomena” in which human behavior 
is “explained in terms of general laws established by observation”. Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune, 
The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry (Wiley-Interscience, 1970), 4. 
54 The challenges of fair theory testing have been the subject of prolonged debates in the philosophy of 
science. For more on these challenges, see Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (New York: 
Basic Books, 1959); Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1962); Lakatos, “Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes.” 
55 For instance, consider the monumental moral and practical problems that would be involved if one 
sought to establish knowledge about LSI by forcing the a government to meddle in some countries at some 
times but not others and then to examine the results for interesting patterns. 
56 Donald Thomas Campbell and Julian C. Stanley, Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for 
Research (Rand McNally, 1973). NB There is a valuable and growing movement toward the use of true 
experimental methods in political science. However, these projects usually take place in the context of a 
laboratory, and the method only applies to a certain range of research questions. Rose McDermott, 
“Experimental Methods in Political Science,” Annual Review of Political Science 5, no. 1 (2002): 31–61. 
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number	   of	   cases	   under	   consideration),	   whereas	   qualitative	   projects	   are	   often	  described	  as	   “small-­‐n”.	   	  However,	   it	  would	  be	  erroneous	   to	   claim	  as	   some	  do	   that	  qualitative	   studies	   are	   therefore	   inferior	   because	   they	   allegedly	   look	   at	   less	   data;	  indeed,	  “qualitative	  and	  unscientific	  are	  hardly	  synonymous”.57	  Because	   both	   approaches	   are	   quasi-­‐experimental	   in	   nature,	   they	   share	  common	   inferential	   limits.	   	  Neither	   quantitative	   nor	   qualitative	  methods	   can	   ever	  isolate	  and	  witness	  causation	  firsthand,	  since	  for	  any	  given	  object	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  apply	  both	  a	  causal	   treatment	  and	  a	  causal	  non-­‐treatment	  at	   the	  same	  moment	   in	  time.	   	  This	  is	  what	  Holland	  terms	  “the	  fundamental	  problem	  of	  causal	  inference”.58	  	  Rather,	  scholars	  must	  place	  trust	  in	  their	  secondary	  assumptions	  about	  how	  groups	  of	  objects	  are	  equivalent	  and	  to	  invoke	  ephemeral	  counterfactual	  assumptions	  about	  what	  would	  have	  happened	  in	  an	  alternate	  world	  where	  the	  incidence	  of	  treatments	  and	  non-­‐treatments	  had	  been	  different.59	  Nor	   do	   qualitative	   studies	   necessarily	   entail	   utilizing	   less	   data.	   	   Whereas	  quantitative	   studies	  have	   a	   large	  number	  of	   data-­‐set	   observations	   (i.e.	   their	   “n”	   is	  high),	   this	   tends	   to	   require	   a	   tradeoff	   in	   terms	   of	   causal-­‐process	   observations.60	  	  Under	   traditional	   quantitative	   approaches,	   each	   “n”	   allows	   for	   only	   one	   or	   two	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 The quote is from George and McKeown, emphases removed. Alexander L. George and Timothy J. 
McKeown, “Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision Making,” Advances in Information 
Processing in Organizations 2, no. 1985 (1985): 54. The claim that qualitative studies are inferior is most 
notably advanced in Arend Lijphart, “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method,” The American 
Political Science Review 65, no. 3 (1971): 682–693; Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, 
Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton University Press, 1994). 
58 Paul W. Holland, “Statistics and Causal Inference,” Journal of the American Statistical Association 81, 
no. 396 (December 1986): 947–8. See also King, Keohane, and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry, 91–97. 
59 James D. Fearon, “Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science,” World Politics 43, no. 2 
(January 1991): 169–195; Timothy J. McKeown, “Case Studies and the Statistical Worldview: Review of 
King, Keohane, and Verba’s ‘Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research’,” 
International Organization 53, no. 01 (1999): 161–190; Henry E. Brady and David Collier, Rethinking 
Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards (Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), 25–36. 
60 Brady and Collier, Rethinking Social Inquiry, 252–264. 
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points	   of	   observation.	   	   However,	   observations	   about	   the	   order,	   presence,	   and	  interaction	   of	   causal	   factors	  within	   a	   single	   “n”	   at	   different	   points	   in	   time	   can	   be	  useful	  if	  not	  invaluable	  information.61	  	  This	  information	  helps	  the	  researcher	  ensure	  that	   future	   quantitative	   studies	   are	   conducted	  well	   and	   are	   less	   inclined	   to	   suffer	  from	  omitted	  variable	  bias	  or	  erroneous	  mixing	  of	  incomparable	  case	  types.	  	   Of	   course,	   none	   of	   this	   is	   to	   claim	   that	   case	   studies	   are	   superior	   to	  quantitative	  studies,	  either.	  	  Rather,	  the	  two	  methods	  are	  comparable	  with	  regard	  to	  their	   true	   inferential	   validity,	   and	   scholars	   must	   make	   tradeoffs	   picking	   between	  them.	  	  Ideally,	  they	  should	  do	  so	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  intended	  subject	  matter.	  	  2.	  Why	  Case	  Studies?	  	   Which	  sorts	  of	  methods	  are	  best	  suited	  to	  this	  subject	  matter?	  	  I	  believe	  that	  case	  study	  methods	  are	  suited	  for	  this	  project	  due	  to	  inherent	  features	  of	  LSI	  itself.	  	  Since	   leadership	   selection	   intervention	   has	   been	   neglected	   to	   date	   as	   a	   topic	   for	  comparative	   inquiry,	   there	   is	   no	   ready-­‐made	   universe	   of	   cases	   with	   which	   to	  conduct	  statistical	  studies,	  and	  I	  believe	  that	  there	  are	  considerable	  impediments	  at	  this	  point	  in	  time	  to	  building	  a	  valid	  set	  of	  this	  sort	  that	  is	  also	  comprehensive.	  First,	  LSI	  is	  a	  phenomenon	  that	  is	  inherently	  difficult	  to	  identify	  when	  it	  does	  take	   place.	   	   Since	   meddling	   in	   another	   country’s	   sovereign	   politics	   is	   taboo	   and	  sender	  governments	  try	  to	  maintain	  a	  veneer	  of	  respectability,	  LSI	  is	  hard	  to	  identify	  accurately	  in	  practice.	  	  In	  fact,	  it	  may	  be	  much	  harder	  to	  compile	  large-­‐n	  data	  for	  LSI	  than	   other,	   more-­‐visible	   phenomena	   in	   international	   relations,	   such	   as	   wars,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Of course, time series statistics are one solution to this challenge.  However, this still does not resolve the 
prior challenge of first learning by causal process observation what types of data one needs to be collecting. 
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occupations,	  national	  power,	  or	  militarized	  inter-­‐state	  disputes.62	  Second,	   the	   hard-­‐to-­‐see	   nature	   of	   LSI	   not	   only	   necessitates	   a	   high	   level	   of	  effort,	  it	  also	  creates	  a	  high	  risk	  of	  false	  negatives	  when	  enumerating	  instances	  of	  it.	  	  Many	   episodes	   of	   LSI	  may	   be	   so	   subtle	   that	   upon	   careful	   consideration	   they	  may	  seem	  like	  non-­‐cases	  –	  or	  they	  may	  not	  even	  attract	  researchers’	  consideration	  at	  all.	  	  And	   it	   is	   difficult	   to	   know	  without	   direct	   investigation	  whether	   or	   not	   such	   false	  negatives	  might	  be	  correlated	  in	  a	  way	  that	  would	  systematically	  bias	  the	  findings.	  Third,	  because	  conspiracy	  theories	  about	  meddling	  across	  borders	  are	  both	  pervasive	   and	  durable,	   building	   a	  data	   set	   runs	   a	   simultaneous	   risk	  of	   lumping	   in	  false	   positives	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   folk	   wisdom	  when	   evidence	   is	   scarce.	   	   If	   common	  knowledge	   holds	   that	   certain	   episodes	   are	   LSI	   but	   hard	   proof	   is	   not	   forthcoming,	  what	  is	  the	  scholar	  to	  do?	  	  This	  is	  especially	  problematic	  when	  looking	  far	  and	  wide	  for	   cases	   but	   not	   very	   deeply	   into	   specific	   episodes,	   and	   it	   involves	   a	   similar	  possibility	  of	  introducing	  systematic	  bias	  into	  the	  project’s	  findings.	  Fourth,	  because	  little	  theorizing	  that	  has	  been	  done	  on	  the	  topic,	  there	  is	  also	  the	   risk	   of	   mixing	   incomparable	   types	   of	   cases	   into	   the	   same	   data	   set.	   	   This	  heterogeneity-­‐of-­‐types	  problem	  is	  not	  negligible;	  indeed,	  the	  validity	  of	  comparative	  analysis	   depends	   upon	   knowing	  when	   one	   is	   comparing	   apples	   to	   oranges	   rather	  than	  apples	   to	  apples.63	   	  Case	  studies	  offer	  an	  excellent	  means	   for	  developing	   this	  richer	   conceptual	   and	   causal	   understanding	   of	   LSI	   that	  will	   benefit	   the	   field	   as	   it	  hopefully	   develops	   a	   large-­‐n	   research	   program	   in	   coming	   years.	   	   This	   is	   a	   key	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Even then, datasets on these other topics have consumed the labor of generations of teams of researchers. 
63 Richard M. Locke and Kathleen Thelen, “Problems of Equivalence in Comparative Politics: Apples and 
Oranges, Again,” Newsletter of the APSA Organized Section in Comparative Politics 9, no. 1 (1998): 9–12. 
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strength	  of	  the	  qualitative	  approach	  because	  of	  its	  more	  exploratory	  nature.64	  	  3.	  Case	  Selection	  Criteria	  	   One	   of	   the	   main	   challenges	   that	   studies	   assessing	   policy	   efficacy	   must	  confront	   the	   risk	   that	   findings	   generated	   from	   a	   sample	   of	   observations	   may	   be	  skewed	   in	   a	   manner	   that	   is	   not	   representative	   of	   the	   broader	   population,	   also	  known	  as	  selection	  bias.65	  	  This	  project	  is	  therefore	  designed	  to	  minimize	  such	  risks.	  	   First,	   by	   looking	   at	   a	   small	   number	   of	   dyads	   in	   great	   depth	   I	   am	   able	   to	  compare	  instances	  that	  resulted	  in	  LSI	  with	  periods	  involving	  similar	  circumstances	  that	  did	  not	  –	  or	  in	  which	  LSI	  was	  considered	  but	  rejected.	  	  This	  helps	  minimize	  one	  kind	   of	   selection	   bias	   by	   ensuring	   that	   important	   causal	   processes	   that	   are	   only	  observable	  in	  the	  non-­‐cases	  are	  not	  lurking	  just	  out	  of	  sight.66	  In	   technical	   terms,	   this	   approach	   is	   called	   Mill’s	   method	   of	   difference,	   by	  which	  the	  researcher	  seeks	  to	  tease	  out	  causal	  processes	  through	  contrasting	  cases	  with	  many	  similar	  characteristics	  but	  different	  values	  on	  the	  main	  study	  variables.67	  	  This	  approach	  permits	  blocking	  out	  a	  good	  deal	  of	  noise	  that	  is	  unrelated	  to	  the	  core	  topic	   of	   interest.	   	   Since	   any	   two	   cases	   on	   the	   same	   directed	   dyad	   have	   many	  extraneous	   variables	   in	   common,	   we	   can	   presume	   that	   those	   variables	   are	   not	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences 
(MIT Press, 2005), sec. “Strengths of Case Study Methods” on pages 19–22; David Collier and Steven 
Levitsky, “Research Note - Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research,” 
World Politics 49, no. 3 (1997): 430–451. 
65 David A. Baldwin, “Success and Failure in Foreign Policy,” Annual Review of Political Science 3, no. 1 
(2000): 167–182; James D. Fearon, “Selection Effects and Deterrence,” International Interactions 28, no. 1 
(2002): 5–29. 
66 Daniel W. Drezner, “The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion,” International Organization 57, no. 03 
(2003): 643–659; Edward E. Leamer, “Let’s Take the Con Out of Econometrics,” The American Economic 
Review 73, no. 1 (March 1983): 39; Brady and Collier, Rethinking Social Inquiry, 230. 
67 Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science, 57. 
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responsible	  for	  the	  particular	  instances	  of	  variation	  observed.	  A	   third	   benefit	   of	   this	   approach	   is	   that	   it	   maximizes	   the	   return	   on	   case-­‐specific,	   contextual	   knowledge.	   	   Looking	   longitudinally	   at	   one	   or	   two	  main	   dyads	  over	  time	  helps	  the	  researcher	  overcome	  the	   false	  negatives	  problem	  noted	  above	  by	  catching	  subtle,	   less	  well-­‐known	   instances	  of	  LSI	  on	   those	  dyads	  as	  well	  as	   the	  more	  prominent	  ones	  that	  otherwise	  might	  be	  cherry-­‐picked	  for	  a	  large-­‐n	  study.	  	   However,	  focusing	  on	  explaining	  all	  of	  the	  relevant	  events	  in	  just	  one	  or	  two	  dyads	   also	   has	   its	   shortcomings.	   	   It	   maximizes	   internal	   validity	   (correct	  understanding	   of	   causal	   processes	   in	   the	   sample	   of	   cases	   that	   are	   studied),	   but	   it	  raises	   challenges	  on	   the	   level	  of	   external	   validity	   (i.e.	  whether	   that	  understanding	  accurately	  reflects	  patterns	  for	  the	  broader	  population	  of	  cases).	  	  	  	   Therefore,	   I	   adopt	   another	   technique	   for	   avoiding	   selection	   bias	   that	   is	  designed	  to	  provide	  at	  least	  a	  moderate	  boost	  in	  external	  validity:	  the	  use	  of	  shadow	  cases.	   	  Shadow	  cases	  are	  qualitative	  studies	  of	  a	  much	  shorter	  length	  and	  intensity	  than	  those	  that	  make	  up	  the	  core	  of	  the	  project.	   	  By	  providing	  additional	  variation	  on	  a	  few	  additional	  dimensions	  that	  might	  be	  salient	  to	  the	  study	  variables,	  shadow	  cases	  reassure	  us	  that	  certain	  initial	  findings	  are	  generalizable	  and	  help	  distinguish	  those	  that	  are	  simply	  idiosyncratic	  to	  the	  core	  cases.	  	  However,	  this	  is	  not	  to	  suggest	  that	   idiosyncratic	   findings	  are	  without	  worth,	   if	   the	  cases	  under	  consideration	  are	  themselves	   critical	   for	   us	   to	   comprehend	   –	   which	   happens	   to	   be	   one	   of	   my	  remaining	  case	  selection	  criteria.	  Having	   attempted	   to	   address	   the	   issue	   of	   selection	   bias,	   I	   employ	   four	  additional	  criteria	  for	  case	  selection:	  (1)	  substantive	  importance,	  (2)	  historiographic	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value,	   (3)	   suitability	   to	   the	   strengths	   of	   the	   researcher,	   and	   (4)	   critical	   values	   for	  theory-­‐testing.	   	   First,	   substantive	   importance	   is	   a	   powerful	   criterion	   for	   case	  selection	  that	   is	  often	  dismissed	  by	  researchers	   in	  principle	  but	   then	  employed	  by	  them	  in	  practice.68	  	  However,	  the	  field	  gains	  an	  additional	  benefit	  when	  the	  episodes	  and	  countries	  studied	  by	  scholars	  are	  of	  intrinsic	  importance	  for	  the	  overall	  field	  of	  study	  (in	  this	  instance,	  geopolitics).	  	   Second,	   substantive	   importance	   goes	   hand	   in	   hand	   with	   historiographic	  value.	   	   If	   telling	   a	   neglected	   tale	   fills	   an	   important	   gap	   in	   our	   collective	   historical	  understanding,	  then	  it	  contributes	  not	  only	  to	  our	  knowledge	  of	  patterns	  of	  behavior	  but	   also	   the	   chronological	   record.	   	   Considering	   this	   criterion	   is	   all	   the	   more	  important	  given	   the	   current	   relative	  neglect	  of	  diplomatic	  history	   in	   the	  academic	  discipline	  of	  history.69	   	  Also,	   the	   longitudinal	   framework	  used	   to	  address	  selection	  bias	  in	  this	  project	  applies	  well	  to	  the	  historical	  approach.	  	   Third,	   qualitative	   studies	   can	   be	  more	   informative	  when	   the	   specific	   cases	  examined	   are	   critical	   values	   for	   the	   theories	   being	   tested.	   	   This	  means	   that	   cases	  should	   be	   especially	   suited	   to	   theory	   testing	   because	   they	   take	   place	   under	  circumstances	   in	   which	   the	   theories	   offer	   particularly	   explicit	   and	   certain	  predictions.	   	  Some	  of	  these	  may	  include	  what	  Van	  Evera	  calls	  a	  “hoop	  test,”	   in	  that	  the	   cases	   selected	   provide	   what	   should	   be	   an	   easy	   test	   for	   the	   theory	   to	   pass	   if	  correct.	   70	   	   I	   select	   cases	   that	   should	   showcase	   the	  power	  of	   legislators	   and	   lobby	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Ibid., 86–87. 
69 Marc Trachtenberg, The Craft of International History: A Guide to Method (Princeton University Press, 
2006). For a more optimistic perspective, see Thomas W. Zeiler, “The Diplomatic History Bandwagon: A 
State of the Field,” The Journal of American History (March 2009): 1053–1073. 
70 Harry Eckstein, “Chapter 4: Case Study and Theory in Political Science,” in Regarding Politics: Essays 
on Political Theory, Stability, and Change (University of California Press, 1992), 152–163; Van Evera, 
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groups	   in	   order	   to	   demonstrate	   the	   theory	   failing	   an	   especially	   easy	   test.	   	   This	  should	  help	  bolster	  for	  my	  claims	  that	  other	  theoretical	  approaches	  seem	  to	  provide	  a	  stronger	  explanation	  of	  the	  data.	  In	  short,	  a	  robust	  approach	  to	  case	  selection	  for	  this	  project	  would	  rely	  upon	  a	  very	  small	  number	  of	   longitudinal,	  directed	  dyads	  and	  a	  handful	  of	  shadow	  case	  episodes	   as	   a	  nod	   to	   external	   validity	   toward	   the	   end	  of	   the	   endeavor.	   	  All	   things	  being	  equal,	   they	  should	  also	  be	  cases	  that	  are	  substantively	   important,	  contribute	  to	   the	  historiography,	  play	   to	   the	  strengths	  of	   the	  researcher,	  and	  serve	  as	  critical	  cases	  for	  one	  or	  more	  of	  the	  theories.	  	  4.	  Cases	  Examined	  in	  this	  Project	  	   What	   specific	   cases	  best	   fulfill	   these	   general	   criteria?	   	   For	   the	   core	   cases,	   I	  choose	  to	  study	  U.S.	  efforts	  to	  influence	  in	  the	  internal	  politics	  of	  Israel	  since	  1977	  and	   the	   Palestinian	   Authority	   since	   1986.	   	   Additionally,	   Chapter	   11	   provides	   a	  shadow	  case	  exploring	  American	  intervention	  in	  Iranian	  politics	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  some	  data	  beyond	   the	  Arab-­‐Israeli	   conflict	   and	  Mideast	  peace	  process.	   	   I	   also	   flag	  additional	  instances	  of	  LSI	  by	  third	  parties	  in	  the	  PA	  or	  Israel	  when	  they	  occur,	  since	  doing	  so	  adds	  to	  both	  external	  validity	  and	  analytical	  leverage	  on	  the	  core	  cases.	  	  	  With	   regard	   to	   time	   bounds,	   I	   use	   1977	   as	   the	   nominal	   starting	   point	   for	  cases	  of	  U.S.	  meddling	  toward	  Israel,	  since	  it	  denotes	  the	  first	  point	  at	  which	  Israel	  moved	   from	   a	   dominant-­‐party	   system	   to	   one	   with	   a	   viable	   right-­‐wing,	   Likud	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science, 30–34; George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory 
Development, 120–123. 
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challenge	   to	   the	   center-­‐left	   power	   of	   Labor.71	   	   For	   the	   Palestinian	   case,	   I	   focus	  especially	   on	   the	   period	   since	   the	   signing	   of	   the	   Oslo	   Accords	   in	   1993	   and	   the	  consequent	  creation	  of	  the	  Palestinian	  Authority	  the	  following	  year.	  	  Although	  I	  note	  in	  Chapter	  8	  how	  the	  US	  sometimes	  sought	  to	  undermine	  the	  PLO	  before	  the	  early	  1990’s,	  America’s	  interest	  in	  the	  movement	  increased	  dramatically	  after	  its	  leaders	  moved	  to	  recognize	  Israel	  and	  participate	  in	  the	  peace	  process.	  The	   cases	   I	   have	   chosen	   for	   the	   core	   of	   this	   project	   do	   an	   excellent	   job	   of	  satisfying	  the	  methodological	  needs	  of	  the	  subject	  matter.	   	  First,	  they	  each	  bear	  an	  extensive	   track	   record	   of	   LSI	   by	   the	   United	   States	   that	   can	   be	   employed	   as	   the	  longitudinal	  case	  studies	  called	  for	  in	  the	  sections	  above.72	  	  Especially	  on	  the	  Israel	  dyad,	  there	  are	  also	  instances	  of	  non-­‐cases	  for	  comparison,	  as	  well	  as	  both	  grand	  LSI	  and	   petit,	   more	   subtle	   cases.	   	   Thus,	   the	   cases	   make	   good	   candidates	   for	   the	  longitudinal	  studies	  by	  having	  numerous	  points	  of	  leverage	  and	  comparison.	  Second,	  the	  cases	  are	  substantively	  important.	  The	  Arab-­‐Israeli	  conflict	  is	  one	  of	   the	   most	   prominent	   flashpoints	   in	   international	   politics	   today.	   	   It	   occupies	   a	  notable	  place	   in	   the	  global	  public	  consciousness;	   is	  a	  major	   focus	  of	   foreign	  policy	  for	   the	   United	   States,	   Arab,	   and	   European	   states;	   and	   has	   severe	   effects	   on	   the	  quality	  of	   life	   for	  millions	  of	  people	   in	   the	   region.	   	  Additionally,	   it	  makes	   sense	   to	  study	   US-­‐Israel	   and	   US-­‐Palestinian	   cases	   together	   because	   joint	   examination	  provides	  a	  fuller	  picture	  of	  U.S.	  policy	  toward	  the	  conflict.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 I also briefly note one or two episodes before 1977 during which LSI could have been pursued but 
probably was not. Those instances took place in 1954 and 1973. 
72 For recognition of US-Israel LSI as a historical phenomenon, see Aaron David Miller, “U.S. Acts as 
Though It Seeks Regime Change in Israel - Los Angeles Times,” Los Angeles Times, April 12, 2010.  For 
an excellent overview of America’s leadership selection intervention in the PA, see Michele Dunne, “A 
Two-State Solution Requires Palestinian Politics,” Carnegie Papers: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace 113 (June 2010). 
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Third,	   the	   cases	   are	   ripe	   for	   historiographic	   contributions.	   	   I	   have	   found	   a	  gripping	  but	  forgotten	  story	  that	  I	  believe	  needs	  to	  be	  told.	  	  The	  record	  of	  American	  meddling	  in	  the	  internal	  politics	  of	  Israel	  and	  of	  the	  PA	  is	  a	  fascinating,	  scandalous,	  instructive,	   and	   largely	   unknown	   tale.	   	   In	   presenting	   this	   chronology,	   I	   not	   only	  extract	  insights	  for	  IR	  theory	  and	  policy-­‐makers,	  I	  also	  address	  a	  notable	  gap	  in	  the	  history	  of	   the	   region.	   	   Conscious	  meddling	  of	   this	   sort	   features	  minimally	   in	  most	  studies	   of	   the	   conflict,	   U.S.	   policy	   toward	   it,	   and	   Palestinian	   or	   Israeli	   political	  history.73	  	  I	  provide	  new	  evidence	  about	  long-­‐suspected	  cases,	  point	  out	  some	  new	  ones,	   and	   collect	   in	   one	   place	   the	   most	   comprehensive	   record	   about	   this	   sort	   of	  behavior	   in	  America’s	  peace	  process	  diplomacy.	   	   I	  make	  a	  special	  effort	  synthesize	  new	  evidence	   through	   the	  use	  of	   interviews,	   especially	   for	   the	  more	   recent	   cases,	  and	  underutilized	  archival	  sources	  for	  older	  ones.	  	   Fourth,	   these	   episodes	   provide	   a	   critical	   case	   for	   theory	   testing.	   	   If	  we	   are	  looking	  to	  see	  a	  strong	  role	  in	  LSI	  for	  structural	  forces	  –	  particularly	  the	  legislative	  branch	   and	   lobby	   groups	   –	   then	   policy	   toward	   this	   conflict	   should	   be	   the	   easiest	  possible	   test	   for	   such	   explanations.	   	   If,	   however,	   leaders	   still	   appear	   to	   have	  extensive	   leeway	   for	  shaping	  behavior	  and	  outcomes	  even	   in	   this	  most	  unlikely	  of	  cases,	   it	   strengthens	   the	   claim	   that	  agency	  matters.	   	   Sixth,	   the	   consideration	  of	   an	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 For instance, consider Mark A. Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Indiana University 
Press, 1994); Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 
1949-1993 (Oxford University Press, 1999); Baruch Kimmerling and Joel S. Migdal, The Palestinian 
People: A History (Harvard University Press, 2003); Ilan Pappé, A History of Modern Palestine: One Land, 
Two Peoples (Cambridge University Press, 2006); Patrick Tyler, A World of Trouble: The White House and 
the Middle East--from the Cold War to the War on Terror (Macmillan, 2010); Mearsheimer and Walt, The 
Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy; Howard Morley Sachar, A History of Israel: From the Rise of 
Zionism to Our Time (Knopf, 2007); Daniel Kurtzer and Scott Lasensky, Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace: 
American Leadership in the Middle East (US Institute of Peace Press, 2008); William B. Quandt, Peace 
Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967, 3rd ed. (Brookings Institution 
Press and the University of California Press, 2005); Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli 
Conflict: A History with Documents (Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2009). 
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Iran	   case	   offers	   variation	   along	   a	   range	   of	   additional	   study	   variables	   in	   order	   to	  boost	  our	  confidence	  that	  findings	  from	  the	  Arab-­‐Israeli	  peace	  process	  apply	  beyond	  that	  particular	  historical	  context.	  	   Fifth,	  along	  the	  way	  I	  also	  note	  some	  parallel	  instances	  of	  LSI	  that	  tie	  into	  the	  core	  cases.	  	  This	  includes	  both	  reciprocal	  cases	  of	  LSI	  by	  targets	  toward	  the	  sender	  and	   instances	   of	   meddling	   in	   Israel	   or	   the	   PA	   by	   third	   party	   actors.	   	   These	   are	  helpful	  for	  providing	  historical	  and	  analytical	  leverage	  to	  better	  understand	  the	  core	  cases	  themselves.	  	  For	  instance,	  it	  helps	  clarify	  why	  the	  U.S.	  did	  nor	  did	  not	  conduct	  LSI	  toward	  one	  of	  the	  target	  polities	  when	  the	  decision	  can	  be	  compared	  to	  that	  of	  a	  neighboring	   state	   that	   pondered	   a	   similar	   dilemma	   and	   may	   have	   reached	   a	  different	   conclusion.	   	   These	   parallel	   examples	   even	   include	   some	   surprising	  instances	  of	  Arab	  states	  backing	  the	  right-­‐wing	  Likud	  Party	  in	  Israel.	  	  
SECTION	  6:	  Coding	  &	  Measurement	  
In	   this	   section,	   I	   briefly	   address	   the	   techniques	  used	   for	   coding	  data	   in	   the	  case	   studies	   that	   follow.	   	   I	   discuss	   three	   relevant	   types	   of	   criteria:	   standards	   for	  coding	  occurrence,	  for	  coding	  efficacy,	  and	  for	  overall	  evidentiary	  standards.	  	  1.	  Coding	  Occurrence	  I	  code	  a	  particular	  time	  span	  of	  a	  directed	  dyad	  as	  an	  LSI	  attempt	  if	   foreign	  policies	   of	   the	   sender	   state	   were	   crafted	   by	   its	   officials	   with	   the	   explicit	   hope	   in	  mind	  of	  influencing	  leadership	  selection	  in	  the	  target	  country.	  	  Thus,	  policy-­‐makers	  must	  not	  only	  express	  a	  private	  or	  public	  preference	  for	  one	  faction	  over	  another	  in	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the	  target	  state,	  but	  they	  also	  must	  change	  policy	  with	  that	  goal	  in	  mind.74	  	   This	  usually	  entails	  one	  of	   three	  different	   levels	  of	  meddling	  attempts.	   	  The	  first	   seeks	   to	   change	   the	   distribution	   of	   formal	   offices	   in	   the	   target	   state,	  reconfiguring	   the	   cast	   of	   individuals	   who	   hold	   seats	   in	   government.	   	   I	   term	   this	  category	   “grand	   LSI”.	   	   The	   second	   seeks	   to	   influence	   the	   relations	   among	   those	  individuals	  without	  changing	  the	  distribution	  of	  formal	  offices,	  while	  the	  third	  seeks	  to	  strengthen	  a	  sitting	  leader	  in	  order	  to	  withstand	  a	  possible	  challenge	  or	  to	  pursue	  a	  controversial	  policy	  program.	  	  These	  I	  term	  “petit	  LSI”.	   	  In	  practice,	  I	  find	  that	  all	  three	   types	  of	  behavior	  display	  enough	   common	  characteristics	   to	  be	   comfortably	  grouped	  together	  under	  the	  rubric	  of	  leadership	  selection	  intervention.	  I	   also	   distinguish	   at	   times	   between	   positive	   and	   negative	   instances	   of	   LSI.	  	  Positive	   LSI	   seeks	   to	   support	   sitting	   officials,	   whereas	   negative	   LSI	   seeks	   to	  undermine	  them.	  	  Understandably,	  the	  latter	  tends	  to	  involve	  tactics	  that	  are	  more	  confrontational	  than	  the	  former.	  Third,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   recognize	   that	   a	   certain	   number	   of	   cases	   fall	  somewhere	  in	  the	  grey	  zone	  between	  full	  occurrence	  and	  full	  non-­‐occurrence.	  	  Thus,	  I	   often	   describe	   these	   cases	   as	   “near-­‐attempts”	   (aka	   “near-­‐LSI”)	   when	   shaping	  leadership	  selection	  in	  the	  target	  state	  is	  considered	  at	  top	  levels	  as	  a	  policy	  option	  but	   is	   ultimately	   rejected.	   	   I	   also	  make	   note	   of	   cases	   in	   which	   LSI	   is	   solicited	   by	  prominent	  officials	  in	  the	  target	  state	  but	  rebuffed	  by	  the	  potential	  sender.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 NB This does not preclude the possibility of hybrid episodes in which the sender attempts multiple, 
concurrent varieties of intervention toward the same target state concurrently. Sometimes the sender state 
seeks to affect multiple targets-of-influence in the target state at the same time (not just ruling coalition but 
also policies or regime institutions).  This should be coded as LSI occurrence so long as shaping the target’s 
ruling coalition remains one of these goals and the means employed do not escalate to the use of force. 
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  2.	  Coding	  Efficacy	  I	   code	   the	   efficacy	   of	   LSI	   according	   to	   two	   indicators:	   narrow	   and	   broader	  success.	  	  An	  attempt	  is	  coded	  as	  a	  narrow	  success	  if	  it	  successfully	  skews	  leadership	  selection	  in	  the	  target	  state	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  sender’s	  preferred	  faction.	  	  However,	  this	  is	   only	   part	   of	  what	   efficacy	  means	   in	   the	   context	   of	   LSI.	   	   In	   order	   to	   be	   coded	   a	  broader	  success,	  an	  attempt	  must	  not	  only	  skew	   leadership	  selection	   in	   the	   target	  state	  but	  do	  so	   in	  a	  manner	   that	   furthers	   the	  underlying	  policy	  goals	   that	   justified	  LSI	   in	   the	   first	  place.	   	   If	  policy-­‐makers	   in	   the	   sender	   state	  attempt	  LSI	   toward	   the	  target	  in	  hopes	  of	  making	  bilateral	  relations	  with	  the	  target	  state	  more	  amicable	  but	  narrow	   success	   shaping	   leadership	   selection	   does	   not	   have	   salutary	   effects	   on	  bilateral	  ties,	  such	  a	  case	  would	  be	  coded	  as	  a	  broader	  failure.	  It	   should	  be	  noted	   that	   these	  metrics	   for	  efficacy	  are	  not	   the	  same	   thing	  as	  necessary-­‐and-­‐sufficient	   causation.	   	   Indeed,	  my	   reasoning	  here	   is	   informed	  by	   the	  exchange	   in	   International	   Security	   between	   Kim	   Elliott	   and	   Robert	   Pape.75	  	  Insistence	   on	   such	   a	   rigid	   standard	   would	   set	   the	   bar	   too	   high	   and	   produce	   the	  misleading	   finding	   that	   influence	   attempts	   simply	   never	   work	   and	   display	   no	  variation	  in	  terms	  of	  efficacy.	  Instead,	   I	   employ	   a	   causal	   threshold	   of	   contributory	   causation.	   	   Narrow	  success	  does	  not	  mean	   that	   intervention	   is	   the	  only	   factor	  working	   in	   favor	  of	   the	  protégé	  candidate.	  	  It	  takes	  a	  multitude	  of	  factors	  to	  put	  a	  candidate	  past	  the	  finish	  line;	  I	  mainly	  seek	  to	  establish	  whether	  the	  sender’s	  efforts	  gave	  her	  a	  useful	  push	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Pape 1997; Elliott 1998; Pape 1998.  See also Baldwin 2000b; Baldwin 2000a. 
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that	   direction.	   	   Similarly,	   broader	   success	   requires	   just	   that	   the	   sender’s	   broader	  goals	  were	  incrementally	  but	  notably	  advanced,	  not	  achieved	  in	  whole.	  In	  order	  to	  minimize	  problems	  of	  selection	  bias,	  I	  also	  evaluate	  policy	  efficacy	  in	  cases	  of	  non-­‐	  or	  near-­‐LSI.	   	   In	   these	   instances,	   I	  seek	  to	  assess	  whether	  avoiding	  conscious	  meddling	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  a	  more	  beneficial	  policy	  for	  the	  sender	  than	  it	  seems	  meddling	  likely	  would	  have	  been.76	  	  3.	  Evidentiary	  Standards	  	   One	   final	   caveat	   is	   in	   order.	   	   This	   research	   endeavor	   is	   an	   effort	   at	  contemporary	   history.	   	   As	   such,	   there	   exist	   certain	   insurmountable	   limits	   to	   the	  sorts	   of	   information	   collection	   I	   can	   reasonably	   expect	   to	   undertake.	   	   My	   goal,	  therefore,	  is	  to	  increase	  public	  knowledge	  on	  the	  cases	  under	  consideration	  within	  reasonable	  constraints.	  Although	   error	   is	   always	   possible,	   I	   do	   not	   believe	   that	   these	   evidentiary	  limits	  will	   bias	   the	   nature	   of	  my	   findings	   as	   a	   result.	   	   Further,	   the	   use	   of	   shadow	  cases	  and	  earlier	  cases	  on	  the	  Israel	  dyad	  are	  useful	  for	  cross-­‐checking	  validity	  for	  the	  more	  recent	  case	  findings.	   	   I	  will	  also	  do	  my	  best	  to	  flag	  elements	  of	  probative	  uncertainty	  when	  determinative	  evidence	  for	  cases	  is	  not	  available.	  	   However,	  I	  do	  treat	  statements	  by	  well-­‐positioned	  past	  policy-­‐makers	  in	  the	  sender	   state	   who	   admit	   LSI	   with	   greater	   weight	   than	   those	   that	   deny	   it.	   	   This	   is	  because	  I	  consider	  the	  former	  an	  instance	  of	  what	  legal	  officials	  term	  an	  “admission	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Of course, counterfactual reasoning of this sort is not without its pitfalls, but I believe its benefits 
outweigh the risks. Further, I am already relying upon some degree of counterfactual reasoning in order to 
assess efficacy in cases where LSI actually did occur; it is just more obvious in the non- and near-cases. 
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against	   interests”	   and	   therefore	  more	   credible.	   	   Policy-­‐makers	   face	  much	   greater	  incentives	   to	   deny	   unsavory	   activities	   such	   as	  meddling	   than	   they	   do	   to	   admit	   it.	  	  Thus,	   when	   they	   such	   claims	   do	   emerge,	   I	   treat	   well-­‐positioned	   admissions	   of	  responsibility	  as	  more	  striking	  –	  and	  thus	  more	  persuasive	  –	  than	  what	  may	  be	  pro	  
forma	   denials	  of	  blame.77	   	  Thankfully,	  however,	   although	   the	  evidence	   is	  mixed	   in	  some	  cases,	  my	  hope	  is	  that	  the	  reader	  will	  agree	  it	  is	  often	  quite	  cut	  and	  clear.	  	  
Section	  7:	  Dissertation	  Road	  Map	  
	   The	  remainder	  of	   this	  dissertation	  presents	  evidence	   for	  demonstrating	  the	  explanatory	   power	   of	   my	   explanation	   over	   its	   most	   prominent	   structural	  competitors.	  	  Chapter	  Three,	  Four,	  and	  Five	  provide	  a	  history	  of	  American	  meddling	  in	   Israeli	   politics	   from	   1977	   to	   1992,	  making	   extensive	   use	   of	   newly	   declassified	  archives.	  	  Chapter	  Six	  and	  Seven	  consider	  American	  LSI	  toward	  Israel	  from	  1993	  to	  present.	   	   Chapters	   Eight,	   Nine,	   and	   Ten	   explore	   U.S.	   efforts	   to	   support	   relative	  Palestinian	  moderates	  before,	  during,	  and	  after	  the	  Oslo	  era.	   	  These	  chapters	  make	  extensive	  use	  of	  over	  seventy	  or	  so	   interviews	  that	  I	  have	  conducted	  thus	  far	  with	  expert	   observers	   or	   firsthand	   participants	   in	   the	   episodes.	   	   These	   include	  Americans,	   Palestinians,	   and	   Israelis	   and	   benefitted	   from	   field	   work	   in	   the	   West	  Bank	   and	   Israel-­‐proper	   as	   a	   visiting	   researcher	   at	   Tel	   Aviv	   University’s	   security	  studies	   center,	  HaMachon	  LeMechkarei	  Bitachon	  Le’umi.	   	   Chapter	  Eleven	  examines	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 A similar, pertinent notion is the idea that, because LSI is a self-concealing phenomenon, a judicious 
scholar should be persuaded by lighter evidentiary footprints about LSI than about foreign policy behavior 
in other issue areas.  However faint these footprints may be, however, I remain reluctant to code cases as 
examples of LSI occurrence without indication that officials (a) maintained a preference among potential 
leaders in the target state and (b) shaped their policies toward that sender state with the goal in mind of 
actualizing this preference. 
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how	  the	  theory	  fares	  when	  applied	  to	  an	  additional	  shadow	  case:	  American	  efforts	  to	  influence	  leadership	  contests	  in	  Iran,	  both	  before	  and	  after	  that	  country’s	  Islamic	  Revolution.	   	   Finally,	   Chapter	  Twelve	   concludes	   by	   reviewing	  my	   findings,	   offering	  recommendations	   for	   policy-­‐makers,	   and	   discussing	   implications	   for	   future	  academic	  research.	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Part	  I.	  	  
~	  
	  WASHINGTON’S	  MEDDLING	  FOR	  PEACE	  IN	  ISRAELI	  POLITICS	  	  	  	   Ever	   since	   the	   dawn	   of	   Israel’s	   Second	   Republic,	   when	   the	   once-­‐dominant	  Labor	  Party	  was	  finally	  forced	  to	  compete	  with	  viable	  parties	  on	  its	  right,	  American	  presidents	  have	  toyed	  with	  the	  possibility	  of	  meddling	  in	  Israeli	  domestic	  politics.1	  	  As	   the	   following	   chapters	   document,	   Jimmy	  Carter	   tried	   to	   undermine	  Menachem	  Begin;	   Ronald	   Reagan	   tried	   to	   build	   up	  Moshe	   Arens;	   George	  H.	  W.	   Bush	   tried	   to	  push	  out	  Yitzhak	  Shamir;	  Bill	   Clinton	   tried	   to	   strengthen	  Rabin,	  Peres,	   and	  Barak;	  and	  George	  W.	  Bush	   tried	   to	   strengthen	  Ariel	   Sharon	  and	  Ehud	  Olmert.	   	  Although	  this	  behavior	   is	  not	  a	  universal	  constant,	   it	  does	  seem	  to	  have	  become	  a	  recurring	  American	   tradition.	   	   Yet	   there	   is	   no	   history	   of	   this	   behavior	   in	   the	   voluminous	  literature	  on	  U.S.-­‐Israel	  relations.	  Because	   leadership	   selection	   intervention	   is	   relatively	   frequent	   in	   this	  particular	  directed	  dyad,	  it	  offers	  an	  excellent	  laboratory	  for	  theory-­‐building	  about	  LSI	  in	  world	  affairs.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  being	  an	  intrinsically	  important	  case	  because	  of	  its	  impact	  on	  the	  Mideast	  peace	  process,	  this	  relationship	  is	  exceptionally	  data	  rich.	  	  As	  Van	  Evera	  explains,	  “selecting	  cases	  for	  data-­‐richness	  is	  especially	  appropriate	  if	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 For an explanation of the Israeli Second Republic, see Asher Arian, The Second Republic: Politics in 
Israel, 2nd edition (CQ Press, 2005). For debate over whether the Second Republic may have ended in 
1992, see Leon T. Hadar, “The 1992 Electoral Earthquake and the Fall of the ‘Second Israeli Republic’,” 
Middle East Journal 46, no. 4 (Autumn 1992), 594-616; Sammy Smooha and Don Peretz, “Israel’s 1992 
Knesset Elections: Are They Critical?” Middle East Journal 47, no. 3 (Summer 1993), 444-463. 
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you	   plan	   to	   infer	   or	   test	   theories	   using	   process	   tracing,	   since	   process	   tracing	  requires	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  data”.2	   	   Since	   the	   initial	  objective	  of	   this	  dissertation	   is	   to	  derive	   a	   theory	   using	   not	   just	   congruence	   tests	   but	   also	   detailed	   causal	   process	  observations,	  process	   tracing	  and	  selecting	  cases	  on	   the	  basis	  of	  data	  richness	  are	  especially	  appropriate.3	  In	   addition,	   I	   compare	   cases	   on	   the	   U.S.-­‐Israel	   directed	   dyad	   in	   which	   LSI	  occurred	  with	  those	  in	  which	  such	  efforts	  did	  not	  take	  place.	   	  This	  technique	  helps	  minimize	  the	  possibility	   that	  selecting	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  data	  richness	  could	  produce	  certain	  kinds	  of	  selection	  bias.	  	  Similarly,	  it	  helps	  rule	  out	  possible	  rival	  explanations	  by	   holding	   a	   range	   of	   country-­‐specific	   factors	   constant	   across	   cases	   in	   which	   a	  dependent	   variable	   of	   interest	   (LSI	   occurrence)	   obviously	   varies.	   	   This	   technique,	  known	  as	  Mill’s	  method	  of	  difference,	  allows	  the	  researcher	  to	  block	  out	  a	  good	  deal	  of	  noise	  that	  is	  unrelated	  to	  the	  main	  study	  variables.4	  Finally,	   examination	   of	   leadership	   selection	   intervention	   on	   the	   U.S.-­‐Israel	  dyad	   provides	   an	   especially	   powerful	   opportunity	   to	   falsify	   lobby-­‐legislative	  explanations	   for	   foreign	  policy	  behavior	   in	   this	   issue	  area.	   	  Because	   this	  approach	  (Theory	  #2)	  should	  be	  at	  its	  most	  powerful	  on	  the	  U.S.-­‐Israel	  dyad,	  then	  behavior	  on	  that	  dyad	  which	  does	  not	  fit	  the	  theory	  provides	  some	  strong	  evidence	  against	  it.	  In	   the	   following	   case	  histories,	   I	   have	  drawn	  on	  widely	   available	  published	  sources	   such	   as	   scholarly	   analyses,	  memoirs,	   and	  newspaper	   articles.	   	  However,	   I	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Cornell University Press, 1999), 
79. 
3 For the distinction between congruence testing and process tracing in case studies, see Harry Eckstein, 
“Chapter 4: Case Study and Theory in Political Science,” in Regarding Politics: Essays on Political 
Theory, Stability, and Change (University of California Press, 1992), 117-176. 
4 Van Evera, Guide to Methods, 57. 
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have	  also	  sought	  to	  expand	  the	  stock	  of	  available	  information	  on	  the	  subject.	  	  Thus,	  these	  case	  histories	  also	  draw	  on	  materials	  from	  the	  following	  archives:	  the	  Jimmy	  Carter	   Presidential	   Library	   in	   Georgia,	   the	   Ronald	   Reagan	   Presidential	   Library	   in	  California,	  the	  George	  H.	  W.	  Bush	  Presidential	  Library	  in	  Texas,	  the	  James	  A.	  Baker	  III	   Personal	   Papers	   at	   Princeton	   University,	   the	   CIA	   Records	   Search	   Tool	   at	   the	  National	  Archives	  and	  Records	  Administration	  Site	  II	  in	  Maryland,	  the	  CIA	  Electronic	  Reading	   Room	   FOIA	   Collection,	   the	   Digital	   National	   Security	   Archive,	   and	   the	  Foreign	   Service	   Oral	   History	   Project	   hosted	   online	   by	   the	   Library	   of	   Congress.	   	   I	  have	  also	  conducted	  interviews	  with	  a	  range	  of	  expert	  observers	  on	  the	  U.S.-­‐Israel	  relationship,	  including	  in	  America	  as	  well	  as	  during	  a	  stint	  of	  field	  work	  based	  out	  of	  the	  Institute	  for	  National	  Security	  Studies	  at	  Tel	  Aviv	  University.	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Chapter	  III.	  
~	  
The	  Carter	  Years	  
(1977-­1981)	  
	  
	   When	   he	   entered	   the	   Oval	   Office,	   President	   Carter	   brought	   with	   him	   an	  intense	  desire	  to	  resolve	  the	  Arab-­‐Israeli	  conflict.	  	  In	  part,	  this	  could	  be	  attributed	  to	  an	  interest	   in	  the	  Biblical	   lands	  he	  had	  studied	  since	  youth.1	   	   In	  part,	  this	  was	  also	  due	   to	   his	   moral	   conviction	   that	   the	   “deprivation	   of	   Palestinian	   rights…	   was	  contrary	   to	   the	   basic	  moral	   and	   ethical	   principles”	   of	   the	   U.S.	   and	   Israel.2	   	  While	  convinced	  of	  Israel’s	  needs	  for	  self-­‐defense,	  he	  evinced	  a	  view	  of	  Israeli	  politics	  that	  placed	  high	  value	  on	  flexibility	  toward	  the	  peace	  process.	  	  He	  also	  demonstrated	  an	  extremely	   active	   style	   of	  managerial	   oversight	   such	   that	   his	   ambassador	   to	   Israel	  compared	  his	  style	  to	  a	  “quarterback	  for	  his	  Middle	  East	  team,	  on	  the	  field,	  calling	  his	  own	  plays,	  orchestrating	  his	  players’	  moves”.3	  	   On	  the	  basis	  of	   these	   factors,	   it	  would	  seem	  that	   Jimmy	  Carter’s	  presidency	  was	  primed	  for	  meddling	  in	  Israeli	  politics.	  	  It	  is	  therefore	  somewhat	  surprising	  that	  during	  his	  term	  as	  president,	  Carter	  did	  not	  pursue	  LSI	  toward	  Israel	  with	  any	  sort	  of	  consistency.	  	  Two	  puzzling	  non-­‐cases	  of	  LSI	  include	  the	  critical	  Israeli	  elections	  of	  May	  1977	  and	  when	  the	  Likud	  Party	  was	  politically	  weakened	  in	  1979	  and	  1980.	  	  In	  addition,	   I	   will	   present	   three	   episodes	   of	   partial	   to	   full	   LSI	   during	   Carter’s	  presidency,	  including	  both	  positive	  and	  negative	  attempts	  as	  well	  as	  both	  petit	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (University of Arkansas Press, 1995), 273. 
2 Ibid., 277. 
3 Samuel W. Lewis, “The United States and Israel: Constancy and Change,” in The Middle East: Ten Years 
after Camp David, ed. William B. Quandt (Brookings Institution Press, 1988), 227-8. 
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grand	   cases.	   	   Because	   the	   1977	   Israeli	   elections	   episode	   was	   especially	  consequential,	   I	  place	  somewhat	  greater	  emphasis	  on	  exploring	   that	  case	   than	   the	  ones	   that	   follow.	   	   In	   each	   instance,	   I	   seek	   to	   demonstrate	   how	   leadership	   theory	  provides	  a	  better	  explanation	  for	  these	  patterns	  than	  its	  structural	  competitors.	  	   For	   each	   episode	   covered	   by	   this	   project,	   I	   follow	   the	   same	   procedure	   for	  organizing	  the	  text.	  	  After	  providing	  some	  very	  brief	  background	  (a	  few	  paragraphs	  at	   most),	   I	   code	   the	   cases	   in	   terms	   of	   this	   study’s	   two	   dependent	   variables:	  occurrence	   and	   efficacy.	   	   That	   is,	   did	   leadership	   selection	   intervention	   take	   place,	  and	   did	   the	   U.S.	   policy	   succeed.	   	   I	   then	  methodically	   sift	   through	   the	   episode	   for	  seven	   categories	   of	   observable	   implications	   that	   enable	   us	   to	   distinguish	   which	  theory	  provides	  the	  most	  persuasive	  explanation	  for	  what	  transpired.	  	  
Carter,	  Case	  #1:	  The	  Israeli	  Elections	  of	  1977	  	  	   Jimmy	   Carter’s	   administration	   came	   into	   office	   determined	   to	   pursue	   a	  comprehensive	  solution	  for	  the	  Arab-­‐Israeli	  conflict.	  	  It	  sought	  to	  premise	  this	  effort	  around	   a	   multilateral	   conference	   in	   Geneva	   and	   quickly	   launched	   into	   advance	  consultations	   with	   regional	   leaders	   to	   ensure	   the	   various	   parties	   would	   attend.	  	  However,	   just	   a	   few	  months	   into	   this	   process	   Israeli	   voters	   tossed	   out	   the	   Labor	  Party	  for	  the	  very	  first	  time	  and	  produced	  a	  right-­‐wing	  government	  under	  the	  Likud.	  	  Although	   the	  new	   Israeli	   government	   eventually	   embarked	  upon	  a	  bilateral	  peace	  effort	  with	  Egypt,	  its	  staunch	  positions	  on	  the	  West	  Bank	  diminished	  the	  prospects	  for	  Carter’s	  multilateral	  strategy	  considerably.	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   Given	  the	   import	  of	   this	  event	   for	   the	  administration’s	  Mideast	  agenda,	  one	  might	   have	   expected	   positive	   LSI	   by	   Washington	   to	   support	   the	   sitting	   Labor	  government	  in	  Israel.	  	  However,	  this	  generally	  did	  not	  take	  place.	  	  Instead,	  the	  vast	  preponderance	   of	   American	   actions	   during	   this	   period	   actually	   worked	   to	  undermine	  Rabin	   instead	  of	  bolster	  him,	   leading	  New	  York	  Magazine	   to	  declare	   it	  “the	   Carter	   administration’s	   worst	  mistake	   to	   date	   in	   the	  management	   of	   foreign	  policy”.4	   	  These	  actions	  are	  best	  explained	  by	  the	  predictions	  of	   leadership	  theory,	  since	   its	   structural	   competitors	  actually	   imposed	  unanswered	  pressures	   for	  LSI	   to	  take	  place.	  	  Instead,	  these	  pressures	  were	  disregarded	  due	  to	  the	  inclinations	  of	  just	  a	   few	   top	   officials	   in	   the	   administration:	   President	   Carter,	   his	   national	   security	  advisor	  Zbigniew	  Brzezinski,	  and,	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent,	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Cyrus	  Vance.	  	  
Coding	  the	  Dependent	  Variables	  (Occurrence	  and	  Efficacy)	  Did	  LSI	  Occur?	  	   For	   the	  most	   part,	   no.	   	   The	  May	   1977	   Israeli	   elections	   stand	   as	   a	   puzzling	  instance	  in	  which	  the	  United	  States	  generally	  did	  not	  undertake	  leadership	  selection	  intervention.	   	   The	   Labor	   Party	   was	   headed	   toward	   disaster,	   and	   Washington’s	  actions	  mainly	  pushed	  it	  further	  in	  this	  direction.	  	  The	  U.S.	  administration’s	  actions	  were	  not	  consonant	  with	  a	  consistent	  and	  conscious	  policy	  of	   trying	  to	  help	  Rabin	  and	  Peres,	  nor	  were	  most	  of	  their	  discussions	  behind	  closed	  doors.	  	  In	  this	  section,	  I	  shall	   first	   indicate	   that	   there	  were	   structural	  pressures	   from	   the	  bureaucracy	   and	  the	  Israeli	  Labor	  Party	  for	  positive	  LSI.	  	  Then,	  I	  will	  describe	  two	  main	  junctures	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Szulc, “How Carter Fouled the Israeli Elections,” 36. 
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provide	  the	  clearest	  indication	  possible	  that	  LSI	  was	  not	  the	  purpose	  of	  U.S.	  policy:	  a	  disastrous	   visit	   to	   Washington	   by	   PM	   Rabin	   and	   a	   subsequent	   dispute	   over	  American	  arms	  sales.	  
<Pressures	  for	  LSI>	  Few	  observers	  predicted	   the	   severity	   of	   Labor’s	   defeat,	   but	   it	  was	  patently	  evident	  that	  the	  party	  was	  in	  for	  a	  difficult	  election.	  	  There	  are	  a	  variety	  of	  reasons	  why	  more	   obliging	   leaders	   at	   the	   top	   of	   the	   American	   administration	  might	   have	  been	   inclined	   to	   undertake	   LSI	   before	   the	   Israeli	   vote.	   	   Many	   of	   the	   sources	   of	  Labor’s	   bad	   political	   fortunes	   were	   widely	   observable	   in	   advance.	   	   Bureaucrats	  warned	  the	  White	  House	  about	  the	  left’s	  shaky	  prospects,	  and	  Labor	  politicians	  even	  solicited	  American	   intervention	   in	  private	  before	  the	  vote.	   	  Because,	   the	  pro-­‐Israel	  community	  opposed	  the	  administration’s	   tough	   line	  on	   Israel,	  even	   legislators	  and	  lobbyists	  were	  pushing	  for	  a	  change	  in	  the	  policies	  that	  were	  undermining	  Rabin.	  As	  American	  University	  political	  scientist	  Amos	  Perlmutter	  noted	  at	  the	  time,	  many	  of	  the	  reasons	  for	  Labor’s	  defeat	  were	  widely	  visible	  at	  the	  time:	  the	  party	  was	  still	  being	  blamed	  for	  its	  failure	  to	  anticipate	  the	  Yom	  Kippur	  War,	   its	  control	  over	  national	  patronage	   institutions	  was	  beginning	   to	  unravel,	  and	  demographic	   trends	  had	   been	   shifting	   rightward	   for	   some	   time.5	   	   The	   national	   economy	   was	   in	   poor	  shape,	  and	  a	  series	  of	  high-­‐profile	   financial	  scandals	  reinforced	  public	  perceptions	  that	  the	  ruling	  party	  had	  been	  corrupted	  by	  power.	  	  Although	  Rabin	  was	  not	  directly	  responsible	  for	  these	  scandals,	  he	  chose	  to	  step	  down	  as	  leader	  of	  the	  party	  and	  was	  replaced	  by	  Shimon	  Peres	  shortly	  before	  the	  election	  took	  place.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Amos Perlmutter, “Cleavage in Israel,” Foreign Policy (1977): 136–157. 
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   The	  State	  Department’s	  Bureau	  of	  Intelligence	  and	  Research	  (INR)	  reported	  on	   the	   basis	   of	   these	   factors	   that	   “the	   Labor	   Party	   has	   never	   entered	   an	   election	  campaign	  in	  so	  weakened	  a	  coalition”	  and	  “the	  elections	  could	  very	  well	  end	  Labor	  hegemony”.6	   	   Near	   East	   hands	   predicted	   that	   “the	   Labor	   Party	   will	   lose	   some	  ground.	  	  The	  question	  is	  how	  much”.7	  	   Officials	   from	   State	   also	   warned	   the	  White	   House	   that	   “a	   large	   number	   of	  voters,	  quite	  possibly	  a	  majority	  [in	  Israel]	  may	  take	  seriously	  opposition	  claims	  that	  they	  could	  handle	  economic	  problems	  better	  than	  the	  Labor	  Party.	  	  Announcement	  of	  an	  increase	  in	  U.S.	  aid	  before	  the	  election	  would	  lend	  credibility	  to	  one	  of	  Labor’s	  principle	   campaign	   themes	   -­‐	   -­‐	   that	   only	   a	   Labor-­‐led	   government	   can	   elicit	   large	  amounts	  of	  aid	  from	  the	  U.S.	  and	  preserve	  the	  vital	  U.S.-­‐Israeli	  relationship”.8	  CIA	  analysts	  presumed	  PM	  Rabin	  “would	  hope	  that	  a	  highly	  visible	  dialogue,	  implying	  an	  endorsement	  by	  the	  new	  US	  government,	  would	  help	  boost	  his	  sagging	  popularity	  at	  home”.9	  	  The	  Agency	  also	  warned	  that	  “the	  Israeli	  elections	  are	  May	  17	  and	   the	   situation	   is	   fragile…	   we	   must	   resist	   pushing	   them	   too	   far,	   too	   fast”.10	  	  Following	   these	  warnings,	  White	  House	  officials	   acknowledged	   that	   Labor	   leaders	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 “Israel: Assessment of the Internal Political Situation” (Director of Intelligence and Research, US 
Department of State, January 17, 1977), Collection “Staff Material: Office”, Box 111, Folder 6, Document 
2-2, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library. 
7 Remarks by Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Roy Atherton in “National Security 
Council Meeting - Summary and Minutes” (National Security Council, February 23, 1977), 10, Collection 
“Brzezinski Material: Brzezinski Office File”, Box 31, Folder 4, Document 4-3, Jimmy Carter Presidential 
Library. 
8 “‘Economic Issues in the Israeli Campaign’ in Additional Information Items - Memorandum from the 
Situation Room for Dr. Brzezinski”, February 14, 1977, 2, Collection “Brzezinski Material: President’s 
Daily Report File”, Box 1, Folder 8, Document 69-6, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library. 
9 “Intelligence Memorandum: Foreign Perceptions of the Incoming US Administration” (Central 
Intelligence Agency, January 7, 1977), 13, Collection “Donated Historical Material - Mondale, Walter F.”, 
Box 227, Folder 4, Document 2-6, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library. 
10 “Summary of Conclusions of PRC Meeting on the Middle East” (National Security Council, February 4, 
1977), 12, Collection “Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection: Subject File”, Box 24, Folder: "Meetings -- PRC 2: 
2/4/77, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library. 
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“face	  strong	  challenges	  from	  the	  rightwing	  Likud	  bloc”11	  and	  were	  aware	  of	  “Israeli	  anxiety”	  that	  “the	  admin	  will	  pursue	  a	  cooler…	  line	  towards	  Israel”.12	  Israeli	  government	  officials	  even	  tried	  to	  solicit	  LSI	  on	  behalf	  of	  Labor.	  	  Rabin	  begged	   Carter	   to	   notify	   him	   in	   advance	   of	   major	   pronouncements	   on	   the	   peace	  process,	   and	  domestic	   considerations	  weighed	  heavily	   in	   his	  mind	  when	  he	  made	  this	  request.13	  	  Their	  Foreign	  Minister	  pushed	  for	  a	  timely	  change	  in	  key	  U.S.	  policies	  on	   the	   eve	  of	   the	   vote,14	   and	  at	   least	   two	   separate	   efforts	  were	  made	   to	  privately	  solicit	  gestures	  of	  support	  from	  Carter	  to	  Peres	  after	  Rabin	  stepped	  down.15	  Carter	   did	   make	   a	   public	   statement	   that	   seemed	   to	   praise	   Peres,	   but	   he	  stumbled	  over	   the	  message,	  contradicting	  himself	   in	   the	  very	  same	  statement.	   	  He	  stated	   in	  an	   interview	  with	  NBC	   that	  Peres	  was	   “a	  very	  strong	  and	   forceful	   leader	  who	   is	   able	   and	   eager	   to	   make	   a	   decision	   and	   stick	   by	   it,	   sometimes	   when	   it’s	  politically	  unpopular”	  and	   that	   “I	   think	   the	  Labor	  Party	  has	   shown	  a	  cohesiveness	  since	   Mr.	   Rabin’s	   problems.	   	   They’ve	   shown	   that	   their	   policies	   are	   going	   to	   be	  continuous”.	   	   Yet	   he	   also	   remarked	   that	   “the	   overwhelming	   thrust	   of	   national	  opinions	  and	  desires	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  far	  transcend	  the	  identity	  of	  any	  particular	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 “White House Profile for Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin”, March 1977, Collection “White House 
Central Files: Subject File-Executive”, Box FO-44, Folder “CO74 Executive,” Jimmy Carter Presidential 
Library. Emphases in the original. 
12 “‘Israeli Anxiety’ in Weekly National Security Report - From Zbigniew Brzezinski for the President”, 
February 19, 1977, 6, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, Box “Subject File 3”, Folder "Weekly Reports [to 
the President], 1-15: [2/77-6/77], Jimmy Carter Presidential Library. 
13 Amos Eiran, former Director General of the Prime Minister’s Office, “Interview with the Author”, July 
3, 2011. 
14 “‘Vance’s Meeting with Foreign Minister Allon’ in Daily Report - Memorandum for the President from 
Zbigniew Brzezinski”, May 11, 1977, Collection “Brzezinski Material: President’s Daily Report File”, Box 
2, Folder 3, Document 12-2, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library. 
15 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981 (Farrar 
Straus & Giroux, 1983), 92; “President’s Daily Report - Memorandum from Brzezinski to the President”, 
April 26, 1977, Collection “Brzezinski Material: President’s Daily Report File”, Box 2, Folder 1, 
Document 28-7, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library. 
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political	  figure	  under	  normal	  circumstances.	  	  So	  I	  think	  we	  have	  the	  same	  chance	  of	  a	  Middle	   East	   peace	   –	   nobody	   knows	   how	   great	   or	   small	   that	  might	   be.	   	   But	   the	  identity	   of	   the	   Israeli	   leader	   –	   I	   do	   not	   think	   will	   make	   that	   much	   difference”.16	  	  Instead	  of	  highlighting	  differences	  between	  Labor	  and	  its	  rivals,	  President	  Carter	  got	  dragged	  down	   into	  defensiveness,	   spoiling	  whatever	  message	  he	  might	  have	  been	  trying	  to	  convey	  in	  praise	  of	  Shimon	  Peres	  and	  the	  Labor	  Party.	  
<Mr.	  Rabin	  Comes	  to	  Washington>	  	   Yitzhak	  Rabin	  came	  to	  Washington	  in	  March	  seeking	  signs	  of	  support,	  but	  the	  administration	  held	  out	  on	  many	  of	   those	  gestures	  as	  carrots	   for	  progress	   toward	  Geneva.	   	   In	   fact,	   the	   administration’s	   peace	  process	   strategy	  was	  predicated	  upon	  Rabin	  taking	  domestically	  unpopular	  steps	  that	  he	  was	  unwilling	  to	  contemplate	  in	  the	  heat	  of	  a	  campaign.	  	  Thoughtlessness	  compounded	  these	  problems.	  In	   preparing	   President	   Carter	   for	   the	   visit,	   Secretary	   of	   State	   Vance	  acknowledged	  that	  Rabin	  would	  seek	  to	  “obtain	  favorable	  decisions	  on	  arms	  [and]	  aid”	  and	  “enhance	  his	  party’s	  chances	  in	  coming	  election	  by	  demonstrating	  personal	  relationship	  with	  American	  leadership”.	   	  However,	  he	  urged	  a	  “response	  to	  Rabin’s	  probable	  requests	  for	  military	  assistance	  in	  a	  way	  that	  maintains	  our	  positions	  and	  freedom	  of	  action”	  because	  “our	  goal	  with	  Rabin	  should	  be…	  to	  make	  clear	   to	  him	  the	  direction	   in	  which	   Israel	   is	  going	   to	  have	   to	  move	  on	   the	  key	   issues	   if	   there	   is	  going	  to	  be	  any	  chance	  of	  successful	  negotiations”.17	   	  Brzezinski	  and	  the	  President	  also	  preferred	  to	  hold	  increased	  support	  in	  reserve	  as	  leverage	  for	  future	  talks.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Interview is quoted in “Near East Report,” Near East Report 21, no. 16 (April 20, 1977). 
17 “Official Working Visit by Israeli Prime Minister Rabin - Memorandum for the President from Cyrus 
Vance”, March 3, 1977, 1-2, Collection “Plains File”, Box 11, Folder 17, Document 1-8, Jimmy Carter 
Presidential Library. 
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   Then,	  on	   the	   first	  day	  of	  Rabin’s	   visit,	   Carter	  went	  off-­‐script	  during	  a	  news	  conference	   by	   indicating	   support	   for	  what	   he	   considered	   “defensible	   borders”	   for	  the	   Jewish	   State.	   	   Although	   correct	   in	   a	   literal	   sense,	   Carter	   was	   unintentionally	  traipsing	  into	  a	  political	  minefield	  because	  the	  term	  he	  used	  had	  long	  been	  code	  in	  Israeli	  politics	  for	  very	  large	  annexations	  of	  territory	  in	  the	  West	  Bank	  –	  obviously	  a	  non-­‐starter	  if	  the	  administration	  hoped	  to	  persuade	  Arab	  states	  to	  come	  to	  Geneva.	  Vance	   also	   explained	   that	   the	   president’s	   statement	   on	   defensible	   borders	  did	  not	  signify	  a	  change	   in	  U.S.	  policy.18	   	  This	  probably	  would	  have	  been	  sufficient	  for	  solving	  the	  issue,	  but	  Carter	  decided	  to	  personally	  walk	  back	  his	  comments	  the	  next	  day	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  highlighted	  the	  gaps	  between	  the	  two	  governments	  and	  reflected	  poorly	  on	  Rabin	  at	  a	  sensitive	  moment	  in	  political	  time.	   	  To	  Rabin’s	  great	  horror,	  Carter	  announced	  that	  what	  he	  meant	  by	   the	  phrase	  was	  near-­‐total	   Israeli	  withdrawal	  to	  the	  1967	  lines,	  with	  only	  “minor	  adjustments”.19	  During	   this	  visit,	  Carter	  also	  broke	  new	  ground	  by	   insisting	   that	  any	  viable	  peace	  plan	  would	  have	  to	  address	  the	  Palestinian	  national	  cause.	   	  He	  followed	  this	  up	  with	  an	  unscripted	  statement	  at	  a	  town	  hall	  in	  Clinton,	  Massachusetts,	  calling	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  Palestinian	  homeland.	   	  He	  then	  made	  headlines	  by	  shaking	  hands	  with	  the	  PLO’s	  representative	  to	  the	  UN,	  all	  of	  which	  were	  seen	  in	  Israel	  as	  support	  for	  a	  position	  that	  was	  widely	  unpopular	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  political	  spectrum.	  
<Up	  in	  Arms>	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Bernard Gwertzman, “Carter Causes Stir by seeming to back Israel on Frontiers; He urges ‘Defensible 
Borders’ but Officials say his remarks, at welcome for Rabin, do not Represent Shift in Policy,” New York 
Times, March 8, 1977. 
19 The Public Papers of President Jimmy Carter, “The President’s News Conference” (The American 
Presidency Project at UC Santa Barbara, March 9, 1977). 
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  Presidential	  Review	  Memorandum	  number	  twelve	  (PRM-­‐12),	   introduced	  in	  late	   April,	   laid	   out	   the	   administration’s	   new,	  more	   restrictive	   approach	   to	   selling	  arms,	  giving	  military	  aid,	  and	  sharing	  sophisticated	  weapons	  systems	  overseas.20	  	  As	  a	   caveat,	   the	   memo	   declared	   that	   nothing	   in	   the	   text	   would	   prejudice	   military	  support	   for	   allies	   with	   whom	   the	   United	   States	   had	   a	   formal	   defense	   treaty,	  especially	  members	  of	  NATO,	  Japan,	  Australia,	  or	  New	  Zealand.	   	  However,	  as	  upset	  members	  of	  Congress	  pointed	  out,	   Israel	  stuck	  out	  as	  a	  glaring	  omission	   from	  this	  list,	   meaning	   that	   PRM-­‐12	   put	   into	   question	   America’s	   long-­‐standing	   support	   for	  Israel’s	  qualitative	  military	  advantage.	  	  	  	  	   The	   week	   of	   the	   Israeli	   election	   (and	   with	   encouragement	   of	   pro-­‐Israel	  members	  of	  Congress)	  Carter’s	  team	  advised	  him	  to	  revise	  the	  memo	  to	  include	  an	  exception	  for	  Israel.	   	  Despite	  a	  detailed	  briefing	  from	  his	  national	  security	  team	  on	  how	   to	   explicitly	   frame	   the	   point,	   the	   president	   ruined	   the	   effort.	   	   At	   his	   press	  conference	  on	  Thursday,	  May	  12,	  the	  president	  was	  asked	  both	  about	  a	  Palestinian	  homeland	   and	   about	   sharing	   arms	   technology	   and	   co-­‐production	   with	   Israel.	  	  Without	   mentioning	   his	   decision	   to	   repeal	   PRM-­‐12’s	   restrictions	   with	   regard	   to	  Israel,	  the	  president	  avoided	  the	  issues	  of	  arms	  and	  chose	  to	  focus	  on	  his	  pet	  issue	  of	  Palestinian	   self-­‐determination.	   	   Consequently,	   the	   reversal	   of	   PRM-­‐12	   was	   not	  announced	  until	  May	  19,	  two	  days	  after	  the	  Israeli	  election	  had	  already	  taken	  place.	  	  Did	  the	  Policy	  Succeed?	  	   No.	   	   Labor	  was	   decimated	   at	   the	   polls,	   and	   there	   is	   reason	   to	   believe	   that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 On PRM-12, I primarily draw from Szulc, “How Carter Fouled the Israeli Elections.” 
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American	   actions	   contributed	   to	   its	   destruction.	   	   Likud	   gained	   four	   seats	   to	   hold	  forty-­‐three	  out	  of	  120	  in	  the	  Knesset.	  	  The	  Labor	  alignment	  pulled	  in	  only	  thirty-­‐two,	  losing	  a	  remarkable	  nineteen	  seats.	  	  Filling	  much	  of	  this	  gap,	  a	  new	  centrist	  party	  for	  clean	  government,	  the	  Democratic	  Movement	  for	  Change	  (DMC	  or	  “Dash”)	  won	  15.	  	  The	  National	   Religious	   Party	   gained	   two	   seats	   to	   rise	   to	   twelve.	   	   As	   leader	   of	   the	  largest	   party	   by	   far,	   it	   fell	   to	   Likud	   chief	  Menachem	  Begin	   to	   form	   a	   government,	  excluding	  Labor’s	  leaders	  for	  the	  first	  time	  in	  Israel’s	  history.	  	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  he	  was	   known,	   Begin	   was	   considered	   a	   warmonger	   and	   a	   fundamentalist.	   	   Officials	  considered	   Labor’s	   defeat	   a	   shocking	   setback	   for	   the	   peace	   process	   and	   U.S.	  interests,21	  but	  they	  had	  done	  only	  things	  that	  could	  have	  helped	  its	  main	  rivals.	  	   Historians	  have	  not	  fully	  taken	  the	  U.S.	  role	  into	  account	  when	  discussing	  the	  sources	  of	  Labor’s	  defeat	  in	  1977.	  	  In	  particular,	  authors	  who	  specialize	  in	  electoral	  politics	   tend	   to	   minimize	   the	   foreign	   sources	   of	   Labor’s	   last-­‐minute	   collapse.22	  	  However,	  this	  perspective	  provides	  an	  incomplete	  understanding	  of	  what	  drove	  the	  results.	  	  Oxford	  historian	  of	  Israeli	  foreign	  affairs	  Avi	  Shlaim	  suspects	  that	  the	  Carter	  administration’s	  activism	  contributed	  to	  the	  Israeli	  public’s	  perception	  of	  the	  Labor	  government	  as	  a	  failure	  but	  provides	  little	  in	  the	  way	  of	  evidence.23	   	  Scholars	  have	  yet	   to	  draw	  upon	   the	  broad	   range	  of	  data	  available	   from	   firsthand	  participants	   to	  support	  Shlaim’s	  impressionistic	  claim.	  	   American	   officials	   were	   concerned	   that	   their	   actions	   could	   be	   tipping	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 For instance, see Carter, Keeping faith, 284; Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 95; William B. Quandt, 
Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics (Brookings Institution Press, 1986), 62-69. 
22 See, for instance, Don Peretz, “The Earthquake: Israel’s Ninth Knesset Elections,” The Middle East 
Journal (1977): 251–266; Asher Arian, Security Threatened: Surveying Israeli Opinion on Peace and War 
(Cambridge University Press, 1995), 130-40; Perlmutter, “Cleavage in Israel”; Colin Shindler, A History of 
Modern Israel (Cambridge University Press, 2008), 148. 
23 Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World (WW Norton & Company, 2001), 349. 
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election	  results	  against	  Labor.	  	  After	  the	  president	  made	  his	  controversial	  comments	  during	   the	  Rabin	  visit,	  NSC	  staffer	  William	  Quandt	  queried	  officials	  at	  State	  out	  of	  concern	   about	   “the	   likely	   effect	   of	   the	   President’s	   public	   statements	   on	   Rabin’s	  electoral	  chances	  in	  May”.24	  	  Although	  Quandt	  was	  reassured	  by	  them	  that	  “the	  best	  guess	  is	  that	  it	  will	  have	  very	  little	  import,”25	  he	  seems	  to	  have	  concluded	  after	  the	  fact	  that	  Carter’s	  statements	  “helped	  set	  off	  a	  chemical	  reaction	  in	  Israel”	  and	  may	  have	   played	   some	   part	   in	   undermining	   Rabin.26	   	   Allegedly,	   Assistant	   Secretary	   of	  State	   Roy	   Atherton	   remarked	   to	   an	   Israeli	   official	   at	   the	   time	   that	   Carter’s	  statements	  would	  certainly	  hurt	  Labor	  in	  the	  May	  elections.27	  	   To	  be	  fair,	  nobody	  in	  the	  administration	  or	   in	  Israel	   foresaw	  the	  severity	  of	  the	   landslide	   until	   the	   last	  minute	   erosion	   of	   Labor’s	   position	   in	   public	   polling.28	  	  However,	   in	  part	   this	   is	  because	  the	  U.S.	  role	  was	  not	  adequately	   factored	  into	  the	  equation	  in	  advance.	   	  Officials	  at	  the	  U.S.	  Embassy	  in	  Tel	  Aviv	  reported	  that	  one	  of	  the	  reasons	  for	  this	  last-­‐minute	  collapse	  in	  Labor’s	  standing	  was	  a	  heightened	  sense	  of	  U.S.	  pressure	  on	  Israel	  during	  the	  commotion	  over	  PRM-­‐12.29	  	   Israeli	  officials	  also	  viewed	  American	  actions	  as	  a	  contributing	   factor	  at	   the	  time.	   	   Rabin’s	   speechwriter	   recalls	   that	   the	   prime	   minister	   was	   downcast	   after	  visiting	  Carter:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 “Evening Report - Memorandum for Zbigniew Brzezinski from Middle East (staff)”, March 11, 1977, 
Collection “Staff Material: FOI/Legal”, Box 44, Folder 4, Document 16-9, Jimmy Carter Presidential 
Library. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Quandt, Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics, 48, 62 & 65. 
27 Kenneth W. Stein, Heroic Diplomacy: Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin, and the Quest for Arab-Israeli 
Peace (Psychology Press, 1999), 193. 
28 Peretz, “The Earthquake,” 251. 
29 “‘Prospects for the Israeli Election’ in Information Items - Memorandum for the President from 
Zbigniew Brzezinski”, May 14, 1977, Collection “Brzezinski Material: President’s Daily Report File”, Box 
2, Folder 3, Document 26-7, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library. 
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  “We	  rested	  up	  before	  flying	  home	  that	  night.	   	  Generally,	   the	  prime	  minister	   enjoyed	   a	   chat	   over	   a	   nightcap	   after	   take-­‐off,	   but	   on	   this	  occasion	   he	   was	   unusually	   uncommunicative…	   seven	   hours	   later,	  nibbling	  on	  an	  El	  Al	  breakfast,	  Rabin	  told	  us	  that	  he	  had	  spent	  much	  of	   the	   night	   ruminating	   over	   Jimmy	   Carter’s	   abysmal	   ignorance	   of	  our	   affairs,	   and	   thinking	   about	   how	   the	   situation	  would	   affect	   the	  forthcoming	   Israeli	   general	   election	   three	  months	   hence.	   	   The	   last	  thing	  he	  needed	  before	  polling	  day	  was	  a	  crisis	  with	  Washington,	  he	  said”.30	  	  	  When	   discussing	   how	   to	   frame	   his	   two	   remaining	   U.S.	   speeches,	   he	   recalls	   Rabin	  saying	   “to	  put	  a	  brave	   face	  on	   things	  and	   totally	  downplay	  his	  difference	  with	   the	  president,	  just	  as	  he	  was	  doing	  with	  the	  Israeli	  press”.31	  	  	   This	   perspective	   was	   also	   reiterated	   by	   the	   former	   Director	   General	   of	  Rabin’s	  office	  (the	  equivalent	  of	  his	  chief	  of	  staff),	  Amos	  Eiran.	  	  Eiran	  claims	  that	  the	  PM’s	   visit	   to	   Washington	   “hurt	   him	   politically	   very	   badly”	   and	   that	   Carter’s	  statements	   in	   particular	   “hurt	   Rabin	   internally	   extensively…	   we	   could	   not	  understand	  the	  move	  to	  affect	  Rabin	  internally	  [in	  a	  way	  that	  would]	  help	  the	  right	  in	  Israel	  that	  opposed	  U.S.	  peace	  plans…	  that	  was	  not	  their	  intention	  to	  promote	  the	  right	  in	  this	  country	  at	  that	  time,	  but	  that	  was	  the	  outcome	  of	  it”.32	  	  For	  Rabin	  “this	  was	  a	  very,	  very	  painful	  trip	  in	  many	  ways”.33	  	   Other	  members	  of	  Labor	  also	  made	  similar	  claims.	  	  In	  his	  concession	  speech,	  Peres	   said	   “I	   do	   not	   look	   for	   scapegoats”	   but	   asserted	   that	   fear	   of	   an	   imposed	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Yehuda Avner, The Prime Ministers: An Intimate Narrative of Israeli Leadership (Toby Press, 2010), 
329. 
31 Ibid., pp. 328-329. 
32 Eiran, former Director General of the Prime Minister’s Office, “Interview with the Author.” 
33 Ibid. 
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settlement	  by	   the	  U.S.	  was	  one	  of	   the	   reasons	   for	   the	  party’s	  defeat.34	   	  During	   the	  campaign,	   Israeli	   Foreign	   Minister	   Yigal	   Allon	   singled	   out	   for	   criticism	   American	  positions	   on	   border	  modifications	   and	  PRM-­‐12.	   	   Embassy	  Tel	   Aviv	   explained	   “the	  Labor	   Party	   is	   concerned	   that	   the	   issue	   may	   weaken	   the	   alignment’s	   electoral	  support	  by	  making	   an	   issue	  of	  U.S./Israeli	   arms	   relationships”	   and	   that	  Allon	  was	  motivated	   by	   a	   “desire	   to	   project	   –	   for	   domestic	   consumption	   in	   the	  midst	   of	   the	  election	  campaign	  –	  a	  willingness	  to	  resist	  whatever	  U.S.	  pressure	  is	  forthcoming.”35	  Allon	  then	  met	  with	  Vance	  and	  expressed	  “at	  length…	  the	  problems	  faced	  by	  the	  Labor	  Party	  in	  Israel	  in	  next	  week’s	  elections,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  doubts	  which	  have	  been	   raised	   in	   Israeli	   minds	   by	   recent	   statements	   made	   by	   the	   U.S.	   on	   various	  elements	   of	   a	   peace	   settlement”.36	   	   The	   incoming	   U.S.	   ambassador	   at	   the	   time,	  Samuel	  Lewis,	  also	  described	  in	  an	  interview	  for	  this	  project	  that	  Allon	  “gave	  me	  a	  blistering	  speech	  about	  the	  United	  States…	  costing	  them	  the	  election”	  soon	  after.37	  	   The	   perception	   that	   American	   actions	   benefitted	   the	   Likud	   at	   Labor’s	  expense	  is	  also	  voiced	  by	  Israelis	  on	  the	  political	  right.	  	  For	  instance,	  in	  my	  interview	  with	  Yitzhak	  Shamir’s	  longtime	  chief	  of	  office,	  Amb.	  Yossi	  Ben-­‐Aharon,	  he	  suggested	  that	   Carter’s	   statements	   about	   Palestinian	   rights	   “contributed	   to	   hurting	   Labor	   in	  the	   election”	   because	   “what	   Carter	   was	   suggesting	   was	   so	   far	   beyond	   what	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 “‘Israeli Elections’ in Information Items - Memorandum for the President from Zbigniew Brzezinski”, 
May 18, 1977, Collection “Brzezinski Material: President’s Daily Report File”, Box 2, Folder 3, Document 
48-3, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library. 
35 “‘Israeli Concern over Relations with U.S.’ in Daily Report - Memorandum for the President from 
Zbigniew Brzezinski”, April 27, 1977, Collection “Brzezinski Material: President’s Daily Report File”, 
Box 2, Folder 1, Document 37-7, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library; “‘Israeli Displeasure Expressed’ in 
Daily Report - Memorandum for the President from Zbigniew Brzezinski”, May 9, 1977, Collection 
“Brzezinski Material: President’s Daily Report File”, Box 2, Folder 2, Document 55-6, Jimmy Carter 
Presidential Library. 
36 “‘Vance’s Meeting with Foreign Minister Allon’ in Daily Report - Memorandum for the President from 
Zbigniew Brzezinski.” 
37 Former US Ambassador to Israel Samuel Wingate Lewis, “Interview with the Author”, February 2, 2011. 
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Israeli	  public	  could	  stomach”	  that	  “people	  here	  realized	  that	  if	  you	  have	  a	  president	  like	  Carter,	  you	  might	  as	  well	  have	  someone	  who	  can	  confront	  him	  and	  not	  concede	  territory	  just	  to	  buy	  some	  kind	  of	  favor”.38	  	   Even	  AIPAC	  concluded	  that	   the	  perceived	  rift	   in	  U.S.-­‐Israel	   relations	  caused	  by	  Carter’s	  new	  approach	  to	  Mideast	  policy	  probably	  contributed	  to	  Rabin’s	  defeat.	  	  Its	  weekly	  newsletter,	   the	  Near	  East	  Report,	   reflected	  one	  week	  after	   the	  vote	  that	  “voters	  appeared	  to	  react	  to	  a	  variety	  of	  domestic	  concerns	  and	  a	  feeling	  that	  after	  29	   years	   of	   Labor	   Party	   rule	   it	  was	   time	   for	   a	   change	   [but]	   another	   factor	  which	  must	  be	  taken	  into	  account	  was	  the	  perceived	  weakening	  of	  U.S.	  support	  for	  Israel	  as	  evidenced	  by	  a	  number	  of	  actions	  taken	  by	  the	  Carter	  administration”.39	  	  
Coding	  the	  Observable	  Implications	  
1.	  Perceptions	  of	  Sender	  Interests:	  	   Each	   of	   the	   four	   theories	   tested	   by	   this	   dissertation	   anticipate	   that	   the	  sender’s	   perceptions	   of	   its	   interests	   help	   explain	   variation	   in	   the	   occurrence	   of	  leadership	  selection.	   	  However,	   they	  pose	  different	  predictions	  with	  regard	  to	  how	  sender	   interests	   matter.	   	   For	   instance,	   national	   interests	   theory	   (Theory	   #1)	  anticipates	   that	   senders	   should	   not	   miss	   opportunities	   to	   meddle	   when	   their	  interests	  are	  objectively	  at	  stake.	  	  However,	  1977	  is	  exactly	  one	  such	  drastic	  “missed	  opportunity”.	   	   U.S.	   interests	   in	   pursuing	   LSI	   should	   have	   been	   highest	   during	   the	  drive	  toward	  a	  Geneva	  conference,	  and	  yet	  we	  did	  not	  see	  an	  effort	  to	  support	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Yossi Ben-Aharon, former Director General of the office of Yitzhak Shamir, “Interview with the 
Author”, June 23, 2011. 
39  “Israeli Elections,” Near East Report 21, no. 21 (May 25, 1977). 
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incumbent	   candidate	   in	   the	   target	   state,	  who	  was	   far	  more	   likely	   to	   countenance	  concessions	  the	  Arabs	  could	  accept	  than	  his	  right-­‐wing	  successor.	  	  The	  fact	  that	  LSI	  did	  not	  take	  place	  in	  1977	  seems	  to	  contradict	  rather	  than	  support	  Theory	  #1.	  	   The	  case	  also	  provides	  little	  support	  for	  domestic	  structural	  theories	  of	  LSI.	  	  Theory	  #2,	  lobby-­‐legislative	  theory,	  holds	  that	  LSI	  toward	  Israel	  is	  unlikely	  because	  Congress	  and	   the	  pro-­‐Israel	   lobby	   tend	  not	   to	   see	  a	  meaningful	  difference	   for	  U.S.	  interests	  between	  Israeli	   leaders	  on	  the	  right	  versus	  the	  left.	   	  Although	  LSI	  did	  not	  take	  place	  during	  the	  Israeli	  vote	  of	  1977,	  this	  outcome	  is	  consonant	  with	  Theory	  #2	  for	  the	  wrong	  reasons.	  	  The	  sorts	  of	  gestures	  that	  would	  have	  been	  most	  helpful	  to	  Labor	   (downplaying	   differences	   over	   border	   modifications,	   Palestinian	   interests,	  and	  weaponry)	  were	  exactly	  those	  policies	  being	  advocated	  by	  pro-­‐Israel	  members	  of	  Congress	  at	  the	  time,	  but	  they	  were	  ignored	  by	  the	  executive	  branch.40	  	   Further,	  administration	  behavior	  contradicts	  the	  notion	  that	  it	  was	  pursuing	  policies	   on	   LSI	   favored	   by	   the	   pro-­‐Israel	   lobby	   for	   that	   community’s	   support.	  	  Otherwise,	  the	  administration	  would	  not	  have	  walked	  back	  its	  “defensible	  borders”	  statement	  (which	  was	  quite	  popular	  with	  that	  community)	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  1967	  with	  minor	  modifications	  (a	  statement	  that	  was	  equally	  unpopular).41	  	  Nor	  would	  Carter	  have	   praised	   nascent	   moderation	   by	   the	   PLO,	   since	   AIPAC	   had	   already	   been	  regularly	  attacking	  “the	  myth	  of	  PLO	  ‘moderation’.”42	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Szulc, “How Carter Fouled the Israeli Elections.” 
41 Carter’s first statement on borders was praised by AIPAC as “significant and welcome,” while his second 
remark was attacked for promoting a state of affairs that “between 1949 and 1967... encouraged Arab 
aggression and postponed a settlement”. See “Carter for Defensible Borders,” Near East Report 21, no. 10 
(March 9, 1977); “Controversy over Borders,” Near East Report 21, no. 11 (March 16, 1977). 
42 “Sadat’s Reversals,” Near East Report 21, no. 1 (January 5, 1977); I. L. Kenen, “Converting the Enemy,” 
Near East Report 21, no. 2 (January 12, 1977); I. L. Kenen, “Plot to Destroy Israel,” Near East Report 21, 
no. 7 (February 16, 1977). 
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   The	  case	  provides	  no	  more	  than	  partial	  support	  for	  Theory	  #3,	  bureaucratic	  politics	  theory.	   	  The	  theory	  predicts	  that	  rates	  of	  LSI	  toward	  Israel	  should	  be	  quite	  high,	   because	  Near	   East	   hands	   in	   the	   bureaucracy	   tend	   to	   see	   a	   deep	   and	   salient	  difference	   in	   the	   positions	   of	   Israeli	   political	   factions	   for	  U.S.	   interests.	   	   Executive	  agencies	  such	  as	  the	  CIA	  and	  State	  were	  the	  most	  vocal	  parts	  of	  the	  administration	  in	   pointing	   out	   Rabin’s	   hopes	   for	   a	   domestic	   push	   from	   Washington,	   but	   their	  oblique	  warnings	  fell	  on	  deaf	  ears	  in	  the	  White	  House,	  and	  LSI	  did	  not	  take	  place.	  	   The	   theory	  best	   supported	   in	   this	   regard	   is	  Theory	  #4	   (leadership	   theory),	  which	   argues	   that	   occurrence	   is	  mainly	   driven	   by	   perceptions	   of	   sender	   interests	  that	   are	   filtered	   through	   the	   beliefs	   of	   individual	   top	   leaders.	   	   Although	   Carter,	  Brzezinski,	   and	  Vance	  did	   tend	   to	  perceive	   Israeli	   flexibility	   as	   a	   crucial	   factor	   for	  U.S.	  interests,	  rightly	  or	  wrongly	  they	  did	  not	  seem	  to	  think	  that	  U.S.	  interests	  were	  at	  stake	  in	  the	  Israeli	  election.	  	  Also,	  in	  terms	  of	  specific,	  interpersonal	  beliefs,	  Rabin	  made	   a	   poor	   impression	   on	   Carter	   in	  Washington.	   	   Carter	   found	  him	   surprisingly	  stubborn	  and	  expressed	  little	  interest	  in	  Rabin’s	  political	  survival.43	   	  In	  fact,	  Carter	  apparently	   joked	   behind	   doors	   that	   if	   he	  were	   Israeli	   he	  would	   probably	   join	   the	  reformist	  Democratic	  Movement	  for	  Change	  in	  protest	  against	  Labor	  hegemony.44	  	  2.	  Perceptions	  of	  Close	  Contests	  	   Decision-­‐makers	   are	   only	   likely	   to	   exert	   the	   political	   capital	   required	   to	  undertake	  LSI	  when	  they	  perceive	  an	  imminent	  political	  contest	  in	  the	  target	  state	  that	  they	  believe	  is	  up	  for	  grabs.	  	  However,	  the	  different	  theories	  considered	  by	  this	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Carter, Keeping faith, 279-81. 
44 “National Security Council Meeting - Summary and Minutes,” 9. 
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dissertation	  pose	  different	  predictions	  regarding	  how	  these	  perceptions	  are	  likely	  to	  vary	   and	   impact	   the	   occurrence	   of	   LSI.	   	   Theory	   #1	   (national	   interests	   theory)	  predicts	   that	   leaders	   should	   respond	   consistently	   to	   available	   information	   about	  objective	   political	   contests	   abroad.	   	   However,	   Theory	   #4	   (leadership	   theory)	  predicts	   that	   such	   responsiveness	   should	   be	   constrained	   by	   the	   subjective	  perceptions	  of	  top	  leaders	  in	  the	  sender	  state.	  	  In	  this	  regard,	  leadership	  theory	  does	  a	  better	  job	  of	  explaining	  the	  outcome	  than	   its	   structural	   competitors.	   	   Both	   objective	   material	   circumstances	   and	  messages	  from	  the	  bureaucracy	  were	  providing	  indications	  that	  meddling	  might	  be	  required	  if	  the	  U.S.	  was	  going	  to	  get	  to	  Geneva	  and	  launch	  multilateral	  negotiations.	  	  	  However,	   U.S.	   leaders	   did	   not	   seem	   to	   believe	   that	   the	   outcome	   of	   the	   political	  contest	   in	   Israel	   was	   in	   question	   and	   therefore	   were	   disinclined	   to	   consider	  intervention.	  	  Because	  leaders	  did	  not	  perceive	  the	  contest	  in	  Israel	  as	  close	  enough	  to	  matter,	  their	  high	  value	  attached	  to	  flexibility	  on	  the	  process	  did	  not	  lead	  to	  LSI	  by	  the	  United	  States.	  For	  instance,	  Brzezinski	  made	  repeated	  statements	  in	  private	  suggesting	  that	  he	   believed	   Rabin	   and	   Peres	   had	   the	   election	   sewn	   up,	   even	   after	   Rabin	   stepped	  down	  from	  leadership	  of	  the	  Party	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  scandal.	  	  During	  the	  Presidential	  Review	  Committee	  meeting	   for	  Mideast	  policy	  on	  February	  4th,	  Brzezinski	   ignored	  CIA	  warnings	  that	  the	  outcome	  was	  uncertain.	  	  When	  urged	  by	  Acting	  CIA	  Director	  Enno	   Knoche	   that	   “the	   Israeli	   elections	   are	   May	   17	   and	   the	   situation	   there	   is	  fragile…	  we	  must	   resist	  pushing	   them	  too	   far,	   too	   fast,”	  Brzezinski	   responded	   that	  “We	  have	  to	  move	  toward	  a	  more	  active	  role.	  	  We	  can’t	  wait.	  	  I	  believe	  the	  situation	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is	  more	  propitious	  than	  it	  has	  been	  in	  the	  past	  23	  years.	  	  But	  I	  think	  we	  need	  to	  give	  the	  Israelis	  and	  the	  Arabs	  a	  more	  substantive	  sense	  of	  what	  is	  required”.45	  In	   April,	   Brzezinski’s	   reporting	   to	   the	   president	   focused	   more	   on	   Peres’s	  likely	  policy	  positions	  toward	  the	  U.S.	  than	  the	  prior	  question	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  he	  would	  get	  elected	  in	  the	  first	  place.46	  	  Whereas	  the	  Brzezinski’s	  Mideast	  staff	  wrote	  to	  him	  in	  terms	  of	  “if	  Peres	  becomes	  Prime	  Minister,”47	  he	  tended	  to	  speak	  in	  terms	  of	  “once	  the	  elections	  are	  held,	  and	  he	  becomes	  Prime	  Minister”.48	  	  He	  had	  begun	  to	  plan	   for	   after	  May	   17th,	   arguing	   that	   “we	   don’t	   want	   to	   lose	   time	  waiting…	   [and]	  need	  to	  get	  Peres	  engaged…	  why	  not	  invite	  him	  for	  early	  June?”49	  	  3.	  Patterns	  of	  Domestic	  Debate:	  	   Another	   area	   in	   which	   the	   theories	   diverge	   involves	   the	   patterns	   of	  deliberation	   within	   the	   sender	   state	   leading	   up	   to	   LSI.	   	   Theories	   2	   and	   3	   (the	  domestic	   structural	   approaches)	   expect	   members	   of	   Congress,	   lobbyists,	   and/or	  bureaucrats	  to	  be	  in	  the	  loop	  and	  influential	  during	  debates	  in	  advance	  of	  adopting	  a	  policy	  of	  leadership	  selection	  intervention.	  	  However,	  Theory	  #4	  (leadership	  theory)	  anticipates	  that	  these	  actors	  should	  be	  in	  the	  dark	  and	  excluded	  from	  the	  center	  of	  gravity	  with	  regard	  to	  national	  decision-­‐making.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 “Summary of Conclusions of PRC Meeting on the Middle East,” 12. 
46 “‘Assessment of Peres as Israeli Prime Minister’ in Information Items - Memorandum for the President 
from Zbigniew Brzezinski”, April 15, 1977, Collection “Brzezinski Material: President’s Daily Report 
File”, Box 1, Folder 5, Document 29-3, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library. 
47 “‘(Notes in Advance of) PRC Meeting on the Middle East, April 19, 3:00 p.m.’ from William B. Quandt 
to Zbigniew Brzezinski”, April 18, 1977, 3, Collection “Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection: Subject File”, 
Box 12, Folder: "Meetings -- PRC 13: 4/19/77, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library. 
48 “[Minutes from] PRC Meeting on the Middle East: April 19, 1977, 3:00 - 4:30 p.m.” (National Security 
Council, n.d.), 17, Collection “Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection: Subject File”, Box 12, Folder: "Meetings -- 
PRC 13: 4/19/77, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library. 
49 Ibid., 17–8. 
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Because	  this	  is	  a	  non-­‐instance	  of	  LSI,	  this	  observable	  implication	  is	  somewhat	  less	  germane.	  	  In	  certain	  regards	  it	  provides	  support	  for	  bureaucratic	  politics	  theory,	  because	   the	   executive	   agencies	   were	   the	   strongest	   voice	   highlighting	   domestic	  problems	   being	   faced	   by	   Labor.	   	   However,	   the	   fact	   that	   there	   seem	   to	   have	   been	  strict	   limits	  on	   these	  groups’	   freedom	  of	  action	  provides	   tentative	  support	  as	  well	  for	  leadership	  theory	  and	  the	  paper	  paradox.	  	  Bureaucrats	  were	  able	  to	  highlight	  the	  closeness	  of	  the	  Israeli	  contest	  and	  even	  the	  impact	  of	  US	  actions	  on	  Israeli	  politics	  but	  were	  not	  sufficiently	  empowered	  to	  advocate	  specific	  policy	  recommendations	  on	   the	  basis	  of	   these	   concerns.	   	  Meanwhile,	   the	  disinterest	  of	   top	  political	   leaders	  helps	  explain	  why	  bureaucratic	  concerns	  had	  little	  impact	  on	  policy	  outcomes.	  	  4.	  Cycles	  of	  Domestic	  Power:	  	   Another	  area	  in	  which	  the	  theories	  diverge	  involves	  cycles	  of	  domestic	  power	  within	  the	  sender	  state.	  	  Theory	  #2	  (the	  lobby-­‐legislative	  approach)	  and	  Theory	  #3	  (the	   bureaucratic	   approach)	   expect	   that	   certain	   periods	   of	   politics	   in	   the	   sender	  state	  should	  be	  especially	  weighted	  in	  favor	  of	  domestic	  structural	  forces	  against	  the	  agency	   of	   top	   political	   leaders,	  whereas	  Theory	  #4	   (leadership	   theory)	   holds	   that	  these	   leaders	   should	   be	   relatively	   unconstrained	  without	   regard	   to	   their	   political	  calendar.	  	  This	   observable	   implication	   provides	   strong	   support	   for	   leadership	   theory	  over	  its	  domestic	  structural	  competitors.	  	  Theory	  #2,	  lobby-­‐legislative	  theory,	  holds	  that	   top	   leaders	  should	  be	  especially	   irrelevant	  and	  disempowered	  during	  periods	  of	  united	  government	  or	  in	  the	  lead-­‐up	  to	  elections	  in	  the	  sender	  state.	  	  This	  was	  in	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fact	   one	   of	   the	   few	   periods	   of	   united	   government	   covered	   by	   this	   study,	   and	   yet	  President	  Carter’s	  intensive	  preparations	  for	  Mideast	  negotiations	  in	  spite	  of	  these	  forces	  drove	  main	  American	  actions	  that	  undermined	  Israel’s	  Labor	  government.	  	   Theory	  #3	  (the	  bureaucratic	  politics	  approach)	  holds	  that	  top	  leaders	  should	  be	   especially	   overpowered	   by	   executive	   agencies	   early	   in	   their	   terms	   because	  administrations	   usually	   take	   some	   time	   to	   get	   their	   bearings,	   undertake	   strategic	  planning,	  and	  put	  in	  place	  a	  system	  of	  intended	  control	  through	  political	  appointees.	  	  However,	   this	   case	   provides	   extraordinary	   evidence	   for	   Theory	   #4	   (leadership	  theory)	   over	   bureaucratic	   politics	   theory	   because	   President	   Carter’s	   eagerness	   to	  push	   for	   comprehensive	   solution	   to	   the	   conflict	   evidently	   overrode	   even	   these	  exceptionally	  strong	  structural	  constraints.	  	  5.	  Bureaucratic	  Freelancing:	  	   The	  theories	  also	  differ	  with	  regard	  to	  whether	  lower-­‐level	  officials	  are	  able	  to	   undertake	   LSI	   without	   the	   approval	   of	   their	   higher	   ups,	   with	   Theory	   #3	   (the	  bureaucratic	  politics	  approach)	  predicting	  high	  rates	  of	  such	  freelancing	  and	  Theory	  #4	  (leadership	  theory)	  predicting	  lower	  rates	  of	  freelancing,	  occurring	  only	  during	  periods	  of	  low	  executive	  oversight.	  	  	  In	  fact,	  it	  seems	  no	  unauthorized	  policy-­‐making	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  LSI	  took	  place	  in	   this	  particular	   instance.	   	  This	  outcome	   supports	  Theory	  #4	   (leadership	   theory)	  for	   two	   reasons.	   	   First,	   it	   supports	   the	   leader-­‐centric	   approach	   simply	   because	  presidential	  authority	  was	  not	  infringed	  upon.	   	  Second,	  it	  fits	  with	  the	  dynamics	  of	  presidential	   oversight.	   	   As	   noted	   above,	   President	   Carter	   exerted	   very	   active	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oversight	   on	   the	  peace	  process	   issues,	   having	   been	  described,	   for	   instance,	   as	   the	  over-­‐involved	   quarterback	   of	   his	   team	   instead	   of	   the	   coach.50	   	   Leadership	   theory	  expects	   presidents	   who	   exert	   active	   oversight	   to	   be	   especially	   fortified	   against	  unauthorized	  behavior	  by	  their	  subordinates.	  	  6.	  Consistency	  of	  Message:	  	   The	   theories	   differ	  with	   regard	   to	  whether	   and	   how	   disagreements	  within	  the	  sender	  state	  over	  what	  sort	  of	  message	  to	  project	  toward	  the	  sender	  state	  affect	  the	   efficacy	  of	   LSI	   attempts.	   	  National	   interests	   theory	   expects	   that	  policy	   efficacy	  should	   not	   be	   affected	   by	   such	   domestic	   disputes.	   	   However,	   that	   is	   exactly	  what	  occurred	   in	   this	   instance,	  and	   these	   foul-­‐ups	  were	   in	   large	  part	  attributable	   to	   the	  idiosyncratic	   choices	   and	   poor	   coordination	   among	   principal	   officials	   in	  Washington.	   	   The	   fact	   that	   these	   errors	   were	   not	   due	   to	   the	   dissent	   of	   major	  institutions	  such	  as	  Congress	  or	  the	  bureaucracy	  contradicts	  Theories	  2	  and	  3	  while	  supporting	  Theory	  #4	  (leadership	  theory).	  President	   Carter’s	   talking	   points	   from	   Secretary	   of	   State	   Vance	   for	   Rabin’s	  visit	  did	  not	  call	  for	  his	  controversial	  language	  either	  on	  border	  modifications	  or	  on	  Palestinian	  self-­‐determination.51	  	  Carter’s	  call	  for	  a	  Palestinian	  homeland	  at	  Clinton,	  MA,	  was	  not	  in	  any	  of	  his	  talking	  points	  from	  bureaucrats	  at	  State.52	  	  In	  fact,	  Vance	  and	   Brzezinski	   were	   themselves	   caught	   by	   surprise	   and	   considered	   issuing	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Lewis, “The United States and Israel: Constancy and Change,” 228. 
51 “Official Working Visit by Israeli Prime Minister Rabin - Memorandum for the President from Cyrus 
Vance.” 
52 Alfred Leroy Atherton Jr., “Interview with Ambassador Alfred Leroy Atherton Jr.”, Summer 1990, 123, 
The Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training 
(ADST), Library of Congress. 
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retraction	   until	   they	   were	   overruled.53	   	   The	   president	   later	   reemphasized	   the	  Palestinian	  question	  and	  failed	  to	  reverse	  PRM-­‐12	  the	  week	  before	  Israel’s	  elections,	  despite	  having	  been	  carefully	  coached	  to	  do	  so	  twice	  that	  very	  morning.54	   	  Carter’s	  remarks	   to	  NBC	  praising	  Shimon	  Peres	  and	  continuity	  within	   the	  Labor	  Party	  was	  undermined	  by	  his	  own	  contradictory	   language	   that	  suggested	  “the	   identity	  of	   the	  Israeli	  leader	  –	  I	  do	  not	  think	  will	  make	  that	  much	  difference”.55	  President	   Carter	   evinced	   a	   strong	   preference	   for	   conducting	   diplomacy	  publicly	  but	  did	  so	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  sometimes	  undermined	  U.S.	  policy	  aims	  and	  his	  Israeli	  partners.	  	  Spiegel	  suggests	  that	  “Carter’s	  comments	  revealed	  a	  president	  who	  was	  an	  unguided	  missile	   in	  public.	   	  No	  matter	  how	  carefully	  he	  was	  briefed	  by	  his	  aides	   in	   the	   intricacies	   of	   Mideast	   politics,	   no	   one	   could	   ever	   be	   certain	   what	   he	  would	  say	  before	  the	  microphones”.56	  	  Quandt	  acknowledges	  that	  Carter	  “had	  little	  patience	  for	  such	  codewords”	  and	  made	  statements	  on	  the	  process	  “carelessly”	  and	  “somewhat	   awkwardly”.57	   	   After	   botching	   his	   press	   conference	   in	   May,	   one	   U.S.	  official	  reportedly	  complained	  “why	  can’t	  the	  president	  watch	  what	  he’s	  saying?”58	  	  7.	  Suitability	  of	  Message:	  	   Another	  determinant	  of	  efficacy	  is	  how	  well	  the	  sender’s	  main	  message	  suits	  political	   realities	   in	   the	   target	   state,	   and	   the	   theories	   offer	   mutually	   distinct	  predictions	   on	   this	   point	   as	  well.	   	   National	   interests	   theory	   predicts	   that	   suitable	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 91. 
54 Szulc, “How Carter Fouled the Israeli Elections.” 
55 Quoted in “Near East Report.” 
56 Steven L. Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America’s Middle East Policy, from Truman 
to Reagan (University of Chicago Press, 1986), 334. 
57 Quandt, Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics, 44 & 58. 
58 Szulc, “How Carter Fouled the Israeli Elections.” 
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messaging	   should	   be	   relatively	   unproblematic,	   whereas	   domestic	   theories	   of	  political	   action	   stress	   institutional	   or	   personal	   factors	   that	   may	   impede	   suitable	  messaging	  by	  officials	  in	  the	  sender	  state.	  The	   1977	   electoral	   case	   provides	   strong	   evidence	   in	   favor	   of	   Theory	   #4	  (leadership	  theory)	  and	  against	  the	  structural	  approaches.	  	  National	  interests	  theory	  is	   contradicted	   because	   it	   holds	   that	   talk	   is	   easily	  malleable	   and	   should	   be	   deftly	  suited	   to	   fit	  national	   interests.	   	  Theories	  2	  and	  3	   find	   little	  support	  because	  of	   the	  mismatch	  between	  U.S.	  messages	  and	  Israeli	  domestic	  politics	  was	  not	  the	  result	  of	  institutionally-­‐driven	  preferences	  from	  either	  the	  executive	  or	  legislative	  sides.	  Rather,	   the	  case	  material	  supports	   leadership	   theory	  because	   the	  mismatch	  appears	  to	  be	  idiosyncratic	  and	  personal	  in	  nature.	  	  The	  president	  and	  his	  principals	  were	  so	   focused	  on	  achieving	  substantive	  progress	  on	  the	  peace	  process	   that	   they	  overlooked	   the	  ways	   in	  which	   their	   procedural	   framework	  would	   undermine	   the	  Labor	   Party	   and	   their	   overall	   ability	   to	   make	   progress.	   	   The	   U.S.	   ambassador	   to	  Israel	  at	  the	  time	  concluded	  “Carter	  was	  very	  impatient.	  	  He	  did	  not	  want	  to	  wait,	  or	  couldn’t	   see	   why	   you	   had	   to	   wait,	   until	   the	   Israeli	   election	   was	   over	   to	   get	   his	  diplomacy	  going”.59	  	  Similarly,	  Brzezinski	  brushed	  aside	  concerns	  voiced	  by	  the	  CIA	  and	   others	   that	   the	   political	   situation	   in	   Israel	   was	   too	   fragile	   for	   tough	   public	  diplomacy	  toward	  Israel	  until	  after	  the	  vote	  took	  place.	  	  
Carter,	  Cases	  #2	  &	  #3:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Samuel W. Lewis, “Interview with Ambassador Samuel Wingate Lewis”, August 9, 1998, 34, The 
Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training (ADST), 
Library of Congress. 
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Figuring	  out	  Menachem	  Begin,	  1977	  	  	   The	   day	   after	   Begin’s	   surprise	   victory,	   the	   United	   States	   began	   to	   regroup	  and	   reevaluate	   its	   policy	   toward	   the	   peace	   process.	   	   As	   is	   common	   during	  unexpected,	   critical	   junctures	   such	   as	   this	   one,	   failure	   of	   the	   prevailing	   approach	  created	   a	   brief	   window	   in	   which	   a	   variety	   of	   new	   avenues	   were	   open	   for	  consideration	  and	  structural	  pressures	  were	  somewhat	  less	  constraining	  than	  usual.	  	  As	  one	  well-­‐placed	  observer	  puts	  it,	  “the	  tactics	  were	  very	  much	  in	  the	  air”.60	  	  Thus,	  decision-­‐makers	  were	   all	   over	   the	  map	   in	   terms	   of	   their	   stated	   policy	   objectives,	  pursuing	  two	  contradictory	  lines	  of	  (at	  least)	  partial	  LSI,	  one	  after	  the	  other.	  	  
Coding	  the	  Dependent	  Variables	  (Occurrence	  and	  Efficacy)	  Did	  LSI	  Occur?	  	   Yes,	  in	  part.	  	  Initially,	  the	  administration	  decided	  upon	  negative	  LSI,	  aiming	  to	  undermine	  Begin	  and	  topple	  him	  in	  early,	  renewed	  elections.	  	  Soon,	  however,	  their	  perceptions	  shifted	  so	  drastically	  that	  they	  toyed	  with	  the	   idea	  of	  bolstering	  Begin	  instead,	   hoping	   he	   would	   make	   broad	   concessions	   for	   peace.	   	   Eventually,	   they	  settled	  somewhere	  between	  these	  two,	  rather	  antithetical	  policy	  positions.	  
<Negative	  LSI>	  	   First,	   administration	   officials	   sought	   to	   catalyze	   internal	   opposition	   to	   him	  and	   eventually	   topple	   his	   government.	   	   Their	   position	   is	   best	   encapsulated	   by	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Former US Ambassador to Israel Samuel Wingate Lewis, “Interview with the Author.” 
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memo	  written	  by	  NSC	  Mideast	  staffer	  Bill	  Quandt	  the	  day	  after	  the	  Israeli	  elections,	  which	  is	  quoted	  in	  block	  at	  the	  start	  of	  the	  section	  above.	  	  In	  it,	  he	  suggests	  that	  an	  intransigent	  Israeli	  government	  would	  likely	  be	  harmful	  for	  U.S.	   interests	  and	  that,	  since	   “a	   new	   Israeli	   election	   may	   be	   inevitable	   in	   the	   near	   future,”	   Washington	  should	   ensure	   “Israeli	   voters…	   know	   that	   a	   hard-­‐line	   government	  will	   not	   find	   it	  easy	  to	  manage	  the	  U.S.-­‐Israel	  relationship.	   	   Intransigence	  must	  be	  seen	  to	  carry	  a	  price	  tag”.	   	  Presuming	  Begin	  “takes	  positions	  in	  his	  talks	  with	  us	  that	  preclude	  the	  continuation	   of	   our	   peace	   initiative,	   we	   should	   not	   hesitate	   to	   explain	   what	   has	  happened.	   	   Israelis	   can	   then	   draw	   their	   own	   conclusions,	   and	   perhaps	   the	   next	  election	  in	  1978	  or	  1979	  will	  produce	  different	  results”.61	  	   National	   security	   advisor	   Brzezinski	   seems	   to	   have	   advocated	   a	   similar	  approach.	  	  He	  approved	  Quandt’s	  memo,	  or	  at	  least	  his	  recommendation	  that	  further	  deliberation	   be	   conducted	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   his	   arguments.	   	   Observers	   recall	   that	  Brzezinski	  sought	  to	  use	  the	  early	  Begin	  trip	  to	  “read	  him	  the	  riot	  act”	  and	  “laying	  down	  the	  law	  not	  to	  screw	  up	  Geneva	  preparations”.62	  	  Brzezinski	  wrote	  to	  Carter:	  	   ““Let	  me	  make	  a	  ‘perverse’	  observation:	  The	  electoral	  outcome	  may	  not	   be	   actually	   all	   that	   bad.	   	   At	   some	   point,	   a	   disagreement	  with	  Israel	  over	  a	  settlement	  would	  have	  been	  likely	  in	  any	  case.	  	  Begin,	  by	  his	   extremism,	   is	   likely	   to	   split	  both	   Israeli	  public	  opinion	  and	  the	  American	  Jewish	  community.	  	  A	  position	  of	  moderate	  firmness	  on	  your	  part	  will	  rally	  to	  you	  in	  time	  both	  the	  Israeli	  opposition	  and	  significant	   portions	   of	   the	  American	   Jewish	   community,	   including	  its	  responsible	  leadership.”63	  	   There	  is	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  President	  Carter	  went	  along	  with	  this	  line	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 William B. Quandt, “Subject: Israeli Elections - NSC Memo 3011-X”, May 18, 1977. 
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63 “‘Israeli Cabinet Formation’ in NSC Weekly Report #13 - Memorandum for the President from 
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reasoning.	   	   Lewis	   recalls	   that	   “after	   Begin	  was	   elected,	   Carter	   and	   his	   team	   back	  here	   were	   trying	   to	   prepare	   to	   deal	   with	   this	   extremist	   when	   he	   came	   to	  Washington.	  	  Their	  instinct	  was,	  ‘we’re	  going	  to	  lay	  down	  the	  law	  to	  him’.	  This	  was	  Brzezinski’s	  advice	  which	  Carter	  very	  much	  shared,	   I	   think,	   initially”.64	   	  Brzezinski	  claims	   that	   “it	   was	   during	   this	   period	   that	   the	   President	   first	   discussed	   the	  possibility	  of	  a	  showdown	  over	  our	  policy	  toward	  Israel”.65	  	   The	   administration’s	   posture	   between	   mid-­‐May	   and	   mid-­‐June	   was	  compatible	  with	   this	   objective.	   	   Quandt	  wrote	   in	   early	   June	   that	   “more	   than	   ever	  before,	  we	  will	   need	   the	   support	   of	   domestic	   public	   opinion.	   	   Congress,	  American	  Jewish	  leaders,	  and	  Israeli	  moderates	  for	  our	  policies”.66	  	  Other	  goals	  for	  Begin’s	  visit	  included	  trying	  to	  “pin	  Begin	  down	  on	  a	  number	  of	  points”	  and	  “to	  keep	  a	  Begin-­‐led	  government	  from	  taking	  preemptory	  action	  such	  as	  annexation	  of	  the	  West	  Bank	  or	  an	   accelerated	   pace	   of	   establishing	   settlements”.67	   	   The	   administration	   did	   move	  ahead	  with	  new	  arms	  shipments	  toward	  Israel,	  but	  these	  were	  part	  of	  a	  prior	  effort	  to	  walk	   back	   PRM-­‐12	   and	   reassure	  moderate	   supporters	   of	   Israel	   that	   the	   Carter	  administration	  did	  not	  consider	  Israel’s	  security	  up	  for	  negotiation.68	  	   It	  is	  likely	  that	  the	  administration	  adopted	  a	  goal	  of	  toppling	  Begin,	  albeit	  as	  a	  tentative	  and	  long-­‐term	  objective.	   	  However,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  judge	  how	  extensively	  this	   objective	   actually	   shaped	   the	   policy.	   	   Thus,	   while	   it	   is	   possible	   that	   this	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Lewis, “Interview with Ambassador Samuel Wingate Lewis,” 34. 
65 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 97. 
66 Emphases added. “[Regarding] Discussion Paper for PRC Meeting on the Middle East, June 10, 1977, 
10:00 - 11:30 a.m. - Memorandum from William B. Quandt to Zbigniew Brzezinski”, June 6, 1977, 1, 
Collection “Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection: Subject File”, Box 24, Folder: “[Meetings -- PRC 17: 
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67 Ibid., 1–2. 
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represented	  a	  full	  case	  of	  negative	  LSI,	  at	  minimum	  it	  should	  be	  coded	  as	  a	  partial	  one,	  since	  there	  is	  little	  doubt	  squeezing	  out	  Begin	  was	  at	  least	  seriously	  considered.	  
<Positive	  LSI>	  	   Second,	  the	  administration	  also	  seemed	  to	  consider	  within	  a	  very	  short	  span	  of	  time	  pursuing	  a	  strategy	  of	  positive	  LSI	  toward	  Begin	  as	  well,	  making	  for	  a	  second	  episode	  of	  (at	  least)	  partial	  LSI.	   	  Something	  clearly	  changed	  in	  the	  administration’s	  thinking	   between	  mid-­‐June	   and	   Begin’s	   arrival	   one	   month	   later	   that	   led	   them	   to	  modify	   their	  actions.	   	  Begin	  received	  not	   just	  a	  cordial	   reception	  but	  one	   that	  was	  syrupy	  sweet.	  	  Carter	  called	  him	  “a	  man	  of	  courage	  and	  principle”	  and	  declared	  that	  “I	   like	  him	  very	  much”.69	   	  Whereas	  Rabin	   left	  Washington	   in	  a	  state	  of	   frustration,	  Begin	  was	  elated	  at	  the	  warm	  welcome	  he	  received,	  transmitting	  on	  his	  flight	  home	  a	  thank	  you	  message	  to	  Carter	  praising	  his	  days	  visiting	  Washington	  as	  “some	  of	  the	  best	   of	   my	   life.	   	   They	   never	   will	   be	   forgotten,	   thanks	   to	   you	   and	   your	   gracious	  attitude”.70	  	  A	  far	  cry	  from	  having	  been	  read	  the	  riot	  act.	  	   Certainly,	   the	   administration’s	   effort	   to	   regroup	   domestically	   may	   have	  played	   a	   role	   in	   this	   adjustment,	   but	   such	   an	   explanation	   seems	   to	   miss	   an	  important	  process	  of	  actual	  persuasion	  that	  was	  concurrently	  at	  play.	  	  It	  was	  not	  just	  Carter’s	   domestic	   advisors	   sending	   him	   memos	   suggesting	   that	   Begin	   might	   be	  willing	  to	  reconsider	  his	  hardline	  commitments71	  but	  his	  foreign	  policy	  advisors	  as	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 101. 
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well.72	   	   After	   two	   last-­‐minute	   trips	   back	   to	  Washington,	   Amb.	   Lewis	   successfully	  persuaded	  Carter	  that	  the	  best	  way	  to	  handle	  Begin	  was	  “with	  honey,	  not	  vinegar”.73	  	  It	   also	   helped	   his	   argument	   that	   Begin	   undertook	   some	   gestures	   that	   bolstered	  perceptions	  he	  might	  be	  more	  reasonable	  than	  expected,	  especially	  announcing	  that	  long-­‐time	  Labor	  stalwart	  Moshe	  Dayan	  would	  serve	  as	  his	  foreign	  minister	  and	  that	  Israel	  would	  not	  annex	  the	  territories	  (which	  was	  Dayan’s	  main	  precondition).	  	   Not	   just	   the	  president	  seems	  to	  have	  shifted	  his	  perception	  of	  Begin	  during	  this	  period.	  	  Quandt	  notes	  that,	  after	  the	  initial	  shock	  over	  Likud’s	  electoral	  victory	  wore	   off,	   many	   within	   the	   administration	   sought	   to	   gloss	   over	   Begin’s	   ideology,	  leading	   to	  nearly	  a	  year	  of	  wishful	   thinking	  he	  would	  be	  more	  accommodating	  on	  the	  West	  Bank	  than	  his	  beliefs	  actually	  allowed.74	  	  By	  late	  June,	  even	  Quandt’s	  own	  memos	  seemed	  to	  shift	  from	  speaking	  of	  an	  imminent	  confrontation	  to	  “assuming”	  Begin’s	  flexibility	  on	  a	  variety	  of	  issues,	  including	  perhaps	  even	  withdrawal	  from	  the	  West	  Bank	  and	  agreement	  to	  an	  indefinite	  settlement	  freeze.75	  	   The	   President	   and	   national	   security	   advisor	   seem	   to	   have	   shifted	   their	  perceptions	  of	  Begin	  even	  more	  drastically.	   	   	  At	   the	  very	   least,	  by	   the	   time	  he	   left	  Washington,	  each	  of	   them	  toyed	  with	   the	   idea	  of	  bolstering	  Begin’s	  position	  so	  he	  could	  be	  a	  strong	  partner	  for	  peace.	   	  They	  thought	  he	  might	  be	  the	  antidote	  to	  the	  troubles	   Kissinger	   had	   encountered	   with	   successive	   Labor	   governments	   so	  internally	  divided	  as	   to	  be	  unable	   to	  make	  progress	  on	  peace.	   	  Thus,	   these	  actions	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Former US Ambassador to Israel Samuel Wingate Lewis, “Interview with the Author.” 
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represent	  a	  period	  of	  (at	  least)	  partial	  LSI	  toward	  Israel	  in	  the	  positive	  direction.	  Carter	  wrote	  the	  following	  in	  his	  diary:	  	   “We	   welcomed	   Prime	   Minister	   and	   Mrs.	   Begin,	   having	   done	   a	   great	   deal	   of	  preparation	  for	  this	  visit.	  	  There	  have	  been	  dire	  predictions	  that	  he	  and	  I	  would	  not	  get	   along,	   but	   I	   found	   him	   to	   be	   quite	   congenial,	   dedicated,	   sincere,	   deeply	  religious…	  I	  think	  Begin	  is	  a	  very	  good	  man	  and,	  although	  it	  will	  be	  difficult	  for	  him	  to	  change	  his	  position,	  the	  public-­‐opinion	  polls	  that	  we	  have	  from	  Israel	  show	  that	  the	  people	  there	  are	  flexible…	  and	  genuinely	  want	  peace.	  	  My	  own	  guess	  is	  that	  if	  we	  give	   Begin	   support,	   he	   will	   prove	   to	   be	   a	   strong	   leader,	   quite	   different	   from	  Rabin.”76	  	  	  	  	  Akin	  to	  the	  notion	  that	  only	  Nixon	  could	  go	  to	  China,	  Brzezinski	  also	  came	  to	  think	  of	  Begin	  differently,	  musing	  that	  “Begin	  eventually	  might	  be	  better	  able	  than	  the	  Israeli	  Labor	  Party	   to	  deliver	   the	   concessions	  necessary	   for	  peace…	   [since]	  he	  would	  not	  face	  much	  domestic	  opposition	  if	  he	  showed	  flexibility”.77	  In	   time	   it	   would	   become	   clear	   that	   Begin	   would	   be	   a	   much	   tougher	  negotiating	  partner	  than	  Carter	  or	  Brzezinski	  felt	  during	  this	  hopeful	  moment.	  	  Upon	  returning	   home,	   Begin	   lent	   his	   support	   to	   expanded	   settlement	   activity	   in	   the	  territories,	  an	  act	  Carter	   felt	  was	  at	  odds	  with	   the	  spirit	  of	   their	   talks.	   	  On	  Vance’s	  next	   visit	   to	   the	   region	   the	   Secretary	   reported	   the	   disappointing	   news	   that	   Begin	  was	  acting	  more	  rigid	  than	  expected.	  	  By	  this	  point,	  there	  is	  little	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  administration	  was	  still	  interested	  to	  boost	  Begin’s	  domestic	  position.	  	  Did	  the	  Policy	  Succeed?	  	   Unclear.	   	   The	   initial	   strategy	   of	   treating	   Begin	  with	   vinegar	   seems	   to	   have	  been	  quickly	   reversed,	   so	   it	   is	  difficult	   to	  assess	  whether	  or	  not	   the	  policy	  had	  an	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impact	  on	  Israeli	  politics.	  	  	  There	  is	  no	  doubt,	  however,	  that	  even	  tentatively	  sweeter	  approach	  to	  Begin	  affected	  his	  standing	  back	  home.	  	  This	  second	  instance	  of	  partial-­‐to-­‐full	   seems	   to	   have	   succeeded	   in	   the	   narrow	   sense	   of	   bolstering	   his	   domestic	  standing,	   even	   though	   it	   is	   unclear	  whether	  doing	   so	   actually	   furthered	  America’s	  broader	  objective	  of	  advancing	  the	  peace	  process.	  	   The	  warm	  reception	  given	  to	  Begin	  probably	  strengthened	  his	  government’s	  hand	  in	  Israel,	  much	  to	  the	  chagrin	  of	  the	  political	  opposition.	  	  Begin’s	  glowing	  thank	  you	  note	  to	  Carter	  fits	  the	  notion	  that	  he	  could	  not	  be	  happier	  with	  his	  position	  upon	  returning	  home	  from	  Washington.	  	  Lewis	  seconds	  this	  perspective:	  	  	   “since	  a	  good	  many	   Israelis	   feared	   that	   this	   first	  encounter	  would	  turn	   out	   very	   badly	   for	   Israel,	   they	  were	   naturally	   very	   relieved.	  	  The	  Labor	  Party	  people	  may	  have	  been	  secretly	  quite	  disappointed	  that	  Begin	  didn’t	  have	  a	  big	  confrontation	  with	  Carter	  on	  that	  first	  trip…	   there	  were	  many	   in	  opposition	  who	  were	  either	  secretively	  or	  openly	  hoping	  that	  a	  big	  crisis	  would	  ensue	  because	  they	  always	  believed	  that	  this	  would	  be	  an	  effective	  weapon	  in	  Israeli	  domestic	  politics…	  Begin	  avoided	  that	  on	  almost	  all	  of	  his	  trips	  and	  certainly	  on	  the	  first	  one”.78	  	  
Coding	  the	  Observable	  Implications	  
1.	  Perceptions	  of	  Sender	  Interests:	  	   One	  area	  in	  which	  the	  theories	  offer	  mutually	  exclusive	  predictions	  involves	  the	  expected	  effect	  of	  perceptions	  about	  sender	  state	  interests	  on	  the	  occurrence	  of	  LSI	  over	   time.	   	  Theory	  #1	   (national	   interests	   theory)	  predicts	   that	  LSI	  occurrence	  should	  be	  directly	  correlated	  with	  objective	  national	  interests	  of	  the	  sender	  relative	  to	   the	   target	   state.	   	   Theory	   #2	   (the	   lobby-­‐legislative	   approach)	   expects	   LSI	   to	   be	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relatively	   low	  because	  members	   of	   Congress	   and	   the	   pro-­‐Israel	   lobby	   tend	   to	   see	  meddling	  in	  Israeli	  politics	  as	  contradictory	  to	  American	  national	  interests.	  	  Theory	  #3	  (the	  bureaucratic	  politics	  approach)	  holds	  that	  LSI	  should	  be	  relatively	  frequent	  since	  working-­‐level	  officials	  dealing	  with	  Israeli	  politics	  tend	  to	  desire	  frequent	  U.S.	  intervention	   on	   behalf	   of	   perceived	   moderates.	   	   Theory	   #4	   (leadership	   theory)	  expects	  rates	  of	  LSI	  to	  vary	  in	  accordance	  with	  how	  top	  leaders	  in	  the	  sender	  state	  perceive	  national	  interests	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  target.	  It	   is	  difficult	  to	  conceive	  of	  an	  argument	  premised	  solely	  upon	  international	  structure	   that	   could	   explain	  why	  American	   perceptions	   Israeli	   politics	   could	   have	  seesawed	   so	   quickly	   within	   a	   matter	   of	   weeks.	   	   National	   interests	   theory	   would	  therefore	   have	   a	   difficult	   time	   explaining	   why	   the	   U.S.	   flirted	   with	   such	  contradictory	  approaches	  to	  Israeli	  politics	  in	  such	  a	  short	  span	  of	  time.	  	   Theory	  #2	   (the	   lobby-­‐legislative	   approach),	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   gets	   partial	  marks	   with	   regard	   to	   perceptions	   of	   sender	   interests.	   	   It	   can	   explain	   why	   the	  administration	  eventually	  flirted	  with	  a	  conciliatory	  approach	  to	  Israel’s	  new	  Likud	  government	  but	  not	  why	  it	  initially	  hoped	  to	  overthrow	  it.	  	  However,	  this	  approach	  cannot	   explain	   why	   private	   assessments	   of	   Begin	   among	   administration	   officials	  also	  underwent	  such	  a	  drastic	  shift.	  	   Theory	  #3	  (the	  bureaucratic	  politics	  approach)	  also	  gets	  half	  marks	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  sender	  interests.	  	  It	  fits	  that	  the	  administration	  pursued	  a	  confrontational	  approach	  toward	  Begin	  but	  not	  that	  it	  so	  quickly	  reversed	  that	  approach.	  	  However,	  it	  does	  not	  accord	   with	   the	   theory	   that	   the	   most	   influential	   bureaucrat	   during	   this	   period	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appears	  to	  have	  been	  a	  political	  appointee:	  the	  ambassador	  to	  Israel.79	  Indeed,	   the	  crucial	  variable	  behind	   the	  shift	   in	  occurrence	   from	  negative	   to	  positive	   LSI	   seems	   to	   have	   been	   the	   interpersonal	   perceptions	   of	   key	   leaders,	   a	  hallmark	  of	  Theory	  #4	  (leadership	  theory).	   	  Ambassador	  Lewis’s	  claims	  that	  Begin	  would	  respond	  better	   to	  honey	  than	  vinegar	  came	  about	  as	  a	  result	  of	   their	   initial	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  meetings.	   	   In	   turn,	  Carter	  and	  Brzezinski’s	  change	   in	  position	  over	  LSI	  appears	   to	  be	  directly	   tied	   to	  Lewis’s	   arguments	   and	  perhaps	   their	   own	  meetings	  with	  Begin.	  	  2.	  Perceptions	  of	  Close	  Contests:	  	   Another	   area	   in	   which	   the	   theories	   diverge	   involves	   perceptions	   of	   close	  contests	  in	  the	  target	  state.	  	  Theory	  #1	  (national	  interests	  theory)	  predicts	  that	  LSI	  should	  accurately	  reflect	  all	  available	  information	  about	  genuine	  political	  contests	  in	  the	  target	  polity	  as	  they	  continue	  to	  develop.	  	  Theory	  #4	  (leadership	  theory)	  expects	  that	   the	   personal	   distractions	   and	   subjective	   perceptions	   of	   top	   officials	   in	   the	  sender	  state	  should	  serve	  as	  a	  major	  constraint	  on	  this	  relationship.	  Because	   the	  possibility	  of	   early	   elections	   raised	  by	  Quandt’s	  May	  18	  memo	  was	   so	   far	   off	   into	   the	   future	   –	   at	   least	   a	   year	   or	   two	   away	   –	   it	   was	   easy	   for	  administration	  officials	  to	  tailor	  their	  conclusions	  about	  the	  likely	  outcome	  of	  future	  Israeli	  political	  contests	  to	  suit	  their	  motivational	  biases.	  	  When	  Begin	  was	  seen	  as	  a	  fundamentalist,	   toppling	   him	   in	   early	   elections	   was	   seen	   as	   both	   pertinent	   for	  discussion	   and	   eminently	   achievable.	   	  When	  Begin	  was	   seen	   as	   a	   bold	   and	  daring	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Technically, Lewis was a career foreign service officer, but he had been selected by Carter to serve in a 
senior political capacity. 
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moderate,	  bracing	  him	  against	  his	  internal	  opponents	  –	  either	  within	  the	  cabinet	  or	  the	  Israeli	  general	  public	  –	  became	  a	  more	  probable	  matter	  for	  consideration.	  	   In	  this	  regard,	  there	  appears	  to	  have	  been	  little	  role	  played	  by	  international	  structure	  or	  domestic	  politics	  within	  the	  United	  States.	   	  Once	  top	  officials	  changed	  their	  subjective	  view	  of	  Begin’s	  intentions	  (incorrectly,	  it	  seems),	  their	  perceptions	  of	  closeness	  in	  Israeli	  politics	  also	  seem	  to	  have	  changed	  in	  tandem.	  	  This	  produced	  a	  shift	  from	  negative	  to	  positive	  LSI	  and	  is	  most	  consonant	  with	  Theory	  #4.	  	  3.	  Patterns	  of	  Domestic	  Debate:	  	   Theories	   2	   and	   3	   expect	   that	   members	   of	   Congress,	   the	   pro-­‐Israel	   lobby,	  and/or	   the	   bureaucracy	   should	   be	   influential	   and	   informed	   in	   advance	   of	   major	  policy	   decisions	   having	   to	   do	  with	   LSI.	   	   Theory	   #4	   (leadership	   theory),	   however,	  expects	  that	  these	  groups	  should	  be	  kept	  in	  the	  dark,	  due	  to	  an	  overriding	  executive	  incentive	  to	  maintain	  secrecy	  about	  their	  true	  intentions	  regarding	  LSI	  attempts.	  Members	  of	  Congress	  and	  the	  pro-­‐Israel	  lobby	  tried	  to	  influence	  top	  decision-­‐making	   during	   this	   period,	   especially	   on	   issues	   of	   arms	   shipments.	   	   However,	  despite	  voicing	  opinions	  about	  whether	  the	  U.S.	  could	  work	  with	  Begin,	  there	  is	  little	  to	  suggest	   that	  either	  were	  privy	   to	   internal	  administration	  decisions	  over	  how	  to	  actually	  deal	  with	  Begin.80	  	  Neither,	  it	  seems,	  was	  the	  bureaucracy,	  considering	  that	  the	  strategy	  behind	  Quandt’s	  May	  18	  memo	  is	  only	  recently	  coming	  to	  light.	  	  Rather,	  the	  administration	  seems	  to	  have	  held	  its	  cards	  quite	  closely	  when	  deciding	  how	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Bernard Gwertzman, “Senator to See Begin,” New York Times, June 1, 1977; Robert Keatley, “Potent 
Persuaders: ‘Israeli Lobby’ in U.S. Gains Repute for Zeal and Overzealousness - Highly Effective in Past, 
it now Attempts to Avoid Carter-Begin Showdown,” The Wall Street Journal, July 5, 1977; “Javits believes 
Begin will seek an accord,” New York Times, July 18, 1977. 
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handle	   Begin’s	   visit,	  which	  would	   support	   Theory	  #4	   (leadership	   theory)	   and	   the	  paper	  paradox.	  For	  instance,	  when	  distributing	  a	  summary	  of	  conclusions	  from	  the	  first	  June	  PRC	  on	  how	   to	  deal	  with	   the	  upcoming	  Begin	   visit	   to	   only	   four	   cabinet	  members,	  Brzezinski	   specified	   “given	   the	   sensitivity	   of	   this	   subject,	   this	   summary	   should	   be	  held	  very	  closely”.81	  	  When	  preparing	  a	  discussion	  paper	  that	  would	  be	  distributed	  at	  the	  second	  PRC	  meeting	  on	  the	  topic	  later	  in	  the	  month,	  Quandt	  wrote	  a	  note	  to	  Brzezinski	   outside	   the	   normal	   channels	   of	   communication	   that	   decisions	   on	   how	  arms	  policy	  relate	  to	  the	  diplomatic	  process	  are	  “too	  dangerous	  to	  put	  on	  paper”	  for	  the	  broader	  group.82	  	  After	  the	  meeting	  took	  place,	  he	  wrote	  another	  outside-­‐system	  note	   to	   Brzezinski	   specifying	   that	   “I	   am	   a	   bit	   reticent	   about	   having	   the	   summary	  circulated	   to	   the	  principals	  at	   this	   time,	  and	   I	  am	  not	  preparing	  a	   full	   set	  of	  notes.	  	  Once	   the	   President	   has	   approved	   the	   summary,	   you	   may	   want	   to	   consider	   only	  sending	   follow-­‐on	  actions	   to	  State	  and	  Defense,”	  a	  decision	  which	  Brzezinski	   soon	  approved.83	   	   These	   notes	   do	   not	   address	   LSI	   per	   se,	   but	   they	   offer	   conditional	  support	  for	  the	  model	  of	  decision-­‐making	  expected	  under	  leadership	  theory.	  Similarly,	  members	  of	  the	  pro-­‐Israel	  community	  expressed	  a	  desire	  for	  Begin	  to	  be	  received	  warmly	  in	  Washington	  and	  then	  praised	  the	  Carter	  administration’s	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 “Summary of PRC Meeting on the Middle East, June 10, 1977 - Memorandum from Zbigniew 
Brzezinski to Miscellaneous Principals”, June 16, 1977, Collection “Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection: 
Subject File”, Box 24, Folder: “[Meetings -- PRC 17: 6/10/77],” Jimmy Carter Presidential Library. 
82 “PRC Meeting on the Middle East, June 22, 1977, 3:30 - 5:00 p.m. - Memorandum for Zbigniew 
Brzezinski from William B. Quandt”, June 20, 1977, Collection “Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection: Subject 
File”, Folder: “[Meetings -- PRC 18: 6/22/77],” Jimmy Carter Presidential Library. 
83 “[Cover Sheet for] Summary of PRC Meeting on the Middle East, June 25, 1977 - Memorandum for 
Zbigniew Brzezinski from William B. Quandt”, June 27, 1977, Collection “Zbigniew Brzezinski 
Collection: Subject File”, Folder: “[Meetings -- PRC 18: 6/22/77],” Jimmy Carter Presidential Library. 
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approach	   to	   his	   visit	   after	   the	   fact.84	   	   However,	   there	   does	   not	   seem	   to	   be	  much	  evidence	  that	  it	  was	  privy	  to	  intra-­‐administration	  deliberations	  on	  the	  trip,	  evidence	  which	   would	   seem	   to	   be	   required	   to	   validate	   Theory	   #2	   (the	   lobby-­‐legislative	  approach)	  in	  this	  regard.	  	  In	  fact,	  the	  administration	  seemed	  to	  continue	  its	  strategy	  of	   blindsiding	   Congress	   and	   the	   pro-­‐Israel	   community,	   soon	   afterward	   issuing	   a	  joint	   statement	   on	   Geneva	  with	   the	   USSR	   that	   provoked	   intense	   shock	   and	   angry	  backlash.85	  	  4.	  Cycles	  of	  Domestic	  Power:	  	   Another	  area	  in	  which	  the	  theories	  diverge	  pertains	  to	  the	  political	  calendar	  in	   the	   sender	   state.	   	   Theory	   #2	   (the	   lobby-­‐legislative	   approach)	   predicts	   that	   LSI	  should	   be	   even	   less	   likely	   toward	   Israel	   during	   periods	   of	   divided	   government	   or	  during	   the	   lead-­‐up	   to	   American	   elections.	   	   Theory	   #3	   (the	   bureaucratic	   politics	  approach)	  predicts	  that	  LSI	  should	  be	  much	  more	  frequent	  toward	  Israel	  at	  the	  very	  beginning	  of	  presidential	  terms.	  These	  two	  cases	  offer	  little	  in	  the	  way	  of	  relevant	  predictions	  or	  observations	  regarding	  cycles	  of	  domestic	  power,	  since	  it	  takes	  place	  neither	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	   president’s	   term	   nor	   in	   the	   lead-­‐up	   to	   elections.	   	   It	   does	   take	   place	   during	   a	  period	   of	   united	   government,	   but	   evidence	   of	   Congressional	   influence	   is	   mixed,	  which	  is	  about	  what	  we	  would	  expect	  under	  theories	  2	  and	  4.	  	  Nor	  did	  the	  events	  in	  question	   occur	   at	   the	   very	   beginning	   of	   a	   presidential	   term,	   so	   the	   possibility	   for	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 “Common Strategy,” Near East Report 21, no. 29 (July 20, 1977); “Near East Report,” Near East Report 
21, no. 30 (July 27, 1977). 
85 “Carter’s Blunder,” Near East Report 21, no. 40 (October 5, 1977); “Congress Angered by Joint 
Statement,” Near East Report 21, no. 40 (October 5, 1977); Carter, Keeping Faith, 293–295. 
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testing	  Theory	  #3	  is	  also	  limited.	  	  5.	  Bureaucratic	  Freelancing:	  	   Some	   of	   the	   theories	   also	   offer	   divergent	   predictions	   with	   regard	   to	  bureaucratic	   freelancing	   and	   LSI.	   	   If	   working	   level	   officials	   pursue	   LSI	   frequently	  without	  regard	  for	  senior	  authorization,	  that	  would	  provide	  support	  for	  Theory	  #3	  (the	  bureaucratic	  politics	  approach).	  	  If	  such	  freelancing	  is	  relatively	  rare	  and	  occurs	  only	  during	  periods	  of	  limited	  executive	  oversight,	  then	  that	  would	  provide	  support	  for	  Theory	  #4	  (leadership	  theory).	  Because	   President	   Carter	   tended	   to	   exert	   an	   active	   style	   of	   managerial	  oversight	  on	  issues	  of	  Mideast	  policy,	  we	  would	  not	  expect	  to	  see	  much	  freelancing	  in	   these	   cases.	   	   This	   case	   fits	   those	   expectations,	   thus	   providing	   some	   additional	  support	  for	  Theory	  #4.	   	  Although	  in	  other	  instances	  the	  U.S.	  ambassador	  is	  often	  a	  common	  perpetrator	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  unauthorized	  pursuit	  of	  LSI,	  in	  this	  instance	  that	   individual	   exerted	   his	   influence	   through	   proper	   channels	   by	   persuading	   his	  superiors,	  not	  circumventing	  them.	  	  6.	  Consistency	  of	  Message:	  	   Whereas	   Theory	   #1	   (national	   interests	   theory)	   predicts	   that	   consistent,	  effective	  messaging	  by	  the	  sender	  state	  should	  be	  unproblematic,	  the	  other	  theories	  stress	  personal	  or	  institutional	  biases	  that	  tend	  to	  get	  in	  the	  way	  of	  consistent	  public	  communication	   on	   behalf	   of	   the	   favored	   faction	   within	   the	   target	   state.	   	   Official	  governmental	  messaging	  during	  this	  case	  was	  internally	  consistent,	  which	  boosted	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its	  efficacy,	  at	   least	   in	   the	  narrow	  sense	  of	   strengthening	  Begin	  back	  home.	   	   If	   the	  administration	  did	  indeed	  seek	  to	  bolster	  Begin,	  the	  fact	  that	  its	  message	  was	  largely	  uniform	  and	  coherent	  by	  the	  time	  of	  his	  visit	  fits	  with	  the	  expectations	  of	  the	  theory.	  	  The	   case	   material	   therefore	   provides	   little	   evidence	   for	   problems	   with	   domestic	  disagreements	  over	  messaging,	  which	  would	  be	  more	  consonant	  with	  Theories	  2	  or	  3	  than	  1	  or	  4.	  	  7.	  Suitability	  of	  Message:	  Finally,	  the	  theories	  also	  offer	  divergent	  predictions	  with	  regard	  to	  whether	  officials	   in	   the	   sender	   state	   are	   able	   to	   project	   a	   message	   that	   is	   suitable	   for	  bolstering	  its	  protégé	  within	  the	  dynamics	  of	  politics	  in	  the	  sender	  state.	  	  Theory	  #1	  (national	   interests	   theory)	   argues	   that	   suitable	   messaging	   should	   be	   relatively	  unproblematic,	   but	   again	   the	   other	   theories	   emphasize	   institutional	   or	   personal	  biases	  that	  should	  make	  such	  messaging	  more	  difficult.	  Despite	  being	  internally	  coherent,	  the	  administration’s	  message	  did	  undergo	  a	   quite	   rapid	   change,	   shifting	   from	   an	   appearance	   of	   confrontation	   to	   one	   of	  conciliation	  around	  mid-­‐June.	  	  This	  shift	  could	  in	  part	  be	  attributed	  to	  legislative	  and	  lobby	   pressure	   but	   also	  must	   take	   into	   account	   drastic	   and	   unrelated	   changes	   in	  actual	  beliefs	  of	   administration	   leaders.	   	  This	  offers	  partial	  backing	   for	  Theories	  2	  and	  4,	  since	  the	  administration’s	  position	  by	  the	  time	  of	  his	  visit	  shifted	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  some	  or	  all	  of	  these	  factors.	  	  	  
Carter,	  Case	  #4:	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Helping	  Cabinet	  Moderates,	  1978	  	   Over	  time	  it	  became	  clear	  that	  the	  Israelis	  were	  not	  the	  only	  party	  reluctant	  to	   endorse	   the	  multilateral	   format	   supported	   by	  Washington.	   	   Egyptian	   President	  Sadat,	   wanting	   to	   inject	   new	   life	   in	   the	   process	   but	   also	   concerned	   about	   the	  prospect	  of	  a	  Syrian	  veto	  at	  Geneva,	  decided	  to	  go	  to	  Jerusalem	  instead.	  	  His	  actions	  helped	   defuse	   the	   comprehensive	   track	   for	   the	   time	   being	   and	   the	   peace	   talks	  instead	  shifted	  over	  to	  a	  bilateral	  process	  between	  Egypt	  and	  Israel	  with	  the	  United	  States	  mediating.	   	   In	   the	   aftermath	  of	   Sadat’s	   trip	   to	   Jerusalem,	   the	  parties	   set	   up	  working	  level	  talks,	  including	  both	  a	  political	  track	  and	  a	  military	  track.	  	   However,	   Sadat	   quickly	   became	   concerned	   that	   Begin	   merely	   wanted	   to	  pocket	   his	   concessions	  without	   offering	  much	   substantive	   in	   return,	   especially	   on	  the	  West	  Bank.	   	  After	  Begin	   then	   insulted	  Egypt’s	   foreign	  minister	  at	  a	  meeting	  of	  the	   political	   track,	   Sadat’s	   frustration	   boiled	   over	   and	   he	   terminated	   the	   political	  track.	   	   In	  an	  effort	  to	  help	  salvage	  the	  process,	  Carter	  invited	  Sadat	  to	  Camp	  David	  for	   an	   intensive	   one-­‐on-­‐one	   in	   February	   1978	   to	   brainstorm	   next	   steps.	   	   At	   the	  meeting,	  Carter	  and	  Sadat	  agreed	  pursue	  an	  elaborate	  NSC	  plan	  that	  called	  for	  U.S.-­‐Egyptian	   collusion	   to	   turn	  up	   the	  pressure	  on	  Begin	  over	   the	  West	  Bank.86	   	   Sadat	  would	   submit	   a	   moderate	   West	   Bank	   plan	   with	   a	   few	   unacceptable	   elements,	  Washington	  would	  submit	  a	  plan	  without	   those	   few	  elements,	  Egypt	  would	  accept	  the	  U.S.	  plan,	  and	  Israel	  would	  then	  face	  tremendous	  pressure	  to	  agree	  as	  well.	  	  
Coding	  the	  Dependent	  Variables	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Quandt, Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics, 170-2. 
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(Occurrence	  and	  Efficacy)	  Did	  LSI	  Occur?	  	   Yes.	   	   In	   the	  course	  of	   trying	   to	  pressure	  Begin	   to	  accept	   this	  plan,	  both	   the	  U.S.	   and	   Egypt	   found	   themselves	   trying	   to	   build	   up	   some	   of	   the	   more	   moderate	  members	  of	  the	  Israeli	  cabinet.87	  	  Moreover,	  once	  a	  protest	  movement	  was	  launched	  in	  Israel	  that	  eventually	  became	  known	  as	  Peace	  Now,	  it	  encouraged	  the	  Egyptians	  to	  pursue	  grand	  LSI	   instead	  and	  also	   led	   the	  Americans	   to	   toy	  with	   it.	   	  Thus,	  both	  Egypt	  and	  the	  U.S.	  pursued	  petit	  LSI	  toward	  Israel;	  Egypt	  soon	  switched	  to	  grand	  LSI	  and	  the	  U.S.	  at	   least	  considered	  grand	  LSI	  as	  well.	   	  The	  differences	  and	  similarities	  between	   Egyptian	   and	   American	   approaches	   will	   be	   discussed	   below	   to	   provide	  extra	  inferential	  leverage	  over	  the	  U.S.	  choice.	  
<DM	  Weizman>	  	   Both	   countries	   sought	   to	  build	  up	   Israel’s	   defense	  minister,	   Ezer	  Weizman.	  	  Weizman	  was	  second	  in	  command	  of	  the	  Likud	  Party’s	  dominant	  Herut	  faction,	  just	  begin	   the	   prime	   minister,	   and	   was	   viewed	   by	   U.S.	   officials	   as	   the	   most	   likely	  successor	  to	  Begin	  in	  the	  event	  of	  an	  unexpected	  turnover	  in	  power.88	  	  He	  also	  was	  considered	  more	  moderate	  in	  his	  positions	  on	  the	  peace	  process.89	  	   When	  Weizman	  visited	  Washington	   in	  March	  of	  1978,	   the	  visit	  was	  used	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 This sort of effort to change the balance of power within an existing Israeli government rather than to 
change governments altogether is defined as “petit” LSI, as opposed to “grand”. 
88 “Israel after Begin: Politics and Consequences of Succession - Central Intelligence Agency 
Memorandum”, January 18, 1978, Collection “Staff Material: Middle East”, Box 48, Folder 8, Document 
6-8, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library. 
89 “Peace Negotiations and Israeli Coalition Politics - State Department Memorandum for Zbigniew 
Brzezinski”, October 7, 1977, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, Country Files, Folder “Israel, 10/77,” 
Jimmy Carter Presidential Library; “‘Israeli Internal Political Dynamics’ in NSC Weekly Report #32 - 
Memorandum to the President from Zbigniew Brzezinski”, October 14, 1977, Zbigniew Brzezinski 
Collection, Box “Subject File 5”, Folder "Weekly Reports [to the President], 31-41: [10/77-1/78], Jimmy 
Carter Presidential Library. 
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build	  Weizman	  up	  and	  sow	  dissent	  within	  the	  Israeli	  cabinet.	  	  Brzezinski	  recalls	  that	  the	   President	   intentionally	   excluded	   Israel’s	   ambassador	   from	   his	   meeting	   with	  Weizman	   in	   order	   to	   foster	   concerns	   in	   Israel	   that	   the	   prime	  minister	  was	   being	  isolated	   politically.90	   	   It	   also	   was	   clear	   to	   the	   U.S.	   that	   Weizman	   was	   using	   the	  meeting	  to	  burnish	  his	  political	  standing	  back	  home.91	  	   Further,	  decisions	  about	  military	  support	  during	  Weizman’s	  March	  visit	  were	  heavily	   conditioned	   by	   political	   considerations.	   	   He	   came	   with	   an	   enormous	  shopping	  list	  related	  to	  Israel’s	  efforts	  to	  modernize	  its	  armed	  forces,	  and	  one	  bone	  of	   contention	   was	   his	   request	   that	   Israel	   be	   allowed	   to	   apply	   a	   small	   portion	   of	  military	  assistance	  to	  finance	  weapons	  produced	  in	  Israel	  instead	  of	  American-­‐made	  goods	  as	  usually	  is	  stipulated	  with	  such	  aid.	  Brzezinski’s	   advisors	   expressed	   the	   desire	   for	   a	   “weapons	   package	   for	  Weizman	   to	   take	   home”	   and	   suggested	   that	   “we	   should	   recommend	   considering	  approval	   of	   some	  Kfir	   [aircraft]	   and/or	  Merkava	   [tank]	   financing	   as	   a	   sweeter	   for	  Weizman”.92	   	   In	   particular,	   they	   suggested	   that	   “we	   do	   not	   want	   to	   be	   totally	  negative	   to	  Weizman,	  who	   is	   emerging	   as	   a	   comparatively	  moderate	   figure	   in	   the	  cabinet”.93	  	  	  Brzezinski	   in	   turn	   explained	   to	   Carter	   that	   “most	   of	   the	   agencies	   were	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 245. See also Ezer Weizman, The Battle for Peace (Bantam Books, 
1981), 257-63. 
91 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 245. 
92 “PRC on Matmon C - Memorandum for Zbigniew Brzezinski from William B. Quandt and Gary Sick”, 
February 25, 1978, Collection “Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection: Subject File”, Box 35, Folder: “[Meetings 
-- PRC 55: 2/27/78],” Jimmy Carter Presidential Library. 
93 “Draft Memorandum for the President on Weizman Visit, Sent to Zbigniew Brzezinski by William B. 
Quandt and Gary Sick”, March 4, 1978, Collection “Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection: Subject File”, Box 
35, Folder: “[Meetings -- PRC 55: 2/27/78],” Jimmy Carter Presidential Library. 
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negative	   to	   this	   point”	   on	   functional	   grounds,94	   including	   State	   and	   Defense,	   but	  reached	  the	  conclusion	  that	  “political	  considerations	  should	  guide	  such	  decisions”.95	  	  He	   argued	   that	   changing	   the	   aid	   stipulations	   was	   “politically	   quite	   important	   to	  Israeli	  leaders,	  particularly	  to	  Weizman,	  who	  is	  deeply	  interested	  in	  developing	  the	  Israeli	  aircraft	  industry”.96	  	  Carter	  approved	  the	  request.97	  
<PM	  Begin>	  	   Meanwhile,	  the	  United	  States	  was	  giving	  Menachem	  Begin	  the	  cold	  shoulder.	  	  When	  the	  Israeli	  prime	  minister	  visited	  Washington	  that	  same	  month,	  Carter	  was	  so	  tough	   on	   him	   that	   the	   PM	   later	   confessed	   the	   visit	   was	   one	   of	   the	   most	   difficult	  moments	  in	  his	  life.98	  	  One	  of	  Begin’s	  advisors	  suggests	  “the	  White	  House	  encounter	  was	   simply	  nasty”.99	   	  When	  Brzezinski	   sent	  up	   two	  possible	  public	   statements	   for	  after	  Begin’s	  departure,	  Carter	  deliberately	  chose	  the	  colder	  of	  the	  two.100	  	   Members	  of	  AIPAC	  leadership	  even	  read	  the	  administration’s	  cold	  treatment	  of	  Begin	  as	  an	  intentional	  effort	  at	  LSI.	  	  The	  organization’s	  weekly	  newsletter,	  Near	  
East	  Report,	  issued	  an	  upset	  analysis	  on	  March	  29th	  that	  read	  as	  follows:	  	  “In	   the	  wake	   of	   Prime	  Minister	   Begin’s	   ‘grim’	  meetings	  with	   President	   Carter	   last	  week,	   U.S.-­‐Israeli	   relations	   fell	   to	   their	   lowest	   point	   since	   direct	   negotiations	  between	   Israel	   and	   Egypt	   began	   last	   fall.	   	   By	   purposely	   painting	   the	   gloomiest	  possible	  picture	  of	  the	  Carter-­‐Begin	  talks,	  and	  by	  implying	  that	  Israel	  would	  be	  better	  
led	  by	  another	  Prime	  Minister,	   the	  Administration	  has	   tilted	  dangerously	   toward	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 “Weizman Visit - Memorandum for the President from Zbigniew Brzezinski”, March 7, 1978, Zbigniew 
Brzezinski Collection, Country Files, Folder “Israel, 1-3/78,” Jimmy Carter Presidential Library. 
95 “Israeli Arms Requests - Matmon C - Memorandum from Zbigniew Brzezinski to Secretaries of State 
and Defense”, February 27, 1978, Collection “Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection: Subject File”, Box 35, 
Folder: “[Meetings -- PRC 55: 2/27/78],” Jimmy Carter Presidential Library. 
96 “Weizman Visit - Memorandum for the President from Zbigniew Brzezinski.” 
97 Coincidentally, this served as a precedent for a second instance of LSI on a much larger scale via U.S. 
financing for indigenous Israeli arms production under the Reagan administration. 
98 Shlaim, The Iron Wall, 370. 
99 Avner, The Prime Ministers: An Intimate Narrative of Israeli Leadership, 482. See also Weizman, The 
Battle for Peace, 286. 
100 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 246. 
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Arab	  position.”101	  	  However,	   one	   day	   later	   during	   a	   press	   conference	   in	   Brazil	   Carter	   rejected	   a	  reporter’s	  suggestion	  that	  his	  administration	  had	  given	  up	  hope	  on	  PM	  Begin:	  	  “Question:	   Mr.	   President,	   have	   you	   or	   any	   other	   [officials]	   suggested	   that	   Prime	  Minister	   Begin	   may	   not	   be	   the	   right	   man	   to	   head	   that	   government	   in	   present	  circumstances...	   do	   you	   now	   think	   the	   Begin	   government	   can	   make	   the	   hard	  decisions	  necessary	  to	  move	  the	  peace	  process	  forward?	  	   Carter:	  I	  can	  say	  unequivocally	  that	  no	  one	  in	  any	  position	  of	  responsibility	  in	  the	  United	  States	  Administration	  has	  ever	  insinuated	  that	  Prime	  Minister	  Begin	  is	  not	  qualified	   to	  be	  Prime	  Minister	  or	   that	  he	   should	  be	   replaced.	   	  This	   report,	   the	  origin	   of	  which	   I	   do	   not	   know,	   is	   completely	   false...	   we	   have	   not	   given	   up	   on	   the	  possibility	   of	   a	   negotiated	   peace	   settlement	   in	   the	   Middle	   East	   under	   the	   Begin	  government	  with	  him	  as	  Prime	  Minister”.102	  	  
<FM	  Dayan>	  	   The	   administration	   also	   took	   a	   somewhat	   positive	   approach	   to	   Israeli	  Foreign	   Minister	   Dayan.	   	   It	   proposed	   meetings	   that	   it	   knew	   were	   being	   used	   by	  Dayan	   to	   bolster	   his	   standing	   domestically103	   and	   saw	   him	   as	   a	  moderate	   on	   the	  Sinai	  if	  not	  the	  West	  Bank.104	  	  He	  had	  a	  close	  working	  relationship	  with	  Vance	  even	  though	  his	  interactions	  with	  Carter	  were	  somewhat	  strained.105	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  Egyptians	  were	  much	  less	  willing	  to	  consider	  embracing	  Dayan,	  considering	  him	  “devious	  and	  untrustworthy”	  and	  resenting	  his	  role	  in	  the	  defeat	  of	  1967.106	  
<From	  Petit	  to	  Grand>	  An	   important	   turning	   point	   was	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	   grassroots	  movement	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 “Near East Report,” Near East Report 22, no. 13 (March 29, 1978). 
102 Press conference in Brasilia, Brazil, on March 30th, quoted in “Carter: Begin Can Make Peace,” Near 
East Report 22, no. 14 (April 5, 1978). 
103 Moshe Dayan, Breakthrough: A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations (Weidenfeld 
and Nicolson, 1981), 118-9; Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 245. 
104 “‘Israeli Internal Political Dynamics’ in NSC Weekly Report #32 - Memorandum to the President from 
Zbigniew Brzezinski.” 
105 Stein, Heroic Diplomacy, 24. 
106 Ibid. See also Weizman, The Battle for Peace, 319. 
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founded	   by	   Israeli	   reservists	  who	   felt	   their	   government	  was	   not	   doing	   enough	   to	  pursue	  the	  opportunity	  for	  peace.	  	  The	  movement,	  which	  provided	  the	  basis	  for	  the	  current	   Israeli	   pressure	   group	  Peace	  Now,	   launched	  a	  petition	  drive	   and	   series	  of	  protests	  that	  put	  the	  Begin	  government	  on	  the	  defensive	  starting	  in	  March	  and	  fed	  perceptions	  that	  he	  could	  be	  outmaneuvered	  politically	  at	  home.107	  Top	  U.S.	   officials	  were	   certainly	   interested	   in	   “recent	   dissidence	  within	   the	  Israeli	   cabinet”	   and	   envisioned	   “a	   ‘center	   coalition’	   for	   Israel”	   led	   by	  Weizman	   or	  Peres.108	  	  Brezinski	  believed	  as	  late	  as	  June	  that	  “if	  we	  proceed	  carefully	  we	  should	  be	  able	   to	  appeal	   to	  more	  moderate	  political	   forces	   in	   Israel.	   	  Change	  will	  have	   to	  come	  primarily	  from	  within,	  which	  may	  take	  time”.109	  	  One	  of	  Vance’s	  advisors	  notes	  that	  inaction	  on	  the	  peace	  process	  would	  preclude	  “the	  possibility	  of	  bringing	  about	  internal	  changes	  in	  Israel.	  	  The	  current	  ferment	  in	  Israel	  will	  die”	  without	  action	  to	  “keep	   domestic	   debate	   in	   Israel	   going	   and	   thereby	   hold	   open	   the	   possibility	   of	  change	  in	  the	  Israeli	  Government	  position	  through	  pressure	  from	  within”.110	  As	  noted	  above,	  rumors	  had	  already	  begun	  to	  emerge	  that	  the	  U.S.	  wanted	  to	  push	  Begin	  out	  entirely.	  	  Word	  also	  spread	  that	  the	  U.S.	  charge	  d’affaires	  in	  Tel	  Aviv,	  Richard	   Viets,	   had	   said	   Begin	   “had	   to	   go”	   even	   though	   the	   NSC	   staff	   insisted	   to	  Brzezinski	   that	   “Viets	  of	  course	  said	  no	  such	   thing”	  and	  that	   “anything	  we	  say	  can	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only	  make	  worse	   the	   charge	   of	   U.S.	  meddling	   in	   Israeli	   domestic	   affairs”.111	   	   And,	  although	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  prove	  the	  U.S.	  actually	  shifted	  its	  policy	  from	  petit	  to	  grand	  LSI	   during	   this	   period,	   it	   was	   at	   very	   least	   considered.	   	   The	   Carter	   team	   was	  definitely	  interested	  in	  changing	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  within	  the	  Israeli	  cabinet	  and	  at	  the	  very	  least	  seems	  to	  have	  considered	  changing	  Israeli	  governments	  altogether.	  	   Regardless,	   Egypt’s	   efforts	   definitely	   escalated	   to	   full,	   grand	   LSI.	   	   Sadat’s	  deputy	  prime	  minister	  Hassan	  Tuhamy	  persuaded	  the	  Egyptian	  president	  to	  adopt	  a	  policy	   of	   “let’s	   topple	   Begin!”	   in	   July	   1978.112	   	   His	   foreign	   minister	   suggested	  fostering	  a	  change	  in	  the	  Israeli	  government	  gradually,	  but	  Tuhamy	  and	  Sadat	  were	  impatient	  to	  sow	  more	  dissent	  with	  an	  end	  run	  around	  Begin.	  	  Therefore,	  although	  Sadat	  had	  refused	  to	  meet	  with	  any	  other	  Israeli	  officials,	  he	  sought	  to	  help	  squeeze	  Begin	  out	  by	  inviting	  Weizman	  to	  a	  private	  meeting	  in	  Austria	  shortly	  after	  having	  met	  there	  with	  Shimon	  Peres	  at	  a	  meeting	  of	  the	  Socialist	  International.	  	  Did	  the	  Policy	  Succeed?	  	   Not	  entirely.	  	  On	  one	  hand,	  the	  Egyptian	  and	  American	  policies	  failed	  because	  they	   did	   not	   force	   a	   significant	   change	   in	  Begin’s	   government	   or	   policies,	   and	   the	  efforts	  were	  soon	  abandoned	  out	  of	  disappointment.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  efforts	  did	   boost	   internal	   pressure	   on	   the	   prime	   minister	   and	   may	   have	   indirectly	  contributed	  to	  his	  willingness	  to	  grant	  certain	  concessions	  at	  Camp	  David.	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   Eventually,	  U.S.	   officials	   concluded	   that	   their	   strategy	  was	  not	  working.	   	  As	  early	  as	  April,	  Brzezinski	  seemed	  to	  recognize	  in	  a	  memo	  to	  the	  president	  that	  “the	  internal	  debate	  over	  Israel’s	  foreign	  policy	  continues	  but	  thus	  far	  has	  not	  produced	  significant	   political	   realignment…	   the	   coalition	   partners	   continue	   to	   support	   the	  government’s	   stance	   on	   the	   peace	   process…	   [although]	   dovish	   elements	   have	  succeeded	  in	  carrying	  the	  debate	  into	  the	  public	  domain,	  as	  indicated	  by	  the	  letter	  to	  Begin	  from	  reserve	  officers	  critical	  of	  the	  government’s	  hard-­‐line	  policy”.113	  	  In	  May,	  Begin	   seemed	   to	   get	   a	   much	   warmer	   reception	   from	   the	   administration	   during	  Israel’s	  30th	  anniversary	  celebrations	  being	  held	  in	  New	  York.114	  In	   June,	   Weizman	   did	   break	   publicly	   with	   the	   prime	   minister	   over	   the	  government’s	   hardline	   approach	   to	   West	   Bank	   issues	   in	   the	   peace	   process.115	  	  Brezinski	  reported	  to	  the	  president	  the	  following	  month	  that	  “Peres	  first,	  and	  then	  Weizman,	   captured	   the	  headlines	  and	   left	   [Begin]	   looking	   ineffectual.	   	  Now	  Dayan	  can	   be	   added	   to	   the	   list	   as	   he	   returns	   from	   Leeds”	   in	   the	   UK,	   where	   a	   trilateral	  summit	   was	   officiated	   by	   Vance.116	   	   However,	   although	   Begin	   “has	   been	   under	  enormous	  pressure	  in	  the	  last	  few	  weeks…	  it	  would	  be	  a	  mistake	  to	  assume	  that	  he	  is	  helplessly	  on	  the	  defensive”.117	  	  One	  of	  Vance’s	  envoys	  reported	  to	  the	  Egyptians	  in	  late	  July	  that	  “Begin’s	  position	  in	  the	  Knesset	  was	  unchanged,	  and	  he	  still	  enjoyed	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majority	  support.	  	  There	  were	  no	  indications	  of	  an	  imminent	  change”.118	  	   Another	   reason	   that	   efficacy	   is	   often	   constrained,	   as	   I	   argue	   in	   my	   theory	  chapter,	  is	  that	  it	  frequently	  takes	  three	  to	  tango	  for	  LSI,	  especially	  in	  the	  context	  of	  peacemaking.	   	   U.S.	   efforts	   to	   shape	   Israeli	   politics	   depended	   upon	   Egyptian	  flexibility	  that	  was	  not	  entirely	  forthcoming.	  	  The	  proposal	  eventually	  submitted	  by	  the	   Egyptians	   under	   the	   NSC’s	   February	   plan	   was	   seen	   by	   the	   U.S.	   as	   “worthless	  legalistic	  documents	  in	  the	  guise	  of	  serious	  negotiating	  proposals”	  and	  so	  rigid	  that	  “an	  American	  compromise	  could	  not	  possible	  bridge	  it”.119	  At	   the	   end	   of	   July,	   Sadat	   even	   terminated	   the	   military	   track	   headed	   by	  Weizman.	  	  The	  Egyptians	  had	  concluded	  that	  the	  meetings	  in	  Austria	  and	  the	  UK	  did	  not	  produce	  sufficient	  change	  in	  the	  Israeli	  position,	  and	  Begin	  publicly	  teased	  Sadat	  after	   Weizman	   told	   him	   of	   Sadat’s	   private	   request	   for	   some	   unilateral	   goodwill	  gestures.	  	  In	  a	  rage,	  Sadat	  declared	  there	  was	  no	  point	  to	  pursuing	  further	  contacts	  with	  Israel	  without	  more	  active	  American	  pressure	  and	  terminated	  further	  talks.	  To	   no	   avail,	   some	   of	   his	   advisors	   begged	   Sadat	   to	   reconsider	   “because	   the	  military	   mission	   is	   under	   Weizman’s	   authority	   and	   its	   expulsion	   would	   be	   a	  personal	   slap	   to	   him.	   	   He	   is	   the	   only	   member	   of	   the	   Israeli	   government	   we	   can	  consider	   a	   friend,	   and	   if	   we	   lose	   him,	   we	   lose	   all	   means	   of	   contact	   with	   the	  Israelis”.120	  	  Weizman	  expressed	  to	  Sam	  Lewis	  his	  “regret	  at	  Sadat’s	  sudden	  move…	  [which]	   can	   only	   strengthen	   the	   hardliners	   in	   the	   Israeli	   government”.121	   	   Also,	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American	  analysts	  judged	  that	  Peace	  Now	  had	  been	  both	  “outmaneuvered	  by	  Prime	  Minister	  Begin	  and	  undercut	  by	  Egyptian	  President	  Sadat’s	  public	  inflexibility”.122	  	   In	   turn,	   the	  U.S.	  administration	  chose	  to	  reassess	   its	  approach.	   	  This	  was	   in	  part	  due	  to	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  more	  flexible	  Egyptian	  partner,	  but	  domestic	  pressures	  in	  America	  were	  also	  a	  factor.	   	  In	  an	  effort	  to	  reassure	  Arab	  states	  about	  American	  commitment,	  Washington	   pushed	   through	   Congress	   a	   package	   of	   fighter	   jets	   that	  bundled	  Israeli,	  Egyptian,	  and	  Saudi	  planes	  together.	   	  The	  administration	  won	  this	  fight	  but	   it	  was	  an	  exhausting	  victory	   that	  cost	   it	   significant	  support	   in	   the	   Jewish	  community.123	   	   This	   contributed	   to	   the	   administration’s	   eventual	   decision	   to	  terminate	  its	  strategy	  of	  isolating	  Begin.	  	  It	  also	  led	  it	  to	  temporarily	  undermine	  the	  strategy	  along	   the	  way.	   	   In	  order	   to	  encourage	  pro-­‐Israel	  members	  of	  Congress	   to	  pass	   the	   jets	   package,	   Carter	   appeared	   with	   Begin	   in	   early	   May	   at	   Israeli	  independence	  day	  celebrations	  in	  New	  York,	  suggesting	  ongoing	  U.S.	  support.124	  However,	   the	   reassessment	   of	   U.S.	   policy	   cannot	   be	   attributed	   to	   domestic	  pressures	   in	   isolation,	   especially	   once	   one	   takes	   into	   account	   the	   policy	   that	  followed.	   	   Quandt	   says	   finally	   decided	   that	   “instead	   of	   working	   against	   Begin,	   he	  wanted	   to	   work	   through	   him,”125	   but	   Democratic	   Congressmen	   and	   VP	   Mondale	  were	  begging	  him	  to	  drop	  his	  Mideast	  push	  altogether.126	  	  Instead,	  Carter	  hoped	  to	  double	  down,	  pursuing	  a	  high-­‐level	  effort	  to	  break	  the	  impasse	  between	  Israel	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 “‘Prospects for Israeli Peace Movement’ in Information Items - Memorandum for the President from 
Zbigniew Brzezinski”, September 13, 1978, Collection “Brzezinski Material: President’s Daily Report 
File”, Box 7, Folder 8, Document 24-9, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library. 
123 Carter, Keeping faith, 313. 
124 Cyrus R. Vance, Hard Choices: Critical Years in America’s Foreign Policy (Simon and Schuster, 
1983), 213. 
125 Quandt, Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics, 201. 
126 Carter, Keeping faith, 315. 
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Egypt.	  	  The	  result	  was	  the	  notorious	  Camp	  David	  Accords	  of	  September	  of	  1978.	  	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   it	   would	   probably	   be	   excessive	   to	  write	   off	   LSI	   during	  1978	  as	  a	  total	  failure.	  	  Peace	  Now	  was	  given	  considerable	  impetus	  by	  the	  isolation	  of	  Israel	  that	  many	  felt	  the	  Begin	  government	  was	  bringing	  upon	  itself.	  	  Although	  it	  became	  clear	  by	   July	   that	  Begin	  remained	   in	  power,	  declarations	  by	  Weizman	  and	  then	  Dayan	  that	  the	  Egyptian	  government	  was	  serious	  about	  peace	  did	  put	  him	  on	  the	  defensive.127	  	  The	  causation	  is	  difficult	  to	  disentangle,	  but	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  their	  personal	  push	  for	  progress	  with	  Egypt	  was	  aided	  by	  America’s	  efforts	  and	  that	  this	  may	  have	   influenced	  Begin’s	  decision	   to	  make	  certain	   concessions	  at	  Camp	  David.	  	  The	  pressure	  Begin	  was	  facing	  certainly	  did	  encourage	  him	  to	  gradually	  move	  away	  from	  his	  adherence	  to	  the	  status	  quo	  that	  year.	  	  
Coding	  the	  Observable	  Implications	  	  1.	  Perceptions	  of	  Sender	  Interests:	  	   One	  area	   in	  which	  the	  theories	  diverge	   involves	  the	  effect	  of	  perceptions	  of	  sender	   state	   interests	   on	   the	   incidence	   of	   LSI	   occurrence.	   	   Theory	   #1	   (national	  interests	   theory)	   predicts	   that	   LSI	   should	   accurately	   reflect	   objective,	   unitary	  national	  interests	  abroad.	  	  Theory	  #2	  (the	  lobby-­‐legislative	  approach)	  expects	  rates	  of	  LSI	  toward	  Israel	  to	  be	  low	  because	  these	  groups	  tend	  not	  to	  see	  such	  behavior	  as	  good	   for	   American	   interests.	   	   Theory	   #3	   (the	   bureaucratic	   politics	   approach)	  expects	   that	   such	  behavior	   should	  be	  more	   frequent	  because	   these	  actors	  actually	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 Weizman considers Dayan’s realignment and declaration after Leeds that the Egyptians were genuine in 
their desire for peace to have been an especially important turning point in the Israeli internal scene. 
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desire	  LSI	  toward	  Israel.	   	  Theory	  #4	  (leadership	  theory)	  holds	  that	  LSI	  occurrence	  should	  depend	  upon	  how	  top	  leaders	  in	  the	  sender	  state	  perceive	  national	  interests	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  sender.	  As	   expected	   by	   leadership	   theory,	   Egyptian	   and	   American	   efforts	   at	   LSI	  toward	  Israel	  in	  1978	  were	  closely	  tied	  to	  perceptions	  that	  top	  officials	  held	  about	  their	  Israeli	  counterparts.	  	  During	  this	  period,	  Carter	  felt	  that	  “Begin	  was	  becoming	  an	  insurmountable	  obstacle	  to	  further	  progress”.128	  	  	  Sadat	  felt	  he	  simply	  could	  not	  work	  with	  Begin	  starting	  in	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  year.	  	  	  Meanwhile,	   Theory	   #1	   (national	   interests	   theory)	   seems	   to	   have	   a	   more	  difficult	   time	   explaining	   why	   a	   president	   who	   previously	   considered	   bolstering	  Begin	  would	   later	  seek	  to	  undermine	  him	   in	   the	  cabinet	  so	  soon	  after.	   	  Theory	  #2	  (the	   lobby-­‐legislative	   approach)	   does	   not	   fit	   with	   the	   occurrence	   of	   LSI	   because	  members	  of	  Congress	   tended	   to	  downplay	   internal	  differences	  of	  political	   opinion	  within	   Israeli	   politics,	   even	   though	   it	   can	   partially	   explain	   the	   pressures	   that	   led	  Carter	   to	   terminate	   the	  effort.	   	  Theory	  #3	  (the	  bureaucratic	  politics	  approach)	   fits	  with	  the	  support	  that	  Carter	  and	  Sadat	  received	  for	  their	  plan	  from	  subordinates	  but	  not	   why	   the	   plan	   was	   ultimately	   terminated.	   	   Once	   the	   effort	   at	   LSI	   started	   to	  flounder,	   the	   advice	   Carter	   was	   receiving	   from	   State	   was	   to	   present	   a	   set	   of	   U.S.	  parameters,	  not	  the	  Camp	  David	  summit	  he	  ultimately	  chose	  to	  pursue.129	  	  2.	  Perceptions	  of	  Close	  Contests:	  	   Another	  area	  in	  which	  the	  theories	  diverge	  involves	  how	  actors	  in	  the	  sender	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state	  perceive	  close	  political	  contests	  abroad.	  	  If	  they	  consistently	  pursue	  LSI	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  accurate	  assessments	  of	  objective	  developments	  abroad,	  that	  would	  provide	  some	   support	   for	  national	   interests	   theory	   (Theory	  #1).	   	   If,	   however,	   they	   choose	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  pursue	  LSI	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  subjective	  perceptions	  of	  those	  foreign	  political	  developments	  or	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  personal	  distractions,	  that	  would	  provide	  support	  for	  Theory	  #4	  (leadership	  theory).	  In	   this	   regard,	   Theory	   #1	   is	   only	   partly	   consonant	   with	   LSI	   in	   1978.	  	  Certainly,	  there	  were	  objective	  indicators	  of	  political	  ferment	  in	  Israel,	  including	  the	  Peace	   Now	   marches	   and	   petition.	   	   However,	   the	   U.S.	   efforts	   at	   LSI	   may	   have	  continued	   longer	   than	   the	   objective	   indicators	   could	   justify.	   	   Brzezinski	   noted	   as	  early	  as	  April	  that	  “the	  internal	  debate	  over	  Israel’s	  foreign	  policy	  continues	  but	  thus	  far	   has	   not	   produced	   significant	   political	   realignment”.130	   	   	   Also,	   Sadat’s	   effort	   to	  heighten	  the	  pressure	  on	  Begin	  in	  July	  through	  following	  his	  Peres	  meeting	  by	  one	  with	   Weizman	   was	   clearly	   a	   misreading	   of	   the	   Israeli	   political	   map.	   	   Accurate	  objective	  factors	  would	  make	  it	  difficult	  to	  justify	  such	  actions.	  	   Theory	  #2	  (the	  lobby-­‐legislative	  approach)	  is	  not	  consonant	  with	  LSI	  during	  this	  period	  because	  executive	  branch	  officials	  perceived	  an	  internal	  contest	  in	  Israeli	  politics	   when	   legislators	   expressed	   little	   interest	   in	   such	   a	   possibility,	  demonstrating	  much	  more	   interest	   in	   Begin	   than	  Dayan	   or	  Weizman.	   	   Theory	   #3	  (the	   bureaucratic	   politics	   approach)	   is	   consonant	   with	   the	   executive	   branch’s	  eagerness	  to	  believe	  an	  internal	  contest	  was	  imminent	  in	  Israeli	  domestic	  politics.	  However,	  at	  many	  points	  the	  source	  of	  key	  decisions	  was	  from	  above	  and	  not	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below,	   a	   prominent	   indicator	   of	   support	   for	   Theory	   #4	   (leadership	   theory).	   	   For	  instance,	   Brzezinski	   explains	   that	   the	   politically-­‐motivated	   decision	   to	   exclude	  Israel’s	  ambassador	  from	  Weizman’s	  meeting	  with	  Carter	  was	  the	  president’s	  alone.	  	  Egyptian	   Foreign	  Minister	   Kamel	   discloses	   that	   his	   government’s	   effort	   to	   topple	  Begin	  was	  the	  brainchild	  of	  two	  individuals,	  Sadat	  and	  Tuhamy,	  not	  Kamel’s	  agency.	  	  3.	  Patterns	  of	  Domestic	  Debate:	  	   Theories	  2	  and	  3	  (the	  lobby-­‐legislative	  and	  bureaucratic	  politics	  approaches,	  respectively)	  expect	  that	  these	  actors	  should	  be	  relatively	  influential	  and	  informed	  in	  advance	  of	  American	  decisions	  about	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  pursue	  LSI,	  while	  Theory	  #4	   (leadership	   theory)	   expects	   these	   actors	   to	   be	   kept	   in	   the	   dark.	   	   American	  behavior	   and	   reasoning	   during	   this	   period	   fits	   extremely	   well	   with	   the	   paper	  paradox	  and	  leadership	  theory.	  	  Retrospectively,	  Quandt	  acknowledges	  that	  the	  NSC	  plan	   to	   collude	   with	   Egypt	   to	   corner	   Begin	   “was	   a	   risky	   strategy,	   especially	   if	   it	  leaked	  to	  the	  press”.131	  	  The	  decision	  to	  make	  Weizman’s	  meeting	  with	  Carter	  a	  one-­‐on-­‐one	   appears	   to	   have	   been	   an	   informal	   decision	  made	   offline	   and	   not	   through	  standard	  written	  process.	  	  In	  advance	  of	  Weizman’s	  visit,	  Brzezinski	  forwarded	  the	  Presidential	   Review	   Committee’s	   findings	   only	   to	   the	   Secretaries	   of	   Defense	   and	  State	  with	   the	   strict	  warning	   that	   “this	   summary	   should	   be	   very	   closely	   held	   and	  distributed	   only	   on	   a	  must	   know	   basis”.132	   	   In	   preparation	   for	   that	   PRC	  meeting,	  Quandt	  wrote	  to	  Brzezinski	  that	  the	  meeting	  “is	  also	  not	  the	  setting	  for	  a	  sensitive	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 Quandt, Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics, 171. 
132 “Israeli Arms Requests - Matmon C - Memorandum from Zbigniew Brzezinski to Secretaries of State 
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discussion	  on	  how	  political	  considerations	  should	  affect	  arms	  decisions”.133	  	  4.	  Cycles	  of	  Domestic	  Power:	  	   Theories	  2	  and	  3	  also	  expect	  top	  leaders	  in	  the	  sender	  state	  to	  be	  particularly	  weak	  during	  certain	  periods	  of	  that	  nation’s	  political	  calendar,	  but	  leadership	  theory	  argues	  that	  these	  dynamics	  should	  have	  little	  effect	  on	  leader	  agency	  to	  pursue	  LSI.	  	  The	  case	  material	  from	  1978	  offers	  little	  in	  the	  way	  of	  predictions	  for	  this	  category	  of	  observable	  implication,	  since	  it	  takes	  place	  neither	  at	  the	  beginning	  nor	  the	  end	  of	  a	   presidential	   term.	   	   Perhaps	   the	   influence	   of	   domestic	   pressures	  was	   somewhat	  greater	  in	  1978	  than	  1977,	  with	  midterm	  elections	  less	  than	  a	  year	  away,	  but,	  again,	  such	  pressures	  were	  still	  not	  determinative.	  	  Rather,	  the	  fact	  that	  such	  an	  extensive	  effort	  to	  foster	  internal	  opposition	  to	  Begin’s	  leadership	  took	  place	  at	  all	  during	  an	  election	  year	  is	  a	  major	  mark	  against	  the	  lobby-­‐legislative	  approach	  and	  in	  favor	  of	  leadership	  theory.	  	  5.	  Bureaucratic	  Freelancing:	  	   Theory	   #3	   (the	   bureaucratic	   politics	   approach)	   expects	   that	   working-­‐level	  pursuit	   of	   LSI	   without	   senior	   authorization	   should	   be	   frequent,	   but	   Theory	   #4	  (leadership	  theory)	  holds	  that	  such	  freelancing	  should	  be	  rare	  and	  occur	  only	  during	  periods	   of	  weak	   executive	   oversight.	   	   The	   case	  material	   also	  provides	   little	   in	   the	  way	  of	  data	  regarding	  unauthorized	  behavior	  because	  no	  such	  activity	  took	  place.	  	  If	  anything,	   the	   locus	  of	   impulsive	  behavior	  was	  at	   the	  very	   top	  of	   the	  Egyptian	  and	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American	  governments,	  rather	  than	  a	  few	  rungs	  below.	  	  For	  instance,	  Sadat’s	  effort	  to	   turn	   up	   the	   pressure	   on	   Begin	   was	   criticized	   by	   his	   foreign	  minister	   as	   “pure	  whim…	  without	  due	  preparation”	  that	  was	  “deviating	  from	  the	  political	  and	  tactical	  line	  we	  were	  pursuing”.134	  	  This	  provides	  support	  for	  leadership	  theory	  against	  the	  bureaucratic	  politics	  approach.	  	  6.	  Consistency	  of	  Message:	  	   Theory	  #1	  (national	  interests	  theory)	  argues	  that	  consistent	  messaging	  in	  LSI	  should	   be	   relatively	   unproblematic	   for	   officials	   in	   the	   sender	   state,	   but	   the	  domestically-­‐oriented	   theories	   emphasize	   institutional	   or	   personal	   biases	   that	  should	   make	   this	   task	   much	   more	   challenging.	   	   The	   Carter	   administration	  undermined	  its	  own	  efforts	  to	  project	  a	  consistent	  message	  to	  the	  Israeli	  public	  with	  its	  warm	  reception	  of	  Begin	  in	  April	  to	  help	  pass	  the	  jets	  package	  through	  Congress.	  	  The	  pressure	  felt	  by	  the	  administration	  that	  drove	  it	  to	  make	  these	  departures	  from	  its	  overall	  strategy	  was	  certainly	  due	  to	  the	  influence	  of	  pro-­‐Israel	  activists	  and	  the	  lobby.	  	  This	  provides	  some	  support	  for	  the	  lobby-­‐legislative	  approach	  regarding	  the	  efficacy	  of	  LSI	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  leadership	  theory.	  	  7.	  Suitability	  of	  Message:	  	   National	   interests	   theory	   also	   expects	   officials	   in	   the	   sender	   state	   to	   be	  relatively	  deft	  at	  choosing	  a	  message	  for	  their	  policies	  that	  is	  suited	  to	  the	  needs	  of	  their	   favored	   faction	   within	   the	   politics	   of	   the	   target	   state.	   	   However,	   the	   other	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theories	   emphasize	   institutional	   or	   personal	   biases	   that	   might	   make	   suitable	  messaging	  more	  difficult.	  In	  general,	   the	  administration’s	  message	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  deftly	   tailored	  to	   suit	   the	   political	   context.	   	   The	   administration	   picked	   its	   fights	   carefully,	  intentionally	   choosing	   “to	   engage	   Begin	   [on]	  U.N.	   Resolution	   242	   and	   settlements	  [because	   they]	   were	   both	   comparatively	   safe,	   especially	   since	   many	   Israelis	   and	  American	  Jews	  were	  more	  in	  agreement	  with	  Carter’s	  position	  on	  these	  points	  than	  with	  Begin’s”.	  135	  	  Carter	  also	  tempered	  his	  desire	  to	  publicly	  criticize	  Dayan	  in	  April	  when	   Vance	   urged	   him	   to	   give	   the	   Israeli	   FM	   the	   benefit	   of	   the	   doubt.136	   	   To	   the	  extent	   that	   administration	   projected	   a	   more	   effective	  message	   toward	   the	   Israeli	  political	  system	  in	  1978	  than	  leading	  up	  to	  Israeli	  elections	  the	  previous	  year,	  that	  difference	   in	   efficacy	   should	   probably	   be	   attributed	   to	   Carter’s	   more	   deliberate	  approach	   to	  public	  diplomacy,	   a	   factor	   that	  would	  be	  most	  germane	   to	   leadership	  theory.	  	  
Carter,	  Case	  #5:	  Likud	  Gets	  a	  Free	  Pass,	  1979-­‐80	  	   Given	   President	   Carter’s	   strong	   interest	   in	   the	   peace	   process	   and	   deep	  animus	  against	  Israeli	  PM	  Menachem	  Begin,	  it	  is	  somewhat	  puzzling	  that	  LSI	  against	  the	  Likud	  did	  not	  take	  place	  during	  1979	  and	  1980	  when	  the	  peace	  process	  ground	  to	  a	  halt	  and	  the	  party	  was	  less	  popular	  at	  home	  due	  to	  hyper-­‐inflation.	  	  The	  Camp	  David	   Accords	   of	   September	   1978	   were	   a	   framework	   agreement	   calling	   for	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 Quandt, Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics, 169. 
136 Vance, Hard Choices, 212. 
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comprehensive	   treaties	   on	   two	   sub-­‐topics:	   (1)	   terms	   of	   peace	   between	   Israel	   and	  Egypt,	   and	   (2)	  a	  detailed	  agreement	  between	   Israel	   and	  Egypt	  over	   the	  autonomy	  and	   possible	   self-­‐determination	   of	   Arabs	   living	   in	   the	   West	   Bank	   and	   Gaza.	  	  Unsurprisingly,	   the	   bilateral	   peace	   agreement,	   though	   not	   without	   its	   challenges,	  offered	  the	  path	  of	  lesser	  resistance.	   	  With	  heavy	  American	  mediation	  a	  treaty	  was	  finally	  agreed	  upon	  and	  signed	  in	  March	  of	  1979.	  	  However,	  once	  the	  bilateral	  treaty	  was	  out	  of	  the	  way,	  negotiators	  moved	  on	  to	  the	  much	  more	  challenging	  topic	  of	  the	  autonomy	  talks	  starting	  in	  May.	  	  One	  might	  therefore	  anticipate	  that	  the	  period	  until	  the	  end	  of	  Carter’s	  term	  would	  have	  been	  primed	  for	  LSI	  toward	  Israel.	  	  	  	  
Coding	  the	  Dependent	  Variables	  (Occurrence	  and	  Efficacy)	  Did	  LSI	  Occur?	  	   No.	   	   It	   is	   relatively	   clear	   that	   the	   administration	   did	   not	   try	   to	   influence	  internal	   Israeli	   politics	   with	   leadership	   selection	   intervention	   during	   this	   period.	  	  Carter	   had	   already	   taken	   on	   a	   great	   deal	   of	   risk	   by	   getting	   so	   deeply	   involved	   in	  Mideast	   negotiations	   leading	   up	   to	   the	   Camp	   David	   Accords	   and	   the	   Egypt-­‐Israel	  Peace	  Treaty.	  	  Upon	  advice	  from	  Vice	  President	  Mondale,	  Carter	  appointed	  a	  special	  envoy	   to	   handle	   day-­‐to-­‐day	   issues	   in	   the	   autonomy	   talks	   and	   chose	   US	   Trade	  Representative	   Robert	   Strauss	   for	   the	   job,	   a	   Jewish-­‐American	   former	   head	   of	   the	  Democratic	   National	   Committee.	   	   When	   Strauss	   left	   the	   job	   in	   late	   1979,	   he	   was	  replaced	  by	  another	  prominent	  Jewish	  Democrat,	  Sol	  Linowitz,	  who	  had	  helped	  the	  administration	  in	  1977	  with	  negotiations	  over	  the	  Panama	  Canal.	  
	   152	  
	   No	  doubt,	   the	  absence	  of	  LSI	  during	  this	  period	  can	   in	  part	  be	  attributed	  to	  domestic	   considerations	   within	   the	   United	   States.137	   	   However,	   to	   explain	   the	  outcome	   solely	   in	   such	   terms	   would	   miss	   more	   important	   parts	   of	   the	   causal	  process.	   	   Although	   Carter	   clearly	   hoped	   that	   handing	   the	   baton	   to	   a	   special	  negotiator	  with	  credibility	  in	  the	  American	  Jewish	  community	  would	  yield	  domestic	  benefits,	   he	   did	   not	   intend	   to	   give	   up	   on	   the	   autonomy	   talks	   altogether.	   	   Behind	  closed	  doors,	  Brzezinski	  deplored	  the	  “suspicion	  [Strauss’s	  appointment]	  “is	  all	  just	  domestic	  politics	  and	  that	  we	  are	  abandoning	  our	  diplomatic	  activity	  altogether”.138	  	  	  In	   fact,	   the	   President,	   Vance,	   and	  Brzezinski	   all	   remained	   strongly	   interested	   that	  the	   talks	   succeed,	   and	   there	   is	   also	   reason	   to	   believe,	   as	   Spiegel	   argues,	   that	   they	  “feared	  Saudi	  oil	  pressure	  more	  than	  pro-­‐Israeli	  domestic	  constraints”.139	  	   Indeed,	   the	   best	   indication	   that	   they	   did	   not	   intend	   to	   bury	   the	   autonomy	  talks	   is	   that	   they	  kept	   trying	   to	  promote	   them.	   	   In	  August	  of	  1979,	  Carter	  publicly	  likened	  the	  Palestinian	  issue	  to	  the	  cause	  of	  civil	  rights	  in	  the	  U.S.140	  	  When	  they	  first	  sent	   Strauss	   to	   the	   region,	   he	   was	   to	   promote	   an	   administration	   plan	   to	   amend	  UNSCR	   242	   in	   a	  manner	   intended	   to	   facilitate	   PLO	  moderation,	   allowing	   them	   to	  incorporate	  the	  movement	  into	  talks	  and	  give	  the	  autonomy	  process	  a	  major	  boost.	  	  	  Despite	  last-­‐minute	  guidance	  from	  Brzezinski	  and	  the	  President	  himself	  to	  “be	  firm,”	  Strauss’s	   palpable	   lack	   of	   enthusiasm	   for	   the	   plan	   encouraged	   Sadat	   and	  Begin	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 For instance, see Quandt, Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics, 23; Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 
438. 
138 Remarks in “Minutes of Meeting from Presidential Review Committee Meeting on West Bank/Gaza 
Negotiations”, May 17, 1979, 4, Collection “Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection: Subject File”, Number 22, 
Folder: “[Meetings -- PRC 107: 5/17/79],” Jimmy Carter Presidential Library. 
139 Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict, 374. 
140 Linda Charlton, “President Angers U.S. Jewish Leaders: His Remarks Likening Palestinian Issue to 
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reject	   it.	   The	   president	   wondered	   if	   “perhaps	   Sadat	   was	   against	   this	   initiative	  because	   Bob	   Strauss	   in	   fact	   talked	   him	   out	   of	   it”.141	   	   In	   March	   of	   1980,	   the	  administration	   even	   pursued	   the	   domestically	   risky	   strategy	   of	   endorsing	   a	   UN	  resolution	  condemning	  Israel	  for	  settlement	  activity	  within	  a	  month	  of	  the	  New	  York	  Democratic	  primary	  to	  keep	  Arab	  representatives	  at	  the	  negotiating	  table.142	  These	   efforts	   were	   relatively	   sporadic,	   but	   the	   administration	   was	   also	  dealing	  with	  enormous	  distractions,	  especially	  in	  the	  broader	  Middle	  East	  region.	  	  In	  February	  of	  1979	  the	  Shah	  of	  Iran	  stepped	  down,	  and	  the	  country’s	  ongoing	  turmoil	  emerged	   as	   a	   major	   distraction	   for	   the	   administration.	   	   This	   only	   became	   worse	  when	  the	  administration	  was	  struck	  with	  twin	  disasters	  in	  November	  and	  December	  that	   also	   took	   away	   from	   consideration	   of	   peace	   process	   issues:	   the	   taking	   of	  American	  hostages	  in	  Tehran	  and	  the	  Soviet	  invasion	  of	  Afghanistan.	  	  Both	  became	  major	   fixations	   for	   administration	   officials	   throughout	   1980.	   	   Skyrocketing	   oil	  prices,	  inflation,	  and	  the	  SALT	  II	  treaty	  were	  also	  possible	  sources	  of	  distraction.143	  In	  between	  Strauss	  and	  Linowitz,	  the	  president	  actually	  expressed	  interest	  in	  letting	   the	   peace	   portfolio	  move	   back	   to	   Vance,	   but	   Brzezinski	   argued	   that	   Vance	  was	  actually	   too	  busy	  with	  other	   issues	  to	  get	  bogged	  down	  in	  the	  talks.144	   	  Vance	  resigned	  at	   the	  end	  of	  April	  over	  handling	  of	   Iran,	  and	  his	  absence	  was	  thought	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 439; Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict, 375. 
142 Carter specifically instructed that all references to Jerusalem as occupied territory should be removed 
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impede	  the	  autonomy	  talks	  somewhat.145	  	  Finally,	  Iraq	  invaded	  Iran	  in	  September	  of	  1980.	  	  The	  administration	  did	  eventually	  put	  thorny	  Mideast	  issues	  aside	  entirely	  to	  focus	   on	   the	   campaign,	   but	   it	  would	   be	   a	   stretch	   to	   say	   that	   this	   effect	   lasted	   for	  more	  than	  the	  last	  few	  months	  of	  the	  campaign	  or	  was	  causally	  decisive.146	  Neither	  were	   the	   parties	   in	   the	   region	   particularly	   helpful	  with	   leadership	  selection	   intervention	  via	   the	  autonomy	  talks.	   	  On	  one	  hand,	  Arab	  actors	  were	  not	  making	   the	   sort	   of	   concessions	   that	   would	   have	   facilitated	   such	   an	   approach.	  	  Sadat’s	   incentive	   and	   ability	   to	   make	   concessions	   on	   behalf	   of	   Palestinians	   were	  quite	  limited,	  and	  he	  was	  at	  a	  bargaining	  disadvantage	  until	  the	  Israelis	  returned	  the	  Sinai	   to	  Egypt	   in	  1982	  as	  agreed	  under	  the	  bilateral	  peace	  treaty.147	   	  The	   isolation	  imposed	  on	  Egypt	  by	  the	  Arab	  world	  for	  making	  peace	  with	  Israel	  was	  tougher	  than	  expected,	  and	  neither	  Jordan	  nor	  Palestinians	  chose	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  autonomy	  talks	  as	  the	  U.S.	  had	  hoped.	   	  In	  response	  to	  a	  provocative	  bill	   in	  the	  Knesset,	  Sadat	  terminated	   the	   talks	   in	   July	   1981.	   	   Although	   the	   administration	   worried	   that	   the	  absence	   of	   talks	   undermined	   Sadat’s	   position	  within	   Egypt,	   they	   hoped	   that	   arms	  and	  aid	  would	  be	  sufficient	  until	  broader	  progress	  could	  be	  achieved.148	  	   On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  Israeli	  government	  had	  retrenched	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  decreased	  possible	  points	  of	  leverage	  and	  made	  negative	  LSI	  more	  difficult	  to	  carry	  out.	   	   The	   coalition	   partner	  DMC	  had	   split	   in	   two,	   and	   the	   left-­‐wing	   faction	   bolted	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145 Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict, 379. 
146 For a bit more on this, see Ibid., 379 & 484, endnote 214. 
147 Ibid., 373; Vance, Hard Choices, 253. 
148 For instance, during an NSC meeting over providing arms to Egypt CIA Director Stansfield Turner 
commented that “without substantial U.S. [weaponry] support, Sadat might be in trouble domestically”. 
“Summary of Findings from Presidential Review Committee Meeting on Egyptian Military Supply 
Relationship”, September 20, 1979, 1, Collection “Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection: Subject File”, Number 
34, Folder: “[Meetings -- PRC 123: 9/20/79],” Jimmy Carter Presidential Library. See also “Minutes of 
Meeting from Presidential Review Committee Meeting on West Bank/Gaza Negotiations,” 6. 
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from	   the	   coalition,	   decreasing	   the	   leverage	   that	   the	   remaining	  members	   had	   over	  government	  decision-­‐making.	  	  Dayan	  and	  Weizman	  resigned	  over	  the	  government’s	  hardline	  approach	  to	  the	  autonomy	  talks.	  	  This	  increased	  their	  public	  standing,	  but,	  as	   individuals	   not	   factions,	   they	   could	   not	   force	   an	   earlier	   vote.	   	   Meanwhile,	   the	  remaining	  partners	  in	  government	  had	  little	  incentive	  to	  permit	  early	  elections.	  	  The	  National	   Religious	   Party’s	   influence	   over	   autonomy	   talks	   and	   other	   governmental	  deliberations	   had	   increased	   markedly,	   and	   members	   of	   the	   Likud	   avoided	   early	  elections	  in	  hopes	  that	  their	  dismal	  poll	  numbers	  might	  eventually	  come	  up.	   	  Ariel	  Sharon	  tried	  to	  attack	  the	  sitting	  government	  from	  the	  right	  but	  did	  so	  alone.149	  	  	  Did	  The	  Policy	  Succeed?	  It	   is	  difficult	   to	  assess	   the	  question	  of	  efficacy	  given	   that	   this	   is	  an	   instance	  during	  which	  LSI	  did	  not	  actually	  occur.	  	  Normally	  for	  such	  non-­‐cases,	  I	  contrast	  the	  policy	   that	   was	   pursued	   with	   the	   hypothetical	   LSI	   policy	   that	   could	   have	   been	  pursued	   but	   was	   not.	   	   However,	   such	   counterfactuals	   are	   most	   valid	   when	   they	  differ	  from	  each	  other	  in	  terms	  of	  as	  few	  antecedent	  historical	  facts	  as	  possible.150	  The	  episode	  of	   Israel’s	  1977	  elections	  discussed	  above	  was	  also	  a	  non-­‐case,	  but	  the	  antecedent	  historical	  conditions	  that	  made	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  policy	  that	  was	  pursued	  and	  its	  hypothesized	  alternative	  were	  relatively	  simple	  to	  identify:	  
not	   taking	   the	   specific	   and	   misguided	   extra	   steps	   that	   harmed	   Rabin	   electorally.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 “‘Speculation that Sharon may be next casualty of Israeli cabinet’ in Noon Notes - Memorandum for 
Zbigniew Brzezinski from the Situation Room”, June 2, 1980, Collection “Brzezinski Material: President’s 
Daily Report File”, Box 15, Folder 6, Document 3-5, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library. 
150 Philip Tetlock and Aaron Belkin, Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics: Logical, 
Methodological, and Psychological Perspectives (Princeton University Press, 1996), chap. 1. 
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However,	   for	   1979	   and	   1980,	   it	   is	   much	   more	   difficult	   to	   pinpoint	   exactly	   what	  would	  have	  had	  to	  be	  different	  in	  order	  to	  change	  the	  outcome	  from	  	  the	  policy	  that	  was	  pursued	  (i.e.	  non-­‐LSI)	  to	  the	  hypothetical	  alternative.	  	  	  What	  would	  have	  had	   to	  happen	  before	   the	  administration	   could	   realize	   it	  would	   not	   have	   a	   better	   opportunity	   to	   pursue	   LSI	   after	   the	   American	   elections?	  	  What	  would	  it	  have	  taken	  to	  get	  autonomy	  talks	  moving	  in	  a	  meaningful	  way?	  	  Then,	  once	   talks	  were	  underway,	  what	  positions	  would	   the	  parties	   take,	  and	  how	  would	  these	  positions	  influence	  the	  prospects	  for	  LSI?	  	  Because	  the	  counterfactual	  for	  this	  non-­‐case	  is	  too	  indistinct	  to	  evaluate	  with	  plausible	  validity,	  I	  confine	  my	  discussion	  of	  this	  episode	  mainly	  to	  considerations	  of	  occurrence	  but	  not	  efficacy.	  	  
Coding	  the	  Observable	  Implications	  
1.	  Perceptions	  of	  Sender	  Interests:	  	   The	   first	   area	   in	   which	   the	   theories	   diverge	   has	   to	   do	   with	   the	   effect	   of	  perceptions	  of	   sender	  state	   interests	  on	  LSI	  occurrence.	   	  National	   interests	   theory	  (Theory	   #1)	   expects	   occurrence	   to	   correlate	   quite	   closely	  with	   objective	   national	  interests	  abroad.	  	  The	  lobby-­‐legislative	  approach	  (Theory	  #2)	  holds	  that	  LSI	  toward	  Israel	   should	   be	   low	   because	   these	   actors	   think	   that	   such	   behavior	   harms	   U.S.	  interests.	  	  The	  bureaucratic	  politics	  approach	  (Theory	  #3)	  predicts	  that	  LSI	  toward	  Israel	   should	   be	   frequent	   because	   these	   actors	   perceive	   such	   behavior	   as	  advantageous	   for	   American	   interests.	   	   The	   agency-­‐based	   approach	   (Theory	   #4)	  expects	   that	   LSI	   occurrence	   should	   vary	   upon	   top	   American	   leaders’	   personal	  perceptions	  of	  American	  national	  interests	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  Israeli	  politics.	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National	   interests	   theory	   has	   a	   difficult	   time	   explaining	  why	  we	  would	  not	  see	   LSI	   in	   this	   instance	   but	   did	   see	   it	   in	   other	   periods	   toward	   Begin.	   	   If	   he	   was	  objectively	  bad	  for	  U.S.	  interests	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  produced	  negative	  LSI	  before,	  we	  should	  expect	   to	   see	  LSI	   in	   this	   case	  –	  which	  we	  do	  not.	   	   Lobby-­‐legislative	   theory	  would	  expect	  U.S.	  policy	  to	  reflect	  the	  preferences	  of	  these	  political	  factions	  and	  thus	  LSI	  would	  not	  take	  place.	  	  In	  this	  regard,	  the	  outcome	  of	  this	  case	  is	  consonant	  with	  the	  theory.	  	  Meanwhile,	  it	  is	  not	  consonant	  with	  bureaucratic	  politics	  theory	  or	  even	  leadership	   theory,	   since	   Carter	   seemed	   to	   conclude	   from	  Dayan	   and	   other	   Israeli	  sources	  that	  Begin	  remained	  an	  unwilling	  partner,	  determined	  to	  avoid	  concessions	  over	  the	  territories.151	   	  However,	  I	  explain	  below	  that	  is	  because	  other	  dimensions	  were	  carrying	  more	  causal	  weight	  than	  perceived	  sender	  interests	  in	  this	  case.	  	  2.	  Perceptions	  of	  Close	  Contests:	  	   Another	   area	   in	   which	   the	   theories	   diverge	   involves	   perceptions	   of	   close	  contests	  abroad.	  	  Theory	  #1	  (national	  interests	  theory)	  expects	  that	  LSI	  occurrence	  should	   accurately	   reflect	   all	   available	   information	   about	   possible	   impending	  leadership	  contests	  abroad	  as	  they	  develop.	  	  Theory	  #4	  (leadership	  theory)	  predicts	  that	  a	  major	  constraining	  factor	  should	  be	  the	  personal	  distractions	  and	  subjective	  perceptions	  of	  leaders	  in	  the	  sender	  state.	  In	   one	   sense,	   the	   Likud	   was	   vulnerable	   starting	   in	   late	   1979	   due	   to	   the	  subject	   matter	   of	   peace	   process	   talks	   and	   because	   its	   polling	   numbers	   were	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151 Carter, Keeping faith, 504. 
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suffering	  over	  severe	  economic	  inflation.152	  	  However,	  for	  all	  the	  reasons	  explained	  above,	   the	   administration	   had	   few	   points	   of	   leverage	   for	   actually	   trying	   to	   shape	  Israeli	   politics.	   	   Further,	   although	   Likud’s	   polling	   numbers	   were	   bad,	   Begin’s	  government	  was	  unlikely	  to	  fall	  due	  to	  simple	  matters	  of	  coalitional	  arithmetic.	  The	   Likud’s	   domestic	   challenges	   did	   not	   escape	   the	   attention	   of	   the	   Carter	  team	   entirely	   but	   did	   so	   in	   a	  manner	   that	   delayed	   the	   possibility	   of	   LSI.	   	   By	   late	  1979,	   Brzezinski	  was	   reporting	   to	   the	   president	   that	   Begin’s	   leadership	  would	   be	  tested	   but	   that	   his	   main	   risk	   was	   losing	   an	   election	   in	   1981,	   not	   falling	   before	  then.153	   	   Provided	   they	   were	   still	   in	   office	   to	   do	   so,	   officials	   in	   the	   Carter	  administration	  planned	   to	  hold	  another	   summit	  between	  Begin	  and	  Sadat	   to	  push	  for	   agreement	   on	   autonomy	   in	   1981,	   when	   Israeli	   elections	   would	   be	   on	   the	  horizon.154	   	  Thus,	  top	  leaders	  anticipated	  a	  critical	  contest	  in	  Israeli	  politics	  but	  no	  real	  opportunity	  to	  pursue	  negative	  LSI	  against	  the	  Likud	  in	  the	  immediate	  term.	  	  3.	  Patterns	  of	  Domestic	  Debate:	  	   The	  domestic	  structural	  theories	  predicts	  that	  members	  of	  Congress,	  the	  pro-­‐Israel	  lobby,	  and/or	  the	  bureaucracy	  should	  be	  informed	  and	  influential	  in	  advance	  of	   decisions	   over	   whether	   pursue	   LSI,	   whereas	   Theory	   #4	   (leadership	   theory)	  expects	  that	  these	  actors	  should	  probably	  have	  been	  left	  in	  the	  dark.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152 Don Peretz and Sammy Smooha, “Israel’s Tenth Knesset Elections: Ethnic Upsurgence and Decline of 
Ideology,” Middle East Journal 35, no. 4 (Autumn 1981): 508. 
153 “‘Israeli Cabinet Disarray’ in Daily Report - Memorandum for the President from Zbigniew 
Brzezinski”, October 12, 1979, Collection “Brzezinski Material: President’s Daily Report File”, Box 12, 
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Theory	  #3	  (the	  bureaucratic	  politics	  approach)	  is	  undermined	  somewhat	  by	  patterns	  of	  domestic	  debate	   in	   this	  case.	   	  The	  appointment	  of	  Mideast	  envoys	  that	  reported	  directly	  to	  the	  president	  excluded	  the	  State	  Department	  from	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process,	  since	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  negotiating	  functions	  had	  usually	  been	  performed	  by	   officials	   from	   the	   Bureau	   for	   Near	   Eastern	   Affairs.	   	   There	   is	   little	   evidence	   to	  indicate	  the	  paper	  paradox	  during	  this	  period,	  but,	  since	  it	  is	  a	  non-­‐episode,	  there	  is	  not	  much	  to	  contradict	  it	  either.	  	  	  4.	  Cycles	  of	  Domestic	  Power:	  	   The	  domestic	  structural	  theories	  also	  expect	  that	  members	  of	  Congress,	   the	  pro-­‐Israel	   lobby,	   and/or	   the	   bureaucracy	   should	   be	   especially	   powerful	   during	  certain	  periods	  during	  the	  sender	  state’s	  political	  calendar.	  	  This	  episode	  provides	  at	  least	  some	  support	  for	  Theory	  #2	  (the	  lobby-­‐legislative	  approach)	  in	  terms	  of	  cycles	  of	   domestic	   power.	   	  With	   presidential	   elections	   looming	   on	   the	   horizon,	   it	   should	  come	   as	   little	   surprise	   that	   the	   outcome	  may	   tend	   to	   be	  more	   reflective	   of	   what	  lobby	  groups	  and	  legislators	  want	  than	  had	  previously	  been	  the	  case.	  	  However,	  one	  must	   also	   take	   into	   account	   the	   major	   distractions	   facing	   administration	   officials	  and	  occasional	  coordination	  problems	  among	  key	  individuals	  such	  as	  when	  Strauss	  undermined	   the	   administration’s	   effort	   on	   UNSCR	   242.	   	   Further,	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  principals	   did	  not	   stop	   trying	   to	   pursue	   their	   preferences	   in	   spite	   of	   appointing	   a	  special	  negotiator	  also	  partially	  undermines	  the	  lobby-­‐legislative	  approach	  in	  favor	  of	  leadership	  theory.	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5.	  Bureaucratic	  Freelancing:	  	   Theory	  #3	   (the	  bureaucratic	   politics	   approach)	   expects	   such	   freelancing	   to	  be	  quite	  frequent,	  but	  Theory	  #4	  (leadership	  theory)	  expects	  that	  freelancing	  should	  be	  rare	  and	  depend	  upon	  lax	  executive	  oversight.	  	  It	  is	  likely	  that	  Strauss	  did	  engage	  in	  some	  unauthorized	  behavior	   in	  August	  of	  1979	  by	  undermining	  Carter’s	  plan	  to	  amend	  UNSCR	  242.	  	  Although	  this	  activity	  was	  not	  an	  effort	  to	  undertake	  LSI,	  it	  did	  decrease	   the	   opportunities	   for	   his	   boss	   to	   pursue	   such	   avenues.	   	   Although	  leadership	  theory	  would	  expect	  bureaucratic	  freelancing	  to	  be	  especially	  low	  under	  a	  president	  with	  an	  active	  managerial	  approach	  to	  the	  issue	  such	  as	  Carter,	  it	  does	  fit	  with	  the	  theory	  that	  such	  renegade	  behavior	  –	  if	  it	  were	  to	  take	  place	  at	  all	  during	  his	  presidency	  –	  should	  occur	  during	  a	  part	  of	  his	  term	  in	  which	  he	  was	  exercising	  relatively	   less	   oversight.	   	   By	   all	   reports	   Carter	   was	   less	   eager	   to	   invest	   Mideast	  issues	   after	   his	   intense	   efforts	   to	   produce	   the	   major	   agreements.	   	   For	   instance,	  although	  Carter	  did	  not	  want	  the	  administration	  to	  give	  up	  on	  stopping	  settlements,	  when	  the	   issue	  came	  up	  at	  an	  NSC	  meeting,	  he	  reportedly	   told	  his	  envoy	  “Strauss,	  take	  care	  of	  it”.155	  	  Further,	   even	   if	   Strauss’s	   behavior	   was	   in	   contradiction	   to	   Carter’s	  preferences,	   that	   divergence	   cannot	   be	   attributed	   to	   organizational	   interests	   or	  desires,	  since	  Strauss	  came	  at	  the	  issue	  from	  a	  point	  of	  reluctance	  about	  leaning	  too	  heavily	   on	   Israeli	   leaders,	   whereas	   the	   deep	   bureaucracy	   –	   such	   as	   the	   State	  Department’s	  near	  east	  offices	  –	  tended	  to	  prefer	  a	  more	  engaged	  position	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  peace	  process	  that	  Strauss	  wanted.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 438. 
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  6.	  Consistency	  of	  Message:	  	   Another	   area	   in	   which	   the	   theories	   diverge	   involves	   consistency	   of	  messaging.	   	   Theory	   #1	   (national	   interests	   theory)	   predicts	   that	   agreeing	   on	   a	  consistent	   (and	   therefore	   more	   effective)	   message	   should	   be	   unproblematic	   for	  officials	  in	  the	  sender	  state.	  	  The	  other	  theories	  emphasize	  personal	  or	  institutional	  biases	  that	  should	  make	  consistent	  messaging	  more	  difficult	  to	  attain.	  It	  is	  somewhat	  difficult	  to	  speak	  of	  efficacy	  in	  instances	  of	  non-­‐action	  such	  as	  this	   one.	   	   Still,	   it	   is	   certainly	   reasonable	   to	   expect	   that	   the	   president’s	   renegade	  envoy	  might	  have	  undercut	  a	  message	  of	  toughness	  that	  could	  have	  been	  helpful	  in	  getting	   the	   talks	   underway	   and	   pursuing	   negative	   LSI	   toward	   the	   government	   of	  Israel.	  	  Domestic	  politics	  no	  doubt	  could	  have	  undermined	  Carter’s	  leverage	  during	  this	  period	  somewhat	  as	  well.	  	  Thus,	  the	  case	  probably	  would	  fit	  with	  Theories	  2	  and	  4	   in	   terms	   of	   consistency	   of	   message,	   although	   the	   biggest	   issue	   affecting	   the	  potential	   efficacy	   of	   LSI	  would	   have	   been	   the	   lack	   of	   a	   concerted	   signal	   –	   not	   the	  unity	  of	  one	  –	  as	  the	  administration	  was	  increasingly	  consumed	  in	  other	  issues.	  	  7.	  Suitability	  of	  Message:	  	  	   The	  last	  area	  in	  which	  the	  theories	  diverge	  involve	  the	  feasibility	  of	  suitable	  (and	  therefore	  more	  effective)	  messaging	  by	  the	  sender	  state.	  	  Theory	  #1	  (national	  interests	   theory)	   expects	   that	   arriving	   at	   a	   message	   that	   suits	   the	   needs	   of	   the	  favored	   faction	  within	   the	  politics	   of	   the	   target	   state	   should	  be	   relatively	   easy	   for	  officials	  in	  the	  sender	  state	  to	  achieve.	  	  Again,	  the	  other	  theories	  stress	  institutional	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or	  personal	  biases	  that	  may	  make	  this	  task	  more	  challenging.	  Again,	   it	   is	   somewhat	   difficult	   to	   evaluate	   the	   efficacy	   of	   an	   attempt	   that	  never	   took	   place.	   	   Nonetheless,	   if	   negative	   LSI	   had	   become	   a	   goal	   of	   U.S.	   policy	  toward	  Israel	  during	  this	  period,	  a	  more	  efficacious	  approach	  would	  have	  required	  projecting	   a	   very	   different	   message	   to	   the	   Israeli	   public.	   	   And	   the	   reason	   such	   a	  message	  was	  not	  adopted	  does	  seem	  to	  have	  some	  roots	   in	  domestic	   issues	  but	   is	  more	   directly	   attributable	   to	   matters	   of	   leadership	   coordination,	   leadership	  attention,	  and	  perceptions	  of	  strategic	  context.	  	  
Conclusion	  
	   The	   preceding	   chapter	   described	   five	   major	   episodes	   during	   the	   Carter	  administration	   that	   had	   insights	   to	   offer	   on	   the	   topic	   of	   leadership	   selection	  intervention	  toward	  Israel.	   	  In	  each	  instance,	  I	  methodically	  sought	  to	  demonstrate	  why	  the	  most	  persuasive	  framework	  for	  explaining	  patterns	  in	  the	  occurrence	  and	  efficacy	   of	   LSI	   focuses	   on	   the	   subjective	   perceptions	   and	   beliefs	   of	   top	   American	  leaders,	   not	   unyielding	   structural	   forces	   such	   as	   objective	   national	   interests,	  bureaucratic	  politics,	  or	  Congress	  working	  in	  lock-­‐step	  with	  pro-­‐Israel	  lobby	  groups.	  	   This	   chapter	  makes	  up	  a	  quarter	  of	   the	   first	  part	  of	   the	  dissertation,	  which	  draws	   heavily	   on	   archival	   resources	   and	   chronicles	   U.S.	   decision-­‐making	   toward	  internal	  Israeli	  politics	  before	  the	  Oslo	  peace	  process.	  	  The	  three	  other	  chapters	  that	  comprise	   Part	   One	   follow	   a	   similar	   approach	   while	   covering	   three	   presidential	  terms	  that	   followed	  Carter:	  Ronald	  Reagan’s	   first	   term	  in	  office,	  his	  second	  turn	  in	  the	   Oval	   Office,	   and	   the	   presidency	   of	   George	   H.	  W.	   Bush.	   	   Then,	   Parts	   Two	   and	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Three	   of	   the	   dissertation	   cover	   U.S.	   decision-­‐making	   toward	   internal	   Israeli	   and	  internal	   Palestinian	   politics	   respectively	   since	   1993.	   	   These	   sections	   make	   much	  greater	   use	   of	   contemporary	   interviews	   with	   American,	   Palestinian,	   and	   Israeli	  individuals	   who	   have	   expertise	   on	   the	   various	   cases.	   	   Then,	   these	   sections	   are	  followed	   by	   shadow	   cases	   to	   boost	   external	   validity	   and	   a	   conclusion	   that	   poses	  recommendations	  for	  policy-­‐makers	  and	  future	  academic	  research.	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Chapter	  IV.	  
~	  
The	  Reagan	  Years	  
(1981-­1989)	  
	  
	   Ronald	  Reagan	  evinced	  a	  very	  different	  approach	  than	  his	  predecessor	  with	  regard	   to	   Israeli	   politics	   and	   leadership	   selection	   intervention	   (LSI).	   	   The	   peace	  process	  did	  not	  rank	  high	  on	  his	  list	  of	  priorities,	  and	  for	  the	  most	  part	  neither	  did	  Israel.	   	  He	  was	  much	  more	   interested	   in	  domestic	  politics,	   economic	   reforms,	   and	  building	   up	   the	   military.1	   	   To	   the	   extent	   that	   Israel	   did	   factor	   into	   his	   initial	  considerations,	  it	  did	  so	  as	  a	  potential	  military	  asset	  against	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  not	  as	  a	  player	  in	  Middle	  East	  peace.2	  Reagan	   also	   differed	   from	   President	   Carter	   in	   terms	   of	   his	   managerial	  approach,	  especially	  on	  the	  Arab-­‐Israeli	  dispute.	   	  For	  instance,	  one	  historian	  of	  the	  conflict	  writes	  that	  “whereas	  Carter	  had	  immersed	  himself	  in	  details,	  perhaps	  overly	  so,	   Reagan	   ignored	   both	   details	   and	   the	   need	   to	   coordinate	   policy.	   	   As	   a	   result,	  officials	   fought	   among	   themselves	   while	   forced	   to	   respond	   to	   events,	   often	  instigated	   by	   the	   logic	   of	   Israel’s	   policies	   that	   helped	   intensify	   hostilities	   in	   the	  region”.3	   	   If	   Carter	   was	   his	   team’s	   overactive	   quarterback,	   Reagan	   displayed	   “his	  own	  management	  style	  [that]	  was	  more	  akin	  to	  that	  of	  a	  professional	  football	  team’s	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Senior Reagan advisor for Mideast Affairs Geoffrey Kemp, “Interview with the Author”, February 16, 
2011; Samuel W. Lewis, “The United States and Israel: Constancy and Change,” in The Middle East: Ten 
Years after Camp David, ed. William B. Quandt (Brookings Institution Press, 1988), 229. 
2 Ronald Reagan, “Recognizing the Israeli asset,” Washington Post, August 15, 1979; Lewis, “The United 
States and Israel: Constancy and Change,” 229. 
3 Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History with Documents (Bedford/St. 
Martin’s, 2009), 354. 
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owner	   than	   its	   quarterback.	   	   He	   employed	   extensive	   delegation	   of	   authority…	   a	  strong	   preference	   for	   staff	   consensus	   coupled	   with	   enduring	   reluctance	   to	  adjudicate	  key	  differences	  or	  enforce	  discipline	  on	  strong-­‐minded	  subordinates”.4	  	   As	   a	   result	   of	   this	   style,	   his	   second	   secretary	   of	   state,	   George	   Shultz,	   also	  became	  a	  key	  player	   for	  American	  decision-­‐making	   toward	   Israeli	  politics.	   	  As	   the	  United	  States	  disengaged	   from	  Lebanon,	  Reagan	   turned	  away	   from	  the	  region	  and	  
de	   facto	   deputized	   Shultz	   to	   handle	   the	   region	   in	   his	   place.	   	   Whereas	   the	  administration	   proposed	   two	   peace	   plans	   for	   addressing	   the	   conflict	   –	   one	   in	   the	  first	  term	  and	  one	  in	  the	  second	  –	  fittingly	  only	  the	  first	  bore	  Reagan’s	  name.	   	  The	  second	  plan	  came	  to	  be	  known	  as	  the	  Shultz	  Initiative.	  During	  term	  two,	  Shultz	  played	  an	  enormous	  role	  in	  ensuring	  that	  America’s	  approach	   to	   Israeli	   politics	   shied	   away	   from	   conscious	   intervention.	   	   This	   period	  coincided	  with	  a	  National	  Unity	  Government	  (NUG)	  in	  Israel	  in	  which	  right-­‐	  and	  left-­‐wing	   forces	   were	   closely	   matched	   and	   frequently	   at	   odds.	   	   This	   condition	   might	  otherwise	  have	  elicited	  repeated	  efforts	  by	  Washington	  to	  tip	  the	  scales	  toward	  the	  left,	  and	  Labor	  often	  entreated	  the	  administration	  to	  do	  just	  that.	  	  However,	  	  Shultz	  preferred	   a	   low-­‐key	   approach	   to	   bilateral	   disagreements	   that	   untentionally	  strengthened	   the	   Likud	   by	   default.	   	   Some	   lower-­‐ranking	   American	   officials	   found	  this	  approach	  quite	  frustrating,	  causing	  bureaucratic	  freelancing	  to	  increase	  during	  Reagan’s	  second	  term,	  but	  because	  of	  Shultz	  their	  efforts	  came	  to	  naught.	  ~	  Like	   Carter,	   Reagan’s	   two	   terms	   are	  marked	   by	   a	   variety	   of	   episodes	  with	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Lewis, “The United States and Israel: Constancy and Change,” 228. 
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regard	  to	  LSI.	  	  These	  episodes	  range	  from	  non-­‐cases	  to	  partial	  cases	  to	  full	  cases	  of	  leadership	   selection	   intervention.	   	   They	   include	  both	  petit	   LSI	   efforts	   to	   influence	  the	   balance	   of	   forces	   within	   the	   Israeli	   cabinet	   as	   well	   as	   grand	   LSI	   efforts	   to	  determine	   the	   content	   of	   the	   ruling	   coalition.	   	   They	   include	   negative	   strategies	  aimed	  at	  undermining	   the	   sitting	   Israeli	   government	  as	  well	   as	  positive	   strategies	  aimed	  at	  bolstering	  its	  members.	  	  Some	  efforts	  succeeded	  but	  others	  failed	  outright.	  However,	   an	  overriding	   commonality	   across	   these	  diverse	   cases	   is	   that	   the	  worldview,	  managerial	   style,	   and	   subjective	  perceptions	  of	  Reagan	   (and	  key	  aides	  such	   as	   Shultz)	   played	   a	   decisive	   role	   in	   driving	   the	   case-­‐by-­‐case	   variation	   this	  study’s	  two	  dependent	  variables	  of	  occurrence	  and	  efficacy.	  In	   the	   sections	   that	   follow,	   I	   review	   three	   prominent	   cases	   from	   Reagan’s	  eight-­‐year	   tenure	   as	   president.	   	   Some	   of	   these	   cases	   are	   compound	   episodes,	  however,	   in	   which	   I	   discuss	   a	   handful	   of	   subsequent	   policy	   postures	   together	  because	   they	   are	   analytically	   interlinked.	   	   First,	   I	   discuss	   the	   administration’s	  reluctance	   to	   undertake	   negative	   LSI	   during	   the	   Israeli	   elections	   of	   1981,	   despite	  Egyptian	   President	   Anwar	   Sadat’s	   greater	  willingness	   to	   interject	   himself	   into	   his	  neighbor’s	   political	   contest.	   	   Second,	   I	   discuss	   the	   administration’s	   jarring	   swing	  during	  1982-­‐1984	  from	  non-­‐LSI	  tinged	  with	  hostility	  to	  negative	  LSI	  to	  positive	  LSI	  and	  then	  back	  again	  to	  non-­‐LSI,	  but	  of	  a	  much	  warmer	  tenor	  than	  before.	   	  Third,	   I	  discuss	   the	   administration’s	   approach	   to	   Israel’s	  National	  Unity	  Government	   from	  1984	   to	   1988,	   during	  which	   Shultz	   came	   to	   the	   fore	   in	  making	   policy	   toward	   the	  region	   and	   staunching	  most	   attempts	   to	   intervene.	   	   Although	  he	   ensured	   that	   the	  U.S.	  did	  not	   intervene	   in	   the	   Israeli	  elections	  of	  1988,	   for	   instance,	   I	  outline	  how	  a	  
	   168	  
broad	  range	  of	  outside	  actors	  –	  from	  Jordan,	  Egypt,	  and	  the	  PLO	  to	  Britain,	  France,	  and	  even	  perhaps	  the	  USSR	  –	  chose	  instead	  to	  try	  LSI	  that	  year	  on	  behalf	  of	  Labor.	  	  
Reagan,	  Case	  #1:	  Osirak	  &	  Israeli	  Elections,	  1981	  	  	   The	   elections	   of	   1981	   were	   perhaps	   the	   dirtiest	   in	   Israel’s	   history.	  	  Menachem	  Begin	  was	  running	  for	  the	  Likud	  against	  Shimon	  Peres	  from	  Labor,	  and	  the	  two	  engaged	  in	  extensive	  ad	  hominem	  attacks.	  	  The	  Sephardic-­‐Ashkenazi	  divide	  became	  strongly	  politicized,	  and	  tensions	  both	  racial	  and	  socioeconomic	  ran	  high	  at	  campaign	  rallies.	   	   In	  one	  especially	  memorable	  example,	   thugs	  brandishing	  knives	  and	  shouting	  pro-­‐Begin	  slogans	  rolled	  barrels	  of	  burning	  garbage	   into	  crowds	  at	  a	  Labor	  rally.	  	  Peres	  fired	  back	  by	  attacking	  the	  Likud’s	  fervor	  as	  “Khomeinism”.5	  The	  ballot	  on	  June	  30th	  also	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  one	  of	  Israel’s	  closest.	  	  Although	  Likud	  pulled	   ahead	   in	   the	   end,	   Labor	   appeared	   to	   be	   ahead	   just	   forty-­‐eight	   hours	  beforehand.6	   	   This	   was	   after	   a	   jarring	   back-­‐and-­‐forth	   in	   which	   Likud	   closed	   a	  months-­‐long	  deficit	   and	  even	  pulled	  ahead	   in	   June	  only	   to	   temporarily	   fall	  behind	  again	  near	   the	  end	  of	   the	  race.	   	  Under	  other	  U.S.	   leaders,	   the	  1981	   Israeli	  election	  might	  have	  been	  seen	  as	  a	  ripe	  opportunity	  for	  outside	  meddling.	  The	   election	   also	   coincided	   with	   a	   series	   of	   foreign	   policy	   crises	   that	  provided	  ample	  motivation	  and	  points	  of	   leverage	   for	  outside	   interference.	   	   Israel	  was	  engaged	  in	  a	  prolonged	  standoff	  with	  Egypt	  over	  the	  frozen	  autonomy	  talks,	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 William Claiborne, “Opposition Party Takes the Offensive in Israel,” Washington Post, June 16, 1981. 
6 Samuel W. Lewis, “Interview with Ambassador Samuel Wingate Lewis”, August 9, 1998, 99, The 
Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training (ADST), 
Library of Congress. 
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tense	   confrontation	  with	  Syria	  over	  Soviet	  missiles	   in	  Lebanon,	  and	  a	   controversy	  over	  its	  surprise	  destruction	  of	  Iraq’s	  nuclear	  reactor	  with	  air	  strikes	  on	  June	  7th.	  	  All	  of	   these	   actions	   provided	   points	   of	   leverage	   for	   outside	   actors,	   especially	   the	  U.S.	  and	  Egypt,	  both	  of	  whom	  the	  crises	  threatened.	  Based	   on	   target	   state	   factors,	   therefore,	   the	   1981	   case	  might	   have	   seemed	  primed	   for	   negative	   LSI	   to	   undermine	  Begin’s	   campaign	   for	   reelection.	   	   However,	  both	  Egypt	  and	  the	  United	  States	  pursued	  policies	  that	  actually	  bolstered	  the	  Likud.	  	  The	   U.S.	   did	   so	   unintentionally;	   Egypt	   did	   so	   on	   purpose.	   	   In	   both	   instances	   the	  policy	  can	  be	  traced	  back	  to	  the	  preferences	  of	  the	  sender	  state’s	  chief	  executive.	  	  It	  is	  quite	  plausible	  –	  and	  perhaps	  even	  probable	  –	  that	  if	  other	  individuals	  had	  been	  in	  Reagan	  and	  Sadat’s	  positions	  that	  negative	  LSI	  would	  have	  been	  pursued	  instead.	  	  
Coding	  the	  Dependent	  Variables	  (Occurrence	  and	  Efficacy)	  Did	  LSI	  Occur?	  	   By	  America,	  no.	  	  By	  Egypt,	  yes.	  Egyptian	  President	  Sadat	  undertook	  positive	  LSI	   to	   bolster	   Begin	   in	   the	   weeks	   before	   the	   vote	   in	   a	   bizarre	   marriage	   of	  convenience	  to	  a	  man	  he	  had	  just	  recently	  professed	  to	  hate.	  	  The	  United	  States,	  on	  the	   other	   hand,	   seems	   to	   have	  pursued	   a	   policy	   of	   non-­‐involvement,	   although	   the	  policy	  was	  pursued	  in	  such	  a	  manner	  that	  it	  unintentionally	  strengthened	  the	  Likud.	  	  A	  number	  of	  actions	  by	  the	  president	  and	  other	  officials	  provide	  strong	  support	  for	  the	  notion	  that	  Washington	  was	  not	  trying	  to	  influence	  the	  Israeli	  elections.	  	  	  
<The	  American	  Approach>	  	   Throughout	  the	   first	   two	  years	  of	  Reagan’s	  presidency,	  his	  government	  had	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an	  exceptionally	  bad	  relationship	  with	  Israel	  under	  the	  Likud,	  and	  it	  was	  even	  clear	  to	  many	  that	  the	  relationship	  was	  likely	  to	  be	  a	  rocky	  one	  from	  the	  start.	  	  However,	  his	   administration	   pursued	   four	   policies	   that	   suggest	   it	   did	   not	   seek	   to	   influence	  internal	  Israeli	  politics,	  especially	  not	  to	  help	  Labor.	  First,	  the	  administration	  declared	  that	  no	  Israeli	  official	  visitors,	  neither	  from	  the	   government	   nor	   the	   opposition,	   would	   be	   welcome	   in	   Washington	   until	   the	  Israeli	   vote	   was	   completed.7	   	   Second,	   despite	   promises	   to	   the	   contrary,	   the	  administration	   did	   not	   promote	   the	   negotiations	   over	   Palestinian	   autonomy	  with	  any	  sort	  of	  enthusiasm	  or	  urgency.	  	  Third,	  the	  administration	  responded	  to	  Syrian-­‐Israeli	   tensions	  with	   relative	   equanimity	   despite	   Begin’s	   role	   in	   provoking	   Syria’s	  escalatory	  action.8	   	  Fourth,	   the	  U.S.	   responded	   to	   Israel’s	  attack	  on	  Osirak	  with	  an	  odd	  mix	  of	  stern	  criticism	  and	  subdued	  empathy.	  	   The	  Osirak	   issue	  was	   perhaps	   the	  most	   prominent,	   and	   the	   administration	  was	  quite	  tough	  on	  Israel	  in	  many	  ways.	  	  Initial	  reactions	  from	  the	  State	  Department	  called	   the	   Israeli	   air	   strike	   “aggressive”	   and	   “unprovoked”.9	   	   The	   White	   House	  notified	  Congress	  that	  Israel’s	  use	  of	  American	  planes	  to	  bomb	  an	  Iraqi	  target	  may	  have	  violated	  the	  Arms	  Control	  Export	  Act	  (AECA).	  	  The	  message	  stated	  that	  further	  investigation	  would	  be	  required	  before	  the	  U.S.	  could	  proceed	  with	  scheduled	  plans	  to	  transfer	  more	  F-­‐16	  fighters	  to	  the	  IDF.	  	  Washington	  also	  voted	  for	  a	  resolution	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Steven L. Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America’s Middle East Policy, from Truman 
to Reagan (University of Chicago Press, 1986), 410; Lewis, “The United States and Israel: Constancy and 
Change,” 233. 
8 Syria’s decision to move the missiles into the Beqaa Valley was in response to Israel shooting down 
Syrian helicopters in the valley during late April. Itamar Rabinovich, The War for Lebanon, 1970-1985 
(Cornell University Press, 1985), 118. 
9 Rodger William Claire, Raid on the Sun: Inside Israel’s Secret Campaign that Denied Saddam the Bomb 
(Random House, 2004), 220. 
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the	  UN	  Security	  Council	  condemning	  the	  air	  strike.	   	  Begin	  even	  expressed	  concern	  that	   Secretary	   of	   Defense	   Caspar	  Weinberger	   could	   be	   pushing	   for	   a	   total	   halt	   to	  military	  and	  economic	  aid	  to	  Israel,	  which	  was	  how	  Turkey	  was	  penalized	  in	  1974	  when	  its	   invasion	  of	  Cyprus	  was	  classified	  as	  a	  violation	  of	  the	  AECA.10	   	  Given	  this	  sort	  of	  criticism,	  it	  is	  unlikely	  that	  the	  U.S.	  sought	  to	  reelect	  Menachem	  Begin.	  	   President	   Reagan	   was	   initially	   incensed	   over	   the	   raid,	   believing	   that	   the	  Israelis	  had	  carried	  it	  out	  without	  first	  consulting	  with	  the	  United	  States.	  	  However,	  his	   temper	   cooled	   considerably	  when	  he	  was	   later	   informed	   that	   this	  was	  not	   the	  case	  –	  numerous	  memos	  detailing	   Israeli	   concern	  about	   the	  reactor	  had	  somehow	  gotten	   lost	   in	   the	   transition	   from	   Carter	   to	   Reagan.	   	   Leaving	   aside	   this	   brief	  misunderstanding,	   his	   reaction	   toward	   the	   strike	   was	   allegedly	   “boys	   will	   be	  boys”.11	   	   When	   asked	   at	   a	   press	   conference	   about	   the	   strike,	   Reagan	   began	   to	  backpedal	  on	  his	  criticism	  of	   the	  attack.	   	  He	  admitted	   that	   “it	   is	  difficult	   for	  me	   to	  envision	   Israel	  as	  being	  a	   threat	   to	   its	  neighbors”	  and	  pointed	  out	   that	   Israel	   “had	  reason	   for	   concern	   in	   view	   of	   the	   past	   history	   of	   Iraq,	   which	   has	   never	   signed	   a	  ceasefire	  or	  recognized	  Israel	  as	  a	  nation”.12	  His	  administration	  also	  refused	  to	  follow	  up	  by	  telling	  Congress	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  attack	  actually	  violated	  the	  AECA.13	  	  Despite	  voting	  for	  the	  Security	  Council	  resolution	  on	  June	  19th	  condemning	  the	  attack,	  the	  White	  House	  made	  clear	  it	  would	  oppose	   the	  measure	   if	   it	   called	   for	   sanctions.	   	  A	   senior	  administration	  official	   told	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Steven R. Weisman, “Reagan voices regret to Arabs, but assures Israel on ties,” New York Times, June 
12, 1981. 
11 Richard V. Allen, “Reagan’s Secure Line,” The New York Times, June 6, 2010, sec. Opinion, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/07/opinion/07allen.html. 
12 Cited in Abraham Ben-Zvi, The United States and Israel: The Limits of the Special Relationship 
(Columbia University Press, 1993), 133. 
13 Shipments of F-16s were approved somewhat later as well. 
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the	   press	   that	   Reagan	   reassured	   the	   ambassador	   from	   Israel	   that	   “there	   is	   no	  fundamental	   re-­‐evaluation	   of	   the	   United	   States’	   relationship	  with	   Israel,	   nor	   does	  the	   United	   States	   Government	   anticipate	   any	   change,”14	   and	   the	   archives	  corroborate	   these	   claims.15	   	   Given	   this	   reassurance	   that	   the	   core	   relationship	  remained	  unharmed,	  it	  is	  unlikely	  Reagan	  was	  trying	  to	  unseat	  Begin.	  This	  also	  fits	  with	  the	  recent	  recollections	  of	  actors	  regarding	  this	  period.	  	  A	  retired	   State	   Department	   official	   who	   oversaw	   Near	   Eastern	   Affairs	   issues	   at	   the	  time	  ventured	  that	  “to	  the	  best	  of	  my	  knowledge…	  we	  did	  not	  try	  to	  get	  involved	  in	  that	   election”.16	   	   Similarly,	   a	   former	   NSC	   staffer	   commented	   that	   “every	   time	   the	  president	  met	  with	  Habib	   I	  was	   there…	   I	   don’t	   recall	   any	  discussion	   in	  which	   the	  Israeli	   domestic	   scene	   was	   a	   principal	   driver	   of	   American	   decision-­‐making	   –	   in	  Osirak,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  missiles…	  I	  don’t	  recall	  anything	  like	  that”.17	  
<The	  Egyptian	  Approach>	  	   Historian	  Avi	  Shlaim	  writes	   that	  Sadat	   “knowingly	  helped	  Begin	  against	  his	  Labor	   opponents”	   leading	   up	   to	   the	   elections.18	   	   Although	   he	   produces	   little	  evidence	  to	  support	  his	  claim,	  Shlaim’s	  claim	  is	  plausible	  enough	  because	  Sadat	  held	  an	   effusive	   meeting	   with	   Begin	   in	   Sharm	   el-­‐Sheikh	   on	   June	   4th	   even	   though	   the	  autonomy	  talks	  had	  been	  stuck	  in	  a	  frustrating	  deadlock	  for	  over	  two	  years.	  	  I	  have	  found	   additional	   evidence	   that	   buttresses	   the	   notion	   Sadat	   did	   so	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   he	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Weisman, “Reagan voices regret to Arabs, but assures Israel on ties.” 
15 “Acting Secretary Stoessel’s Memo to the President on ‘Political Strategy for Responding to Israeli 
Attack’," - Memorandum to Richard V. Allen from Douglas J. Feith”, June 15, 1981, Folder “Subject Iraq-
Israel 1981 (2 of 6)”, Box 37, Executive NSC Secretariat, Israel Country File, Ronald Reagan Presidential 
Library. 
16 Retired, Senior State Department Official, “Interview with the Author”, March 8, 2011. 
17 Reagan administration NSC staffer for Mideast affairs Raymond Tanter, “Interview with the Author”, 
February 15, 2011. 
18 Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World (WW Norton & Company, 2001), 384. 
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wanted	  Begin	  to	  win	  the	  election.	  	   First	   of	   all,	   the	   transcript	   from	   their	   press	   conference	   is	   indeed	   quite	  remarkable.	   	   Despite	   prolonged	   stagnation	   in	   both	   the	   talks	   and	   their	   personal	  relationship,	  Sadat	  hinted	  when	  speaking	  to	  the	  press	  after	  a	  brief	  private	  meeting	  with	  the	  prime	  minister	  that	  “I’m	  hopeful	  that	  before	  the	  end	  of	  the	  year,	  by	  God’s	  will,	  we	  shall	  be	  reaching	  full	  autonomy	  and	  giving	  much	  more,	  I	  mean,	  push	  to	  the	  peace	  process”.19	  	  Begin	  trumpeted	  that	  major,	  secret	  agreements	  had	  been	  reached	  –	   none	   of	   which	   later	   materialized	   –	   and	   politicized	   the	   content	   of	   the	   meeting	  without	   receiving	   any	   pushback	   from	   Sadat.	   	   The	   Egyptian	   president	   also	   blamed	  tensions	  between	  Israel	  and	  Syria	  entirely	  on	  Damascus,	  absolving	  Begin	  of	  any	  role	  in	  escalating	  the	  crisis.	  	  When	  asked	  by	  a	  reporter	  whether	  the	  summit	  could	  affect	  Israeli	  elections,	  Sadat	  let	  Begin	  brashly	  take	  the	  lead	  in	  proclaiming	  that	  “it	  didn’t	  even	  occur	  to	  us…	  we	  have	  so	  serious	  problems	  and	  you	  mix	  in	  the	  elections!”20	  	   Sadat’s	   approach	   to	   the	   issue	   stood	   in	   striking	   contrast	   to	   the	   approach	  favored	  by	  his	  underlings.	   	  UN	  Secretary	  General	  Boutros	  Boutros-­‐Ghali,	  who	  was	  serving	   as	   Egypt’s	   deputy	   foreign	  minister	   at	   the	   time,	  writes	   that	  most	   Egyptian	  officials	  believed	  only	  Labor	  could	  deliver	  a	  genuine	  agreement	  involving	  the	  West	  Bank	  and	  sought	  to	  help	  the	  Israeli	   left	  in	  the	  1981	  vote.	   	  The	  previous	  November,	  Boutros-­‐Ghali	  and	  a	  handful	  of	  other	  officials	   from	  the	  ruling	  National	  Democratic	  Party	  organized	  an	   informal	  party-­‐to-­‐party	  summit	  with	   Israeli	  Labor	   that	  he	  says	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Press Conference with Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat - 
Sharm El-Sheikh - 4 June 1981” (Historical Documents 1981-1982, 1981). 
20 Ibid. 
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was	   intended	   “to	   contribute	   to	   the	   victory	   of	   Labor	   in	   the	   coming	   elections”.21	  	  However,	   he	   says	   that	   Sadat	   met	   with	   the	   delegation	   but	   was	   disinterested	   and	  removed	  from	  the	  effort	  and	  had	  first	  vetoed	  a	  more	  official	  overture	  when	  it	  was	  suggested	  to	  him.	  	   Yossi	   Beilin	   reports	   that	   Boutros-­‐Ghali	   once	   described	   to	   him	   Sadat’s	  preferences	  even	  more	  starkly.	  	  He	  claims	  Boutros-­‐Ghali	  said	  that,	  at	  end	  of	  the	  day,	  “Sadat	  was	  a	  Likudnik”	  for	  believing	  Begin	  was	  the	  only	  Israeli	  leader	  strong	  enough	  to	  deliver	  the	  West	  Bank.	  	  He	  reports	  Boutros-­‐Ghali	  told	  him	  “when	  Begin	  asked	  for	  a	  meeting	  in	  Sharm	  el-­‐Sheikh	  just	  before	  the	  elections,	  [Sadat]	  knew	  exactly	  why	  he	  wanted	  this	  and	  he	  played	  along,	  even	  though	  almost	  all	  his	  advisers	  told	  him	  not	  to	  get	  involved	  in	  an	  Israeli	  election	  campaign”.22	  If	  these	  claims	  are	  to	  be	  believed,	  it	  seems	  quite	  clear	  that	  Sadat	  was	  trying	  to	  interfere	  in	  Israeli	  domestic	  politics	  in	  support	  of	  the	  right-­‐wing.	  	  This	  perspective	  is	  also	   supported	   by	   Ephraim	   Dowek,	   who	   was	   a	   political	   minister	   in	   the	   Israeli	  embassy	  in	  Cairo	  at	  the	  time.	  	  Dowek	  says	  that	  Sadat	  “decided,	  against	  the	  advice	  of	  his	  closest	  collaborators”	  to	  take	  the	  Sharm	  meeting,	  fully	  cognizant	  that	  it	  “might	  be	  construed	  as	  an	  indirect	  service	  to	  the	  election	  campaign	  of	  the	  Likud”.23	  	  Did	  the	  Policy	  Succeed?	  	   No.	   	   Neither	   the	   American	   nor	   Egyptian	   policies	   furthered	   their	   overall	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Egypt’s Road to Jerusalem: A Diplomat’s Story of the Struggle for Peace in the 
Middle East (Random House, 1997), 319. 
22 Cited in Yossi Beilin, Touching Peace: From the Oslo Accord to a Final Agreement (Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson, 1999), 40. 
23 Ephraim Dowek, Israeli-Egyptian Relations, 1980-2000 (Frank Cass, 2001), 141-142. 
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objectives	   of	   achieving	   national	   interests	   and	   furthering	   the	   peace	   process.	   	   PM	  Begin	   was	   able	   to	   turn	   both	   governments’	   postures	   to	   his	   electoral	   benefit	   yet	  yielded	   little	   on	   the	   peace	   process	   in	   his	   second	   term	   as	   premier.	   	   In	   fact,	   he	  returned	   to	  office	  with	   the	  most	   right-­‐wing	  government	   in	   Israeli	   history	  up	  until	  that	  point	  and	  approved	  Israel’s	  invasion	  of	  Lebanon	  and	  subsequent	  war	  in	  1982.	  
<America’s	  Impact>	  	   The	  general	  hope	  within	  the	  American	  administration	  was	  that	  Labor	  would	  win	   the	   June	   ballot.24	   However,	   it	   pursued	   a	   policy	   that	   instead	   contributed	   to	  Begin’s	   success.	   	   Putting	   the	   autonomy	   talks	   in	   deep	   freeze	  meant	   that	   the	   Likud	  could	  have	  its	  cake	  and	  eat	  it	  too,	  pursuing	  a	  maximalist	  approach	  to	  the	  territories	  without	  meaningful	  recompense.	  	  Begin	  could	  also	  pursue	  an	  approach	  to	  Lebanon	  that	   enabled	   him	   to	   look	   tough	   for	   Israeli	   voters	   and	   simulate	   a	   constructive	  relationship	  with	  Washington	  while	  knowing	  that	  the	  risks	  of	  all-­‐out	  conflagration	  were	  dampened	  by	  American	  mediation.	  A	  remarkably	  thorough	  CIA	  analysis	  in	  advance	  of	  the	  1981	  Israeli	  elections	  notes	  that	  	   “Begin	  also	  has	   succeeded	   in	   rallying	  voter	   support	  by	  his	   skillful	  management	  of	  the	  impasse	  with	  Syria	  over	  its	  air	  defense	  missiles	  in	   Lebanon…	   by	   cooperating	   with	   U.S.	   Ambassador	   Habib’s	  mediation	  mission,	  Begin	  has	  sought	  to	  reinforce	  his	  claim	  that	  he	  has	   established	   a	   close	   working	   relationship	   with	   the	   new	   US	  administration	  –	  a	  major	  aim	  of	   any	   Israel	   government	  and	  a	  key	  element	  of	  Begin’s	  reelection	  strategy.	  Begin	  has	  tried	  to	  capitalize	  on	   his	   close	   cooperation	   with	   the	   United	   States	   to	   calm	   public	  uneasiness	   over	   his	   tough	   statements	   and	   to	   parry	   Labor	   claims	  that	   he	   is	   prone	   to	   precipitate	   military	   action.	   Begin	   also	   has	  reinforced	  his	  image	  as	  a	  strong,	  effective	  leader	  with	  the	  hawkish	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Senior Reagan advisor for Mideast Affairs Geoffrey Kemp, “Interview with the Author.” One exception 
to this rule may have been Kemp’s aide at the time Douglas Feith. 
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community	  of	  Sephardic	  Jews,	  a	  key	  Likud	  constituency”.25	  	  	   Even	  more	  stark	  are	  the	  report’s	  findings	  on	  the	  Osirak	  strike.	  	  Although	  the	  Israeli	   public	   overwhelmingly	   supported	   the	   IAF’s	   raid	   on	   the	   Iraqi	   reactor,26	   the	  magnitude	  of	  this	  reaction	  may	  have	  been	  contingent	  on	  the	  U.S.	  response.	  	  The	  CIA	  analysis	   first	  notes	  that	  “as	  much	  as	  25	  percent	  of	  the	  electorate	  –	   including	  many	  traditionally	  pro-­‐Labor	  Ashkenazi	  Jews	  –	  is	  undecided.	  	  Labor	  could	  recover	  much	  of	  its	  lost	  momentum	  if	  it	  succeeds	  in	  gaining	  significant	  support	  from	  this	  group	  in	  the	  final	  days	  of	  the	  election	  campaign”.27	  	  It	  then	  explains	  that	  Begin:	  	   “probably	  would	  become	  vulnerable	  on	   this	   issue,	  however,	   if	   the	  public	  comes	  to	  perceive	  him	  as	  responsible	  for	  provoking	  a	  major	  crisis	   in	   relations	   with	   the	   United	   States.	   	   Currently	   undecided	  Ashkenazi	  Jews	  –	  traditionally	  a	  pro-­‐Labor	  group	  –	  might	  then	  rally	  to	   Labor,	   thereby	   increasing	   the	   prospect	   of	   a	   last-­‐minute	   Labor	  comeback.	  	  But	  so	  far	  Begin	  and	  most	  Israelis	  appear	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  US	  vote	  for	  the	  Iraq-­‐sponsored	  UN	  Security	  Council	  resolution	  condemning	   the	   raid	   is	   intended	   mainly	   to	   pacify	   the	   Arabs	   and	  that	  it	  will	  not	  cause	  major	  long-­‐term	  damage	  to	  bilateral	  ties”.28	  	  This	   assessment	   fits	   with	   Begin’s	   behavior	   during	   the	   campaign.	   	   After	   it	   was	  	  publicly	   announced	   that	   Reagan	   had	   ruled	   out	   meaningful	   consequences	   for	   the	  bilateral	   relationship,	  Begin	  proclaimed	   the	  Reagan	  quote	   to	   a	  public	   rally,	   calling	  them	   “very	   important	  words”.29	   	  The	  next	  day	  Begin	  warmly	  described	  Reagan	  as	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 “The Israeli National Election: Prospects and Implications (An Intelligence Memorandum)” (CIA 
National Foreign Assessment Center, June 22, 1981), summary and 2, CREST Collection (The CIA 
Records Search Tool), The National Archives and Records Administration “Site II” facility in College 
Park, Maryland. 
26 “Opinion polls show Begin has surged since raid on Iraqi nuclear reactor,” Washington Post, June 22, 
1981. 
27 “The Israeli National Election: Prospects and Implications (An Intelligence Memorandum),” summary. 
28 Ibid., 1. 
29 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (ME/6752/A/7), trans., “Begin’s 16th June election rally: US 
reactions to Osirak Raid (Excerpt from Begin’s Speech with Introduction),” Israel Home Service, June 17, 
1981. 
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“our	  glorious	  friend,	  the	  U.S.	  president”.30	  The	  administration	  even	  had	  a	  clear	  avenue	  for	  involvement	  once	  the	  Peres	  campaign	  decided	  to	  place	  a	  gamble	  in	  the	  last	  two	  weeks	  on	  taking	  a	  much	  firmer	  stance	   in	   criticism	   of	   Begin’s	   security	   policies.	   	   Instead	   of	   objecting	   only	   to	   the	  timing	  of	  the	  attack,	  the	  Peres	  team	  began	  questioning	  the	  Israeli	  government’s	  logic	  for	  calling	  the	  plant	  an	  imminent	  danger	  and	  suggesting	  that	  the	  international	  costs	  brought	   on	   by	   the	   attack	   would	   bring	   about	   Israeli	   isolation,	   especially	   from	  Washington.	  	  Peres	  also	  came	  out	  swinging	  on	  Lebanon,	  accusing	  the	  government	  of	  instigating	  the	  crisis	  by	  first	  shooting	  down	  Syrian	  helicopters.31	  These	  were	  issues	  on	  which	  the	  Washington	  could	  have	  done	  much	  more	  to	  bolster	  Labor’s	  narrative	  had	  it	  chosen	  to	  do	  so.	  	  Possible	  tactics	  could	  have	  included	  hinting	   even	   just	   briefly	   that	   changes	   in	   relationship	   could	   be	   drastic,	   permitting	  sanctions	  to	  be	  included	  in	  the	  Security	  Council	  Resolution,	  drawing	  attention	  to	  the	  GoI’s	   (government	   of	   Israel’s)	   role	   in	   escalations	   over	   Lebanon,	   consulting	   visibly	  with	   the	   Israeli	   opposition,	   and/or	  publicly	   sharing	  more	   intelligence	   to	  point	  out	  the	  extensive	  intelligence	  flaws	  in	  Begin’s	  argument	  for	  why	  the	  reactor	  represented	  an	   imminent	   threat.32	   	   Instead,	   PM	  Begin	   took	   numerous	   provocative	   actions	   and	  turned	  the	  American	  administration’s	  tame	  response	  to	  his	  electoral	  benefit.	  
<Egypt’s	  Impact>	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (ME/6754/A/1), trans., “Begin’s remarks after meeting Philip 
Habib,” Israel Home Service, June 18, 1981. 
31 Claiborne, “Opposition Party Takes the Offensive in Israel.” 
32 Many of Begin’s initial claims to justify the attack were shown to be incorrect, including some at the 
time. See Anthony Lewis, “Abroad at Home: Lacking the Evidence,” New York Times, June 21, 1981; Shai 
Feldman, “The Bombing of Osiraq-Revisited,” International Security 7, no. 2 (1982): 114–142; Joshua 
Kirschenbaum, “Operation Opera: An Ambiguous Success,” Journal of Strategic Security 3, no. 4 (2010): 
49-62. 
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   In	   the	  narrow	  sense,	  Sadat’s	  gestures	  seem	  to	  have	  succeeded	  at	  bolstering	  Begin	  in	  the	  election.	  	  In	  the	  broader	  sense,	  however,	  his	  approach	  failed	  to	  advance	  Egyptian	  interests	  in	  the	  manner	  intended.	  	   The	  immediate	  political	  impact	  of	  their	  June	  4th	  meeting	  at	  Sharm	  were	  quite	  clear	   at	   the	   time.	   	  A	  Likud	   film	   crew	  captured	   the	   event	   and	   turned	   it	   into	   a	   five-­‐minute	   campaign	   commercial	   for	   prime-­‐time	   Israeli	   television.	   	   Time	   Magazine	  reporters	  quoted	  “a	  Begin	  aide	  [saying]	  with	  glee,	  ‘it’s	  clear	  Sadat	  is	  voting	  for	  us’.”33	  Boutros-­‐Ghali	  writes	  that	  Sadat	  taunted	  him	  over	  the	  results,	  crowing	  “your	  Israeli	  [Labor]	  friends	  couldn’t	  get	  elected,	  could	  they?”	   	  He	  also	  claims	  that	  “I	  responded	  timidly	  that	  the	  president’s	  position	  had	  contributed	  to	  their	  defeat”.34	  	   This	   rather	   odd	   arrangement	   –	   an	   Arab	   leader	   tacitly	   endorsing	   an	   Israeli	  right-­‐wing	   politician	   –	   turned	   out	   to	   be	   fleeting.	   	   It	   is	   true	   that	   Sadat	   was	  “determined	  not	  to	  give	  Israel	  a	  pretext	  for	  refusing	  to	  withdraw	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  Sinai	  in	  April	  1982,”35	  but	  it	  would	  be	  erroneous	  to	  conclude	  that	  his	  decision	  was	  driven	   by	   this	   factor	   alone.	   	   Instead,	   it	   appears	   he	   harbored	   wider	   hopes	   that	  backing	  Begin	  would	  also	  yield	  benefits	  on	  the	  Palestinian	  track	  –	  a	  belief	  that	  soon	  proved	  to	  be	  mistaken.	  	  Also,	  Begin	  soon	  took	  reckless	  actions	  that	  put	  the	  Egyptian	  government	   in	   a	   difficult	   position	   for	   having	   cozied	   up	   to	   him.	   	   The	   bombing	   of	  Osirak	  less	  than	  one	  week	  later	  mortified	  Sadat,36	  and	  Israel’s	   invasion	  of	  Lebanon	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Marguerite Johnson, David Aikman, and Nathaniel Harrison, “Middle East: Pausing at the Summit,” 
Time Magazine, June 15, 1981. 
34 Boutros-Ghali, Egypt’s Road to Jerusalem, 343. 
35 “Egyptian Foreign Policy in the 1980s: An Intelligence Assessment”, March 1981. CIA National Foreign 
Assessment Center, June 22, 1981. CREST Collection (The CIA Records Search Tool). The National 
Archives and Records Administration “Site II” facility in College Park, Maryland.” 
36 E. Allan E. Wendt, “Israeli attack on Iraqi nuclear facility: Message from President Sadat to President 
Reagan” (Cable 13649 from Embassy Cairo for Richard Allen, by Counselor for Economic and 
	   179	  
the	  following	  year	  put	  his	  successor,	  Gamal	  Mubarak,	  in	  a	  very	  difficult	  position	  both	  at	   home	   and	   internationally.	   	   Both	   actions	   heightened	   Egypt’s	   economic	   and	  strategic	  isolation	  from	  the	  broader	  Arab	  world.	  	  Sadat’s	  wager	  on	  Begin	  succeeded	  in	  the	  narrow	  sense	  of	  helping	  strengthen	  the	  Likud	  leader	  but	  failed	  in	  the	  broader	  sense	  of	  advancing	  Egypt’s	  overall	  strategic	  goals.	  	  
Coding	  the	  Observable	  Implications	  
The	   four	   theories	   tested	   by	   this	   dissertation	   pose	   mutually	   exclusive	  predictions	  across	  a	  range	  of	  observable	  implications.	  	  Those	  theories	  are:	  national	  interests	   theory	   (Theory	   #1),	   the	   lobby-­‐legislative	   approach	   (Theory	   #2),	   the	  bureaucratic	   politics	   approach	   (Theory	   #3),	   and	   leadership	   theory	   (Theory	   #4).	  	  National	   interests	   theory	   expects	   that	   state	   behavior	   should	   be	   driven	   by	   the	  objectively	  given,	  rational	  interests	  of	  unitary	  states.	  	  The	  lobby-­‐legislative	  approach	  expects	   foreign	  policy	   to	   be	  driven	  by	   the	  preferences	   of	   lobbyists,	  who	   influence	  state	   behavior	   mainly	   through	   their	   allies	   in	   the	   legislature.	   	   The	   bureaucratic	  politics	  approach	  expects	  foreign	  policy	  behavior	  to	  be	  the	  product	  of	  organizational	  interests	  and	  lower-­‐level	  bargaining,	  with	  policy	  solutions	  bubbling	  up	  from	  lower	  levels	   of	   the	   executive	   branch.	   	   Leadership	   theory	   argues	   that	   policy	   programs	  instead	   come	   from	   the	   top	   down,	   with	   top	   officials	   in	   the	   sender	   state	   molding	  foreign	  policy	  to	  fit	  their	  personal	  beliefs	  and	  styles	  of	  behavior.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Commercial Affairs at U.S. Embassy Cairo, June 8, 1981), Folder “Iraq (Israeli Strike on Iraq Nuclear 
Facility 6/8/81) [5 of 6]”, Box 37, Executive Secretariat NSC Records, Country File, Ronald Reagan 
Presidential Library; David B. Ottaway, “Baghdad raid is major embarrassment to Sadat’s peace policy,” 
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1.	  Perceptions	  of	  Sender	  Interests:	  	   The	  first	  such	  observable	  impliction	  on	  which	  the	  theories	  diverge	  is	  the	  area	  of	  perceptions	  of	  sender	  state	  interests.	  	  Theory	  #1	  (national	  interests	  theory)	  holds	  that,	  barring	  some	  sort	  of	  intelligence	  failure,	  the	  United	  States	  should	  not	  miss	  clear	  opportunities	  to	  carry	  out	  leadership	  selection	  intervention	  because	  its	  government	  should	   act	   consistently	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   objective	   national	   interests.	   	   The	   1981	  election	  presented	   such	   objective	   opportunities.	   	   It	  was	   clearly	   close,	   the	  U.S.	   had	  multiple	  points	  for	  leverage	  over	  the	  outcome,	  and	  the	  Israeli	  government	  had	  just	  acted	  in	  a	  number	  of	  ways	  against	  U.S.	  interests.	  	  Yet	  America	  declined	  to	  exploit	  this	  relative	  opportunity.	  Nor	   does	   Theory	   #2	   (lobby-­‐legislative	   theory)	   fare	   particularly	   well.	   The	  theory	  expects	   intervention	   to	  be	  rare	  because	  members	  of	  Congress	  and	  the	  pro-­‐Israel	  lobby	  tend	  to	  believe	  that	  national	  interests	  are	  not	  served	  by	  intervention	  in	  Israeli	   leadership	   struggles.	   	  However,	   the	   causal	  patterns	  of	  U.S.	   decision-­‐making	  during	   this	   period	   do	   not	   suggest	   that	   this	   preference	   was	   what	   drove	   the	  administration’s	  choice	  not	  to	  try	  and	  skew	  the	  Israeli	  elections.	  True,	  AIPAC	  officials	  did	  stress	  the	  “continuities	   in	  the	  life	  of	  nations...	   [that	  are]	  essential	  to	  contemplate...	  as	  we	  speculate	  upon	  the	  potential	  consequences	  of	  the	  Israeli	  election	  this	  spring”.37	  	  They	  framed	  Begin	  as	  a	  moderate	  and	  minimized	  differences	   between	   him	   an	   any	   possible	   Labor	   alternative	   that	   might	   emerge,	  arguing	  that	  “Israel	  desperately	  wants	  peace...	  just	  as	  Israel	  wants	  peace,	  it	  eschews	  rule	   over	   a	   million	   Arabs...	   [but]	   will	   not	   abide	   any	   Palestinian	   Arab	   state	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 “Editorial: Israel’s Permanent Interests,” Near East Report 25, no. 4 (January 23, 1981). 
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determined	   to	   destroy	   us...	   this	   is	   what	   the	   Begin	   policy	   amounted	   to.	   	   And,	  whatever	   the	   nuances	   of	   difference,	   no	   Labor	   government	  would	   demand	   less”.38	  	  They	  also	  insisted	  that	  	  “regardless	  of	   the	  outcome	  [of	   the	  elections	   in	  Israel]...	   Israel’s	  poicy	  on	  peace	  and	  survival	  will	  remain	  unchanged.	  	  There	  are	  doubltess	  nuances	  of	  difference	  in	  style,	  tone,	   and	   image	  between	   the	   two	  major	   contending	  parties,	   but	  none	   in	   the	  basic	  lineaments	  of	  what	  security	  requires.	  	  This	  reflects	  and	  extraordinarily	  broad,	  deep	  and	   durable	   national	   consensus	   among	   the	   people	   of	   Israel...	   It	   remains	   an	  inscrutable	  mystery	  why	  successive	  governments	  of	   Israel	  –	  whether	   led	  by	  David	  ben	  Gurion,	  Levi	  Eshkol,	  Golda	  Meir,	  Yitzhak	  Rabin	  or	  Menachem	  Begin	  –	  have	  been	  labeled	   intransigent	   by	   some,	   when	   it	   has	   been	   the	   Arab	   regimes	   that	   have	  truculently	  rejected	  Israel’s	  legitimacy”.39	  	   However,	  the	  causal	  processes	  in	  this	  case	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  support	  the	  lobby-­‐legislative	  approach’s	  argument	  for	  why	  the	  outcome	  in	  this	  partiuclar	  sub-­‐case	  was	  consonant	  with	   expectations	   of	   the	   theory.	   	   U.S.	   legislators	  were	   quick	   to	   declare	  that	   they	  did	  not	  want	  to	  undermine	  relations	  with	  Israel	  over	  the	  attack,	  but	   it	   is	  clear	  that	  the	  GoI’s	  justification	  for	  the	  Osirak	  raid	  fell	  on	  many	  skeptical	  ears	  even	  among	  some	   in	  Congress.40	   	  The	  attack	  also	  seems	  to	  have	   lessened	  Congressional	  resistance	   to	   administration	   proposals	   for	   selling	   AWACS	   radar	   systems	   to	   Saudi	  Arabia	   soon	   after.41	   	   Despite	   outrage	   in	   the	   Jewish	   community	   over	   the	  administration’s	   criticism	   of	   Israel,42	   Congress	   did	   not	   aggressively	   press	   this	  position	  on	  the	  executive,	  providing	  some	  evidence	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  theory.	  	   Theory	   #3	   (bureaucratic	   politics)	   predicts	   that	   organizational	   interests	  within	  the	  executive	  branch	  should	  be	  strong	  enough	  to	  hijack	  U.S.	  policy	  and	  force	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Ibid. 
39 “Editorial: The Elections in Israel,” Near East Report, no. 25, no. 27 (July 3, 1981). 
40 Judith Miller, “Senators Skeptical of Israeli Argument,” New York Times, June 17, 1981; “Senators 
Rebuke Israel but don’t wish to alter relations,” The Wall Street Journal, June 19, 1981. 
41 “Stevens Predicts Senate will Approve AWACS for Saudis,” Dow Jones News Service, June 15, 1981. 
42 “Vote by U.S. is Assailed by Jewish Organizations,” Associated Press, June 20, 1981. 
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the	   government	   to	  pursue	  LSI	   at	   very	  high	   rates.	   	   Although	   the	   case	   supports	   the	  notion	  that	  bureaucratic	  preferences	  tend	  in	  this	  direction,	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  case	  (i.e.	  non-­‐LSI)	  does	  not	  fit	  the	  theory’s	  main	  prediction.	  	  The	  CIA	  report	  in	  advance	  of	  Israeli	  elections	  appears	  to	  support	  the	  notion	  that	  bureaucrats	  are	  especially	  open	  to	  LSI.	  	  Although	  it	  never	  actually	  presumes	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  United	  States	  should	  pursue	  such	  a	  policy,	  the	  report	  clearly	  hints	  at	  a	  number	  of	  points	  that	  such	  a	  policy	  could	   be	   both	   feasible	   and	   desirable.	   	   However,	   the	   fact	   that	   LSI	   did	   not	   occur	  contradicts	  the	  theory’s	  expectation	  that	  bureaucratic	  preferences	  drive	  policy.	  Theory	  #4	  (leadership	  theory)	  holds	  that	  LSI	  should	  only	  occur	  if	  top	  leaders	  in	   the	   sender	   state	   personally	   favor	   such	   an	   approach.	   	   In	   this	   regard,	   the	   theory	  receives	   much	   better	   support	   from	   this	   case	   than	   the	   structural	   approaches	   do.	  	  President	  Reagan’s	  personal	  perceptions	   seem	   to	  explain	   the	  U.S.	  posture	   in	  1981	  and	  help	  explain	  why	  the	  United	  States	  did	  not	  carry	  out	  LSI	  against	  Begin.	  	  Reagan	  wrote	  in	  his	  diary	  that	  “I	  can	  understand	  his	  feel	  but	  feel	  he	  took	  the	  wrong	  option.	  	  He	  should	  have	  told	  us	  &	  the	  French,	  we	  could	  have	  done	  something	  to	  remove	  the	  threat.	  	  However,	  we	  are	  not	  turning	  on	  Israel	  –	  that	  would	  be	  an	  invitation	  for	  the	  Arabs	  to	  attack”.43	  	  It	  appears	  that	  Reagan	  had	  decided	  to	  resume	  cooperation	  with	  Israel	  by	  June	  10th,	  noting	  in	  his	  diary	  that	  even	  if	  Congress	  concluded	  that	  the	  AECA	  had	  been	  violated	  he	  would	  grant	  a	  waiver	  to	  allow	  military	  aid	  to	  continue.44	  Reagan	  may	  have	  preferred	  a	  more	  pliable	  Israel	  on	  West	  Bank	  issues,	  but	  he	  had	   long	   thought	   of	   Israel	   mainly	   in	   terms	   of	   being	   a	   bulwark	   against	   Soviet	  depredation,	   and	   LSI	   would	   not	   have	   done	   much	   to	   directly	   further	   these	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Ronald Reagan, The Reagan Diaries, ed. Douglas Brinkley (HarperCollins, 2009), 46-7. 
44 Ibid., 47. 
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objectives.45	   	   Reagan	   writes	   that,	   when	   the	   Israeli	   election	   results	   were	   finally	  coming	   in,	   it	   “look[ed]	   like	   a	   dead	   heat	   between	   Begin	   &	   Peres	   which	   means	  problems	  whichever	  one	  wins”.46	   	  Either	  he	   saw	   little	  difference	  between	   the	   two	  candidates	   for	   U.S.	   interests	   or	   felt	   that	   a	   weak	   Israeli	   government	   would	   be	  problematic	  no	  matter	  who	  was	  at	  its	  helm.	  	  Of	  course,	  given	  the	  reckless	  invasion	  of	  Lebanon	   masterminded	   by	   Sharon	   that	   took	   place	   less	   than	   one	   year	   later,	   this	  judgment	   seems	   to	   have	   been	   off	   the	   mark.	   	   Further,	   it	   is	   quite	   probable	   that	   a	  different	   president	   in	   Reagan’s	   shoes	   –	   such	   as	   Carter	   or	   Bush	   41	   –	   might	   have	  perceived	  U.S.	  interests	  differently	  and	  pursued	  LSI	  to	  hinder	  the	  Begin	  campaign.	  	   The	   Egyptian	   case	   also	   provides	   evidence	   for	   Theory	   #4,	   especially	   at	   the	  expense	  of	  the	  bureaucratic	  politics	  approach.	   	  Egyptian	  policy	  gave	  Begin	  a	  boost,	  and	  Sadat	  determined	  that	  policy	  over	  the	  disgruntled	  objections	  of	  practically	  his	  entire	   government.47	   	   It	   stretches	   the	   imagination	   to	   try	   envisioning	   the	   Egyptian	  scheme	  without	  Sadat.	  	  2.	  Perceptions	  of	  Close	  Contests	  Another	   area	   in	   which	   the	   theories	   diverge	   involves	   whether	   or	   not	  observers	  in	  the	  sender	  state	  actually	  perceived	  that	  a	  close	  contest	  was	  brewing	  in	  the	   target	  polity.	   	  Although	   theories	  2	  and	  3	  do	  not	  pose	  very	  clear	  predictions	   in	  this	   regard,	   theories	   1	   and	   4	   do.	   	   National	   interests	   theory	   holds	   that	   observers	  should	  tend	  to	  be	  well-­‐apprised	  in	  advance	  of	  close	  electoral	  contests	  in	  the	  target	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Reagan, “Recognizing the Israeli asset.” 
46 Reagan, The Reagan Diaries, 27. 
47 Boutros-Ghali, Egypt’s Road to Jerusalem. 
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polity,	  whereas	  leadership	  theory	  expects	  that	  this	  awareness	  should	  be	  conditioned	  by	  the	  attentiveness	  and	  motivation	  of	  top	  officials	  in	  the	  sender	  state.	  The	   absence	   of	   LSI	   in	   this	   case	   should	   be	   taken	   as	   mild	   evidence	   against	  Theory	  #1	  (national	  interests	  theory).	   	  As	  noted	  above,	  the	  Israeli	  election	  of	  1981	  was	  objectively	   a	   close	   contest.	   Labor	  had	   frittered	   away	  a	   commanding	   three-­‐to-­‐one	  lead	  at	  the	  start	  of	  the	  year,	  and	  Likud	  briefly	  pulled	  ahead	  with	  a	  bump	  from	  Begin’s	  handling	  of	   Iraq	  and	  Syria.48	   	  However,	  a	  number	  of	   factors	  brought	  Labor	  back	  into	  striking	  distance.	  	  Arab	  and	  Jewish	  voters	  typically	  inclined	  to	  vote	  for	  far-­‐left	  parties	  rallied	  to	  Labor	  out	  of	  opposition	  to	  the	  prime	  minister.49	  	  Shimon	  Peres	  publicly	   reconciled	   with	   Yitzhak	   Rabin	   and	   was	   perceived	   as	   winning	   “a	   clear	  debating	   victory…	   over	   Prime	   Minister	   Begin”	   on	   Israeli	   television	   in	   the	   final	  week.50	   	   Final	   polls	   gave	   the	   Labor	   Party	   a	   razor-­‐thin	   lead	   on	   the	   eve	   of	   the	  election.51	   	  What	  may	  have	  ultimately	  tipped	  the	  vote	   in	  Likud’s	   favor	  was	  a	  racist	  joke	  told	  by	  a	  comedian	  at	  the	  Labor	  election	  rally.52	   	  With	  a	  result	  so	  finely	  in	  the	  balance,	   there	   should	   be	   little	   question	   that	   the	   election	   was	   objectively	   up	   for	  grabs.	   The	  CIA	  report	  on	   the	   Israeli	  elections	  supports	   the	  notion	   that	   the	  contest	  was	  seen	  by	  at	  least	  some	  U.S.	  bureaucrats	  as	  a	  close	  contest	  that	  might	  still	  be	  up	  for	  grabs.	  	  The	  fact	  that	  Washington	  rejected	  LSI	  in	  spite	  of	  this	  assessment	  seems	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 David K. Shipler, “Begin gains in Israel poll as tough image pays off,” New York Times, June 13, 1981. 
49 Don Peretz and Sammy Smooha, “Israel’s Tenth Knesset Elections: Ethnic Upsurgence and Decline of 
Ideology,” Middle East Journal 35, no. 4 (Autumn 1981): 516. 
50 “Israeli opposition rivals close ranks for election,” The Globe and Mail (Canada), June 27, 1981; 
Abraham Rabinovich, “Caustic Election Debate: Peres Wins Points on Israeli TV,” The Globe and Mail 
(Canada), June 26, 1981. 
51 “Shifting Sands in Israel,” The Globe and Mail (Canada), June 30, 1981. 
52 Lewis, “Interview with Ambassador Samuel Wingate Lewis,” 98. 
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conflict	  with	  the	  predictions	  of	  Theory	  #3	  (the	  bureaucratic	  politics	  approach).	  It	  should	  come	  as	  little	  surprise	  that	  Congress	  did	  not	  display	  much	  interest	  in	   the	   Israeli	   elections.	   	   What	   is	   more	   surprising	   is	   that	   Peres	   and	   Labor	   barely	  appear	  to	  have	  registered	  on	  the	  president’s	  radar	  screen	  until	   the	  Israeli	  national	  unity	   government	   a	   few	   years	   later.	   	   Although	   Reagan	   noted	   the	   Israeli	   election	  results	   in	   his	   diary,	   after	   looking	   through	  both	   public	   and	  declassified	   sources	   on	  this	   period	   and	   conducting	   interviews	  with	   some	   of	   his	   close	  Mideast	   advisors,	   I	  cannot	   seem	   to	   find	   anything	   to	   suggest	   that	   Reagan	   displayed	   any	   interest	   or	  curiosity	  in	  advance	  of	  the	  Israeli	  elections.	  	  This	  is	  quite	  striking	  when	  considered	  in	   contrast	   to,	   say,	   Bill	   Clinton,	   who	   became	   an	   obsessive	   junkie	   for	   up-­‐to-­‐the-­‐minute	  and	  even	  precinct-­‐specific	  information	  during	  Israeli	  election	  campaigns.	  	  3.	  Patterns	  of	  Domestic	  Debate:	  	   Another	  area	  in	  which	  the	  theories	  diverge	  involves	  the	  patterns	  of	  domestic	  debate	  within	  the	  sender	  state	  in	  advance	  of	  a	  possible	  policy	  of	  LSI.	   	  Whereas	  the	  lobby-­‐legislative	   and	   bureaucratic	   approaches	   expect	   these	   actors	   to	   be	   well-­‐apprised	   of	   national	   policy	   in	   addition	   to	   being	   influential	   on	   its	   selection,	  leadership	   theory	   expects	   otherwise.	   	   As	   argued	   above	   in	   my	   theory	   chapter,	  leadership	   theory	   argues	   that	   patterns	   of	   domestic	   debate	   for	   LSI	   are	   unusually	  close-­‐hold.	   	   This	   is	   because	   top	   decision-­‐makers	   in	   the	   sender	   state	   face	   two	  countervailing	   incentives.	   	   On	   one	   hand,	   they	   face	   temptations	   to	   meddle	   in	   the	  target	  state’s	  politics	  to	  achieve	  their	  strategic	  and/or	  ideological	  objectives.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	   the	   face	  considerable	  risks	  because	  to	  do	  so	  openly	  would	  engender	  a	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nationalist	   backlash	   in	   the	   target	   state.	   	   Therefore,	   they	   behave	   in	   a	   manner	  characterized	  by	  what	   I	   call	   “the	  paper	  paradox,”	  meaning	   they	  balance	   these	   two	  motives	   by	  meddling	   in	   a	  manner	   that	   avoids	  written	  directives,	   formal	   channels,	  and	  normal	  distribution	  lists,	  even	  inside	  the	  sender	  state’s	  normal	  decision-­‐making	  apparatus.	  	  Thus,	  LSI	  is	  conducted	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  is	  partly	  hidden	  from	  view.	  There	  is	  little	  in	  the	  way	  of	  official	  material	  on	  the	  decision-­‐making	  of	  either	  Egypt	  or	  the	  United	  States	  toward	  internal	  Israeli	  politics	  during	  this	  period.	  	  In	  part,	  this	   is	   because	   non-­‐cases	   are	   tougher	   to	   pin	   down	   empirically	   than	   visible	   cases.	  	  Indeed,	   there	   is	   a	   great	   deal	   of	   material	   on	   the	   Osirak	   attack	   in	   the	   American	  archives,	   but	   none	   of	   the	   reporting	   at	   the	   political	   level	   seems	   to	   address	   the	  implications	   that	   different	   U.S.	   policy	   options	   for	   responding	   to	   the	   attack	   could	  have	  on	  Israeli	  domestic	  politics.	   	  This	  is	  the	  case	  for	  memos	  to	  the	  president	  from	  State53	   and	   the	   national	   security	   advisor54	   as	   well	   as	   by	   NSC	   staffers	   Geoffrey	  Kemp,55	   Doug	   Feith,56	   and	   Raymond	   Tanter.57	   	   Meanwhile,	   Egypt’s	   efforts	   were	  conducted	  at	  such	  a	  high	  but	  informal	  effort	  that	  what	  appear	  to	  have	  been	  Sadat’s	  true	   motivations	   were	   only	   acknowledged	   in	   public	   through	   the	   writings	   and	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informal	  conversations	  of	  his	  advisor	  years	  after	  Sadat’s	  death.	   	  These	  patterns	  do	  not	  provide	  very	  strong	  support	  for	  Theory	  #4,	  but	  they	  do	  seem	  consonant	  with	  it.	  	  4	  &	  5.	  Cycles	  of	  Domestic	  Power	  and	  Bureaucratic	  Freelancing:	  	   Two	  other	  areas	  in	  which	  the	  theories	  diverge	  pertain	  to	  cycles	  of	  domestic	  power	   and	   to	   the	   likelihood	   of	   bureaucratic	   freelancing.	   	   Theory	   #3	   (the	  bureaucratic	   politics	   approach)	   expects	   high	   levels	   of	   freelancing	   as	  well	   as	   even	  higher	   rates	   of	   LSI	   than	   usual	   during	   the	   early	  months	   of	   a	   new	  president’s	   term	  because	   his	   political	   appointees	   are	   not	   yet	   in	   place	   to	   impose	   loyalty	   on	   the	  bureaucracy.	  This	  case	  provides	  strong	  evidence	  against	  bureaucratic	  politics	  with	  regard	  to	  both	  observable	  implications.	  	  This	  episode	  took	  place	  early	  in	  President	  Reagan’s	  first	  term,	  a	  time	  during	  which	  the	  bureaucracy’s	  power	  over	  political	  leadership	  is	  supposed	   to	  be	  especially	  preponderant.	   	  The	   case	  provides	  an	  easy	  hoop	   test	   for	  Theory	  #3,	  and	  yet	  it	  fails	  the	  test.	  First,	  the	  administration	  not	  undertake	  LSI	  toward	  Israel,	  which	  bureaucratic	  preferences	  should	  have	  led	  us	  to	  expect.	  	  Second,	  Nimrod	  Novik	  points	  out	  that,	  on	  Israel	   policy	   in	   particular,	   the	   Reagan	   administration	   got	   an	   especially	   slow	   start	  exerting	  executive	  control,	  especially	  with	  regard	  to	  policy	  toward	  Israel.58	  	  Not	  only	  were	   administration	   officials	   thrown	   off	   track	   appointing	   its	   political	   appointees	  and	  sorting	  out	  its	  policy	  priorities,	  they	  were	  still	  reeling	  since	  John	  Hinckley	  shot	  President	   Reagan	   just	   three	   months	   earlier	   and	   were	   divided	   on	   Israel	   at	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Nimrod Novik, “An Intervening Variable: The Slow Start,” in Encounter with Reality: Reagan and the 
Middle East During the First Term (Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1985), 15-20. 
	   188	  
political	  level.	  	  The	  case	  provides	  an	  easy	  test	  for	  Theory	  #3,	  yet	  the	  administration	  did	   not	   undertake	   LSI	   toward	   Israel,	  which	   bureaucratic	   preferences	   should	   have	  led	  us	  to	  expect.	   	  Nor	  did	  any	  bureaucratic	  freelancing	  seem	  to	  take	  place,	  another	  strike	  against	  the	  theory.	  	  6.	  Consistency	  of	  Message:	  	   The	   theories	   also	   diverge	   with	   regard	   to	   whether	   or	   not	   the	   message	  conveyed	  by	   sender	   state	  policy	   is	   likely	   to	  be	   consistent	   and,	   therefore,	   effective.	  	  Theory	  #1	  (national	   interests	  theory)	  expects	  that	  consistent	  messaging	  should	  be	  unproblematic,	   whereas	   the	   other	   theories	   argue	   that	   institutional	   or	   personal	  biases	  might	  detract	  from	  the	  consistency	  of	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy.	  The	  American	  administration	  projected	  an	  inconsistent	  message	  toward	  the	  Israeli	   body	   politic.	   	   This	   works	   against	   Theory	   #1,	   since	   the	   national	   interests	  approach	  expects	  that	  domestic	  disputes	  over	  policy	  should	  not	  be	  consequential	  for	  messaging.	   	   Further,	   the	   fact	   that	   this	   inconsistency	   arose	   almost	   entirely	   from	  within	   the	   upper	   reaches	   of	   the	   Reagan	   administration,	   not	   across	   different	  branches	  or	   levels	  of	  government,	  contradicts	  Theories	  2	  and	  3.	   	   Instead,	  the	  main	  disagreements	  over	  how	  tough	  to	  be	  with	  Israel	  came	  from	  the	  top	  echelons	  of	  the	  administration	  and	  did	  not	  line	  up	  with	  institutional	  interests.	  The	   strongest	   calls	   inside	   the	   administration	   for	   a	   punitive	   approach	   to	  Israel,	  which	  helped	  drive	  the	  administration’s	   initial	   tough	  talk	  over	  Osirak,	  came	  from	  officials	  such	  as	  Secretary	  of	  Defense	  Weinberger,	  Vice	  President	  Bush,	  White	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House	   chief	   of	   staff	   James	   Baker,	   and	   Deputy	   Secretary	   of	   State	   William	   Clark.59	  	  Their	  opinions	   in	   this	   instance	   tracked	  much	   closer	   to	   their	   long-­‐term	  views	   than	  their	   organizational	   interests.	   	   For	   instance,	   Clark	   disagreed	   with	   his	   immediate	  boss,	   Al	   Haig,	   and	   would	   hold	   a	   much	   tougher	   position	   on	   the	   issue	   as	   national	  security	  advisor	  than	  his	  predecessor,	  Richard	  Allen.	   	  These	  trends	  fit	  much	  better	  with	  Theory	  #4	  than	  its	  structural	  competitors.	  	  7.	  Suitability	  of	  Message:	  Finally,	  the	  theories	  diverge	  with	  regard	  to	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  sender	  state’s	  policies	  convey	  a	  message	  that	   is	  well-­‐suited	  to	   the	  domestic	  political	  dynamics	  of	  the	  target	  political	  system.	   	  Theory	  #1	  expects	   this	   to	  be	  unproblematic,	  while	   the	  other	   theories	   argue	   that	   institutional	   or	   personal	   biases	  might	   skew	  policy	   away	  from	   positions	   that	   would	   have	   been	   better	   suited	   to	   the	   needs	   of	   the	   protégé	  faction	  in	  the	  target	  state.	  In	   this	   case,	   the	   administration	   projected	   a	   mixed	   message	   to	   Israeli	  audiences	   that	  was	  well-­‐suited	   for	   its	   immediate,	  non-­‐LSI	  purposes	  and	  yet	  rather	  mismatched	  for	  undermining	  Likud	  at	  the	  polls.	  	  The	  administration	  highlighted	  its	  political	  opposition	  to	  the	  Osirak	  bombing	  to	  help	  diminish	  the	  risks	  of	  fallout	  from	  moderate	   Arab	   allies.	   	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   it	   strove	   not	   to	   isolate	   Israel	   lest	   that	  isolation	  encourage	   radical	  Arab	  actors	   to	   chain-­‐gang	   those	  moderates	   into	  war.60	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Allen, “Reagan’s Secure Line”; Ben-Zvi, The United States and Israel, 133. 
60 Tanter, “Memorandum for Richard V. Allen: Israel’s Air Strike on Iraq’s Nuclear Facility.” For a rather 
memorable dissent in which Feith derisively puts the word moderate in quotes when describing America’s 
Arab allies such as Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, see: “Acting Secretary Stoessel’s Memo to the 
President on ‘Political Strategy for Responding to Israeli Attack’," - Memorandum to Richard V. Allen 
from Douglas J. Feith.” 
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Thus,	   the	   U.S.	   intentionally	   voiced	   loud	   criticism	   of	   Israeli	   actions	   while	   making	  clear	  that	  American	  criticism	  would	  come	  without	  meaningful	  costs	  attached.	  This	   two-­‐pronged	  approach	  unintentionally	  bolstered	  Begin	   in	  each	  regard.	  	  First,	  by	  carefully	  capping	   its	  criticism	  the	  administration	  allowed	  him	  to	  reap	  the	  electoral	   benefits	   of	   a	   tough	   foreign	   policy	   posture	   without	   real	   negative	  consequences	  for	  his	  relations	  with	  Washington.	   	  Second,	  by	  continuing	  to	  criticize	  Israel	  nonetheless	  the	  administration	  gave	  extra	  campaign	  fodder	  to	  the	  nationalist	  right-­‐wing	   in	   Israel.	   	   For	   instance,	   Begin	   blasted	   the	   American-­‐backed	   resolution	  from	   the	   UN	   Security	   Council,	   insisting	   that	   the	   Israeli	   air	   strike	   had	   prevented	  another	  Holocaust	  and	  bashing	  the	  United	  States	  for	  ganging	  up	  on	  its	  ally.61	  	  
Reagan,	  Case	  #2:	  The	  Pendulum	  Swings,	  1982-­‐1984	  	  	   America’s	  posture	  toward	  Israeli	  politics	  oscillated	  wildly	  over	  the	  next	  few	  years	  in	  a	  progression	  I	  divide	  into	  four	  subsequent	  stages.	  	  First,	  the	  administration	  pursued	   a	   policy	   of	   non-­‐LSI	   despite	   increasing	   frustration	   at	   provocations	   from	  Jerusalem.	  	  Second,	  the	  Lebanon	  War	  pushed	  the	  relationship	  to	  its	  breaking	  point,	  with	  the	  U.S.	  seriously	  considering	  negative	  LSI	  against	  the	  Likud.	  	  Third,	  the	  United	  States	  sought	  to	  bolster	   forces	  of	  moderation	  within	  Israel’s	  cabinet	  using	  positive	  LSI	  after	  a	  partial	  shake-­‐up	  of	  the	  government	  brought	  in	  some	  new	  blood.	  	  Fourth,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (ME/6756/A/2), trans., “Israeli Cabinet Meeting on 21st June: 
Begin’s Statement,” Israel Home Service, June 23, 1981. 
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U.S.	  policy	  underwent	  another	  period	  of	  drift	  and	  de	  facto	  non-­‐LSI,	  except	  this	  time	  non-­‐LSI	   was	   tinged	   with	   warmth,	   not	   hostility.	   	   U.S.	   efforts	   to	   boost	   strategic	  cooperation	  with	  Israel	  thus	  worked	  to	  the	  Likud’s	  advantage	  in	  the	  1984	  elections,	  although	   this	   was	   not	   actually	   the	   administration’s	   intent.	   	   In	   all	   four	   instances,	  personal	  factors	  predict	  outcomes	  as	  well	  as	  or	  better	  than	  structural	  ones.	  	  
Coding	  the	  Dependent	  Variables	  (Occurrence	  and	  Efficacy)	  Did	  LSI	  Occur?	  	   Occasionally,	   yes.	   	   In	   a	   short	   period	   of	   time,	   the	   administration’s	   posture	  toward	  Israel	  swung	  from	  non-­‐LSI	  to	  tentative	  exploration	  of	  negative	  LSI,	   then	  to	  positive	   LSI,	   and	   eventually	   settling	   into	   another	   period	   of	   non-­‐LSI	   due	   to	  unintended	  drift.	   	  Even	  stranger,	  the	  initial	  period	  of	  non-­‐LSI	  was	  characterized	  by	  very	  hostile	  relations,	  while	  the	  latter	  period	  of	  non-­‐LSI	  was	  especially	  amicable.	  
<Phase	  One:	  Frustration	  Building>	  	   Although	   the	   administration	   did	   not	   pursue	   LSI	   from	   late	   1981	   until	   early	  1983,	   this	  was	  still	  one	  of	   the	  most	  difficult	  patches	   in	   the	  U.S.-­‐Israel	   relationship.	  	  The	   relative	   doves	   of	   Begin’s	   first	   government,	   Dayan	   and	   Weizman,	   had	   been	  replaced	   by	   Shamir	   and	   Sharon,	   and	   the	   new	   Likud	   government	   therefore	   grew	  more	  hawkish	   in	   its	  positions.	   	  The	  result	  was	  a	  series	  of	   Israeli	  provocations	  and	  American	   expressions	   of	   discontent.	   	   However,	   Washington	   did	   not	   try	   to	  undermine	  the	  Likud’s	  hold	  on	  power.	  	   American	  shipments	  of	  F-­‐16	  fighter	  jets	  were	  suspended	  a	  second	  time	  after	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the	  Israeli	  air	  force	  bombed	  PLO	  targets	  in	  Beirut,	  producing	  high	  civilian	  casualties.	  	  A	   more	   bruising	   fight	   was	   around	   the	   corner,	   however.	   	   The	   U.S.	   sought	   to	   sell	  AWACS	  military	  technology	  to	  Saudi	  Arabia,	  and	  stiff	  resistance	  by	  the	  GoI	  created	  a	  severe	  rift	  between	  the	  two	  governments.	  	  Reagan	  advisor	  Geoffrey	  Kemp	  explains	  	  	   “as	  agonizing	  as	  putting	  a	  hold	  on	  the	  delivery	  of	  the	  weapons	  was,	  it	   was	   later	   eclipsed	   by	   AWACS,	   which	   was	   infinitely	   more	  acrimonious.	   	   AWACS	  was	   the	   first	   time	   there	  was	   open	   hostility	  throughout	  the	  Reagan	  government	  versus	  Begin.	  	  The	  next	  year	  of	  bitterness	  was	   from	  the	  odor	  of	  AWACS…	  [and]	   left	  a	  bad	  taste	   in	  everyone’s	  mouth	  toward	  Begin”.	  62	  	  Reagan	  was	  especially	  upset	   that	  Begin	  appeared	   to	  be	   lobbying	  Congress	   against	  the	  sale	  after	  assuring	  the	  president	  that	  he	  would	  not	  do	  so.63	  When	  Begin	   finally	  did	   visit	  Washington	  and	  meet	  with	   the	  new	  president,	  they	   did	   agree	   to	   conclude	   a	   Memorandum	   of	   Understanding	   on	   strategic	  cooperation.	   	  However,	  after	   the	  Likud	  pushed	  a	  bill	   through	  the	  Knesset	  applying	  Israeli	   law	   to	   the	   Golan	   Heights	   (effectively	   annexing	   them),	   the	   MOU	   was	  suspended	   by	   the	   U.S.	   as	   a	   sign	   of	   protest.	   	   PM	   Begin	   summoned	   the	   American	  ambassador	   and	   subjected	   him	   to	   a	   tirade	   later	   leaked	   to	   the	   press	   in	   which	   he	  accused	  Washington	  of	  mistreating	  Israel	  like	  a	  vassal	  state	  and	  a	  banana	  republic.	  The	   first	   few	   months	   of	   1982	   were	   spent	   ensuring	   that	   the	   scheduled	  handover	   to	   Egypt	   of	   the	   eastern	   Sinai	   took	   place	   as	   planned.	   	   Any	   goodwill	  engendered	  by	   the	   Israeli	  withdrawal	   evaporated	   just	  weeks	   later,	   however,	   after	  Israel	  responded	  to	  increasing	  PLO	  provocations	  from	  the	  north	  with	  a	  full-­‐fledged	  invasion	  of	  Lebanon.	   	   Israel’s	  Lebanon	  War	  was	  originally	   sold	   to	   the	  cabinet	  as	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Senior Reagan advisor for Mideast Affairs Geoffrey Kemp, “Interview with the Author.” 
63 Reagan, The Reagan Diaries, 66. 
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limited	   military	   operation	   that	   would	   not	   extend	   beyond	   the	   country’s	   extreme	  bordering	   upon	   Israeli	   territory.	   	   However,	   DM	   Sharon	   systematically	  misrepresented	  what	  he	  had	  actually	  conceived	  of	  as	  a	  plan	  designed	  to	  take	  the	  IDF	  all	  the	  way	  into	  Beirut	  to	  destroy	  the	  PLO’s	  base	  in	  Lebanon	  once	  and	  for	  all.64	  	   Although	  Reagan	  publicly	  acceded	  to	  Israel’s	  broadened	  war	  aims	  once	  they	  became	  clear,	  he	  claims	  that	   in	  private	  “I	  was	  pretty	  blunt”	  and	  that	   “we	  think	  his	  action	  was	  overkill”.65	  	  However,	  when	  the	  IDF	  began	  air	  and	  artillery	  bombardment	  of	  PLO	  positions	  inside	  Beirut,	  Reagan	  snapped.	  	  He	  writes	  the	  following	  entry	  in	  his	  diary	  for	  August	  12,	  1982:	  	   “King	   Fahd	   called	   begging	  me	   to	   do	   something.	   	   I	   told	   him	   I	  was	  calling	  PM	  Begin	  immediately.	  	  And	  I	  did	  –	  I	  was	  angry	  –	  I	  told	  him	  it	  had	  to	  stop	  or	  our	  entire	  relationship	  was	  endangered.	  	  I	  used	  the	  word	   holocaust	   deliberately	   &	   said	   the	   symbol	   of	   his	   war	   was	  becoming	  a	  picture	  of	  a	  7	  month	  old	  baby	  with	  its	  arms	  blown	  off.	  	  He	   told	  me	  he	  had	  ordered	   the	  bombing	   stopped	  –	   I	   asked	  about	  the	   artillery	   fire…	   Twenty	   mins.	   later	   he	   called	   to	   tell	   me	   he’d	  ordered	   an	   end	   to	   the	   barrage	   and	   pled	   for	   our	   continued	  friendship”.66	  	  September	  of	  1982	  was	  another	  important	  turning	  point.	  	  On	  the	  first	  of	  the	  month,	  the	  president	  presented	  a	  peace	  proposal	   that	  became	  known	  as	   the	  Reagan	  Plan,	  calling	   for	   a	   settlement	   freeze	   and	   an	   autonomous	   Palestinian	   entity	   linked	   to	  Jordan.	  	  The	  plan	  was	  rejected	  outright	  by	  Jerusalem,	  although	  Labor	  and	  moderate	  Arab	  states	  voiced	   their	  support.	   	  On	  the	  14th,	  Lebanese	  President	  Bashir	  Gemayel	  was	  assassinated,	  and	  the	  IDF	  occupied	  West	  Beirut.	  	  Seeking	  revenge,	  members	  of	  Gemayel’s	   militia	   entered	   Palestinian	   refugee	   camps	   at	   Sabra	   and	   Shatila.	   	   They	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claimed	  to	  be	  pursuing	  PLO	  guerillas	  but	  instead	  carried	  out	  a	  civilian	  massacre	  that	  left	  at	  least	  800	  dead,	  the	  majority	  of	  whom	  were	  women	  and	  children.67	  The	  Phalange	  entry	  into	  Sabra	  and	  Shatila	  was	  in	  part	  facilitated	  by	  the	  IDF,	  and	   after	   enormous	   protests	   inside	   of	   Israel	   Begin	   indignantly	   folded	   to	   internal	  pressure	   to	   appoint	   a	   commission	   of	   inquiry	   into	   the	   events.	   	   The	   U.S.	   had	   only	  recently	  completed	  its	  mission	  leading	  a	  multinational	  force	  to	  facilitate	  withdrawal	  of	  the	  PLO	  and	  protect	  Palestinian	  civilians	   in	  Beirut.	   	  The	  massacres	  at	  Sabra	  and	  Shatila	  led	  Reagan,	  wracked	  with	  guilt,	  to	  send	  U.S.	  troops	  back	  into	  the	  conflict.	  
<Phase	  Two:	  Negative	  LSI>	  	   In	   the	   period	   that	   followed,	   American	   frustration	   boiled	   over,	   and	   the	  administration	  moved	   toward	  negative	  LSI	  against	  some	  or	  all	  of	   the	  sitting	  Likud	  government.	   	  Now	  that	  American	  troops	  were	  back	  in	  harm’s	  way,	  Reagan	  wanted	  the	  Israeli	  invasion	  to	  end.	  	  Also,	  Jordan	  refused	  to	  participate	  in	  his	  peace	  program	  as	   long	  as	  Israel	  continued	  to	  build	  settlements	  and	  remained	  in	  control	  of	  central	  Lebanon.	  	  Reagan	  concluded	  that	  the	  Israelis	  had	  overplayed	  their	  hand	  and	  it	  was	  time	   for	   them	   to	   go.	   	  He	   reappointed	  Habib	   as	   a	   special	   envoy	   to	  mediate	   Israel’s	  withdrawal	  and	  told	  him	  “the	  msg.	  for	  P.M.	  Begin	  is	  that	  I	  want	  action”.68	  	   By	  now	  the	  president’s	  relationship	  with	  Begin	  had	  gone	  from	  bad	  to	  worse.	  	  They	   had	   been	   scheduled	   to	   meet	   in	   November	   of	   1982,	   but	   the	   prime	   minister	  cancelled	  his	   trip	  and	  returned	  home	  because	  his	  wife	  unexpectedly	  passed	  away.	  	  However,	  had	  this	  unrelated	  event	  not	  occurred,	  it	  was	  quite	  clear	  to	  observers	  that	  Reagan	   was	   preparing	   to	   read	   Begin	   the	   riot	   act,	   especially	   over	   the	  West	   Bank,	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settlements,	  and	  rejection	  of	  the	  Reagan	  Plan.69	  	  As	  Lewis	  argues,	  “Begin’s	  personal	  loss	  of	  credibility	  with	  Reagan	  was	  the	  most	  damaging	  consequence”	  of	  the	  Lebanon	  War	   for	  bilateral	   relations.	   	   “Begin	  had	   always	  been	  prickly	   and	  difficult...	   [but	   by	  August]	  Begin’s	  credibility	  in	  Washington	  had	  nearly	  dissolved.	  	  The	  last	  reservoirs	  were	  drained	  during	  mid-­‐September”.70	   	  Reagan	  had	  gone	   from	  starting	   letters	   to	  the	   Israeli	   PM	   with	   “Dear	   Menachem”	   to	   instead	   addressing	   him	   strictly	   as	   “Mr.	  Prime	  Minister”.71	  	  By	  this	  point	  Reagan	  had	  also	  met	  with	  Israeli	  opposition	  leader	  Shimon	  Peres	  and	  described	  him	  as	  “quite	  a	  contrast	   to	  Begin,”	  noting	  his	  relative	  flexibility	  on	  a	  number	  of	  points	  of	  bilateral	  friction.72	  	   The	  administration’s	  frustration	  toward	  Begin	  were	  no	  match	  for	  its	  attitude	  toward	  Defense	  Minister	   Sharon,	  whose	   style	  was	   something	   akin	   to	   “sticking	   his	  thumb	   in	   our	   eyes	   every	   time	   he	   got	   a	   chance”.73	   	   Sharon	   strong	   armed	   the	   new	  Lebanese	   president,	   Amin	   Gemayel,	   into	   a	   secret	   treaty	   but	   then	   torpedoed	   it	   by	  leaking	  it	  to	  the	  press	  to	  boost	  his	  own	  standing.	  	  He	  also	  went	  out	  of	  his	  way	  “to	  rub	  Habib’s	  nose	  in	  it…	  in	  front	  of	  the	  entire	  cabinet”.74	  Sharon	  then	  imposed	  maximalist	  positions	  on	  the	  negotiating	  teams	  and	  drew	  out	  the	  withdrawal	  talks.	  	  It	  was	  clear	  to	  American	  decision-­‐makers	  that	  “Israeli	  demands	  [from	  Lebanon],	  at	  the	  behest	  of	  Sharon,	  have	  steadily	  escalated”	  and	  that	  “Israel	  (specifically	  Sharon)	  may	  see	  delay	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in	  Lebanon	  as	  a	  way	  of	  forestalling	  [our]	  September	  1	  initiative”.75	  	   There	   was	   also	   some	   speculation	   that	   the	   administration	   would	   use	   the	  January	  1983	  visit	  of	  Israeli	  President	  and	  possible	  contender	  for	  head	  of	  the	  Labor	  Party	  Yitzhak	  Navon	  as	  an	  opportunity	  to	  strengthen	  Navon	  for	  an	  eventual	  race	  to	  unseat	  Begin.	   	  However,	   the	  administration	  and	  Navon	  both	  seemed	   to	  play	  down	  such	  suspicions	  during	  his	  trip.76	  By	   early	   February,	   the	   president	   reached	   his	   breaking	   point	   over	   the	  stagnant	   Lebanon	   talks,	  writing	   “it’s	   still	   Israel	   dragging	   their	   feet”	   and	   even	   that	  “Phil	  Habib	  is	  on	  his	  way	  back	  to	  Israel.	  	  I	  asked	  him	  to	  let	  me	  know	  if	  a	  phone	  plea	  to	  Begin	  would	  help.	  	  If	  not	  we’ll	  just	  have	  to	  separate	  ourselves	  from	  Israel”.77	  This	   sentiment	  was	   echoed	   in	   Reagan’s	   public	   statements	   at	   the	   time.	   	   He	  emphasized	   the	   “moral	   point	   we	   think	   the	   Israelis	   are	   neglecting”	   not	   to	   be	   “an	  occupying	  force”.	   	  He	  told	  representatives	  of	  the	  World	  Jewish	  Congress	  that	  Israel	  needed	  to	   freeze	  settlement	  activity	  because	   its	  actions	  were	  harming	  the	  chances	  for	  peace.	  	  He	  also	  staunchly	  defended	  a	  U.S.	  marine’s	  decision	  to	  draw	  his	  pistol	  and	  order	  an	  Israeli	  tank	  commander	  to	  stand	  down	  from	  a	  disputed	  area	  in	  Lebanon.78	  	  	   Memos	  from	  his	  advisors	  fit	  the	  notion	  that	  negative	  LSI	  figured	  prominently	  on	  officials’	  minds.	  	  Howard	  Teicher	  ventured	  that	  “the	  President’s	  prestige	  is	  on	  the	  line”	  and	  “the	  Israeli	  political	  scene	  was	  ripe	  in	  the	  fall	  of	  1982,	  and	  most	  recently	  following	  the	  release	  of	  the	  Commission	  of	  Inquiry	  report”.	  	  He	  argued	  that	  “we	  need	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to	  act	  boldly”	  and	  appoint	  a	  special	  envoy	  to	  push	  hard	  for	  peace.	  	  He	  suggested	  that	  Henry	  Kissinger	  would	  be	   the	  best	   person	   for	   the	   job	   since	   “Begin	  would	  have	   to	  calculate	  how	  Kissinger	  -­‐	  -­‐	  more	  than	  others	  -­‐	  -­‐	  might	  be	  able	  to	  turn	  Israeli	  public	  opinion	  against	  him.	  	  Should	  Kissinger	  label	  Begin	  intransigent,	  it	  would	  not	  only	  set	  the	  stage	  for	  increased	  U.S.	  pressures	  against	  Israel	  (if	  that	  becomes	  necessary)	  but	  might	  also	  trigger	  a	  domestic	  political	  storm	  inside	  Israel”.79	  	   The	  president’s	  national	  security	  advisor,	  William	  P.	  Clark,	  gave	  him	  similar	  advice	  in	  early	  February:	  	   “The	  strategic	  change	  in	  the	  situation	  created	  by	  your	  September	  1	  proposal	   has	   been	   allowed	   to	   slip	   away…	   The	   Labor	   party	   [sic]	  immediately	   endorsed	   your	   proposal	   and	   invested	   considerable	  capital	   in	   it.	   	   That	   too	   has	   been	   eroded	   and	   is	   near	   the	   point	   of	  being	  lost…	  to	  achieve	  decisive	  results	  you	  must	  take	  decisive,	  bold	  action…	  Peace	   for	   territory	   is	   a	   concept	  widely	   accepted	   in	   Israel	  among	  the	  people	  if	  not	  by	  Prime	  Minister	  Begin.	  	  And	  if	  we	  use	  our	  influence	  carefully	  and	  remain	  credibly	  devoted	  to	  Israel’s	  security,	  I	  believe	  we	  can	  make	  progress	  by	  appealing	  to	   the	   Israeli	  people	  from	  the	  high	  road	  of	  ‘Peace	  with	  Security’.”80	  	  It	  therefore	  appears	  quite	  probable	  that	  at	  the	  very	  least	  the	  administration	  thought	  seriously	   about	   trying	   to	  push	   Sharon	   and	  Begin	  out	   of	   power	  during	   this	   period,	  which	  makes	  it	  an	  episode	  of	  at	  least	  partial	  LSI.	   	  However,	  I	  would	  be	  reluctant	  to	  code	  this	  as	  an	  episode	  of	  full	  LSI	  without	  further	  evidence.	  
<Phase	  Three:	  Turning	  Positive>	  	   In	   February	   of	   1983,	   the	   Kahan	   commission	   of	   inquiry	   in	   Israel	   called	   for	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Sharon	   to	   resign	   for	   allowing	   the	   massacres	   at	   Sabra	   and	   Shatila	   to	   occur.	   	   The	  commission	  also	  censured	  PM	  Begin	  and	  FM	  Shamir	  for	  not	  doing	  more	  to	  stop	  the	  attacks.	   	  After	  putting	  up	   initial	   resistance,	  Sharon	  was	  soon	   forced	   to	  give	  up	   the	  Defense	  portfolio,	  where	  he	  was	  replaced	  by	  Israel’s	  Ambassador	  to	  the	  U.S.,	  Moshe	  (aka	  “Misha”)	  Arens.	   	  Having	  originally	   lived	   in	   the	  United	  States	  as	  a	  young	  adult	  and	   attended	  MIT	   and	   Cal	   Tech	   before	  moving	   to	   Israel,	   Arens	   displayed	   a	  much	  better	  understanding	  of	  American	  sensibilities	  than	  his	  predecessors	  in	  Washington	  and	  already	  had	  made	   inroads	  with	  many	  American	  officials.	   	  He	  was	  certainly	  an	  ideological	   conservative	   but	  was	   considered	   by	   the	   U.S.	   as	   “a	   breath	   of	   fresh	   air”	  after	  Sharon	  for	  his	  less	  confrontational	  style.81	  As	  defense	  minister,	  Arens	  immediately	  got	  to	  work	  decreasing	  friction	  with	  U.S.	   forces	   in	   Lebanon	   and	   sought	   to	   speed	   up	   the	   negotiations	   for	   Israeli	  withdrawal	   more	   than	   his	   colleagues	   preferred.	   	   The	   president	   felt	   “Ahrens	   as	  defense	  minister	  of	  Israel	  is	  a	  definite	  improvement	  over	  Sharon”.82	  	  In	  fact,	  the	  U.S.	  administration	  liked	  him	  so	  much	  they	  tried	  to	  boost	  him	  politically	  back	  home.	  	   In	  April	  of	  1983,	  the	  administration	  decided	  to	  green	  light	  support	  for	  Israel’s	  controversial	  Lavi	  fighter	  jet	  project.	  	  The	  Lavi	  was	  Israel’s	  effort	  to	  build	  a	  state-­‐of-­‐the-­‐art	   fighter	  aircraft	   indigenously,	  but	  Washington	  had	  always	  been	  cagey	  about	  the	  proposal.	  	  It	  required	  substantial	  American	  funding	  and	  technological	  support	  in	  order	  to	  succeed,	  and	  yet	   it	  would	  provide	  U.S.	  defense	  manufacturers	  with	  added	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Shultz, Ambassador Charles Hill, “Interview with the Author”, March 17, 2011. 
82 Reagan, The Reagan Diaries, 207. 
	   199	  
competition	  for	  international	  arms	  sales.	  The	  Pentagon	  had	  already	  turned	  down	  Israel’s	  main	  tech	  transfer	  requests	  for	  the	  Lavi,	  finding	  the	  strategic	  rationale	  for	  the	  project	  uncompelling.	   	  However,	  the	   advent	   of	   Arens	   in	   the	   Defense	   Ministry	   provided	   America	   with	   an	   added	  political	   incentive	   for	   approving	   the	   project	   as	   a	   means	   for	   bolstering	   perceived	  moderates	   in	   Israeli	   politics.	   	   The	   political	   echelon	   in	   the	   Reagan	   administration	  overruled	  these	  objections	  from	  the	  Defense	  Department,	  allowing	  the	  Lavi	  project	  to	  proceed	  with	  American	  support.	  	   Administration	   officials	   had	   three	   political	   rationales	   for	   approving	   in	   the	  spring	   of	   1983	   this	   request	   that	   had	   previously	   been	   turned	   down.	   	   One	   was	   to	  provide	   reassurance	   that	   the	   American	   commitment	   to	   Israel’s	   security	   remained	  strong	  after	  a	   long	  period	  of	   tensions.83	   	  Another	  was	   to	  boost	  Arens’	  hand	   in	   the	  cabinet	  and	  in	  negotiations	  with	  Lebanon	  to	  finally	  help	  produce	  a	  viable	  agreement	  for	   Israeli	  withdrawal.84	   	  As	  mentioned	  above,	   this	  project	  defines	   such	  actions	  as	  “petit”	  LSI	  because	  they	  aim	  to	  affect	  the	  internal	  balance	  of	  power	  within	  a	  sitting	  foreign	   government	   rather	   than	   reinforcing	   or	   overthrowing	   that	   government	  wholesale.	   	   Apparently,	   a	   third	   rationale	   for	   the	   plan	   entailed	   “grand”	   LSI	   as	  well	  because	  it	  aimed	  to	  actually	  change	  the	  composition	  of	  Israel’s	  government.	  	   Teicher,	  the	  NSC	  staffer	  who	  served	  as	  the	  architect	  of	  this	  plan,	  explains	  the	  plan’s	  logic	  in	  his	  memoirs.	  	  Although	  Begin	  would	  not	  resign	  for	  another	  half	  year,	  he	  had	  fallen	  into	  a	  deep	  bout	  of	  depression,	  	  and	  it	  was	  clear	  that	  he	  may	  have	  been	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on	  his	  way	  out.	  	  Teicher	  anticipated	  that	  a	  transfer	  of	  power	  could	  be	  imminent	  and	  anticipated	  a	  major	  struggle	  within	  the	  Likud	  for	  party	  leadership.	   	  He	  thought	  the	  three	  main	   contenders	   would	   be	   FM	   Shamir,	   DM	   Arens,	   and	  Minister	   of	   Housing	  David	  Levy.	  	  Although	  he	  was	  wary	  of	  the	  other	  two,	  Teicher	  felt	  it	  should	  be	  a	  “key	  goal”	  of	  American	  policy	  to	  “help	  strengthen	  Arens	  and	  others	  who	  understood	  the	  need	  to	  minimize	  friction	  between	  the	  two	  countries”.85	  	   Teicher	   writes	   that	   he	   specifically	   sought	   to	   do	   this	   via	   the	   Lavi	   because,	  “owing	   to	   Arens’s	   background	   as	   an	   aerospace	   engineer	   and	   his	   interest	   in	   the	  development	   of	   Israel’s	   high-­‐technology	   defense	   industries,	   U.S.	   assistance	   to	   this	  sector	  would	  strengthen	  Arens’s	  influence”.86	  	  He	  claims	  that	  the	  relevant	  principals	  quickly	  bought	  into	  his	  plan:	  	  McFarlane	   gave	   my	   strategy	   paper	   to	   Eagleburger,	   who	   in	   turn	  passed	   it	   on	   to	   [Secretary	   of	   State	   Shultz]…	   Shultz	   was	   so	  impressed	   with	   the	   paper	   that	   he	   had	   decided	   to	   make	   it	   his	  strategy…	   With	   McFarlane,	   Eagleburger	   and	   me	   present,	   Shultz	  presented	   the	   strategy…	   [and	   President]	   Reagan	   agreed	   to	   the	  general	  outlines	  of	  the	  strategy	  as	  well	  as	  Shultz’s	  specific	  request	  for	  the	  release	  of	  the	  Lavi	  licenses….	  Recognizing	  the	  importance	  of	  the	   licenses	   in	   building	   Arens’s	   stake	   in	   the	   U.S.	   relationship	  Ambassador	  Lewis	  [in	  Tel	  Aviv]	  promptly	  communicated	  the	  news	  of	  the	  president’s	  decision	  to	  Arens.”87	  	  Teicher	  says	  that	  Defense	  Secretary	  Weinberger	  contacted	  the	  president	  hoping	  to	  reverse	   this	   decision	   but	   that	   Reagan	   broke	   with	   typical	   practice	   and	   held	   firm,	  overruling	  the	  secretary.	  Arens	   himself	   says	   nothing	   about	   this	   angle	   of	   the	   Lavi	   project	   in	   his	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memoirs,	  and	  he	  denied	  the	  allegations	  in	  a	  recent	  interview.	  	  However,	  a	  number	  of	  other	   observers	   have	   echoed	   Teicher’s	   account.88	   	   Israeli	   journalists	  Melman	   and	  Raviv	  give	  credence	   to	  Teicher’s	  account,89	  and	  Reagan	  has	  a	  diary	  entry	   that	  also	  corroborates	  part	  of	  this	  story.90	  	  It	  is	  even	  possible	  that	  Arens	  specifically	  solicited	  America’s	   support	   via	   gestures	  on	   the	  Lavi.	   	  Danny	  Halperin,	   a	   former	  bureaucrat	  from	  Israel’s	  embassy	  in	  Washington	  recalls	  that	  at	  the	  time	  he	  advised	  Arens	  to	  call	  Shultz	  in	  early	  April	  because	  “the	  Americans	  ‘hold	  you	  in	  high	  esteem	  and	  want	  you	  to	   succeed’.”	   	   He	   claims	   Arens	   contacted	   Shultz	   on	   this	   premise	   to	   press	   for	  expediting	  the	  Lavi	   licenses	  and	  that	  the	  licenses	  were	  released	  within	  a	  matter	  of	  days.91	  Even	  AIPAC	  thought	  their	  might	  be	  credence	  to	  claims	  that	  the	  Lavi	  was	  used	  as	  a	  fillip	  for	  influencing	  Israeli	  politics,	  writing	  at	  the	  time	  in	  its	  weekly	  bulletin,	  the	  
Near	   East	   Report,	   that	   “there	   is	   also	   a	   view	   that	   the	   release	   [of	   Lavi-­‐related	   tech	  licenses]	   was	   intended	   to	   bolster	   Arens’	   political	   position	   in	   the	   Israeli	   cabinet	   –	  especially	   since	  he	   is	   viewed	   in	   the	  U.S.	   as	   the	  minister	  most	   favoring	  withdrawal	  from	  Lebanon”.92	  
<Phase	  Four:	  Pro-­Likud	  Drift>	  	   By	   the	   spring	   of	   1983,	   Israeli	   politics	   were	   in	   an	   obvious	   state	   of	   flux.	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Whereas	  during	  Israel’s	  initial	  invasion	  only	  the	  pro-­‐communist	  party	  dared	  to	  table	  a	   no	   confidence	   motion	   against	   the	   government,	   now	   the	   mainstream	   was	   also	  becoming	  quite	  critical.	  	  Even	  Labor	  leader	  Yitzhak	  Rabin,	  who	  represented	  Labor’s	  more	   hawkish	  wing	   at	   the	   time,	   accused	   the	   government	   of	  making	   an	   enormous	  “mistake”	   by	   dragging	   out	  withdrawal,	   and	   he	   decried	   the	   “political	   illusions	   that	  underlay	  the	  war”.93	  	  Anti-­‐war	  activism	  had	  trebled	  on	  the	  streets	  of	  Israel,	  and	  the	  Reagan	   Plan	   had	   temporarily	   refocused	   Israeli	   public	   opinion	   on	   the	   prospect	   of	  trading	  land	  for	  peace.	  Although	  Begin	  was	  still	  the	  most	  popular	  politician	  in	  Israel,	  his	  ratings	  had	  plummeted,	   adding	   to	   a	   perception	   of	   “the	   general	  weakness	   of	   [his]	   coalition”.94	  	  From	   late	  1982	   through	  early	  1984	   the	  Likud’s	  numbers	  underwent	  a	  precipitous	  collapse,	  falling	  consistently	  in	  polls	  from	  a	  drastic	  lead	  over	  Labor	  of	  18	  seats	  to	  an	  even	  larger	  deficit	  of	  24.95	  	  Begin	  cancelled	  yet	  another	  scheduled	  Washington	  visit,	  and	  U.S.	  officials	  guessed	  “he	  simply	  was	  not	  up	  to	  the	  stresses	  of	  a	  Washington	  trip	  and	  did	  not	  want	  to	  face	  some	  tough	  questioning	  by	  us	  on	  his	  West	  Bank	  policy”.96	  	   Given	  this	  background,	  one	  might	  have	  expected	  the	  United	  States	  to	  push	  its	  advantage	  and	  try	  to	  replace	  Begin’s	  government	  with	  one	   led	  by	  the	  Labor	  Party.	  	  However,	  this	  was	  not	  the	  case.	  	  Relations	  over	  Lebanon	  had	  warmed	  considerably	  now	  that	  Sharon	  was	  out	  of	  the	  Defense	  Ministry.	  	  The	  trilateral	  talks	  with	  Lebanon	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finally	   reached	   fruition,	   and	   a	   treaty	  was	   signed	   on	  May	   17th.	   	   Shamir	   and	   Arens	  visited	  Washington	  in	  Begin’s	  stead,	  and	  their	  meetings	  focused	  almost	  entirely	  on	  coordination	   in	   Lebanon.	   	   They	   were	   perceived	   as	   reasonably	   flexible	   by	   the	  president	  and	  his	  aides.97	  	   By	   the	   time	   the	   two	   Israelis	   visited	   again	   that	   November,	   a	   broader	  reorientation	  had	  taken	  place,	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  U.S.	  policy	  and	  Israeli	  politics.	  	  Begin	  had	   stepped	   aside,	   and	   Shamir	  was	   newly	   annointed	   prime	  minister.	   	   The	  United	  States	   announced	   a	   new	   regional	   security	   strategy	   that	   depended	   upon	   vastly	  expanded	  military	  cooperation	  with	  both	  Israel	  and	  its	  Arab	  neighbors	  –	  a	  strategy	  articulated	   in	   National	   Security	   Decision	   Directives	   111	   and	   115.98	   	   The	   public	  perception	   was	   that	   the	   administration	   was	   undergoing	   a	   drastic	   “turn	   toward	  Israel”	   and	   senior	   officials	  made	   leaks	   to	   the	   press	   praising	   the	   Israeli	   leadership	  and	  suggesting	  that	  the	  two	  countries	  had	  turned	  a	  new	  page	  in	  their	  relations.99	  The	  administration	  also	  gave	  Shamir	  and	  Arens	  a	  whole	  series	  of	  gifts	  to	  take	  home	  with	  them.	  	  Perhaps	  most	  remarkable	  among	  these	  measures	  was	  permission	  for	   Israel	   to	   use	   $200	   million	   in	   annual	   military	   aid	   on	   developing	   the	   Lavi	  indigenously	  –	  an	  unprecedented	  concession	  because	  it	  is	  almost	  always	  stipulated	  that	   military	   assistance	   of	   this	   sort	   must	   be	   spent	   purchasing	   items	   made	   in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 Ibid.; Reagan, The Reagan Diaries, 252. 
98 NSDDs 111 and 115 are not yet released in full, but partially redacted copies are now available, and the 
sections that are unavailable seem very minor and unlikely to change the intent of the documents. NSC, 
“National Security Decision Directive 111: Next Steps toward Lebanon and the Middle East”, October 28, 
1983, Collection “Executive Secretariat, NSC: National Security Decision Directives”, Box 91291, Folder 
“NSDD 111 (Folder 1) [Next Steps toward Progress in Lebanon and the Middle East],” Ronald Reagan 
Presidential Library; NSC, “National Security Decision Directive 115: Visit of Prime Minister Shamir”, 
November 26, 1983, Collection “Executive Secretariat, NSC: National Security Decision Directives”, Box 
91291, Folder “NSDD 115 [Visit of Prime Minister Shamir],” Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. 
99 Bernard Gwertzman, “Reagan turns to Israel,” New York Times (Magazine), November 27, 1983. 
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America.100	   	   Other	   gestures	   included	   agreements	   to	   resume	   selling	   Israel	   cluster	  bombs,	  to	  treat	  American	  wounded	  from	  Lebanon	  in	  Israeli	  hospitals,	  for	  America	  to	  purchase	   Israeli	   small	   arms,	   to	   launch	   talks	   leading	   to	   a	   free	   trade	   deal,	   and	  coordination	  of	  military	  maneuvers	   inside	  Lebanon.101	   	  One	  commentator	  went	  so	  far	  as	  to	  suggest	  the	  U.S.	  had	  been	  “falling	  in	  love”	  with	  Israel	  since	  the	  summer.102	  Given	  this	  public	  love	  affair,	  one	  might	  be	  tempted	  to	  code	  the	  summer	  and	  fall	  of	  1983	  as	  a	  period	  of	  positive	  LSI	  intended	  to	  benefit	  the	  new,	  more	  moderate	  face	  of	  the	  Likud	  government.	  	  In	  fact,	  this	  was	  my	  own	  initial	  suspicion.	  	  However,	  I	  eventually	   discovered	   evidence	   indicating	   this	   interpretation	   was	   incorrect.	  	  Instead,	  this	  was	  a	  period	  of	  U.S.	  drift	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  Israeli	  politics.	   	  America	  had	  a	  new	  policy	   for	   how	   to	   approach	   military	   cooperation	   but	   no	   policy	   for	   managing	   the	  reverberations	  that	  redoubled	  strategic	  cooperation	  would	  have	  in	  Israeli	  politics.	  There	  were	  a	  variety	  of	  motivations	  contributing	  to	  this	  turn	  of	  events.	  	  The	  value	   to	   the	   U.S.	   of	   good	   relations	   with	   Israel	   over	   Lebanon	   had	   increased	   once	  American	   troops	   became	   the	   targets	   of	   increasing	   violence.	   	   There	  were	   also	   two	  major	  terrorist	  bombings	  against	  U.S.	  targets,	  first	  against	  the	  Embassy	  in	  Beirut	  and	  then	   against	  marine	   barracks;	   both	   attacks	   caused	   enormous	   casualties.	   	   This	   fed	  the	   nascent	   American	   apprehension	   over	   the	   threat	   of	   radical	   Islamist	   terrorism,	  and	  it	  also	  led	  to	  a	  gradual	  reevaluation	  by	  some	  as	  to	  the	  desirability	  of	  pushing	  for	  further	  Israeli	  withdrawals.103	  	  Thus,	  when	  it	  came	  time	  for	  Israel	  to	  withdraw	  from	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (ME/7505/A/1), trans., “Shamir’s talks with President Reagan,” 
Israel Home Service, November 30, 1983. 
101 Lewis, “The United States and Israel: Constancy and Change,” 244. 
102 William Safire, “Falling in love again,” New York Times, June 16, 1983. 
103 Charlie Hill argues that “we were only vaguely beginning to figure out what terrorism was… and this 
was suddenly the number one issue” for many in Washington. Former Chief of Staff to Sec. State Shultz, 
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the	  Shouf	  Mountains	  in	  Lebanon,	  the	  American	  administration	  found	  itself	  begging	  the	  IDF	  to	  stay,	  not	  leave.	  	  Syria	  had	  been	  resupplied	  by	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  its	  proxies	  in	  Lebanon	  had	  seized	   the	  offensive,	  and	  Assad	  was	  working	   to	   turn	   the	  May	  17th	  Accords	  into	  a	  dead	  letter.	   	  By	  early	  1984,	  the	  U.S.	  administration	  decided	  to	  scrap	  its	   Lebanon	   mission	   altogether.	   	   Political	   considerations	   regarding	   Reagan’s	  upcoming	  reelection	  bid	  played	  a	  role,	  but	  so	  did	  increasing	  violence	  on	  the	  ground	  and	  the	  collapse	  of	  Amin	  Gemayel’s	  fragile	  government	  in	  Lebanon.	  In	  the	  immediate	  aftermath	  of	  the	  barracks	  bombing,	  the	  White	  House	  seized	  on	   a	   Mideast	   strategic	   review	   document	   that	   had	   been	   churning	   through	   the	  bureaucracy	   for	   nearly	   two	   years	   (National	   Security	   Study	   Directive	   #4)	   and	  repurposed	  it	  to	  suit	  its	  perception	  of	  the	  newly	  emergent	  strategic	  environment.104	  	  NSSD-­‐4	   originally	   noted	   that	   Israel	   could	   contribute	   little	   to	   U.S.	   interests	   in	   the	  event	  of	  a	  regional	  conflict	  but	  that	  its	  military	  might	  would	  be	  useful	   in	  the	  event	  that	  the	  USSR	  tried	  to	  physically	  invade	  the	  Middle	  East.	  	  In	  the	  context	  of	  expanded	  Syrian-­‐Soviet	  cooperation	  and	  Syrian	  adventurism	  in	  Lebanon,	  the	  study	  directive’s	  findings	   were	   twisted	   in	   NSDD	   111	   and	   115,	   which	   retained	   the	   bland	   slogan	   of	  “strategic	  cooperation”	  with	  Israel	  but	  for	  somewhat	  different	  purposes.	  	   As	  I	  will	  argue	  below,	  the	  administration’s	  new	  Israel	  policy	  became	  a	  crutch	  that	   helped	   the	   Likud	   party	   limp	   through	   to	   the	   1984	   Israeli	   elections	   with	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moderate	  success,	  but	  bolstering	  the	  Likud	  was	  not	  an	  intentional	  aim	  of	  U.S.	  policy.	  	  When	   I	   asked	   former	   Assistant	   Secretary	   of	   State	   for	   Near	   East	   Affairs	   Richard	  Murphy	  whether	  the	  administration	  saw	  the	  replacement	  of	  Begin	  and	  Sharon	  with	  Shamir	  and	  Arens	  as	  the	  advent	  of	  genuine	  new	  partners,	  he	  flatly	  said	  “no”.105	  Secretary	   of	   State	   George	   Shultz,	   the	   architect	   of	   the	   new	   plan,	   had	  warm	  relations	   with	   Arens	   and	   Shamir,	   but	   even	   he	   was	   not	   blind	   to	   their	   points	   of	  disagreement.	   	   In	   the	   very	   memo	   in	   which	   he	   advocates	   for	   expanding	   strategic	  cooperation	  with	  Israel	  through	  the	  NSDDs,	  Shultz	  recognizes	  that	  Israel	  had	  	  “new	  leaders	  [that],	  while	  somewhat	  more	  pragmatic	  in	  style	  than	  Begin	   and	  Sharon,	   are	  no	  more	  willing	   to	  be	   flexible	   on	   the	  West	  Bank	  and	  Gaza.	  	  This	  handicaps	  our	  peace	  diplomacy	  and	  weakens	  our	  position	  and	  that	  of	  our	  moderate	  Arab	  friends….	  	  Hopes	  for	  the	  peace	   process	   will	   ultimately	   depend	   on	   changes	   in	   two	   basic	  factors	  [one	  of	  which	  is]	  the	  ideological	  rigidity	  on	  the	  Israeli	  side,	  represented	   by	   the	   present	   policies	   of	   the	   Israeli	   government	   on	  the	  West	  Bank	  and	  Gaza….	   	   In	   the	  meantime,	  we	   should	  keep	   the	  September	  1	  initiative	  on	  the	  table	  and	  make	  clear	  that	  we	  do	  not	  accept	   either	   Israeli	   annexation	   of	   the	   occupied	   territories	   or	  continued	  settlement	  activities”.106	  	   Shultz	  worried	   that	   Israel	  was	   “going	   through	   an	   unprecedented	   period	   of	  war-­‐weariness,	  demoralization,	  and	  political	  and	  economic	  crisis”	  and	   that	   “Israeli	  retreat	  in	  Lebanon	  is	  the	  crucial	  factor	  which	  has	  undermined	  the	  balance	  of	  forces	  there,	  making	   the	   Syrians	   bolder	   not	   only	  within	   Lebanon	   but	   in	   the	   Arab	  world	  generally.	   	   The	   Soviets,	   too,	   are	   bolder”.	   	   Shultz	   especially	   highlighted	   Soviet	  shipments	   of	   SS-­‐21	   surface-­‐to-­‐surface	   missiles	   to	   Syria	   that	   could	   target	   U.S.	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106 “Our Strategy in Lebanon and the Middle East - Memorandum for the President from George P. Shultz”, 
October 13, 1983, Collection, “Executive Secretariat, NSD: Records, National Security Decision 
Directives,” Box 91291, Folder “NSDD 103 (1) [Strategy for Lebanon],” Ronald Reagan Presidential 
Library. 
	   207	  
gunships	  off	  the	  Lebanese	  coast	  as	  an	  ominous	  indicator	  of	  this	  trend.	  	  He	  therefore	  argued	   that	   “it	   is	   essential	   now	   to	   take	   steps	   to	   bolster	   Israeli	   strength	   and	   self-­‐confidence	   so	   that	   Israel	   can	   become	   a	   decisive	   deterrent	   to	   Syrian	   and	   Soviet	  ambitions”.	  	  Even	  Shultz,	  who	  was	  quickly	  becoming	  Israel’s	  biggest	  booster	  within	  the	   administration,	   never	   intended	   to	   bolster	   the	   Likud	   so	   much	   as	   hoping	   to	  advance	  “the	  broader	  purpose	  of	  bolstering	  Israel”.107	  	  Any	  political	  reverberations	  that	  this	  plan	  had	  in	  Israeli	  politics	  were	  an	  unwelcome	  and	  thoughtless	  byproduct	  but	  evidently	  not	  its	  objective.	  	   Incidentally,	   it	   is	   also	   worth	   noting	   that	   the	   strategic	   validity	   of	   his	  arguments	  are	  open	  to	  question	  and	  highly	  subjective.	   	  Both	  Shultz’s	  office	  and	  the	  president	  mentioned	  the	  Syrian	  SS-­‐21s	  as	  an	  essential	   indicator	  of	  Soviet	  tentacles	  in	  Lebanon.108	  	  However,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  how	  much	  further	  the	  Soviets	  were	  prepared	  to	  go	  in	  arming	  Syria,	  and	  the	  navy’s	  AEGIS	  destroyers	  off	  Lebanon	  could	  probably	  have	   protected	   its	   gunships	   against	   any	   harm	   from	   the	   SS-­‐21s.109	   	   The	   Defense	  Department	   and	   its	   secretary	   strenuously	   objected	   to	   the	   value	   of	   balancing	   the	  Soviets	   by	   helping	   Israel	   offset	   Syria,	   as	   did	   the	   Chairman	   of	   the	   Joint	   Chiefs	   of	  Staff.110	  	  Former	  Secretary	  of	  Defense	  and	  then-­‐Mideast	  envoy	  Donald	  Rumsfeld	  also	  objected	  to	  the	  plan	  in	  a	  classified	  memo	  to	  Shultz	  at	  the	  time:	  	  “I	   am	   troubled	   by	   the	   concept	   of	   ‘U.S.	   Strategic	   Cooperation	  with	  Israel.’	  I	  don’t	  understand	  what	  it	  means	  or	  what	  we	  give	  or	  get	  out	  of	  it.	  It	  is	  unhelpful	  in	  the	  region.	  If	  we	  got	  from	  Israel	  a	  settlements	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freeze	   or	   some	   major	   breakthrough	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   peace	  process,	   I	   would	   see	   the	   logic.	   Absent	   that,	   I	   suspect	   the	   burden	  may	  be	  greater	  than	  the	  benefit,	  and	  reciprocity	  is	  debatable”.111	  	   Neither	  was	   the	   turn	   toward	   Israel	   originally	   intended	   to	   give	   Israel	   a	   free	  ride	  on	  settlements	  or	  the	  peace	  process.	  	  Upon	  receiving	  NSSD-­‐4,	  national	  security	  advisor	   Judge	   Clark	   wrote	   to	   the	   president	   that	   strategic	   cooperation	   with	   Israel	  should	  be	   seen	   as	   “expression	  of	   our	  determination	  where	   interests	   coincide”	  but	  that	   it	  was	   also	   “critical	   to	   improving	   our	   own	   freedom	   of	   action	   and	   latitude	   on	  issues	  where	  U.S.	  and	  Israeli	  interests	  do	  not	  coincide…	  our	  latitude	  to	  act	  on	  your	  peace	  initiative,	  for	  example”.112	  	  Although	  the	  language	  on	  the	  urgency	  of	  the	  peace	  process	   was	   softened	   somewhat	   from	   NSSD-­‐4	   to	   NSDDs	   111	   and	   115,	   they	   still	  called	  for	  the	  president’s	  peace	  plan	  to	  be	  a	  core	  tenet	  of	  policy	  toward	  Israel.	  Nor	  did	  the	  administration’s	  actions	  seem	  to	  suggest	  that	  it	  was	  prepared	  yet	  to	  sweep	  West	  Bank	  issues	  under	  the	  rug.	  	  The	  president	  and	  his	  aides	  made	  clear	  to	  Shamir	   and	   Arens	   in	   November	   that	   they	   were	   still	   serious	   about	   pursuing	   the	  president’s	  peace	  initiative.113	  	  In	  December	  of	  1983,	  Reagan	  publicly	  stated	  that	  the	  was	  hopeful	  that	  autonomy	  talks	  would	  soon	  restart.114	  	  He	  received	  King	  Hussein	  of	  Jordan	  in	  February	  of	  1984	  and	  pushed	  him	  to	  give	  the	  process	  another	  try.115	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However,	  as	  I	  show	  repeatedly	  in	  other	  cases	  in	  this	  dissertation,	  LSI	   in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  peace	  process	  can	  be	  more	  difficult	  because	  it	  often	  takes	  three	  to	  tango.	  	  King	   Hussein	   quickly	   became	   frustrated	   that	   he	   did	   not	   get	   the	   support	   he	   had	  expected	   from	   Washington	   for	   co-­‐opting	   Arafat	   and	   the	   PLO	   on	   the	   issue	   of	  Palestinian	  representation	  to	   the	  talks,	  so	  he	  soon	   lashed	  out	   in	   frustration.116	   	  He	  proclaimed	   there	   could	   be	   no	   Jordanian	   talks	   with	   Israel	   under	   the	   Reagan	   Plan,	  excoriated	   the	  U.S.	   for	   subservience	   to	   the	  pro-­‐Israel	   lobby,	   and	  pointed	   to	   Israeli	  settlement	  activity	  as	  the	  chronic,	  underlying	  problem.	   	  As	  one	  U.S.	  official	  pointed	  out,	  the	  fact	  that	  he	  did	  so	  right	  as	  Reagan	  spoke	  up	  for	  arms	  sales	  to	  Jordan	  in	  front	  of	  a	  pro-­‐Israel	  audience	  suggests	  that	  “if	  a	  committee	  had	  set	  out	  to	  devise	  the	  worst	  possible	  timing	  for	  such	  a	  statement,	  it	  could	  not	  have	  done	  better”.117	  At	  this	  point,	  many	  within	  the	  U.S.	  administration	  were	  fed	  up,	  especially	  Sec.	  Shultz.	  	  He	  had	  been	  stuck	  holding	  the	  bag	  for	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  Reagan	  Plan	  in	  1982,	  the	  May	  17th	  Agreement	  in	  1983,	  and	  this	  Reagan	  Plan	  redux	  in	  early	  1984.	  	  Shultz	  blamed	   America’s	   Arab	   allies	   for	   each	   of	   these	   failures,	   even	   though	   the	   Israeli	  government	  had	  been	  equally	  staunch	  in	  its	  rejection	  of	  the	  president’s	  plan.118	  	  One	  official	  describes	   this	   as	   Shultz	  having	   “this	   sort	  of	   ‘road	   to	  Damascus’	   conversion	  toward	  Israel”	  from	  what	  many	  considered	  an	  initial,	  pro-­‐Arab	  orientation.119	  Fatigue	  was	  another	  important	  factor.	  	  As	  one	  of	  his	  Mideast	  advisors	  puts	  it,	  “George	  Shultz	   [was]	  absolutely	  exhausted.	   	  He	  had	  spent	   time	  on	  the	  Middle	  East	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from	  the	  moment	  he	  walked	  into	  the	  office.	  	  We	  had	  the	  simultaneous	  launching	  of	  the	  Reagan	  Plan	  and	  the	  efforts	  to	  get	  the	  Israelis	  out	  of	  Lebanon…there	  was	  an	  Arab	  fatigue	   factors	   that	   set	   in,	   and…	   Shultz	   turned	   his	   attention	   toward	   righting	   the	  Israeli	  economy”	   instead.120	   	  Another	  official	  suggests	  that	  by	  1984,	  “the	  American	  government	   was	   so	   tired	   over	   Lebanon	   that	   we	   didn’t	   want	   to	   be	   engaged	   any	  more,”	  and	  principals	  within	  the	  administration	  had	  instead	  turned	  their	  attention	  to	  the	  Iran-­‐Iraq	  War	  and	  a	  reassessment	  of	  Cold	  War	  strategy.	  	  In	  effect,	  ”the	  Reagan	  administration	  had	  a	  hangover	  toward	  the	  Arab-­‐Israeli	  dispute”.121	  By	  the	  time	  the	  1984	  Israeli	  elections	  rolled	  around,	  American	  officials	  were	  pursuing	  a	  policy	  line	  that	  emphasized	  security	  cooperation	  and	  closeness	  to	  Israel	  while	   marginalizing	   disputes	   over	   Lebanon,	   West	   Bank	   settlements,	   and	   the	  president’s	  peace	  plan.	  	  This	  naturally	  worked	  to	  the	  Likud’s	  advantage,	  but	  that	  was	  not	  the	  administration’s	  actual	  intent.	  	  The	  U.S.	  was	  pursuing	  a	  pro-­‐Likud	  policy,	  but,	  as	  Shultz	  confidante	  Charlie	  Hill	   insists,	   “it	  was	  not	  done	   for	   that	  reason”.	   	  Both	   in	  late	   1983	   and	   in	   early	   1984,	   “we	   were	   not	   focused	   on	   that,	   not	   tracking	   that.	  	  Nobody	  that	  I	  was	  working	  with	  talked	  about	  it	  that	  way	  at	  all.	  	  There	  was	  certainly	  no	   attempt	   to	   change	   American	   policy…	   in	   any	  way	   to	   affect	   the	   election,	   so	   not	  anything	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  we	  want	  to	  keep	  Begin	  [or	  his	  successors]	  in	  office”.122	  	  Did	  these	  Policy	  Succeed?	  	   Yes	  and	  No.	   	  During	  phase	  one	  (hostile	  non-­‐LSI	  during	  1982),	   there	  was	  no	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efficacy	   to	   assess	   because	   the	   United	   States	   did	   not	   pursue	   LSI	   and	  was	   far	   from	  doing	  so.	  During	   phase	   two	   (partial-­‐to-­‐full	   negative	   LSI),	   the	   counterfactual	   is	   much	  more	   plausible	   and	   the	   administration	   may	   even	   have	   implemented	   such	   an	  objective	   into	   its	  policies.	   	   In	   this	   instance,	  U.S.	  political	   intervention,	   to	  the	  extent	  that	  it	  was	  or	  would	  have	  been	  pursued,	  was	  set	  for	  narrow	  and	  broader	  efficacy.	  During	   phase	   three	   (positive	   LSI	   in	   support	   of	   Arens),	   the	   administration	  should	  again	  receive	  positive	  marks	  in	  both	  the	  narrow	  sense	  of	  contributing	  to	  his	  standing	  and	  the	  broader	  sense	  of	  advancing	  American	  objectives	  and	  interests.	  During	   phase	   four	   (effusive	   non-­‐LSI),	   the	   administration’s	   efforts	   had	   the	  narrow	  effect	  of	  unintentionally	  boosting	  the	  Likud	  and	  a	  broader	  impact	  that	  was	  quite	  mixed.	   	   It	  helped	  soothe	  and	  rebuild	   troubled	  bilateral	   ties	  while	   setting	   the	  stage	  for	  later	  confrontations	  over	  the	  territories	  and	  peace	  process	  down	  the	  road,	  especially	  after	  the	  eruption	  of	  the	  first	  Palestinian	  intifada.	  
<Efficacy,	  Phase	  One>	  	   For	   many	   of	   the	   non-­‐cases	   examined	   in	   this	   dissertation,	   I	   still	   seek	   to	  address	   the	   question	   of	   efficacy	   by	   asking	   whether	   LSI	   might	   have	   been	   a	   wiser	  policy	   approach.	   	   In	   some	   cases,	   this	   is	   quite	   doable	   –	   for	   instance,	   I	  will	   use	   this	  technique	  to	  varying	  degrees	  below	  for	  evaluating	  the	  efficacy	  of	  American	  actions	  during	  phases	  two	  and	  four.	  	  However,	  in	  some	  instances	  I	  argue	  that	  this	  technique	  is	  untenable,	  and	  phase	  one	  (i.e.	  1982)	  is	  one	  of	  these	  cases.	  	  For	  counterfactuals	  to	  be	  a	  valid	  exercise,	  they	  must	  differ	  from	  the	  actual	  course	  of	  events	  in	  terms	  of	  as	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few	  antecedent	  historical	   facts	  as	  possible.123	   	  When	  too	  many	  parameters	  need	  to	  be	   changed	   in	   order	   to	   achieve	   the	   counterfactual	   condition,	   the	   value	   of	   the	  findings	  it	  produces	  plummets	  dramatically.	  	   In	   the	   early	   phases	   of	   the	   Lebanon	  War,	   Israeli	   society	  was	   experiencing	   a	  rally-­‐around-­‐the-­‐flag	  effect.	   	  Only	  Rakah,	   the	   Israeli	   communist	  party,	  voted	   in	   the	  Knesset	  to	  stop	  the	  invasion.	  	  The	  U.S.	  probably	  would	  not	  have	  pursued	  LSI	  until	  a	  major	   reconfiguration	   of	   the	   Israeli	   internal	   scene	   took	   place.	   	   It	   also	   is	   not	   clear	  what	  sort	  of	  means	  the	  United	  States	  would	  have	  used	  to	  carry	  out	  LSI,	  which	  could	  be	   an	   important	   factor	   for	   evaluating	   the	   hypothetical	   strategy’s	   odds	   of	   success.	  	  Further,	  one	  has	  to	  wonder	  just	  what	  sort	  of	  Israeli	  actions	  it	  would	  have	  taken	  to	  elicit	  LSI	  from	  Reagan	  and	  his	  team.	  	  If	  bombing	  Beirut	  and	  enabling	  the	  massacre	  of	  refugees	  at	  Sabra	  and	  Shatila	  were	  not	  enough,	  what	  would	  have	  been?	  	   Because	  so	  many	  broad	  environmental	  factors	  would	  have	  had	  to	  change	  in	  order	   to	   reach	   such	   a	   counterfactual	   condition,	   I	   do	   not	   place	   much	   stock	   in	  whatever	   answer	   it	  might	   produce.	   	   Thus,	   I	   decline	   to	  wager	   an	   answer	   as	   to	   the	  efficacy	  of	  U.S.	  actions	  during	  this	  period.	  
<Efficacy,	  Phase	  Two>	  	   Phase	  two,	  however,	  is	  a	  different	  matter.	  	  Many	  of	  the	  parameters	  that	  were	  so	  murky	  during	  phase	  one	   came	   into	   crisper	   focus	  during	   the	  period	   from	  Sabra	  and	   Shatila	   until	   when	   the	   commission	   of	   inquiry	   to	   investigate	   those	   events	  divulged	   its	   findings.	   	   In	   addition	   to	   turmoil	   within	   Israeli	   politics,	   the	   U.S.	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government	  had	  finally	  begun	  to	  manifest	   its	   frustration	  with	  the	  GoI	   in	  ways	  that	  may	  have	  been	  aimed	  at	  achieving	  leadership	  selection	  intervention.	  	   The	  main	  means	  being	  used	  by	  the	  Reagan	  administration	  to	  communicate	  a	  message	  to	  the	  Israeli	  body	  politic	  were	  public	  statements	  of	  frustration	  and	  a	  mild	  U.S.	  peace	  plan	  that	  garnered	  majority	  support	  from	  Israeli	  voters	  when	  asked	  about	  it	  in	  polls.	  	  If	  one	  were	  to	  read	  these	  actions	  as	  part	  of	  a	  conscious	  U.S.	  effort	  to	  push	  the	   Likud	   out	   of	   office,	   then	   no	   counterfactual	   is	   needed.	   	   Such	   reasoning	   is	   only	  necessary	  if	  one	  chooses	  to	  code	  this	  case	  as	  a	  partial	  instance	  of	  LSI.	  Public	  protest	  against	  the	  government	  was	  massive,	  with	  roughly	  ten	  percent	  of	  the	  country	  taking	  to	  the	  streets	  in	  September	  to	  protest	  against	  the	  government	  after	   the	  massacres.124	   	   The	  National	   Religious	   Party,	  which	   served	   as	   the	   critical	  swing	  vote	  holding	  Begin’s	  government	  together,	  demanded	  Sharon’s	  dismissal	  and	  hinted	   it	   might	   quit	   the	   government	   if	   he	   remained.125	   	   Labor	   was	   now	   openly	  critical	  of	  the	  government	  and	  the	  wind	  was	  at	  its	  back	  politically.	  For	  some	  time,	  it	  even	  appeared	  that	  Begin	  would	  have	  to	  resign	  in	  response	  to	   the	  political	   pressure	  he	  was	   facing	   and	   the	   report’s	   criticisms	  of	   his	   role.126	   It	  was	  quite	  clear	  to	  political	  observers	  from	  the	  Israeli	  perspective	  that	  Washington	  wanted	  Sharon	  and	  perhaps	  Begin	  out.	  	  For	  instance,	  Wolf	  Blitzer,	  who	  reported	  for	  Israeli	  papers	  at	  the	  time,	  explained	  that	  	  “the	   Defense	   minister	   has	   deeply	   angered	   State	   Department	   and	  White	  House	  officials	  with	  his	  comments,	  and	  they	  would	  clearly	  be	  delighted	   to	   see	   his	   career	   cut	   short	   by	   the	   final	   verdict	   of	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 David K. Shipler, “Israeli Inquiry Gives Leaders Indirect Blame in Massacre: Calls for Sharon’s 
Departure,” New York Times, February 9, 1983.i 
125 “Israel Coalition in Disarray, with Parties Split on Sharon,” New York Times, February 9, 1983. 
126 “Reports Say Begin May Resign to Resolve Sharon Crisis,” The Wall Street Journal, February 10, 1983. 
	   214	  
Kahan	   Commission	   of	   Inquiry	   into	   the	   Sabra	   and	   Shatilla	  massacres.	   	   At	   best,	   Sharon	   is	   seen	   by	   the	   U.S.	   administration	   as	  anti-­‐American	   –	   a	   pest.	   	   At	  worst,	   he	   is	   feared	   to	   be	   a	   dangerous	  fanatic	  –	  someone	  who	  has	  managed	  to	  make	  Prime	  Minister	  Begin	  look	  moderate	  and	  reasonable	  in	  comparison.”127	  	  The	  appointment	  of	  Arens,	  a	  clear	  U.S.	  favorite,	  to	  replace	  Sharon	  could	  also	  be	  read	  as	   recognition	   of	   Washington’s	   evident	   frustration	   with	   the	   way	   the	   Likud	  government	  had	  been	  handling	  its	  affairs	  in	  Lebanon.	  The	   prime	   minister,	   though	   able	   to	   remain	   in	   office,	   now	   fell	   into	   a	   deep	  depression.	   	  Without	  his	   late	  wife	   to	  pull	  him	  out	  of	   it,	  he	  receded	  almost	  entirely	  from	  the	  daily	  affairs	  of	  government.	  	  His	  inflammatory	  rhetoric	  was	  visibly	  stunted,	  with	   American	   officials	   observing	   that	   “Begin’s	   diminished	   physical	   stamina	   sets	  clear	  limits	  on	  his	  formerly	  effective	  rhetoric	  and	  political	  activity”.128	  	  He	  was	  also	  less	   willing	   to	   push	   back	   during	   disagreements	   with	   the	   United	   States.	   	   The	  American	  ambassador	  at	  the	  time	  commented	  that	  	  “whenever	   I	  would	   be	   dealing	  with	   issues…	   in	   that	   spring	   of	   ‘83,	  Begin	   uncharacteristically…	  would	   listen	   to	  whatever	  message	   or	  report	   Habib…	   or	   I’m	   bringing	   but	   never	   ask	   any	   questions	   and	  never	  really	  develop	  any	  interest	   in	  the	  subject,	  which	  was	  totally	  unlike	  what	  he	  normally	  was,	  so	  therefore	  Shamir	  and	  Arens	  were	  the	   two	   people	   we	   were	   dealing	   with	   on	   anything	   important	  because	  Begin	  was	  really	  withdrawn”.129	  	   Also,	  Reagan’s	  surprising	  willingness	  expressed	  in	  early	  February	  to	  separate	  the	  U.S.	   from	  Israel	  suggests	  and	  extremely	  high	  level	  of	  resolve.	   	   It	   is	  possible	  the	  administration’s	  attention	  would	  have	  remained	  focused	  and	  perhaps	  become	  more	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 Wolf Blitzer, “Rebutting Sharon,” Jerusalem Post, February 4, 1983. 
128 “Former Presidents Briefing: Middle East - Memorandum for William P. Clark from Patrick A. 
Putignano”, June 15, 1983, Collection “Near East and South Asia Affairs Directorate, NSC”, OA/ID#: 
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129 Former US Ambassador to Israel Samuel Wingate Lewis, “Interview with the Author.” 
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targeted	   toward	   shaping	   the	   internal	   Israeli	   equation	   if	   Sharon	   had	   held	   on	   or	   if	  Begin	  went	  straight	  to	  early	  elections	  as	  a	  means	  of	  stabilizing	  their	  position.	  American	  efforts	  during	  this	  period	  should	  be	  coded	  as	  successful	  both	  in	  the	  narrow	   and	   the	   broader	   senses.	   	   In	   the	   narrow	   sense,	   U.S.	   actions	  were	   probably	  helpful	  in	  bringing	  down	  Sharon	  and	  even	  in	  helping	  to	  sideline	  Begin,	  although	  the	  emotional	  toll	  they	  took	  on	  him	  was	  certainly	  not	  an	  intentional	  goal	  of	  U.S.	  policy.	  	  In	  the	  broader	  sense,	  American	  interests	  and	  objectives	  were	  advanced	  by	  helping	  to	  get	  rid	  of	  some	  of	  the	  worst	  irritants	  in	  the	  bilateral	  relationship.	  
<Efficacy,	  Phase	  Three>	  	   Israeli	  journalists	  Melman	  and	  Raviv	  condemn	  the	  Reagan	  administration	  for	  buying	  into	  Teicher’s	  strategy	  of	  focusing	  on	  Arens	  with	  approval	  of	  the	  Lavi.	  	  They	  argue	  that	  “Arens	  did	  not	  become	  prime	  minister	  anyway….	   	  The	  Lavi…	  would	  not	  have	  brought	  him	  the	  nation’s	  leadership.	  	  Teicher	  and	  other	  Americans	  should	  have	  known	  that	  Israeli	  politics	  are	  much	  more	  complex	  than	  the	  success	  or	  failure	  of	  pet	  projects	  –	  even	  when	  the	  United	  States	  pours	  in	  a	  billion	  dollars”.130	  	  Indeed,	  when	  the	   Likud	  Party	   chose	   its	   new	   leader	   to	   succeed	  Begin	   in	   September,	  Arens	   could	  have	  been	  made	  head	  of	  the	  party	  but	  remained	  ineligible	  to	  replace	  Begin	  as	  head	  of	  government	  because	  he	  was	  not	  yet	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Knesset.131	  	  Instead,	  Shamir	  was	  selected	  to	  lead	  the	  Likud	  and	  was	  appointed	  as	  the	  new	  prime	  minister.	  	   However,	   I	   differ	   with	   Melman	   and	   Raviv’s	   assessment	   for	   three	   reasons.	  	  First,	  the	  gesture	  probably	  did	  yield	  benefits	  within	  the	  context	  of	  the	  Israeli	  cabinet	  even	   if	   it	  did	  not	  achieve	   the	  more	  ambitious	  objective	  of	  helping	  make	  Arens	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 Melman and Raviv, Friends in Deed, 268. 
131 Colin Shindler, The Land beyond Promise: Israel, Likud and the Zionist Dream (I.B.Tauris, 2002), 172. 
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prime	   minister.	   	   A	   White	   House	   official	   familiar	   with	   the	   plan	   argues	   that	   it	  strengthened	   Arens’s	   hand	   in	   the	   cabinet	   and	   helped	   him	   advance	   U.S.	   goals	   by	  pushing	   harder	   to	   produce	   an	   agreement	   on	   IDF	   withdrawal	   from	   Lebanon.	  	  Although	  it	  seemed	  “Shamir	  really	  wanted	  to	  be	  absolutely	  hard	  line,”	  this	  individual	  felt	   the	   release	   of	   the	   licenses	   increased	   Arens’s	   ability	   and	   desire	   to	   persuade	  Shamir	   to	   soften	   Israeli	   positions.	   	   He	   felt	   that	   as	   a	   result	   “Arens	   [became]	   a	  moderating	  influence	  on	  Shamir…	  in	  my	  view,	  it	  actually	  worked.	  	  We	  got	  what	  we	  wanted.	   	  We	  got	  Arens’	  assistance	  in	  the	  diplomacy,	  within	  the	  Israeli	  government,	  to	  get	  the	  agreement,	  even	  if	  it	  eventually	  was	  ill-­‐fated”.132	  	   Second,	   these	   sorts	   of	   leadership	   contests	   are	   inherently	   uncertain	   and	  contingent.	   	   The	   fact	   that	   it	   turns	   out	  Arens	  did	  not	   get	   a	   chance	   to	   stand	   for	   the	  prime	   ministership	   does	   not	   mean	   that	   the	   effort	   to	   boost	   his	   chances	   was	  unreasonable	  or	  futile.	  	  In	  fact,	  the	  Likud	  Party	  was	  strongly	  considering	  calling	  new	  elections	  in	  which	  case	  he	  actually	  could	  have	  led	  the	  party	  at	  the	  ballot	  box.133	  	   Third,	  even	  without	  a	  Likud	  Party	  decision	  to	  dissolve	  the	  government,	  Arens	  still	   stood	   a	   reasonable	   chance	  of	   being	   chosen	   as	  party	   leader	   that	   September	  of	  1983	  at	  the	  party’s	  convention.	  	  Fearing	  a	  loss	  of	  power	  to	  the	  upstart	  DM,	  the	  two	  other	  challengers,	  David	  Levy	  and	  Finance	  Minister	  Yoram	  Aridor,	   “decided	   to	  put	  up	   no	   more	   than	   token	   opposition	   [because]	   both	   were	   afraid	   a	   more	   popular	  candidate…	   Arens,	  might	   defeat	   all	   of	   them.	   	  Mr.	   Shamir	   is	   68	   and	   regarded	   as	   a	  stop-­‐gap”.134	  	  A	  poll	  at	  the	  time	  showed	  that	  only	  1.8	  percent	  of	  voters	  would	  have	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chosen	  [Shamir]	  as	  party	   leader,	  and	  the	   Jerusalem	  Post	  commented	  that	   ‘Shamir’s	  strength	  lies	  in	  his	  weakness’.”135	  	  It	  just	  happened	  to	  be	  that	  Shamir	  would	  surprise	  the	  skeptics,	  going	  on	  to	  dominate	  the	  Likud	  list	  for	  the	  next	  decade	  and	  serving	  the	  most	  time	  as	  Israel’s	  prime	  minister	  since	  David	  Ben-­‐Gurion.	  	   The	  effort	   to	  bolster	  Arens	  should	  also	  be	  given	  positive	  marks	   for	  broader	  efficacy	  over	  the	  long	  term.	  	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  the	  Lavi	  and	  warmer	  U.S.	  ties	  helped	  cement	  his	  place	  in	  the	  Likud’s	  top	  echelons,	  this	  seems	  to	  have	  advanced	  American	  interests	  and	  perhaps	  the	  peace	  process	  as	  well.	   	  Arens	  became	  a	  prominent	  voice	  for	   the	  Likud’s	  moderate	  wing,	  was	  often	   responsible	  or	   involved	  when	   the	  Likud	  did	  choose	  to	  make	  gestures	  toward	  the	  peace	  process,	  and	  was	  often	  described	  as	  a	  helpful	  intermediary	  in	  negotiations	  by	  U.S.	  officials	  over	  the	  following	  decade.	  The	   move	   also	   was	   one	   of	   the	   main	   American	   gestures	   at	   the	   time	   –	   as	  Reagan	  saw	  it,	  a	  “palm	  leaf”	  in	  the	  mode	  of	  an	  olive	  branch	  –	  that	  helped	  usher	  in	  the	  shift	   from	   some	   of	   the	   darkest	   days	   in	   bilateral	   relations	   to	   some	   of	   the	   closest,	  during	  Reagan’s	  second	  term.136	  	  This	  shift	  is	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  below.	  
<Efficacy,	  Phase	  Four>	  	   American	  actions	  in	  late	  1983	  and	  early	  1984	  had	  the	  effect	  of	  boosting	  the	  Likud,	  but,	   as	  noted	  above,	   it	   appears	   as	   though	   this	  was	  not	   the	  administration’s	  intention	  so	  much	  as	  a	  byproduct	  of	  using	  Israel	  to	  balance	  Syria	  and	  of	  reaping	  the	  benefits	  from	  better	  relations	  overall.	  	  But	  by	  aligning	  with	  Israel	  over	  Lebanon,	  the	  administration	  undermined	  Labor’s	   case	  and	  bolstered	  Likud’s	  on	   the	   issue	  of	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 Ibid. 
136 Reagan, The Reagan Diaries, 216. See also Lewis, “The United States and Israel: Constancy and 
Change,” 242-245. 
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war.	   	   By	  deciding	   to	   shelve	   the	   revived	  Reagan	  Plan,	   the	  U.S.	   undermined	  Labor’s	  case	  and	  bolstered	  Likud’s	  over	  the	  territories.	  	  Likud’s	  hand	  was	  also	  strengthened	  by	   its	   ability	   to	   point	   to	   booming	   security	   ties	   with	   Washington,	   whereas	   only	  recently	  relations	  had	  been	  frayed	  and	  near	  the	  breaking	  point.	  	   This	   perspective	   is	   confirmed	  by	   former	   Shamir	   advisor	  Yossi	  Ben-­‐Aharon.	  	  Ben-­‐Aharon	  said	  the	  following	  about	  the	  PM’s	  November	  1983	  visit	  to	  Washington:	  	  “Look,	   you	   don’t	   need	   to	   say	   it	   [that	   America	   supports	   Shamir],	  because	   this	   would	   feature	   in	   the	   elections	   [anyway].	   	   Here	   was	  Shamir.	  	  Laborites	  used	  to	  attack	  Likud	  that	  they	  are	  not	  capable	  of	  maintaining	  a	  good	  relationship	  with	  America,	   they	  are	   losing	   the	  strong	   backing	   of	   the	   superpower,	   and	   here	   you	   have	   a	   guy	   like	  Shamir	  who	  is	  coming	  back	  laden	  with	  goodies,	  so	  to	  speak,	  and	  an	  understanding	   unprecedented.	   So	   that	   gave	   him	   a	   clear	   boost	  domestically”.137	  	  	   These	   dynamics	   set	   the	   stage	   for	   the	   upcoming	   July	   elections	   in	   Israel.	  	  Whereas	   the	   campaign	   of	   1981	  was	   perhaps	   the	   nastiest	   in	   Israel’s	   history,	   1984	  may	  have	  been	  the	  dullest.	   	  The	  U.S.	  had	  stopped	  making	  an	   issue	  out	  of	  Lebanon,	  the	  West	  Bank,	  or	  bilateral	  relations,	  and	  Labor	  decided	  to	  do	  the	  same.	  	  The	  party’s	  strategists	   decided	   instead	   to	   pursue	   a	   “catch-­‐all”	   strategy	   of	   deemphasizing	   the	  party’s	   ideological	   positions	   and	   instead	   trying	   to	   win	   over	   undecided	   voters	   by	  making	   the	  race	  about	  wisdom	  and	  experience.138	   	  Thomas	  Friedman,	  who	  served	  then	  as	  a	  foreign	  correspondent	  in	  the	  region,	  describes	  the	  election	  as	  follows:	  	   “Neither	   the	   Labor	   Party	   nor	   the	   Likud	   Party	   focused	   its	   television	   campaign	  commercials	  on	  the	  key	  existential	  issue	  facing	  the	  state	  of	  Israel	  –	  what	  to	  do	  with	  the	  West	  Bank	  and	  Gaza	  Strip.	  	  Instead,	  each	  party	  aired	  pop	  commercials,	  with	  lots	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 Yossi Ben-Aharon, former Director General of the office of Yitzhak Shamir, “Interview with the 
Author”, June 23, 2011. 
138 J. Mendilow, “Israel’s Labor Alignment in the 1984 Elections: Catch-All Tactics in a Divided Society,” 
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of	   beaming	   faces	   and	   Pepsi-­‐generation	   Israelis	   cavorting	   about	   and	   testifying	   in	  singsong	   voices	   about	   how	  wonderful	   life	  was	   in	   a	   Likud-­‐led	   Israel	   or	   how	  much	  better	  it	  would	  be	  in	  a	  Labor-­‐led	  Israel”.139	  	  	  	  He	   also	   reports	   that,	   in	   an	   interview	   with	   Peres,	   the	   Israeli	   leader	   meticulously	  dodged	   his	   questions	   about	   the	   territories	   and	   referred	   to	   the	  West	   Bank	   by	   the	  Biblical	  names	  Judea	  and	  Samaria	  to	  appeal	  to	  undecided	  nationalist	  voters.140	  	  	  	   Labor’s	   strategy	  abjectly	   failed.	   	   It	   frittered	  away	   the	  energized	  state	  of	   the	  Israeli	  left-­‐wing	  that	  had	  been	  so	  engaged	  in	  protests	  against	  the	  Likud	  government	  and	   instead	  alienated	   those	  voters	   in	  hopes	  of	  wooing	  undecideds.141	   	  Meanwhile,	  the	  undecided	  voters	  Peres	  was	  wooing,	  who	  were	  mostly	  Sephardic	  and	  politically	  conservative,	  stuck	  with	  the	  Likud	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  day.	  	  He	  could	  not	  overcome	  his	  unfavorable	  past	   image	  with	  Sephardic	  voters,	  and	  they	  actually	  went	   for	  Likud	   in	  even	  greater	  numbers	  than	  they	  had	  in	  1981.142	  	  Labor	  strategists	  foolishly	  banked	  on	   making	   the	   election	   about	   character	   for	   a	   candidate	   who	   had	   chronic	   image	  issues	  while	  avoiding	  the	  ideological	  topics	  on	  which	  he	  was	  most	  credible.143	  	  	   King	  Hussein’s	  attack	  on	  the	  Reagan	  Plan	  was	  both	  unfortunate	  and	  ill-­‐timed,	  and	  Washington	  cannot	  be	  blamed	  for	  Labor’s	  ultimate	  choice	  of	  strategies	  once	  the	  Israeli	   campaign	   began.	   	   However,	  Washington	   can	   be	   blamed	   for	   decreasing	   the	  viability	  of	  Labor’s	  main	  alternatives.	   	  Labor	  was	  working	  with	  a	  bad	  hand	  on	   the	  territories	  and	  on	  Lebanon,	  and	  many	  of	  those	  cards	  had	  just	  been	  dealt	  by	  the	  U.S.	  	   Thus,	   in	   the	   narrow	   sense	   of	   helping	   Washington’s	   preferred	   political	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 Thomas L. Friedman, From Beirut to Jerusalem (Fontana, 1990), 255. 
140 Ibid., 255-256. 
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partners	  in	  Israel,	  its	  policy	  of	  idyllic	  ties	  and	  non-­‐LSI	  was	  a	  failure.	  	  This	  approach	  undermined	   that	  goal	  and	  helped	  revive	   the	  Likud’s	   flagging	  political	   fortunes.	   	   In	  the	  broader	  sense,	  its	  impact	  was	  more	  mixed.	  	  In	  the	  short-­‐	  and	  medium-­‐term,	  the	  policy	   helped	   produce	   some	   of	   the	   warmest	   years	   of	   bilateral	   ties	   in	   the	  relationship’s	   history.	   	   In	   the	   longer-­‐term,	   it	   set	   the	   stage	   for	   inevitable	  confrontation	  with	  the	  Israeli	  government	  by	  impeding	  the	  prospects	  for	  peace	  with	  Jordan	   and	   facilitating	   the	   eventual	   displacement	   of	   the	   Jordanian	   option	   by	   the	  PLO.	   	  Washington’s	  embrace	  of	  the	  Likud’s	  new	  leadership	  in	  1983/4	  kicked	  a	  can	  down	  the	  road,	  setting	  the	  stage	  for	  more	  severe	  bilateral	  conflict	  in	  future	  years.	  	  
Coding	  the	  Observable	  Implications	  
1.	  Perceptions	  of	  Sender	  Interests:	  
	   One	  area	  in	  which	  the	  theories	  diverge	  involves	  perceptions	  of	  sender	  state	  interests.	   	   National	   interests	   theory	   (Theory	   #1)	   expects	   that	   LSI	   should	   occur	   in	  direct	   relation	   to	   objective	   opportunities	   to	   advance	   national	   interests	   through	  foreign	   intervention.	   	   Intervention	   should	   be	  more	   likely	   when	   opportunities	   are	  objectively	   greater.	   	   The	   lobby-­‐legislative	   approach	   (Theory	   #2)	   expects	   that	   LSI	  should	  be	  unlikely	  if	  members	  of	  these	  groups	  oppose	  intervention	  –	  which,	   in	  the	  Israeli	   case,	   they	   seem	   to	   do.	   	   The	   bureaucratic	   politics	   approach	   (Theory	   #3)	  predicts	   that	   LSI	   should	   be	   highly	   likely	   toward	   Israel	   due	   to	   support	   for	   such	   a	  policy	  from	  the	  professional-­‐level	  bureaucracy	  within	  the	  executive	  branch.	  	  Finally,	  leadership	  theory	  (Theory	  #4)	  predicts	  that	  LSI	  should	  occur	  in	  correlation	  with	  the	  preferences	  and	  desires	  of	  top	  leaders	  within	  the	  government	  of	  the	  sender	  state.	  
	   221	  
<Phases	  One	  and	  Two>	  That	  the	  U.S.	  did	  not	  actively	  consider	  LSI	  toward	  Israel	  until	  the	  end	  of	  1982	  is	  a	  difficult	  result	  to	  explain	  under	  national	   interests	  theory	  or,	   to	  a	   lesser	  extent,	  leadership	   theory.	   	   The	   government	   of	   Israel	   had	   been	   engaging	   in	   provocative	  actions	   that	   infuriated	   the	   administration	   for	  well	   over	   a	   year	  without	   eliciting	   a	  reaction	  in	  terms	  of	  leadership	  selection	  intervention.	  The	   administration	   felt	   that	   Israel’s	   invasion	   of	   Lebanon	   was	   an	  inappropriate	  overreaction.	   	  The	  bombings	  of	  Beirut	   in	  1981	  and	  1982	  were	  both	  seen	   as	   violations	   of	  U.S.	   interests.	   	   Annexation	   of	   the	  Golan	  was	   seen	   as	   harmful	  enough	   to	   the	  U.S.	   to	   justify	   cancellation	  of	   an	  MOU	  on	   security	   cooperation.	   	  The	  fight	  over	  providing	  AWACS	  to	  Saudi	  Arabia	  even	  devolved	  into	  a	  public	  showdown	  which	  the	  media	  called	  “Reagan	  versus	  Begin,”	  yet	  LSI	  seemed	  nowhere	  in	  the	  offing.	  	   One	  explanation	  for	  this	  discrepancy	  is	  provided	  below	  under	  the	  framework	  of	  observable	  implication	  number	  two:	  perceptions	  of	  close	  contests.	  	  Another	  factor	  that	   helps	   explain	   the	   difference	   between	   phase	   one	   and	   phase	   two	   for	   LSI	  considerations	   –	   at	   least	   for	   leadership	   theory	   –	   is	   that	   perceptions	   by	   American	  leaders	   toward	   their	   Israeli	   counterparts	   underwent	   a	   major	   shift	   during	   this	  period.	   	   After	   it	   became	   clear	   just	   how	   much	   responsibility	   Sharon	   bore	   for	  escalation	   of	   the	   fighting	   in	   Lebanon	   and	   for	   deceiving	   decision-­‐makers	   in	   both	  governments,	  he	  lost	  all	  credibility	  with	  the	  U.S.	  	  As	  noted	  by	  Blitzer	  above,	  Sharon	  came	  to	  be	  seen	  in	  Washington	  at	  best	  as	  a	  pest	  and	  at	  worst	  as	  a	  dangerous	  fanatic.	  	   This	   also	   filtered	   through	   to	   Reagan	   and	   Shultz’s	   perceptions	   of	   Begin.	  	  Reagan	  began	  to	  hold	  Begin	  at	  distance	  even	  in	  their	  private	  communications,	  and	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the	   PM’s	   credibility	  was	   steadily	   eroded	   by	   naively	   passing	   on	   Sharon’s	   doctored	  military	  reports	  to	  a	  Washington	  that	  simply	  knew	  better.	  	  Also,	  Reagan	  and	  Shultz	  were	  disappointed	  by	  Begin’s	  absolute	  rejection	  of	  their	  peace	  plan.	   	  By	  the	  time	  it	  became	  clear	  Sharon	  was	  intentionally	  slow-­‐rolling	  negotiations	  with	  Lebanon	  over	  withdrawal	  and	  that	  Begin	  was	  permitting	  this	  move,	  the	  administration	  had	  clearly	  had	   enough	   of	   both	   Israeli	   leaders.	   	   The	   U.S.	   began	   to	   discuss	   LSI	   in	   private	  assessments	  of	  the	  situation	  while	  escalating	  their	  negative	  statements	  in	  public.	  	   The	  Congressional	   role	   during	  phases	   one	   and	   two	  does	  not	  provide	  much	  evidence	   for	   lobby-­‐legislative	   theory.	   	   Despite	   having	   put	   up	   a	   staunch	   fight	   over	  AWACS	  before	  eventually	  caving	  to	  administration	  demands,	  members	  of	  Congress	  were	  furious	  with	  Israel	  after	  the	  start	  of	  the	  Lebanon	  War.	  	  They	  gave	  Begin	  a	  very	  nasty	  reception	  during	  the	  summer	  of	  1982.	   	  After	  meeting	  with	  the	  Conference	  of	  Presidents,	   a	   prominent	   group	   of	   leaders	   from	   the	   American	   Jewish	   community,	  Shultz	   described	   them	   as	   “concerned	   but	   not	   hostile”	   about	   U.S.	   pressure	   toward	  Israel,	  noting	  that	  “a	  sense	  of	  good	  will	  was	  evident	  during	  the	  session”.144	  The	   Congress	   did	   pursue	   one	   major	   action	   that	   contradicted	   the	  administration	  during	  this	  period,	  but	  it	  was	  tangential	  to	  LSI.	   	  Pro-­‐Israel	  lobbyists	  prioritized	   their	   efforts	   during	   tough	   times	   by	   focusing	   on	   aid	   levels,	   persuading	  Senate	   Appropriations	   to	   approve	   $475	   million	   in	   aid	   to	   Israel	   beyond	   what	   the	  administration	  had	  requested.	  	  This	  was	  achieved	  despite	  warnings	  from	  State	  that	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the	  higher	  aid	  levels	  could	  have	  “disastrous	  effects	  on	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy	  and	  leave	  the	  impression	  that	  the	  U.S.	  condones	  Israel’s	  presence	  in	  southern	  Lebanon”.145	  	   However,	   White	   House	   officials	   do	   not	   sound	   as	   though	   they	   were	  particularly	  intimidated	  by	  domestic	  pressures.	   	  For	  instance,	  when	  counseling	  the	  president	  to	  consider	  LSI,	  national	  security	  advisor	  Judge	  Clark	  pressed	  him	  to	  “take	  decisive,	  bold	  action.	   	   I	  do	  not	  say	  that	  naively,	   ignoring	  the	  real	  domestic	  political	  constraints	  which	  impinge	  on	  what	  can	  be	  sustained	  with	  the	  Congress	  or	  the	  public	  at	  large…	  however…	  those	  elements	  also	  respect	  leadership	  and	  that	  success	  creates	  its	   own	   consensus”.146	   	   Teicher’s	   reporting	   was	   more	   concerned	   about	   the	  president’s	  prestige	  abroad	   than	   the	  possibility	  of	  domestic	  backlash	   for	  pursuing	  negative	  LSI.147	  	  Even	  the	  lobby’s	  show	  of	  strength	  on	  aid	  seems	  to	  have	  done	  little	  to	  dissuade	  Reagan	  from	  pondering	  a	  complete	  rupture	  in	  relations	  with	  Israel	  had	  developments	  not	  moved	  in	  a	  more	  favorable	  direction	  that	  February.	  
<Phase	  Three>	  	   Positive	   LSI	   during	   phase	   three	   provides	   strong	   evidence	   for	   leadership	  theory	   over	   its	   structural	   competitors.	   	   Theory	   #1	   suffers	   from	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  strategic	   logic	   alone	   for	   the	  Lavi	  had	  been	   insufficient	   for	  producing	   tech	   transfer	  licenses	  until	  political-­‐level	  justifications	  strengthened	  the	  case	  for	  it.	  Theory	  #2	  suffers	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  administration	  effort	  came	  from	  the	  initiative	   of	   individuals	   in	   the	   executive	   branch,	   not	   the	   legislative.	   	   Pro-­‐Israel	  Members	  of	  Congress	  had	   long	  been	   in	   favor	  of	   the	  Lavi	  project,	  but	   their	  support	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had	  not	  made	  the	  critical	  difference	  before,	  and	  their	  efforts	  to	  advance	  the	  project	  were	  stepped	  up	  in	  the	  fall	  of	  1983,	  not	  in	  the	  spring	  (more	  on	  this	  below).	  	   Theory	   #3	   suffers	   from	   the	   fact	   the	   campaign	   for	   approval	   of	   the	   Lavi	  licenses	  deliberately	  bypassed	  the	  deep	  bureaucracy	  and	  instead	  involved	  a	  handful	  of	   individuals	   at	   the	   very	   top	   of	   government.	   	   The	   Lavi’s	   Israeli	   promoters	  acknowledge	   that	   they	  decided	   “our	   strategy	   should	  be	   that	   the	  Pentagon	  doesn’t	  exist.	  	  This	  is	  a	  political	  decision.	  	  We	  should	  go	  to	  State	  and	  the	  White	  House”.148	  	   Theory	  #4	  provides	  the	  best	  explanation	  for	  America’s	  decision	  to	  grant	  the	  Lavi	  licenses	  in	  April	  of	  1983.	  	  Reagan	  saw	  Arens	  as	  a	  major	  improvement	  over	  his	  predecessor,	  and	  Shultz	  had	  a	  very	  good	  working	  relationship	  with	  the	  new	  defense	  minister.	  	  The	  plan	  to	  use	  the	  Lavi	  for	  LSI	  originated	  at	  the	  White	  House	  with	  an	  NSC	  staffer	  and	  was	  advanced	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  personal	  opinions	  of	  McFarlane,	  Shultz,	  and	  Reagan,	  over	  the	  opposition	  of	  Weinberger	  and	  members	  of	  the	  bureaucracy.	  
<Phase	  Four>	  	   Leadership	  theory	  also	  provides	  the	  most	  persuasive	  explanation	  for	  why	  the	  administration	   turned	   toward	   Israel	   in	   late	   ’83	   and	   early	   ’84	   in	   a	   manner	   that	  benefitted	   the	   Likud	   electorally.	   	   Strategic	   logic	   was	   invoked	   to	   justify	   the	   turn	  toward	   Israel	   –	   which	   would	   seem	   to	   support	   Theory	   #1	   –	   but	   that	   logic	   was	  personalized	  and	  subjective.	   	  Shultz	  and	  his	  advisors	  believed	  it,	  and	  the	  president	  was	   evidently	   brought	   at	   least	   part	   way	   along,	   but	  Weinberger,	   Chairman	   of	   the	  Joint	   Chiefs	   Vessey,	   and	   the	   State	   Department’s	   Near	   East	   bureau	   all	   disagreed.	  	  Strategic	   thinking	   about	   power	   balances	   in	   the	   region	   played	   a	   part	   in	   the	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administration’s	   policy	   shift	   but	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   a	   threat	   assessment	   that	   was	  contested	  and	  subjective,	  not	  consensual	  and	  empirically	  obvious.	  	   Theory	  #2	  also	  receives	  some	  support	  here	  but	  was	  not	  a	  decisive	  factor	   in	  administration	   decision-­‐making.	   	   AIPAC	   was	   a	   “third	   rail”	   consideration	   and	  presidential	   campaigning	   did	   eventually	   intervene	   in	   1984,	   but	   administration	  insiders	  argue	  that	  their	  embrace	  of	  the	  Likud	  had	  much	  more	  to	  do	  with	  personal	  fatigue	   toward	  Arab-­‐Israeli	   issues	   than	   electoral	   pressures.149	   	   The	  U.S.	   continued	  pushing	   hard	   on	   settlements	   until	   Hussein’s	   tantrum	   undermined	   the	   Jordanian	  option.	   	  Officials	  defended	   this	  position	  –	   including	   the	  proposed	  weapons	   sale	   to	  Jordan	  –	   in	   front	  of	  pro-­‐Israel	  audiences	   in	  spite	  of	  open	  criticism	  by	  AIPAC.150	   	   It	  seems	  that	  “from	  Reagan	  and	  Shultz	  on	  down,	  [the	  administration]	  intended	  to	  fight	  all-­‐out	   for	   the	   sale	   even	   if	   AIPAC	   and	   other	   Israeli	   supporters	   couldn’t	   be	   won	  over”.151	  Members	   of	   Congress	   did	   put	   on	   the	   agenda	   a	   proposal	   to	   let	   IAI	   pay	   for	  some	  Lavi	  expenses	  incurred	  in	  Israel	  with	  American	  military	  aid.	  	  In	  fact,	  the	  main	  advocate	   for	   the	   FMS	  waivers	   was	   none	   other	   than	   notorious	   Texas	   Rep.	   Charlie	  Wilson	  of	  Charlie	  Wilson’s	  War	  fame.	  	  He	  and	  his	  colleagues	  were	  so	  eager	  to	  support	  the	  project	  that	  they	  even	  allocated	  $150	  million	  for	  the	  effort	  than	  the	  Israelis	  were	  able	  to	  spend	  in	  a	  single	  year.	   	  However,	  administration	  approval	  of	  the	  waivers	  in	  November	  was	  only	  a	  small	  part	  of	  turning	  toward	  the	  Likud,	  and	  that	  measure	  was	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approved	  because	  it	  fit	  with	  its	  wider	  schema	  on	  regional	  security	  at	  the	  time.152	  	   Theory	   #3	   does	   an	   exceptionally	   bad	   job	   as	   an	   alternative	   to	   leadership	  theory	   during	   this	   period.	   	   The	   bureaucracy	   remained	   alarmist	   about	   Likud	  intentions	   but	   were	   cut	   out	   of	   the	   decision-­‐making	   process.	   	   During	   Begin’s	   last	  days,	  they	  argued	  that	  	  “were	  Begin	   to	   depart,	   and	  were	   the	   successor	   government	   to	   be	  Likud-­‐led,	   it	   would	   likely	   pursue	   a	   similar	   policy.	   	   A	   Labor	  government,	  however,	  would	  be	  likely	  to	  revert	  partially	  to	  earlier,	  more	   flexible	   Israeli	   policies.	   	   In	   fact,	   Labor	   Party	   leaders	   have	  given	   clear	   signals	   that	   they	   would	   find	   the	   President’s	   1	  September	  proposals	  a	  good	  starting	  point	  for	  negotiations	  leading	  toward	  a	  resolution	  of	  the	  Palestinian	  issue…	  [Also,]	  the	  U.S.	  must	  pursue	   the	   Middle	   East	   peace	   process…	   [because]	   this	   issue	   is	  fundamentally	  important	  for	  political	  and	  security	  reasons	  to	  most	  of	  the	  states	  of	  Southwest	  Asia”.153	  	  However,	  officials	  from	  the	  Near	  East	  bureau	  were	  “kept	  largely	  in	  the	  dark”	  while	  the	  turn	  toward	  Israel	  was	  being	  worked	  out	  by	  Shultz’s	  advisors.	  	  More	  influential	  than	  NEA	  were	  those	  in	  Shultz’s	  personal	  office,	  Deputy	  Secretary	  Eagleburger,	  and	  the	   secretary’s	   Policy	   Planning	   Staff.154	   	   The	   perspective	   at	   the	   political	   level	  was	  “Sure,	  Shamir	  was	  an	  obstinate	  little	  bugger,	  but	  Sharon	  and	  Begin	  were	  out!”.155	  	  2.	  Perceptions	  of	  Close	  Contests	  The	   theories	   also	   diverge	   with	   regard	   to	   whether	   or	   not	   officials	   in	   the	  sender	  state	  notice	  that	  a	  close	  leadership	  contest	  is	  brewing	  in	  the	  target.	  	  Theories	  2	   and	   3	   do	   not	   pose	   very	   clear	   predictions	   in	   this	   regard,	   but	   national	   interests	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theory	  (Theory	  #1)	  suggests	  that	  LSI	  should	  occur	  in	  direct	  accordance	  to	  objective	  circumstances	   abroad,	   whereas	   leadership	   theory	   (Theory	   #4)	   suggests	   that	   the	  occurrence	  of	  LSI	  should	  be	  conditioned	  first	  upon	  whether	  or	  not	  top	  officials	  in	  the	  sender	  state	  are	  actually	  paying	  attention	  to	  political	  dynamics	  in	  the	  target	  state.	  The	  matter	   of	   perceived	   close	   contests	  may	   help	   explain	  why	   LSI	   emerged	  during	  phase	  two	  but	  not	  in	  phase	  one,	  as	  well	  as	  why	  U.S.	  activity	  during	  phase	  two	  may	  not	  have	  escalated	   from	  partial	   to	   full.	   	  There	  was	  already	  a	  steady	  stream	  of	  Israeli	  actions	  during	  phase	  one	  that	  upset	  the	  administration,	  but	  only	  in	  phase	  two	  was	   the	   Israeli	   public	   mobilized	   enough	   to	   make	   a	   close	   contest	   look	   feasible.	  	  Administration	  officials	  may	  have	  held	  back	  from	  full	  LSI	  during	  phase	  two	  for	  hope	  that	   the	  Kahan	  Commission	  might	   accomplish	   the	   dirty	  work	   of	   removing	   Sharon	  without	   direct	   American	   involvement.	   	   These	   observations	   help	   offset	   some	   of	  Theory	  #1’s	  poor	  showing	  above	  and	  also	  fit	  with	  the	  predictions	  of	  Theory	  #4.	  Positive	   LSI	   during	   phase	   three	   was	   no	   doubt	   motivated	   by	   a	   belief	   that	  Arens	  was	  a	  viable	  political	   actor,	   either	   to	   contend	   for	   the	   top	  post	  or	  at	   least	   to	  affect	  Israeli	  behavior	  in	  negotiations.	  	  This	  perception	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  correct,	  even	  to	  some	  extent	  regarding	  Arens’	  viability	  for	  contesting	  the	  PM	  job.	  	  However,	  it	   is	  not	  clear	  how	  much	   this	  perception	  was	   fueled	  by	  objective	   indicators	  versus	  individuals’	  positive	  experiences	  with	  him	  from	  when	  he	  served	  in	  Washington.	  During	   phase	   four,	   the	   lack	   of	   LSI	   can	   in	   part	   be	   attributed	   to	   matters	   of	  attention	  and	   fatigue,	  providing	  additional	  support	   for	  Theory	  #4.	   	  Administration	  officials	  had	  a	  hangover	  for	  Arab-­‐Israeli	  conflict	  resolution,	  and	  they	  were	  distracted	  by	  other	  issues	  at	  the	  time.	  	  One	  of	  these	  was	  the	  presidential	  campaign	  –	  which	  fits	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best	  with	  Theory	  #2	  –	  but	  so	  were	  internal	  policy	  debates	  over	  how	  to	  handle	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  arming	  Iraq	   in	   its	  war	  against	   Iran.	   	  Neither	  the	  administration’s	  approach	   to	   Iraq	   nor	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   objectively	   required	   offsetting	   concessions	  toward	  Israel,	  so	  this	  distraction	  should	  be	  coded	  more	  as	  a	  drag	  on	  top	  individuals’	  time	  and	  attention	  (Theory	  #4)	  than	  objective	  strategic	  interests	  justifying	  a	  change	  in	   Levant	   policy	   (Theory	   #1).	   	   As	   Charlie	   Hill	   notes,	   by	   mid-­‐1984,	   nobody	   was	  paying	  attention	  to	  how	  close	  the	  Israeli	  elections	  were.	  	  That	  factor	  was	  objectively	  present	  but	  did	  not	  garner	  high-­‐level	  attention	  in	  Washington.	  	  3.	  Patterns	  of	  Domestic	  Debate:	  	   Whereas	   the	   bureaucratic	   politics	   approach	   (Theory	   #3)	   and	   the	   lobby-­‐legislative	   approach	   (Theory	   #2)	   expect	   these	   actors	   and	   institutions	   to	   be	   well-­‐informed	   about	   administration	   deliberations	   over	  whether	   or	   not	   to	   conduct	   LSI,	  leadership	  theory	  (Theory	  #4)	  expects	  that	  these	  actors	  may	  actually	  be	  kept	  in	  the	  dark	  about	  administration	  intentions.	  Both	   the	   positive	   and	   negative	   episodes	   of	   LSI	   described	   above	   offer	  evidence	   to	   support	   the	   predictions	   of	   Theory	   #4	   and	   the	   paper	   paradox	   in	   the	  deliberative	  process.	  	  Shortly	  before	  Judge	  Clark’s	  memo	  to	  the	  president	  calling	  for	  negative	  LSI,	  Clark’s	  aide	  Bud	  McFarlane	  passed	  along	  a	  note	  to	  update	  him	  on	  their	  “close-­‐hold”	  deliberations	  over	  how	  to	  deal	  with	  “Israel’s	   intransigence”.	   	  He	  notes	  that	  during	  a	  meeting	  with	  Phil	  Habib	  in	  the	  Oval	  Office	  “the	  President	  agreed	  that	  Israel	  was	  the	  problem”.	   	  McFarlane	  speaks	  in	  terms	  of	  “the	  moment	  of	  truth”	  and	  “firm	  action”	  toward	  Israel,	  explaining	  that	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  “All	   [in	   the	  Oval	  Office]	  understood	  the	  extreme	  sensitivity	  of	   this	  issue	   and	   the	   need	   for	   discretion.	   After	   the	  meeting	   I	   called	   Ken	  Dam	  and	  asked	  that	  he	  convene	  a	  small	  discrete	  [sic]	  group	  of	  three	  or	   four	   people	   to	   think	   about	   the	   issues…	   Yesterday	   at	   5:30	   Ken	  Dam	   convened	   a	   meeting.	   Contrary	   to	   my	   request,	   12	   people	  showed	   up…	   All	   of	   us	   agreed	   that	  we	   ought	   not	   put	   anything	   on	  paper	   until	   the	   night	   before	   the	   meeting	   with	   the	   President	   (if	  then)”.156	  	  This	   pattern	   also	   seems	   to	   fit	   internal	   administration	  deliberations	   about	  positive	  LSI	  during	  phase	  three.	   	  When	  I	  sat	  down	  to	  interview	  him,	  former	  Ambassador	  to	  Israel	   Samuel	   Lewis	   acknowledged:	   “I	   don’t	   know	  what	   the	   hell	   Teicher’s	   talking	  about.	   	   It	  may	  be	   that	   that	  argument	  was	  made	   in	  a	  memo	  –	   I	  never	  heard	  of	   that	  memo	  –	  or	  the	  NSC	  meeting,	  but	  nobody	  ever	  suggested	  [it]	  to	  me”.157	  	  4.	  Cycles	  of	  Domestic	  Power:	  	   Theory	  #1	  offers	  no	  predictions	  for	  this	  observable	  implication,	  and	  –	  since	  these	  cases	  did	  not	  take	  place	  during	  the	  start	  of	  an	  administration	  –	  neither	  does	  Theory	  #3.	   	  Lobby-­‐legislative	  politics	  would	  expect	  domestic	  pressures	  to	  be	  more	  powerful	   toward	  the	  very	  end	  of	  a	   term	  as	  presidential	  elections	  are	  approaching.	  	  The	  fact	  that	  LSI	  did	  not	  occur	  during	  1984	  fits	  with	  this	  prediction,	  and	  there	  does	  seem	   to	   have	   been	   a	   domestic	   component	   to	   the	   administration’s	   decision	   to	  withdraw	   from	  Lebanon	   and	   embrace	   the	   Likud.	   	  However,	   as	   argued	   extensively	  above,	  in	  neither	  instance	  was	  the	  domestic	  factor	  decisive.	  	  Rather,	  key	  individuals’	  subjective	  perceptions	  of	  the	  strategic	  environment	  mattered	  much	  more.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156 “Ken Dam’s Close-Hold Review on Where to Go in Lebanon - Memorandum for Judge Clark signed 
‘Bud’ [McFarlane]”, January 28, 1983, Collection “Robert McFarlane Files”, Box 5, Folder "Sensitive 
Chron File - [01/07/1983 - 03/02/1983], Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. Underlining in the original. 
157 Former US Ambassador to Israel Samuel Wingate Lewis, “Interview with the Author.” 
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  5.	  Bureaucratic	  Freelancing:	  	   Theory	  #3	  (the	  bureaucratic	  politics	  approach)	  anticipates	  that	  bureaucratic	  freelancing	   should	   be	   quite	   common.	   	   However,	   leadership	   theory	   (Theory	   #4)	  claims	   that	   it	   should	   be	   much	   rarer	   and	   conditioned	   upon	   whether	   or	   not	   the	  president	   demonstrates	   an	   active	   or	   passive	   style	   of	   overall	   management	   and	   of	  specific	  issue	  oversight	  regarding	  bilateral	  relations	  with	  the	  target	  state.	  This	   case	   provides	   support	   for	   Theory	   #4,	   the	   leadership-­‐based	   approach.	  	  President	   Reagan’s	   behavior	   during	   this	   period	   was	   both	   unusual	   and	  consequential.	   	  He	  acted	   somewhat	  out	  of	   character	  when	  he	  decisively	  overruled	  his	  defense	  secretary	  to	  enforce	  a	  decision	  over	  the	  Lavi.	  	  His	  support	  for	  LSI	  in	  this	  instance	  and	  perhaps	  during	  phase	   two	  are	  also	  out	  of	  character	   for	  an	   individual	  renowned	   for	   his	   disinterest	   in	   the	   peace	   process	   and	   lax	   style	   of	   oversight.	  	  However,	   the	  president’s	  attention	  was	  unusually	   focused	  on	  Israeli	  policy-­‐making	  during	  this	  period	  because	  of	  America’s	  embroilment	  in	  the	  Lebanon	  conflict.	  	   Some	  freelancing	  may	  still	  have	  taken	  place.	  	  Amb.	  Lewis	  was	  later	  accused	  of	  colluding	  in	  early	  1983	  with	  a	  Sharon	  rival	  within	  the	  Likud,	  Simcha	  Ehrlich,	  to	  have	  the	  Defense	  Minister	  booted	  out	  of	  office.158	  	  There	  are	  reasons	  to	  cast	  serious	  doubt	  on	   these	   claims,	   but,	   if	   true,	   they	   could	   represent	   an	   instance	   of	   bureaucratic	  freelancing.	   	   Such	  behavior	  would	  have	  been	   in	   fitting	  with	  administration’s	   goals	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158 “Sharon accuses U.S. officials of plotting his ouster,” Associated Press, December 9, 1983, AM Cycle 
edition; “Sharon accuses U.S. Ambassador of trying to oust him,” Associated Press, December 9, 1983, PM 
Cycle edition; Lewis, “Interview with Ambassador Samuel Wingate Lewis,” 180-94. For instance, the story 
came from a reporter who was a favorite recipient of leaks from Sharon, and Ehrlich’s widow denied the 
story even though it was predicated upon a claim about documents allegedly in her possession. 
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but	   probably	   not	   the	   specific	   level	   of	   interference	   that	   had	   been	   authorized.	  	  However,	  more	  instances	  of	  freelancing	  emerge	  during	  Reagan’s	  second	  term,	  which	  makes	  sense	  since	  he	  no	  longer	  cared	  so	  much	  to	  address	  the	  conflict	  at	  that	  point.	  	  6.	  Consistency	  of	  Message:	  The	   theories	   also	   diverge	   with	   regard	   to	   whether	   or	   not	   the	   message	  communicated	  by	  the	  sender	  state’s	  policies	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  consistent.	   	  Theory	  #1	  (the	   national	   interests	   approach)	   predicts	   that	   this	   should	   be	   unproblematic,	  whereas	  the	  other	  theories	  emphasize	  institutional	  or	  personal	  disagreements	  that	  may	  undermine	  the	  sender	  state’s	  ability	  to	  convey	  a	  consistent	  message	  abroad.	  During	   phase	   one,	   the	   prevailing	   message	   toward	   Israel	   from	  Washington	  was	  one	  of	  anger	  with	  the	  Likud	  government,	  albeit	  not	  with	  the	  objective	  of	  LSI	  in	  mind.	   	   This	   fits	   with	   Theories	   1,	   3,	   and	   4	   and	   somewhat	   contradicts	   Theory	   #2.	  	  Lobby-­‐legislative	   theory	   would	   predict	   not	   only	   that	   Congress	   would	   push	   back	  against	   this	   message	   but	   that	   it	   would	   do	   so	   enough	   to	   undermine	   its	  persuasiveness.	  	  However,	  it	  was	  quite	  evident	  to	  all	  involved	  that	  Washington’s	  ire	  with	   Jerusalem	  was	   sincere	   and	   substantial.	   	   Also,	   other	   than	   during	   the	   AWACS	  dispute,	  at	  no	  point	  did	  Congress	  appear	  poised	  to	  overrule	  the	  executive.	  During	   phase	   two,	   the	   message	   from	   Washington	   continued	   to	   be	   one	   of	  frustration	  but	  now	  it	  included	  the	  corollary	  that	  improved	  relations	  could	  depend	  upon	  certain	  members	  of	  the	  GoI	  departing	  the	  scene.	  	  This	  fits	  Theories	  1,	  3,	  and	  4	  but	   not	   the	   lobby-­‐legislative	   approach.	   	   The	   White	   House’s	   message	   was	  undermined,	   especially	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   its	   peace	   plan,	   when	   the	   Senate	   Appropriations	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Committee	  decided	  to	  offer	  increased	  aid	  to	  Israel	  beyond	  what	  the	  administration	  was	  seeking.	  	  However,	  this	  deicsion	  did	  not	  prevent	  Blitzer	  or	  other	  observers	  from	  recognizing	   by	   early	   February	   that	   the	   administration	   was	   furious	   with	   Sharon,	  unhappy	  with	  Begin,	  and	  perhaps	  willing	  to	  work	  hard	  to	  push	  them	  out.	  	   During	   phase	   three,	   the	   message	   being	   conveyed	   was	   that	   Washington	  considered	  Arens	  a	  genuine	  partner	  and	  that	  security	  relations	  would	  prosper	  if	  he	  remained	  influential.	  	  Congress	  and	  AIPAC	  boosted	  the	  Lavi	  project	  but	  were	  late	  to	  the	   party,	   working	   to	   achieve	   FMS	   waivers	   but	   not	   doing	   much	   to	   project	   the	  message	  in	  the	  first	  place	  through	  the	  approval	  of	  critical	  tech	  transfer	  licenses.	  Theories	  1	  and	  3	  fare	  poorly	  in	  this	  instance.	  	  The	  strategic	  logic	  for	  the	  Lavi	  had	  not	  been	  persuasive	  enough	  to	  justify	  the	  project	  during	  earlier	  periods,	  and	  it	  was	   approved	   over	   the	   firm	   objection	   of	   the	   Defense	   Department.	   	   However,	   the	  prevailing	   mood	   was	   that	   these	   factions	   were	   out	   of	   favor	   at	   the	   time	   and	   they	  appeared	  unlikely	  to	  disrupt	  the	  administration’s	  plan	  once	  put	  into	  action.	  Messaging	  during	  phase	   four	  was	  both	  consistent	  and	  homogenous,	  but	   the	  topic	  of	  suitability	  makes	  for	  a	  more	  interesting	  question,	  which	  is	  taken	  up	  below.	  	  7.	  Suitability	  of	  Message:	  	   Finally,	  the	  theories	  also	  diverge	  with	  regard	  to	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  message	  they	  convey	  is	  likely	  to	  support	  or	  undermine	  the	  narrative	  supported	  by	  its	  favored	  protégé	  within	  the	  target	  state.	  	  Theory	  #1	  (national	  interests	  theory)	  holds	  that	  this	  should	  be	  unproblematic,	  whereas	  the	  other	  approaches	  emphasize	  institutional	  or	  personal	  biases	  that	  may	  detract	  from	  the	  sender	  state’s	  ability	  to	  convey	  a	  suitable	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message	  for	  successful	  LSI.	  Phase	   four	  was	  the	  period	   in	  which	  Washington’s	  message	  was	  most	  out	  of	  sync	  with	  its	  true	  preferences	  toward	  internal	  Israeli	  politics.	   	  As	  noted	  above,	  the	  strategic	  logic	  behind	  the	  turn	  toward	  Israel	  was	  not	  uniformly	  accepted	  within	  the	  U.S.	   government;	   some	   bodies	   charged	   with	   assessing	   the	   security	   strategy	   –	  Defense,	   the	   Joint	   Chiefs,	   and	   State’s	   Near	   East	   bureau	   –	   strongly	   objected	   to	   the	  administration’s	   approach.	   	   However,	   their	   objection	   did	   little	   to	   undermine	   the	  strategy’s	   unintended	   impact	   on	   the	   internal	   Israeli	   scene.	   	   Nor	   was	   the	  administration’s	  Likud-­‐friendly	  message	  the	  result	  of	  Congress	   forcing	  the	  hand	  of	  an	   unwilling	   administration.	   	   These	   trends	   contradict	   Theories	   1,	   2,	   and	   3	   with	  regard	  to	  the	  observable	  implication	  of	  message	  suitability.	  	   Rather,	   it	   seems	   that	  Washington’s	  message	  worked	  against	   its	  preferences	  about	   internal	   Israeli	   politics	   because	   of	   factors	  most	   germane	   to	   Theory	   #4:	   the	  idiosyncratic	  beliefs,	  perceptions,	  and	  concerns	  of	  top	  U.S.	  leaders.	  	  Reagan	  was	  sick	  of	  devoting	  so	  much	  attention	  to	  the	  Levant,	  and	  Shultz	  was	  absolutely	  fed	  up	  with	  the	   region,	  having	   spent	  almost	  his	  entire	   time	   in	  office	   consumed	  with	  managing	  the	   Arab-­‐Israeli	   conflict.	   	   Shultz	   sold	   Reagan	   on	   the	   questionable	   threat	   of	   Soviet	  tentacles	  in	  the	  region	  via	  an	  overgrown	  Syria	  and	  the	  outrageous	  notion	  that	  Israeli	  decision-­‐makers	  needed	  encouragement	  to	  be	  assertive	  about	  security	  affairs.	  	  King	  Hussein’s	   tantrum	  also	  exacerbated	   the	   impact	   that	   their	   strategic	   embrace	  of	   the	  GoI	  had	  on	  internal	  Israeli	  politics,	  but	  the	  main	  drivers	  for	  this	  case	  seem	  to	  have	  been	  the	  subjective	  experiences	  of	  individual	  American	  officials.	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Reagan,	  Case	  #3:	  Shultz’s	  Siamese	  Twins,	  1985-­‐1988	  	   	  	  	   During	   his	   second	   term	   in	   office,	   President	   Reagan	   and	   his	   administration	  confronted	   an	   entirely	   different	   political	   landscape	   in	   Israel.	   	   Neither	   Labor	   nor	  Likud	  could	  form	  a	  satisfactory	  government	  without	  the	  other,	  and	  so	  both	  agreed	  to	  participate	  in	  a	  National	  Unity	  Government	  (NUG).	  	  Shimon	  Peres	  would	  serve	  as	  Prime	  Minister	  for	  the	  first	  two	  years,	  after	  which	  he	  would	  hand	  the	  office	  over	  to	  Yitzhak	   Shamir.	   	   Understandably,	   this	   tenuous	   balance	   created	   numerous	  opportunities	   for	   American	   meddling	   in	   Israeli	   politics.	   	   It	   also	   heightened	  sensitivities	  among	  right-­‐wing	  Israelis	  and	  some	  Americans	  about	  the	  risks	  of	  LSI.	  In	  this	  section,	  I	  divide	  Reagan’s	  second	  term	  into	  three	  main	  phase.	  	  In	  each	  instance,	   the	   administration	   devised	   an	   approach	   to	   Israeli	   politics	   that	   was	  decentralized,	  ambivalent,	   and	   internally	   conflicted.	   	  Without	  boots	  on	   the	  ground	  or	  a	  war	   in	   the	  Levant,	  President	  Reagan	  remained	  aloof	   from	  Arab-­‐Israeli	  affairs.	  	  For	  example,	  his	  senior	  Mideast	  advisor	  at	  the	  NSC	  recalls:	  “when	  I	  started	  in	  1987…	  the	   President	   did	   not	   place	   the	   so-­‐called	   Middle	   East	   peace	   process	   high	   on	   his	  agenda.	   	  He	   paid	   some	   attention	   to	   it,	   but	   only	   as	   situations	   required”.159	   	   Shultz,	  who	  had	  increasingly	  become	  the	  president’s	  surrogate	  for	  the	  conflict,	  preferred	  a	  deliberately	  low-­‐key	  approach	  that	  was	  ill-­‐suited	  to	  advancing	  U.S.	  objectives	  in	  the	  Israeli	   political	   arena.	   	  Other	   individuals	   freelanced	   in	  ways	   designed	   to	   project	   a	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firmer	  line	  on	  Israeli	  political	  affairs,	  but	  their	  efforts	  generally	  came	  to	  naught.	  As	  one	  keen	  observer	  points	  out,	  Shultz	  “presided	  over,	  and,	  given	  President	  Reagan’s	   detachment,	   was	   primarily	   responsible	   for	   a	   fundamental	   change	   in	  emphasis	  in	  U.S.	  policy	  on	  the	  Arab-­‐Israeli	  conflict”.160	  	  Further,	  his	  policy	  legacy	  on	  the	  conflict	  was	  “the	  product	  as	  much	  of	  his	  personality	  and	  personal	  style	  as	  of	  any	  strategic	  planning”.161	  As	  journalists	  have	  noted,	  Shultz	  tended	  to	  see	  the	  world	  as	  “a	  problem	  of	  management”	   (unlike,	   say,	   Carter	   the	   engineer’s	   conviction	   that	   deep-­‐seated	  conflicts	  can	  and	  should	  be	  solved).162	  	  Instead,	  the	  secretary	  provided	  ample	  grounds	   for	   suspecting	   he	   was	   “concerned	   only	   with	   preventing	   the	   world	   from	  blowing	  up	   in	  his	   face	  tomorrow”.163	   	  Whereas	  this	  subdued	  approach	  focusing	  on	  conflict	   management	   instead	   of	   resolution	   may	   have	   been	   an	   asset	   in	   Cold	   War	  relations	  –	  helping	  nudge	  Reagan	  to	  tone	  down	  confrontation	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  during	  his	  second	  term	  –	  it	  also	  meant	  that	  Shultz	  was	  terribly	  ill-­‐suited	  to	  creating	  anything	  but	  drift	  in	  the	  explosive	  realm	  of	  Israeli-­‐Arab	  relations.	  	  
Coding	  the	  Dependent	  Variables	  (Occurrence	  and	  Efficacy)	  Did	  LSI	  Occur?	  	   Yes.	   	   In	   all	   three	   instances,	   the	   administration	   responded	   with	   mixed	   and	  muted	   voice.	   	   Invariably,	   some	   officials	   tried	   to	   conduct	   leadership	   selection	  intervention	   that	   would	   help	   bolster	   Shimon	   Peres,	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   they	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stymied	  by	  the	  president’s	  disinterest	  and	  the	  secretary	  of	  state’s	  opposition.	  	   During	  phase	  one	  (1985	  and	  1986),	  the	  U.S.	  Ambassador	  to	  Israel	  sought	  to	  help	   Labor	   void	   its	   rotation	   agreement	   with	   the	   Likud	   by	   producing	   a	   major	  Jordanian	   peace	   deal	   that	   the	   right-­‐wing	   would	   no	   doubt	   reject.	   	   There	   were	   no	  doubt	  impediments	  to	  reaching	  such	  a	  solution,	  but	  Amb.	  Thomas	  Pickering	  did	  not	  get	   much	   help	   from	   back	   home.	   	   The	   rotation	   agreement	   took	   place	   as	   planned:	  Shamir	  became	  PM,	  and	  Peres	  moved	  to	  the	  foreign	  ministry.	  	   During	  phase	  two	  (1987),	  FM	  Peres	  finally	  achieved	  a	  major	  breakthrough	  on	  the	   peace	   process:	   a	   secret	   agreement	   in	   London	  with	   King	  Hussein	   over	   how	   to	  launch	  negotiations.	   	  However,	  since	  he	  was	  no	  longer	  prime	  minister,	  Peres	  could	  not	  dissolve	  his	  government	  at	  will,	  and	  PM	  Shamir	  was	  dead	  set	  against	  the	  plan.	  	  Instead,	  Labor	  needed	  enough	  drama	  to	  garner	  61	  votes	  in	  the	  Knesset	  in	  order	  to	  topple	  Shamir,	  and	  for	  that	  Peres	  depended	  upon	  America	  to	  get	  involved.	   	  He	  and	  King	  Hussein	  sought	  for	  the	  U.S.	  to	  pitch	  their	  secret	  agreement	  as	  its	  own,	  so	  as	  to	  give	   each	   of	   them	   enough	   political	   cover	   to	   sign	   onto	   it	   in	   public.	   	   Pickering	   and	  some	   other	  U.S.	   officials	   hoped	  Washington	  would	   pursue	   an	   activist	   approach	   to	  the	  Accords	  that	  would	  help	  boost	  the	  forces	  of	  peace.	   	  However,	  Shultz	  refused	  to	  let	  the	  administration	  get	  involved.	  	  The	  London	  Accords	  –	  probably	  the	  last	  chance	  for	  a	  realistic	  Jordanian	  option	  –	  fizzled	  out	  due	  to	  apparent	  lack	  of	  U.S.	  interest,	  and,	  along	  with	  them,	  Peres’s	  chances	  of	  toppling	  the	  unity	  government.	  	   During	  phase	  three	  (1988),	  the	  U.S.	  government	  found	  itself	  back	  in	  the	  peace	  processing	  business.	  	  The	  outbreak	  of	  the	  first	  Palestinian	  intifada	  convinced	  many	  that	   something	   had	   to	   be	   done,	   and	   it	   gradually	   became	   clear	   even	   to	   Shultz	   that	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Shamir	  was	  “still	  captive	  of	  old	  ways	  of	  thinking”.164	  	  Whereas	  previously	  President	  Reagan	  had	  proposed	  his	  own	  peace	  plan	  in	  September	  of	  1982,	  this	  time	  he	  left	  it	  to	  his	  secretary	  of	  state,	  who	  revealed	  what	  became	  known	  as	  the	  Shultz	  Initiative	  in	  the	  beginning	  of	   ’88.	   	  Shultz	  was	  not	  deterred	  by	  Congressional	  opposition,	  nor	  by	  the	   fact	   that	   it	   was	   a	   presidential	   election	   year,	   but	   he	   continued	   to	   believe	   that	  anything	   successful	   had	   to	   be	   done	   through	   Shamir,	   not	   over	   his	   opposition.	  	  Because	  Shultz	  refused	  to	  back	  up	  his	  plan	  with	  American	  threats,	  Shamir	  therefore	  felt	   free	   to	  kill	   Shultz’s	  Plan	  by	  being	  obstinate	  nonetheless.	   	   Some	  administration	  officials	   tried	   to	   help	   Peres	   by	   toughening	   up	   Shultz’s	   soft	   touch,	   but	  without	   the	  president’s	  consistent	  support	  they	  were	  marginalized	  throughout.	  	   Finally,	  I	  also	  contrast	  American	  efforts	  to	  influence	  Israeli	  politics	  with	  those	  by	  other	  outside	  actors	  during	  Reagan’s	  second	  term,	  especially	  in	  1988.	  	  Jordan	  and	  Egypt	  were	  both	  intensively	  involved	  in	  trying	  to	  shape	  Israeli	  politics.	  	  It	  seems	  the	  PLO,	  France,	  Britain,	  and	  perhaps	  even	  the	  USSR	  each	  tried	  a	  hand	  at	  this	  as	  well.	  
<Phase	  One:	  Blocking	  Rotation>	  	   Peres	   pursued	   four	   priorities	   during	   his	   rump	   term	   as	   prime	  minister:	   (1)	  fixing	   Israel’s	   crisis-­‐ridden	   economy,	   (2)	   withdrawing	   the	   IDF	   from	   south-­‐central	  Lebanon	   to	   a	   smaller	   security	   zone	   above	   Israel’s	   border,	   (3)	   resolving	   a	   dispute	  with	   Egypt	   over	   Taba,	   and	   (4)	   promoting	   a	   peace	   plan	   that	   used	   the	   Jordanian	  option.	   	   This	   last	   item	  was	   of	   greatest	   interest	   long-­‐term	   to	  Washington,	   but	   the	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other	  three	  items	  were	  more	  pressing	  and	  took	  up	  much	  of	  his	  time	  in	  office.165	  According	   to	   Arthur	   Hughes,	   who	   served	   as	   deputy	   chief	   of	   mission	   at	  Embassy	  Tel	  Aviv,	  it	  was	  clear	  that	  for	  Peres	  “one	  of	  his	  objects	  in	  life	  was	  to	  figure	  out	  how	  to	  break	  the	  national	  unity	  government…	  before	  the	  transition”.166	   	  While	  he	  was	  still	  prime	  minister,	  Peres	  had	  more	  assets	  at	  his	  disposal	  for	  doing	  so.	   	  He	  could	  dissolve	   the	  government	  at	  will	  and	  was	  not	   required	   to	  muster	  61	  Knesset	  votes.	  	  He	  could	  also	  refuse	  to	  hand	  off	  the	  premiership,	  although	  he	  felt	  he	  needed	  a	  rather	   extraordinary	   justification	   for	   doing	   so.167	   	   Thus,	   Labor	   leaders	   sought	   to	  achieve	  something	  dramatic	  on	   the	   Jordanian	   track	   that	  would	  be	  unacceptable	   to	  the	  Likud	  but	  seen	  by	  the	  public	  as	  an	  important	  step	  forwards.168	  Apparently,	  Ambassador	  to	  Israel	  Thomas	  Pickering	  sought	  to	  help	  Peres	  use	  the	  issue	  of	  talks	  with	  Jordan	  as	  a	  means	  of	  both	  advancing	  the	  peace	  process	  and	  expelling	   the	   Likud	   from	   power.	   	   Pickering’s	   political	   counselor	   at	   the	   embassy,	  Roger	  Harrison,	  told	  the	  foreign	  service	  oral	  history	  now	  deposited	  at	  the	  Library	  of	  Congress	   that	   that	  Pickering	  “was	  conspiring…	  playing	  a	  quasi-­‐partisan	  role	   in	   the	  [Israeli]	  political	  equation”.169	   	  Another	   individual	  who	  was	   familiar	  with	   this	  case	  confirms	   that	   some	   U.S.	   ambassadors	   to	   Israel	   “played	   Israeli	   politics	   without	  getting	  their	  hands	  dirty…	  did	  Thomas	  Pickering	  play?	  	  Yes	  he	  did”.170	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When	  an	  analyst	  for	  AIPAC	  went	  and	  met	  with	  the	  American	  ambassador	  the	  following	  summer,	  the	  headline	  that	  came	  out	  of	  their	  conversation	  was	  “Pickering	  denies	   interference,”	   in	   which	   he	   “acknowledged	   that	   the	   U.S.	   position	   on	   an	  international	   conference	   on	   the	   Middle	   East	   is	   closer	   to	   that	   of	   Isralei	   Foreign	  Minister	   Shimon	   Peres	   than	   Prime	   Minister	   Yitzhak	   Shamir	   but	   denied	   that	   in	  publicly	   communicating	   that	   policy	   Washington	   was	   meddling	   in	   internal	   Israeli	  affairs”.171	  	  He	  felt	  compelled	  to	  insist	  that	  that	  United	  States	  has	  “on	  every	  occasion	  tried	  to	  make	  clear	  to	  all	  of	  our	  contacts	  that	  we	  did	  not	  wish	  to	  interfere	  and	  would	  not	  interfere	  in	  the	  internal	  political	  process	  in	  Israel	  and	  we	  were	  going	  at	  the	  same	  time	   to	   conduct	   our	   foreign	   policy	   by	   explaining	   clearly	   our	   position”.172	   	   He	  recognized	   that	   “it	   is	   true	   that	   some	   in	   Israel	  have	  been	  sensistive	   to	  our	  position	  [and]	   have	   criticized	   us	   merely	   for	   articulating	   it,	   but	   nowhere	   in	   my	   diplomatic	  history	   did	   the	   doctrine	   of	   non-­‐interference	   in	   internal	   domestic	   affairs	   ever	  impinge	  upon	  a	  state’s	  right,	  indeed	  its	  obligation,	  to	  its	  own	  people	  to	  make	  its	  view	  known”.173	  Pickering	   reflects	  back	   that	  he	   saw	  Peres	  as	   “an	   Israeli	   leader	  who	  showed	  the	   potential	   promise	   for	   bringing	   Israel	   along	   [and]	   should	   in	   fact	   be	   in	   the	  centerpiece	  of	  our	  concentration”.	   	  He	  also	   felt	   that	   the	   ideological	  dividing	   line	   in	  Israeli	   politics	  was	   quite	   stark	   and	   justified	   speedy	   action:	   “the	   truth	  was,	   David,	  that	  no	  agreement	  to	  organize	  a	  peace	  arrangement	  in	  my	  view	  as	  then	  bridgeable	  between	   Likud	   and	   even	   King	   Hussein…	   so	   we	   had	   to	   see	   what	   could	   be	   put	   in	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place…	  regardless	  of	  whether	  there	  are	  Herut	  Likudniks	  deep	  in	  the	  background”.174	  In	  order	  to	  succeed,	  he	  notes	  that	  obviously	  Peres	  could	  “enlist	  several	  forces	  to	  his	  side…	  one	  was	  the	  U.S.	  and	  the	  other	  was	  the	  Israeli	  public”.	   	  Because	  of	  the	  NUG	  Peres	  “was	  forced	  into	  a	  situation	  in	  which,	  if	  he	  wanted	  to	  make	  progress,	  he	  had	   to	   use	   those	   levers”.	   	   The	   ambassador	   says	   that	   he	   dealt	   with	   Peres	   “almost	  daily.	   	   Sometimes	   less	   than	   that,	   but	   often”	   and	   would	   frequently	   sit	   down	   with	  Peres	  aides	  Yossi	  Beilin	  and	  Nimrod	  Novik	  as	  well.175	  Harrison	  claims	  that	  Pickering	  “was	  interested	  in	  devising	  with	  Peres	  a	  peace	  proposal	  which	  would	  be	  attractive	  domestically,	  but	  unacceptable	  to	  the	  Likud”.176	  	  He	  suggests	  that	  Pickering	  was	  maneuvering	  	  	  “in	  collaboration	  with	  Peres…	  [and]	  Novik…	  [and]	  Beilin…	  to	  bring	  about	  a	  peace	  plan	  which	  could	   then	  be	   the	  subject	  of	  an	  election	  which	  would	  then	  prevent	  Shamir	  from	  coming	  to	  power.	  The	  idea	  being	   that	  Peres	   could	  not	   simply	  declare	   that	  he	  wasn’t	   going	   to	  leave	   office,	   but	   he	   might	   by	   proposing	   a	   peace	   plan	   that	   was	  acceptable	  to	  the	  Arab	  side,	  the	  Palestinian	  side,	  he	  might	  then	  put	  that	   to	   referendum	   [sic]	  which	  would	  have	   the	   same	  effect.	  Peres	  was	   continuing	   [sic]	   promising	   Pickering	   he	   could	   deliver	   the	  Knesset	   for	   this…	   but	   the	   notion	   was	   that	   if	   you	   came	   to	   the	  Knesset	  with	  a	  fait	  accompli	  with	  the	  Palestinians’	  signature	  on	  it,	  even	   though	   the	   Likud	   was	   opposed	   to	   it…	   the	   Knesset	   would	  accept	   it	   and	   therefore	   [sic]	   or	   if	   they	   turned	   it	   down	   you	   could	  take	  it	  to	  a	  referendum	  in	  the	  country	  as	  a	  whole	  and	  win”.177	  	  Meanwhile	  “I	  thought	  that	  Peres	  could	  not	  deliver.	  	  It	  was	  my	  view	  that	  he	  was	  over	  promising…	  whether	  you	  didn’t	   like	  him	  or	  not	   [sic],	  whether	  you	  could	  deal	  with	  Sharon	  or	  not,	  or	  Shamir	  or	  not…	  you	  just	  simply	  couldn’t	  override	  their	  wishes	  as	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Peres	  hoped	  to	  do	  and	  ram	  it	  down	  his	  throat”.178	  	   Also,	   William	   Quandt	   writes	   that	   this	   desire	   to	   help	   Peres	   among	   some	  applied	  to	  other	  issues	  as	  well.	  	  He	  explains	  that	  	  “However	  tempted	  some	  American	  officials	  may	  have	  been	  to	  press	  forward	  with	  an	  initiative	   [on	   assembling	   a	   joint	   Jordanian-­‐Palestinian	   negotiating	   team]	   in	   these	  seemingly	   propitious	   circumstances,	   there	   were	   three	   offsetting	   considerations…	  the	  third	  inhibition	  was	  derived	  from	  a	  concern	  for	  the	  political	  standing	  of	  Israeli	  Prime	   Minister	   Peres...	   Some	   American	   officials	   wanted	   to	   help	   Peres	   position	  himself	   for	   a	   showdown	   with	   the	   Likud.	   	   This	   desire	   led	   them	   to	   advise	   against	  	  anything	   that	   could	   be	   viewed	   as	   causing	   a	   strain	   in	  U.S.-­‐Israeli	   relations,	   such	   as	  American	  dealings	  with	  the	  PLO”.179	  	  	   Ideologically,	  members	  of	  the	  Reagan	  administration	  appeared	  to	  have	  been	  much	  closer	  to	  Peres	  than	  Shamir	  in	  their	  general	  outlook	  on	  the	  conflict.	  	  However,	  it	   is	  unclear	  how	  widely	   this	   strategy	   translated	   into	  support	  back	   in	  Washington.	  	  U.S.	  officials	  seemed	  to	  prefer	  Peres	  at	  the	  time	  but	  were	  not	  uniformly	  interested	  to	  intervene	  on	  his	  behalf.	  	   President	   Reagan’s	   views	   are	   particularly	   striking	   in	   this	   regard.	   	   He	  remarked	  upon	  meeting	  receiving	  Peres	  in	  1984	  that	  “I	  think	  he	  is	  the	  most	  flexible	  and	   reasonable	   PM	   that	   I’ve	   known	   since	   I’ve	   been	   in	   office”.180	   	   Upon	   his	   next	  Washington	  visit	  one	  year	   later,	  Reagan	  writes	   in	  his	  diary	   “a	  meeting	  with	  PM	  of	  Israel.	   	   I	  hope	  he	  remains	  PM.	   	  He’s	  a	  statesman	  and	  a	   fine	  man”.181	   	  Finally,	  when	  Peres	  visited	  on	  the	  eve	  of	  the	  rotation	  agreement	  Reagan	  wrote	  “Shimon	  Peres	  time	  –	  PM	  of	   Israel.	   	   I	  admire	  him	  very	  much	  and	  am	  sorry	  the	  pol.	  rotation	  agreement	  will	   see	   him	   replaced	   as	   PM	   of	   Israel	   by	   Shamir.	   	   Of	   course,	   he	   will	   be	   Foreign	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Minister	   then.	   	  That	  will	  help	  some.	   	  He’s	  done	  a	  great	   job	  seeing	   the	  way	   toward	  peace	  in	  the	  Middle	  East”.182	  	  He	  later	  wrote	  that	  “I	  found	  [Peres]	  less	  combative	  and	  much	  more	  reasonable	  than	  Begin,”	  more	  open	  to	  American	  relations	  with	  moderate	  Arab	   states,	   and	   that	   “I	   liked	   Shimon	  Peres...	   a	   statesman	  who	  was	  more	   realistic	  about	   the	   Middle	   East	   than	   Begin...	   [who]	   recognized	   that	   any	   solution	   to	   the	  region’s	  problems	  would	  have	  to	  include	  a	  resolution	  of	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  Palestinian	  refugees”.183	  	   However,	  Reagan	  kept	   the	  process	  at	  arm’s	   length	  and	  did	   little	   to	  advance	  the	  prospects	  for	  an	  Israeli-­‐Jordanian	  deal.	  	  If	  the	  Jordanians	  and	  Israelis	  could	  agree	  upon	   a	   satisfactory	   Palestinian	   contingent	   to	   participate	   in	   their	   negotiations,	  Reagan	   would	   let	   Assistant	   Secretary	   of	   State	   for	   Near	   Eastern	   Affairs	   Richard	  Murphy	  meet	  with	  the	  delegation	  to	  confer	   it	  with	  U.S.	  backing.	   	  However,	  Reagan	  insisted	   that	   two	   conditions	   be	   met:	   that	   the	   participants	   could	   not	   be	   remotely	  associated	  with	  the	  PLO	  and	  that	  the	  talks	  had	  to	  take	  place	  in	  the	  context	  of	  direct	  negotiations,	  not	  an	  international	  conference.	  	  According	  to	  Shultz,	  “Ronald	  Reagan	  was	  taking	  a	  personal	  stand	  on	  this,	  and	  he	  was	  steadfast”.184	  	  In	  fact,	  by	  helping	  to	  work	  out	  a	  set	  of	  lowest	  common	  denominator	  principles	  among	  the	  parties	  during	  a	   showboating	   tour	   of	   the	   region	   that	   summer,	   VP	   Bush	   showed	   more	   direct	  involvement	  in	  these	  issues	  than	  either	  the	  president	  or	  the	  secretary	  of	  state.	  	  	   Shultz	   expressed	   some	   concerns	   that	   Peres	   was	   “operating	   up	   to	   –	   and	  perhaps	   beyond	   –	   the	   limits	   of	   his	   political	   capability	   in	   his	   coalition	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government”.185	   He	   did	   lead	   a	   U.S.	   effort	   to	   bail	   out	   the	   Israeli	   economy	   and	  encourage	  major	   structural	   reforms,	   which	   boosted	   Peres’s	   standing	   enormously,	  but	  the	  secretary	  was	  not	  motivated	  by	  Israeli	  domestic	  politics	  in	  this	  regard.	  	   But	  by	  refusing	  to	  facilitate	  some	  sort	  of	  compromise	  between	  the	  Jordanian	  and	   Israeli	   positions	   on	   an	   international	   conference,	   Shultz	   “fail[ed]	   to	   even	  encourage	  Israel’s	  then-­‐Prime	  Minister	  Peres	  in	  his	  1985-­‐86	  attempts	  to	  pursue	  the	  Jordanian	   option”.186	   	   When	   Peres	   was	   finally	   focusing	   on	   Jordan	   in	   early	   1986,	  instead	  of	  trying	  to	  throw	  off	  the	  rotation	  agreement	  Shultz	  approached	  the	  talks	  in	  order	   to	   “get	   something	   going	   so	   that	   Peres	   can	   put	   something	   in	   place	   that	   the	  other	  guy	  can’t	  tear	  down”.187	  In	  any	  event,	  he	  was	  much	  more	   interested	   in	  developments	  on	  the	  ground	  than	   in	   producing	   something	   dramatic	   on	   the	   negotiating	   track	   that	   would	   help	  Peres.	   	  When	  King	  Hussein	  visited	  Washington	  that	   June	  –	  an	   ideal	  opportunity	   to	  push	  for	  some	  sort	  of	  breakthrough	  –	  the	  	  talking	  points	  and	  briefing	  memo	  sent	  by	  the	  secretary	  to	  the	  president	  say	  almost	  nothing	  about	  the	  negotiations	  track	  and	  instead	  focus	  on	  promoting	  Shultz’s	  plan	  for	  trilateral	  confidence	  building	  measures	  to	  boost	  quality	  of	  life	  and	  marginalize	  supporters	  of	  the	  PLO	  in	  the	  territories.188	  	  	  
<Phase	  Two:	  The	  London	  Agreement>	  	   Shimon	  Peres	  continued	  discreet	  negotiations	  with	  Jordan	  as	  Israel’s	  foreign	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
185 Ibid., 453. 
186 Christison, “Splitting the Difference,” 31 & 45. 
187 Cluverius, “Interview with Ambassador Wat Tyler Cluverius IV”, May 31, 1990, 52, The Foreign 
Affairs Oral History Collection of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training (ADST), Library of 
Congress. 
188 “Your Meeting with King Hussein of Jordan, June 9-10, 1986 - Memorandum for the President from 
George P. Shultz (with talking points attached)”, June 5, 1986, Collection “Ross, Dennis Files”, Box 5, 
Folder “Chron File-June 1986, Dennis Ross (3 of 3),” Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. 
	   244	  
minister.	  	  He	  and	  the	  king	  secretly	  met	  in	  London	  in	  April	  of	  1987	  and	  ironed	  out	  the	  remaining	  areas	  of	  disagreement.	  	  They	  would	  both	  accept	  a	  multilateral	  conference	  but	   as	   a	   toothless	   opening	   ceremony.	   	   All	   substantive	   talks	   would	   take	   place	   in	  bilateral	   negotiations,	   including	   direct	   talks	   between	   Israel	   and	   a	   joint	   Jordanian-­‐Palestinian	   delegation.	   	   All	   Palestinian	   participants	   would	   publicly	   renounce	  terrorism	  and	  accept	  UNSCRs	  242	  and	  338	  to	  help	  mitigate	  Israeli	  sensitivities	  over	  loose	  affiliations	  with	  the	  PLO.	  	  There	  would	  be	  no	  right	  of	  referral	  from	  the	  bilateral	  talks	  back	  to	  the	  main	  plenary.	  	   However,	  both	  leaders	  were	  skittish	  about	  the	  domestic	  political	  constraints,	  deciding	  their	  agreement	  should	  remain	  secret	  and	  instead	  should	  be	  pitched	  as	  an	  American	  plan	  to	  provide	  them	  with	  greater	  political	  cover.	  	  Peres	  recalls	  that	  	   “we	   had	   decided,	   therefore,	   to	   transmit	   [the	   agreements]	   to	   the	   Americans,	   with	  each	  side	  separately	  informing	  the	  Americans	  that	  these	  documents	  summarized	  the	  position	   we	   had	   agreed	   on.	   	   We	   would	   both	   ask	   the	   United	   States	   to	   adopt	   the	  agreement,	   and	   to	   present	   it,	   through	   the	   Secretary	   of	   State,	   as	   an	   American	  
proposal.189	  	  At	   first,	   American	   officials	   were	   thrilled	   when	   informed	   about	   the	   London	  Agreement.	  	  Peres	  aide	  Yossi	  Beilin	  rushed	  to	  Helsinki	  to	  catch	  the	  secretary	  on	  his	  way	   to	   meetings	   in	   Moscow.	   	   Beilin	   met	   with	   Shultz’s	   chief	   of	   staff,	   Charlie	   Hill,	  whom	  Peres	  says	  was	  “unreservedly	  enthusiastic”.190	   	  Another	  account	  claims	  that	  Shultz	  told	  Hill	  in	  excitement	  “we’ve	  got	  a	  touchdown!”191	  	  As	  a	  result,	  Peres	  says	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“Beilin	   returned	   from	   Helsinki	   full	   of	   optimism.	   	   Ambassador	  Pickering	  in	  Tel	  Aviv	  was	  equally	  enthusiastic,	  as	  was	  Dick	  Murphy,	  who	  said	  he	  could	  hardly	  believe	  his	  eyes	  when	  he	  read	   the	  draft	  accords.	  	  All	  of	  us	  felt	  that	  we	  had	  made	  a	  major	  breakthrough,	  and	  that	  Shamir’s	   fears	  would	  be	  allayed:	   the	   international	  conference	  would	   not	   have	   the	   power	   to	   impose	   any	   solution,	   and	   the	   PLO	  would	  not	  participate	  in	  the	  negotiations”.192	  	  	   Upon	   his	   return	   home	   from	   London,	   Peres	  met	  with	   Shamir	   and	   informed	  him	  in	  detail	  about	  the	  agreement,	  although	  he	  refused	  to	  leave	  a	  text	  of	  the	  accord	  for	   fear	   of	   leaks.193	   	   Shamir	   then	   dispatched	   Arens	   to	   Foggy	   Bottom	   in	   hopes	   of	  dissuading	   Shultz	   from	   endorsing	   the	   Accord.	   	   Shultz	   says	   he	   tried	   to	   argue	   the	  merits	   of	   the	   deal	  with	   him,	   “describ[ing]	   for	   Arens	   in	   excruciating	   detail	   exactly	  how	   a	   conference	   could	   work	   and	   be	   kept	   under	   control,	   but	   he	   would	   not	  budge”.194	  	  In	  his	  memo	  to	  the	  president	  describing	  the	  meeting,	  Shultz	  reports:	  	  “I	  made	  clear	  that	  I	  did	  not	  agree	  with	  the	  arguments	  that	  Shamir	  had	  made	  against	  the	  London	  Agreement	  and	  its	  significance.	  I	  said	  that	   I	   considered	   that	   it	   reflected	   a	   possibility	   that	   never	   existed	  before.	   Nevertheless,	   I	   accepted	   Shamir’s	   negative	   answer,	  although	  I	  consider	  it	  unfortunate	  since	  the	  King	  is	  finally	  ready	  to	  engage	  in	  negotiations	  with	  Israel”.195	  	  	   During	   their	   meeting,	   Shultz	   also	   agreed	   to	   a	   number	   of	   conditions	   that	  destroyed	  the	  momentum	  of	  the	  London	  Agreement	  and,	  along	  with	  it,	  the	  political	  gambit	  by	  Shimon	  Peres.	   	  He	   informed	  Arens	   that	  Labor	  asked	  him	  to	  present	   the	  agreement	  as	  a	  U.S.	  proposal	  and	  agreed	  not	  to	  do	  so.	  	  He	  also	  agreed	  not	  to	  visit	  the	  region	   to	   promote	   the	   plan	   and	   accepted	  Arens’s	   argument	   that	   the	   only	  way	   for	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
192 Peres, Battling for Peace, 310. 
193 Yitzhak Shamir, Summing Up: An Autobiography (Diane Pub Co, 1994), 169. 
194 Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 941. 
195 “Meeting with the President: Middle East Peace Process - Comments by George Shultz”, April 29, 
1987, Collection, “NSC Near East and South Asia Directorate - Dennis Ross Files”, Box 1, Folder “Hill, 
Charlie Meetings Folder - Dennis Ross (1 of 3),” Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. 
	   246	  
progress	  to	  be	  made	  was	  for	  Shamir	  to	  hold	  his	  own	  secret	  meeting	  with	  Hussein.	  	   Shultz	   really	   believed	   in	   this	   approach,	   claiming	   that	   “the	   Hussein-­‐Shamir	  meeting…	  is	  the	  next	  essential	  step	  –	  realistically,	  little	  further	  progress	  is	  possible	  without	  it.	  	  Only	  Hussein	  can	  give	  Shamir	  the	  stake	  in	  the	  process”.196	  	  However,	  this	  argument	  was	  unrealistic	  for	  a	  variety	  of	  reasons.	  	  First,	  it	  was	  widely	  known	  within	  the	   U.S.	   government	   that	   Shamir	   rejected	   the	   principle	   of	   land	   for	   peace.	   For	  instance,	   an	   interagency	  paper	  being	  assembled	  at	   the	   time	  observed	   that	   “on	   the	  substantive	   issues	   to	   be	   taken	   up	   in	   negotiations,	   Shamir	   remains	   adamantly	  opposed	  to	  any	  solution	  based	  on	  territorial	  compromise”.197	  	  Yet	  this	  was	  a	  sine	  qua	  
non	  for	  any	  sort	  of	  meaningful	  progress	  with	  Jordan	  and	  other	  Arab	  states.	  Additionally,	  Hussein’s	  political	  strategy	  had	  been	  predicated	  upon	  working	  around	   Shamir	   to	   bring	   back	   Peres,	   not	   working	   through	   him.	   	   The	   king	   was	  convinced	   that	   “Shamir’s	   opposition	   isn’t	   to	   the	   agreement	   and	   the	   international	  conference	   idea	   but	   to	   any	   negotiations	   based	   on	   UNSC	   Resolution	   242	   and	   the	  principle	   of	   ‘land-­‐for-­‐peace’.”198	   	   Hussein	   relented	   in	   his	   opposition,	   but	   what	   he	  heard	   in	   his	   July	  meeting	  with	   Shamir	   frightened	   the	   king	   and	   left	   him	  perturbed	  about	  the	  reliability	  of	  Washington’s	  role.	  When	   Shultz	   proposed	   to	   the	   two	   of	   them	   in	   October	   that	   they	   forego	   a	  stand-­‐alone,	  symbolic	  conference	  for	  a	  press	  event	  on	  the	  sidelines	  of	  an	  upcoming	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superpower	  conference,	  Hussein	  had	  finally	  had	  lost	  hope	  in	  the	  U.S.	  approach	  and	  said	  no.	   	  Shultz’s	  staff	  wanted	  to	  troubleshoot	  further,	  but	  Shultz	  said	  “stop	  talking	  about	  it…	  it’s	  over.	  	  No	  more	  memos.	  	  No	  need	  for	  a	  postmortem”.	  	  He	  claims	  he	  had	  been	  told	  by	  an	  unenthusiastic	  Reagan	  that	  “the	  first	  guy	  who	  vetoes	  it	  kills	  it”.199	  	   Others	  within	   the	   administration	  hoped	   for	   a	  more	  vigorous	  approach	   that	  would	  be	  more	  prone	   to	  aiding	  Peres.	   	   For	   instance,	  Peres	   claims	   that	   the	  plan	   to	  pitch	  London	  as	  an	  American	   idea	  was	   “in	  accordance	  with	  a	  prior	  understanding	  we	  had	  reached	  with	  Dick	  Murphy	  and	  Tom	  Pickering”.200	  	  If	  Murphy	  and	  Pickering	  agreed	  to	  do	  so,	  they	  were	  exceeding	  their	  authority.	  	  One	  observer	  wonders	  if	  Peres	  made	  this	  claim	  based	  upon	  a	  miscommunication	  or	  misunderstanding.201	   	  When	  I	  asked	  Murphy	  if	  the	  idea	  of	  pitching	  an	  agreement	  between	  Hussein	  and	  Peres	  as	  an	  American	  proposal	  had	  come	  up	  before	  London,	  he	  acknowledged	  “it	  must	  have”.202	  	  Pickering	  says	   “there	  was	  no	  question	   that	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  possibilities	   it	  had	  been	  discussed	   that	   if	   Hussein	   and	   Peres	   could	   reach	   agreement	   it	   would	   be	   very	  important	  for	  the	  United	  States	  to	  pick	  it	  up	  and	  see	  if	  we	  could	  move	  it,	  but	  it	  was	  never	  discussed	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  conditions	  or	  where	  it	  was	  at	  the	  present	  time”.203	  	   Once	   Peres	   had	   informed	   Shamir	   about	   London,	   Pickering	   also	   sought	   to	  endorse	  Peres’s	  plan.	  	  Although	  he	  knew	  it	  might	  be	  a	  difficult	  sell,	  the	  ambassador	  wrote	   the	  secretary	  a	  cable	   that	  was	  so	  enthusiastic	   that	  Harrison,	  his	  disgruntled	  aide,	  tried	  to	  send	  a	  dissenting	  cable	  as	  a	  minority	  report.	  	  However,	  Pickering	  put	  a	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hold	  on	  Harrison’s	  message,	  so	  it	  did	  not	  get	  through	  in	  time	  to	  make	  a	  difference.204	  	   Although	   it	  was	  not	   their	   “main	   goal,”	   officials	   at	   the	  NSC	  also	   advocated	   a	  policy	  approach	  that	  they	  knew	  “will	  help	  Peres”.	  	  They	  called	  for	  the	  administration	  to	  be	  more	  “actively	  engaged”	  and	  that	  	  	  “such	   engagement	   requires	   us	   to	   keep	   the	   pressure	   on	   Shamir…	  pursuing	   answers	   to	   these	   questions	   and	   saying	   so	   publicly	   will	  keep	   the	   heat	   on	   Shamir….	   building	   pressure	   on	   Shamir	   to	   be	  responsive	   both	   on	   the	   ground	   and	   on	   a	   negotiating	   track…	   We	  think	  he	  is	  blocking	  movement	  toward	  peace”.205	  	  They	  also	  called	  for	  a	  presidential	  speech	  to	  indicate	  that	  the	  peace	  process	  was	  high	  on	  his	  agenda	  but	  were	  unable	  to	  elicit	  his	  interest.	  Robert	  Oakley,	  the	  head	  of	  the	  Near	  East	  and	  South	  Asian	  affairs	  at	  the	  NSC,	  complained	  that	  Shultz’s	  slow-­‐roll	  approach	  was	  harming	  the	  peace	  process.	  	  Shultz	  proposed	   sending	   his	   aide	   Charlie	   Hill	   on	   a	   mission	   to	   encourage	   movement	   by	  Shamir,	  but	  Oakley	  pointed	  out	  that	  it	  was	  being	  pursued	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  was	  all	  carrot	  and	  no	  stick,	  yet	  “another	  low-­‐key	  push”.	  	  He	  recalled	  that	  they	  had	  approved	  of	  Hill’s	  mission	  “not	  simply	  to	  convey	  interest	  [and	  win	  Shamir’s	  confidence],	  but	  to	  lay	  out	  a	  plan	  that	  Shamir	  would	  have	  a	  hard	  time	  rejecting”.	  	  He	  emphasized	  Shultz	  had	   not	   been	   to	   the	   region	   in	   over	   two	   years,	   claiming	   “we	   appear	   disinterested,	  distracted,	  and	  purposeless….	  we	  are	  seen	  in	  the	  region	  and	  elsewhere	  (including	  in	  Congress)	  as	  having	  given	  up	  the	  general	  diplomatic	  initiative”.206	  	  National	  security	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advisor	  Frank	  Carlucci	  agreed,	  urging	   the	  president	   to	  ask	  Shultz	  announce	  a	  visit	  the	  region	  soon	  so	  as	  to	  “demonstrate	  a	  higher	  level	  of	  interest	  and	  commitment”.207	  	   Shultz’s	  line	  carried	  the	  day,	  and	  Peres	  was	  unable	  to	  use	  an	  endorsement	  of	  the	  London	  Agreement	  by	  Washington	  to	  engineer	  his	  return	  to	  power.	  
<Phase	  Three:	  The	  Shultz	  Initiative>	  	   After	   letting	   the	  1987	  process	  sputter	  out,	  Shultz	   found	  himself	  back	   in	   the	  peace	   processing	   business	   just	   a	   few	  months	   later	   and	   even	   pitched	   a	   new	  peace	  plan	  that	  became	  known	  as	  the	  Shultz	  Initiative.	  	  Anger	  and	  despair	  in	  the	  territories	  had	  burst	  out	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  first	  Palestinian	  intifada,	  which	  started	  in	  December	  of	   ’87.	   	   He	   denounced	   “drift	   in	   the	   peace	   process,”	   though	   it	   was	   partly	   his	   own	  doing,	  and	  concluded	  that	  “both	  Israel	  and	  Jordan	  are	  out	  of	  fresh,	  workable	  ideas,”	  despite	  killing	  off	  their	  last	  fresh,	  workable	  idea.208	  	  One	  of	  his	  advisors	  noted	  that	  it	  took	  a	  lot	  of	  effort	  to	  persuade	  Shultz	  to	  invest	  into	  the	  process	  again:	  	  “When	   the	   intifada	   breaks	   out	   in	   December	   of	   87,	   Shultz’s	   first	  inclination	  was	  to	  give	  a	  speech,	  it’s	  not	  to	  come	  up	  with	  a	  political	  initiative.	   	   And	   he	   becomes	   persuaded	   of	   the	   need	   for	   it,	   of	   an	  initiative,	   and	   in	   a	   sense	   that’s	   how	   the	   Shultz	   Plan,	   the	   Shultz	  Initiative	   gets	   born…	   but	   it	   wasn’t	   the	   first	   thing	   he	   thought	   of.	  	  First	  thing	  he	  thought	  of	  was	  well	  let’s	  give	  a	  speech	  and	  talk	  about	  the	  violence	  and	  the	  intifada.	  Q:	  So	  what	  changed	  his	  mind?	  A:	  Staff	  work.	  	  Staff	  convinced	  him	  to	  add	  a	  policy	  to	  the	  speech”209	  	  Reluctantly,	  Shultz	  gradually	  accepted	  that	  an	  actual	  plan	  was	  needed.	  	   The	  plan	  featured	  some	  modifications	  to	  suit	  current	  times	  but	  in	  many	  ways	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was	  not	  so	  different	   from	  the	  accords	  he	  had	   let	   linger	   just	  months	  before.	   	  There	  would	  be	  an	  international	  conference	  substantive	  enough	  to	  give	  Hussein	  cover	  but	  tied	   into	   direct	   bilateral	   talks	   and	   toothless	   enough	   to	   win	   over	   Israelis.	   	   There	  would	  be	  a	  Palestinian	  entity	   tied	   in	  confederation	   to	   Jordan.	   	  The	  main	  new	   item	  was	  a	  revision	  of	  the	  traditional	  Camp	  David	  formula	  for	  an	  interim	  period	  followed	  by	  final	  status.	  	  Instead,	  there	  would	  be	  partial	  “interlock”	  between	  talks	  on	  interim	  status	  (to	  entice	  the	  Israelis)	  and	  final	  status	  (to	  appeal	  to	  Arabs).	  After	  having	  neglected	  the	  region	  for	  over	  two	  years	  before	  visiting	  that	  past	  October,	   Shultz	   undertook	   a	   remarkable	   series	   of	   four	   intensive	   shuttles	   in	  February,	  March,	  April,	  and	  June	  of	  1988.210	  	  Although	  he	  may	  have	  disagreed	  with	  Shamir’s	  perspective,	  he	  was	  determined	   to	   try	  working	   through	   the	   Israeli	  Prime	  Minister	   rather	   than	   against	   him.	   	   Shultz’s	   advisor	   confirmed	   for	   me	   that	   the	  secretary	   had	   no	   interest	   in	   trying	   to	   outmaneuver	   the	   Likud	   PM	   through	   LSI.211	  	  However,	   some	   U.S.	   officials	   had	   other	   ideas.	   	   At	   various	   points	   they	   sought	   to	  toughen	  Shultz’s	  low-­‐key	  message	  in	  ways	  that	  would	  benefit	  Labor	  at	  the	  polls.	  Shultz’s	  February	  shuttle	  went	  poorly.	   	  Peres	  and	  Egypt	  endorsed	   the	  plan,	  but	  Shamir,	  Hussein,	  and	  Assad	  of	  Syria	  were	  ambivalent,	  saying	  no	  but	  thanking	  the	  secretary	   for	  his	   efforts.	   	   Shamir	  blasted	   the	   idea	  of	   an	   international	   conference	  –	  even	  a	  watered	  down	  one	  –	  as	  absolutely	  unacceptable.	   	  Shultz	  suspected	  that	  this	  argument	   was	   an	   excuse	   because	   Shamir	   was	   also	   making	   statements	   that	  contradicted	  the	  very	  premise	  of	  land	  for	  peace.	  	  And	  yet	  he	  sheepishly	  admits	  that	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“I	  hoped	  that	  Yitzhak	  Shamir	  would	  somehow	  seize	  the	  moment”.212	  	   In	   March,	   Shultz	   tried	   again,	   delivering	   hand-­‐written	   letters	   to	   leaders	   in	  Jordan,	  Syria,	  Egypt,	  and	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  aisle	  in	  Israel.	   	  The	  letters	  formalized	  his	  plan	  and	  requested	  a	  formal	  response	  in	  ten	  days.	  	  Peres	  endorsed	  the	  offer	  and	  leaked	  a	  copy	  to	  the	  press	  in	  order	  to	  draw	  attention	  to	  the	  dispute.213	  	  At	  this	  point,	  Shamir	  responded	  harshly,	  proclaiming	  that	  “the	  only	  word	  in	  the	  Shultz	  plan	  which	  is	  I	  accept	  is	  his	  signature”.214	  	  He	  scheduled	  a	  Washington	  visit	  for	  the	  very	  last	  day	  of	  the	  ten-­‐day	  decision	  period,	  and	  observers	  expected	  an	  imminent	  confrontation.	  	   While	   in	  Washington,	  Shamir	  held	  one	  meeting	  with	  the	  president	  and	  four	  with	  Shultz,	   including	  coming	  over	   for	  pancakes	  cooked	  by	   the	  secretary’s	  wife.215	  	  The	  president	  reiterated	  his	  support	  for	  the	  peace	  plan	  but	  did	  not	  specify	  that	  there	  would	  be	  consequences	  for	  letting	  the	  ten-­‐day	  deadline	  lapse.	   	  Shamir	  held	  steady,	  neither	  endorsing	  nor	  rejecting	  the	  plan,	  and	  returned	  home	  proclaiming	  victory.216	  	   In	  April,	   Shultz	   tried	   to	  boost	  public	   sentiment	   in	   Israel	   and	   Jordan	   for	   the	  proposal	   by	   giving	   extended	   interviews	   for	   television	   and	   print	   outlets,	   insisting	  that	   their	   leaders	   were	   missing	   a	   major	   opportunity.217	   	   He	   also	   suggested	   that	  hardliners	  could	  not	  kill	  the	  plan	  because	  he	  would	  continue	  his	  effort	  even	  without	  immediate	  signs	  of	  progress.218	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However,	  in	  his	  effort	  to	  win	  PM	  Shamir’s	  support	  he	  opted	  for	  carrots	  when	  he	  probably	  needed	  a	  stick.	  	  Shultz	  fought	  and	  won	  an	  internal	  American	  debate	  to	  grant	   the	   Likud	   government	   a	   memorandum	   of	   understanding	   that	   formalized	  ongoing	   strategic	   dialogues	   and	   declared	   Israel	   a	   major	   non-­‐NATO	   ally.	   	   The	  president	  granted	  Shultz’s	   request	  out	  of	  deference	   to	  his	   chosen	  point	  person	  on	  the	   peace	   process.	   	   Thus,	   the	   MOU	   was	   announced	   during	   the	   April	   shuttle	   and	  signed	  later	  that	  month	  in	  honor	  of	  Israel’s	  independence	  day.219	  	   Peres	  soon	  made	  arrangements	  to	  visit	  Washington	  in	  mid-­‐May.	   	  During	  his	  visit,	  he	  urged	  the	  U.S.	  not	  to	  abandon	  the	  peace	  plan	  during	  Israeli	  elections	  so	  as	  not	  to	  feed	  into	  despair	  and	  fundamentalism.220	  	  News	  outlets	  treated	  the	  visit	  as	  “a	  bid	  by	  Peres	  for	  U.S.	  support	  in	  advance	  of	  Israel’s	  fall	  election”.221	  	  An	  official	  in	  the	  Prime	  Minister’s	  office	  attacked	  America	  for	  “meddling	  in	  Israel’s	  interior	  problems”	  and	  claimed	  that	  “it	  shows	  the	  Foreign	  Minister	  using	  his	  official	  visit	  to	  Washington	  to	  get	  the	  American	  support	  for	  him	  in	  the	  political	  campaign”.222	  	   Shultz	  returned	  for	  his	  final	  shuttle	  two	  weeks	  later	  in	  early	  June,	  knowing	  it	  would	   probably	   be	   his	   last.223	   	   He	   chose	   to	   base	   his	   regional	   travel	   out	   of	   Cairo	  instead	  of	  Jerusalem,	  which	  was	  perceived	  as	  a	  possible	  sign	  of	  his	  frustration	  with	  Shamir.224	  	  Yet	  in	  an	  even	  bolder	  slap	  to	  Shultz	  the	  prime	  minister	  arranged	  to	  leave	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town	  for	  a	  UN	  conference	  shortly	  after	  the	  secretary’s	  arrival.225	  	  Shultz	  made	  some	  cautionary	  statements,	  calling	  the	  occupation	  a	  “dead-­‐end	  street”	  and	  warning	  about	  the	  risks	  of	  war,	  but	  he	  left	  for	  home	  empty	  handed.226	  	  He	  insisted	  he	  was	  ready	  for	  a	  fifth	  shuttle	  if	  prospects	  on	  the	  ground	  warranted	  it,	  but	  this	  was	  not	  to	  be.227	  	   Shultz	  had	  hoped	  earlier	  on	   that	   a	  public	   endorsement	  of	   the	  plan	  by	  King	  Hussein	  would	  put	  pressure	  on	  Shamir	   to	   reciprocate	  but	  was	  disappointed	  when	  the	   king	  handed	  him	  a	   list	   of	   request	   clarifications	   in	   lieu	   of	   a	   yes.	   	  However,	   the	  Jordanians	  seem	  to	  have	  been	  more	  receptive	  than	  the	  Israeli	  government.	  	  Indeed,	  Reagan	  wrote	   in	   his	   diary	   then	   that	   Shultz	   “just	   can’t	  move	   Shamir.	   	   He	   has	  King	  Hussein	  &	  Egypts	  [sic]	  Moubarak	  going	  for	  him	  but	  not	  the	  hold	  out”	  Shamir,	  who	  is	  “being	  bullheaded	   about	   our	   peace	  proposal”.228	   	   Although	   Shultz	   tends	   to	   equate	  Jordanian	  ambivalence	  and	  Likud	  obstructionism	  in	  his	  memoirs,	  his	  private	  cables	  admit	  that	  “Hussein	  is	  engaging	  with	  the	  process	  while	  Shamir	  is	  not”.229	  	   At	  this	  point,	  America’s	  window	  of	  opportunity	  began	  to	  close.	   	  The	  intifada	  had	  been	  putting	  the	  king	  under	  increasing	  pressure	  to	  fall	  in	  line	  with	  the	  PLO,	  and	  the	   Arab	   summit	   that	   took	   place	   shortly	   after	   Shultz’s	   visit	   in	   June	   marked	   the	  beginning	  of	  the	  end	  for	  his	  assertive	  claims	  to	  the	  West	  Bank.	  	  Hussein	  was	  under	  strong	   pressure	   throughout	   the	   Arab	   world	   orchestrated	   by	   the	   PLO	   and	   he	   had	  simply	  had	  enough.	   	  At	   the	   summit,	  he	   stressed	  his	   acceptance	  of	   the	  PLO	  as	   “the	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sole	   legitimate	   representative	   of	   the	   Palestinian	   people,”	   proclaimed	   that	   the	   PLO	  must	   represent	   the	   Palestinian	   people	   at	   any	   future	   peace	   conference,	   and	  suggested	  he	  was	  open	   to	  an	   independent	  Palestinian	  state	  not	   confederated	  with	  Jordan.230	   	  On	   July	  31st	   he	   gave	   a	   landmark	   speech	  announcing	   that	   Jordan	  would	  sever	  it	  administrative	  and	  legal	  ties	  to	  Palestinian	  institutions	  in	  the	  West	  Bank.	  This	  process	  was	   a	  huge	   setback	   for	  Peres	   and	   also	  marked	   the	   end	  of	   the	  Shultz	  Plan.	  	  His	  aide	  noted	  that	  by	  early	  June	  Shultz	  was	  already	  	  “aware	  that	  the	  initiative	  is	  dead,	  and	  he	  goes	  with	  the	  intention	  to	  leave	  behind	  a	  rhetorical	  record	  of	  which	  the	  Washington	  Institute	  speech	  is	  the	  capstone,	  so	  you	  can	  read	  his	  public	  statements	  in	  the	  region,	  I	  think	  there	  was	  an	  op-­‐ed	  at	  the	  time	  that	  he	  published	  in	  the	  Washington	  Post,	  and	  then	  the	  Washington	  Institute	  speech	  as	  a	   -­‐	   almost	   an	   integral	   whole.	   	   Shultz	   was	   of	   the	   belief	   that	   you	  needed	  to	  leave	  something	  behind	  and	  it	  wasn’t	  going	  to	  be	  a	  peace	  process,	  so	  it	  could	  be	  this	  rhetorical	  record”.231	  	  With	   Hussein’s	   disavowal	   of	   the	   West	   Bank,	   the	   secretary	   also	   began	   to	   explore	  other	  avenues	  for	  progress,	  including	  hints	  that	  the	  PLO	  was	  ready	  to	  moderate	  its	  positions	  in	  response	  for	  American	  engagement.	  	  By	  the	  time	  Israeli	  elections	  rolled	  around,	  Shultz	  was	  no	  longer	  actively	  pushing	  his	  peace	  plan	  on	  the	  parties.	  	   Some	   American	   officials	   disagreed	  with	   Shultz’s	   conciliatory	   approach	   and	  did	  what	   they	   could	   to	   toughen	   America’s	  Mideast	   diplomacy	   in	  ways	   that	  might	  better	   benefit	   Labor.	   	   When	   Shamir	   visited	   in	   March,	   NSC	   staff	   persuaded	   the	  president	  to	  announce	  that	  “the	  United	  States	  will	  not	  slice	  this	  initiative	  apart	  and	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will	  not	  abandon	  it”.	  	  In	  surprisingly	  tough	  language	  that	  could	  be	  interpreted	  as	  a	  a	  threat	  of	  LSI,	  Reagan	  suggested	   “those	  who	  will	   say	   ‘no’	   to	   the	  United	  States	  plan,	  and	   the	   prime	   minister	   has	   not	   used	   this	   word,	   need	   not	   answer	   to	   the	   United	  States.	   	   They’ll	   need	   to	   answer	   to	   their	   own	   people	   on	   why	   they	   turned	   down	   a	  realistic	   and	   sensible	   plan”.	   	   Shultz	   privately	   notified	   Shamir	   about	   the	   Reagan	  language	  a	  day	  in	  advance,	  and	  allegedly	  Shamir	  “almost	  popped”.232	  	   There	  was	  also	  a	  furious	  internal	  debate	  over	  Shultz’s	  desire	  to	  provide	  Israel	  with	   the	  April	  MOU.	   	  Allegedly	   the	  debate	   “pitted	  Shultz	  against	   ‘everybody	  else’,”	  with	  Pickering	  and	  national	   security	   advisor	  Colin	  Powell	  being	  perhaps	   the	  most	  outspoken.	  	  One	  upset	  White	  House	  official	  complained	  “we’ve	  been	  trying	  the	  soft-­‐soap	   approach	   for	   years	   and	   have	   nothing	   to	   show	   for	   it…	   why	   do	   we	   want	   to	  reward	  Shamir?	  	  What	  has	  he	  done	  for	  us?	  	  He	  can	  now	  claim	  that	  there	  has	  been	  no	  cost	   to	   his	   stonewalling	   our	   initiative”.	   	   Administration	   officials	   also	   tried	   to	   play	  down	   the	   agreement,	   deviating	   from	   normal	   protocol	   by	   giving	   the	   document	   to	  journalists	  only	  when	  specifically	  queried	  and	  holding	  the	  U.S.	  signing	  ceremony	  in	  a	  room	  without	  cameras,	  attended	  only	  by	  VP	  Bush	  and	  the	  Israeli	  ambassador.233	  	   These	  officials	  did	  what	  they	  could	  to	  help	  Peres	  during	  his	  visit	  in	  May.	  	  They	  convinced	  Reagan	  to	  praise	  him	  as	  “creative	  and	  [having]	  the	  courage	  and	  wisdom	  to	  say	  yes	  when	  real	  opportunities	  arise”	  while	  criticizing	  “leaders	  who	  are	  negative,	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consistently	   reject	   new	   ideas…	   [and]	   make	   progress	   impossible”.234	   	   The	   gesture	  was	  perceived	  as	  support	  for	  Peres	  and	  “indirect	  criticism	  of	  the	  prime	  minister”.235	  	   Finally,	  when	  Labor	  was	  damaged	  by	  King	  Hussein’s	  divorce	  from	  the	  West	  Bank,	   administration	   officials	   scrambled	   to	   somehow	   keep	   the	   process	   moving.	  Reagan	   called	   for	   a	   rather	   odd	   emergency	   summit	   in	   late	   September	   at	   the	   UN	  General	   Assembly	   between	   Peres	   and	   his	   Egyptian	   counterpart,	   FM	   Esmat	   Abdel	  Meguid,	  to	  discuss	  the	  state	  of	  the	  peace	  process.	  	  Washington	  ensured	  Peres	  left	  the	  meeting	  with	   a	   tangible	   takeaway,	   granting	   his	   request	   that	   employees	   of	   Israel’s	  defense	  procurement	  mission	  in	  New	  York	  be	  granted	  consular	  status.236	  	  Pickering	  agrees	   there	   was	   evidently	   a	   domestic	   angle	   to	   the	   meeting	   and	   recalls	   that	   the	  Likud	   “raised	   hell	   when…	   the	   U.S.	   demeaned	   the	   position	   of	   Shamir	   as	   prime	  minister	  by	  asking	  his	  opponent	  to	  come	  to	  talk	  about	  the	  peace	  process”.237	  	  Shamir	  both	   belittled	   the	   event	   for	   having	   “no	   special	   value”	   and	   suggested	   it	   was	   an	  egregious	  attempt	  by	  Washington	  to	  tip	  the	  scales	  in	  Israel’s	  election.238	  	   Thus,	   during	   1988	   the	   prevailing	   American	   posture	   was	   exemplified	   by	  Secretary	   of	   State	   Shultz’s	   initiative,	   which	   was	   very	   firmly	   intended	   to	   focus	   on	  eliciting	  Israeli	  behavior	  change	  while	  avoiding	  negative	  LSI.	  	  However,	  there	  was	  a	  strong	  undercurrent	  of	  opposition	   to	   this	  approach	   from	  other	  U.S.	  officials	   at	   the	  working	  level,	  who	  preferred	  a	  policy	  of	  leadership	  selection	  intervention.	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<Post-­Script:	  Other	  Meddlers>	  	   A	  remarkable	  feature	  of	  the	  National	  Unity	  Government	  is	  that	  it	  also	  elicited	  LSI	   toward	   Israeli	   politics	   from	   a	   whole	   panoply	   of	   outside	   actors.	   	   Besides	   the	  United	   States,	   this	   group	   included	   Jordan,	   Egypt,	   the	   PLO,	   Britain,	   France,	   and	  perhaps	   even	   the	   USSR.	   	   I	   briefly	   discuss	   those	   efforts	   here	   in	   order	   to	   provide	  another	  point	  of	  reference	  for	  understanding	  American	  behavior	  during	  this	  period.	  	  Most	  of	  these	  efforts	  focused	  on	  the	  Israeli	  elections	  of	  1988	  and	  were	  probably	  in	  part	  elicited	  by	  international	  concern	  in	  light	  of	  the	  ongoing	  Palestinian	  intifada.	  	   The	   Jordanian	  effort	   is	  most	  obvious.	   	  As	   early	   as	  1985,	   the	  king’s	   strategy	  was	   consciously	   predicated	   upon	   trying	   to	   help	   Shimon	   Peres	   call	   of	   the	   rotation	  agreement.	  	  Adam	  Garfinkle	  explains	  that	  	  “Peres	  and	  his	  group	  understood	  however,	  as	  did	  the	  King,	  who	  is	  an	   expert	   in	   Israeli	   domestic	   politics,	   that	   as	   long	   as	   Likud	  remained	  a	  part	  of	  the	  Israeli	  government,	  dramatic	  breakthroughs	  were	  possible	  only	  in	  potential.	  	  The	  idea	  was	  to	  build	  up	  functional	  ties	   and	   a	   series	   of	   interim	   measures	   or	   changes	   that	   implied	  change	  in	  the	  Israeli	  occupation	  of	  the	  West	  Bank	  and	  Gaza.	  	  These	  changes	   would	   create	   a	   certain	   trajectory	   that	   ultimately	   would	  force	  the	  divided	  Israeli	  government	  to	  break	  up.	  	  Peres’s	  hope,	  and	  no	  doubt	  Hussein’s	  too,	  was	  that	  by	  the	  time	  the	  domestic	  political	  crunch	   came,	   enough	   hopefulness	   would	   have	   been	   created	   in	  Israel	  and	  the	  United	  States	  to	  tip	  the	  scales	  toward	  Labor”.239	  	  In	  1987,	  after	  he	  finally	  reached	  that	  agreement	  in	  London,	  the	  king	  wrote	  a	  letter	  to	  Shultz	   urging	   him	   to	   “get	   engaged	   and	   help	   Peres;	   he	   is	   exposed”.240	   	   British	   PM	  Thatcher	  wrote	  a	  similar	  letter	  to	  President	  Reagan	  calling	  on	  him	  to	  shore	  up	  Peres	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after	  meeting	  with	  Hussein	  that	  summer.241	  	   Hussein’s	  decision	  to	  sever	  ties	  from	  the	  West	  Bank	  in	  1988	  was	  immensely	  damaging	   to	   Peres,	   but	  within	   his	   new	   constraints	   the	   king	   tried	   to	  mitigate	   that	  damage.	   	   He	   appeared	   on	  Nightline	   back-­‐to-­‐back	  with	   Shimon	   Peres,	   proclaiming	  that	  a	  Shamir	  victory	  would	  be	  a	  disaster.242	   	  One	  week	  before	  the	  Israeli	  vote,	  the	  king	  also	  hosted	  a	  trilateral	  summit	  in	  Aqaba	  with	  Mubarak	  and	  Arafat	  designed	  to	  hint	   that	   confederation	  might	   still	  be	  possible.	   	  A	   source	   from	  the	   Jordanian	  court	  admitted	  to	  the	  press,	   “we	  believe	  that	  a	  strong	  Arab	  position	  before	  the	  elections	  would	  help	  the	  (Israeli)	  voters”.243	  Egypt	   also	   played	   an	   active	   role	   trying	   to	   influence	   the	   Israeli	   election.	  	  Leaving	  Aqaba,	  President	  Mubarak	  proclaimed	  that	  Egypt,	  Jordan,	  and	  the	  PLO	  had	  reached	  a	  secret	  agreement	  on	  confederation,	  though	  offering	  few	  details	  about	  the	  alleged	   union.244	   	   Elaborating	   on	   the	   meeting’s	   purpose,	   Mubarak’s	   chief	   foreign	  policy	  advisor,	  Osama	  el-­‐Baz,	  told	  the	  press	  that	  “we	  want	  the	  Israeli	  voter,	  whether	  Arab	  or	  Jew,	  to	  understand	  where	  his	  specific	  interest	  lies.	  	  Let	  him	  know,	  when	  he	  casts	  his	  vote,	  that	  there	  is	  an	  Arab	  partner	  ready	  for	  negotiations.	  	  The	  voter	  faces	  the	   issue	   of	  war	   and	   peace.	   	   If	   he	  wants	   peace,	   the	   Arab	   side	   is	   ready”.245	   	   I	   also	  found	  cables	  in	  which	  Mubarak	  is	  reported	  as	  telling	  American	  officials	  that	  “he	  will	  try	  to	  keep	  Egyptian-­‐Israeli	  relationship	  on	  even	  keel	  between	  now	  and	  November	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1,”	  which,	  of	  course,	  was	  the	  date	  on	  which	  Israeli	  elections	  were	  scheduled.246	  More	  evidence	  has	  recently	  come	  to	  light	  on	  the	  Egyptian	  role	  during	  the	  first	  half	  of	  1988.	  	  An	  Israeli	  journalist	  who	  received	  documents	  from	  Peres’s	  inner	  circle	  chronicles	   their	   close	   cooperation	   with	   Mubarak’s	   team	   to	   influence	   the	   1988	  elections	   to	   Labor’s	   advantage.	   	   The	   article	   is	   still	   only	   available	   in	  Hebrew,	   but	   I	  have	  tracked	  down	  a	  copy	  and	  translated	  it	  into	  English.247	  	  As	  noted	  below,	  I	  have	  also	   confirmed	   a	   general	   description	   of	   the	   author’s	   argument	   with	   an	   observer	  within	  the	  Reagan	  administration	  at	  the	  time.	  Mubarak	  advisor	  El-­‐Baz	  was	  the	  point	  person	  for	  such	  efforts,	  and	  a	  series	  of	  highly	  restricted	  and	  “eyes	  only”	  memoranda	  summarize	  the	  content	  of	  his	  meetings	  with	   Peres	   advisors	   such	   as	   personal	   advisor	   Novik,	   then-­‐Director	   General	   of	   the	  Foreign	  Ministry	  Abrasha	  Tamir,	   and	  Mideast	   studies	  Prof.	   Stephen	  Cohen.	   	  Tamir	  wrote	   to	   Peres	   after	   a	   January	   1988	   meeting	   with	   El-­‐Baz	   that	   “their	   and	   our	  common	  motive	   is	   that	  our	  winning	   the	  elections	   is	  a	  prerequisite	   for	  progress	   in	  peace.	   	   With	   the	   Likud	   there	   can	   be	   no	   peace	   because	   for	   that	   party	   to	   accept	  territorial	  concessions	  is	  like	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  without	  Communism”.	  Prior	   to	   the	  Shultz	  plan,	  Egypt	  hoped	   to	  pitch	   its	   own	   initiative	   that	  would	  call	   for	   the	  participation	   of	   foreign	  ministers,	   not	   prime	  ministers,	   so	   that	   Peres’s	  participation	  “would	  give	  him	  great	  exposure	  and	  help	  him	  in	  terms	  of	  Israeli	  public	  opinion”.	   	   Tamir	   says	   that	   El-­‐Baz	   emphasized	   he	   “will	   do	   everything	   possible	   to	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create	  a	  background	  to	  help	  the	  Labor	  Alignment	  win	  an	  election	   in	  every	  way.	   	   If	  they	  do	  not,	  there	  will	  be	  stagnation	  and	  possibly	  a	  victory	  for	  the	  Likud,	  and	  then	  this	  will	  be	  a	  disaster	   for	  us	  and	   for	   them.	   	  They	  have	  decided	   to	  help	  Peres	   from	  now	  until	  April	  to	  present	  to	  Israel	  a	  practical	  proposal	  for	  movement”.	  El-­‐Baz	  told	  Novik	  and	  Cohen	  that,	  when	  Mubarak	  visited	  the	  U.S.	  in	  January,	  the	   Egyptian	   president	   told	   Reagan	   and	   Shultz	   that	   “he	   sees	   in	   Israel	   only	   one	  partner.	   	  That	  only	  Peres	  is	  a	  partner	  for	  peace.	   	  He	  completely	  accepts	  this	  thesis,	  and	  to	  contribute	  to	  this	  the	  PLO	  will	  disappear	  under	  the	  carpet	  for	  the	  near	  future	  and	  will	  not	  even	  raise	  a	  request	   for	  change	  until	  after	   the	  elections	   in	   Israel”.	   	  At	  another	  meeting,	   El-­‐Baz	   told	   Novik	   that	   “we	  will	   continue	   to	   prove	   to	   the	   Israeli	  voter	  that	  the	  Labor	  Alignment	  is	  the	  only	  partner	  for	  dialogue	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  peace”	  and	   that	   “Mubarak	   is	   ready	   to	   appear	   on	   Israeli	   television	   on	   the	   [current	   affairs	  program]	  ‘Moked’	  [literally,	  “Focus”]	  as	  soon	  as	  you	  say	  it	  would	  be	  good	  for	  you”.	  The	   Egyptian	   Ambassador	   to	   Israel,	   Mohammed	   Bassiouny,	   kept	   Peres’s	  people	  in	  the	  loop	  about	  his	  official	  meetings	  with	  Shamir’s	  office.	   	  He	  relayed	  that	  Mubarak	   turned	   down	   repeated	   entreaties	   from	   Shamir	   to	   hold	   a	   joint	   peace	  summit	  without	  preconditions	  that	  would	  also	  include	  King	  Hussein	  of	  Jordan.	  	  This	  fits	  with	   the	   claims	  of	   a	   former	   staffer	  at	   the	   Israeli	  Embassy	   in	  Cairo,	  who	  wrote	  that	   Mubarak	   intensely	   disliked	   PM	   Shamir	   and	   refused	   to	   grant	   him	   meetings	  (though	  not	  other	  Israelis)	  out	  of	  hopes	  this	  would	  undermine	  Shamir	  back	  home.248	  	  Finally,	  I	  have	  recently	  confirmed	  the	  general	  thrust	  of	  Schiffer’s	  claims	  in	  the	  article	  with	  Dennis	  Ross.	  	  This	  portion	  of	  the	  conversation	  went	  as	  follows:	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  “DW:	  In	  eighty-­‐eight	  we	  have	  Osama	  el-­‐Baz	  telling	  folks	  like	  Nimrod	  Novik	  that	  the	  Egyptian	  government	  was	  going	  to	  do	  everything	  it	  could	  to	  make	  Labor	  look	  good	  before	  their	  upcoming	  elections.	  	  Ross:	  I	  remember	  that.	  	  I	  had	  conversations	  with	  Osama	  el-­‐Baz.	  	  But	  I	  told	  him	  it	  was	  a	   delicate	   business	   and	   Egypt	   should	   be	   careful	   not	   to	   look	   like	   it	   was	   trying	   to	  manipulate	  Israeli	  politics”.249	  	  	   Egyptian	  efforts	  also	  seem	  to	  have	  been	   linked	  with	  separate	  endeavors	  by	  both	  the	  PLO	  and	  by	  France.	  	  Just	  after	  Egypt	  and	  Jordan	  held	  their	  meeting	  with	  the	  PLO	  at	  Aqaba,	  Arafat	  proclaimed	  that	  Israeli	  Arabs	  should	  “push	  forward	  the	  peace	  process”	   by	   voting	   in	   the	   Israeli	   election.250	   	   Also,	   Arafat	   advisor	   Hani	   al-­‐Hassan	  went	  to	  Saudi	  Arabia	  to	  ask	  Islamic	  authorities	  in	  Mecca	  to	  issue	  a	  fatwa	  instructing	  Israeli	   Arabs	   to	   vote	   for	   the	   candidate	   most	   likely	   to	   negotiate	   peace	   with	   the	  Palestinians.251	  French	  President	  Francois	  Mitterrand	  visited	  Egypt	  a	  few	  days	  after	  Aqaba	  to	  meet	  with	  Mubarak.	   	  During	  the	  visit,	  they	  sought	  to	  highlight	  ongoing	  multilateral	  negotiations	  to	  organize	  a	  possible	  peace	  conference	  and	  to	  draw	  more	  attention	  to	  the	   results	   of	   Aqaba.	   	   The	   fact	   that	   they	   had	   already	   met	   the	   previous	   month	  supports	   the	  notion	   that	   the	  purpose	  of	   their	  meeting	  may	  have	  been	   tied	   in	  with	  Israeli	  elections	  later	  that	  week.252	  	   Some	  observers	  suggest	  that	  even	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  was	  trying	  to	  facilitate	  a	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Peres	  triumph	  in	  1988.253	  	  Although	  the	  two	  nations	  did	  not	  have	  prior	  relations,	  the	  Soviets	   agreed	   to	  welcome	   an	   unprecedented	   Israeli	   consular	  mission	   to	  Moscow	  after	  meetings	  with	   Peres	   in	  Madrid,	  Washington	   and	   Geneva	   that	  May.254	   	   Peres	  claimed	  that	  they	  also	  were	  relenting	  on	  their	  previous	  demand	  that	  relations	  could	  only	  be	  restored	  following	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  Palestinian	  state,	  instead	  lowering	  their	  bar	   to	   simply	  holding	   the	   international	   conference.255	   	  Allegedly,	   in	   the	   lead	  up	   to	  Aqaba,	  Soviet	  officials	  played	  an	  important	  role	  in	  helping	  the	  Egyptians	  to	  persuade	  Arafat	  to	  hint	  that	  he	  was	  open	  to	  the	  plan	  for	  confederation	  with	  Jordan.256	  	  Did	  these	  Policy	  Succeed?	  	   No.	  	  Reagan’s	  second	  term	  approach	  to	  LSI	  was	  characterized	  by	  policy	  drift.	  	  With	  the	  president	  so	  removed	  from	  decision-­‐making	  and	  his	  secretary	  of	  state	  so	  restrained	  on	  Arab-­‐Israeli	  issues,	  opportunities	  for	  LSI	  were	  missed	  or	  mishandled	  and	  were	   unable	   to	   succeed	  without	   higher-­‐level	   support.	   	   Also,	   efforts	   by	   third-­‐parties	   were	   unable	   to	   accomplish	   much	   in	   light	   of	   Washington’s	   lackluster	  approach	  and	  King	  Hussein’s	  stunning	  disavowal	  of	  the	  West	  Bank.	  	  The	  overall	  low	  level	  of	  efficacy	  for	  LSI	  during	  Reagan’s	  second	  term	  stands	  in	   stark	   contrast	   to	   the	   four	   years	   that	   followed	   and	   the	   four	   years	   preceding.	  	  During	  Reagan’s	   first	   term,	  his	   attention	  was	  more	   tightly	   focused	  on	  Arab-­‐Israeli	  issues	  because	  of	   the	  war	   in	  Lebanon.	   	  His	  policies	   therefore	   tended	   to	  be	  carried	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out	  then	  with	  stronger	  levels	  of	  U.S.	  commitment.	  	  During	  George	  H.	  W.	  Bush’s	  term,	  the	   president	   was	   either	   deeply	   invested	   in	   leadership	   selection	   intervention	   or	  charged	  his	   activist	   secretary	  of	   state,	   James	  Baker,	  with	  doing	   the	   same.	   	   In	  both	  instances,	  the	  rates	  of	  LSI	  success	  were	  greater	  than	  Reagan’s	  second	  term.	  	   During	   phase	   one,	   the	   administration	   failed	   to	   act	   swiftly	   enough	   to	   take	  advantage	  of	  the	  brief	  window	  in	  which	  Peres	  still	  retained	  the	  prime	  ministership.	  	  A	  more	  active	  and	  early	  effort	  to	  provide	  the	  participants	  with	  political	  cover	  could	  have	  enabled	  them	  to	  reach	  a	  deal	  like	  the	  London	  Agreement	  when	  Peres	  was	  still	  powerful	  enough	  to	  dissolve	  the	  NUG	  and	  call	  elections	  based	  on	  the	  peace	  plan.	  	   During	  phase	  two,	  the	  administration	  tended	  to	  follow	  Secretary	  Shultz’s	  lead	  of	  refusing	  to	  getting	  involved	  in	  Israeli	  politics.	  	  American	  non-­‐involvement	  had	  an	  impact	  on	  Israeli	  politics	  that	  went	  counter	  to	  what	  administration	  officials	  hoped	  to	  see	  happen	  there.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  failing	  in	  this	  narrow	  sense,	  the	  administration	  also	  undermined	   its	   broader	   objective	   of	  marginalizing	   the	   PLO	   by	   letting	   its	   last	   real	  chance	  at	  a	  viable	  Jordanian	  option	  slip	  through	  its	  fingers.	  	   During	   phase	   three,	   the	   administration	   promoted	   a	   peace	   plan	   that	   was	  designed	  to	  bolster	  the	  cause	  of	  peace	  and	  moderation	  in	  the	  region,	  but	  it	  failed	  to	  achieve	  this	  objective.	  	  Despite	  becoming	  more	  active	  on	  the	  process	  with	  repeated	  shuttle	  visits	  to	  the	  region,	  Shultz	  proved	  that	  he	  was	  a	  paper	  tiger,	  enabling	  Shamir	  to	  say	  no	  to	  him	  without	  tangible	  consequences.	  	  Some	  administration	  officials	  tried	  to	   advance	   a	   tougher	   line,	   but	   they	  were	   unsuccessful	   because	   they	   did	   not	   have	  sustained	  senior	  buy-­‐in	  for	  their	  efforts.	  	  Conscious	  neutrality	  actually	  impacted	  the	  internal	  balance	  of	  power	  within	  Israeli	  politics	  by	  unintentionally	  bolstering	  Likud.	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<Efficacy,	  Phase	  One>	  	   Time	  ran	  out	  for	  Peres	  because	  the	  win	  sets	  between	  him	  and	  Hussein	  were	  just	  too	  far	  apart	  for	  a	  deal	  to	  be	  reached	  before	  the	  rotation	  agreement.	  	  For	  some	  time,	  the	  two	  sides	  could	  not	  close	  the	  ground	  between	  them	  over	  two	  main	  issues:	  the	  PLO	  and	  an	  international	  conference.	   	  Peres	  felt	  he	  could	  not	  proceed	  with	  the	  PLO	   and	   Hussein	   felt	   he	   could	   not	   proceed	   without	   them.	   	   Hussein	   wanted	  negotiations	   to	   take	   place	   in	   the	   context	   of	   a	   binding,	   multilateral	   conference,	  whereas	   Peres	   was	   reluctant	   to	   consider	   a	   conference	   that	   was	   anything	   but	   a	  “castrated”	  charade	  that	  would	  serve	  as	  an	  opening	  ceremony	  for	  direct	  talks.	  	  The	  king	  severed	  all	  ties	  with	  the	  PLO	  in	  February	  of	  1986,	  but	  by	  that	  point	  there	  was	  little	  time	  to	  work	  out	  the	  necessary	  compromises	  that	  would	  enable	  a	  deal.	  Pickering’s	  efforts	  to	  help	  Peres	  cling	  to	  high	  office	  would	  certainly	  have	  been	  easier	   had	   Peres	   and	   Hussein	   been	   willing	   to	   soften	   their	   negotiating	   positions	  before	   the	   rotation	   agreement.	   	   However,	   he	   suffered	   from	   a	   lack	   of	   enthusiastic	  support	   from	   Washington	   in	   this	   endeavor.	   	   The	   actions	   of	   principal	   American	  officials	  ultimately	  kept	  the	  Jordanian	  and	  Israeli	  positions	  farther	  apart	  rather	  than	  helping	   them	   bridge	   their	   gaps.	   	   Reagan	   and	   Shultz’s	   hard	   line	   against	   an	  international	   conference	   ignored	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   king	   was	   politically	   unable	   to	  water	   down	   this	   demand	   without	   political	   cover	   from	   outside.	   	   Wat	   Cluverius,	   a	  State	  Department	  official	  shuttling	  between	  Amman	  and	  Jerusalem,	  explained:	  	  “This	   is	   where	   I	   have	   problems	   with	   George	   Shultz	   and	   his	  immediate	   staff.	   	   He	   said	   not	   to	   an	   international	   conference…	  	  Shultz	  wouldn’t	  push	  for	  it,	  and	  I	  kept	  writing	  messages	  that	  there	  is	  no	  way	  forward	  except	  through	  an	  international	  conference.	  	  And	  I	  would	   get	   phone	   calls	   saying	   ‘what	   are	   you	   smoking	   out	   there?	  	  The	  Secretary	  doesn’t	  want	  one’.	  	  And	  I	  would	  say	  I	  don’t	  care,	  I’m	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supposed	   to	   tell	   him	   what	   I	   think	   would	   work	   and	   what	   I	   think	  won’t	  work”.257	  	  In	   the	   end,	   what	   helped	   Hussein	   reach	   agreement	   with	   Peres	   at	   London	   in	   early	  1987	   was	   when	   the	   Egyptians	   decided	   to	   fill	   this	   vacuum	   and	   give	   Hussein	   the	  political	   cover	  Washington	  was	   not	   providing.	   	   As	   Foreign	  Minister,	   Peres	   visited	  Mubarak	   in	   February,	   and	   they	   agreed	   on	   compromises	   to	   mitigate	   the	   PLO	   and	  conference	   issues	   that	  emboldened	  Hussein	   to	   finally	  go	  out	  on	   that	   limb.258	   	  This	  was	   a	   role	   that	   Washington	   could	   have	   been	   playing	   earlier	   had	   Shultz	   and	   the	  president	   been	   more	   flexible	   and	   nuanced	   in	   their	   approaches.	   	   Had	   a	   London	  Accord-­‐type	   agreement	   been	   reached	   before	   rather	   than	   after	   Peres	   surrendered	  the	  premiership	  to	  Yitzhak	  Shamir,	   it	  might	  have	  been	  a	  totally	  different	  ballgame.	  	  Yet,	  when	  Hussein	  came	  to	  Washington	  in	  June	  of	  1986,	  Shultz	  was	  encouraging	  the	  president	  to	  pay	  little	  heed	  to	  the	  ongoing	  efforts	  between	  Hussein	  and	  Peres.	  	  
<Efficacy,	  Phase	  Two>	  	   Without	   American	   support,	   the	   joint	   scheme	   between	   Hussein	   and	   Peres	  quickly	  fizzled	  out.	  	  Not	  only	  did	  Shultz	  decide	  to	  cancel	  his	  plans	  to	  visit	  the	  region	  based	   upon	   his	  meeting	  with	   Arens,	   the	   Likud	   leaked	   this	   information,	  making	   it	  public	   knowledge	   that	   the	   secretary	   of	   state	  was	  declining	   to	   support	   the	  plan.259	  	  Whereas	   before	   Peres	   would	   have	   benefitted	   most	   from	   American	   support	   to	  produce	   a	   deal,	   he	   had	   now	   lost	   many	   of	   the	   levers	   available	   to	   him	   as	   prime	  minister,	  and	  what	  he	  really	  needed	  was	  strong	  American	  backing	  for	  a	  deal	  after	  it	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had	  been	  reached.	  	  He	  could	  no	  longer	  dissolve	  the	  government	  at	  will	  and	  instead	  needed	  a	  surge	  of	  initiative	  to	  help	  him	  garner	  61	  MKs	  for	  a	  vote	  of	  no	  confidence.	  	  He	  retained	  high	  public	  approval	  levels	  (25%	  higher	  than	  Shamir)	  but	  was	  unable	  to	  translate	  that	  popularity	  into	  political	  gains	  without	  an	  election.260	  	   Without	  such	  support	  Peres	  fell	  flat	  on	  his	  face.	  	  By	  mid-­‐May	  it	  became	  clear	  that	  Peres	  could	  neither	  garner	  a	  majority	  of	  the	  cabinet	  for	  the	  London	  Agreement,	  nor	  could	  he	  get	  more	  than	  59	  votes	  in	  the	  Knesset	  –	  just	  shy	  of	  what	  he	  needed	  to	  bring	  down	  the	  government.261	  	  Peres	  then	  visited	  Washington	  to	  urge	  more	  active	  American	  support	  for	  the	  plan,	  but	  Pickering	  says	  “by	  then	  the	  whole	  thing	  had	  gone	  flat,	   and	   you	   couldn’t	   get	   air	   back	   into	   the	   tire”.262	   	   Scholars	   Caplan	   and	   Zittrain	  Eisenberg	   agree	   that	  Washington’s	   lack	   of	   enthusiasm	   “denied	   Peres	   the	   political	  ammunition	  with	  which	  he	  was	  hoping	   to	  create	  a	  groundswell	  of	   support	   for	   the	  plan	  within	  the	  Knesset	  and	  among	  the	  Israeli	  electorate”.263	  	   It	  was	  clear	  to	  many	  observers	  at	  the	  time	  that	  Shultz	  was	  abandoning	  Peres.	  	  For	  instance,	  British	  PM	  Thatcher	  wrote	  a	  letter	  to	  President	  Reagan	  urging	  a	  more	  proactive	  approach	  to	  the	  Jordanian-­‐Israeli	  accords.	  	  Oakley	  explains	  to	  Carlucci	  that	  she	   was	   “urging	   greater	   activity	   on	   our	   part	   in	   support	   of	   Peres	   and	   the	  international	  conference.	  	  She	  says…	  giving	  [Shamir]	  a	  veto	  will,	  she	  believes,	  erode	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Peres’	   position”.264	   	   Hussein	   also	  wrote	   to	   Shultz	   urging	   him	   to	   “get	   engaged	   and	  help	   Peres;	   he	   is	   exposed”.265	   	   As	   noted	   above,	   NSC	   staff	   recognized	   that	   Shultz’s	  approach	  was	  allowing	  Shamir	  to	  sit	  tight	  and	  wait	  out	  the	  London	  Agreement.	  Not	  only	  did	  the	  administration	  fail	  in	  the	  narrow	  sense	  of	  trying	  to	  bolster	  a	  proponent	  of	  peace,	  it	  also	  failed	  in	  the	  broader	  sense	  of	  advancing	  the	  process	  and	  boosting	  American	  influence	  in	  the	  region.	  	  Oakley	  pointed	  out	  that	  Shultz’s	  low-­‐key	  approach	  also	  persuaded	  people	  in	  the	  region	  that	  the	  administration’s	  posture	  was	  one	  of	  disinterest	  and	  drift.	  	  Observers	  aptly	  wondered	  why	  the	  U.S.	  was	  so	  focused	  on	   keeping	   the	   Soviets	   out	   of	   the	   region	   when	   it	   was	   itself	   so	   noticeably	  uninvolved.266	   	  One	  area	  of	  administration	  reluctance	  about	  the	  plan	  was	  that	  they	  ideally	  would	   have	   liked	   for	   stronger	   terms	   for	  marginalizing	   the	   PLO	   from	   talks.	  	  However,	  by	   letting	  the	  London	  Agreement	   fall	  apart,	   the	  administration	   lost	   their	  last,	  best	  chance	  for	  a	  viable	  Jordanian	  agreement.	  	  When	  the	  intifada	  broke	  out	  later	  that	  year,	  it	  spelled	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  end	  for	  Jordanian	  condominium.	  
<Efficacy,	  Phase	  Three>	  	   In	  the	  end,	  the	  right	  and	  left	  blocs	  were	  evenly	  tied	  at	  60	  to	  60	  seats	   in	  the	  Knesset,	  with	  Likud	  winning	  one	  more	  seat	  as	  a	  party	  than	  Labor.	  	  Given	  that	  Likud	  held	  a	  commanding	  lead	  earlier	  in	  the	  year,	  the	  fact	  that	  Labor	  closed	  the	  gap	  at	  all	  is	  noteworthy.	   	   Labor	   ran	   a	   stronger	   campaign	   in	   1988,	  winning	  more	   votes	  with	   a	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outspoken	   ideological	   appeal	   that	   it	   had	   with	   its	   “catch-­‐all”	   strategy	   of	   1984.267	  	  However,	  a	  large	  part	  of	  narrowing	  this	  gap	  had	  to	  do	  with	  ideological	  polarization	  that	   diminished	   the	   returns	   for	   both	   major	   parties	   while	   boosting	   turnout	   for	  orthodox	   and	   radical	   secular	   parties.268	   	   It	   is	   even	  possible	   that	   Labor	   could	  have	  won	  the	  election	  if	  not	  for	  a	  grisly	  terror	  attack	  just	  two	  days	  before	  the	  election.269	  	  	   However,	  much	  of	  this	  gain	  was	  in	  spite	  of	  American	  efforts,	  not	  because	  of	  them.	  	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  administration	  was	  pushing	  a	  peace	  plan	  certainly	  appealed	  to	  Labor	  strategists,	  but	  the	  lackluster	  manner	  in	  which	  it	  was	  promoted	  both	  killed	  the	  initiative	  and	  defused	  the	  possibility	  that	  it	  might	  have	  had	  for	  helping	  Labor	  at	  the	   polls.	   	   Despite	   repeated	   attempts	   by	   other	   high-­‐level	   American	   officials	   to	  reinforce	   Shultz’s	   message	   with	   an	   undercurrent	   of	   toughness,	   his	   soft-­‐soap	  approach	  was	  generally	  what	  prevailed.	  	  By	  the	  time	  Israeli	  elections	  rolled	  around,	  there	  was	  very	  little	  being	  said	  in	  Washington	  about	  the	  peace	  process	  at	  all.	  Whereas	   the	   next	  American	   secretary	   of	   state,	   James	  Baker,	  was	   notorious	  for	   threatening	   to	   “leave	   a	   dead	   cat”	   on	   the	   doorstep	   of	   whoever	   said	   no	   to	   his	  proposals	   for	   the	   1991	   Madrid	   conference,	   Shultz	   was	   a	   paper	   tiger.	   	   Shamir	  repeatedly	   flouted	   his	   entreaties,	   even	   when	   offered	   a	   generous	   set	   of	   carrots	  through	   the	  MOU	  on	  strategic	  cooperation.	   	  As	  one	   Israeli	   commentator	  observed,	  the	  message	  of	  letting	  his	  original	  10-­‐day	  deadline	  pass	  without	  an	  Israeli	  response	  and	  then	  also	  granting	  the	  MOU	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  “one	  may	  say	  no	  to	  America	  and	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still	   get	   a	   bonus!”.270	   	   Another	   commentator	   pointed	   out	   that	   what	   Shultz	   really	  needed	  to	  deliver	  was	  “the	  diplomatic	  equivalent	  of	  a	  good	  kick	  in	  the	  crotch”.271	  
<Efficacy,	  Other	  Meddlers>	  	   A	  range	  of	  other	  actors	  actively	  tried	  to	  conduct	  LSI	  to	  help	  the	  Israeli	  left	  in	  the	   1988	   elections,	   and,	   unlike	   the	   U.S.,	   their	   efforts	   probably	   had	   a	   generally	  positive	  effect.	  	  However,	  the	  magnitude	  of	  this	  effect	  is	  negligible	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  deleterious	  effects	  of	  King	  Hussein’s	  new	  West	  Bank	  policy	  and	  America’s	  laissez	  faire	   posture.	   	   Also,	   in	   two	   instances	   the	   pretenses	   behind	   which	   LSI	   was	   being	  pursued	  did	  not	  hold	  up	  to	  scrutiny	  and	  backfired	  rather	  than	  helping.	  	   For	   instance,	   the	  Egyptian	  effort	   to	  help	  Peres	  was	  probably	  a	  net	  positive,	  but	  Jordanian	  and	  Palestinian	  efforts	  were	  more	  problematic.	  	  Yasser	  Arafat’s	  call	  on	  Arab	   Israeli	   voters	   to	   support	   the	   party	   of	   peace	   was	   a	   convenient	   tool	   for	  aggressive	   opposition	   advertisements	   suggesting	   the	   party	   was	   in	   league	   with	  terrorists:	  “‘Why,’	   it	  was	  repeatedly	  asked	  in	  the	  Likud’s	  television	  campaign,	   ‘why	  does	  the	  PLO	  urge	  voters	  to	  support	  Labor?’.”	  	  Then,	  when	  it	  was	  revealed	  that	  King	  Hussein’s	  Nightline	   appearance	   had	   been	   solicited	   and	   facilitated	   by	   Peres’s	   close	  advisors,	  the	  effort	  backfired	  and	  “lent	  credence	  to	  the	  Likud’s	  accusations	  that	  the	  [Labor]	  Alignment	  was	  soliciting	  foreign	  intervention	  in	  the	  elections”.272	  	   More	  damaging	  by	  far,	  however,	  was	  King	  Hussein’s	  political	  separation	  from	  the	  West	  Bank.	  	  When	  he	  started	  to	  float	  suggestions	  in	  June	  that	  he	  might	  bow	  out	  to	  the	  PLO,	  Shamir	  jumped	  on	  these	  statements	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  Jordanian	  option	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was	  a	  mirage,	  and	  Peres	  was	  forced	  to	  scramble	  to	  refute	  this	  claim.273	  	  Then,	  when	  he	  announced	  the	  full-­‐fledged	  schism	  at	  the	  end	  of	  July,	  it	  was	  devastating	  for	  Labor	  no	  matter	  how	  much	  the	  king	  later	  backtracked	  to	  hint	  that	  confederation	  was	  still	  viable.	  	  The	  peace	  camp	  did	  what	  it	  would	  to	  recover	  some	  ground	  by	  floating	  a	  new	  initiative	   –	   this	   one	   for	   elections	   in	   the	   Palestinian	   territories	   to	   elect	   a	   non-­‐PLO	  leadership	   with	   which	   to	   negotiate.	   	   In	   spite	   of	   this	   plan,	   CIA	   analysts	   observed	  privately	   in	   August	   that	   “Foreign	   Minister	   Peres’s	   Labor	   Party	   has	   been	   dealt	   a	  severe	   blow	   by	   Hussein’s	   disengagement,	   as	   it	   undermines	   the	   ‘Jordanian	   option’	  that	   has	   served	   as	   the	   foundation	   stone	  of	   Labor’s	   peace	  process	  platform”.274	   	   In	  short,	   gestures	   of	   support	   can	   be	   helpful	   in	   isolation	   but	   are	   usually	  much	  more	  persuasive	  when	  used	  to	  amplify	  the	  context	  of	  a	  compelling	  overall	  process.	  	  
Coding	  the	  Observable	  Implications	  
1.	  Perceptions	  of	  Sender	  Interests:	  	   The	  four	  theories	  tested	  by	  this	  dissertation	  offer	  divergent	  predictions	  with	  regard	  to	  whether	  or	  not	  perceptions	  of	  sender	  state	  interests	  are	  likely	  to	  increase	  or	  decrease	  the	  possibility	  of	  leadership	  selection	  intervention.	  	  Theory	  #1	  (national	  interests	   theory)	   	   anticipates	   that	   LSI	   occurrence	   should	   directly	   correlate	   to	  objective	   opportunities	   for	   meddling	   abroad.	   	   Theory	   #2	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   lobby-­‐legislative	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
273 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (ME/0174/i), “King Husayn says Shultz initiative still the subject 
of dialogue.” 
274 ‘The Arab-Israeli Peace Process: Jordan’s Disengagement from the West Bank’ - Item in Regular 
Report Entitled Near East and South Asia Review”. CIA Directorate of Intelligence, August 26, 1988. 
CREST Collection (The CIA Records Search Tool). The National Archives and Records Administration 
“Site II” facility in College Park, Maryland.” See also James McCartney, “Hussein has torpedoed peace 
plan, U.S. aides say,” Knight-Ridder News Service, August 11, 1988; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 
(ME/0239/A/1), trans., “Israel: Peres says Palestinian uprising ‘cannot end in victory’”, August 22, 1988. 
	   271	  
approach)	   expects	   that	   rates	   occurrence	   should	  be	   low	  on	   the	  U.S.-­‐Israel	   directed	  dyad	   because	   pro-­‐Israel	   lobbyists	   and	  members	   of	   Congress	   tend	   to	   believe	   that	  intervention	   in	   Israeli	   politics	   does	   not	   further	   U.S.	   interests.	   	   Theory	   #3	   (the	  bureaucratic	  politics	  approach)	  expects	  rates	  of	  LSI	  occurrence	  to	  be	  high	  because	  working-­‐level	   officials	   in	   the	   executive	   branch	   tend	   to	   see	   a	   strong	   relationship	  beween	   national	   interests	   and	   support	   for	   peacemakers	   within	   Israeli	   politics.	  	  Finally,	   Theory	   #4	   (leadership	   theory)	   expects	   LSI	   to	   vary	   in	   accordance	   to	   the	  preferences	  of	  higher-­‐level	  political	  officials	  within	  the	  sender	  state.	  In	  this	  regard,	  the	  data	  for	  this	  episode	  seems	  to	  support	  leadership	  theory.	  	  Two	   personalities	   loom	   large	   in	   this	   entire	   drama:	   (1)	   President	   Reagan	   for	   his	  deferential,	   aloof	   approach	   and	   (2)	   Secretary	   of	   State	   Shultz	   for	   his	   disinterested,	  low-­‐key	  approach	  to	  the	  peace	  process	  and	  aversion	  to	  getting	  caught	  up	  in	  Israeli	  domestic	  politics.	  	  As	  Oakley	  notes	  in	  his	  ADST	  oral	  history,	  “Shultz	  had	  already	  been	  burned	   [over	   the	   Reagan	   Plan	   and	   May	   17th	   Accords]…	   but	   even	   had	   that	   not	  happened,	   I	   don’t	   think	   the	   Secretary	   would	   have	   felt	   it	   wise	   to	   take	   21	   trips	   to	  Damascus	   and	   spend	   innumerable	   hours	   on	   a	   problem	   that	   was	   not	   flaring	   up.	  	  Some	  people	  get	  the	  ‘Middle	  East’	  bug;	  others	  don’t	  –	  regardless	  of	  circumstances	  on	  the	  ground”.	  	  In	  my	  interview	  with	  then-­‐Assistant	  Secretary	  for	  Near	  Eastern	  Affairs	  Richard	  Murphy,	  he	  remarked	  that	  “Shultz	  was	  especially	  very	  determined	  to	  avoid	  entanglement	   in	   Israeli	   politics…	   about	   not	   getting	   twisted	   around	   the	   wheel	   of	  domestic	  politics	  in	  Israel,	  especially	  the	  rivalry	  between	  Peres	  and	  Shamir”.275	  In	  addition	  to	  getting	  upset	  at	  Pickering	  for	  constantly	  urging	  him	  to	  do	  more	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on	  the	  process,276	  Shultz	  bore	  a	  personal	  animus	  against	  Peres	  during	  periods	  two	  and	  three	  that	  could	  not	  have	  boosted	  his	  desire	  to	  get	  involved.	  	  Philip	  Wilcox,	  who	  was	   then	   the	   U.S.	   Consul	   General	   in	   East	   Jerusalem	   and	  was	   in	   the	  waiting	   room	  during	  at	  least	  one	  of	  Shultz’s	  meetings	  with	  Israeli	  intermediaries	  over	  the	  London	  Accords,	   says	   that	   “Shultz	   was	   furious	   toward	   Peres	   regarding	   Pollard	   and	   Iran-­‐Contra.	   	  He	  felt	  betrayed	  by	  Peres”	  because	  both	  breaches	  happened	  while	  he	  was	  prime	  minister	  even	  though	  he	  was	  not	  responsible	  for	  the	  Pollard	  spying	  episode,	  nor	  was	  he	  aware	  that	  Shultz	  was	  being	  cut	  out	  of	  the	  loop	  on	  Iran-­‐Contra.	  	  Also,	  he	  suggests	  that	   interpersonally	  “Shultz	   liked	  Shamir”	  even	  if	   they	  did	  not	  always	  see	  eye	  to	  eye	  on	  the	  territories.277	  	  He	  felt	  less	  warmly	  toward	  Peres,	  since,	  as	  Pickering	  notes,	   “it	   was	   also	   true	   that	   Peres	   tended	   to	   drive	   Shultz	   nuts	   once	   in	   a	   while…	  because	  he	  had	  a	   thousand	   ideas,	  about	   ten	  percent	  of	  which	  were	  very	  good	  and	  about	  eighty	  percent	  of	  which	  were	  in	  the	  middle	  and	  10	  percent	  were	  [not]”.278	  	  These	  personal	  traits	  seem	  to	  have	  played	  a	  major	  role	  in	  shaping	  how	  Shultz	  perceived	   U.S.	   interests	   toward	   Israeli	   politics	   during	   term	   two	   and	   affecting	   the	  actual	   patterns	   of	   occurrence.	   	   The	   low	   rates	   of	   LSI	   and	   high	   rates	   of	   attempted	  freelancing	   fit	   quite	   well	   with	   Theory	   #4	   but	   much	   less	   well	   with	   the	   other	  approaches.	   	   Objectively,	   meddling	   in	   Israeli	   politics	   should	   have	   been	   easiest	  during	   this	   period	   due	   to	   the	   existence	   of	   the	   NUG	   tied	   at	   60-­‐60,	   and	   also	   most	  appealing,	  due	  to	  the	  objective	  threat	  to	  US	  interests	  caused	  by	  the	  intifada	  and	  the	  global	   outrage	   that	   it	   provoked.	   	   And	   yet	   authoritative	   LSI	   happened	   at	   no	   point	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during	  this	  period	  by	  the	  United	  States.	  	  The	  fact	  that	  numerous	  other	  actors	  found	  these	  objective	  structural	  features	  of	  the	  situation	  compelling	  enough	  to	  justify	  LSI	  should	   provide	   additional	   reason	   to	   doubt	   that	   national	   interests	   were	   driving	  American	  decision-­‐making	  with	  regard	  to	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  undertake	  LSI.	  At	   first	   glance,	   the	   low	   rate	   of	   LSI	   is	   congruent	   with	   the	   preferences	   of	  lobbyists	   and	  members	  of	  Congress.	   	   For	   instance,	   in	  1986	  AIPAC	  argued	   that	   the	  Israeli	   rotation	   agreement	   that	   would	   put	   Shamir	   in	   power	   “will	   not,	   as	   Israel’s	  detractors	   claim,	   end	   the	   possibilites	   for	   negotiations”	   since	   “as	   Prime	   Minister,	  Shamir	  will	  follow	  the	  same	  national	  unity	  government	  agreement	  which	  has	  guided	  Peres”.279	  	  The	  group	  was	  generally	  critical	  of	  the	  international	  conference	  premise	  upon	   which	   the	   London	   Accords	   revolved,	   and	   its	   executive	   director	   called	   on	  members	   to	   reject	   “the	   ever	   present	   danger”	   of	   disunity	   caused	   by	   “the	   split	  between	  the	  two	  major	  parties	  in	  Israel”.280	  	  	  However,	   this	   data	   is	   congruent	   with	   Theory	   #2	   for	   the	   wrong	   reasons.	  	  When	   asked	   about	   the	   impact	   of	   these	   domestic	   political	   forces,	   Murphy	   was	  dismissive,	   responding	   “was	   Shultz	   afraid	  of	  Congress	   and	  AIPAC?	   	  No,	   I	  wouldn’t	  describe	  it	  that	  way”.	   	  Instead,	  he	  put	  much	  more	  store	  in	  Shultz’s	  personal	  beliefs	  about	   the	   PLO,	   Arab	   states,	   and	   the	   peace	   process.281	   	   He	   also	   received	   strong	  support	  from	  members	  of	  Congress	  for	  his	  push	  for	  calm	  in	  1988,	  given	  the	  low-­‐key	  approach	  that	  he	  was	  naturally	  inclined	  to	  take.282	  	  Nor	  was	  Reagan’s	  disinterest	  in	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resolving	  the	  conflict	  due	  to	  fear	  of	  Congress	  –	  he	  simply	  did	  not	  care	  that	  much.	  Finally,	  the	  case	  also	  provides	  evidence	  against	  bureaucratic	  politics	  theory.	  	  Lower-­‐ranking	  members	   of	   government	   repeatedly	   preferred	   LSI	   against	   Shamir,	  but	   their	   preferences	   mattered	   little	   for	   shaping	   mainstream	   American	   policy	  toward	  the	  conflict.	  	  Top	  principals	  felt	  otherwise,	  and	  their	  beliefs	  prevailed	  in	  the	  battle	  to	  determine	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  U.S.	  got	  involved.	  	  2.	  Perceptions	  of	  Close	  Contests	  The	   theories	   also	   diverge	   with	   regard	   to	   how	   tightly	   LSI	   occurrence	   is	  expected	  to	  correlate	  with	  close	   leadership	  contests	   in	   the	  target	  country.	   	  Theory	  #1	  (national	  interests	  theory)	  expects	  that	  the	  correlation	  should	  be	  extremely	  tight,	  with	   the	   occurrence	   of	   LSI	   tracking	   very	   closely	   to	   the	   ebb	   and	   flow	   of	   possible	  leadership	   contests	   occurring	   overseas.	   	   However,	   theory	   #4	   (leadership	   theory)	  expects	   that	   the	  occurrence	  of	   LSI	  must	   first	  be	   conditioned	  upon	  whether	  or	  not	  top	  officials	  in	  the	  sender	  state	  are	  actually	  paying	  attention	  to	  political	  contests	  as	  they	  develop	  within	  the	  target.	  Objectively,	   1984-­‐1988	  was	   the	   period	   of	   Israeli	   politics	   in	   which	   the	   two	  main	  parties	  were	  almost	  perfectly	  matched	  in	  their	  political	  power.	   	  The	  left-­‐	  and	  right-­‐wing	   blocs	  were	   tied	   in	   the	   Knesset	   60-­‐60,	   and	   the	   parties	   even	   traded	   the	  premiership	  mid-­‐way	  through	  the	  government’s	  term.	  	  With	  power	  in	  Labor’s	  hands	  during	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  government,	  America	  could	  have	  advanced	  Labor’s	  cause	  without	   even	   having	   to	   gain	   it	   votes	   or	   seats	   per	   se.	   	   All	   that	   would	   have	   been	  required	  would	  have	  been	   to	  help	  Labor	   sever	   the	   rotation	  and	  sustain	   the	   status	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quo.	   	  And	   the	   intifada	  during	   the	   last	  year	  of	   this	  period	  also	  made	   Israeli	  politics	  more	   arresting	   and	   salient	   for	   American	   interests	   over	   the	   global	   outcry	   that	   it	  evoked.	  	  And	  yet	  the	  U.S.	  generally	  avoided	  meddling	  in	  Israeli	  politics.	  	  These	  cases	  therefore	  provide	  strong	  evidence	  against	  Theory	  #1.	  	   One	  possible	  explanation	  is	  that	  administration	  officials	  would	  have	  loved	  to	  meddle	  in	  Israeli	  politics	  but	  were	  deterred	  or	  distracted	  by	  members	  of	  Congress	  or	  the	  pro-­‐Israel	   lobby,	  who	  tend	  to	  see	  little	  difference	  between	  Labor	  and	  Likud.	  	  However,	   there	   is	   little	   evidence	   for	   this	   perspective.	   	   Cluverius	   and	   Oakley	   both	  argue	   that	   Congress	   kept	   a	   relatively	   low	   profile	   on	   the	   conflict	   during	   Reagan’s	  second	   term	   and	   did	   not	   dissuade	   them	   much	   from	   pursuing	   preferred	   policies.	  	  When	  asked	   if	   the	  administration	  encountered	  problems	  with	  Congress,	  Cluverius,	  who	  worked	  on	  this	  file	  during	  1985	  and	  86,	  responded	  “No.	  	  The	  tendency	  is	  to	  get	  involved	  when	  things	  are	  very	  high	  visibility.	  	  This	  was	  a	  period	  of	  low	  visibility”.283	  	  Oakley,	  who	  covered	  Mideast	  issues	  at	  the	  NSC	  in	  ’87	  and	  ’88,	  remarks	  “I	  must	  say	  that	  in	  my	  two	  years	  at	  the	  NSC,	  we	  had	  relatively	  little	  pressure	  from	  U.S.	  domestic	  constituencies.	  	  We	  had	  some	  problems	  with	  arms	  sales	  to…	  Arab	  states,	  but	  we	  had	  no	  major	   [domestic]	   debates	   on	   the	   peace	   process”.284	   	   In	   fact,	   in	  March	   of	   1988	  Shultz	  even	  received	  a	  letter	  from	  thirty	  members	  of	  Congress,	  many	  of	  whom	  were	  traditionally	  pro-­‐Israel	  stalwarts,	  urging	  him	  to	  persist	  in	  his	  efforts	  and	  expressing	  “dismay”	  at	  Shamir’s	  statements	  rejecting	  land	  for	  peace.285	  	   Nor	  does	  bureaucratic	  politics	   theory	  provide	  a	  better	  explanation	  than	  the	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lobby-­‐legislative	  approach.	   	  Working	  level	  officials	  covering	  Mideast	  affairs	  tend	  to	  perceive	   close	   contests	   in	   Israeli	   politics	  more	   often	   than	   the	   political	   leadership,	  but	   this	  would	   cause	  more	   LSI	   to	   occur	   during	   this	   period,	   not	   less.	   	  Many	   of	   the	  officials	  below	  Shultz’s	  paygrade	  felt	  that	  Labor	  could	  be	  significantly	  advantaged	  by	  American	   involvement,	   but	   if	   their	   concern	   in	   this	   regard	  was	  decisive	  we	   should	  expect	  more	  LSI	  during	  this	  period,	  not	  less.	  	   Instead,	   personalities	   provide	   the	   best	   explanation	   for	   variation	   in	  occurrence	  and	  perceptions	  of	  the	  state	  of	  Israeli	  politics.	   	  Throughout	  this	  period,	  Pickering	   was	   optimistic,	   perhaps	   even	   fixated,	   on	   the	   possibility	   that	   American	  involvement	   could	   tip	   the	   scales	   toward	   Labor.	   	   Reagan	   even	  wishfully	   foresaw	   a	  possibility	   that	  Peres	  might	   remain	  prime	  minister	   beyond	  1986,	   but	   he	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  have	  given	  much	  thought	  to	  whether	  American	  involvement	  might	  make	  the	   critical	   difference.	   	   Meanwhile,	   Shultz	   does	   not	   appear	   to	   have	   given	   much	  consideration	   to	   the	   state	  of	   internal	   Israeli	   politics	   except	  by	   recognizing	   that	  he	  wanted	   to	  stay	  out.	   	  He	  appears	   to	  have	  been	  much	   less	   interested	   in	   the	  rotation	  than	  his	  ambassador	  in	  Tel	  Aviv,	  and	  he	  did	  not	  seem	  to	  foresee	  the	  possibility	  that	  a	  more	  active	  American	  role	  could	  have	  changed	  outcomes	  in	  Israeli	  politics.	  	  Shultz’s	  unique	  perception	  of	  Israeli	  politics	  helps	  explain	  why	  LSI	  rates	  in	  Reagan’s	  second	  term	  were	  so	  low,	  and	  it	  also	  provides	  evidence	  in	  favor	  of	  Theory	  #4.	  	  3.	  Patterns	  of	  Domestic	  Debate:	  	   The	  theories	  pose	  contradictory	  predictions	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  dynamics	  of	  deliberation	   about	   LSI	   within	   the	   sender	   state.	   	   Theories	   2	   and	   3	   (the	   lobby-­‐
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legislative	  and	  bureaucratic	  politics	  approaches)	  expect	  that	  these	  actors	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  well-­‐informed	  about	  deliberations	  over	  whether	  or	  not	   to	  pursue	  LSI	  before	  they	  actually	  occur.	  	  Leadership	  theory,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  expects	  these	  actors	  to	  be	  kept	   in	   the	   dark	   because	   doing	   so	   serves	   the	   interests	   of	   the	   sender	   state’s	   top	  political	  leaders.	  Leadership	   theory	   seems	   to	   provide	   the	   best	   framework	   for	   explaining	  patterns	  of	  decision-­‐making	  toward	  Israeli	  politics	  during	  this	  period.	  	  For	  instance,	  Pickering’s	   disgruntled	   political	   counselor	   Roger	   Harrison	   remarks	   that	   his	   boss	  “didn’t	  ever	  feel	  in	  need	  of	  political	  counsel,	  least	  of	  all	  from	  me.	  	  I	  mean,	  he	  was	  not	  a	  man	  tortured	  by	  self-­‐doubt,	  so	  he	  essentially	  didn’t	  use	   the	  political	  section”.	   	   In	  effect,	  he	  was	  “running	  this	  out	  of	  his	  vest	  pocket”.286	  	   Similarly,	   deliberations	   over	   the	   London	   Agreement	   were	   mostly	   offline,	  conducted	   verbally	   and	   outside	   of	   normal	   channels.	   	   The	   U.S.	   was	   first	   informed	  about	  the	  agreement	  when	  Yossi	  Beilin	  rushed	  to	  meet	  Shultz’s	  aide	  Charlie	  Hill	   in	  Helsinki,	  not	  in	  writing.	  	  In	  the	  weeks	  that	  followed,	  Labor	  and	  Likud	  envoys	  poured	  through	  Washington	  in	  efforts	  to	  make	  the	  case	  for	  their	  respective	  parties,	  leaving	  both	   the	   American	   and	   Israeli	   embassies	   cut	   out	   of	   the	   actual	   decision-­‐making	  process.287	   	   Final	   decision-­‐making	   took	   place	   mainly	   out	   of	   the	   seventh	   floor	   of	  Foggy	  Bottom	  and	  in	  occasional	  conversations	  between	  Reagan	  and	  the	  secretary.	  	   Even	   more	   astonishing	   are	   the	   remarks	   of	   Osama	   El-­‐Baz	   with	   regard	   to	  Egyptian	  LSI	  toward	  Israel	  during	  this	  period.	  	  According	  to	  close-­‐held	  memos	  from	  the	  Peres	  camp,	  El-­‐Baz	  told	  Nimrod	  Novik	  when	  they	  met	  in	  Rome	  that	  “I	  prefer	  not	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to	  talk	  on	  the	  phone.	  	  Our	  troops	  and	  your	  troops	  listen.	  	  They	  do	  not	  need	  to	  hear	  what	  we	  are	  planning”.288	   	  All	  of	  the	  written	  memoranda	  comprising	  this	  exchange	  were	  marked	  “eyes	  only”	  for	  Peres	  or	  Mubarak,	  were	  labeled	  highly	  restricted	  (often	  outside	   of	   formal	   governmental	   systems),	   or	   were	  wiped	   clean	   from	   government	  computers	  when	  the	  premiership	  rotated	  to	  Likud.289	  	  4.	  Cycles	  of	  Domestic	  Power:	  	   Another	  area	  in	  which	  the	  theories	  diverge	  involves	  cycles	  of	  political	  power	  within	   the	   sender	   state.	   	   The	   lobby-­‐legislative	   approach	   (Theory	  #2)	   expects	   that	  these	  actors	  should	  be	  even	  more	  influential	  during	  periods	  of	  divided	  government	  and	   in	   the	   lead-­‐up	   to	   elections	   in	   the	   sender	   state.	   	   The	   bureaucratic	   politics	  approach	   (Theory	  #3)	   expects	   that	  working-­‐level	   officials	   in	   the	   executive	  branch	  should	   be	   more	   influential	   during	   periods	   at	   the	   start	   of	   a	   presidential	  administration.	   	   Alternative	   theories	   hold	   that	   failure	   to	   fulfill	   these	   predictions	  offers	  a	  rather	  strong	  test	  against	  these	  two	  domestic	  structural	  approaches.	  In	  this	  regard,	  the	  second	  term	  Reagan	  cases	  offer	  some	  very	  strong	  evidence	  against	   Theories	   2	   and	   3.	   	   The	   most	   active	   period	   of	   American	   peace	   process	  diplomacy	   was	   during	   the	   fourth	   year	   of	   the	   term,	   when,	   according	   to	   lobby-­‐legislative	   theory	   American	   presidents	   are	   supposed	   to	   be	   the	   most	   wary	   of	  domestic	   pressures,	   not	   the	   least.	   	   American	   recognition	   of	   the	   PLO	  was	   delayed	  until	   after	   the	   vote,	   but	   the	   fall-­‐off	   in	   activity	   during	   the	   summer	  had	  more	   to	   do	  with	  Hussein	  and	  Shultz	  giving	  up	  on	  hopes	  that	  the	  initiative	  would	  bear	  fruit,	  not	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because	  the	  effort	  was	  hushed	  up	  due	  to	  domestic	  political	  reasons.	  	   Meanwhile,	  the	  least	  active	  period	  of	  American	  activity	  on	  the	  peace	  process	  was	  1985	  and	  1986.	  	  This	  should	  have	  been	  the	  most	  active	  time	  for	  U.S.	  diplomacy	  according	  to	  lobby-­‐legislative	  theory	  because	  the	  president	  has	  a	  new	  mandate	  and	  elections	   are	   far	   off.	   	   This	   should	   also	   have	   been	   the	   most	   active	   time	   for	   U.S.	  diplomacy	   under	   bureaucratic	   politics	   theory	   because	   political	   appointees	   are	  weaker	   during	   the	   start	   of	   a	   president’s	   term	   –	   especially	   the	   first	   but	   also	   the	  second.	   	  And	  yet	  we	   see	   less	   LSI	   in	   this	  period	   than	   in	  1988.	   	  A	   large	  part	   of	   this	  discrepancy	   had	   to	   do	   with	   political	   appointees	   being	   more	   interested	   in	   other	  aspects	  of	  U.S.-­‐Israel	  relations,	  especially	  crafting	  Israel’s	  economic	  bailout	  package.	  	  5.	  Bureaucratic	  Freelancing:	  	   The	  bureaucratic	  politics	  approach	  (Theory	  #3)	  holds	   that	  LSI	  should	  often	  be	  made	  by	  working-­‐level	  officials	  without	  the	  approval	  of	  higher	  ups.	  	  Meanwhile,	  leadership	   theory	   (Theory	   #4)	   and	   the	   national	   interests	   theory	   (Theory	   #1)	  anticipate	   that	   the	   sender	   state’s	   foreign	  policy	   should	  not	  be	  made	  with	  multiple	  voices	   at	   once.	   	   Leadership	   theory	   also	   anticipates	   that	   freelancing	   should	  be	   less	  likely	   to	   occur	   when	   the	   president	   demonstrates	   an	   active	   style	   of	   general	  management	  and	  of	  specific	  oversight	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  bilateral	  relations	  with	  the	  target.	  There	  was	  an	  enormous	  amount	  of	  LSI	   freelancing	  during	  this	  period.	   	  This	  contradicts	   Theory	   #1	   (national	   interests	   theory),	   which	   does	   not	   expect	   foreign	  policy	  to	  be	  made	  with	  multiple	  voices	  at	  once	  in	  the	  same	  nation.	   	  A	   large	  part	  of	  this	   has	   to	   do	   with	   personalities.	   	   Reagan	   was	   absent	   and	   Shultz	   was	   driving	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recklessly	   slow	   in	   the	   highway	   fast	   lane.	   	   Naturally,	   other	   people	   handling	   the	  Mideast	   file	   and	   stuck	   behind	   his	   slow-­‐go	   approach	   grew	   very	   frustrated,	   and	  sometimes	  this	  frustration	  found	  voice	  in	  freelance	  attempts	  at	  LSI.	  	  The	  fact	  that	  we	  see	  the	  most	  freelancing	  thus	  far	  in	  this	  study	  during	  Reagan’s	  second	  term	  provides	  mitigating	   evidence	   for	   Theory	   #4	   by	   suggesting	   that	   the	   president’s	   lax	  management	  style	  provided	  the	  incentive	  and	  made	  allowance	  for	  more	  freelancing	  than	  normally	  occurs.	  	  Theory	  #3	  is	  also	  bolstered	  somewhat,	  because	  it	  was	  lower-­‐level	   (though	   still	   political	   level)	  officials	   conducting	  LSI	   in	   this	   renegade	  manner,	  but	  their	  influence	  was	  minimal	  and	  subject	  to	  the	  prior	  fact	  of	  Reagan	  choosing	  not	  to	  get	  involved.	  	  6.	  Consistency	  of	  Message:	  	   The	   theories	   also	   offer	   different	  predictions	  with	   regard	   to	  whether	   or	  not	  the	  sender	  state’s	  policies	  are	  likely	  to	  convey	  a	  consistent	  message	  to	  observers	  in	  the	  target	  state.	   	  National	  interests	  theory	  (Theory	  #1)	  predicts	  that	  foreign	  policy	  messaging	   should	   be	   consistent	   and	   that	   dissenting	   domestic	   voices	   should	   be	  unlikely	   to	   emerge.	   	  Meanwhile,	   the	   other	   theories	   anticipate	   that	   institutional	   or	  personal	  disagreements	  within	   the	  sender	  state	  should	  be	   likely	   to	  undermine	   the	  consistency	  of	  messaging	  by	  that	  country’s	  government.	  The	  U.S.	  message	  did	  suffer	  from	  inconsistency	  during	  this	  period,	  and	  there	  is	  strong	  indication	  that	  this	  undermined	  the	  efficacy	  of	  American	  support	  for	  Israeli	  advocates	   of	   peace.	   	   Again,	   this	   contradicts	   Theory	   #1,	   which	   anticipates	   that	  domestic	  disputes	   should	  have	   a	  negligible	   impact	  over	  outcomes	   in	   international	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relations.	  	  A	  big	  part	  of	  the	  discrepancy	  in	  messaging	  had	  to	  do	  with	  disputes	  among	  elite	  personalities.	  	  Reagan	  was	  open	  to	  pressure	  from	  below	  at	  times,	  while	  Shultz	  preferred	   to	   remain	   affable	   and	   conciliatory.	   	   Thus,	   we	   occasionally	   see	   tough	  statements	  coming	  out	  of	  not	  just	  Embassy	  Tel	  Aviv	  but	  also	  the	  White	  House,	  such	  as	  when	  Reagan	  said	  enemies	  of	  peace	  would	  have	   to	  answer	   to	   their	  own	  people	  and	   criticized	   leaders	   who	   do	   not	   work	   proactively	   to	   resolve	   the	   conflict.	  	  Meanwhile,	   the	   secretary	   of	   state,	  who	  was	  much	  more	   visible,	  was	   articulating	   a	  more	  gentle	  line	  toward	  Israel’s	  right	  wing.	  	  This	  supports	  Theory	  #4.	  	   Theory	  #2	  receives	  some	  support	  but	  not	  much.	   	  Members	  of	  Congress	  did	  express	  a	  softer	  line	  toward	  Shamir	  when	  he	  visited	  Washington	  in	  March	  of	  1988,	  saying	  they	  did	  not	  want	  to	  force	  Israel	  to	  act	  against	  what	  it	  felt	  were	  its	  important	  security	   needs.	   	   However,	   he	   also	   encountered	   widespread	   support	   for	   Shultz’s	  initiative,	  and	  nobody	  in	  Congress	  seemed	  advocate	  for	  taking	  it	  off	  the	  table.290	  	   Theory	  #3	  does	  not	  receive	  much	  support.	  	  Lower-­‐level	  officials	  did	  work	  to	  toughen	   Shultz’s	   message	   some	   but	   did	   not	   seem	   to	   have	   much	   impact	   on	   how	  American	  policy	  was	  perceived	  at	  the	  time.	  	  	  7.	  Suitability	  of	  Message:	  	   The	   last	   area	   in	   which	   the	   theories	   diverge	   involves	   whether	   or	   not	  messaging	   by	   the	   sender	   state	   is	   likely	   to	   be	   suited	   to	   the	   needs	   of	   its	   favored	  protégé	  within	   the	  politics	  of	   the	   target	  nation.	   	  National	   interests	   theory	   (Theory	  #1)	  argues	  that	  messaging	  should	  be	  well-­‐suited	  to	  sender	  state	  objectives,	  whereas	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the	  other	   theories	  emphasize	   institutional	  or	  personal	  biases	   that	  may	  undermine	  the	  sender	  state’s	  ability	  to	  achieve	  this	  goal.	  The	   core	  message	   during	   this	   period	   provides	   support	   for	   Theory	   #4	   that	  unsuitable	  messages	  for	  boosting	  advocates	  of	  peace	  can	  generally	  be	  attributable	  to	  idiosyncratic	   personal	   preferences	   or	   beliefs	   of	   top	   leaders.	   	   Shultz’s	   decision	   to	  provide	  Israel	  with	  an	  MOU	  in	  1988	  suggested	  to	  Israeli	  commentators	  that	  saying	  no	   to	   the	   U.S.	   was	   not	   only	   permissible	   but	   came	  with	   a	   bonus.	   	   In	   1987,	   Shultz	  almost	   single-­‐handedly	   determined	   Washington’s	   response	   to	   the	   London	  Agreement	  as	  something	  akin	  to	  “thanks	  but	  no	  thanks”.	  	  And	  in	  1985	  and	  1986	  he	  conveyed	  the	  message	  that	  it	  was	  up	  to	  Israelis	  and	  Jordanians	  to	  figure	  out	  how	  to	  get	   to	   direct	   talks	   and	   that	   American	   involvement	  would	   not	   extend	   beyond	   low-­‐level	  intermediaries	  until	  they	  sorted	  that	  out	  on	  their	  own.	  	   In	   each	   instance,	   the	   core	   U.S.	   message	   was	   insufficient	   for	   bolstering	  advocates	  of	  peace	  and	  probably	  benefitted	   their	  opponents.	   	  The	  selection	  of	   this	  message	  is	  not	  attributable	  to	  lobby-­‐legislative	  forces	  because	  members	  of	  Congress	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  have	  played	  a	  decisive	  role	  in	  picking	  or	  forcing	  this	  message	  on	  the	  administration.	   	  Nor	  can	  the	  message	  be	  attributed	  to	  the	  bureaucracy,	  since	  those	  groups	  prefer	  a	  tough	  U.S.	  posture	  to	  Israeli	  inflexibility	  on	  the	  peace	  process,	  not	  a	  tender	   one.	   	   Instead,	   the	   reason	   for	   unsuitable	   U.S.	   messaging	   during	   Reagan’s	  second	   term	   was	   intensely	   personal,	   the	   product	   of	   Shultz’s	   low-­‐key	   style	   and	  preference	   for	   conflict	   management	   over	   conflict	   resolution.	   	   In	   the	   absence	   of	  strong	  leadership	  from	  Reagan,	  his	  secretary	  of	  state	  may	  instead	  have	  exacerbated	  the	   very	   conflict	   he	   hoped	   to	   keep	   in	   check.	   	   Certainly,	   in	   these	   three	   phases	   of	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Reagan’s	  second	  term,	  America’s	   tendency	  to	  engage	   in	  actions	  that	  benefitted	  the	  Likud	  and	  undermined	  Labor	  were	  largely	  attributable	  to	  him.	  	  
Conclusion	  
	   President	  Ronald	  Reagan	  displayed	  fleeting	  interest	  in	  addressing	  the	  Arab-­‐Israeli	  conflict.	  	  Other	  than	  when	  his	  interest	  was	  keenly	  focused	  on	  the	  issue	  due	  to	  American	   involvement	   in	   the	   Lebanon	   War,	   he	   remained	   largely	   aloof	   from	   the	  issue.	  	  Nor	  did	  he	  exert	  meaningful	  oversight	  most	  of	  the	  time.	  	  Instead,	  he	  deferred	  to	  his	  point	  person,	   Secretary	  of	   State	  George	  Shultz,	   especially	  during	  his	   second	  term.	   	  Nor	  did	  he	  do	  much	  to	  stop	   lower-­‐ranking	  officials	   from	  trying	  to	  carry	  out	  unauthorized	   LSI	   by	   freelance,	   who	   were	   frustrated	   with	   the	   go-­‐slow	   approach	  generally	  preferred	  by	  the	  secretary.	  The	   low	  rates	  of	  actual	  LSI,	  high	  rates	  of	  attempted	   freelancing,	  and	  dismal	  rates	  of	  efficacy	  –	  especially	  during	   term	  two	  –	  of	  American	  efforts	   to	  support	   the	  peace	  camp	  in	  Israel	  are	  largely	  attributable	  to	  issues	  of	  leadership.	   	  These	  include	  the	   subjective	   beliefs,	   perceptions,	   and	   styles	   of	   top	   American	   leaders.	   	   Far	   less	  persuasive	  are	  arguments	  that	  these	  patterns	  in	  the	  dynamics	  of	  LSI	  are	  attributable	  to	   structural	   forces	   –	   such	   as	   objective	   American	   interests	   abroad,	   overwhelming	  pressure	   from	  Congress	  and	   the	  pro-­‐Israel	   lobby,	  or	   the	  dictates	  of	  organizational	  interests	  in	  the	  Washington	  bureaucracy.	  The	   chapter	   that	   follows	  paints	   a	   very	  different	  picture	  with	   regard	   to	  LSI,	  and	  much	  of	  that	  difference	  can	  be	  tied	  to	  the	  personal	  decisions	  and	  styles	  of	  two	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individuals:	   President	   George	   H.	   W.	   Bush	   and	   Secretary	   of	   State	   James	   A.	   Baker.	  	  Whereas	  Reagan	  and	  Shultz	  displayed	  aloof	  or	   low-­‐key	  approaches	   to	   the	  conflict,	  Bush	   and	   Baker	   demonstrated	   a	   mix	   of	   strong	   feelings	   and	   steely	   resolve.	   	   As	   a	  result,	  the	  patterns	  of	  leadership	  selection	  intervention	  during	  Bush	  41’s	  presidency	  stand	  in	  stark	  contrast	  to	  the	  course	  of	  events	  under	  Reagan,	  the	  man	  for	  whom	  he	  had	  only	  just	  served	  as	  vice	  president.	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Chapter	  V.	  
~	  
The	  George	  H.	  W.	  Bush	  Years	  
(1989-­1993)	  	   President	  George	  H.	  W.	  Bush	  had	  served	  as	  Reagan’s	  vice	  president	  for	  eight	  years,	   but	   he	   brought	   to	   the	   Oval	   Office	   a	   very	   different	   management	   style	   and	  worldview	  toward	  Israel	  than	  did	  his	  predecessor.	  	  It	  was	  clear	  from	  the	  outset	  that	  he	  and	  his	  secretary	  of	  state,	  James	  Baker,	  were	  disinclined	  to	  give	  Israel	  the	  same	  leeway	  it	  received	  during	  the	  Reagan	  years	  and	  that	  they	  would	  run	  a	  much	  tighter	  ship	  in	  terms	  of	  decision-­‐making.1	  	  However,	  they	  faced	  frustrating	  circumstances	  in	  Israel:	  an	  ongoing	  Intifada	  and	  a	  government	  that	  had	  Likud	  at	  the	  helm.	  As	  Baker	  advisor	  Aaron	  David	  Miller	  puts	  it	  “George	  H.	  W.	  Bush	  empowered	  Baker…	   [while]	   Baker	   drove	   the	   diplomacy”.	   	   The	   Secretary	   was	   “the	   president’s	  man	   at	   the	   State	  Department,”	   but	   such	   a	   close	   connection	   to	   the	  Oval	  Office	   and	  their	   decades-­‐long	   friendship	  meant	   that	   Baker	  was	   able	   to	   operate	   freely	   on	   the	  basis	  of	  the	  president’s	  trust.	   	  As	  a	  result,	  “Baker’s	  relationship	  with	  Bush,	  and	  the	  president’s	   willingness	   to	   empower	   Baker	   to	   make	   peace	   a	   top	   priority,	   was	  indispensible…	  [giving	  him]	  the	  imprimatur	  of	  the	  president”.2	  The	   Bush	   administration	   pursued	   a	   variety	   of	   approaches	   to	   leadership	  selection	  intervention	  (LSI)	  in	  Israel.	  	  These	  include	  periods	  of:	  (1)	  urging	  Labor	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Fred Axelgard, “The New U.S. Administration,” Journal of Palestine Studies 18, no. 2 (Winter 1989): 
168-170. Also, William Andreas Brown, “Interview with Ambassador William Andreas Brown”, 
November 3, 1998, 262-263, The Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection of the Association for Diplomatic 
Studies and Training (ADST), Library of Congress. 
2 Aaron David Miller, The Much Too Promised Land: America’s Elusive Search for Arab-Israeli Peace 
(Bantam Books, 2008), 200-201. 
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remain	  in	  a	  Likud	  government	  in	  1989;	  (2)	  a	  semi-­‐incoherent	  approach	  to	  meddling	  during	   the	   1990	   Israeli	   coalition	   crisis;	   (3)	   total	   non-­‐LSI	   from	   the	   1991	  Gulf	  War	  through	  the	  Madrid	  conference;	  and	  (4)	  the	  most	  confrontational	  episode	  of	  LSI	   in	  U.S.-­‐Israel	  relations	  over	  American	  housing	  loan	  guarantees	  (HLGs)	  in	  1992.	  The	  Bush	  administration	  also	  witnessed	  a	  range	  of	  outcomes	  with	  regard	  to	  this	  study’s	  second	  dependent	  variable:	  LSI	  efficacy.	   	  On	  one	  hand,	   its	  approach	   in	  1992	  was	  a	  double	   success:	  boosting	  Labor	  at	   the	  polls	  and	  advancing	   the	  Middle	  East	   peace	   process.	   	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   its	   approach	   in	   1990	   produced	   a	   double	  failure:	   failing	  to	  help	  Labor	   form	  a	  government	  and	  failing	  to	  sustain	  the	  process.	  	  However,	   the	   administration	  was	   pursuing	   a	   high	   stakes	   strategy	   by	   running	   the	  risk	   of	   fracturing	   Israel’s	   national	   unity	   government	   (NUG).	   	   If	   not	   for	   a	   series	   of	  unexpected	  developments,	   it	   is	  quite	  possible	  Washington’s	   gamble	   in	  1990	  could	  have	  instead	  produced	  a	  double	  success.	  	   In	   each	   instance,	   the	  American	   approach	  was	   suffused	  with	   features	   of	   the	  Bush-­‐Baker	  relationship,	  including;	  tight	  coordination	  at	  most	  times	  between	  these	  two	   officials,	   willingness	   to	   issue	   sharp	   rebukes	   and	   accept	   prolonged	   stalemate,	  Bush’s	   strong	   emotions	   on	   the	   conflict,	   and	   Baker’s	   tenacity	   and	   capacity	   to	   play	  rough.	  	  At	  many	  points,	  the	  secretary	  operated	  as	  though	  “the	  main	  leverage	  I	  had”	  was	  a	  threat	  to	  “leave	  [a]	  dead	  cat”	  on	  the	  doorstep	  of	  whoever	  says	  no	  to	  the	  U.S.3	  	  
George	  H.	  W.	  Bush,	  Case	  #1:	  Washington	  Defers	  to	  Rabin,	  1989	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 James A. Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War & Peace, 1989-1992 (G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 
1995), 450. 
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   The	  1988	  elections	  resulted	   in	  a	  slight	  Likud	  edge	  and	  a	  60-­‐60	  tie	  between	  the	  blocs.	  	  Ultra-­‐Orthodox	  parties	  had	  done	  unexpectedly	  well,	  leading	  them	  to	  make	  some	  extravagant	  demands	  for	  participation	  in	  a	  coalition.	   	  This	  eventually	  caused	  Likud	  turn	  to	  Labor,	  inviting	  it	  to	  join	  as	  the	  junior	  partner	  in	  yet	  another	  national	  unity	   government.	   	   However,	   this	   time	   there	   would	   be	   no	   rotation	   of	   the	  premiership,	  and	  so	  Labor	  conditioned	  its	  participation	  upon	  approval	  of	  a	  common	  denominator	  peace	  program.	   	  To	  satiate	  Labor	  and	  head	  off	  American	  pressure	   to	  engage	  with	  the	  PLO	  (which	  the	  U.S.	  had	  recognized	  in	  December	  of	  1988),	  Shamir	  soon	  headed	  to	  Washington	  with	  a	  new	  Israeli	  peace	  initiative.4	  	  
Coding	  the	  Dependent	  Variables	  (Occurrence	  and	  Efficacy)	  Did	  LSI	  Occur?	  	   Yes.	   	  The	  United	  States	  engaged	  in	  positive	  LSI	  during	  this	  period,	  including	  both	   petit	   efforts	   to	   change	   the	   balance	   of	   power	   within	   the	   Israeli	   cabinet	   and	  grand	  interventions	  aimed	  at	  influencing	  the	  makeup	  of	  that	  government	  altogether	  –	  in	  this	  case,	  reinforcing	  it.5	  	  Yitzhak	  Rabin,	  who	  remained	  defense	  minister	  in	  the	  new	  Israeli	  government,	  had	  now	  become	  America’s	  favorite	  interlocutor.	  	  The	  U.S.	  administration	   carried	   out	   petit	   LSI	   by	   working	   to	   build	   up	   his	   influence	   in	   the	  cabinet	  as	  an	  advocate	   for	  peace.	   	   It	  also	  conducted	  grand	  LSI	  by	  working	   to	  keep	  the	   NUG	   together,	   siding	   with	   Rabin	   (who	   sought	   its	   continuation)	   against	   Peres	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Moshe Arens, Broken Covenant: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis between the U.S. and Israel 
(Simon & Schuster, 1995), 53-63; Colin Shindler, The Land beyond Promise: Israel, Likud and the Zionist 
Dream (I.B.Tauris, 2002), 250. 
5 As defined in Chapter Two, petit LSI seeks to affect the balance of power within a sitting government in 
the target state, whereas grand LSI seeks to change or reinforce that government as a whole. 
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(who	  hoped	  to	  bring	  it	  down)	  and	  keeping	  a	  Likud-­‐led	  government	  in	  power.	  	   What	   became	   known	   as	   the	   Shamir	   Plan	  was	  mostly	   formulated	   by	   others	  within	  his	  government.	  	  The	  plan	  adhered	  to	  the	  Camp	  David	  formula	  of	  focusing	  on	  Palestinian	  autonomy	  instead	  of	  moving	  straight	  to	  final	  status	  while	  taking	  up	  the	  idea	  of	  elections	  in	  the	  territories	  to	  select	  a	  Palestinian	  leadership	  that	  could	  serve	  as	  an	  alternative	   to	   the	  PLO.	   	  Rabin	  had	  pitched	  a	  plan	   for	  Palestinian	  elections	   in	  January	   of	   1989,6	   as	   did	   Arens	   that	   February.7	   	   After	   strong	   urging	   from	   the	  moderate	  wing	  of	  the	  Likud,	  Shamir	  decided	  to	  adopt	  the	  Arens	  plan.8	  Shamir	  announced	  the	  plan	  during	  his	  April	  visit	  to	  Washington,	  D.C.,	  and	  the	  American	  administration	  considered	  it	  a	  pleasant	  surprise.	  	  However,	  after	  Shamir’s	  announcement	   members	   of	   the	   party’s	   hardline	   faction	   –	   Ariel	   Sharon,	   Yitzhak	  Moda’i,	   and	   David	   Levy	   –	   demanded	   a	   series	   of	   severe	   constraints	   to	   the	   plan,	  earning	   for	   themselves	   the	   nickname	   of	   the	   “shackle	   ministers”.	   	   Their	   demands	  included	  (1)	  no	  elections	  until	  the	  intifada	  had	  been	  crushed;	  (2)	  Arab	  residents	  of	  East	  Jerusalem	  should	  be	  prohibited	  from	  voting	  in	  the	  Palestinian	  elections;	  (3)	  no	  partition	  of	  “western	  Eretz	  Yisrael”	  (e.g.	  no	  land	  for	  peace);	  and	  (4)	  no	  contact	  of	  any	  sort	  with	  the	  PLO.9	  	  Although	  at	  first	  it	  seemed	  Shamir	  would	  stand	  firm	  and	  defend	  the	  plan	  that	  bore	  his	  name,	  he	  caved	  to	  their	  demands	  at	  a	  meeting	  of	  the	  party’s	  central	  committee	  in	  July.	  	   These	   constraints	   were	   a	   major	   setback	   for	   the	   peace	   process.	   	   They	   also	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World (WW Norton & Company, 2001), 467-468. 
7 Arens, Broken Covenant: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis between the U.S. and Israel, 44-45. 
8 Ibid., 53 & 60. Other individuals involved in brainstorming Shamir’s strategy for April included brothers 
Daniel and Salai Meridor, Eli Rubenstein, Ehud Olmert, Yossi Ben-Aharon, and Bibi Netanyahu.  At 
various later points Olmert, Rubenstein, and the Meridors broke off from the Likud to either join center 
parties or serve under non-Likud governments. 
9 Shlaim, The Iron Wall, 270. 
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provided	  a	  pretense	  for	  some	  Labor	  ministers	  to	  hint	  that	  they	  were	  looking	  to	  quit	  the	  coalition	  in	  protest.	  	  Peres	  was	  especially	  eager	  to	  leave,	  but	  Rabin	  felt	  there	  was	  still	  room	  for	  progress	  and	  advocated	  continued	  participation.	  	   According	  to	  an	  article	  by	  a	  New	  York	  Times	  reporter,	  Washington	  weighed	  in	  on	  the	  debate	  at	  this	  point	  in	  time,	  responding	  negatively	  to	  Peres’s	  idea.	  	  The	  article	  claimed	  that	  American	  officials	   told	  the	  press	   they	  had	  relayed	  a	  message	  through	  the	   ambassador	   in	   Tel	   Aviv,	   William	   Andreas	   Brown,	   and	   through	   less	   formal	  conversations	   that	   “the	   Israeli	   peace	   process	   should	   be	   given	   every	   chance	   of	  success”	   and	   “keeping	   Israel’s	   unity	   Government	   together	   is	   critical	   to	   that	  process”.10	   	  Although	  new	  constraints	  were	  described	  as	   “unhelpful,”	   the	  plan	  was	  still	   described	   by	   U.S.	   officials	   as	   “the	   most	   realistic	   way	   to	   advance	   the	   peace	  process”.11	   	   I	   have	   since	   confirmed	   a	   general	   description	   of	   this	   version	   of	   events	  with	   Dennis	   Ross,	   who	   seems	   to	   have	   been	   either	   involved	   in	   or	   well-­‐informed	  about	  this	  particular	  episode:	  	  “DW:	  The	  New	  York	  Times	  reported	  in	  1989	  in	  July	  that	  the	  United	  States	  dispatched	  messages	  to	  the	  leadership	  of	  the	  Israeli	  Labor	  Party	  that	  the	  U.S.	  felt	  it	  was	  not	  time	  for	  the	  national	  unity	  government	  to	  split	  up	  and	  that	  there	  was	  promise	  in	  the	  so-­‐called	  Shamir	  Plan	  that	  we	  wanted	  to	  see	  where	  we	  could	  go	  with	  it.	  	  Ross:	  That’s	  true...	  we	  did	  this”.12	  	  	   The	   administration	   also	   worked	   to	   bolster	   Rabin’s	   hand	   within	   the	   Israeli	  cabinet.	   	  When	  Rabin	   visited	  Washington	   in	  May,	   the	  head	  Mideast	   official	   on	   the	  NSC,	  Richard	  Haass,	  wrote	   to	  national	   security	  advisor	  Brent	  Scowcroft	   to	  suggest	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Robert Pear, “U.S. officials urge Labor to remain in Israeli cabinet,” New York Times, July 12, 1989. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Dennis Ross, “Interview with the Author,” March 23, 2012. 
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that	  “As	  you	  know,	  the	  President	  is	  scheduled	  to	  meet	  with	  Israeli	  Defense	  Minister	  Yitzhak	   Rabin…	   a	   positive	   statement	   afterward	   by	   [spokesperson]	   Marlin	  [Fitzwater]	  would	  help	  bolster	  Rabin’s	  position	  within	  Israel”.13	  	  Scowcroft	  had	  also	  explained	  to	  the	  president’s	  scheduling	  staff	  that	  Rabin	  	  “is	   a	   member	   of	   the	   inner	   Cabinet	   that	   controls	   all	   of	   Israel’s	  sensitive	  foreign	  and	  defense	  policy	  decisions.	   	  Rabin	  was	  also	  the	  original	   proponent	   of	   the	   elections	   idea;	   he	   tends	   to	   be	   both	  forthcoming	  and	  pragmatic	  on	  elections	  modalities.	  Rabin	   will	   play	   a	   key	   role	   in	   the	   internal	   Israeli	  deliberations	   about	   the	   peace	   process.	   	   Our	   effort	   to	   promote	   an	  Israeli-­‐Palestinian	  dialogue	  via	  elections	  depends	  on	  getting	  Rabin	  on	   board	   with	   our	   ideas	   and	   building	   up	   his	   role	   in	   the	   internal	  Israeli	  process”.14	  	   The	   meeting	   was	   accompanied	   by	   a	   photo	   opportunity,	   and	   Fitzwater’s	  statement	   emphasized	   the	   “productive”	   nature	   of	   the	   president’s	   meeting	   with	  Rabin.	   	  He	  explained	  that	  the	  president	  “reaffirmed	  the	  U.S.	  commitment	  to	  a	  close	  relationship”	  and	  “made	  clear	  his	  determination	  to	  provide	  Israel	  with	  the	  resources	  necessary	  for	  its	  security”.	  	  He	  said	  the	  president	  told	  Rabin	  that	  the	  Israeli	  proposal	  for	  elections	  in	  the	  territories	  “gives	  us	  something	  to	  work	  with”	  and	  “constitutes	  an	  important	  contribution	  to	  the	  process”.15	  	  Did	  the	  Policy	  Succeed?	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Richard N. Haass, “Memorandum for Brent Scowcroft - Statement following President’s Meeting with 
Rabin”, May 23, 1989, Folder “Presidential Visit with [Israeli Defense] Minister [Yitzhak] Rabin - May 24, 
1989”, Box “OA/ID CF01404”, Series “Haass, Richard N., Files”, Collection “National Security Council,” 
George H. W. Bush Presidential Library. 
14 Brent Scowcroft, “Schedule Proposal”, May 9, 1989, Folder “Presidential Visit with [Israeli Defense] 
Minister [Yitzhak] Rabin - May 24, 1989”, Box “OA/ID CF01404”, Series “Haass, Richard N., Files”, 
Collection “National Security Council,” George H. W. Bush Presidential Library. 
15 Marlin Fitzwater, “Statement by the Press Secretary (for immediate release by the Office of the White 
House Press Secretary)”, May 24, 1989, Folder “Presidential Visit with [Israeli Defense] Minister 
[Yitzhak] Rabin - May 24, 1989”, Box “OA/ID CF01404”, Series “Haass, Richard N., Files”, Collection 
“National Security Council,” George H. W. Bush Presidential Library. 
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   Yes.	   	   In	   the	   narrow	   sense,	   these	   efforts	   probably	   helped	   keep	   the	   NUG	  together	  and	  boost	  Rabin’s	  hand	  in	  the	  cabinet.	   	  In	  the	  broader	  sense	  they	  allowed	  the	   administration	   to	   continue	   trying	   to	   make	   the	   so-­‐called	   Shamir	   Plan	   work	  through	  the	  start	  of	  the	  next	  year.	  	  Although	  it	  would	  have	  been	  difficult	  to	  envision	  the	  prime	  minister	   accepting	   the	  principle	  of	   land	   for	  peace,	   the	  next	   few	  months	  did	  seem	   like	  a	  promising	  period	  of	  movement	  on	   the	  process.	   	  Shamir	  eventually	  backed	  away	  from	  the	  plan	  for	  good	  in	  early	  1990,	  but	  by	  then	  the	  administration	  had	  provided	  him	  with	  additional	  pretexts	  for	  doing	  so.	  	   After	   the	  U.S.	  communicated	   its	  message	  to	  Labor	  through	  private	  channels	  that	  it	  should	  stay	  in	  the	  national	  unity	  government,	  an	  Israeli	  official	  familiar	  with	  the	   deliberations	   acknowledged	   “we	   got	   the	   message.	   	   The	   U.S.	   believes	   that	  dissolution	  of	  the	  national	  unity	  Government	  means	  an	  election	  campaign	  in	  Israel,	  and	   that	   means	   a	   period	   of	   uncertainty	   during	   which	   no	   Israeli	   government	   can	  pursue	  the	  peace	  process”.16	  	  
Coding	  the	  Observable	  Implications	  
1.	  Perceptions	  of	  Sender	  Interests:	  	   One	  area	  in	  which	  the	  theories	  diverge	  involves	  predictions	  about	  the	  effect	  of	   perceptions	   of	   sender	   interests	   on	   the	   occurrence	   of	   LSI.	   	   Theory	   #1	   (national	  interests	  theory)	  predicts	  that	  LSI	  occurrence	  should	  reflect	  objective	  opportunities	  and	  interests	  of	  the	  sender	  state	  abroad.	  	  Theory	  #2	  (the	  lobby-­‐legislative	  approach)	  expects	   LSI	   toward	   Israel	   to	   be	   rare	   because	   members	   of	   Congress	   and	   the	   pro-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Pear, “U.S. officials urge Labor to remain in Israeli cabinet.” 
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Israel	  lobby	  tend	  to	  believe	  that	  U.S.	  interests	  are	  not	  served	  by	  meddling	  in	  Israeli	  politics.	  	  Theory	  #3	  (the	  bureaucratic	  politics	  approach)	  expects	  LSI	  toward	  Israel	  to	  be	   frequent	   because	   work-­‐level	   officials	   who	   deal	   with	   Israeli	   politics	   tend	   to	  believe	   that	  American	   interests	  are	   served	  by	   intervening	   in	   support	  of	  pro-­‐peace	  moderates.	  	  Theory	  #4	  (leadership	  theory)	  holds	  that	  LSI	  occurrence	  should	  reflect	  the	  subjective	  beliefs	  of	   top	  officials	  about	  whether	  or	  not	   intervention	  serves	  U.S.	  interests.	  The	  U.S.	  worked	  to	  stop	  what	  it	  saw	  as	  a	  potential	  imminent	  collapse	  of	  the	  NUG	   and	   to	   bolster	   the	   hand	   of	   Rabin	   within	   the	   Israeli	   cabinet.	   	   And,	   although	  lobby-­‐legislative	   theory	   is	   consonant	   with	   American	   actions	   that	   redound	   to	   the	  benefit	   of	   the	   Likud,	   it	   would	   not	   predict	   U.S.	   interference	   in	   Israeli	   politics	   to	  achieve	  this	  aim.	  	  Intentional	  favoritism	  for	  Rabin	  over	  other	  Israeli	  interlocutors	  is	  also	   at	   odds	   with	   the	   lobby-­‐legislative	   approach,	   which	   would	   expect	   the	   U.S.	   to	  remain	  ambivalent	  to	  the	  range	  of	  possible	  Israeli	  counterparts.	  	   Theory	   #3,	   bureaucratic	   politics,	   also	   receives	  mixed	  marks	   for	   explaining	  events	  in	  1989.	  	  The	  bureaucratic	  approach	  fits	  with	  American	  support	  for	  Rabin	  but	  cannot	   explain	   U.S.	   indifference	   toward	   Peres	   or	   willingness	   to	   bolster	   a	  government	  led	  by	  the	  Likud.	  	   Theories	   1	   and	   4	   both	   fit	   with	   the	   fact	   that	   U.S.	   administration	   looked	  favorably	  upon	  the	  Shamir	  Plan	  as	   its	  best	  option	  for	  moving	  the	  process	  forward.	  	  The	   prospect	   of	   keeping	   a	   process	   going,	   even	   with	   some	   shackles,	   led	   the	  administration	   to	   throw	   its	   weight	   in	   with	   stability	   instead	   of	   sitting	   back	   while	  Labor	  left	  the	  government	  or	  helping	  it	  do	  so.	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   However,	   interpersonal	   relationships	   were	   the	   critical	   part	   of	   the	   causal	  story	  in	  1989,	  a	  factor	  tied	  in	  with	  leadership	  theory.	  	  Peres	  hoped	  the	  United	  States	  would	  continue	  working	  through	  him	  as	  vice	  premier,	  finance	  minister,	  and	  formal	  leader	  of	   the	  Labor	  Party,	  but	  he	  was	   in	   for	  yet	  another	  disappointment.	   	   Instead,	  when	   the	   Baker	   opened	   a	   negotiations	   track	   with	   Labor	   to	   complement	   U.S.	  negotiations	  with	  the	  Likud	  leadership,	  he	  went	  to	  Rabin	  instead.17	  	   The	   reasons	   for	   this	   favoritism	   for	  Rabin	  over	  Peres	  are	  not	  quite	   clear.	   	   It	  could	   be	   that	   Peres	   had	   worn	   out	   his	   welcome	   in	   the	   U.S.	   with	   his	   repeated	  maneuvering	   during	   Reagan’s	   second	   term.	   	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   Rabin	  was	   also	   a	  problematic	   interlocutor	   in	   some	   ways	   because	   he	   was	   still	   associated	   with	  implementing	   Israel’s	   hardline	   response	   to	   intifada	   protest	   in	   the	   territories.	  	  However,	  the	  idea	  that	  Rabin	  not	  only	  would	  push	  for	  peace	  but	  perhaps	  could	  also	  deliver	  Shamir	  might	  have	  been	  the	  crucial	   factor	  here.	   	  Ambassador	  Brown	  notes	  that	  “Baker	  and	  [his	  Mideast	  advisor	  Dennis]	  Ross	  had	  the	  hope	  that	  Rabin,	  given	  his	  unique	   position	   and	   his	   direct	   entrée	   to	   Prime	   Minister	   Shamir,	   as	   well	   as	   his	  reputation	  as	  a	  tough,	  old	  warrior,	  might	  be	  able	  to	  help	  them	  pull	  something	  off”.18	  	   As	  a	   result,	  Peres	  was	   “very	  unhappy	  he	  wasn’t	   the	  main	  channel	   for	   these	  discussions	  with	  the	  Americans,”	  telling	  the	  U.S.	  ambassador	  “that	  ‘these	  young	  men	  in	  Washington’	  were	  mishandling	  the	  situation.	   	  He	  clearly	  mean	  that	  Dennis	  Ross	  and	  his	  associates	  ought	  to	  be	  dealing	  primarily	  with	  him”.19	  	   This	  inclination	  to	  trust	  Rabin	  over	  Peres	  was	  predicated	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  past	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Brown, “Interview with Ambassador William Andreas Brown,” 253. 
18 Ibid., 276. 
19 Ibid., 275. 
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experience,	  but	  future	  events	  would	  show	  that	  it	  was	  unwise.	  	  The	  United	  States	  was	  caught	   unaware	   when	   Israel	   and	   the	   Palestinians	   later	   reached	   a	   major	  breakthrough	  at	  Oslo	  in	  1993.	  	  They	  had	  been	  kept	  informed	  by	  Peres’s	  people,	  but,	  because	   they	   figured	  he	  was	  an	   incorrigible	  dreamer	  and	  wheeler-­‐dealer,	   they	  did	  not	  put	  sufficient	  stock	  in	  his	  claims	  that	  something	  big	  was	  afoot	  in	  Norway.20	  	   The	   American	   administration’s	   belief	   that	   the	   Shamir	   Plan	   was	   the	   best	  means	   for	   forward	   progress	   was	   heavily	   predicated	   upon	   this	   interpersonal	  assessment	   of	   Rabin	   relative	   to	   Peres.	   	   Thus,	   although	   this	   case	   exhibits	   some	  behavior	  that	  is	  consonant	  with	  Theory	  #1,	  it	  seems	  leadership	  theory	  provides	  the	  most	  compelling	  explanation.	  	  2.	  Perceptions	  of	  Close	  Contests	  A	  second	  area	  in	  which	  the	  theories	  diverge	  involves	  the	  predicted	  effect	  of	  predictions	   about	   close	   contests	   that	   may	   be	   brewing	   within	   the	   target	   state.	  	  Theory	   #1	   (national	   interests	   theory)	   predicts	   that	   LSI	   should	   occur	   in	   close	  correlation	  with	  all	  available	  information	  about	  possible	  leadership	  contests	  in	  the	  target	   state	   as	   they	   continue	   to	   develop.	   	   Theory	   #4	   (leadership	   theory)	   predicts	  that	   an	   important	   intervening	   factor	   should	   be	   the	   subjective	   beliefs	   of	   top	   U.S.	  officials	  about	  whether	  or	  not	  a	  political	  contest	  in	  Israel	  appears	  to	  be	  imminent.	  The	   administration	   perceived	   that	   a	   political	   contest	   could	   be	   imminent	   in	  Israeli	  politics	  and	  that	  preemptive	  U.S.	  action	  could	  prevent	  that	  contest	  by	  urging	  Labor	  to	  remain	  in	  the	  government.	  	  This	  is	  at	  odds	  with	  Theory	  #2,	  which	  suggests	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Hussein Agha et al., Track-II Diplomacy: Lessons from the Middle East (MIT Press, 2003), 52-54. 
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that	   because	   Congress	   and	   pro-­‐Israel	   lobbyists	   tend	   not	   to	   focus	  much	   on	   Israeli	  political	  contests	  they	  should	  force	  the	  administration	  to	   look	  the	  other	  way	  when	  such	   a	   contest	   is	   looming.	   	   It	   is	   also	   at	   odds	   with	   Theory	   #3.	   	   Although	   Baker’s	  favoritism	  towards	  Rabin	  can	  in	  part	  be	  attributed	  to	  his	  subordinate,	  Dennis	  Ross,	  it	  is	  also	  true	  that	  Ross	  seemed	  to	  favor	  keeping	  the	  NUG	  together,	  a	  position	  to	  the	  right	  of	  what	  the	  theory	  predicts	  traditional	  bureaucratic	  preferences	  should	  be	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  Israel.	   	  Instead,	  Ross’s	  beliefs	  seem	  to	  track	  closer	  to	  his	  long-­‐standing	  beliefs	  about	  the	  Middle	  East	  peace	  process	  than	  his	  organizational	  position	  at	  the	  time.	  	  3.	  Patterns	  of	  Domestic	  Debate:	  	   Theories	   2	   and	   3	   predict	   that	   members	   of	   Congress,	   the	   pro-­‐Israel	   lobby,	  and/or	  the	  bureaucracy	  should	  be	  influential	  and	  informed	  in	  advance	  of	  decisions	  about	   whether	   or	   not	   to	   pursue	   LSI.	   	   Leadership	   theory,	   however,	   expects	   that	  policy-­‐making	  within	  the	  sender	  state	  should	  leave	  these	  actors	  in	  the	  dark	  and	  to	  make	  use	  of	  informal	  channels	  of	  decision-­‐making	  as	  a	  means	  of	  limiting	  the	  risk	  of	  leaks.	   Administration	   decision-­‐making	   on	   Israeli	   politics	   at	   this	   time	   was	   the	  epitome	  of	  informality.	  	  U.S.	  consultations	  with	  Rabin	  were	  held	  under	  the	  cover	  of	  secret	  pretense.	  	  Ambassador	  Brown	  explains:	  	   “we	  developed	   a	   sense	   that	  Rabin	  was	  willing	   to	  negotiate,	   really	  negotiate…	  Rabin	  was	  willing	   to	  play.	  This	  developed	  to	   the	  point	  that	   Secretary	   of	   State	   Baker	   wanted	   to	   open	   a	   unique,	   special	  channel	  to	  Rabin.	  Dennis	  Ross	  instructed	  me	  to	  set	  one	  up.	  Indeed,	  and	   I	   think	   that	   this	   is	   the	   first	   time	   that	   I	   have	   discussed	   this,	   I	  approached	   Rabin	   after	   consultations	   with	   Dennis	   on	   how	   to	  handle	  this.	   I	  had	  a	  secure	  phone	  at	  home	  in	  a	  special	  vault	   in	  my	  residence.	   I	   would	   invite	   Rabin	   over	   for	   drinks,	   which	   he	   never	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refused.	  We	  would	  have	  a	  glass	  of	  this	  or	  that,	  would	  go	  upstairs	  to	  this	  special	  vault,	  and	  I	  would	  then	  bring	  out	  and	  key	  in	  the	  secure	  phone.	  Having	  made	  telephonic	  contact	  with	  Dennis	  Ross,	  I	  would	  then	  turn	  the	  secure	  phone	  over	  to	  Rabin,	  and	  he	  and	  Dennis	  would	  conduct	  a	  conversation”.21	  	   Rather	   than	   coordinating	   its	   policy	   through	   open	   consultations,	   the	  United	  States	  was	  communicating	  out	  of	  a	  secret	  phone	  in	  an	  upstairs	  vault	  inside	  the	  U.S.	  ambassador’s	   personal	   residence	   over	   cocktails.	   	   As	   Baker	   admits	   in	   his	  memoirs	  “we’d	  been	  working	  quietly	  with	  Rabin	  for	  months	  –	  so	  quietly	  that	  my	  staff	  and	  I	  referred	   to	   him	   in	   all	   our	   conversations	   as	   ‘the	  man	  who	   smokes’	   to	   disguise	   our	  ‘back-­‐channel’	  conversations	  with	  the	  chain-­‐smoking	  Defense	  Minister”.22	  	  4.	  Cycles	  of	  Domestic	  Power:	  	   Theories	  2	  and	  3	  also	  predict	  that	  top	  officials	  in	  the	  sender	  state	  should	  be	  especially	   weak	   during	   certain	   periods	   of	   that	   country’s	   political	   calendar.	   	   In	  particular,	   this	   was	   early	   in	   the	   administration’s	   term,	   so	   we	   should	   expect	   the	  power	   of	   the	   bureaucracy	   over	   policy	   outcomes	   to	   be	   rather	   high	   according	   to	  Theory	  #3	  (the	  bureaucratic	  politics	  approach).	  	  Although	  it	  is	  true	  that	  Brown	  and	  Ross	  played	  a	  prominent	   role	   in	   these	  deliberations,	   they	  were	  both	  very	  political	  figures	   advocating	   positions	   at	   odds	   with	   the	   permanent	   bureaucracy.	   	   Both	  developed	   reputations	   as	   being	   more	   tolerant	   of	   the	   Likud	   that	   most	   of	   their	  colleagues.	   	   They	  were	   not	   chomping	   at	   the	   bit	   to	   topple	   the	  NUG	   in	   the	  manner	  Theory	  #3	  would	  predict.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Brown, “Interview with Ambassador William Andreas Brown,” 274. 
22 Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War & Peace, 1989-1992, 126. 
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5.	  Bureaucratic	  Freelancing:	  	   Theory	  #3	   (the	   bureaucratic	   politics	   approach)	   predicts	   that	  working-­‐level	  pursuit	   of	   LSI	   without	   senior	   approval	   should	   be	   frequent,	   whereas	   Theory	   #4	  (leadership	   theory)	   predicts	   that	   such	   freelancing	   should	   be	   relatively	   rare	   and	  occur	  only	  during	  periods	  of	  lax	  executive	  oversight.	  U.S.	   officials	   in	   this	   particular	   case	   seem	   to	   have	   been	   operating	   in	   close	  consultation	  with	  Baker.	   	  Although	  Ross	  was	  the	  one	  talking	  by	  phone	  with	  Rabin,	  Brown	   saw	   it	   as	   Baker’s	   personal	   channel	   to	   Rabin.	   	   The	   Secretary	   was	   not	   yet	  willing	   to	   engage	  his	  personal	  prestige	   in	   the	  peace	  process,	   but	  he	  was	  directing	  policy	   from	  Washington.	   	   It	   is	   not	   clear	   if	  Bush	  was	  very	   involved	  at	   this	  point	   in	  decision-­‐making,	   but	   his	   authority	   was	   not	   being	   trampled	   upon.	   Although	   his	  relations	  with	   the	   Israeli	   PM	  were	   by	   no	  means	  warm,	   Bush	   still	   hoped	   he	   could	  establish	   a	  working	   relationship	  with	   Shamir	   and	  wanted	   to	   pursue	   his	   elections	  proposal.	  	  This	  fits	  with	  Bush’s	  style	  of	  management:	  strong	  oversight	  tempered	  by	  a	  willingness	  to	  delegate	  to	  his	  trusted	  secretary	  of	  state	  and	  friend	  of	  thirty	  years.	  	  6.	  Consistency	  of	  Message:	  The	  theories	  also	  offer	  divergent	  predictions	  with	  regard	  to	  whether	  or	  not	  officials	   in	   the	  sender	  state	  are	   likely	   to	  be	  capable	  of	   crafting	  a	  message	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  politics	   in	   the	   target	   that	   is	   internally	   consistent	   (and	   therefore	   more	   effective).	  	  Theory	  #1	  (national	  interests	  theory)	  expects	  that	  this	  should	  be	  relatively	  easy	  to	  achieve,	   whereas	   the	   other	   theories	   each	   emphasize	   different	   institutional	   or	  personal	  biases	  that	  may	  make	  this	  objective	  more	  difficult	  to	  fulfill.	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The	  U.S.	  message	  during	  this	  period	  was	  clear	  and	  coherent.	  	  First,	  provided	  the	  PM	  would	  stick	  by	  his	  peace	  plan,	  the	  administration	  was	  willing	  to	  support	  his	  hold	  on	  power.	   	   Second,	   the	  administration	  praised	  Rabin	  as	  an	   ideal	  partner	  and	  hoped	  to	  maximize	  his	  influence	  within	  the	  Likud-­‐led	  government	  of	  Israeli.	   	   	  And,	  as	  noted	  above,	  a	  senior	  Labor	  official	  told	  the	  press	  “we	  got	  the	  message”.	  This	  fits	  with	  Theories	  1	  and	  4,	  which	  predict	  clear	  messaging	  by	  the	  sender	  state	  provided	  that	  its	  top	  leaders	  coordinate	  amongst	  themselves	  or	  at	  least	  remain	  on	  the	  same	  page	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  objectives.	  	  Theory	  #2	  is	  contradicted	  because	  it	  would	   have	   expected	   Congress	   and	   the	   pro-­‐Israel	   lobby	   to	   block	   efforts	   to	   boost	  Rabin	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  other	  Israeli	  officials	  and	  perhaps	  even	  block	  U.S.	  efforts	  to	  keep	  the	  NUG	  government	  together,	  since	  doing	  so	  was	  itself	  an	  act	  of	  interference.	  	  Theory	   #3	   is	   contradicted	   because	   it	   would	   have	   expected	   the	   bureaucracy	   to	  undermine	  the	  administration’s	  plan	  to	  keep	  the	  Likud-­‐led	  government	  together.	  	  7.	  Suitability	  of	  Message:	  	   Finally,	   the	   theories	   also	   offer	   different	   predictions	   about	   whether	   or	   not	  officials	   in	   the	   sender	   state	   should	   find	   crafting	   a	   message	   that	   is	   suitable	   in	   its	  content	   for	   aiding	   the	   favored	   protégé	  within	   the	   context	   of	   politics	   in	   the	   target	  state.	   	  Theory	  #1	  (national	   interests	  theory)	  again	  sees	  this	  goal	  as	  easy	  to	  obtain,	  whereas	  the	  other	  theories	  emphasize	  various	  personal	  or	  institutional	  biases	  that	  should	  make	  this	  objective	  more	  difficult	  to	  achieve.	  The	  U.S.	  message	  was	  also	  well-­‐suited	  to	  helping	  Rabin	  keep	  the	  NUG	  intact	  and	  bolstering	  his	  influence	  within	  it.	  	  By	  indicating	  both	  in	  private	  and	  in	  public	  via	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leaks	   that	   the	   U.S.	   wanted	   Labor	   to	   stay	   in	   the	   government,	   the	   administration	  undermined	   Peres’s	   ability	   to	   persuade	   his	   party	   colleagues	   that	   they	   should	  withdraw	  from	  the	  government.	  	  By	  showering	  Rabin	  with	  praises	  and	  making	  him	  America’s	  main	  Labor	  interlocutor,	  the	  administration	  was	  acting	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  was	  well-­‐designed	  to	  strengthen	  his	  influence	  within	  the	  NUG.	  	   This	   fits	   with	   Theories	   1	   and	   4	   but	   not	   2	   or	   3.	   	   National	   interests	   theory	  expects	  messaging	  to	  always	  be	  suitable	  to	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  sender	  state,	  and	  so	  suitable	  messaging	  is	  consonant	  with	  the	  theory’s	  predictions.	  	  The	  lobby-­‐legislative	  and	   bureaucratic	   politics	   approaches,	   however,	   expect	   that	   messaging	   should	  usually	  be	  skewed	  according	  to	  the	  interests	  of	  those	  organizations	  –	  which	  we	  do	  not	   see	   in	   this	   case.	   	   Leadership	   theory	   expects	   messaging	   to	   be	   subject	   to	   the	  personal	   idiosyncrasies	   of	   individuals	   who	   call	   the	   shots	   in	   the	   sender	   state.	  	  Although	   in	   later	   instances	  Bush’s	   temper	  sometimes	  detracted	   from	  his	  ability	   to	  craft	  a	  message	  that	  was	  suitable	  to	  shaping	  Israelis	  politics,	  he	  was	  not	  yet	  invested	  in	  the	  conflict	  or	  infuriated	  with	  Shamir.	   	  Thus,	   it	  also	  fits	  with	  Theory	  #4	  that	  the	  U.S.	  message	  in	  this	  case	  was	  suitable	  to	  achieving	  its	  intended	  aims.	  	  
George	  H.	  W.	  Bush,	  Case	  #2:	  Breaking	  Apart	  the	  NUG,	  1990	  	  	  	   The	   period	   that	   followed	   offers	   a	   superb	   natural	   experiment	   for	   testing	  theories	  about	   the	  dynamics	  of	  American	  LSI	   toward	   Israel.	   	  Whereas	   in	  1987	   the	  United	  States	  declined	  to	  push	  a	  peace	  proposal	  that	  was	  only	  backed	  by	  one	  side	  of	  a	   national	   unity	   government	   –	   the	   London	   Agreement	   between	   King	   Hussein	   of	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Jordan	  and	  Israel’s	  Shimon	  Peres	  –	  in	  1990	  the	  U.S.	  did	  exactly	  that.	  	  It	  promoted	  the	  peace	  plan	   that	  bore	   the	  Prime	  Minister	   Shamir’s	  name	  even	  after	  he	  himself	  had	  abandoned	  it.	  	  Fear	  of	  shattering	  the	  NUG	  had	  prevented	  active	  U.S.	  involvement	  in	  the	  process	  in	  1987,	  but	  if	  anything	  it	  served	  as	  an	  incentive	  for	  staunch	  promotion	  of	   the	   elections	   initiative	   into	   early	   1990	   when	   the	   government	   of	   Israel	   finally	  fractured.	  	  
Coding	  the	  Dependent	  Variables	  (Occurrence	  and	  Efficacy)	  Did	  LSI	  Occur?	  	   Yes.	   	   The	   U.S.	   administration	   pushed	   the	   elections	   initiative	   even	   when	   it	  became	  clear	  that	  doing	  so	  might	  break	  apart	  the	  NUG.	  	  American	  decision-­‐makers	  concluded	   that	   forceful	   diplomacy	   would	   either	   pressure	   the	   Likud	   to	   be	   more	  flexible	  or	  sideline	  them	  in	  favor	  of	  a	  more	  amenable	  Labor-­‐led	  government.	  	   The	   Egyptian	   government	   announced	   a	   ten-­‐point	   peace	   plan	   in	   September	  after	   Mubarak’s	   foreign	   policy	   advisor	   Osama	   El-­‐Baz	   conducted	   separate	  consultations	  with	   the	  PLO	   and	  Peres	   aide	  Nimrod	  Novik.	   	  His	   efforts	   produced	   a	  plan	   that	   was	   in	   line	   with	   Labor’s	   party	   platform	   but	   would	   obviously	   to	   be	  unacceptable	  to	  Shamir.	  	  The	  Israeli	  cabinet	  rejected	  Egypt’s	  plan	  in	  short	  order.23	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Dennis Ross, The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace (Macmillan, 
2004), 57-58; Mordechai Gazit, “The Middle East Peace Process,” in Middle East Contemporary Survey - 
1990, ed. Ami Ayalon, vol. XIV (Westview Press, 1992), 103; Norman Kempster, “Baker won’t offer 
formal Mideast peace plan,” Los Angeles Times, October 7, 1989. Egypt’s ten-point declaration indicated 
that the PLO would permit negotiations with Israel to be handled by Palestinians who were not members of 
the organization, provided that at least one member came from outside the territories and from East 
Jerusalem, respectively (so as not to suggest relinquishment of Palestinian claims to pre-1967 Arab 
Jerusalem or the right of return). 
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   Upon	  urging	  by	  his	  staff,	  Baker	  soon	  proposed	  his	  own	  five-­‐point	  plan.24	  	  The	  Baker	  ideas	  fell	  somewhere	  in	  between	  the	  Israeli	  and	  Egyptian	  initiatives	  and	  was	  designed	   to	   give	   Shamir	   sufficient	   cover	   to	   say	   yes	   and	   thus	   sustain	   the	   process.	  	  They	  suggested	  that	  perhaps	  the	  elections	  initiative	  could	  be	  set	  into	  motion	  if	  Israel	  held	   a	   dialogue	   in	   Cairo	   with	   non-­‐PLO	   Palestinian	   intermediaries	   who	   would	   be	  carefully	  vetted	  so	  as	  to	  be	  acceptable	  to	  all	  of	   the	  parties.	   	  However,	  Shamir	  soon	  denounced	  even	  the	  Baker	  points	  in	  his	  public	  remarks.	  Ross	  noted	  that	  by	  this	  point	  “both	  Baker	  and	  the	  President…	  had	  become	  fed	  up	  with	  Shamir”.	  	  Baker	  concurred	  that	  the	  two	  of	  them	  were	  now	  quite	  upset.	  	  The	  president	  called	  Shamir	  at	  Baker’s	  urging,	  asking	  him	  to	  stand	  by	  his	  own	  proposal.	  	  Bush	  also	  warned	  “I’ve	   just	  read	  the	  wire	  story	  quoting	  you	  about	  a	  confrontation	  with	   the	   United	   States.	   	   If	   you	   want	   that	   –	   fine”.	   	   After	   additional	   backchannel	  warnings	   were	   passed	   to	   Shamir	   that	   he	   was	   on	   the	   verge	   of	   losing	   the	   U.S.,	   he	  instructed	  the	  cabinet	  to	  approve	  Baker’s	  ideas	  (albeit	  with	  a	  list	  of	  reservations).25	  	   However,	  matters	   soon	   stalled	   again	   over	   questions	   of	   implementation.	   	   In	  particular,	   Likud	   refused	   to	   agree	   to	   the	   PLO’s	   insistence	   on	   having	   Palestinians	  from	  East	   Jerusalem	  and	  abroad	  participate	   the	  Cairo	  dialogue.26	   	  Peres	  continued	  trying	   to	   break	   the	   NUG,	   but	   Rabin	   and	   Arens	   persevered,	   coming	   separately	   to	  Washington	   in	   early	   1990	   to	   work	   out	   alternative	   compromises	   for	   finessing	   the	  details	  of	  Palestinian	  representation	  with	  Baker.	   	  Each	   time,	  one	  of	   them	  obtained	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Miller, The Much Too Promised Land, 208. 
25 Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War & Peace, 1989-1992, 125; Ross, The Missing Peace: 
The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace, 60-61. 
26 The PLO insisted on these points to indicate that it was not willing to surrender its claims to East 
Jerusalem or the right of return. 
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Shamir’s	   tentative	  agreement	   to	  a	   specific	   compromise,	   after	  which	   the	  PM	  would	  renege,	  bowing	  to	  pressure	  from	  the	  shackle	  ministers.	  	   Finally,	   Rabin	   gave	   up	   on	   persuading	   Shamir	   and	   conceded	   to	   Peres	   that	  Labor	   should	   leave	   the	   government.	   	   Peres	   then	   issued	   an	   ultimatum	   that	   the	  cabinet	  should	  vote	  on	  the	  compromises	  for	  Palestinian	  representation	  right	  away,	  and	  Shamir	  announced	  he	  had	  decided	  to	  dismiss	  Peres.	   	  In	  response,	  all	  the	  other	  Labor	  ministers	  announced	  their	  resignation	  and	  secured	  the	  Shas	  Party’s	  backing	  for	  a	  no	  confidence	  vote	  that	  toppled	  the	  government	  on	  March	  15th.	  	   In	  1987	  the	  United	  States	  had	  shied	  away	  from	  pushing	  a	  peace	  proposal	  that	  was	  endorsed	  by	  only	  one	  side	  of	  the	  national	  unity	  government.	  Now,	  “despite	  the	  disarray	  in	  Israeli	  political	  circles	  in	  early	  1990,	  President	  Bush	  pressed	  hard	  for	  a	  positive	  reply	  to	  Baker’s	  queries”.27	  	  Ross	  explains	  that	  	  	   “There	   were	   no	   tears	   in	   Washington	   over	   [the	   government’s]	  demise.	  	  Shamir’s	  opposition	  to	  the	  dialogue	  confirmed	  what	  Bush	  and	  Baker	  believed	  –	  namely,	  that	  he	  had	  been	  stringing	  us	  along.	  	  Peres	  was	  much	  more	   in	   favor	  of	   taking	   steps	   for	  peace,	   and	  had	  the	   votes	   to	   form	   a	   government.	   	  We	   believed	   that	   real	   progress	  could	  be	  made	  now”.28	  	   However,	  the	  administration	  did	  make	  two	  statements	  that	  complicated	  this	  effort.	  	  First,	  Baker	  testified	  before	  Congress	  on	  March	  1	  that	  the	  $400	  million	  initial	  package	  of	  HLGs	  requested	  by	  Israel	  to	  help	  settle	  Soviet	  immigrants	  would	  by	  tied	  to	  a	  complete	  halt	  in	  settlement	  activity.	  	  Second,	  when	  asked	  an	  unrelated	  question	  at	   a	   joint	   press	   conference	  with	   the	   PM	  of	   Japan	   about	   Israeli	   settlement	   activity,	  President	   Bush	   sternly	   remarked	   that	   all	   settlement	   construction	   was	   illegal,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 William Quandt, “The Middle East in 1990,” Foreign Affairs 70, no. 1 (1990): 54. 
28 Ross, The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace, 64. 
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including	  in	  East	  Jerusalem.29	  	   During	   the	  period	   that	   followed,	   the	  U.S.	  did	  what	   it	   could	   to	  remain	  out	  of	  sight	  while	  walking	  back	  the	  president’s	  statement	  on	  Jerusalem.	  	  His	  spokesperson	  announced	   that	   the	   administration’s	   position	   on	   Jerusalem	   had	   remained	  unchanged,	  in	  that	  its	  final	  status	  could	  only	  be	  determined	  through	  negotiations.30	  	  Richard	  Haass	  sent	   the	  press	  secretary	  additional	  guidance	   from	  the	  NSC	  before	  a	  press	  conference	  on	  the	  day	  of	  the	  Israeli	  no	  confidence	  vote	  explaining:	  	   “Attached	   are	   the	   themes	   for	   use	   on	  background	  or	   on	   record	  by	  you	  regarding	  the	  Middle	  East	  Peace	  Process.	  	  It	  is	  essential	  that	  we	  keep	  the	  focus	  on	  the	  Peace	  Process	  and	  not	  on	  either	  Jerusalem	  or	  the	  settlements.	  	  It	  is	  also	  essential	  that	  we	  do	  not	  allow	  the	  notion	  to	   take	   hold	   that	   somehow	   we	   (in	   particular	   The	   President)	   are	  responsible	  for	  what	  is	  going	  on.	  	  Responsibility	  ought	  to	  be	  placed	  where	  it	  belongs:	  with	  the	  government	  of	  Israel	  and	  its	  inability	  to	  provide	  a	  basis	  for	  moving	  ahead	  on	  a	  viable	  Peace	  Process….	  Have	  fun.”31	  	  The	  administration	  also	  released	  a	  warm	  letter	  from	  the	  President	  to	  Teddy	  Kollek,	  Jerusalem’s	  longtime	  mayor,	  reiterating	  that	  the	  U.S.	  position	  had	  not	  changed.32	  The	  most	   notable	   aspect	   of	   this	   letter	   seems	   to	   have	   been	   the	   discussions	  leading	  up	  to	  it.	  	  As	  the	  NUG	  was	  beginning	  to	  collapse,	  on	  March	  12th	  Haass	  sent	  a	  draft	  letter	  to	  deputy	  national	  security	  advisor	  Robert	  Gates,	  commenting	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War & Peace, 1989-1992, 127-128. 
30 Fitzwater Marlin, “Statement by the Press Secretary”, March 5, 1990, Folder “Israeli Settlements [4]”, 
Box “OA/ID CF01069”, Series “Rostow, Nicholas, Files”, Collection “National Security Council,” George 
H. W. Bush Presidential Library. 
31 Emphasis added. Richard N. Haass, “Press Guidance from Richard N. Hass to Marlin Fitzwater”, March 
15, 1990, Folder “[Middle East] Peace Process - March 1990”, Box OA/ID CF01353, Series “Haass, 
Richard N., Files”, Collection “National Security Council,” George H. W. Bush Presidential Library. 
32 President George H. W. Bush, “Letter from President Bush to Jerusalem Mayor Teddy Kollek” (National 
Security Council, March 13, 1990), Folder “[Middle East] Peace Process - March 1990”, Box OA/ID 
CF01353, Series “Haass, Richard N., Files”, Collection “National Security Council,” George H. W. Bush 
Presidential Library. 
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“As	   I	   mentioned	   in	   the	   staff	   meeting,	   a	   Presidential	   response	   to	  Mayor	  Kollek	  could	  help	  in	  two	  ways:	  it	  could	  help	  put	  out	  some	  of	  the	   fire	   on	   Jerusalem,	   and	   could	   restore	   the	   focus	   of	   attention	  where	  it	  should	  be,	  i.e.,	  on	  the	  peace	  process.	  	  Attached	  at	  Tab	  A	  is	  a	  letter	  to	  Kollek	  drafted	  by	  yours	  truly	  and	  cleared	  by	  both	  Dennis	  Ross	  and	  John	  Kelly.	   	   It	  should	  be	  signed	  by	  the	  President	  as	  soon	  as	  possible”.33	  	  In	  a	  handwritten	  note	  at	  the	  top	  of	  the	  memo,	  Haass	  explains	  with	  added	  urgency:	  “Bob:	  This	   really	  does	  need	   to	  be	  signed	  out	  by	   the	  Pres	  ASAP	   to	  have	   the	  desired	  
impact”.34	  Gates	   clarifies	   in	   his	   cover	  memo	   to	   the	  president	   on	   the	   same	   letter:	   “our	  alleged	  change	  of	  policy	  is	  being	  used	  by	  some	  in	  Israel	  as	  an	  excuse	  for	  not	  moving	  forward	   with	   the	   peace	   process.	   	   Jerusalem’s	   Mayor	   Kollek	   has	   written	   a	   fairly	  positive	   letter	   dealing	   with	   his	   concerns.	   	   The	   prepared	   response	   provides	   an	  opportunity	   for	  us	   to	   set	   the	   record	   straight	  and	   to	  bolster	   those	   in	   Israel	  who	  are	  
willing	  to	  work	  with	  us	  on	  a	  viable	  peace	  process”.35	  Even	  after	  March	  15th,	  it	  appears	  the	  administration	  continued	  to	  “soft-­‐pedal	  its	   attitude	   in	   public	   because	   it	   wanted	   to	   avoid	   charges	   of	   meddling	   in	   Israeli	  politics”.36	  	  They	  continued	  efforts	  to	  defuse	  the	  issue	  of	  East	  Jerusalem,	  as	  Secretary	  Baker	   sent	   a	   letter	   to	   Congressman	   Mel	   Levine	   stating	   that	   the	   administration’s	  position	  was	  Jews	  should	  be	  allowed	  to	  live	  in	  East	  Jerusalem	  if	  they	  so	  desire	  and,	  in	   restating	   opposition	   to	   the	   settlement	   activity	   in	   the	   West	   Bank	   and	   Gaza,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Richard N. Haass, “Memorandum for Robert M. Gates - Presidential Letter to the Mayor of Jerusalem 
(with handwritten notes from Haass to Gates)”, March 12, 1990, Folder “Israeli Settlements [4]”, Box 
“OA/ID CF01069”, Series “Rostow, Nicholas, Files”, Collection “National Security Council,” George H. 
W. Bush Presidential Library. 
34 Ibid. Underlining in original, emphasis added. 
35 Emphasis added. Robert M. Gates, “Memorandum for the President - Letter to Mayor Kollek of 
Jerusalem”, March 12, 1990, Folder “Israeli Settlements [4]”, Box “OA/ID CF01069”, Series “Rostow, 
Nicholas, Files”, Collection “National Security Council,” George H. W. Bush Presidential Library. 
36 “U.S. says Shamir ruined chances for peace talks,” San Francisco Chronicle, May 1, 1990. 
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pointedly	  made	  no	  mention	  of	  East	  Jerusalem.37	  	  They	  also	  “went	  out	  w/	  very	  strong	  message	   to	   the	   Arabs	   –	   shut	   up	   –	   Peres	   hurt	   by	   anything	   Arabs	   say	   –	   they	  were	  pretty	   good”.38	   	   However,	   the	   U.S.	   kept	   a	   low	   public	   profile	   as	   Peres	   worked	   to	  assemble	  his	  new	  government.	  Once	   it	   became	   clear	   that	   Peres’s	   efforts	   to	   form	   a	   government	   were	   in	  danger	  of	  failing,	  the	  administration	  emerged	  once	  again	  with	  outspoken	  criticism	  of	  the	  Likud.	   	  The	  State	  Department	  let	   loose	  with	  a	  wave	  of	  criticism	  toward	  Shamir	  that	   likely	  came	  from	  the	  top.	   	  State	  Department	  Spokeswoman	  Margaret	  Tutwiler	  read	   from	   a	   prepared	   statement	   on	   April	   19th	   stating	   “we	   have	   made	   important	  progress	   by	   getting	   to	   the	   point	   where	   Palestinians	   from	   the	   territories	   were	  prepared	   to	   engage	   in	   a	  dialogue	  with	   Israel	   about	   elections”	   and	   “what	   is	   needed	  
now	  to	  get	  to	  such	  a	  dialogue	  is	  for	  an	  Israeli	  government	  to	  emerge	  that	  is	  capable	  of	  
saying	  yes	   to	  the	  proposals	  put	  forward	  by	  Secretary	  Baker”.	   	  She	  also	  suggested	  it	  was	  “disappointing”	  that	  Shamir’s	  caretaker	  government	  was	  launching	  new	  “steps	  on	   settlements,	  which	   in	   our	   view	  make	   it	  more	   difficult	   to	   develop	   a	  meaningful	  peace	  process”.39	  Critical	  statements	  of	  this	  sort	  continued	  until	  it	  became	  clear	  Shamir	  really	  did	  have	  the	  votes	  to	  form	  the	  next	  government.	  	  	  On	  May	  1st,	  Tutwiler	  gave	  a	  point-­‐by-­‐point	  rebuttal	  of	  Shamir’s	  claims	  the	  previous	  day	  about	  why	  the	  NUG	  fell	  apart.	  	  She	  claimed	  that	  “saying	  yes	  to	  Secretary	  Baker’s	  (proposal)	  meant	  saying	  yes	  to	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 “Baker says Jews have right to live in Arab East Jerusalem,” St. Petersburg Times, March 31, 1990. 
38 Thomas M. DeFrank, “Sub-Section entitled ‘Mid-Early 1990’ in Section ‘Kurtzer 6-29-94’ of interviews 
in wire-bound memo book entitled ‘Burns/Kurtzer 6-29-94, handwritten’”, August 9, 1994, Box 173 / 
Folder 10 / Interviews, Miscellaneous Notes Undated, James A. Baker III Papers, Public Policy Papers, 
Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton University Library. 
39 Barry Schweid, “State Department criticizes Shamir government,” Associated Press, April 19, 1990. 
Emphases added. 
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government	   of	   Israel’s	   (own)	   plan,	   yes	   to	   Israeli-­‐Palestinian	   dialogue	   and	   yes	   to	  peace.	  	  Continuing	  to	  say	  no	  will	  give	  us	  very	  little	  to	  work	  with”	  since	  the	  plan	  was	  “on	   the	   verge”	   of	   producing	   unprecedented	   progress.40	   	   Bush’s	   spokesperson	  responded	   to	   riots	   after	   the	   murder	   of	   at	   least	   seven	   Palestinian	   civilians	   by	   an	  unstable	   IDF	   soldier	   by	   urging	   Israel’s	   security	   forces	   “to	   act	   with	   maximum	  restraint”	  and	  explaining	  that	  “we	  look	  forward	  to	  the	  quick	  emergence	  of	  an	  Israeli	  government	  that	  is	  capable	  of	  making	  decisions	  on	  issues	  of	  peace	  and	  is	  committed,	  just	  as	  we	  are,	  to	  moving	  ahead	  on	  the	  peace	  process”.41	  	  Did	  the	  Policy	  Succeed?	  	   Overall,	   no.	   	   The	   termination	   of	   the	   NUG	   inaugurated	   one	   of	   the	   most	  controversial	  moments	  in	  Israel’s	  political	  history,	  a	  three-­‐month	  period	  of	  blatant	  political	  maneuvering	  and	  bribery	  that	  afterward	  came	  to	  be	  known	  as	  the	  HaTargil	  
HaMasriakh,	  meaning	  “the	  dirty	  maneuver”	  or	  “stinking	   trick”.42	   	   In	   the	  end,	  Peres	  failed	  to	  become	  prime	  minister,	  and	  instead	  Shamir	  formed	  what	  some	  have	  called	  the	  most	  right-­‐wing	  government	  in	  Israel’s	  history.43	  	  This	  meant	  that	  Washington’s	  efforts	  neither	  put	  Labor	  in	  control	  nor	  enabled	  the	  peace	  process	  to	  move	  forward.	  However,	   some	   allowance	   must	   be	   made	   for	   the	   contingent	   and	  unpredictable	   nature	   of	   leadership	   contests	   –	   especially	   informal	   ones	   that	   take	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 “U.S. says Shamir ruined chances for peace talks.” 
41 Lawrence L. Knutson, “Bush Extends Condolences to Palestinians, Urges Israeli Restraint,” Associated 
Press, May 22, 1990. 
42 The episode was labeled as such by Rabin in his subsequent effort to wrest control of the Labor Party 
from Peres, despite his own personal involvement in the coalition maneuvers at the time. The episode also 
provided strong impetus for Israeli campaign reform in the 1990s, especially Israel’s brief experiment with 
direct elections for prime minister. The reform was first implemented in 1996 but revoked after 2003 
because it had the unintentional effect of strengthening rather than weakening third parties. 
43 Quandt, “The Middle East in 1990,” 55. 
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place	   through	   opaque	   wrangling	   among	   political	   elites.	   	   If	   not	   for	   a	   series	   of	  improbable	  events,	  Peres	  was	  actually	  well-­‐positioned	  to	  carry	  out	  his	  scheme	  with	  great	  success.	  	  In	  that	  case,	  one	  could	  have	  attributed	  a	  double	  success	  to	  American	  efforts	  instead	  of	  dual	  failure.	  	  Putting	  pressure	  on	  the	  Israeli	  government	  to	  deliver	  on	  the	  peace	  process	  forced	  the	  situation	  to	  a	  head	  –	  it	  is	  just	  that	  risking	  the	  end	  of	  the	  NUG	  was	  by	  nature	  a	  high-­‐stakes	  approach.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  should	  also	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  United	  States	  government	  undermined	   its	   own	   efforts	   in	   a	   number	   of	   ways.	   	   In	   the	   end,	   the	   message	   it	  projected	  toward	  Israeli	  observers	  was	  not	  always	  clear	  and	  coherent,	  and	  this	  may	  have	  undermined	  the	  efficacy	  of	  American	  LSI.	  	  First	  and	  foremost	  in	  this	  regard	  was	  President	   Bush’s	   ill-­‐considered	   remark	   on	   East	   Jerusalem.	   	   In	   addition	   to	   further	  undermining	  his	  own	  administration’s	  peace	   initiative,	  Bush’s	   statement	  also	  gave	  Shamir	   an	   initial	   advantage	   right	   out	   of	   the	   gate	   in	   his	   efforts	   to	   outmaneuver	  Shimon	   Peres	   and	   the	   Labor	   Party.	   	   Dennis	   Ross	   describes	   the	   harmful	  consequences	  of	  President	  Bush’s	  remarks	  as	  follows:	  	  “The	   last	   thing	  we	  needed	  was	   Jerusalem,	  which	  would	  give	  Shamir	   a	   rallying	   cry	  and,	  more	   than	   that,	   a	   kind	   of	   diversion.	   	   This	  was	   a	   very	   delicate	   time...	   the	   last	  thing	   we	   need	   is	   an	   issue	   that	   drowns	   out	   everything	   else,	   that	   is	   kind	   of	   an	  emotional	   lightning	  rod	  and	  that	  Shamir	  can	  use	   to	  bolster	  his	  position	  and	  divert	  attention	  away	  form	  the	  effort	  to	  follow	  through	  on	  launching	  this	  dialogue”.44	  	  	   Yet	  Peres	  still	  had	  sound	  basis	  for	  some	  initial	  optimism.	  	  As	  finance	  minister,	  he	   had	   been	   using	   financial	   inducements	   to	   court	   the	   ultra-­‐orthodox	   parties	  who	  could	  serve	  as	  kingmakers	  for	  any	  new	  government.	   	  The	  fact	  that	  Shas	  decided	  to	  allow	  his	  motion	  of	  no	  confidence	  to	  succeed	  suggested	  it	  would	  also	  be	  willing	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Dennis Ross, “Interview with the Author”. 
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join	  his	  new	  government.45	   	  Before	   fracturing	   the	  government,	  Peres	   insisted	   that	  this	  was	   the	   case	   and	   “that	   he	   had	  worked	   that	   circuit	  well	   enough	   that	   he	   could	  engineer	   a	   political	   coup	   d’etat,	   as	   it	   were,	   with	   the	   result	   that	   the	   Labour	   Party	  could	   take	   over	   the	   Israeli	   Government…	  Peres	   assured	  Rabin	   that	   this	   operation	  was	  in	  the	  bag”.46	  	  However,	  he	  was	  mistaken,	  and	  his	  plan	  took	  repeated	  turns	  for	  the	  worse.	  	   Although	   Shas	   had	   permitted	   the	   no	   confidence	   vote	   to	   succeed	   on	   the	  tentative	  initiative	  of	  one	  of	  its	  spiritual	  leaders,	  Rabbi	  Ovadia	  Yosef,	  what	  outsiders	  did	  not	  realize	  was	  that	  the	  party	  was	  undergoing	  an	  internal	  power	  struggle	  at	  the	  time.	   	   Another	   religious	   leader,	   Rabbi	   Eliezer	   Schach,	   still	   held	   considerable	   sway	  with	   the	   party’s	   faithful,	   despite	   having	   technically	   departed	   to	   form	   his	   own	  orthodox	   party,	   Degel	   HaTorah.	   	   While	   Peres	   was	   trying	   to	   entice	   Shas	   to	   join	   a	  Labor-­‐led	  government,	  Schach	  told	  a	  stadium	  full	  of	  his	  devotees	  that	  Labor	  was	  a	  bunch	  of	  godless,	  pig-­‐eating	  hedonists	  and	  that	  they	  should	  not	  be	  allowed	  to	  form	  the	  next	  government.	  	  This	  precluded	  Labor	  from	  being	  able	  to	  entice	  not	  only	  Degel	  HaTorah	  into	  joining	  the	  government	  but	  the	  Shas	  Party	  as	  well.47	  	   Peres	  found	  yet	  another	  way	  to	  reach	  the	  61	  Knesset	  votes	  he	  needed	  to	  form	  a	  government,	  but	  yet	  another	  bizarre	  disaster	  struck	  down	  his	  effort.	   	  He	  reached	  exactly	   that	   number	   by	   enticing	   a	   former	   Likud	   minister,	   Abrasha	   Sharir,	   with	  promises	  of	  a	  safe	  seat	  and	  ministerial	  portfolio.	   	  Sharir	  went	   into	  hiding	   from	  his	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Arens, Broken Covenant: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis between the U.S. and Israel, 127-128; 
Ross, The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace, 64. 
46 Brown, “Interview with Ambassador William Andreas Brown,” 279. 
47 Joel Brinkley, “Peres at an impasse in forming Israeli government,” New York Times, March 24, 1990; 
Joel Brinkley, “Orthodox leader in Israel appears to spurn Peres,” New York Times, March 26, 1990. 
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former	  Likud	  colleagues.	   	  Peres	  also	   reached	  agreement	  with	   the	   remaining	  ultra-­‐orthodox	  party	  in	  the	  Knesset,	  Agudat	  Yisrael,	  getting	  him	  to	  exactly	  61	  votes.	  However,	   the	  Brooklyn-­‐based	  Hasidic	  Rabbi	  Menachem	  Schneerson	   carried	  out	   some	   meddling	   of	   his	   own,	   calling	   upon	   members	   of	   Agudat	   Yisrael	   and	  forbidding	  them	  to	  join	  the	  government.	  	  Although	  the	  party	  had	  a	  written	  contract	  with	  Peres,	  two	  of	  its	  members	  left	  the	  party,	  refusing	  to	  join	  the	  government.	  	  The	  news	  came	  just	  as	  the	  Knesset	  gathered	  on	  the	  11th	  to	  vote	  on	  forming	  a	  new	  Labor	  government,	  and	  Peres	  was	  forced	  to	  admit	  his	  coalition	  was	  not	  ready.	  Peres	  got	  a	  reprieve,	  but	  once	  again	  that	  chance	  slipped	  through	  his	  fingers.	  	  Israeli	   President	   Chaim	   Herzog	   gave	   him	   a	   fifteen-­‐day	   extension	   to	   assemble	  another	  majority.	  	  Also,	  a	  rabbinical	  court	  ruled	  that	  the	  two	  renegade	  members	  of	  Agudat	  Yisrael,	  Avraham	  Verdiger	  and	  Eliahu	  Mizrahi,	  could	  not	  void	  their	  contract	  by	  leaving	  the	  party	  because	  they	  had	  signed	  the	  its	  agreement	  with	  Labor.	  	  Yet	  still	  the	  plan	  failed.	  	  Verdiger	  submitted	  to	  the	  court’s	  judgment	  and	  sheepishly	  returned	  to	   Peres.	   	   However,	   with	   the	   deadline	   for	   forming	   a	   Labor	   government	   less	   than	  twenty-­‐four	  hours	  away,	  Mizrahi	  devised	  an	  unusual	  solution:	  “he	  called	  the	  phone	  company,	   had	   the	   number	   changed	   for	   his	   car	   phone	   and	   then	   drove	   around	   the	  country	  all	  day,	  to	  be	  sure	  that	  no	  one	  could	  reach	  him”.48	  Also,	  Labor	  had	  nearly	  succeeded	  in	  buying	  off	  a	  five-­‐member	  faction	  led	  by	  Likud	  MK	  Yitzhak	  Moda’i,	  but	  Moda’i	  just	  used	  that	  offer	  to	  extort	  a	  better	  one	  from	  the	  Likud	  central	   committee	   the	  morning	  before	   the	  vote.	   	  Again,	   an	  embarrassed	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Joel Brinkley, “Peres in trouble as deadline nears,” New York Times, April 26, 1990; Joel Brinkley, 
“Israeli Coalition Cracks at Last Minute,” New York Times, April 11, 1990; Joel Brinkley, “Israeli legislator 
who switched switches again,” New York Times, April 19, 1990. See also Ariel Goldman, “One Brooklyn 
Rabbi’s Long Shadow,” New York Times, April 13, 1990. 
	   310	  
Peres	   was	   forced	   to	   confess	   to	   Herzog	   that	   his	   votes	   were	   not	   there,	   and	   the	  mandate	  to	  form	  a	  new	  government	  now	  went	  to	  Shamir.49	  	   Even	   still	   the	   Peres	   plan	   was	   not	   yet	   dead.	   	   Despite	   “endless	   haggling,”	  Shamir	   himself	   needed	   to	   request	   an	   extension	   when	   his	   deadline	   for	   forming	   a	  government	   was	   about	   to	   expire.	   	   Despite	   all	   that	   had	   transpired,	   Arens	   even	  beseeched	  Shamir	  to	  consider	  another	  NUG	  for	  fear	  that	  Likud	  would	  be	  unable	  to	  form	   its	  own	  government	  by	   the	  new	  deadline	  on	   June	  8th.	   	  Yet	  by	   June	  7,	  Shamir	  finally	  succeeded	  in	  forming	  a	  narrow	  right-­‐wing	  government	  without	  Labor.50	  	  Had	  he	  not	  done	  so,	  there	  is	  a	  good	  chance	  that	  Israel	  would	  have	  gone	  to	  new	  elections.	  	   Thus,	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  different	  points	  at	  which	  the	  plan	  for	  forming	  a	  new	  Labor	  government	  could	  have	  succeeded	  but	  did	  not.	   	  Some	  American	  actions	  furthered	   this	   objective,	   but	   some	   of	   them	   undermined	   it.	   	   For	   instance,	   Baker	  believes	   that	   his	   March	   1	   testimony	   conditioning	   $400	   million	   in	   HLGs	   on	   a	  settlement	   freeze	   and	   Bush’s	   comment	   objecting	   to	   Israeli	   construction	   in	   East	  Jerusalem	  as	  illegal	  settlement	  activity	  were	  both	  counterproductive.	  	  He	  estimates	  that	  “my	  comments	  and	  the	  President’s	  strengthened	  the	  hand	  of	  conservatives	  by	  diverting	   attention	   from	   the	   larger	   issue	   of	   peace.	   	   More	   important,	   they	   gave	  Shamir	  a	   convenient	  excuse	  –	  his	  anger	  at	  being	  pressured	  by	   the	  United	  States	  –	  behind	   which	   to	   hide”	   when	   rending	   apart	   the	   NUG.51	   	   Ross	   writes	   that	   Shamir	  grabbed	  onto	  Bush’s	  statement	  “as	  a	  pretext”	  for	  trying	  to	  kill	  Baker’s	  plan.52	  The	  New	  York	  Times	  editorial	  page	  agreed	  that	  Bush’s	  comment	  “made	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Arens, Broken Covenant: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis between the U.S. and Israel, 132-133. 
50 Ibid., 137-138. 
51 Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War & Peace, 1989-1992, 128. 
52 Ross, The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace, 64. 
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maneuvering	  all	  the	  more	  complicated”	  because	  it	  was	  “a	  thoughtless,	  unnecessary	  jolt	  to	  Israelis	  on	  a	  matter	  that	  should	  not	  even	  be	  raised	  until	  the	  very	  end	  of	  a	  long	  and	   successful	   peace	   process”.53	   	   Repeatedly	   throughout	   the	   coalition	   formation	  process	   Likud	   attacked	   Labor	   on	   the	   issue	   of	   Jerusalem,	   and	   the	   American	  administration	   struggled	   to	   walk	   back	   the	   president’s	   ill-­‐timed	   remark.	   	   It	   also	  provided	  a	  basis	  for	  pro-­‐Israel	  members	  of	  Congress	  to	  outflank	  the	  administration	  with	   a	   resolution	   calling	   for	   the	   U.S.	   to	   recognize	   an	   undivided	   Jerusalem	   as	   the	  capital	  of	  Israel.54	  	  According	  to	  a	  firsthand	  participant,	  it	  turns	  out	  the	  idea	  for	  this	  bill	  was	  forwarded	  to	  Congress	  by	  Shamir’s	  political	  team	  via	  Israel’s	  embassy	  in	  the	  U.S.	  as	  a	  tactic	  for	  boosting	  Likud’s	  hand	  in	  coalition	  talks	  back	  home.55	  Further,	  the	  administration	  erred	  on	  the	  side	  of	  keeping	  a	  low	  profile	  during	  the	   first	   month	   of	   wrangling	   over	   coalition	   formation	   in	   Israel.	   	   However,	   in	  retrospect	   the	   U.S.	   might	   have	   had	   better	   luck	   firmly	   expressing	   its	   preferences	  while	  Peres	  still	  had	  a	  chance	  of	  forming	  a	  government	  rather	  than	  afterwards.	  	  
Coding	  the	  Observable	  Implications	  
1.	  Perceptions	  of	  Sender	  Interests:	  One	   area	   in	   which	   the	   theories	   diverge	   involves	   the	   expected	   effect	   of	  perceptions	   of	   sender	   interests	   on	   the	   occurrence	   of	   LSI.	   	   Theory	   #1	   (national	  interests	   theory)	   predicts	   that	   LSI	   occurrence	   should	   directly	   reflect	   objective	  national	   interests	   abroad.	   	  Theory	  #2	   (the	   lobby-­‐legislative	  approach)	   expects	  LSI	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 “Editorial - The Right Bush Push on Israel,” New York Times, March 16, 1990. 
54 William E. Clayton Jr., “Pro-Israel House Act Stirs Rebuke,” Houston Chronicle, April 27, 1990. 
55 Retired Senior Israeli Official, “Interview with the Author”, June 2011. 
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toward	  Israel	  to	  be	  rare	  because	  members	  of	  Congress	  and	  the	  pro-­‐Israel	  lobby	  tend	  to	  see	  meddling	  in	  Israeli	  politics	  as	  bad	  for	  U.S.	  national	  interests.	  	  Theory	  #3	  (the	  bureaucratic	  approach)	  expects	  LSI	  toward	  Israel	  to	  be	  frequent	  because	  working-­‐level	   officials	   in	   the	   executive	   branch	  who	   deal	  with	   Israeli	   politics	   tend	   to	   favor	  intervention.	   	   Theory	   #4	   (leadership	   theory)	   predicts	   that	   LSI	   occurrence	   should	  vary	   according	   to	   leader’s	   personal	   beliefs	   about	   how	   Israeli	   politics	   bear	   on	  U.S.	  national	  interests	  at	  the	  time.	  By	  the	  time	  the	  NUG	  fell,	   the	  Bush	  team	  felt	  that	  a	  Labor	  government	  could	  serve	   U.S.	   interests	   much	   better	   than	   a	   Likud-­‐led	   one	   given	   the	   chance.	   	   Israeli	  politics	  involved	  the	  same	  players	  as	  in	  1989,	  and	  Shamir	  still	  regularly	  rejected	  the	  principle	  of	  land	  for	  peace	  in	  his	  public	  statements.	  	  Thus,	  the	  fact	  that	  perceptions	  of	   U.S.	   interests	   underwent	   a	   substantial	   shift	   toward	   the	   same	   Israeli	   political	  configuration	  of	  actors	  suggests	  that	  something	  other	  than	  Theory	  #1	  it	  at	  play.	  Nor	  does	  Theory	  #2	  fare	  well.	  	  Congressional	  activity	  was	  more	  prominent	  in	  the	  1990	  episode	  than	  1989.	  	  However,	  the	  fact	  that	  LSI	  against	  the	  Likud	  occurred	  in	   the	   former	   rather	   than	   the	   latter	   suggests	   that	   legislative	   pressure	   was	   not	   a	  decisive	  factor	  for	  explaining	  why	  negative	  LSI	  in	  one	  case	  but	  not	  the	  other.	  	  During	  the	   first	   half	   of	   1990,	  AIPAC	  officials	  wrote	   repeatedly	   in	   their	  weekly	   newsletter	  that	  Shamir’s	  positions	  were	  toward	  the	  center	  for	  Israeli	  public	  opinion,	  that	  there	  were	   not	   measurable	   differences	   between	   the	   Israeli	   left	   and	   right,	   and	   that	  Shamir’s	   behavior	   demonstrated	   a	   noble	   commitment	   to	   peace.56	   	   Yet	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 “Peace Takes Precedence,” Near East Report 34, no. 2 (January 8, 1990); “Israelis on Peace,” Near East 
Report 34, no. 5 (January 29, 1990); “Shamir Stands Firm,” 34, no. 8 (February 19, 1990); “What Next?” 
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administration	  acted	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  firmly	  contradicted	  these	  preferences.	  Theory	  #3	   receives	  mixed	  marks	   in	   this	   regard.	   	  The	   fact	   that	  negative	  LSI	  was	  carried	  out	  against	   the	  Likud	   fits	  with	   the	  predictions	  of	  bureaucratic	  politics	  theory,	   and	   comments	   attributed	   to	  Daniel	   Kurtzer	   that	   the	   diplomatic	   corps	  was	  telling	  Arab	  states	  to	  stay	  quiet	  in	  the	  spring	  of	  1990	  so	  as	  not	  to	  hurt	  Peres	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  effort	  of	  this	  sort.	  	  However,	  it	  is	  equally	  possible	  that	  these	  efforts	  were	  being	  conducted	  by	  Baker	  himself,	  as	  I	  will	  demonstrate	  was	  the	  case	  in	  1992.	  Rather,	   it	   is	   the	  assessments	  of	   top	  American	  officials	   that	   seem	  to	  provide	  the	  most	   important	  moving	   pieces	   in	   this	   case.	   	   Baker	  wrote	   that	   “I	   felt	   battered,	  beaten,	   and	  betrayed.	   	   From	   the	  outset,	   I’d	   tried	   to	   give	   Shamir	   the	  benefit	   of	   the	  doubt…	  it	  was	  now	  clear	  to	  me	  that	  I’d	  been	  wrong	  about	  him.	  	  [His	  actions]	  said	  to	  me	  that	  Shamir	  simply	  must	  not	  be	  serious	  about	  peace”.57	  	  The	  president	  was	  angry	  with	  the	  PM’s	  retreat	  from	  so-­‐called	  Shamir	  Plan,	  and	  Bush’s	  frustration	  showed	  in	  his	  curt	  warnings	  to	  Shamir	  described	  above.	  	  Rabin’s	  new	  willingness	  to	  leave	  the	  government	   also	  may	  have	  played	   a	  major	   role	   in	   influencing	  how	   top	  officials	   in	  Washington	  saw	  their	  interests	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  NUG.	  	  These	  factors	  support	  Theory	  #4.	  	  2.	  Perceptions	  of	  Close	  Contests	  The	  theories	  also	  offer	  divergent	  predictions	  about	  how	  expectations	  of	  close	  political	   contests	   abroad	   affect	   LSI	   occurrence.	   	   Theory	   #1	   (national	   interests	  theory)	  expects	  that	  LSI	  should	  correlate	  closely	  with	  all	  available	  information	  about	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objectively	   contests	   that	   as	   they	   are	   emerging	  within	   the	   target	   state.	   	   Theory	  #4	  (leadership	   theory)	   predicts	   that	   the	   personal	   distractions	   and	   subjective	  perceptions	  of	  these	  developments	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  an	  important	  intervening	  factor.	  Baker’s	  willingness	  to	  push	  hard	  for	  an	  answer	  to	  his	  proposal	  were	  in	  part	  due	   to	   his	   belief	   that	   Labor	  was	   now	   a	   viable	   contender	   for	   power	   in	   Israel.	   	   He	  expresses	  his	  belief	  that	  a	  close	  contest	  in	  Israeli	  politics	  might	  have	  been	  imminent:	  	   “In	  truth,	  I	  did	  not	  believe	  the	  situation	  was	  beyond	  redemption.	  	  At	  least	   Arens	   was	   passionately	   committed	   to	   the	   compromise.	   	   If	  anyone	  could	  reason	  with	  Shamir,	  I	  thought,	  it	  was	  Misha.	   	  Even	  if	  Shamir	   refused	   to	   accept	   the	   plan,	   Labor	   would	   almost	   certainly	  pull	   out	   of	   the	   coalition	   in	   the	   belief	   that	   it	   could	   muster	   the	  support	   to	   form	  a	  new	  government.	   	   Therefore,	  we	   reasoned,	   the	  plan	  was	  almost	  certain	  to	  be	  approved”.58	  	  However,	  until	  it	  became	  clear	  Peres	  was	  in	  serious	  trouble,	  the	  administration	  did	  not	  pursue	  LSI	  toward	  Israeli	  politics	  with	  the	  sort	  of	  tenacity	  that	  might	  have	  had	  produced	  a	   larger	   impact.	   	  Most	  problematic	  may	  have	  been	   the	   fact	   that	  many	   in	  the	  U.S.	  believed	  that	  Peres	  had	  the	  votes	   for	  a	  new	  government	  sewn	  up.	   	  Dennis	  Ross	  writes	  that	  he	  believed	  “Peres…	  had	  the	  votes	  to	  form	  a	  government,”	  perhaps	  based	  on	  his	  ability	  to	  muster	  a	  successful	  vote	  of	  no	  confidence	  on	  March	  15th.59	  	   Another	   factor	   that	  may	  have	  contributed	   to	   the	  American	  administration’s	  passive	  approach	  during	  much	  of	  the	  coalition	  crisis	  was	  that	  the	  Iraq	  portfolio	  was	  starting	  to	  heat	  up,	  becoming	  a	  major	  Mideast	  distraction	  for	  American	  official.	  	  One	  American	  official	  involved	  in	  these	  deliberations	  comments	  that:	  	  “We	   dropped	   [the	   Shamir	   Plan]	   largely	   because	   that’s	   when	   Iraq	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Ibid. 
59 Ross, The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace, 64. 
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started	  heating	  up.	  Q:	  In	  March?	  A:	   Yeah,	   even	   in	   late	   February	   and	   in	  March.	   	   Saddam	   gives	   this	  speech…	  that	  he’s	  gonna	  burn	  half	  of	  Israel…	  there	  are	  eight	  or	  nine	  very	  serious	  warning	  signs	  in	  the	  spring	  of	  ’90,	  and	  the	  Arab-­‐Israeli	  peace	  process	  just	  drops	  off	  the	  edge	  of	  the	  world.	  Q:	   	   …	   The	   administration	   was	   really	   quiet	   until	   Shamir	   gets	   the	  mandate	   to	   form	  a	  government	  and	   then	   they	  go	  nuts…	   I	   figured,	  was	   this	   their	   strategy	   about	   coalition	   formation,	   but	   the	   Iraq	  explanation	  makes	  so	  much	  more	  sense.	  A:	  It’s	  all	  Iraq.”60	  	   Both	   of	   these	   factors	   seem	   to	   have	   been	   matters	   for	   Theory	   #4,	   not	   its	  structural	   competitors.	   	   Perceptions	   by	   top	   American	   officials	   that	   Peres	   had	   the	  government	   formation	   process	   sewn	   up	   were	   understandable	   but	   empirically	  incorrect.	  	  Further,	  their	  preoccupation	  with	  Iraqi	  threats	  functioned	  more	  as	  a	  drag	  on	  their	  attention	  than	  a	  strategic	  rationale	  for	  softening	  their	  criticism	  of	  the	  Likud.	  	  Otherwise,	   stern	  U.S.	   criticism	  should	  have	   fallen	  off	   completely,	  not	   just	   subsided	  until	  Shamir’s	  stock	  was	  on	  the	  rise.	  Also,	  Arens	  asserts	  that	  “most	  disturbing	  was	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  United	  States	  was	  doing	  nothing	   to	  alert	   Saddam	  Hussein	   to	   the	   reaction	  he	   should	  expect	   if	  he	  were	  to	  use	  chemical	  weapons	  again	  [as	  he	  was	  threatening	  to	  do	  against	  Israel].	  	  As	  a	   matter	   of	   fact,	   there	   had	   been	   no	   high-­‐level	   contact	   between	   us	   and	   the	   Bush	  administration	   since	   my	   meeting	   with	   Baker	   back	   in	   February…	   [they]	   were	  probably	   avoiding	   contact	   with	   us	   in	   the	   expectation	   that	   any	   day	   Peres	   would	  replace	  Shamir	  as	  prime	  minister”.61	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Retired Senior American Diplomat, “Interview with the Author”, June 2011. For more on Iraqi threats 
during this period see John Edward Wilz, “The Making of Mr. Bush’s War: A Failure to Learn from 
History?,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 25, no. 3 (Summer 1995): 554; Quandt, “The Middle East in 
1990,” 56; Arens, Broken Covenant: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis between the U.S. and Israel, 
130-135. 
61 Arens, Broken Covenant: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis between the U.S. and Israel, 135. 
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  3.	  Patterns	  of	  Domestic	  Debate:	  	   Another	  area	  in	  which	  the	  theories	  diverge	  involves	  the	  patterns	  of	  domestic	  deliberation	  within	   the	   sender	   state	   at	   the	   time.	   	   Theory	  #2	   (the	   lobby-­‐legislative	  approach)	   and	   Theory	   #3	   (the	   bureaucratic	   approach)	   expects	   that	   these	   actors	  should	  be	  informed	  and	  influential	  in	  advance	  of	  important	  decisions	  about	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  sender	  state	  should	  engage	  in	  leadership	  selection	  intervention.	  	  Theory	  #4	  (leadership	  theory)	  anticipates	  that	  those	  domestic	  forces	  should	  actually	  be	  left	  in	   the	   dark	   and	   that	   channels	   of	   communication	   among	   top	   officials	   should	   be	  unusually	  closed	  and	  informal	  to	  prevent	  leaks	  of	  their	  true	  intentions.	  Congress	  as	  a	  whole	  was	  not	  privy	  to	  the	  administration’s	  deliberations	  over	  internal	  Israeli	  politics.	  	  Instead,	  the	  two	  were	  at	  odds	  over	  Jerusalem.	  	  Also,	  the	  only	  bureaucratic	   actors	   at	   State	   who	   were	   involved	   in	   this	   episode	   were	   individuals	  working	   for	   the	   secretary	   such	   as	   Ross	   and	   Kurtzer,	   not	   officials	   out	   of	   the	   Near	  Eastern	  Affairs	  bureau.	  	  Both	  of	  these	  factors	  provide	  tentative	  evidence	  in	  favor	  of	  the	   paper	   paradox	   and	   leadership	   theory.	   	  However,	   firmer	   evidence	   is	   elusive	   in	  this	  case.	  	  	  4.	  Cycles	  of	  Domestic	  Power:	  	   The	  theories	  also	  offer	  divergent	  predictions	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  political	   calendar	   within	   the	   sender	   state.	   	   Theory	   #3	   (the	   bureaucratic	   politics	  approach)	  predicts	   that	  LSI	   should	  be	  more	   frequent	  early	  on	   in	  new	  presidential	  administrations.	  	  Theory	  #2	  (the	  lobby-­‐legislative	  approach)	  expects	  LSI	  to	  be	  much	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rarer	  during	  periods	  of	  divided	  government	  or	  during	   the	   lead-­‐up	   to	   sender	   state	  elections.	   	   Theory	   #4	   (leadership	   theory)	   expects	   these	   factors	   to	   be	   relatively	  unimportant	  for	  affecting	  the	  rate	  of	  LSI	  occurrence	  over	  time.	  The	   fact	   that	   negative	   LSI	   against	   the	   Likud	   occurred	   in	   1990	   rather	   than	  1989	  contradicts	   the	  expectations	  of	   lobby-­‐legislative	   theory	  with	  regard	  to	  cycles	  of	   domestic	   power.	   	   The	   theory	   predicts	   that	   domestic	   political	   pressures	   from	  Congress	  and	  lobby	  groups	  should	  be	  exceptionally	  strong	  in	  the	  lead-­‐up	  to	  election	  periods.	   	   Indeed,	  Congress	  was	  more	  active	   in	   trying	   to	  discourage	  administration	  efforts	  in	  the	  1990	  case.	  	  However,	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  administration	  chose	  to	  pursue	  negative	  LSI	  in	  1990	  but	  not	  in	  1989	  suggests	  that	  Congressional	  behavior	  was	  not	  a	  decisive	  factor	  for	  explaining	  variation	  in	  LSI	  occurrence.	  	  5.	  Bureaucratic	  Freelancing:	  	   Theory	  #3	   (the	  bureaucratic	  politics	  approach)	  expects	  efforts	  by	  working-­‐level	   officials	   to	   pursue	   LSI	   without	   senior	   authorization	   should	   be	   extremely	  common.	   	  Theory	  #4	   (leadership	   theory)	  predicts	   that	   such	   freelancing	   should	  be	  rare	  and	  constrained	  to	  periods	  of	  lax	  executive	  oversight.	  There	   is	   little	   evidence	   of	   freelancing	   behavior	   in	   the	   1990	   case.	   	   The	  comment	   about	   quiet	  messaging	   to	   Arab	   capitals	   attributed	   to	   Kurtzer,	   the	   tough	  statements	  by	  Tutwiler	  and	  Fitzwater,	  and	  written	  notes	  between	  Haass	  and	  Gates	  all	  seem	  in	  fitting	  with	  the	  objectives	  of	  administration	  principals	  Bush	  and	  Baker.	  	  There	  is	  little	  to	  suggest	  that	  any	  of	  this	  behavior	  was	  taking	  place	  without	  suitable	  authorization.	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  6.	  Consistency	  of	  Message:	  Another	  area	  in	  which	  the	  theories	  diverge	  involves	  the	  ability	  of	  officials	  in	  the	   sender	   state	   to	   project	   a	   consistent	   (and	   therefore	   relatively	   more	   effective)	  message	   abroad.	   	   Theory	   #1	   (national	   interests	   theory)	   expects	   this	   to	   be	   a	  relatively	   easy	   task,	   whereas	   the	   other	   theories	   emphasize	   various	   personal	   or	  institutional	  biases	  that	  can	  make	  this	  task	  more	  challenging.	  Three	  factors	  in	  1990	  undermined	  the	  persuasiveness	  of	  the	  administration’s	  message	  toward	  Israel	  and	  thus	  may	  have	  detracted	  from	  the	  efficacy	  of	  American	  LSI.	  	  First,	  Congress’s	  effort	  to	  outflank	  the	  administration	  on	  Jerusalem	  helped	  keep	  the	  focus	  on	  an	  issue	  that	  advantaged	  the	  Likud	  over	  Labor.	  	  As	  noted	  above,	  the	  bill	  was	  discreetly	  solicited	  by	  Shamir’s	  own	  political	  team.	  	   Second,	   the	   administration	  made	   statements	   that	  distracted	   the	   focus	   from	  Likud’s	   refusal	   to	   accept	   a	   reasonable	   compromise	   on	   Palestinian	   representation.	  	  Bush’s	  comment	  on	  East	  Jerusalem	  building	  as	   illegal	  settlement	  activity	  was	  most	  prominent	  in	  this	  regard.	  	   Finally,	   the	   administration	   pursued	   a	   muted	   approach	   to	   Israeli	   coalition	  negotiations	  when	  it	  still	  looked	  as	  though	  Peres	  was	  going	  to	  be	  able	  to	  pull	  of	  his	  plan.	   	   Although	   one	   can	   debate	   how	   effective	   U.S.	   pressure	   would	   have	   been	   at	  boosting	   Peres’s	   chances,	   it	  was	   clearly	   too	   late	   once	   his	   proposals	   for	   forming	   a	  government	  had	  imploded	  and	  he	  was	  forced	  to	  surrender	  his	  mandate	  to	  Shamir.	  	   These	  factors	  provide	  support	  for	  Theories	  2	  and	  4,	  since	  in	  each	  instance	  the	  American	  message	  was	  muddled	  either	  by	  pressure	   from	  the	   legislative	  branch	  or	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from	  poor	  coordination	  among	  top	  officials	  in	  the	  executive	  branch.	  	  7.	  Suitability	  of	  Message:	  	   The	  last	  area	  in	  which	  the	  theories	  diverge	  involves	  the	  ability	  of	  officials	  in	  the	  sender	  state	  to	  project	  an	  international	  message	  that	  is	  well-­‐suited	  in	  its	  content	  to	  the	  needs	  of	  their	  protégé	  within	  the	  target	  state	  (and	  therefore	  relatively	  more	  effective).	  	  Theory	  #1	  (national	  interests	  theory)	  expects	  this	  to	  be	  a	  relatively	  easy	  task,	  while	   the	  other	   theories	  emphasize	   institutional	  or	  personal	  biases	   that	  may	  make	  this	  objective	  more	  difficult.	  The	   core	   U.S.	  message	   at	   this	   time	  was	   that	  Washington	  wanted	   an	   Israeli	  government	   that	  was	  willing	   to	  move	   forward	  as	  a	  partner	   for	  peace	  –	  and	   that	   a	  Likud	   which	   opposed	   Baker’s	   ideas	   was	   not	   such	   a	   partner.	   	   However,	   the	  president’s	  outburst	  in	  the	  beginning	  of	  March	  contradicted	  this	  message	  by	  hinting	  that	   the	   administration	   would	   force	   Israel	   to	   make	   concessions	   that	   were	   more	  extreme	  than	  most	  Israelis	  were	  willing	  to	  entertain	  at	  that	  time.	  	  This	  seems	  a	  rare	  instance	  in	  which	  Bush’s	  strong	  personal	  beliefs	  trumped	  his	  close	  ties	  and	  regular	  coordination	  with	  James	  Baker.	  	  The	  secretary	  writes	  in	  his	  memoirs	   that	   he	   only	   learned	   after	   the	   fact	   about	   what	   had	   motivated	   the	  president’s	  comments.	  	  It	  turns	  out	  Bush’s	  emotions	  had	  just	  been	  stoked	  by	  White	  House	  Chief	  of	  Staff	   John	  Sununu,	  who	  had	  shown	  him	  a	  map	  of	   Israeli	  settlement	  growth,	  particularly	  in	  East	  Jerusalem.	  	  Baker	  telephoned	  Bush,	  teasing	  him	  that	  “we	  almost	  had	  that	  Middle	  East	  deal	  worked	  out”	  except	  “you	  screwed	  it	  up	  so	  bad	  with	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that	  statement	  about	  settlements	  that	  even	  I	  can’t	  straighten	  it	  out”.62	  	   This	   behavior	   supports	   leadership	   theory.	   	   Bush	   ran	   a	   tight	   ship	   on	   peace	  process	  issues,	  conducting	  oversight	  but	  delegating	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  management	  to	  the	  secretary	  and	  his	  staff.	  	  It	  seems	  quite	  fitting	  with	  Theory	  #4	  that	  if	  something	  were	  to	  upset	  this	  pattern,	  it	  should	  be	  the	  passions	  of	  the	  president	  himself.	  	  	  
George	  H.	  W.	  Bush,	  Case	  #3:	  Bush	  versus	  Shamir,	  1991-­‐92	  	  	   The	  collapse	  of	  the	  USSR	  opened	  the	  floodgates	  for	   large	  numbers	  of	  Soviet	  Jews	  to	  move	  to	  Israel.	  	  To	  finance	  the	  anticipated	  expenses	  of	  resettling	  these	  new	  immigrants,	   Israel	   sought	  housing	   loan	  guarantees	   (HLGs)	   from	   the	  United	  States,	  asking	  Washington	  to	  cosign	  Israel’s	  loans	  so	  they	  could	  borrow	  at	  lower	  rates.	  	   The	  first	  such	  request	  came	  in	  1990	  for	  the	  U.S.	  to	  guarantee	  $400	  million	  in	  stopgap	   loans.	   	   After	  months	   of	   negotiations,	   Israel’s	   new	   foreign	  minister	   David	  Levy	   elicited	   an	   agreement	   from	   Baker	   provided	   that	   Israel	   would	   “not	   direct	   or	  settle	   immigrants	   beyond	   the	   green	   line”	   that	   divides	   Israel’s	   pre-­‐	   and	   post-­‐1967	  borders.63	   	   However,	   it	   soon	   became	   clear	   that	   the	   Israeli	   government	   was	  systematically	   violating	   these	   commitments.64	   	   The	   stage	   was	   therefore	   set	   for	   a	  confrontation	  over	  the	  HLGs	  when	  Israel	  returned	  to	  the	  U.S.	  with	  its	  full	  request	  for	  $10	  billion	  in	  guarantees	  spread	  over	  five	  years.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War & Peace, 1989-1992, 128.  Emphasis in the original. 
63 Joel Brinkley, “Israeli bristles over U.S. loan-guarantee terms,” New York Times, October 4, 1990; 
“Mideast tensions: Israel retracts pledge to U.S. on East Jerusalem housing,” New York Times, October 19, 
1990. 
64 Shindler, Land Beyond Promise, 265. 
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   The	   request	   came	   to	   a	   head	   in	   September	   of	   1991.	   	   Bush	   called	   for	  consideration	   of	   Israel’s	   request	   to	   be	   delayed	   by	   120	   days	   in	   order	   to	   keep	  settlement	   issues	   from	   spoiling	   Baker’s	   preparations	   for	   the	   peace	   conference	   at	  Madrid.	  	  Israel,	  Congress,	  and	  AIPAC	  fought	  the	  delay,	  but	  Bush	  pushed	  back	  and	  got	  them	  to	  accept	  it,	  albeit	  in	  a	  very	  rough	  manner	  that	  left	  bitter	  feelings	  on	  all	  sides.	  	   The	  October	  Madrid	  conference	  was	  a	  major	  success,	  launching	  bilateral	  and	  multilateral	  negotiating	  tracks	  between	  Israel	  and	  its	  Arab	  neighbors.	  	  However,	  the	  conference	   also	   precipitated	   an	   eventual	   coalition	   crisis	   in	   Israel.	   	   Far-­‐right	  members	  of	  the	  government	  opposed	  the	  Madrid	  process	  and	  joined	  with	  Labor	  in	  a	  vote	  of	  no	  confidence	  that	  brought	  down	  the	  government	  in	  January	  of	  1992.	   	  This	  meant	   that	   Israeli	   elections	   were	   moved	   up	   from	   November	   to	   June	   and	   that	  reconsideration	  of	  the	  HLGs	  when	  the	  120-­‐day	  delay	  expired	  would	  now	  take	  place	  in	  the	  context	  of	  an	  Israeli	  election	  campaign.	  	   Although	   it	   seemed	   for	   a	   short	   time	   as	   though	   the	  U.S.	   administration	  was	  willing	   to	  relent	  and	  grant	   the	   loan	  guarantees,	   it	  began	   in	  February	   to	  shift	  away	  from	  conciliation	  back	  to	  confrontation.	  	  Last-­‐ditch	  efforts	  in	  March	  by	  key	  senators	  and	  by	  Arens	  to	  reach	  a	  compromise	  by	  watering	  down	  or	  splitting	  up	  the	  request	  were	  dismissed	  by	  Bush	  and	  Baker,	  who	  insisted	  on	  a	  tough	  package	  offer	   for	  $10	  billion	  over	  five	  years	  predicated	  upon	  commitment	  to	  a	  total	  settlement	  freeze	  or	  at	  least	  offsets	  for	  any	  money	  spent	  on	  settlements	  in	  violation	  of	  these	  terms.	  	  
Coding	  the	  Dependent	  Variables	  (Occurrence	  and	  Efficacy)	  Did	  LSI	  Occur?	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Yes.	   	   Conservative	   Israeli	   politicians	   and	   some	  historians	   have	   accused	   the	  U.S.	  of	  using	  housing	  loan	  guarantees	  to	  topple	  Shamir’s	  right-­‐wing	  government	  but	  have	   been	   unable	   to	   produce	   concrete	   proof	   for	   this	   claim.65	   	   I	   have	   assembled	  extensive	   new	  material	  which	  demonstrates	   that	   the	  Bush	   administration’s	   policy	  toward	  Israel	  by	  the	  start	  of	  1992	  was	  predicated	  upon	  trying	  to	  push	  out	  the	  Likud	  and	  bring	  in	  Labor.	  	  This	  influenced	  not	  only	  how	  Washington	  approached	  the	  loan	  guarantees	   but	   also	   how	   it	   handled	   a	   range	   of	   other	   issues,	   including	   the	   post-­‐Madrid	  peace	  talks	  and	  public	  statements	  about	  Jerusalem	  and	  settlement	  activity.	  U.S.	  officials	  tailored	  their	  approach	  to	  the	  Arab-­‐Israeli	  negotiating	  tracks	  in	  order	   to	   try	   shaping	   Israeli	  public	  opinion.	   	  Declassified	   talking	  points	   for	  Baker’s	  private	  meetings	  with	   Arab	   leaders	  were	   aimed	   at	   persuading	   them	   to	   remain	   in	  talks	  through	  the	  spring	  to	  bolster	  the	  peace	  camp	  in	  Israel.	  	  For	  instance,	  his	  notes	  for	  meeting	  with	  King	  Hussein	  of	  Jordan	  state	  that	  “your	  participation	  in	  bilaterals	  and	  multilaterals	  have	  sent	  very	  important	  signals	  to	  Israel.	   	  Please	  keep	  it	  up	  and	  look	   for	  ways	   to	   reach	  out,	  particular	  during	   the	  next	   several	  months.	   	  Helping	   to	  condition	  the	  Israeli	  public’s	  attitude	  toward	  peace	  is	  [a]	  critical	  component	  of	  this	  process;	  you	  understand	  the	  best	  way	  to	  affect	  popular	  perceptions”.66	  The	  notes	  for	  his	  meeting	  with	  Palestinian	  negotiator	  Faisal	  al-­‐Husseini	  read	  as	   follows:	   “Keep	  on	  Negotiating:	  Some	  on	  Arab	  side…	  want	   to	  suspend	  talks	  until	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Yitzhak Shamir, Summing Up: An Autobiography (Diane Pub Co, 1994), 249; Arens, Broken Covenant: 
American Foreign Policy and the Crisis between the U.S. and Israel, 9, 281, 301; Shlaim, The Iron Wall, 
497; Shindler, Land Beyond Promise, 276. For a contrary perspective, see Barry Rubin, “U.S.-Israel 
Relations and Israel’s 1992 Elections,” in The Elections in Israel, 1992, ed. Alan Arian and Michal Shamir 
(SUNY Press, 1995), 193-204; Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War & Peace, 1989-1992, 
555-556. 
66 James A. Baker, “Peace Process: Hussein Meeting”, March 12, 1992, Box 111 / Folder 2 / 1992 March, 
James A. Baker III Papers, Public Policy Papers, Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, 
Princeton University Library. 
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after	  Israeli	  elections.	  	  This	  would…	  only	  strengthen	  hardliners	  in	  Israel.	  We	  need	  to	  demonstrate	   continuity	   in	   negotiations	   over	   the	   next	   three	   months,	   not	   open	   up	  questions	   about	   Palestinian/Arab	   commitment…	   Israeli	   politics:	   Situation	   is	   fluid	  with	   changes	   in	   Labor;	   what	   Palestinians	   do	   over	   next	   three	   months	   will	   be	  important	  to	  what	  happens	  in	  June.	  	  Don’t	  give	  ammunition	  to	  hardliners.”.67	  The	  administration	  also	  made	  a	  careful	  effort	  to	  exclude	  East	  Jerusalem	  from	  demands	  for	  a	  settlement	  freeze.	  	  Part	  of	  the	  justification	  for	  doing	  so	  was	  because	  doing	  otherwise	  would	   leave	  Labor	  dead	   in	   the	  water.	   	  Ross	  wrote	   in	  February	   to	  the	  secretary:	  “so	  far	  we’ve	  kept	  Shamir	  off	  balance,	  denying	  him	  any	  easy	  rallying	  points	   for	   Israeli	   public	   opinion,	   like	   applicability	   of	   a	   freeze	   on	   new	   starts	   to	  Jerusalem…	  if	  we	  clarify	  Jerusalem	  at	  this	  point,	  we’ll	  create	  a	  major	  problem:	  either	  we	  will	  kill	  Rabin	  or…	  push	  the	  Palestinians	  to	  do	  stupid	  things…	  I	  recommend	  we	  stick	  to	  our	  low-­‐profile	  public	  line”.68	  Before	   1992,	   the	   administration’s	   approach	   to	   the	   HLGs	   was	   targeted	   at	  influencing	   Israeli	  policy	  and	  not	   leadership	  selection.	   	  For	   instance,	  a	  memo	  from	  Ross	  to	  Baker	   in	   July	  of	  1991	   lays	  out	   the	  administration’s	  strategy	   for	   linking	  the	  $10	  billion	  package	  to	  a	  large-­‐scale	  settlement	  freeze	  that	  September.	  	  In	  it,	  the	  focus	  is	   on	   “our	   need	   to	   build	   leverage	   with	   Shamir”	   and	   says	   nothing	   that	   suggests	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 James A. Baker, “Points for Husseini”, February 20, 1992, Box 111 / Folder 1 / 1992 February, James A. 
Baker III Papers, Public Policy Papers, Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton 
University Library. Underlining in the original. 
68 Dennis Ross, “Public Position on Israeli Loan Guarantees”, February 21, 1992, Box 193 / Folder 3 / Chpt 
29 – Baker Files, 1994, James A. Baker III Papers, Public Policy Papers, Department of Rare Books and 
Special Collections, Princeton University Library.  
	   324	  
consideration	  of	  leadership	  selection	  intervention.69	  	  However,	  when	  the	  issue	  was	  revisited	  in	  1992,	  the	  context	  had	  changed	  dramatically.	  To	  date,	  the	  closest	  thing	  to	  published	  evidence	  on	  the	  topic	  is	  Dennis	  Ross’s	  assessment	   that	   “delaying	   congressional	   consideration	   of	   the	   loan	   guarantees…	  thrust	   this	   issue	   directly	   into	   the	   Israeli	   elections	   set	   for	   June	   1992.	   	   Baker	   was	  determined	   not	   to	   do	   anything	   that	   might	   help	   Shamir.	   	   Providing	   the	   loan	  guarantees	   would	   show	   that	   he	   could	   have	   settlement	   activity	   and	   still	   get	   our	  support.	   	   There	  would	   be	   no	   cost	   to	   him	   and	  he	   could	   use	   that	   in	   the	   election”.70	  	  Both	  Quandt	  and	  Melman	  &	  Raviv	  also	  describe	  U.S.	  strategy	  as	  “refusal	   to	  help”71	  	  However,	   these	  claims	  per	   se	   are	  difficult	   to	  classify	  as	  LSI.	   	  Barring	  evidence	   that	  the	   refusal	   to	   help	   Shamir	   was	   conscious,	   intentional,	   and	   changed	   policies	   from	  what	  they	  otherwise	  might	  have	  been,	  such	  claims	  are	  insufficient.	  Of	   course,	   James	   Baker	   rejects	   that	   “the	   hard	   line	   on	   loan	   guarantees	  was	  deliberately	   pursued	   as	   a	   means	   of	   greasing	   the	   skids	   for	   Likud…	   it	   was	   not	   a	  conscious	   policy”.72	   	   To	   his	   credit,	   Baker	   is	   consistent	   on	   this	   point,	   even	   behind	  closed	  doors,	  insisting	  that	  LSI	  is	  “the	  wrong	  inference.	  	  We	  weren’t	  thinking	  about	  domestic	  Israeli	  politics”.73	  	  However,	  it	  is	  not	  even	  clear	  that	  the	  ghost	  writer	  for	  his	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70 Ross, The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace, 83. 
71 William B. Quandt, Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967, 3rd 
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memoirs,	   Thomas	   DeFrank,	   believed	   these	   claims,	  which	   provides	   some	   basis	   for	  suspecting	  his	  denials	  were	  intended	  either	  to	  protect	  his	  legacy	  or	  shield	  Bush’s.	  In	  preparing	  to	  help	  write	  Baker’s	  memoirs,	  DeFrank	  interviewed	  a	  number	  of	   stakeholders	   in	   the	   Bush	   administration	   to	   gain	   a	   fuller	   idea	   of	   what	   the	  government	  was	  trying	  to	  achieve	  on	  various	  issues.	  	  The	  following	  is	  a	  transcript	  of	  DeFrank’s	   interview	   with	   Daniel	   Kurtzer,	   who	   by	   1992	   was	   the	   deputy	   assistant	  secretary	   at	   State	   responsible	   for	   handling	   Arab-­‐Israeli	   affairs	   full	   time	   at	   the	  Bureau	  for	  Near	  Eastern	  Affairs:	  	   [Kurtzer]:	   “As	   a	   democratic	   government,	   we	   can’t	  articulate	   as	   a	   goal	   the	   overthrow	   of	   another	   government,	   but	   it	  was	   not	   in	   anybody’s	   interest	   to	   have	   Shamir	  win	  with	   regard	   to	  anything	   because	   of	   his	   positions	   on	   substance.	   Now,	   how	  much	  that	  played	  into	  the	  calculations	  to	  play	  tough	  on	  loan	  guarantees,	  how	  much	  the	  other	  factor	  played	  in	  -­‐-­‐	  which	  was	  the	  Bush-­‐Shamir	  disconnect	   from	  Day	  One…	  all	  of	   that	   is	  now	  coming	  together	  at	  a	  point	  where	  the	  Israeli	  position	  in	  the	  negotiations	  is	  intransigent.	  	  Shamir	  is	  basically	  lording	  it	  over	  everybody,	  saying,	  I	  got	  us	  into	  a	  process	   that’s	  not	  gonna	  result	   in	  anything,	   I’m	  a	  big	  hero,	   I	  want	  $10	   billion	   as	   my	   payoff,	   and	   I’m	   gonna	   win	   the	   election	   in	   six	  months.	  	  And	  this	  is	  a	  prescription	  for	  you	  know	  the	  President	  and	  the	  Secretary	  to	  get	  together	  privately	  and	  say,	  oh	  no	  he’s	  not.	  	  T[homas	  DeFrank]	  –	  I	  asked	  him	  [Baker]	  that	  and	  he	  said,	  you	  don’t	  really	  think	  we’d	  do	  something	  like	  that?	  	  K	  –	  Right!	  	  T	  –	  He	  kind	  of	  takes	  umbrage.	  	  He	  says,	  we	  didn’t	  do	  that,	  it	  was	  done	  on	  the	  merits.	  	  He’s	  insistent.	  	  K	  –	  The	  merits	   existed	   -­‐-­‐	   and	   they	  existed	  because	  of	   the	  experience	  of	  the	  $400	  million.	  	  But	  this	  was	  not	  done	  on	  the	  merits	  -­‐-­‐	  this	  was	  a	  political	  calculation.	  	  Now,	  do	  I	  know	  that	  for	  a	  fact?	  	  Of	  course	  not.	  	  T	  –	  Will	  you	  believe	  it	  forever?	  	  K	  –	  Yeah.	  	  Of	  course.	  	  And	  was	  it	  effective?	  	  Yes.”74	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Thomas M. DeFrank, “Transcript of Interview with Daniel Kurtzer”, August 4, 1994, Box 193 / Folder 3 
/ Chpt 29 – Baker Files, 1994, James A. Baker III Papers, Public Policy Papers, Department of Rare Books 
and Special Collections, Princeton University Library. 
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   Further,	   I	  have	  video	   footage	  of	  Bruce	  Riedel,	  who	  served	   then	  on	   the	  NSC,	  arguing	  at	  a	  public	  event	  that	  President	  Bush	  “actively	  colluded	  with	  Yitzhak	  Rabin	  to	  have	  Likud	  voted	  out	  of	  office	  and	  to	  bring	  a	  Labor	  government	  to	  power”.75	  	  When	  asked	   to	  elaborate	   in	  an	   interview	   for	   this	  project,	  Mr.	  Riedel	  explained	   that	  Bush	  and	  his	  NSC	  staff	  felt	  that	  “we	  had	  to	  get	  rid	  of	  him.	  	  And	  they	  consciously	  devised	  a	  strategy	  using	  the	  housing	  loan	  process…	  This	  was	  very	  much	  thought	  through	  that	  this	  will	  impact	  Israeli	  public	  opinion.	  	  We	  [were]	  tilting	  against	  Shamir”.76	  	  Did	  the	  Policy	  Succeed?	  Yes.	   	  Certainly,	  Kurtzer	  seems	  to	  believe	  U.S.	  policy	  helped	  facilitate	  Rabin’s	  landmark	   victory,	   and	   many	   other	   observers	   agree.77	   	   Baker	   judges	   that	   “in	  hindsight,	  it’s	  obvious	  that	  the	  controversy	  over	  loan	  guarantees	  clearly	  contributed	  to	  the	  Likud’s	  defeat”.78	   	  Arens	  believes	  “the	  Bush	  administration’s	  confrontational	  style	  with	  Israel,	  especially	  the	  withholding	  of	  the	  loan	  guarantees,	  had	  contributed	  to	   the	   Likud’s	   defeat	   and,	   considering	   Rabin’s	   slim	  margin	   of	   victory,	   might	   well	  have	  been	  decisive”.79	  	  Ross	  thinks	  it	  was	  “certainly	  a	  factor”.80	  Veteran	  analysts	  of	  Israeli	  elections	  Don	  Peretz	  and	  Sammy	  Smooha	  describe	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Emphases mine. Bruce Riedel, Remarks at MIT Event "The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy" 
(Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2007), pt. 45:00 - 47:00, http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/488. 
76 Bruce O. Riedel, “Interview with the Author”, April 9, 2011. 
77 Labor won the election by its biggest margin since in fifteen years, beating the Likud by an unheard-of 
twelve seats. It was also the first time since 1977 that the faction had won a “double victory” – as a party 
(over Likud) and as a bloc (over the right wing) – both of which often affect government formation. 
Sammy Smooha and Don Peretz, “Israel’s 1992 Knesset Elections: Are They Critical?,” The Middle East 
Journal 47, no. 3 (1993): 451. See also Leon T. Hadar, “The 1992 Electoral Earthquake and the Fall of the 
‘Second Israeli Republic’,” The Middle East Journal 46, no. 4 (1992): 594–616. 
78 Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War & Peace, 1989-1992, 555. 
79 Arens, Broken Covenant: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis between the U.S. and Israel, 301-302. 
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the	  American	  impact	  as	  follows:	  	   “The	  Bush	  administration	  played	  a	  key	  role	  in	  sensitizing	  the	  Israeli	  public…	   [because	   it]	   forced	   the	  government	  and	   the	   Israeli	  public	  to	   make	   a	   choice…	   The	   hard-­‐line	   Likud	   government	   selected	   the	  Greater	   Israel	   option.	   The	   Israeli	   public,	   with	   the	   assistance	   of	  President	  George	  Bush	  and	  Secretary	  of	  State	  James	  Baker,	  saw	  the	  high	   cost	   of	   this	   ideological	   option,	   and	   the	   majority	   decided	   in	  1992	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  peace	  alternative.	  Public	  opinion	  polls	   revealed	  both	   the	  direct	  and	   indirect	  effects	   of	   the	   peace	   issue	   on	   the	   Israeli	   Jewish	   voter.	   First,	   there	  had	  been	  a	   clear,	   steady	  but	   gradual	   trend	   since	  1990	   in	   favor	  of	  land	  for	  peace.	  Second,	  foreign	  and	  national	  security	  considerations	  loomed	   prominently	   in	   the	   voters'	   decisions	   during	   1992,	  especially	  in	  comparison	  with	  previous	  elections.	  Third,	  the	  choices	  of	  voters	  such	  as	  new	  immigrants,	  economically	  depressed	  working	  class	   families,	   industrialists,	   and	   many	   others	   affected	   by	   the	  economy,	   were	   indirectly	   shaped	   by	   peace	   concerns.	   The	   1992	  election	   was	   the	   first	   electoral	   campaign	   in	   which	   the	   linkage	  between	  the	  economy	  and	  peace	  was	  made	  so	  firmly.”81	  	  Israel	  was	  experiencing	  an	  economic	  crisis,	  and	  denial	  of	  the	  HLGs	  for	  about	  half	  a	  year	  had	  decreased	  the	  state’s	  ability	  to	  resettle	  immigrants	  and	  manage	  economic	  affairs.	   	   Unemployment	   was	   very	   high	   before	   the	   vote,	   and	   part	   of	   this	   can	   be	  attributed	  to	  the	  HLGs.	   	  Over	  a	  third	  of	  new	  immigrants	  were	  unable	  to	  find	  work,	  and	  Labor	  made	  gains	  among	  the	  poor,	  Sephardic,	  and	  Soviet	  immigrants.82	  	   Although	  Israel’s	  overall	  rate	  of	  unemployment	  was	  already	  11%,	  a	  Ministry	  of	   Finance	   report	   predicted	   levels	   as	   high	   as	   16.2%	   in	   four	   years	   if	   the	   U.S.	  continued	   to	  withhold	   the	   guarantees.83	   	   Thus,	   the	   Bush	   administration’s	   staunch	  position	   on	   loan	   guarantees	   also	   fostered	   an	   environment	   that	   played	   to	   Labor’s	  election	  platform,	  which	  argued	  that	  Likud’s	   focus	  on	  settlement	  construction	  was	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Smooha and Peretz, “Israel’s 1992 Knesset Elections,” 460-461. 
82 Shindler, Land Beyond Promise, 276-277; Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, 553. 
83 Shindler, Land Beyond Promise, 276; Smooha and Peretz, “Israel’s 1992 Knesset Elections.” 
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diverting	  much-­‐needed	  funds	  from	  socioeconomic	  causes	  within	  Israel	  proper.84	  American	   behavior	   helped	   boost	   Labor’s	  message	   by	   validating	   the	   party’s	  argument	   that	   rapid	   settlement	   construction	   would	   undermine	   the	   health	   of	   the	  Israeli	   economy	   as	   well	   as	   its	   foreign	   relations.	   Public	   support	   for	   a	   settlement	  freeze	   eventually	   reached	   as	   high	   as	   76%,85	   and	   the	   Likud’s	   settlement	   policy	  became	  “the	  major	  wedge	  issues	  of	  the	  1992	  elections”.86	  This	  narrow	   success	   influencing	   the	  outcome	  of	   Israeli	   leadership	   selection	  also	  produce	  a	  broader	  diplomatic	  success	  by	  helping	  to	  promote	  the	  peace	  process.	  	  Rabin	   had	  made	   a	   campaign	   pledge	   to	   reach	   an	   agreement	   with	   the	   Palestinians	  within	   a	   year,	   and,	   although	   slightly	   behind	   schedule,	   he	   soon	   took	   this	   historic	  plunge	  via	  the	  Oslo	  Accords	  and	  mutual	  recognition	  with	  the	  PLO.	  One	   possible	   down	   side	   of	   the	   American	   effort	  was	   that	   Shamir	  may	   have	  engaged	  in	  an	  act	  of	  score-­‐settling	  after	  he	  had	  already	  been	  removed	  from	  office.	  	  In	  October	   of	   1992,	   just	   before	   the	   American	   vote,	   an	   Israeli	   source	   gave	   the	  “Nightline”	  at	  ABC	  News	  a	  copy	  of	  a	  1987	  memo	  to	  Shamir	  from	  a	  deceased	  advisor,	  outlining	   that	   Bush	   knew	  more	   about	   the	   Iran-­‐Contra	   scandal	   as	   it	   was	   going	   on	  than	  he	  had	  admitted	  to	  date.	  	  The	  article	  stirred	  up	  some	  controversy	  that	  dogged	  Bush	  in	  the	  lead-­‐up	  to	  the	  1992	  presidential	  ballot	  in	  the	  United	  States.87	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Coding	  the	  Observable	  Implications	  
1.	  Perceptions	  of	  Sender	  Interests:	  	   One	   area	   in	   which	   the	   theories	   offer	   divergent	   predictions	   involves	   the	  predicted	   effect	   of	   perceptions	   of	   sender	   interests	   on	   the	   likelihood	   of	   LSI	  occurrence.	   	   Theory	   #1	   (national	   interests	   theory)	   expects	   that	   LSI	   occurrence	  should	   correlate	   closely	  with	   objective	   national	   interests	   abroad.	   	   Theory	  #2	   (the	  lobby-­‐legislative	  approach)	  anticipates	   that	  LSI	   toward	   Israel	   should	  be	  quite	   rare	  because	  pro-­‐Israel	  lobbyists	  and	  members	  of	  Congress	  tend	  to	  perceive	  meddling	  in	  Israeli	  politics	  as	  behavior	  that	  is	  counterproductive	  for	  American	  interests.	  	  Theory	  #3	  (the	  bureaucratic	  politics	  approach)	  expects	  LSI	  toward	  Israel	  to	  be	  common	  due	  to	   the	   strong	   preference	   that	  working-­‐level	   officials	  who	   deal	  with	   Israeli	   politics	  tend	  to	  have	  for	  American	  intervention	  on	  behalf	  of	  pro-­‐peace	  moderates.	   	  Theory	  #4	   (leadership	   theory)	   anticipates	   that	   LSI	   occurrence	   should	   vary	   in	   accordance	  with	   the	   subjective	   beliefs	   of	   top	   American	   officials	   about	   how	   best	   to	   achieve	  American	  national	  interests.	  By	   1992,	   Shamir	   had	   lost	   all	   credibility	   with	   the	   U.S.	   government.	   	   The	  administration’s	  internal	  assessment	  was	  that,	  while	  they	  may	  have	  needed	  Shamir	  to	   get	   to	   Madrid,	   any	   further	   progress	   would	   be	   “impossible	   until	   the	   Shamir	  government	   was	   replaced”.	   	   DeFrank	   records	   Kurtzer	   explaining	   that	   “all	   of	   us	  believed	  needed	  Sh[amir]	  2	  get	  into	  process,	  but	  it	  would	  fail	  if	  Sh.	  remained	  in	  the	  government”.88	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   However,	   these	  were	  not	   only	   generalized	  beliefs	   about	   the	  process	   –	   they	  were	   also	   subjective	   assessments	   of	   Shamir’s	   character	   and	   intentions.	   	   A	   verbal	  misunderstanding	  early	   in	  his	  administration	  had	   led	  Bush	  to	  believe	  he	  had	  been	  double-­‐crossed	   by	   Shamir	   over	   what	   he	   thought	   was	   a	   face-­‐to-­‐face	   promise	   to	  constrain	   settlement	   construction.89	   	  The	  PM’s	  abandonment	  of	   even	   the	   so-­‐called	  Shamir	  Plan	  in	  1990	  shook	  Baker’s	  faith	  in	  the	  prime	  minister	  asl	  well.	  	  By	  this	  point	  in	   time,	   Bush	   had	   even	   taken	   to	   calling	   Shamir	   “that	   little	   shit”	   behind	   closed	  doors.90	   	   These	   factors	   point	   to	   the	   personalized	   nature	   of	   the	   administration’s	  animus	  against	  Shamir,	  a	  trademark	  of	  leadership	  theory	  over	  Theories	  1	  through	  3.	  	  2.	  Perceptions	  of	  Close	  Contests	  Theory	   #1	   (national	   interests	   theory)	   predicts	   that	   LSI	   occurrence	   should	  closely	  reflect	  objective	  political	  developments	   in	  the	  target	  state,	  whereas	  Theory	  #4	   (leadership	   theory)	   expects	   the	   subjective	   perceptions	   of	   top	   leaders	   in	   the	  sender	  state	  to	  be	  a	  major	  intervening	  variable	  in	  this	  relationship.	  	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  occurrence	   of	   LSI	   clearly	   could	   not	   have	   been	   possible	   without	   the	   January	   29th	  decision	  in	  Israel	  to	  call	  early	  elections.	  	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  an	  imminent	  opportunity	  for	   leadership	   selection,	   American	   policy	   had	   earlier	   been	   geared	   only	   toward	  changing	  the	  Israeli	  government’s	  behavior,	  not	  its	  membership.	  However,	   a	   more	   crucial	   turning	   point	   for	   American	   policy	   seems	   to	   have	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Policy Papers, Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton University Library. See also 
Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, 555. 
89 In reality, Shamir had said something to the effect of “don’t worry, it will not be a problem”. Ibid., 123; 
Miller, The Much Too Promised Land, 210; Brown, “Interview with Ambassador William Andreas 
Brown,” 272. 
90 Miller, The Much Too Promised Land, 210. 
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been	  February	  19th,	  when	  Yitzhak	  Rabin	  beat	  out	  Shimon	  Peres	  for	  leadership	  of	  the	  Labor	   Party.91	   	   At	   least	   two	   of	   the	   internal	   memos	   cited	   above	   for	   implying	   LSI	  followed	  just	  after	  this	  date:	  Ross’s	  memo	  on	  East	  Jerusalem	  on	  the	  21st	  and	  Baker’s	  talking	  points	  for	  meeting	  with	  Husseini	  on	  the	  20th.92	  Also,	   attached	   to	   the	   Ross	  memo	   is	   a	   cover	   letter	   entitled	   “game	   plan”,	   in	  which	  he	  advises	  Baker	  not	  on	  whether	  to	  shape	  the	  Israeli	  vote	  but	  on	  how	  to	  avoid	  eliciting	   nationalist	   backlash.	   	   Ross	   recommends	   low-­‐key	   public	   posturing	   on	   the	  HLGs	  so	  that	  “we	  not	  look	  like	  we’re	  playing	  pols	  or	  seeking	  to	  avoid	  a	  deal”	  lest	  U.S.	  efforts	  be	  “portrayed	  as	  a	  delib.	  effort	  to	  introduce	  new	  conditions	  to	  avoid	  a	  deal.	  	  more	  than	  anything	  else,	  you	  have	  got	  to	  look	  fair,	  not	  like	  someone	  seeking	  ways	  to	  change	  the	  goalposts”.	   	  Then,	  on	  the	  24th,	  Baker	  laid	  out	  the	  administration’s	  strict	  new	  standard	  for	  granting	  the	  $10	  billion:	  a	  comprehensive	  settlement	  freeze.93	  	  3.	  Patterns	  of	  Domestic	  Debate:	  Theory	  #2	  (the	  lobby-­‐legislative	  approach)	  and	  Theory	  #3	  (the	  bureaucratic	  approach)	   expect	   that	   members	   of	   Congress,	   the	   pro-­‐Israel	   lobby,	   and/or	   the	  bureaucracy	  should	  be	  informed	  and	  influential	  in	  advance	  of	  major	  decisions	  by	  the	  sender	  state	  about	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  pursue	  LSI.	   	  However,	  Theory	  #4	  (leadership	  theory)	  expects	  that	  top	  officials	  in	  the	  sender	  state	  should	  keep	  these	  other	  actors	  in	  the	  dark	  about	  their	  true	  intentions	  and	  pursue	  restrictive,	  unusual	  deliberative	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Leon T. Hadar, “The Last Days of Likud: The American-Israeli Big Chill,” Journal of Palestine Studies 
21, no. 4 (Summer 1992): 82; Morton M. Kondracke, “New Bush Strategy Tries to Win Both U.S., Israel 
Elections,” Roll Call, April 20, 1992. 
92 Baker, “Points for Husseini”; Ross, “Public Position on Israeli Loan Guarantees.” 
93 Thomas L. Friedman, “U.S. details terms Israel must meet for deal on loans,” New York Times, February 
25, 1992. 
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procedures	  to	  reduce	  the	  risk	  of	  leaks.	  Because	   meddling	   is	   such	   risky	   behavior,	   prospective	   co-­‐conspirators	   face	  strong	  incentives	  not	  to	  put	  plans	  on	  paper	  or	  to	  share	  ideas	  too	  widely	  within	  the	  government.	   	   This	   notion	   helps	   us	  make	   sense	   of	   Ambassador	   Kurtzer’s	   remarks	  that	   he	   never	   saw	   written	   evidence	   yet	   remains	   convinced	   that	   Bush	   and	   Baker	  reached	  an	  understanding	  to	  impede	  Shamir’s	  election	  campaign	  by	  withholding	  the	  loan	   guarantees.94	   	   Riedel	   believes	   that	   there	   “probably…	   was	   no	   memo”	   and,	   if	  there	  was,	  it	  certainly	  would	  have	  been	  “with	  very	  limited	  distribution”.95	  	  4.	  Cycles	  of	  Domestic	  Power:	  	   Theory	   #2	   (the	   lobby-­‐legislative	   approach)	   predicts	   that	   periods	   in	   the	  sender	   state	   of	   	   either	   divided	   government	   or	   in	   the	   lead-­‐up	   to	   elections	   should	  make	  for	  especially	  predominant	  influence	  wielded	  by	  pro-­‐Israel	  lobby	  groups	  and	  members	   of	   Congress.	   	   Theory	  #3	   (the	   bureaucratic	   politics	   approach)	   holds	   that	  during	   periods	   at	   the	   start	   of	   presidential	   administrations	   –	  which	   clearly	   do	   not	  apply	  here	  –	  rates	  of	  LSI	  should	  go	  up.	  	  Theory	  #4	  (leadership	  theory)	  expects	  that	  the	   political	   calendar	   in	   the	   sender	   state	   should	   usually	   not	   affect	   rates	   of	   LSI	   in	  these	  particular	  directions.	  The	  1992	  case	  provides	  a	  remarkably	  strong	  test	  for	  leadership	  theory	  over	  lobby-­‐legislative	  approaches.	   	  Not	  only	  is	  Congress	  expected	  to	  be	  more	  influential	  during	  election	  years,	  but	  1992	  was	  a	  presidential	  election	  year,	  and	  Bush	  himself	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 This is something I am also finding in less disputed cases of LSI, such as Bill Clinton’s 1996 effort to get 
Peres elected. Interview with a senior State Department official from the 1996 period. 
95 Riedel, “Interview with the Author.” 
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was	  up	  for	  reelection.	  	  If	  Theory	  #2	  provides	  the	  best	  explanation	  for	  the	  dynamics	  of	   LSI,	   then	   the	   1992	   case	   should	   be	   a	   trivially	   easy	   hoop	   for	   the	   theory	   to	   jump	  through	  –	  what	  Van	  Evera	  calls	  a	  “hoop	  test”.96	  	  And	  yet	  it	  fails.	  	   Presidential	   involvement	  was	  a	  prominent	   feature	  of	   this	  episode.	   	  As	  early	  as	  summer	  of	  1991,	  the	  memo	  from	  policy	  planning	  that	  first	  pushed	  for	  a	  strategy	  of	   linking	  HLGs	  with	  a	  settlement	   freeze	  said	   that	   success	  would	  depend	  on	   “total	  Presidential	  involvement”	  in	  what	  promised	  to	  be	  “an	  ‘AWACS	  plus’	  fight…	  frankly,	  we’d	  also	  need	  to	  know	  the	  president	  was	  prepared	  to	  go	  all	  out	  before	  pushing	  this.	  (That	  means	  he	  sticks	  with	  it,	  even	  knowing	  some	  of	  his	  friends	  on	  the	  Hill	  will	  come	  to	  him	  at	  the	  first	  sign	  of	  a	  fight	  saying	  they	  can’t	  afford	  this	  and	  we	  can’t	  win	  it)”.97	  	   Starting	   in	   September,	   the	   president	   became	   personally	   involved,	   both	  through	  public	  statements	  and	  in	  consultations	  with	  Congress.	  	  Bush	  and	  Baker	  also	  met	  in	  private	  with	  Jewish	  and	  pro-­‐Israel	  leaders,	  urging	  them	  to	  consider	  the	  delay.	  	  	  When	  that	  did	  not	  yield	  their	  support,	  President	  Bush	  went	  public	  and	  fought	  hard.	  Bush	  proclaimed	  “I	  don’t	  care	  if	  I	  get	  one	  vote,	  I’m	  going	  to	  stand	  for	  what	  I	  believe	  here.	  	  And	  I	  believe	  the	  American	  people	  will	  be	  with	  me”.	  	  He	  argued	  that,	  so	  soon	   after	   “American	   men	   and	   women	   in	   uniform	   risked	   their	   lives	   to	   defend	  Israelis	  in	  the	  face	  of	  Iraqi	  scud	  missiles,”	  it	  was	  necessary	  to	  be	  more	  understanding	  of	  the	  administration’s	  efforts	  and	  grant	  the	  120-­‐day	  delay.	   	  He	  complained	  that	  “I	  heard	   that	   there	  was	   something	   like	  a	   thousand	   lobbyists	  on	   the	  Hill	  working	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 Stephen Van_Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Cornell University Press, 1997), 
120-123. 
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other	  side	  of	  the	  question.	  	  We’ve	  only	  got	  one	  lonely	  guy	  down	  here	  doing	  it”.98	  	  	   Just	  as	  Ross’s	  	  July	  1991	  memo	  called	  for	  “total	  presidential	  commitment,”	  a	  memo	   to	  Baker	   in	   the	   last	  week	  of	   that	  August	   from	  State	  Department	  Legislative	  Liaison	  Janet	  Mullin	  explained	  that	  linkage	  would	  require	  the	  administration	  to	  fire	  a	  shot	  across	  Congress’s	  bow:	  	  “If	  we	  convince	  the	  leadership	  privately	  that	  we	  intend	  to	  play	  hardball	  and	  take	  our	  case	  to	  the	  American	  people,	  they	  could	  then	  prevail	  upon	  their	  colleagues	  to	  defer…	  	  the	   first	   step	   is	   to	  make	   sure	   the	   leadership	  understands	   that	  proceeding	  now	  on	  loan	   guarantees	  will	   doom	   the	   peace	   process…	   further,	  we	  would	   emphasize	   that	  the	  responsibility	  for	  that	  would	  fall	  directly	  on	  the	  Congress.	  	  That	  should	  get	  their	  attention”.99	  	  The	   next	   week,	   the	   president	   met	   with	   Sen.	   Patrick	   Leahy	   of	   the	   Appropriations	  Committee	  to	  discuss	  the	  issue.	  	  His	  declassified	  talking	  points	  read	  as	  follows:	  	   “Approach	   if	  deferral	  blocked:	  Don’t	  want	  a	   fight.	   	  But	   if	  you	  don’t	  defer	   the	   issue,	  there’ll	  be	  one.	  	  You’ll	  leave	  us	  no	  choice.	  	  And	  have	  no	  illusions	  about	  what	  the	  fight	  will	  be	  like…	  we’ll	  state	  bluntly	  that	  rush	  to	  action	  puts	  peace	  process	  directly	  and	  unnecessarily	   at	   risk…	   We’ll	   point	   out	   who	   bears	   responsibility…	   we’ll	   make	  proponents	   of	   premature	   action	   explain	   to	   American	   people	  why	  we	   should	   rush	  ahead	  on	  $10	  billion	  program	  -­‐-­‐	  biggest	  ever	  to	  single	  country	  -­‐-­‐	  at	  time	  when	  we’re	  holding	  off	  on	  unemployment,	  insurance,	  dairy	  price	  supports,	  etc.”100	  	  When	   the	   issue	   came	   up	   again	   in	   the	   context	   of	   Israeli	   elections,	   it	  was	   a	   similar	  meeting	  between	  Bush,	  Leahy,	  and	  Leahy’s	  Republican	  counterpart	  Bob	  Kasten	  that	  ended	   the	   effort.	   	   Leahy	   concluded	   after	   this	   second	  meeting	   with	   Bush	   that	   the	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Princeton University Library. 
100 James A. Baker, “Presentation to Leahy on Absorption Aid: Outline for President”, September 3, 1991, 
Box 193 / Folder 3 /Chpt 29 – Baker Files, 1994, James A. Baker III Papers, Public Policy Papers, 
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Israeli	  request	  was	  “dead”	  and	  described	  himself	  as	  “very,	  very	  discouraged”.101	  Once	  Rabin	  was	  elected,	  Bush	  did	  rush	  to	  heal	   the	  relations	  with	  Israel	  and	  its	   American	   supporters	   just	   before	   the	   November	   U.S.	   vote.	   	   Rabin	   and	   his	   wife	  were	  invited	  to	  join	  the	  Bushes	  at	  their	  family	  retreat	  in	  Kennebunkport,	  Maine,	  for	  a	  symbolic	  vacation	  summit.102	  	  After	  speedy	  talks	  to	  sort	  out	  details,	  President	  Bush	  announced	  with	  delight	   that	   they	  had	  reached	  agreement	  on	  extension	  of	   the	   loan	  guarantees	  and	  sharp	  curtailment	  of	   Israeli	   settlement	  activity.	   	  Reportedly,	  Rabin	  tried	   scaling	   back	   his	   demands	   at	   Kennebunkport	   to	   $2	   billion	   as	   a	   tactical	  concession	  but	  was	  urged	  by	  a	  jovial	  Baker	  to	  take	  all	  $10	  billion	  instead.	  	  	   Despite	   clear	   awareness	   within	   the	   administration	   that	   withholding	   loan	  guarantees	  would	  elicit	  a	  fight	  with	  Congress	  and	  AIPAC,	  Bush	  and	  Baker	  persisted,	  even	  as	  the	  dispute	  spilled	  into	  a	  presidential	  election	  year.	  	  Certainly,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	   a	   less	   determined	   president	   might	   have	   acted	   differently	   under	   similar	  circumstances.	  	  However,	  it	  is	  striking	  that	  even	  the	  anticipation	  of	  an	  “‘AWACS	  plus’	  fight”	  may	  not	  be	  enough	  to	  deter	  or	  cut	  short	  LSI	  when	  the	  president	  and	  secretary	  of	  state	  are	  themselves	  onboard	  with	  such	  an	  initiative.	  	   Nor	   is	   this	   phenomenon	   something	   unique	   to	   George	   H.	   W.	   Bush.	   	   When	  President	  Clinton	  faced	  reelection	  in	  1996,	  he	  engaged	  in	  not	  one	  but	  two	  dramatic	  and	  domestically	   risky	   efforts	   at	   leadership	   selection	   intervention	   to	  bolster	   close	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 Thomas L. Friedman, “Bush rejects Israel loan guarantees,” New York Times, March 18, 1992. 
102 See James A. Baker, “Proposed Agenda for Meeting with the President”, June 24, 1992, Box 115 / 
Folder 9 / White House Meeting Agendas, 1992, James A. Baker III Papers, Public Policy Papers, 
Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton University Library. Rabin “wants to be seen 
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partners	  facing	  tight	  races	  in	  both	  Israel	  and	  Russia.103	  	  5.	  Bureaucratic	  Freelancing:	  	   The	  bureaucratic	  politics	  approach	  (Theory	  #3)	  expects	  unauthorized	  LSI	  by	  working-­‐level	   officials	   to	   be	   relatively	   frequent.	   	   However,	   Theory	   #4	   (leadership	  theory)	   expects	   such	   freelancing	   to	   be	   rare	   and	   constrained	   to	   periods	   in	   which	  executive	  oversight	  is	  lax.	  No	  unauthorized	  behavior	  took	  place	  in	  this	  case.	  	  Ross	  explored	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  softened	  compromise	  with	  Israel’s	  ambassador,	  Zalman	  Shoval.	   	  However,	  this	  was	  not	   intended	   to	   undermine	   the	   administration’s	   efforts	   at	   LSI	   or	   to	   carry	   out	   LSI	  without	  formal	  approval.	  	  Regardless,	  Baker	  simply	  overruled	  him.104	  	  As	  discussed	  extensively	   above,	   the	   1992	   effort	   came	   from	   the	   top	   down.	   	   It	   may	   have	   been	  recommended	  or	  implemented	  by	  officials	  at	  State	  or	  the	  NSC,	  but	  the	  policy	  that	  the	  U.S.	  pursued	  bore	  the	  president’s	  imprimatur	  and	  his	  active	  participation.	  This	   outcome	   supports	   leadership	   theory	   in	   two	  ways.	   	   First,	   the	   fact	   that	  presidential	   authority	  was	   untrammeled	   supports	   the	   theoretical	   perspective	   that	  emphasizes	  the	  power	  and	  prerogatives	  of	  the	  chief	  executive.	  	  Second,	  the	  fact	  that	  freelancing	  was	  so	  much	  less	  frequent	  under	  Bush	  than	  his	  immediate	  predecessor,	  Reagan,	   suggests	   that	   presidential	   styles	   of	   management	   matter.	   	   Bush’s	   firm	  oversight	  and	  activist	  policy	  position	  each	   reduced	   the	  amount	  of	   freelancing	   that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 Also, Netanyahu’s efforts to collude with a Republican-controlled Congress against the Clinton White 
House may have reinforced the president’s aggravation and his desire to push Netanyahu out. See Martin 
Indyk, Innocent Abroad: An Intimate Account of American Peace Diplomacy in the Middle East (Simon 
and Schuster, 2009), 179. 
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took	  place	  during	  his	  administration,	  and	  1992	  is	  a	  perfect	  example	  of	  this	  pattern.	  	  6.	  Consistency	  of	  Message:	  The	   theories	   offer	   divergent	   predictions	   with	   regard	   to	   whether	   or	   not	  officials	  in	  the	  sender	  state	  should	  be	  capable	  of	  crafting	  a	  message	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  politics	  in	   the	   target	   that	   is	   internally	  consistent	  and	   therefore	  more	  effective.	   	  Theory	  #1	  (national	  interests	  theory)	  expects	  this	  task	  to	  be	  relatively	  unproblematic,	  since	  it	  does	   not	   anticipate	   domestic	   disagreements	   cropping	   up	  within	   the	   sender	   state.	  	  The	  other	   theories,	  however,	  emphasize	  particular	  personal	  or	   institutional	  biases	  that	  they	  believe	  should	  be	  likely	  to	  make	  this	  a	  more	  problematic	  task.	  In	   this	  case,	   the	   top	  administration	  officials	  were	  unified	   in	   their	  objectives	  and	  coordinated	  well	  amongst	  themselves.105	  	  Meanwhile,	  members	  of	  Congress	  and	  the	  pro-­‐Israel	  lobby	  put	  up	  vocal	  resistance	  against	  the	  administration’s	  decision	  to	  link	  loan	  guarantees	  with	  settlement	  activity.	   	  However,	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  American	  message	   still	   came	   through	   clearly	   and	   credibly	   to	   the	   Israeli	   public	   provides	  support	  for	  leadership	  theory	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  the	  lobby-­‐legislative	  approach.	  	  	  7.	  Suitability	  of	  Message:	  	   Finally,	   the	   theories	   offer	   divergent	   predictions	  with	   regard	   to	  whether	   or	  not	  the	  core	  message	  conveyed	  by	  officials	  in	  the	  sender	  state	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  suitable	  to	   the	   needs	   of	   its	   favored	   faction	   within	   the	   target	   state	   (and	   therefore	   more	  effective).	   	  Theory	  #1	   (national	   interests	   theory)	   expects	   this	   task	   to	  be	   relatively	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 For instance, compare 1992 with 1990, when Baker called Bush to tease him about upsetting their 
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unproblematic,	   but	   the	   other	   theories	   emphasize	   personal	   biases	   (Theory	   #4)	   or	  institutional	  biases	  (Theories	  2	  and	  3)	  that	  make	  this	  task	  more	  difficult	  to	  achieve.	  Some	  Israelis	  I	  have	  encountered	  during	  my	  field	  work	  have	  suggested	  that	  negative	  LSI	  by	  President	  Barack	  Obama	  today	  would	  stand	  little	  chance	  of	  success	  because	  he	  is	  so	  much	  less	  popular	  among	  Israeli	  voters	  than	  President	  Clinton	  was.	  	  However,	  the	  1992	  Bush	  case	  provides	  a	  useful	  counterexample	  in	  this	  regard.	  	  Bush	  was	  no	  darling	  of	  the	  Israeli	  public,	  and	  by	  the	  end	  of	  his	  term	  he	  was	  even	  accused	  by	  some	  of	  being	  anti-­‐Semitic.	  	  Yet	  he	  was	  still	  able	  to	  make	  a	  credible	  argument	  that	  the	  massive	   expansion	   of	   settlement	   construction	   between	   1990	   and	   1992	  was	   a	  threat	  to	  U.S.	  national	  interests	  that	  would	  not	  be	  tolerated	  indefinitely.	  Second,	   his	   message	   was	   well-­‐suited	   to	   reinforcing	   the	   Labor	   Party’s	  platform	   that	   rapid	   settlement	   construction	  would	   cause	   serious	   harm	   to	   Israel’s	  economic	  and	  diplomatic	  well-­‐being.	   	  The	  dearth	  of	  affection	  for	  Bush	  in	  Israel	  did	  not	  keep	  his	  actions	  from	  validating	  Labor’s	  depiction	  of	  Israeli	  national	  interests.	  Finally,	  Bush	  did	  a	  better	  job	  of	  holding	  his	  tongue	  in	  1992	  relative	  to	  his	  ill-­‐timed	  comment	  about	  East	  Jerusalem	  in	  1990.	   	  Although	  his	  remarks	  attacking	  the	  pro-­‐Israel	   lobby	   in	   September	   of	   1991	   left	   a	   legacy	   of	   mistrust	   in	   the	   Jewish	  community,	  persuading	  many	  that	  he	  was	  accusing	  them	  of	  dual	  loyalties,	  he	  made	  a	  number	  of	  goodwill	  gestures	  to	  at	  least	  soften	  this	  perception	  and	  kept	  on	  message	  throughout	  early	  1992	  until	  the	  Israeli	  vote	  in	  June.	  	   In	   all	   three	   regards,	   the	   American	   effort	   to	   conduct	   LSI	   was	   made	   more	  effective	   because	   President	   Bush	   projected	   and	   sustained	   a	   message	   that	   was	  suitable	   to	   the	   context	   of	   Israeli	   domestic	   politics	   at	   the	   time.	   	   This	   provides	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additional	  support	  for	  Theory	  #4.	  	  
Conclusion	  
	   President	  George	  H.	  W.	  Bush	  differed	  from	  his	  predecessor	  by	  viewing	  Israel	  in	   terms	   of	   its	   flexibility	   on	   the	   peace	   process	   –	   and	   settlement	   construction	   in	  particular.	   	   He	   displayed	   a	   much	   more	   active	   style	   of	   management,	   delegating	  specific	   roles	   to	   his	   secretary	   of	   state	   but	   assuming	   control	   when	   it	   suited	   his	  geostrategic	  objectives.	  	  Both	  he	  and	  Baker	  were	  doggedly	  tenacious	  and	  willing	  to	  withstand	  a	  fight	  with	  the	  Likud	  if	  they	  felt	  it	  could	  advance	  American	  interests.	  	   As	  a	  result,	  we	  see	  LSI	  occur	  at	  a	  much	  higher	  rate	  during	  Bush’s	  presidency,	  while	   instances	   of	   bureaucratic	   freelancing	   decline	   in	   comparison.	   	   This	   period	  entailed	  greater	  breakthroughs	  on	  the	  Middle	  East	  peace	  process	  as	  a	  whole,	  and	  –	  had	  the	  unpredictable	  dictates	  of	  coalition	  wrangling	   in	  1990	  gone	   just	  a	  bit	  more	  favorably	   for	   Peres	   –	   it	   also	   might	   have	   been	   characterized	   by	   consistent	   U.S.	  successes	  at	  leadership	  selection	  intervention	  in	  Israeli	  politics	  over	  the	  years.	  	   By	  helping	  the	  parties	  get	  to	  Madrid	  –	  and	  helping	  to	   install	   the	  first	   Israeli	  government	  without	  the	  Likud	  in	  the	  last	  fifteen	  years	  –	  the	  Bush	  administration	  set	  the	   stage	   for	   the	   breakthrough	   at	   Oslo	   that	   would	   soon	   follow.	   	   His	   successor,	  President	   Clinton,	   therefore	   arrived	   upon	   the	   scene	   in	   a	   very	   different	   regional	  context.	  	  Throughout	  the	  1990s,	  President	  Clinton	  worked	  to	  keep	  an	  active	  process	  alive	  rather	  than	  trying	  to	  start	  something	  from	  scratch.	  	  He	  also	  faced	  a	  context	  in	  which	   he	   would	   be	   forced	   to	   balance	   decision-­‐making	   toward	   internal	   Israeli	  politics	  with	  a	  newfound	  concern	  for	  the	  well-­‐being	  of	  the	  PLO	  leadership	  that	  had	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participated	  in	  Oslo.	  	  Although	  this	  is	  not	  to	  suggest	  that	  he	  necessarily	  granted	  the	  two	  sides	  equal	  consideration,	   it	  does	  mean	  that	  LSI	  became	  even	  more	  central	   to	  understanding	  American	  deliberation	  toward	  the	  Middle	  East	  peace	  process.	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Chapter	  VI.	  
~	  
The	  Clinton	  Years	  
(1993-­2001)	  	  
William	   Jefferson	   Clinton	   came	   to	   office	   with	   little	   experience	   in	   foreign	  policy.	   	   On	   the	   campaign	   trail,	   he	   highlighted	   the	   preeminence	   of	   domestic	   over	  international	  problems	  and	  attacked	  George	  Bush	  for	  being	  too	  aggressively	  caught	  up	  with	   Israel.1	   	   Yet	   in	   time,	   Clinton’s	   government	  meddled	   in	   Israeli	   politics	   far	  more	  extensively	  than	  even	  Bush	  41	  had	  done.	  No	   doubt,	   objective	   international	   circumstances	   piqued	   this	   interest,	  including	  Bush	  and	  Baker’s	  achievement	  at	  Madrid	  and	  the	  secret	  Oslo	  deal	  worked	  out	  under	  Norwegian	  auspices	  early	  in	  his	  presidency.	   	  But	  America’s	   involvement	  in	  the	  process	  under	  Clinton	  was	  also	  driven	  by	  his	  personal	  convictions.	  	  Although	  his	   presidency	  has	   been	   criticized	   for	   not	   paying	   enough	   attention	   to	   the	   issue	   in	  between	  moments	   of	   crisis,	   the	   administration’s	   characteristic	   inclination	   toward	  high-­‐stakes	   summitry	   reflected	   the	   president’s	   willingness	   to	   invest	   his	   personal	  prestige	  in	  hopes	  of	  clinching	  Arab-­‐Israeli	  peace.2	  	   The	  president’s	  personal	  attention	  to	  the	  peace	  process	  was	  especially	  acute	  in	  the	  area	  of	  leadership	  selection	  intervention	  (LSI).	  	  First	  of	  all,	  this	  was	  due	  to	  the	  decision-­‐making	  structure	  of	  his	  administration	  on	  foreign	  policy	   issues	   in	  general	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Leon T. Hadar, “The Last Days of Likud: The American-Israeli Big Chill,” Journal of Palestine Studies 
21, no. 4 (Summer 1992): 89–91. 
2 His administration has also been criticized for investing presidential prestige too much.  For this 
argument, see Aaron David Miller, The Much Too Promised Land: America’s Elusive Search for Arab-
Israeli Peace (Bantam Books, 2008). 
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and	   on	  Mideast	   peace	   issues	   in	   particular.	   	   President	   Clinton	   was	   served	   by	   two	  secretaries	  of	  state	  who	  were	  remarkably	  detached	   from	  this	   issue.	   	  True,	  Warren	  Christopher	  made	  numerous	  visits	  to	  Damascus,	  and	  Madeline	  Albright	  managed	  a	  few	  days	  of	  the	  Camp	  David	  2000	  summit	  while	  President	  Clinton	  left	  to	  attend	  the	  G-­‐8.	  	  But	  neither	  secretary	  exerted	  predominant	  influence	  over	  the	  issue	  in	  the	  way	  that	  their	  predecessors	  Shultz	  or	  Baker	  did.	  	  Instead,	  they	  were	  cut	  out	  of	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  management	   of	   the	   process	   by	   a	   strong	   envoy,	   Ambassador	   Dennis	   Ross.	   	   And	  although	  Ross	  and	  some	  of	  the	  president’s	  other	  aides,	  including	  Martin	  Indyk,	  were	  at	  times	  involved	  in	  episodes	  of	  leadership	  selection	  intervention,	  the	  main	  impetus	  came	  from	  an	  especially	  motivated	  president.	  Clinton	  felt	  unusually	  close	  bonds	  with	  his	  counterparts	  from	  Israel’s	  Labor	  Party	  (Rabin,	  Peres,	  and	  Barak)	  as	  well	  as	  genuine	  animosity	  toward	  his	  counterpart	  from	  the	  Likud	  (Netanyahu).	  	  Often,	  it	  was	  not	  just	  his	  political	  agenda	  that	  was	  tied	  up	  in	  their	  success,	  but	  his	  emotional	  sympathies	  as	  well.	  	  He	  was	  a	  “political	  junkie,”	  following	  even	  obscure	  details	  of	  his	  allies’	  political	  contests	  abroad.3	  	  This	  tendency	  combined	  with	   the	  high-­‐stakes	  nature	  of	   the	  peace	  process	  during	   the	  Oslo	  era	   to	  yield	  a	  level	  of	  intervention	  during	  the	  1990s	  that	  was	  historically	  unprecedented.	  In	   short,	   the	  Clinton	  administration	  was	   the	  high-­‐water	  mark	   for	  American	  intervention	   in	   Israeli	   politics.	   	   Prolific	   political	   analyst	   Barry	   Rubin	   argues	   that	  American	  behavior	  during	   the	  1990s	  did	  not	   involve	  meddling	  because	   “the	   same	  things	   would	   have	   been	   done	   even	   if	   there	   had	   been	   no	   election	   in	   Israel	   at	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Amb. Martin S. Indyk, “Interview with the Author”, April 10, 2011. 
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time”.4	  	  He	  is	  flat-­‐out	  wrong.	  Of	   course,	   this	   high	   level	   of	  meddling	   cannot	   be	   sustained	   indefinitely.	   	   At	  some	  points	  during	  Clinton’s	  two	  terms,	  his	  government	  avoided	  political	  meddling	  in	  Israeli	  affairs.	  	  Until	  the	  Oslo	  Accords,	  he	  generally	  avoided	  political	  interference	  of	   this	   sort.	   	   Also,	   during	   the	   first	   two	   years	   of	   Netanyahu’s	   premiership,	  Washington’s	  focus	  was	  on	  trying	  to	  work	  with	  him	  rather	  than	  against	  him.	  At	   other	   times,	   American	   intervention	   was	   sporadic	   and	   not	   sustained.5	  	  During	   these	   periods,	   Washington	   acted	   on	   a	   general	   preference	   for	   the	   Labor	  Party’s	   success	  but	  did	  not	  prioritize	   this	   goal	   as	   a	   sustained	  objective.	   	  Examples	  include	  episodic	  but	  very	  conscious	  efforts	  to	  bolster	  Rabin	  between	  the	  Oslo	  I	  and	  Oslo	   II	   agreements;	  efforts	   to	   force	  Netanyahu	   to	  either	   implement	   the	  Wye	  River	  Memorandum	   or	   step	   aside;	   and	   efforts	   to	   keep	   Barak’s	   coalition	   together	   even	  before	  his	  failed	  summit	  at	  Camp	  David.	  Finally,	   the	   Clinton	   administration	   at	   times	   engaged	   in	   all-­‐out	   political	  warfare	  in	  Israel,	  undertaking	  dramatic	  and	  sustained	  efforts	  to	  skew	  the	  outcome	  of	   Israeli	  elections	   in	  1996,	  1999,	  and	  2001.	   	   In	   these	  cases,	   I	  document	  American	  intentions,	  describe	  a	  much	  broader	  campaign	  than	  previously	  has	  been	  recognized,	  and	  highlight	  attempts	  by	  third	  parties	  to	  also	  influence	  Israeli	  political	  contests.	  	  
Clinton,	  Case	  #1:	  Rabin,	  the	  father	  figure	  (1993-­‐1995)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Barry Rubin, “External Factors in Israel’s 1999 Elections,” in Israel at the Polls, 1999, ed. Daniel Judah 
Elazar and M. Benjamin Mollov (Frank Cass, 2001), 199. 
5 These efforts fall somewhere on the typological spectrum between partial and full LSI.  Indeed, I most 
confess that my own conceptual framework seems to fall a bit short here. 
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   Owing	  to	  the	  circumstances	  of	  the	  1992	  U.S.	  presidential	  campaign,	  President	  Clinton’s	   relationship	  with	   Yitzhak	  Rabin	   got	   off	   to	   a	   poor	   start.	   	   After	   a	   bruising	  fight	  with	   Shamir,	   Bush	  was	   eager	   to	   curry	   favor	  with	   the	   Israeli	   prime	  minister,	  inviting	  Yitzhak	  Rabin	  and	  his	  wife	  Leah	  to	  a	   family	  retreat	  at	  Kennebunkport	  and	  announcing	  swift	  agreement	  on	  how	  to	   issue	   Israel	   loan	  guarantees.	   	  Whereas	   the	  Republican	  team	  offered	  Rabin	  loan	  guarantees,	  proven	  experience	  in	  promoting	  the	  peace	  process,	  and	  had	  done	  a	  good	  deal	  to	  help	  get	  Rabin	  elected,	  the	  Clinton	  team	  struck	  Rabin	  as	  inexperienced	  and	  overly	  idealistic.6	  	   But	   once	   Clinton	   was	   situated	   in	   the	   White	   House,	   their	   consequent	  interactions	  went	  much	  better.	   	  Clinton	  expressed	  his	  desire	   for	   continuity	  on	   the	  peace	   process	   despite	   past	   criticisms	   of	   Bush’s	   approach.	   	   Furthermore,	   although	  Clinton’s	   predilection	   for	   approaching	   Israel	   with	   carrots	   rather	   than	   sticks	   may	  have	   been	   a	   liability	   in	   Rabin’s	   eyes	   when	   Shamir	   remained	   prime	   minister,	   the	  president’s	   “hug	   Israel”	  mentality	  eventually	  became	  an	  asset	   for	  Rabin.	   	  A	   strong	  personal	  relationship	  began	  to	  form,	  and	  in	  time	  numerous	  former	  Clinton	  advisors	  would	   suggest	   that	   their	   boss	   came	   to	   see	  Rabin	   as	   a	   father	   figure.7	   	   In	   time,	   this	  close	  personal	  relationship	  helped	  sustain	  efforts	  by	  the	  U.S.	  to	  bolster	  Rabin	  so	  he	  could	  pursue	  an	  unprecedented	  opportunity	  to	  make	  peace	  with	  the	  PLO.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Leon Hadar, “To Tell the Truth: Will Yitzhak Rabin Provide George Bush’s October (1992) Surprise?,” 
Washington Report on Middle East Affairs (September 1992): 11–12, 38; Samuel “Sandy” Berger, “PBS 
Frontline Interview on the Clinton Years,” interview by Chris Bury, November 2000. 
7 Bruce O. Riedel, “Interview with the Author”, April 9, 2011; Donald Harrison, “Clinton, Israelis Share 
Strong Affection, Former Aide Says,” San Diego Jewish Press-Heritage, December 18, 1998. 
	  	   345	  
Coding	  the	  Dependent	  Variables	  (Occurrence	  and	  Efficacy)	  Did	  LSI	  Occur?	  	   Eventually,	   yes.	   	   I	   cannot	   find	   evidence	   to	   suggest	   leadership	   selection	  intervention	  by	  the	  United	  States	  toward	  Israel	  during	  first	  nine-­‐plus	  months	  of	  Bill	  Clinton’s	  presidency	  –	  through	  at	  least	  the	  White	  House	  lawn	  signing	  ceremony	  for	  the	   Oslo	   Accords.	   	   Nor	   do	   I	   have	   reason	   to	   suspect	   otherwise,	   especially	   in	   the	  absence	  of	  an	  impending	  political	  contest	  within	  Israel.	  	  	  However,	   once	  Rabin	   tied	   the	   political	   fortunes	   of	   his	   coalition	   to	   the	  Oslo	  process	   and	   peace	   with	   the	   Palestinians,	   the	   American	   administration	   adjusted	  accordingly,	  taking	  occasional	  breaks	  from	  focusing	  on	  the	  process	  in	  order	  to	  also	  address	  the	  matter	  of	  Rabin’s	  politics	  at	  home.	  
<Phase	  One:	  Non-­LSI>	  	   At	   first,	   U.S.-­‐Israel	   relations	   and	   the	   Mideast	   peace	   process	   were	   stuck	   in	  slow	  motion.	  	  Clinton’s	  team	  came	  to	  office	  confronting	  a	  crisis	  in	  post-­‐Madrid	  peace	  talks,	  with	  Arab	  delegations	  boycotting	  over	  the	  controversial	  expulsion	  to	  Lebanon	  of	  415	  supporters	  of	  Hamas	  and	  Islamic	  Jihad	  without	  trial.8	   	  When	  talks	  resumed,	  American	   negotiators	   pitched	   bridging	   proposals	   at	   the	   working	   level	   but	   were	  unable	  to	  achieve	  substantive	  progress	  due	  to	  the	  sizable	  gaps	  between	  the	  Israeli	  and	  Palestinian	  teams.9	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 David Horovitz, ed., Shalom, Friend: The Life and Legacy of Yitzhak Rabin (Newmarket Press, 1996), 
142; Marvin C. Feuerwerger, “Israeli-American Relations in the Second Rabin Era,” in Israel Under Rabin, 
ed. Robert Owen Freedman (Westview Press, 1995), 12–13. 
9 Morton M. Kondracke, “Clinton Diplomats Score a Success in Mideast Talks,” Roll Call, February 8, 
1993; Helena Cobban, “Israel and the Palestinians: From Madrid to Oslo and Beyond,” in Israel Under 
Rabin, ed. Robert Owen Freedman (Westview Press, 1995), 95–101. 
	  	   346	  
Talks	  were	  further	  stymied	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  both	  Rabin	  and	  Arafat	  had	  shifted	  their	  attention	  toward	  cutting	  a	  deal	  at	  Oslo	  rather	  than	  through	  the	  Madrid	  process,	  a	   development	   largely	   missed	   by	   observers	   in	   Washington.	   	   Finally,	   the	   U.S.	  administration	  had	  decided	   to	   shift	  most	  of	   its	   focus	   to	   the	  Syrian	   track,	  believing	  that	   a	   deal	   with	   Damascus	   would	   be	   less	   complicated	   to	   negotiate,	   easier	   to	  implement,	  and	  put	  greater	  pressure	  on	  the	  PLO	  at	  a	  later	  date.10	  	   Some	  events	  did	  occur	  that	  did	  set	  the	  stage	  for	  American	  LSI	  at	  a	  later	  date.	  	  First	  of	  all,	  Clinton	  was	  quickly	  persuaded	  by	  his	  staff	  that	  the	  Mideast	  peace	  process	  was	   one	   area	   in	  which	  major	   progress	  was	   possible	   and	   could	   play	   a	   part	   in	   his	  broader	  presidential	   legacy.	   	   Second,	  Clinton	  began	  seeking	  out	   information	  about	  Israeli	   domestic	   politics.	   	   	   One	   of	   his	   main	   Mideast	   advisors	   at	   the	   time,	   Martin	  Indyk,	  observed	  from	  the	  NSC	  that	  Clinton	  was	  “a	  political	  junkie”	  when	  it	  came	  to	  his	  friend’s	  elections	  abroad	  and	  quickly	  started	  following	  Israeli	  domestic	  politics:	  	   “MI:	   I	  remember	  when	  I	  briefed	  him	  for	  his	   first	  meeting	  with	  Rabin	  [in	  August	  of	  1992].	  	  This	  was	  before	  he	  was	  elected,	  he	  was	  running	  as	  a	  candidate.	  	  He	  was	  very	  nervous	  about	  it	  and	  did	  not	  know	  a	  lot	  abut	  Israeli	  politics	  at	  that	  point…	  he	  didn’t	  know	  a	  lot.	  But	  it	  didn’t	  take	  him	  long.	  	  It’s	  not	  as	  if	  we	  sat	  down	  and	  briefed	  him	  on	  Israeli	  politics.	  	  He	  was	  picking	  it	  up	  from	  his	  friends.	  	  [And]	  reading.	  	  I	  mean,	  he	  was	  a	  voracious	  reader...	   I	   think	  he	  also	  got	   it	   from	  talking	   to	   Israeli	   leaders,	   right.	   	  He	  talked	  to	  Rabin	  about	  his	  political	  situation.	  DW:	  When?	  MI:	  When	  he	  came,	  the	  first	  meeting.	  	  Clinton	  discussed	  it	  with	  him,	  and	  Rabin	  was	  happy	  to	  share	  it	  with	  him	  because	  it	  was	  in	  Rabin’s	  interest	  that	  he	  would	  understand	  the	  difficulties	  he	  faced…	  DW:	   Now	   to	   what	   extent	   did	   we	   keep	   Rabin’s	   domestic	   situation,	   his	   domestic	  strength,	  his	  coalition	  stability	  in	  mind?	  MI:	  Totally.”11	  	   However,	  circumstances	  did	  not	  yet	  call	  for	  this	  concern	  to	  be	  tested	  or	  put	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Miller, The Much Too Promised Land, 252. 
11 Indyk, “Interview with the Author.” 
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into	  action.	  	  Further,	  Rabin’s	  electoral	  victory	  was	  quite	  recent,	  and	  there	  was	  little	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  his	  hold	  on	  power	  was	  going	  to	  be	  put	  to	  the	  test.	  	  Thus,	  at	  this	  time	  there	  was	  very	  little	  American	  interest	  expressed	  in	  pursuing	  LSI.	  
<Phase	  Two:	  LSI>	  
	   Once	   Rabin	   staked	   his	   political	   future	   on	   the	   Oslo	   Accords,	   the	   Clinton	  administration’s	  approach	  to	  Israeli	  politics	  shifted	  considerably.	  	  Rabin	  returned	  to	  the	   White	   House	   just	   two	   months	   after	   the	   Oslo	   signing	   ceremony	   to	   seek	   an	  American	   nod	   of	   approval	   in	   the	   face	   of	   lagging	   domestic	   support	   for	   his	   agenda.	  Rather	   than	   focusing	   on	   how	   to	  move	   the	   agreement	   forward,	   Rabin’s	   November	  visit	   focused	   instead	   on	   demonstrating	   to	   the	   Israeli	   public	   that	   its	   sacrifices	   for	  peace	  would	  yield	  substantive	  benefits	  for	  Israel	  in	  its	  relations	  with	  America.	  	   During	  the	  visit,	  President	  Clinton	  made	  a	  series	  of	  gestures	  that	  he	  said	  were	  designed	  to	  help	  Israel	  “defray	  the	  costs	  of	  peace”.12	   	  He	  reiterated	  past	  pledges	  to	  protect	   Israel’s	   $3	  billion	   in	   annual	   aid,	   despite	  of	   a	   tough	   fiscal	   environment	   and	  domestic	  pressures	  to	  decrease	  foreign	  aid	  since	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War.	   	  He	  also	  promised	  new	  measures	  to	  boost	  Israel’s	  qualitative	  military	  edge	  in	  the	  region.	  	  For	  instance,	   the	   announced	   the	   approval	   of	   technology	   transfer	   licenses	   for	  sophisticated	  supercomputers	  and	  other	  electronics	  with	  military	  applications	  that	  had	   previously	   been	   banned	   for	   export	   to	   Israel.	   	   He	   instructed	   the	   Defense	  Department	  to	  approve	  advanced	  F15-­‐E	  fighter	  planes	  described	  by	  the	  Washington	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Steve Holland, “Clinton Offers Incentives to Bolster Rabin,” Reuters News, November 12, 1993. For 
additional detail on U.S. pledges made during this visit, see “Clinton Promises Warplanes to Israel: U.S. 
Will Also Relax Rules for High-tech Exports,” San Francisco Chronicle, November 13, 1993. 
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Post	  as	  “the	  most	  sophisticated	  attack	  jets	  ever	  sold	  by	  the	  United	  States”.13	  	  Also,	  he	  pledged	  to	  persuade	  Congress	  to	   let	   Israel	  repurpose	  $250	  million	  of	  existing	   loan	  guarantees	   towards	   costs	   that	   the	   IDF	  would	   incur	   from	   redeploying	   out	   of	   Gaza	  City	  and	  Jericho	  under	  the	  Oslo	  Accords.	  	   Administration	   officials	  made	   anonymous	   statements	   to	   the	   press	   that	   LSI	  featured	  prominently	  in	  their	  intentions	  at	  the	  time.	  	  Thomas	  Friedman	  wrote	  in	  his	  New	   York	   Times	   column	   that	   these	   deliverables	   comprised	   a	   conscious	   “effort	   to	  bolster	   Rabin”	   that	   Clinton	   “hopes	  will	   both	   reinforce	   the	   Israeli	   leader’s	   political	  standing	   at	   home”	  while	   also	   facilitating	   possible	   steps	   toward	   Syria.	   	  He	   claimed	  that	  these	  assertions	  were	  based	  on	  private	  comments	  from	  U.S.	  officials:	  	  	   “the	   politics	   behind	   this	   package,	   say	   American	   officials,	   is	   this:	   Since	   Mr.	   Rabin	  signed	  the	  peace	  accord	  in	  September	  with	  Yasir	  Arafat,	  the	  PLO	  chairman,	  there	  has	  been	   a	   slight	   erosion	   in	   support	   for	   the	   treaty	   in	   Israel,	   as	   shown	   by	   the	   recent	  municipal	  elections	  in	  which	  Mr.	  Rabin’s	  Labor	  Party	  took	  a	  beating	  from	  the	  right-­‐wing	  Likud	  in	  both	  Jerusalem	  and	  Tel	  Aviv.	  	   “Administration	   officials	   say	   they	   want	   to	   do	   all	   they	   can	   to	   bolster	   Mr.	  Rabin’s	  standing,	  by	  showing	  the	  Israeli	  public	   that	   the	  Prime	  Minister	  can	  deliver	  on	  their	  security	  concerns.	   	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  they	  want	  to	  make	  the	  Israeli	   leader	  more	  comfortable	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  striking	  a	  deal	  with	  Syria.”14	  	  Boston	   Globe	   reporter	   Mary	   Curtius	   also	   cited	   administration	   officials	   stating	   on	  background	   that	   “the	  promises	  of	  assistance	  are	  meant	   to	  bolster	  Rabin’s	  political	  standing	   in	   Israel,	   where	   Palestinian	   attacks	   on	   Jewish	   settlers	   and	   soldiers	   have	  eroded	   public	   support	   for	   Israel’s	   accord	   with	   the	   PLO,	   administration	   officials	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Daniel Williams, “U.S. Offers to Sell Israel Upgraded Fighter Jets: Aspin and Rabin Discuss Terms for 
F-15s,” Washington Post, November 16, 1993. 
14 Thomas L. Friedman, “U.S. to Give Israel Incentives to Seek a Broader Peace,” New York Times, 
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said”.15	  	  The	  Globe’s	  editorial	  page	  described	  administration	  efforts	  that	  week	  as	  “a	  policy	  predicated	  on	  Clinton’s	  conviction	  that	  Washington	  must	  do	  everything	  it	  can	  to	  bolster	  support	  for	  Rabin’s	  government	  within	  Israel”.16	  	   Just	  over	  one	  year	  later,	  the	  administration	  again	  made	  overtures	  designed	  to	  help	  bolster	  Rabin	  back	  home	  in	  Israel.	  	  Two	  especially	  dramatic	  terrorist	  attacks	  in	  October	   1994	   and	   January	   1995	   did	   severe	   damage	   to	   the	   cause	   of	   peace	  within	  Israeli	  politics.17	  	  	  By	  early	  1995	  only	  37%	  of	  Israelis	  wished	  to	  continue	  peace	  talks,	  and	  Benjamin	  Netanyahu	  pulled	  ahead	  of	  Rabin	  for	  the	  first	  time	  in	  public	  polling.18	  	   In	  this	  difficult	  political	  climate,	  the	  White	  House	  again	  sought	  to	  strengthen	  Rabin.	  	  Washington	  Post	  reporter	  Daniel	  Williams	  cited	  anonymous	  U.S.	  officials	  that	  “the	  Clinton	  administration	   is	   trying	   to	  shore	  up	   the	  domestic	  political	   fortunes	  of	  Yitzhak	   Rabin,	   the	   battered	   Israeli	   prime	   minister”.	   	   Williams	   explained	   that	  “Washington	   regards	   Rabin	   as	   the	   best	   hope	   to	   reach	   final	   peace	   solutions…	   but	  over	   the	  past	   several	  months,	   guerilla	   and	   terror	   attacks	   inside	   Israel	  have	   raised	  Israeli	   popular	   doubts	   about	   peace	   talks	   as	   an	   avenue	   to	   security,	   severely	  weakening	  Rabin’s	  standing”.	  	  Thus,	  “in	  a	  move	  partly	  designed	  to	  close	  ranks	  with	  Rabin,	   President	   Clinton	   announced	   on	   Tuesday	   a	   freeze	   on	   any	   financial	  transactions	   by	   Middle	   Eastern	   groups	   and	   individuals	   suspected	   of	   supporting	  terrorism.	  	  In	  addition,	  the	  administration	  is	  tolerating	  Rabin’s	  desire	  to	  delay	  troop	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Mary Curtius, “Clinton Vows Aid, Weapons for Israel: Rabin, in DC, Encourages More U.S. Help in 
Peace Talks,” Boston Globe, November 13, 1993. 
16 “Editorial: Clinton’s Partner for Peace,” Boston Globe, November 13, 1993. 
17 Those attacks struck in central Tel Aviv at the prominent Dizengoff shopping center and then at a busy 
bus station nearby Netanya. The first attack killed twenty-two Israeli civilians; the second killed one 
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18 Dan Kurzman, Soldier of Peace: The Life of Yitzhak Rabin, 1922-1995 (HarperCollins, 1998), 478; Dan 
Leon, “Israeli Public Opinion Polls on the Peace Process,” Palestine-Israel Journal 2, no. 1 (1995). 
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withdrawal	   from	   the	   occupied	   West	   Bank	   and	   his	   plans	   to	   expand	   West	   Bank	  settlements,	  both	  in	  the	  name	  of	  security”.	  	  Meanwhile,	  Williams	  explained	  that	  the	  U.S.	  also	  sought	  to	  push	  Syria	  to	  restrain	  terrorist	  groups	  based	  out	  of	  Damascus	  to	  give	  Rabin	  increased	  room	  to	  maneuver.19	  	   He	   points	   out	   that	   the	   U.S.	   gestures	   against	   terror	   were	   largely	   symbolic,	  since	   most	   of	   the	   funding	   for	   Hamas	   came	   from	   sources	   like	   Iranian	   officials	   or	  private	   Saudi	   citizens.	   	   He	   explained	   that	   the	   gestures	  were	   consciously	   aimed	   at	  Rabin’s	  domestic	  position:	  	  	   “in	  the	  longer	  term,	  the	  administration	  worries	  Rabin	  will	  lose	  reelection	  in	  1996.	  	  A	  victory	  by	  the	  rightist	  Likud	  party,	  which	  strongly	  opposes	  the	  talks,	  could	  abort	  the	  peace	  process.	  	  Moreover,	  signs	  of	  Rabin’s	  weakness	  could	  deter	  Assad	  from	  further	  talks…	   ‘[although]	   it’s	   too	   early	   to	  make	   definitive	   statements	   on	  Rabin’s	   political	  future…	  his	  central	   task	   is	   to	  address	   the	  security	   issue,’	   a	   senior	  U.S.	  official	   said.	  ‘We	  are	  willing	  to	  help	  him	  on	  that’.”20	  	  Finally,	   in	   response	   to	   the	   early	   1995	   suicide	   bombing,	   the	   U.S.	   tried	   putting	  together	   a	   joint	   condemnation	   of	   terror	   by	   the	   Palestinians,	   Jordanians,	   and	  Egyptians	  that	  Ross	  explains	  was	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  “demonstrating	  to	  Israelis	  that	  peace	  would	  produce	  Arab	  partners	  for	  combating	  terror”.21	  Yet	   at	   some	   other	   times	   the	   U.S.	   prioritized	   the	   peace	   process	   itself	   over	  addressing	  Rabin’s	  domestic	  concerns.	  	  First,	  it	  rejected	  requests	  in	  August	  of	  1993	  from	  his	   foreign	  minister,	   Shimon	  Peres,	   for	  Washington	   to	   lie	   and	   take	   credit	   for	  the	  Oslo	  Accords	  as	  an	  American-­‐mediated	  initiative.	  	  Peres	  hoped	  that	  if	  the	  U.S.	  did	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Peace,” Washington Post, January 27, 1995. 
20 Ibid. 
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so,	   it	  would	  help	   shield	   Israel’s	  Labor-­‐led	  government	   from	  blame	   for	  acceding	   to	  the	  agreement.	  	  However,	  Christopher	  and	  Ross	  doubted	  that	  the	  truth	  could	  be	  held	  back	  for	  long	  and	  believed	  that	  the	  deal	  would	  have	  greater	  legitimacy	  if	  the	  Israelis	  owned	  up	  to	  having	  negotiated	  directly	  in	  Norway	  with	  the	  PLO.22	  	   Second,	  President	  Clinton	  overruled	  his	  aides	  and	  decided	  to	  pressure	  Rabin	  into	   attending	   the	   Oslo	   signing	   ceremony	   alongside	   Yasser	   Arafat	   on	   the	   White	  House	  lawn.	  	  This	  episode	  will	  be	  covered	  in	  greater	  depth	  in	  the	  parallel	  chapter	  on	  American	  LSI	  in	  Palestinian	  affairs,	  since	  there	  is	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  gesture	  was	  motivated	  partly	  by	  a	  desire	  to	  strengthen	  Yasser	  Arafat	  as	  a	  partner	  for	  peace.	  	  However,	  for	  the	  time	  being	  it	  is	  sufficient	  to	  note	  that	  until	  Clinton	  publicly	  forced	  Rabin’s	  hand	  by	  inviting	  Arafat	  to	  attend,	  the	  Israeli	  prime	  minister	  was	  determined	  not	  to	  attend	  the	  ceremony	  because	  he	  feared	  it	  would	  hurt	  him	  domestically	  to	  be	  seen	  standing	  beside	  the	  leader	  of	  the	  PLO,	  his	  nation’s	  longtime	  enemy.23	  	   Finally,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   note	   that	   U.S.	   efforts	   during	   this	   period	   were	  unfocused	   and	   intermittent.	   	   In	   time,	   the	  pressure	   of	   an	   imminent	   Israeli	   election	  campaign	  in	  1996	  did	  more	  to	  focus	  the	  attention	  of	  U.S.	  officials,	  but	  as	  fate	  would	  have	   it	   this	   occurred	   after	  Rabin’s	   assassination	  on	  behalf	   of	   his	   successor,	   Peres.	  	  President	   Clinton’s	   intervention	   in	   support	   of	   Rabin	   was	   sporadic	   and	   at	   least	  reactive	  to	  the	  vagaries	  of	  domestic	  politics	  in	  Israel.	  	  Did	  the	  Policy	  Succeed?	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Ibid., 116–117. 
23 Kurzman, Soldier of Peace: The Life of Yitzhak Rabin, 1922-1995, 458–460; Warren Christopher, 
Chances of a Lifetime: A Memoir, First ed. (Scribner, 2001), 202. 
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   Yes.	   	  However,	  American	  gestures	  were	  measured,	   and	  so	  were	   their	   likely	  results.	   	   U.S.	   efforts	   on	   behalf	   of	   Rabin	   did	   not	   protect	   his	   popularity	   from	   the	  damage	   caused	   by	   a	   spate	   on	   ongoing	   terror	   attacks,	   but	   they	   probably	   helped	  protect	  him	  from	  falling	   further	  by	  validating	  his	  strategic	  argument	  that	  an	  Israel	  committed	   to	  peace	  would	  be	  backed	  staunchly	  by	   the	   international	   system’s	   sole	  remaining	  superpower.	  Rabin	  left	  the	  November	  1993	  meeting	  noting	  that	  “I	  return	  home	  stronger	  in	  many	   aspects,	   more	   confident	   in	   our	   ability	   to	   reach	   peace	   and	   reassured	   that	  thousands	  of	  miles	  away	  from	  Israel,	  we	  have	  a	  true	  friend	  the	  White	  House	  that	  we	  can	  rely	  on”.24	  	  Then	  again,	  once	  terror	  attacks	  continued	  to	  escalate	  in	  1995,	  there	  was	   only	   so	  much	   the	   United	   States	   could	   do	   to	   offset	   the	   cumulative	   impact	   on	  Israeli	  public	  opinion.	  	  Indeed,	  as	  then-­‐journalist	  David	  Makovsky	  noted	  at	  the	  time,	  during	   the	   1992	   election	   Rabin	   had	   made	   a	   “promise	   implicit[ly]…	   that	   a	   peace	  agreement	  with	   the	  Palestinians	  would	   insulate	  voters	   inside	   the	  Green	  Line	   from	  violence”.25	  	  Still,	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  terror	  attacks	  on	  Rabin’s	  standing	  would	  have	  been	  greater	  without	  American	  backing.	  I	  believe	  the	  1993-­‐1995	  episode	  of	  U.S.	  LSI	  on	  behalf	  of	  Yitzhak	  Rabin	  should	  be	  coded	  as	  a	  modest	  narrow	  success	  at	  the	  goal	  of	  raising	  his	  domestic	  standing	  to	  a	  limited	  extent.	  	  It	  should	  also	  be	  coded	  as	  a	  broader	  success	  at	  the	  general	  goal	  of	  incrementally	   contributing	   to	   the	   feasibility	   of	   producing	  major	   steps	   forward	   on	  the	   overall	   peace	   process	   –	   by	   helping	   Rabin	   remain	   in	   office	   and	   avoid	   political	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Holland, “Clinton Offers Incentives to Bolster Rabin.” 
25 David Makovsky, Making Peace With The PLO: The Rabin Government’s Road To The Oslo Accord 
(Westview Press, 1996), 150. 
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crises	  that	  would	  diminish	  his	  ability	  to	  pursue	  peace.26	  	  
Coding	  the	  Observable	  Implications	  
1.	  Perceptions	  of	  Sender	  Interests:	  	   The	   various	   theories	   offer	   mutually	   exclusive	   predictions	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	  dynamics	  of	  LSI,	  including	  with	  regard	  to	  whether	  U.S.	  officials	  view	  intervention	  in	  Israeli	   politics	   as	   relevant	   for	   advancing	   national	   interests.	   	   In	   this	   case,	   it	   is	  noteworthy	   that	   America’s	   initiatives	   to	   bolster	   Rabin	   came	   from	   the	   executive	  branch,	   not	   the	   legislative	   one.	   	   This	   suggests	   that	   the	   expectations	   of	  Theory	  #2,	  lobby-­‐legislative	  theory,	  do	  not	  fit	  with	  the	  data	  for	  this	  category.	  That	  having	  been	  said,	  Congress	  was	  generally	  supportive	  of	  these	  particular	  gestures,	   since	   their	   overt	   pretense	   was	   aimed	   at	   strengthening	   Israel’s	   defense	  capabilities.	   	   Right-­‐wing	   lobbyists	   did	   occasionally	   partner	   with	   members	   of	  Congress	   to	  undermine	  administration	  aid	  efforts	  during	   the	  early	  Oslo	  years,	  but	  these	  attacks	  were	  largely	  confined	  to	  fighting	  aid	  to	  the	  Palestinians,	  not	  against	  aid	  to	  Israel	  that	  coincidentally	  was	  intended	  to	  strengthen	  Rabin.27	  	  Aaron	  David	  Miller	  argues	  that	  this	  pattern	  continued	  throughout	  the	  Clinton	  presidency,	  thanks	  to	  proactive	  outreach	  and	  exceptional	  sensitivity	  from	  above:	  	  “We	   did	   reaching	   out	   to	   the	   organized	   Jewish	   community	   with	   conference	   calls,	  meetings,	   and	   briefings,	   not	   only	   Christopher,	   but	   the	   President	   as	   well,	   and	   on	  down	  from	  him.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  Bill	  Clinton	  faced	  less	  pressure	  from	  domestic	  politics	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 It is even possible that such staunch U.S. support might have encouraged Rabin to proceed with the peace 
process by signing on to Oslo II, a deal he was in some ways hesitant to sign. However, there is little 
evidence to prove this suspicion. For Rabin’s reluctance over Oslo II, see Kurzman, Soldier of Peace: The 
Life of Yitzhak Rabin, 1922-1995, 478. 
27 Scott Lasensky, “Underwriting Peace in the Middle East: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Limits of 
Economic Inducements,” Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) 6, no. 1 (March 2002). 
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than	  any	  other	  president	  engaged	  in	  serious	  Arab	  Israeli	  diplomacy.	  	  In	  fact	  the	  real	  pressure	   from	   the	   Jewish	   community	   came	   from	   groups	   like	   Peace	   Now	   and	   the	  Israel	  Policy	  Forum	  pushing	  him	  to	  go	   fast…	  as	  Christopher	  recalls,	  at	   least	  during	  Clinton’s	  first	  term	  ‘I	  can’t	  remember	  a	  specific	  issue	  on	  which	  we	  took	  a	  decision	  or	  didn’t	  take	  a	  decision	  because	  of	  fear	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  Jewish	  community”.28	  	  Furthermore,	   AIPAC	   itself	   had	   undergone	   a	   leadership	   shakeup,	   temporarily	  bringing	   in	  a	  new	  executive	  director,	  Neal	  Sher,	  who	  was	  seen	  as	  more	   friendly	  to	  the	  Oslo	  process	  and	  the	  ruling	  Labor	  Party	  in	  Israel.29	  	  The	  group	  had	  even	  lobbied	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  Clinton	  administration’s	  positions	  in	  1995	  on	  working	  with	  Rabin	  to	  reach	  out	  to	  Syria,	  arguing	  that	  lobbying	  of	  Congress	  by	  the	  Zionist	  Organization	  of	  America	  and	  Likud	  officials	  against	  a	  possible	  Golan	  deal	  could	  “limit	  the	  flexibility	  of	  the	  negotiators	  and	  thereby	  undermine	  a	  unique	  opportunity	  for	  peace”.30	  Moving	   on,	   Theory	   #3	   (bureaucratic	   politics)	   receives	   mixed	   marks	   for	  explaining	  perceptions	  of	  sender	  interests	  from	  1993	  to	  1995.	   	  Although	  members	  of	   the	   State	   Department	   bureaucracy	   did	   see	   Rabin’s	   political	   tenure	   as	  advantageous	   to	   U.S.	   interests,	   they	   were	   hesitant	   toward	   some	   of	   the	   measures	  Washington	  ended	  up	  employing.	   	  On	  one	  hand,	  some	  pro-­‐Rabin	  gestures	  came	  at	  the	   expense	   of	   the	   Palestinians	   and	   momentum	   for	   the	   Oslo	   process	   –	   such	   as	  enabling	  Israel	  to	  delay	  PA	  elections	  or	  IDF	  evacuation	  from	  Palestinian	  cities.	   	  On	  the	   second	   hand,	   some	   pro-­‐Rabin	   measures	   –	   such	   as	   the	   F-­‐15E	   jets	   or	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Miller, The Much Too Promised Land, 248. 
29 In addition to the Oslo Accords, other factors that may have contributed to the shakeup include a 
derogatory comment by the previous executive director insulting Orthodox Jews, personal and political 
tensions among AIPAC board members, and Rabin lashing out at the group during his first Washington 
visit after become premier, criticizing AIPAC for taking positions on loan guarantees that had benefitted 
his rival in the 1992 election. Inter alia, see Ofira Seliktar, Divided We Stand: American Jews, Israel, and 
the Peace Process (Greenwood, 2002), 133-134; Nathan Guttman, “AIPAC and Israel: The Rosen-
Weismann Scandal Sheds Light on the Complex Relationship between the Lobby and Israel,” Moment 
Magazine, June 2006. 
30 “AIPAC: Premature Hill Action on U.S. Golan Personnel Could Jeopardize Peace,” Near East Report 39, 
no. 3 (January 30, 1995). 
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supercomputer	   licenses	   –	   involved	   the	   approval	   of	   technology	   transfers	   that	   had	  previously	  been	  denied	  by	  executive	  agencies.	   	  Neither	  of	  these	  measures	  bear	  the	  mark	  of	  a	  bureaucratically-­‐driven	  policy	  program.	  	   Theories	   1	   and	   4	   (national	   interest	   and	   leadership	   theories,	   respectively)	  both	  fit	  with	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  administration	  felt	  backing	  Rabin	  was	  consonant	  with	  U.S.	  interests.	  	  Failure	  of	  Israel’s	  Labor	  government	  would	  entail	  a	  serious	  decline	  in	  the	   Oslo	   peace	   process	   –	   as	   was	   later	   demonstrated	   starting	   in	   1996	   under	  Netanyahu	  –	  so	  efforts	  to	  shore	  Rabin	  up	  when	  his	  public	  backing	  seemed	  to	  lessen	  does	  fit	  with	  the	  predictions	  of	  either	  theory.	  	   However,	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  personal	  relationship	  between	  Clinton	  and	  Rabin	  was	  so	  strong	  –	  again,	  a	  bond	  ultimately	  likened	  to	  a	  father-­‐son	  relationship	  –	  seems	  to	   fit	   especially	   well	   with	   the	   predictions	   of	   leadership	   theory.	   	   The	   president’s	  personal	  motivation	  helps	  underpin	  his	  exceptional	  sensitivity	  to	  Rabin’s	  domestic	  situation.	  	  The	  fact	  that	  they	  explicitly	  consulted	  on	  Rabin’s	  domestic	  situation	  also	  fits	  with	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  top-­‐down	  political	  process	  driven	  by	  leadership	  in	  the	  White	  House,	   as	   does	   the	   description	   of	   Clinton’s	   general	   tendencies	   toward	   being	   a	  “political	  junkie”	  with	  regard	  to	  his	  friends’	  electoral	  contests	  overseas.	  	  2.	  Perceptions	  of	  Close	  Contests	  The	   fact	   that	   both	  major	  U.S.	   initiatives	   to	   boost	  Rabin,	   in	  November	   1993	  and	   January	  1995,	  were	  expressly	   justified	   in	   terms	  of	  perceived	  challenges	   to	  his	  domestic	   standing	   fits	   quite	  well	  with	   theories	   one	   and	   four.	   	   Allegedly,	   the	   1993	  supplementary	  aid	  package	   to	   Israel	  was	  prompted	  due	   to	   losses	  by	  Labor	  Party’s	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candidates	   in	   the	   Tel	   Aviv	   and	   Jerusalem	  mayoral	   races	   and	   perhaps	   also	   by	   the	  Shas	  Party’s	  decision	  to	  leave	  the	  coalition	  that	  September.31	  	  The	  measures	  in	  1995	  were	  allegedly	  prompted	  by	  major	  declines	  of	  Rabin’s	  standing	   in	   the	  polls	  versus	  the	  Likud,	  with	  an	  eye	   toward	   Israeli	  elections	   the	   following	  year.	   	  Both	  measures	  were	  taken	  in	  hopes	  of	  partially	  offsetting	  the	  damage	  to	  Rabin’s	  standing	  caused	  by	  terrorist	  on	  Israeli	  civilians.	  However,	  two	  additional	  dynamics	  seem	  to	  point	  to	  the	  subjective	  biases	  of	  leadership	  theory	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  national	  interests	  theory.	  	  First,	  the	  president’s	  Mideast	   advisors	   became	   increasingly	   distracted	   by	   Oslo	   II	   negotiations	   over	   the	  course	  of	  1995,	  which	  might	  help	  explain	  why	  the	  administration	  did	  not	  do	  much	  for	  on	  Rabin’s	  domestic	  standing	  beyond	  January,	  even	  as	  suicide	  bombings	  in	  April,	  July,	  and	  August	  continued	  to	  damage	  his	  poll	  numbers	  and	  election	  prospects.32	  Second,	  the	  episodic	  nature	  of	  American	  gestures	  –	  tied	  to	  major,	  attention-­‐getting	  events	  and	  eliciting	  sporadic	  policy	  responses	  rather	  than	  coming	  in	  smooth,	  gradual	  waves	   to	  match	   fine-­‐grained,	   fluid	  variations	   in	   Israeli	  public	  polling	  over	  these	  three	  years	  –	  seems	  fit	  with	  the	  inherently	  “sticky”	  nature	  of	  belief	  updating	  in	  real-­‐world	  praxis.	  	  In	  fact,	  the	  1993	  LSI	  attempt	  may	  not	  have	  even	  been	  tied	  to	  a	  dip	  in	   Rabin’s	   personal	   standing	   in	   the	   polls.	   	   It	   was	   pursued	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   other	  indicators	   that	   went	   beyond	   poll	   figures	   and	   seemingly	   signaled	   his	   political	  weakness,	   including	   difficult	   municipal	   battles	   for	   Labor	   and	   possibly	   Shas’s	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 For more on these mayoral races, see “Israeli Right Strengthens Hold on Town Halls,” Agence France-
Presse (AFP), November 3, 1993. For Rabin’s coalitional challenge after Shas departed, see “More Shas 
Deputy Ministers Resign, Spiritual Leader Meets Rabin,” BBC Monitoring Service Middle East (Editorial 
Report, September 14, 1993); “Rabin Says He Has Had Enough of a Minority Government,” Agence 
France-Presse (AFP), March 3, 1994. 
32 See, for instance, “Poll: Netanyahu Beats Rabin,” Jerusalem Post, May 29, 1995. For a list of major 
terrorist attacks during this period, see Horovitz, Shalom, Friend, 158. 
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departure	   from	  Rabin’s	   coalition	   government.	   	   In	   fact,	   there	   is	   reason	   to	  question	  whether	  the	  administration	  had	  even	  seen	  polling	  that	  demonstrated	  Rabin’s	  sliding	  poll	  numbers	  before	  deciding	  to	  bolster	  him	  during	  his	  visit	  that	  November.	  	   Ongoing	  Palestinian	  violence	  and	  disputes	  over	  how	  to	  implement	  Oslo	  also	  did	  damage	   to	  Rabin’s	   standing	   in	   the	  polls,	  but	  public	  data	  on	   this	   trend	  actually	  came	  at	  about	   the	  same	  time	  as	   the	  prime	  minister’s	  visit	   to	  Washington.	   	  Coming	  from	  a	  dead	  heat	  against	  the	  Likud	  in	  June,	  the	  Oslo	  agreement	  had	  put	  Rabin	  way	  ahead,	  leading	  Netanyahu	  by	  at	  least	  thirteen	  percentage	  points	  and	  giving	  his	  party	  an	  eleven	  percent	  lead	  over	  its	  right-­‐wing	  rival.	  	  These	  numbers	  held	  steady	  through	  at	  least	  mid-­‐October.33	  	  However,	  five	  terrorist	  bombings	  after	  the	  Accords	  began	  to	  feed	   settler	   riots	   and	   broader	   dissatisfaction	   within	   Israel.34	   	   Rabin	   called	   the	  mayoral	  races	  in	  Tel	  Aviv	  and	  Jerusalem	  a	  test	  of	  confidence	  in	  his	  peace	  initiative	  and	  had	   campaigned	   for	   the	  Labor	   candidate,	  Teddy	  Kollek,	   in	   Jerusalem.35	   	   Later	  that	  week	  the	  right	  wing	  called	  for	  early	  elections	  in	  Israel,	  claiming	  their	  municipal	  victories	  pointed	  to	  a	  new	  groundswell	  of	  domestic	  support	  for	  their	  position.36	  	  	  However,	   as	   best	   I	   can	   tell	   it	   was	   only	   on	   November	   12th	   that	   Rabin’s	  standing	   plunged	   in	   publically	   available	   opinion	   polls,	   putting	   the	   right-­‐	   and	   left-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Dan Perry, “Right-Wing Leader Plans More ‘Pragmatic’ Approach,” Associated Press, October 18, 
1993; Patrick Martin, “Israeli Parliament Backs Peace Agreement with PLO: Public Opinion Poll Shows 
Overwhelming Support for Prime Minister, Sharp Decline for Likud,” The Globe and Mail (Canada), 
September 24, 1993. 
34 For a list of attacks, see “Palestinian Blows Himself up in West Bank Car Bomb,” Agence France-Presse 
(AFP), November 2, 1993. For the broader, Israeli response, see also Richard Beeston, “Attack on Rabbi 
Sparks Violence in West Bank,” The Times (of London), November 8, 1993. 
35 Clyde Haberman, “Jerusalem Journal: This Race Is a Cliffhanger (Watch the Arab Vote),” New York 
Times, November 3, 1993; Julian Ozanne, “Israeli Poll Is Test for Peace Drive,” Financial Times, 
November 3, 1993. 
36 Barry Parker, “Right-wing Demands Early General Elections in Israel,” Agence France-Presse (AFP), 
November 4, 1993. 
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wing	   blocs	   tied	   neck-­‐and-­‐neck	   at	   sixty	   projected	   Knesset	   seats	   each.37	   	   That	   poll	  came	  during	  Rabin’s	  Washington	   visit	   and	   likely	   after	   the	  U.S.	   administration	   had	  already	  made	  up	  its	  mind	  to	  bolster	  the	  Israeli	  prime	  minister.38	  	  3.	  Patterns	  of	  Domestic	  Debate:	  	   Another	   area	   in	  which	   the	   theories	   diverge	   has	   to	   do	  with	   the	   patterns	   of	  domestic	  debate	  that	  are	  predicted	  to	  occur	  within	  the	  sender	  state.	   	   In	  particular,	  leadership	  theory	  holds	  that	  presidents	  or	  other	  top	  political	   leaders	  in	  the	  sender	  state	   have	   incentives	   to	   undertake	   LSI	   in	   a	   deceptive	   manner	   that	   avoids	   formal	  decision	   channels	   and	   leaves	   lower	   level	   officials	   and	   legislators	   in	   the	   dark	  regarding	   their	   actual	   intention	   to	   undertake	   meddling.	   	   This	   case	   fits	   with	   the	  expectations	  of	  leadership	  theory	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  these	  domestic	  structural	  forces	  seem	   to	   have	   been	   excluded	   for	   the	   most	   part	   from	   decision-­‐making	   about	   the	  initiatives	  that	  were	  used	  to	  carry	  out	  LSI.	  Whereas	  Indyk	  claims	  that	  officials	  at	  the	  White	  House	  were	  “totally”	  fixated	  on	   Rabin’s	   domestic	   circumstances,	   there	   is	   little	   evidence	   to	   suggest	   that	   such	  attention	   was	   also	   given	   to	   the	   issue	   by	   either	   members	   of	   Congress	   or	   the	  bureaucracy.	  	  In	  fact,	  neither	  body	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  in	  a	  position	  to	  initiate	  any	  of	  the	  measures	  undertaken	  by	  the	  administration	  to	  bolster	  Rabin.	  	  The	  bureaucracy	  was	  informed	  that	  its	  previous	  judgments	  on	  technology	  transfer	  issues	  were	  to	  be	  overruled	  for	  political	  reasons	  by	  the	  White	  House.	   	  And	  Congress	   led	  on	  only	  one	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 “Israeli Left Plunges in Polls,” Agence France-Presse (AFP), November 12, 1993. 
38 Then again, it is likely that the other signs of disaffection prepared them for Labor’s drop in the polls.  
Also, it is certainly possible that the CIA or State Department had conducted private polling in Israel during 
this month or that Rabin’s team shared with them figures as a result of private, internal polling. 
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major	   gesture	   toward	   Israel	   during	   this	  period	  –	   a	  bill	   obligating	   the	  president	   to	  move	  the	  U.S.	  embassy	  to	  Jerusalem	  or	  explain	  every	  six	  months	  why	  he	  declined	  to	  do	  so.	  	  And	  yet	  this	  measure	  elicited	  Rabin’s	  private	  consternation	  not	  his	  gratitude,	  since	  he	  felt	  it	  was	  counterproductive	  and	  unprofessional.39	  	  4.	  Cycles	  of	  Domestic	  Power:	  	   Theories	  two	  and	  three	  (lobby-­‐legislative	  politics	  and	  bureaucratic	  politics),	  expect	  the	  power	  of	  various	  domestic	  forces	  to	  be	  greatest	  during	  particular	  periods	  in	   the	   sender	   state’s	   electoral	   cycle.	   	   Specifically,	   Theory	   #2	   it	   expects	   the	  preferences	  of	  lobbyists	  and	  the	  legislative	  branch	  to	  be	  exceptionally	  powerful	  and	  imprinted	   upon	   policy	   outcomes	   during	   the	   end	   of	   two-­‐	   and	   four-­‐year	   electoral	  cycles,	   when	   the	   president	   is	   held	   more	   accountable	   to	   domestic	   pressures.	  	  Meanwhile,	   Theory	   #3	   expects	   the	   relative	   power	   of	   bureaucratic	   officials	   to	   be	  greatest	  during	  the	  beginning	  of	  presidential	   terms,	  meaning	  that	  policy	  outcomes	  during	  this	  period	  should	  be	  especially	  likely	  to	  reflect	  bureaucratic	  preferences.	  	   Neither	   proposition	   finds	   very	   strong	   support	   in	   these	   cases,	   although	  Theory	   #2	   at	   least	   is	   consonant	  with	   the	   timing	   of	   the	   data.	   	   True,	   the	   timing	   of	  sporadic	  efforts	   to	  help	  Rabin	   took	  place	   in	   late	  1993	  and	  early	  1995	  skipped	   the	  lead-­‐up	   to	  mid-­‐term	  election	   in	   the	  year	  1994,	  an	  outcome	   that	   is	   consonant	  with	  the	  expectations	  of	  lobby-­‐legislative	  theory.	  	  However,	  the	  timing	  of	  these	  behaviors	  could	  have	  been	  attributable	  to	  exogenous	  factors	  having	  to	  do	  Rabin’s	  sinking	  poll	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Horovitz, Shalom, Friend, 192; Steven Greenhouse, “Rabin Tells U.S. Lawmakers Aid Cuts Would Hurt 
Peace Effort,” New York Times, May 9, 1995; Colleen Siegel, “Israel Wary on U.S. Embassy Move to 
Jerusalem,” Reuters News, May 7, 1995. 
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numbers	  and	  the	  irregular	  attention	  of	  officials	  in	  the	  executive	  branch.	  	  	  Further,	   this	   minor	   consonance	   is	   more	   than	   outweighed	   by	   the	   fact	   that	  President	  Clinton’s	  most	  dramatic	   efforts	   at	  meddling	   in	   Israeli	  politics	  during	  his	  first	   term	   came	   in	   1996,	   the	   year	   of	   his	   race	   for	   presidential	   reelection.40	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  capture	  of	  both	  the	  House	  and	  Senate	  by	  the	  Republicans	  for	  the	  first	   time	   in	   decades	   in	   1994	   seems	   to	   have	   had	   little	   serious	   impact	   on	   the	  president’s	  relatively	  free	  hand	  on	  peace	  process	  issues.41	  Meanwhile,	  Theory	  #3	  (bureaucratic	  politics)	  is	  directly	  contradicted	  by	  the	  data.	   	  The	  theory	  expects	   that	  early	  periods	   in	  a	  president’s	   term	  should	  display	  a	  higher	  rate	  of	  meddling	  because	  bureaucrats	  tend	  to	  have	  a	  more	  consistent,	  strong	  preference	   in	   favor	   of	   intervention	   and	   are	   relatively	  more	   influential	   over	   policy	  outcomes	   when	   a	   president’s	   political	   appointees	   are	   still	   getting	   their	   bearings.	  	  However,	   we	   actually	   see	   the	   lowest	   rate	   of	   intervention	   during	   the	   first	   nine	  months	  of	  Clinton’s	   first	  term,	  not	  the	  highest.	   	  Thus,	  this	  outcome	  fits	  much	  more	  with	   Theory	   #4	   (leadership	   theory),	   which	   suggests	   that	   organizational	   disarray	  and	  undetermined	  preferences	  within	  the	  executive	  branch	  leadership	  should	  lead	  to	  lower,	  not	  higher,	  rates	  of	  meddling	  during	  these	  early	  adjustment	  periods.	  	  5.	  Bureaucratic	  Freelancing:	  	   Sometimes,	   leadership	   selection	   intervention	  may	   be	   carried	   out	   by	   career	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Indeed, although parsed into separate cases in this paper according to eras of Israeli leaders, these cases 
could instead be viewed as part of a single Israeli election cycle. Rather than being driven by domestic 
American politics as predicted by Theory #2, this dynamic appears to be driven by real or perceived trends 
in the domestic politics of Israel, which would seem to fit better with theories one and four. 
41 Yossi Beilin, The Path to Geneva: The Quest for a Permanent Agreement, 1996-2004 (Akashic Books, 
2004), 39–40. For an alternative perspective, see Colin Shindler, A History of Modern Israel (Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), 258. 
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bureaucrats	   rather	   than	   by	   top	   political	   leaders.	   	   When	   this	   occurs,	   it	   provides	  support	   for	   bureaucratic	   politics	   theory	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   leadership	   theory.	  	  However,	  when	  it	  appears	  conditioned	  by	  presidential	  styles	  of	  decision-­‐making	  and	  oversight	   or	   by	   possible	   opposition	   elsewhere	   the	   bureaucracy,	   that	   vitiates	   the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  evidence	  seems	  to	  bolster	  Theory	  #3.	  	   In	   this	   case,	   the	  evidence	   seems	   to	  weigh	  more	   in	   favor	  of	  Theory	  #4	   than	  Theory	  #3.	   	   Indyk	   insists	   that	  Clinton	  was	   a	  driving	   force	  behind	  policy	  decisions	  aimed	   at	   affecting	   Israeli	   politics	   and	   that	   he	   was	   a	   “political	   junkie”	   by	   nature,	  worrying	  actively	  about	  Israeli	  domestic	  politics	  from	  his	  first	  official	  meeting	  with	  Rabin	  in	  early	  1993.	  	  On	  this	  issue,	  his	  administration’s	  style	  of	  decision-­‐making	  was	  active	  and	  White	  House-­‐driven.	  	  Nor	  is	  there	  any	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  that	  decisions	  were	  being	  driven	  by	  bureaucratic	  actors.	  	  In	  fact,	  during	  U.S.	  efforts	  to	  bolster	  Rabin	  in	  late	  1993,	  these	  measures	  were	  framed	  as	  political	  choices	  to	  overrule	  previous	  decisions	  by	  the	  bureaucracy,	  not	  decisions	  made	  at	  its	  behest.	  	  In	  terms	  of	  possible	  bureaucratic	   freelancing,	   this	   case	   seems	   to	   fit	  more	  persuasively	  with	   leadership	  theory	  than	  with	  the	  predictions	  of	  the	  bureaucratic	  politics	  approach.	  	  6.	  Consistency	  of	  Message:	  Although	  practitioners	  of	   leadership	   selection	   intervention	   typically	   adhere	  to	   the	   farce	   that	   they	   are	   respecting	   the	   target	   state’s	   sovereignty,	   their	   ability	   to	  impact	  political	  outcomes	   there	   requires	   the	  projection	  of	   a	   consistent	  underlying	  message	   that	   validates	   the	   campaign	   narrative	   of	   its	   favored	   political	   protégés.	  	  Given	   that	   the	   theories	   pose	   distinctive	   observable	   implications	   in	   this	   regard,	   it	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offers	   us	   some	   additional	   leverage	   for	   explaining	   variation	   in	   LSI	   outcomes	   –	  particularly	  with	  regard	  to	  efficacy.	  Theory	  #1	  (national	  interests	  theory)	  views	  domestic	  political	  phenomena	  in	  the	   sender	   state	   as	   epiphenomenal	   for	   predicting	   that	   state’s	   foreign	   policy	  behavior.	   	   Therefore,	   it	   predicts	   that	   domestic	   political	   dynamics	   should	   not	  undermine	   efficacy	   by	   detracting	   from	   consistent	   messaging	   by	   that	   state’s	   top	  leadership.	   	   However,	   the	   LSI	  messaging	   during	   this	   period	  was	   inconsistent	   and	  episodic,	   which	   probably	   did	   undermine	   the	   message’s	   effectiveness.	   	   This	   is	   a	  phenomenon	  that	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  fit	  with	  the	  image	  of	  a	  perfectly	  rational	  foreign	  policy-­‐making	   state.	   	   The	   administration	   did	   adhere	   to	   a	   steady	  message	   that	   the	  U.S.	  would	  help	  Israel	  minimize	  risks	  and	  bear	  the	  costs	  of	  pursuing	  peace,	  but	  only	  sporadically	   did	   it	   pair	   this	   message	   with	   concrete	   gestures	   designed	   to	   actually	  persuade	  the	  Israeli	  public	  that	  it	  should	  stand	  behind	  Rabin.	  Furthermore,	  once	  decisions	  to	  pursue	  LSI	  were	  concluded,	  there	  appears	  to	  have	   been	   little	   opposition	   from	   either	   lower	   ranking	   officials	   in	   the	   executive	  branch	  or	  from	  lobbyists	  and	  members	  of	  Congress.	  	  The	  fact	  that	  neither	  domestic	  structural	   force	   seems	   to	   have	   done	   much	   to	   obstruct	   administration	   messaging	  seems	   to	   contradict	   theories	   two	  and	   three	   in	   favor	  of	  Theory	  #4,	  which	   sees	   top	  leaders	  such	  as	  the	  president	  and	  secretary	  of	  state	  as	  masters	  of	  their	  domain	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  crafting	  communicative	  foreign	  policies.	  	  7.	  Suitability	  of	  Message:	  	   If	  the	  message	  communicated	  by	  the	  sender	  state	  is	  systematically	  skewed	  in	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a	  manner	   that	   undermines	   its	   ability	   to	   persuade	   voters	   or	   political	   elites	   in	   the	  target	   polity,	   LSI	   should	   be	   inclined	   to	   fail.	   	   Again,	   the	   theories	   offer	   distinctive	  predictions	   for	   explaining	   variation	   on	   this	   dimension.	   	   Theory	   #1	   expects	  messaging	   to	   always	   be	   well-­‐suited	   to	   the	   sender	   state’s	   goals,	   theories	   two	   and	  three	  expect	  the	  content	  of	  messaging	  to	  be	  undermined	  by	  institutional	  preferences	  of	   domestic	   structural	   forces,	   and	   Theory	   #4	   predicts	   that	   the	   suitability	   of	   LSI	  messaging	  should	  be	  driven	  by	  subjective	  beliefs	  of	  top	  officeholders.	  The	   underlying	   message	   the	   Clinton	   administration	   used	   to	   bolster	   Rabin	  was	  that	  the	  United	  States	  would	  help	  Israel	  bear	  the	  costs	  and	  minimize	  the	  risks	  of	  pursuing	   peace	   with	   its	   neighbors.	   	   This	   message	   to	   the	   Israeli	   public	   was	   well-­‐suited	  to	  the	  objective	  of	  leadership	  selection	  intervention	  so	  long	  as	  a	  Labor	  prime	  minister	   held	   power	   in	   Israel.	   	   The	   bureaucracy	   did	   little	   to	   undermine	   the	  coherence	   of	   this	   message,	   despite	   its	   inherent	   institutional	   reluctance	   to	   grant	  Israel	  too	  many	  carrots	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  Palestinians.	  For	  instance,	  the	  decision	  in	  1995	   to	   let	   Rabin	   postpone	   withdrawing	   the	   IDF	   from	   West	   Bank	   cities	   and,	  therefore,	   push	   back	   Palestinian	   elections	   as	   well,	   was	   not	   the	   sort	   of	   measure	  designed	  to	  win	  over	  bureaucrats	  within	  the	  Near	  East	  bureaucracy.	  	  Instead,	  it	  was	  imposed	   upon	   them	   by	   the	   White	   House.	   	   This	   contradicts	   the	   messaging	  expectations	  of	  Theory	  #3	  in	  favor	  of	  Theory	  #4.	  Nor	   did	   lobby-­‐legislative	   forces	   seriously	   undermine	   this	  message,	   despite	  being	  fundamentally	  opposed	  to	  American	  LSI	  in	  Israel.	  	  In	  part,	  they	  may	  have	  been	  hesitant	   to	   interfere	  with	   the	  administration’s	  policy	   initiatives	  because	   they	  were	  mostly	  bonus	  carrots	  to	  the	  government	  of	  Israel.	  	  But	  even	  in	  instances	  in	  which	  the	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two	  branches	  seriously	  differed	  –	  such	  as	  over	  whether	  to	  move	  the	  U.S.	  embassy	  to	  Jerusalem	   –	   the	   executive	   branch	   prevailed,	   blocking	   legislators’	   ability	   to	  undermine	   the	   president’s	   claim	   that	   exceptional	   American	   backing	   would	   come	  only	  as	  a	  result	  of	  pursuing	  the	  peace	  process,	  not	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  course.	  Given	   that	   President	   Clinton	   did	   not	   hold	   beliefs	   that	   were	   at	   odds	   with	  suitable	  messaging	   for	  LSI,	   the	   fact	   that	   administration’s	  messaging	  was	   generally	  well-­‐suited	   to	   perceptions	   by	   the	   Israeli	   selectorate	   fits	  with	   either	   Theory	   #1	   or	  Theory	  #4.	  	  But,	  as	  noted	  above,	  the	  hypotheses	  of	  Theory	  #4	  tend	  to	  fit	  even	  better	  with	  certain	  additional	  trends	  in	  the	  observed	  data.	  	  Thus,	  the	  case	  evidence	  during	  the	   Rabin-­‐Clinton	   years	   seems	   to	   provide	   the	   strongest	   support	   for	   leadership	  theory,	  suggesting	  that	  the	  efficacy	  and	  occurrence	  of	  LSI	  was	  especially	  driven	  by	  the	  concerns	  and	  behavior	  of	  top	  individuals	  within	  the	  sender	  state.	  Given	  that	  this	  period	  was	  an	  incomplete	  cycle	  of	  meddling,	  moving	  from	  full	  non-­‐intervention	  to	  only	  irregular	  intervention,	  the	  subsequent	  Peres	  period	  in	  the	  lead-­‐up	   to	   Israeli	   elections	   provides	   an	   excellent	   complement	   to	   the	   data	   from	  Rabin’s	  time	  in	  office.	  	  In	  comparison	  to	  this	  initial	  period	  of	  sporadic	  intervention,	  the	  data	  during	   an	  all-­‐out	  U.S.	   campaign	   to	  determine	   the	  outcome	  of	   elections	   in	  Israel	  provides	  even	  stronger	  support	  for	  Theory	  #4.	  	  
Clinton,	  Case	  #2:	  Peres,	  the	  peace	  candidate	  (1995-­‐1996)	  	  	  	   On	  the	  evening	  of	  November	  4,	  1995,	  Yitzhak	  Rabin	  was	  assassinated	  by	  an	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Israeli	   right-­‐wing	   religious	   fanatic.	   	   In	   his	   stead,	   Rabin’s	   foreign	  minister	   Shimon	  Peres	  was	  quickly	  sworn	  in	  as	  prime	  minister.	  	  And	  although	  Peres	  chose	  to	  pursue	  accelerated	   talks	   with	   Syria	   instead	   of	   going	   immediately	   to	   early	   elections,	   his	  government	  had	  at	  maximum	  another	  year	  left	  in	  office.	  	  Therefore,	  when	  it	  became	  clear	   by	   February	   of	   1996	   that	   talks	  with	   Syria	   probably	  would	   not	   yield	   results	  within	  that	  time	  frame,	  Peres	  chose	  to	  move	  the	  elections	  up	  to	  May	  29th.	  	  Although	  he	   initially	   led	  by	  20%	  in	  the	  polls	  due	  to	  residual	  sympathy	  over	  Rabin’s	  death,	  a	  wave	   of	   suicide	   bombings	   by	  Hamas	   and	   Islamic	   Jihad	   in	   late	   February	   and	   early	  March	  put	  his	  Likud	  rival	  Netanyahu	  in	  the	  lead	  and	  the	  peace	  process	  in	  jeopardy.	  	  What	   followed	  was	  perhaps	   the	  most	  blatant	   instance	  of	  American	   intervention	   in	  Israeli	  politics	  to	  date,	  documented	  in	  greater	  detail	  here	  than	  ever	  before.	  	  
Coding	  the	  Dependent	  Variables	  (Occurrence	  and	  Efficacy)	  Did	  LSI	  Occur?	  	   And	  how!	  	  American	  efforts	  to	  bolster	  Peres	  were	  deep,	  broad,	  and	  sustained	  throughout	  this	  period,	  especially	  once	  elections	  had	  been	  moved	  up	  to	  take	  place	  in	  May.	  	  The	  peace	  process	  appeared	  to	  be	  in	  mortal	  danger,	  along	  with	  Yitzhak	  Rabin’s	  legacy,	  and	  President	  Clinton	  leapt	   into	  action,	  exceeding	  the	  bounds	  of	  what	  even	  his	  advisors	  thought	  was	  appropriate.	  The	  governments	  of	  Israel	  and	  the	  United	  States	  enlisted	  LSI	  by	  other	  actors	  during	   this	  period	  as	  well,	   including:	  a	   concerted	   if	  belated	  campaign	  by	  Arafat	   to	  rescue	  Peres,	  a	   lavish	   “red	  carpet”	  welcome	  by	  Gulf	   states	  Qatar	  and	  Oman;	  and	  a	  vast,	   multilateral	   effort	   by	   twenty-­‐eight	   governments	   (including	   thirteen	   Arab	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states)	  to	  join	  hands	  with	  Peres	  against	  the	  scourge	  of	  suicide	  bombings.	  Also,	  the	  1996	  election	  includes	  a	  rare	  but	  striking	  instance	  of	  a	  “marriage	  of	  convenience”	   across	   ideological	   lines	   between	   an	  Arab	   government,	   Jordan,	   and	   a	  right-­‐wing	  Israeli	  political	  party,	  by	  which	  Jordan’s	  King	  Hussein	  knowingly	  signaled	  his	  preference	  for	  Binyamin	  Netanyahu	  over	  Peres.	  Finally,	   there	   is	   apparently	   intelligence	   data	   to	   suggest	   that	   the	   Islamic	  Republic	  of	   Iran	  engaged	   in	  negative	  LSI	   to	  undermine	  Peres	  and	  derail	   the	  peace	  process	  in	  1996.	   	  If	  this	  was	  indeed	  the	  case,	  Tehran’s	  meddling	  may	  actually	  have	  been	  the	  most	  effective	  outside	  influence	  on	  the	  Israeli	  leadership	  contest.42	  
<The	  American	  Approach>	  	   Aaron	  David	  Miller	  writes	  that	  the	  six	  months	  of	  U.S.	  policy	  between	  Rabin’s	  death	  and	  Peres’s	  defeat	  were	  suffused	  with	  a	  desire	  to	  “frankly	  do	  all	  we	  could	  to	  ensure	   that	   Shimon	  Peres,	   heir	   to	  Rabin’s	   legacy,	  won	   the	   election.	   	   The	   idea	   that	  America	   doesn’t	   sometimes	   interfere	   in	   Israel’s	   politics	   is	   about	   as	   absurd	   as	   the	  notion	  that	  Israel	  doesn’t	  meddle	  in	  ours.	   	  Much	  of	  what	  we	  did	  during	  that	  period	  was	  designed	  to	  support	  Peres	  and	  in	  doing	  so	  save	  Arab-­‐Israeli	  diplomacy”.43	  	  	  This	  desire	  ran	  like	  a	  live	  wire	  through	  administration	  efforts	  to	  foster	  peace	  between	  Israel	  and	  Syria,	  to	  help	  Israel	  weather	  both	  a	  wave	  of	  terror	  by	  Hamas	  and	  Islamic	  Jihad	  and	  a	  second	  wave	  by	  Hezbollah	  in	  the	  north,	  and	  to	  reassure	  Israeli	  voters	   about	   strategic	   cooperation.	   	   Most	   notable	   was	   President	   Clinton’s	   speedy	  effort	   to	   organize	   a	   “Summit	   of	   the	   Peacemakers”	   at	   Sharm	   el-­‐Sheikh	   to	   show	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 N.B. The terms “negative” and “positive” are being used here in the sense defined in my theory chapter 
and not in the pejorative sense. Thus, negative LSI means an effort that aims primarily to undermine a 
sitting government, whereas positive LSI aims to prop up the incumbent. 
43 Miller, The Much Too Promised Land, 267. 
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broader	  multilateral	  umbrella	  of	  support	  for	  Peres	  in	  the	  face	  of	  terrorist	  violence.	  
Managing	  the	  Syrian	  Track.	  	  When	  Clinton	  visited	  Israel	  for	  Rabin’s	  funeral,	  he	   met	   Peres	   with	   two	   surprises:	   an	   unexpected	   bear	   hug	   and	   word	   that	   his	  predecessor	   Rabin	   had	   asked	   the	   U.S.	   to	   relay	   to	   Damascus	   a	   secret	   offer	   of	   full	  Golan	  withdrawal	   in	  exchange	   for	   full	  peace.44	   	  Peres	  soon	  expressed	  his	  desire	   to	  work	   hard	   for	   an	   agreement	  with	   Syria	   provided	   that	  Assad	  was	   prepared	   to	   “fly	  high	  and	  fast,”	  since	  this	  would	  enable	  Peres	  to	  face	  elections	  with	  a	  completed	  deal	  in	  hand.45	  	  He	  also	  received	  U.S.	  assurances	  that	  physical	  concessions	  by	  Israel	  could	  wait	  until	  after	  elections	  to	  be	  implemented,	  in	  order	  to	  boost	  his	  performance.46	  Although	  the	  Israelis	  and	  Syrians	  engaged	  in	  intensive	  talks	  under	  American	  supervision	  that	  began	  to	  yield	  measured	  progress,	  Peres	  began	  to	  doubt	  whether	  they	  would	   produce	   an	   agreement	   before	  November,	   the	   latest	   point	   at	  which	   he	  could	  go	   to	  new	  elections.	   	  Faced	  with	  growing	  pressures	  within	  his	  own	  party	   to	  call	  early	  elections	  while	  they	  were	  polling	  twenty	  points	  ahead	  of	  the	  Likud,	  Peres	  asked	   the	  United	   States	   to	   tell	   Assad	   he	  would	   be	   unable	   to	   avoid	   early	   elections	  unless	  they	  could	  personally	  meet	  for	  a	  high-­‐profile	  leaders’	  summit.	  Although	   Dennis	   Ross	   felt	   that	   the	   U.S.	   should	   discourage	   Peres	   from	  undermining	  these	  productive	  talks	  by	  rushing	  to	  elections,	  Christopher	  and	  Clinton	  both	   deferred	   to	   the	   prime	   minister	   on	   the	   matter	   because	   of	   his	   political	  considerations	  at	  home.47	   	  The	  ever-­‐cautious	  Assad	  declined	  to	  meet	  with	  Peres	  in	  person,	  and	  the	  Syrian	  track	  was	  kept	  at	  the	  working	  level	  until	  an	  attack	  by	  Islamic	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Ross, The Missing Peace, 212–213. 
45 Ibid., 234. 
46 Ibid., 225. 
47 Ibid., 242–243. 
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Jihad,	  a	  terror	  group	  based	  in	  Damascus,	  led	  even	  those	  discussions	  to	  unravel.48	  
Responding	   to	   Palestinian	   Terror	   Attacks.	   	   In	   early	   January,	   Peres	   was	  approached	   by	   officials	   from	   Israeli	   internal	   security	   services	   with	   a	   plan	   to	  assassinate	  Yahya	  Ayyash,	  mastermind	  of	  numerous	  suicide	  bombings	  and	  a	  leader	  of	  the	  Hamas	  military	  wing.	  	  Even	  if	  Peres	  thought	  the	  plan	  was	  a	  bad	  idea,	  in	  reality	  he	   had	   little	   choice	   since	   to	   disagree	   could	   have	   led	   to	   leaks	   that	   would	   have	  destroyed	   him	   politically.	   	   Thus,	   on	   January	   5th	   Israeli	   operatives	   assassinated	  Ayyash.	  	  Although	  Hamas	  waited	  until	  after	  PA	  elections	  and	  a	  prescribed	  period	  of	  mourning	  were	  over,	   in	   late	  February	   the	  organization	   launched	  a	   series	   of	   grisly	  suicide	  bombings,	  reportedly	  in	  retaliation	  for	  Ayyash’s	  death.	  	   Over	   the	   course	   of	   nine	   days,	   Israel	   experienced	   four	   major	   suicide	  bombings,	  which	  killed	  over	  sixty	  Israelis	  and	  wounded	  more	  than	  a	  hundred.	  	  The	  first	  three	  attacks	  were	  by	  Hamas,	  striking	  two	  buses	  in	  Jerusalem	  and	  a	  hitchhiking	  post	  in	  Ashkelon.	  	  Finally,	  the	  last	  attack	  was	  conducted	  by	  Islamic	  Jihad	  and	  struck	  at	  school	  children	  shopping	  for	  Purim	  holiday	  costumes	  in	  downtown	  Tel	  Aviv.	  	  The	  elections	  shook	  the	  country,	  catapulted	  Netanyahu	  into	  the	  lead	  in	  opinion	  polls,	  and	  put	  the	  peace	  process	  into	  serious	  danger.	  	   The	   United	   States	   first	   responded	   by	   rushing	   $40	   million	   of	   emergency	  assistance	   to	   Israel	   in	   cargo	   planes	   along	   with	   a	   delegation	   of	   counter-­‐terrorism	  experts	  to	  advise	  Israeli	  officials.	  	  The	  president	  attended	  a	  memorial	  service	  at	  the	  Israeli	   embassy	   in	  Washington,	   exerted	  visible	  pressure	  on	  Yasser	  Arafat	   to	   crack	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down	   on	   terrorist	   groups,	   and	   recorded	   a	   videotaped	   message	   for	   Israeli	   TV.49	  	  However,	  it	  soon	  became	  evident	  that	  more	  help	  would	  be	  required.	  	  The	  result	  was	  the	  U.S.-­‐directed	  counterterrorism	  conference	  at	  Sharm	  el-­‐Sheikh.	  The	  March	  13th	  Summit	  of	  the	  Peacemakers	  projected	  a	  multilateral	  message	  of	   solidarity	   with	   Israel	   in	   the	   face	   of	   terrorism,	   and	   the	  most	  memorable	   image	  from	  the	  event	  was	  a	  carefully	  stage-­‐managed	  photograph	  of	  world	  leaders	  joining	  hands	  with	  Shimon	  Peres	  front	  and	  center	  (see	  far	  above).	  	  According	  to	  Indyk,	  the	  administration	  saw	  bolstering	  Peres	  as	  “the	  be	  all	  and	  end	  all”	  of	  that	  event.50	  	  Miller	  agrees	  that	  “at	  Sharm…	  we	  absolutely	  conspired	  to	  do	  everything	  we	  possibly	  could	  for	  Shimon	  Peres	  to	  help	  him	  defeat	  Netanyahu…	  if	  you	  ask	  me	  whether	  or	  not	  we	  were	  thinking	  about	  ways	  the	  support	  Peres,	  the	  answer	  is	  ‘yes’.”51	  	   Clinton	   took	   Shimon	   Peres	   back	   to	   Israel	   with	   him	   on	   Air	   Force	   One	   and	  visited	  Jerusalem	  and	  Tel	  Aviv	  (with	  Peres	  conspicuously	  at	  his	  side	  throughout)	  in	  order	  to	  reiterate	  the	  depth	  of	  his	  support.	  	  The	  way	  Indyk	  describes	  this	  visit,	  “the	  two	  of	  them	  campaigned	  for	  Peres	  in	  Israel…	  he	  basically	  made	  the	  case	  for	  peace”	  and,	  while	  he	  did	  not	  explicitly	  endorse	  Peres,	  “he	  was	  trying	  to	  use	  his	  popularity	  amongst	  the	  Israeli	  people	  to	  boost	  Peres’s	  chances”.52	  Clinton’s	   Israel	   visit	   included	   a	   highly	   publicized	   trip	   to	   Rabin’s	   gravesite,	  where	   he	   left	   a	   pebble	   from	   the	  White	   House	   lawn	   in	   commemoration.	   	   He	   also	  announced	   plans	   for	   $100	   million	   in	   new	   U.S.	   aid	   beyond	   the	   previous	   month’s	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Gene Gibbons, “Clinton Sends Bomb-sniffing Equipment to Israel,” Reuters News, March 6, 1996. 
50 Indyk, “Interview with the Author.” 
51 Aaron David Miller, “Interview with the Author”, November 4, 2011. 
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emergency	  support.53	  	  The	  aid	  package	  would	  include	  new	  equipment	  and	  training,	  joint	   development	   of	   anti-­‐terror	   technologies,	   enhanced	   policy	   coordination	   and	  intelligence	  sharing.	  	  The	  president	  announced	  he	  had	  instructed	  CIA	  director	  John	  Deutsch	   to	   remain	   in	   Israel	   after	   his	   departure	   to	   oversee	   finalization	   of	   the	  agreement.54	  	  Finally,	  Clinton	  spoke	  before	  a	  huge	  gathering	  of	  school	  children	  in	  Tel	  Aviv,	  urging	  them	  to	  honor	  Rabin’s	  legacy	  by	  not	  abandoning	  their	  hopes	  of	  peace.55	  By	   the	   time	   he	   left	   Israel,	   polls	   showed	   that	   if	   Clinton	   were	   running	   as	   a	  candidate,	  he	  would	  win	  in	  Israel’s	  election	  for	  prime	  minister.56	  	  However,	  he	  could	  not	  rest	  long	  on	  his	  laurels,	  since	  a	  new	  round	  of	  terror	  soon	  came	  from	  the	  north.	  
Responding	  to	  Lebanese	  Terror	  Attacks.	  	  In	  spite	  of	  repeated	  reassurances	  from	   the	   Syrians	   that	   they	   would	   restrain	   Hezbollah,	   the	   organization	   used	  relatively	  ordinary	  friction	  with	  the	  IDF	  and	  its	  proxy,	  the	  South	  Lebanon	  Army,	  as	  a	  pretext	   to	   suddenly	  escalate	   the	   launching	  of	  Katyusha	  rockets	  against	   civilians	   in	  northern	   Israel.57	   	  After	   repeatedly	   asking	   for	  help	   to	   resolve	   the	   conflict	   through	  diplomatic	  means,	  Peres	  finally	  responded	  to	  pressure	  from	  the	  IDF	  and	  the	  public	  after	  an	  attack	  that	  wounded	  thirty	  Israeli	  civilians	  by	  ordering	  massive	  air	  strikes	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on	  suspected	  Hezbollah	  bases,	  which	  the	  IDF	  labeled	  Operation	  Grapes	  of	  Wrath.58	  The	   Israeli	   campaign	   relied	   upon	   the	   controversial	   tactic	   of	   intentionally	  seeking	   to	  put	  pressure	  on	   the	   government	   in	  Beirut	  by	  driving	   large	  numbers	  of	  Lebanese	  civilians	  out	  of	  the	  south.	   	  Yet	   in	  spite	  of	  this	  questionable	  approach,	  the	  United	   States	   hewed	   to	   a	   persistent	   and	   intentional	   theme	   that	   Hezbollah	   was	  singlehandedly	  to	  blame	  and	  that	  the	  Israeli	  operation	  was	  entirely	   justified.59	   	  On	  April	  18th,	  Israel	  accidentally	  struck	  a	  UN	  facility	  in	  Lebanon	  at	  Kafr	  Qana	  that	  was	  full	  of	  refugees,	  killing	  roughly	  one	  hundred	  and	  wounding	  many	  more.	   	  However,	  Dennis	  Ross	  writes	  that	  “with	  the	  Israeli	  election	  looming,	  we	  muted	  our	  criticism	  of	  the	  Israeli	  action,	  striving	  instead	  more	  visibly	  to	  produce	  a	  cease-­‐fire”.60	  The	   IDF	   was	   forced	   to	   stop	   fighting	   before	   achieving	   its	   aims	   against	  Hezbollah,	   but	   Secretary	   Christopher	   provided	   Peres	   with	   a	   partial	   salve	   by	  confirming	  in	  a	  letter	  that	  Washington	  remained	  steadfast	  in	  its	  support	  for	  Israel’s	  right	  to	  self-­‐defense.61	  According	  to	  Washington	  Post	  reporter	  Barton	  Gellman,	  the	  normally	   laconic	   Christopher	   also	   “made	   a	   point…	   in	   remarks	   broadcast	   live	   in	  Israel,	   to	   say	   the	   case-­‐fire	  negotiated	  by	  Peres	  was	  a	   ‘significant	   improvement’	  on	  what	  his	  predecessor,	  Yitzhak	  Rabin,	  had	  achieved	  in	  1993”	  during	  an	  earlier	  round	  of	  fighting	  with	  Hezbollah,	  even	  though	  this	  claim	  was	  highly	  debatable.62	  	  The	  U.S.	  also	   sent	   messages	   to	   Tehran	   via	   France	   and	   Germany	   that	   anti-­‐Israel	   terrorism	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must	  halt	   immediately.63	   	  The	  U.S.	  even	  made	  clear	  to	  the	  Secretary	  General	  of	  the	  United	  Nations,	  Boutros	  Boutros-­‐Ghali,	  that	  they	  would	  prefer	  no	  UN	  reporting	  at	  all	  on	  the	  Qana	  incident	  because	  of	  the	  threat	  it	  would	  pose	  to	  the	  Peres	  campaign.64	  	   Highlighting	   Strategic	  Cooperation.	   	   This	   speedy	   ceasefire	   enabled	  Peres	  to	  keep	  his	  prior	  appointment	  to	  visit	  Washington	  for	  the	  annual	  AIPAC	  conference	  at	   the	   end	   of	   April.	   	   The	   Clinton	   administration	   used	   the	   prime	   minister’s	  Washington	   visit	   to	   showcase	   strategic	   cooperation	   in	   hopes	   of	   bolstering	   his	  standing	  after	  the	  Hezbollah	  attack.	  	  As	  Ross	  describes	  it:	  	  “on	   the	   eve	   of	   the	  mandated	   thirty-­‐day	   campaign	   period	   [in	   Israel],	   Peres	   visited	  Washington	  and	  we	  all	  but	  endorsed	  him,	  with	  the	  President	  lavishing	  praise	  on	  him	  and	   pledging	   additional	   American	   assistance.	   	   Clinton,	   a	   hero	   in	   Israel	   since	   the	  Rabin	  funeral,	  sought	  to	  transfer	  his	  own	  credibility	  to	  Peres,	  and	  in	  so	  doing	  ‘save’	  Labor	  and	  the	  peace	  process”.65	  	  Charles	  Krauthammer	  attacked	  the	  Washington	  visit	  as	  “an	  emergency	  love-­‐in”.66	  Clinton	   spoke	   AIPAC	   alongside	   Peres	   and	   used	   the	   opportunity	   to	   lavish	  praise	  on	  his	  Israeli	  counterpart.	  	  He	  hailed	  Peres	  as	  “a	  true	  and	  reliable	  friend”	  who	  was	   carrying	   forward	   the	   legacy	   of	   Rabin.	   	   He	   highlighted	   Arab	   cooperation	   at	  Sharm,	  Oman	  and	  Qatar’s	  unprecedented	   invitation	  to	  Peres,	  and	  commitments	  by	  the	   PLO	   to	   fight	   terrorism	   and	   to	   amend	   its	   charter.	   	   He	   placed	   blame	   for	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Enderlin, Shattered Dreams, 34. 
64 In spite of this pressure, Boutros-Ghali filed a report that was especially harsh on the Israelis. He relates 
that “the Clinton administration wanted no report at all, fearing that any criticism of Israel at that moment 
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65 Ross, The Missing Peace, 256. 
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Lebanon	   conflict	   solely	   on	   Hezbollah,	   and	   he	   announced	   new	   defense	   measures	  agreed	  earlier	  that	  day	  to	  help	  Israel	  combat	  that	  threat.67	  	   That	   afternoon,	   Peres	  had	  held	   a	   signing	   ceremony	  with	  Defense	   Secretary	  William	  Perry	   for	   a	  deal	   on	   theater	  missile	  defense	   cooperation.	   	  Gellman	   reports	  that	  the	  ceremony	  was	  intentionally	  scheduled	  for	  1:05	  PM	  eastern	  time	  to	  coincide	  with	   the	   start	   of	   Israel’s	   evening	   television	  news,	  which	   jumped	   straight	   from	   the	  day’s	  headlines	  to	  cover	  the	  prime	  minister’s	  signing	  conference	  at	  the	  Pentagon.68	  Their	   agreement	   included	   a	   decision	   by	   the	   United	   States	   to	   spend	   $50	  million	   in	   the	   first	   year	   developing	   the	   Nautilus	   laser	   system	   to	   shoot	   down	  incoming	  rockets,	  to	  share	  satellite	  intelligence	  that	  could	  give	  Israel	  early	  warning	  of	   any	   regional	   missile	   attack	   within	   seconds	   of	   launch,	   and	   to	   send	   a	   team	   of	  advisors	  to	  Israel	  for	  devising	  protective	  measures	  in	  the	  interim.69	  	  	  In	   addition,	   during	   his	   AIPAC	   speech	   Clinton	   said	   that	   the	   United	   States	  would	  help	  fund	  Israel’s	  Arrow	  missile	  defense	  batteries,	  discussed	  the	  provision	  of	  AMRAAM	  air-­‐to-­‐air	  missiles	  which	  could	  be	  adapted	  to	   intercept	  cruise	  missiles	   in	  flight,	  and	  announced	  that	   Israel	  would	  soon	  be	  receiving	   its	   first	  F-­‐15i	  Ra’am	   (lit.	  “thunder”)	  fighter	  jets,	  which	  had	  heightened	  radar	  capabilities	  for	  detecting	  hostile	  missile	  batteries	  on	  the	  ground.70	  	  Acknowledging	  the	  political	  aspect	  of	  the	  missile	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 William J. Clinton, “Remarks to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) Policy 
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68 Barton Gellman, “Rival Criticizes Peres’s ‘Cynical’ Use of U.S.-Israeli Ties to Boost Campaign,” 
Washington Post, May 2, 1996. 
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defense	   agreement,	   a	   Pentagon	   spokesperson	   justified	   the	  measures	   as	   a	   “way	   of	  supporting	   the	   cease-­‐fire	   and	   the	   larger	   peace	   process,	   if	   only	   by	   convincing	   the	  Israeli	  public	  that	  we	  are	  searching	  for	  ways	  to	  guarantee	  their	  safety”.71	  	   Two	  days	   later,	  Peres	  and	  Clinton	  met	  at	   the	  White	  House	   to	  sign	  a	  second	  high-­‐profile	   defense	   document,	   this	   one	   focused	   on	   formalizing	   the	  counterterrorism	   measures	   that	   were	   announced	   during	   the	   president’s	   visit	   to	  Israel.72	   	   Like	   the	   Pentagon	   ceremony,	   their	   signing	   the	   of	   U.S.-­‐Israel	  Counterterrorism	   Cooperation	   Accord	   was	   again	   timed	   for	   1:05	   PM	   to	   allow	   live	  coverage	   by	   Israel’s	   evening	   TV	   news.73	   	   When	   Peres	   left	  Washington,	   he	   waxed	  lyrical	   to	   Israeli	   reporters	   that	   now	   “the	   state	   of	   Israel...	   has	   nothing	  more	   to	   ask	  for”.74	  	  The	  visit	  elicited	  complaints	  from	  the	  Likud	  that	  the	  United	  States	  was	  overly	  meddling	  in	  Israel’s	  domestic	  affairs,	  and	  both	  the	  president	  and	  his	  press	  secretary	  were	  forced	  during	  press	  conferences	  to	  deny	  any	  desire	  to	  interfere.75	  
Last-­Minute	  Messaging.	   	  Washington	  also	  took	  steps	  during	  final	  moments	  of	  the	  campaign	  period	  that	  were	  aimed	  at	  bolstering	  the	  prime	  minister.	  	  Clinton’s	  team	  used	  at	  least	  three	  different	  channels	  to	  communicate	  with	  the	  Peres	  camp	  his	  domestic	  needs.	  	  The	  first	  such	  channel	  went	  from	  Clinton’s	  Mideast	  policy	  advisors	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such	  as	  Ross	  to	  Peres’s	  close	  policy	  advisors	  such	  as	  Uri	  Savir.76	  	  Second,	  there	  was	  regular	  communication	  between	  Martin	  Indyk,	  now	  the	  U.S.	  ambassador	  in	  Tel	  Aviv,	  and	  Moishe	  Theumim,	  the	  director	  of	  Peres’s	  election	  campaign.77	  	  Third,	  there	  was	  a	  special	  back	  channel	  between	  Clinton’s	  political	  advisors	  in	  the	  White	  House	  such	  as	   Rahm	   Emanuel	   to	   Peres’s	   secret	   campaign	   consultants	   Zev	   Furst	   and	   Doug	  Schoen.78	   	   Furst	   and	   Schoen	  would	   occasionally	   offer	   advice	   directly	   to	   the	  prime	  minister	  but	  were	  not	  part	  of	  the	  Labor	  Party’s	  campaign	  payroll	  and	  were	  instead	  paid	  by	  private	  donors	  from	  the	  U.S.79	  	  Indyk	  explains	  that	  “Clinton	  used	  the	  Schoen-­‐Furst	  back	  channel	  to	  coordinate	  his	  public	  statements	  with	  Peres’s	  campaign	  needs	  in	   the	   countdown	   to	   the	   election”.80	   	   In	   fact,	   all	   three	   channels	   were	   used	   to	  coordinate	  public	  messages	  in	  order	  to	  maximize	  political	  benefits	  to	  Peres.81	  	   Once	   the	  official	   campaign	  period	  began,	  Netanyahu’s	   team	  bombarded	   the	  Israeli	  public	  with	  ads	  warning	  that	  Peres	  would	  divide	  Jerusalem.	  	  These	  different	  channels	  of	  communication	  therefore	  relayed	  a	  message	  to	  the	  White	  House	  in	  mid-­‐May	  asking	  President	  Clinton	  to	  reconsider	  moving	  the	  U.S.	  embassy	  from	  Tel	  Aviv	  to	   Jerusalem	   in	  hopes	   that	   it	  might	   inoculate	  Peres	  on	   the	   Jerusalem	   issue.	   	   Indyk	  reports	   that	   one	   request	   was	   passed	   from	   Theumim	   and	   from	   the	   Schoen/Furst	  channel,	  and	  Ross	  reports	  receiving	  a	  similar	  request	  from	  Peres	  via	  Savir.82	  	  But	  in	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the	  end,	  no	  such	  move	  was	  made.	  	   One	   week	   before	   the	   election,	   Clinton	   made	   a	   direct	   appeal	   to	   the	   Israeli	  people	  during	  a	  commencement	  speech	  at	  the	  Coast	  Guard	  Academy.	  	  He	  declared:	  “I	   say	   this	   to	   the	   people	   of	   Israel…	   as	   Israel	   takes	   further	   risks	   for	   peace	   in	   the	  future,	  it	  can	  count	  on	  further	  manifestations	  of	  American	  support…	  now	  is	  not	  the	  time	  to	  turn	  back”.83	   	  Then,	  one	  day	  before	  the	  Israeli	  vote,	  Clinton	  asked	  his	  aides	  for	  a	  speech	  insert	  on	  the	  topic	  for	  an	  unrelated	  press	  event.	  	  He	  ultimately	  went	  off	  script,	  making	  a	  far	  more	  explicit	  statement	  than	  they	  thought	  was	  wise.	  	  He	  said:	  	  “that	  election	  tomorrow	  is	  a	  very	  important	  election	  for	  the	  future	  of	  Israel	  and	  the	  future	  of	  the	  Middle	  East…	  the	  United	  States	  supports	  the	  peace	  process,	  and…	  we	  will	   stand	   with	   the	   Government	   and	   the	   people	   of	   Israel,	   the	   leaders	   of	   Israel	   in	  minimizing	  those	  risks…	  that	  is	  the	  important	  thing	  that	  I	  want	  the	  people	  of	  Israel	  to	  know”.84	  	  Dennis	  Ross	   reflects	   that	   “I	   felt	   the	  President	  had	   crossed	   the	   line,	   but	  Uri	   [Savir]	  called	  me	  to	  say	  it	  would	  help	  and	  Peres	  was	  very	  grateful”.85	  
<The	  Palestinian	  Approach>	  
	   Yasser	   Arafat	   and	   the	   Palestinian	   Authority	   also	   took	   steps	   designed	   to	  bolster	   Peres	   in	   his	   race	   against	   Netanyahu.	   	   This	   included	   up	   to	   five	   different,	  complementary	   measures:	   (1)	   boosting	   security	   cooperation,	   (2)	   accepting	   a	  delayed	   Israeli	   withdrawal	   from	   Hebron,	   (3)	   revising	   the	   Palestinian	   National	  Council’s	  charter,	   (4)	  helping	  the	  Labor	  Party	  reach	  out	   to	   Israeli	  Arab	  voters,	  and	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(5)	  holding	  a	  meaningless	  opening	  ceremony	  for	  final	  status	  talks	  in	  early	  May.	  	   Although	  Arafat’s	  preferred	  strategy	  was	   to	  co-­‐opt	   rather	   than	  confront	  his	  Islamist	  opponents,	  he	  engaged	  in	  a	  serious	  confrontation	  with	  Hamas	  and	  Islamic	  Jihad	   after	   the	   suicide	   bombings	   in	   February	   and	   March,	   dismantling	   terrorist	  infrastructure	  and	  arresting	  nearly	  2,000	  of	   their	  adherents.86	   	  Officials	  across	   the	  aisle	  in	  Israel	  look	  back	  on	  the	  1996	  crackdown	  by	  Arafat	  as	  a	  landmark	  moment	  for	  security	  cooperation	  with	  the	  Palestinians.87	  	  Peres	  later	  claimed	  that	  Arafat	  went	  so	  far	  in	  his	  confrontation	  with	  the	  Islamists	  to	  shave	  off	  their	  beards.88	  	  	  Arafat	  also	  stood	  with	  Peres	  and	  other	  world	   leaders	  at	  Sharm,	  pledging	   in	  his	   speech	   to	   “confront	   terrorism	   and	   uproot	   it	   from	   our	   land…	   confronting	   this	  terrorism	   and	   these	   extremist	   and	   dangerous	   wings	   of	   Hamas	   and	   the	   Jihad”.89	  	  Coordination	  behind	  the	  scenes	  was	  also	  unusually	  robust,	  with	  secret	  committees	  meeting	   ten	   times	   over	   the	   course	   of	   the	   following	   month	   and	   reaching	   secret	  agreements	  on	  information	  sharing	  and	  cooperation	  against	  terror.90	  	  	  	   Of	   course,	   it	   is	   difficult	   to	   pinpoint	   just	   how	  much	   of	   this	   effort	  was	   taken	  with	   Peres	   in	   mind,	   and	   there	   was	   certainly	   a	   more	   immediate	   self-­‐interested	  component	  to	  Arafat’s	  efforts.	  	  The	  closure	  imposed	  on	  the	  territories	  by	  Israel	  after	  the	   attacks	   was	   devastating	   for	   the	   Palestinian	   economy,	   and	   Arafat	   came	   under	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 This number was given by former interior security official Yisrael Hasson in Enderlin, Shattered 
Dreams, 34. 
87 See comments by Likud politician Silvan Shalom and by Hasson in Ilan Marciano, “Shalom: Hamas Win 
Will Lead to Chaos,” Yediot Ahronot (online), January 26, 2006; Enderlin, Shattered Dreams, 34. 
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East (Translated from March 13th edition of Palestinian TV Gaza, March 14, 1996). 
90 Savir, The Process, 295–297. 
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major	   pressure	   by	   Israel	   and	  Washington	   to	   be	   doing	   more.91	   	   He	   also	   probably	  viewed	  the	  Islamist	  attacks	  as	  a	  possible	  threat	  to	  his	  own	  power.92	  	  However,	  given	  that	   he	   also	   took	   other	   efforts	   to	   bolster	   Peres	   at	   this	   time,	   it	   is	   reasonable	   to	  suspect	   that	   the	   surge	   in	   counter-­‐terrorism	   cooperation	   may	   also	   have	   been	  motivated	  in	  part	  by	  the	  desire	  to	  help	  Peres.	  	  For	  instance,	  this	  is	  Charles	  Enderlin’s	  interpretation	  of	  Arafat’s	  motivation	  for	  the	  security	  crackdown.93	  	   Second,	   the	   PA	   secretly	   reached	   an	   agreement	  with	   Israel	   to	   postpone	   the	  IDF’s	   evacuation	   from	   Hebron	   until	   one	   month	   after	   the	   election.	   	   Peres	   advisor	  Savir	  notes	  that	  he	  personally	  negotiated	  such	  an	  agreement	  with	  Abu	  Mazen,	  and	  Abu	  Alaa	  later	  wrote	  that	  this	  was	  done	  with	  Peres’s	  government	  in	  mind,	  with	  the	  specific	  intention	  “to	  improve	  his	  electoral	  prospects”.94	  	   Third,	  Arafat	  agreed	  after	  meeting	  with	  Peres	  on	  April	  18th	  to	  call	  for	  a	  vote	  within	  the	  Palestinian	  National	  Council	  to	  change	  the	  PLO’s	  charter	  to	  reflect	  Israel	  and	   the	   PLO’s	   1993	   letters	   of	  mutual	   recognition	   and	   therefore	   remove	   elements	  calling	   for	   Israel’s	  destruction.95	   	  Again,	  Arafat	  did	  have	  external	  encouragement	  –	  including	  pledges	  of	  increased	  U.S.	  aid	  and	  a	  quid	  pro	  quo	  declaration	  by	  the	  Labor	  Party	   removing	   elements	   of	   its	   platform	  opposed	   to	   a	   Palestinian	   state	   –	   but	   this	  encouragement	   was	   supplemented	   by	   the	   desire	   to	   bolster	   Peres.96	   	   Indeed,	   to	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Peace Payoff: Arafat to Reap Rewards from Clinton, Peres,” Seattle Post-Intelligencer (Heart 
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maximize	   the	   symbolic	   impact	  on	   Israeli	  public	  opinion,	   the	  PNC	  held	   its	   vote	   the	  following	  week	  on	  Israeli	  independence	  day.97	  	   Fourth,	   PLO	   leaders	   helped	   Peres	   reach	   out	   to	   Israeli	   Arab	   voters,	   a	  traditionally	  stolid	  constituency	  of	  the	  Labor	  Party	  that	  was	  currently	  enraged	  over	  the	  Lebanese	  casualties	  caused	  by	  Operation	  Grapes	  of	  Wrath.	  	  Abu	  Alaa	  notes	  that	  “we	  encouraged	  our	  brethren	  inside	  the	  Green	  Line	  who	  were	  Israeli	  citizens	  to	  vote	  for	  him	  [Peres],	  in	  order	  to	  prevent	  Netanyahu’s	  victory”.98	   	  Reportedly,	  in	  Arafat’s	  April	  meeting	  with	  Peres,	  he	  gave	  Peres	  a	  list	  of	  30,000	  likely	  Arab	  voters.99	  	  When	  asked	   about	   these	   allegations,	   a	   former	   Peres	   advisor	   replied	   “I	   don’t	   want	   to	  comment	  on	  that”.100	  	   Fifth,	  after	  Arafat	  held	  meetings	  with	  Peres	  and	  with	  Clinton	  in	  Washington,	  the	  Israeli	  and	  Palestinian	  negotiating	  teams	  met	  in	  Taba	  on	  May	  5th	  to	  symbolically	  begin	  the	  task	  of	  final	  status	  negotiations	  under	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  Oslo	  I	  agreement	  of	  1993.	  	  The	  implication	  of	  the	  symbolic	  opening	  ceremony	  was	  that	  the	  talks	  would	  be	  resumed	  the	  following	  month,	  provided	  Peres	  won	  the	  Israeli	  election.101	  
<The	  Broader	  International	  Community’s	  Approach>	  	   American	   and	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   efforts	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election	  were	  perhaps	  the	  most	  prominent	  gestures	  but	  by	  no	  means	  the	  only	  ones.	  	  It	  is	  reasonable	  to	  presume	  that	  many	  of	  the	  nearly	  thirty	  states	  that	  sent	  high-­‐level	  delegations	   to	   Sharm	   El-­‐Sheikh	   sought	   to	   politically	   bolster	   Peres	   by	   doing	   so.	  	  Indeed,	  Savir	  claims	  that	  when	  “thirty	  national	  leaders,	  half	  of	  them	  from	  the	  Middle	  East,	   came	  to	  say	  no	   to	   terrorism…	  they	  were	  actually	   joining	  hands	   in	  support	  of	  one	  man:	  the	  prime	  minister	  of	  Israel”.102	  The	   monarchs	   of	   Qatar	   and	   Oman	   went	   on	   to	   welcome	   Peres	   on	  unprecedented	   state	   visits,	   during	   which	   he	   reached	   new	   agreements	   for	  commercial	  normalization	  and	  was	  welcomed	  with	  “red	  carpet”	  treatment	  including	  official	   government	   bands	   playing	   the	   Israeli	   national	   anthem,	  HaTikvah.103	   	   Also,	  the	  King	  of	  Morocco	  expressed	  his	  belief	  that	  a	  victory	  by	  Peres	  was	  “essential”	  for	  the	   peace	   process.104	   	   Egypt’s	   ambassador	   to	   Israel,	   Mohammed	   Basiouny,	  approvingly	   told	   the	  media	   in	   late	  May	   that	   “Labor	  has	   illustrated	  more	   flexibility	  concerning	   the	   peace	   process	   than	   any	   other	   Israeli	   party”.105	   	   The	   1996	   election	  was	  widely	  seen	  as	  one	  with	  crucial	  repercussions	  for	  the	  fate	  of	  peace	  and	  stability	  in	  the	  region,	  prompting	  an	  array	  of	  actors	  to	  try	  influencing	  the	  results.	  
<The	  Jordanian	  Approach>	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   Just	  as	  Jordan	  tried	  to	  influence	  the	  Israeli	  elections	  in	  1988,	  it	  also	  sought	  to	  weigh	  in	  on	  the	  Israeli	  election	  in	  1996.	   	  However,	  the	  direction	  of	  its	  support	  this	  time	   was	   counterintuitive,	   with	   the	   Hashemite	   Kingdom	   pursuing	   a	   marriage	   of	  ideological	   convenience	   with	   the	   right-­‐wing	   Israeli	   Likud	   Party.	   	   William	   Safire	  mused	   at	   the	   time	   that	   Jordan	   seemed	   to	   prefer	   a	   Likud	   victory	   over	   that	   of	   the	  ruling	  Labor	  Party,	  and	  it	  seems	  he	  may	  have	  been	  onto	  something	  in	  this	  regard.106	  	   Itamar	  Rabinovich	  writes	  after	  the	  fact	  that	  Safire’s	  suspicion	  was	  correct:	  	  “Jordan	   stood	   in	   a	   category	   by	   itself.	   	   King	  Hussein	   and	   his	   government	  were	   the	  only	  Arab	  party	   to	  have	  supported	  Netanyahu	  during	  his	  election	  campaign,	  being	  concerned	   that	  a	  victorious	  Peres	  would	  proceed	  swiftly	   to	  a	  sweeping	  agreement	  with	   Syria	   and	   the	   establishment	   of	   a	   Palestinian	   state.	   	   Netanyahu	   managed	   to	  persuade	   him	   that	   he	   would	   keep	   the	   peace	   process	   going	   at	   a	   level	   and	   pace	  suitable	  to	  Jordan’s	  political	  needs”.107	  	  Despite	  claims	  by	  King	  Hussein	  that	  “I	  did	  not	  interfere	  in	  the	  elections	  in	  any	  form	  or	  way,”	  his	  biographer	  Avi	  Shlaim	  notes	  that	  the	  Jordanian	   leader	  “did	  knowingly	  display	  a	  bias	   in	   favour	  of	  Netanyahu	  by	   inviting	  him	  to	  Amman	  on	   the	  eve	  of	   the	  elections	  while	  declining	  to	  extend	  an	  invitation	  to	  Peres”.108	  	  The	  king	  let	  the	  press	  know	  that	  Peres	  requested	  a	  similar	  invitation	  but	  had	  been	  turned	  down.109	  Shlaim	  writes	  that	  the	  decision	  was	  made	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  number	  of	  factors:	  the	  king’s	  dislike	  of	  Peres	  over	  his	  mishandling	  of	  both	   the	  1987	  London	  Accords	  and	  negotiations	  leading	  up	  to	  Israel’s	  1994	  peace	  treaty	  with	  Jordan,	  fear	  that	  Peres	  would	  pursue	  the	  peace	  process	  too	  precipitously	  and	  privilege	  Palestinian	  interests	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over	   Jordanian	   ones,	   frustration	   over	   Israel’s	   recent	   air	   strikes	   in	   Lebanon,	   and	  discomfort	   with	   the	   Israeli	   leader’s	   vision	   of	   an	   economically	   integrated	   “New	  Middle	  East,”	  which	  many	  Arab	   leaders	  saw	  as	  code	   for	   Israeli	  hegemony	   through	  trade.110	  	  	  The	   king	   made	   his	   decision	   over	   objections	   by	   at	   least	   some	   advisors,	  including	   his	   ambassador	   to	   Israel,	   Marwan	   Muasher.	   	   Muasher	   felt	   the	   king	  underestimated	   the	   Likud’s	   ideological	   resistance	   to	  Oslo.111	   	   Royal	   confidante	  Ali	  Shukri	  recalls	   that	  “His	  Majesty	  wanted	  Netanyahu	  to	  win	  because	  he	  thought	  this	  was	  a	  man	  he	  could	  deal	  with…	  Hussein	  did	  not	  believe	  for	  a	  moment	  that	  he	  would	  set	  out	  to	  destroy	  the	  peace…	  His	  Majesty	  wanted	  to	  give	  Netanyahu	  a	  chance”.112	  
<The	  Iranian	  Approach>	  	   A	   few	   years	   later,	   Dennis	   Ross	   reflected	   back	   on	   1996,	   telling	   Charles	  Enderlin	  that	  “we	  had	  information	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  the	  Iranians	  were	  encouraging	  this	  terrorism.”113	  	  Other	  U.S.	  officials	  who	  had	  access	  to	  classified	  intelligence	  at	  the	  time	   such	   as	   Ken	   Pollack	   and	   Martin	   Indyk	   have	   also	   written	   that	   the	   Islamic	  Republic	  of	  Iran	  intentionally	  encouraged	  terrorism	  against	  Israel	  in	  order	  to	  defeat	  peace	  at	  the	  Israeli	  ballot	  box.114	  Steve	   Simon,	  who	   served	   on	   the	  NSC	   in	   a	   counterterrorism	   capacity	   at	   the	  time,	   said	   that	   “the	   U.S.	   in	   this	   period	   had	   very	   specific	   information	   about	   Iran	  pressing	   Palestine	   Islamic	   Jihad	   to	   do	   what	   they	   were	   being	   paid	   to	   do…	   acting	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sufficiently	   vigorously	   to	   stymie	   those	   peace	   talks”	   in	   advance	   of	   the	   1996	  election.115	   	   Indyk	  also	  remarked	  that	  “then	  there	  was	  a	   lot	  of	   intelligence,	  a	   lot	  of	  intelligence,	   that	   the	   IRGC	   was	   ramping	   up	   its	   efforts	   to	   attack	   Israeli	   targets	   in	  advance	  of	  the	  election”.116	  	  Despite	  assurances	  by	  Iran’s	  president,	  Rafsanjani,	  that	  Iran	   had	   ruled	   out	   “practical	   interference,	   executive	   action,	   or	   the	   physical	  prevention	  of	  developments”	  in	  the	  Oslo	  process,	  it	  seems	  pretty	  clear	  that	  by	  1996	  Iran	  was	  interfering	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  Peres’s	  reelection	  campaign.117	  American	  information	  was	  also	  confirmed	  by	  Israeli	  data.	  	  After	  the	  election,	  Peres	  told	  a	  reporter	  that	  “we	  had	  clear	  documents	  –	  I	  read	  them	  –	  regarding	  Iran’s	  involvement	  with	  the	  intention	  of	  toppling	  the	  (Israeli)	  government”.118	  	  Even	  more	  remarkably,	   his	   head	   of	   military	   intelligence,	   Maj.	   Gen.	   Moshe	   Ya’alon,	   also	   told	  reporters	   that	   Iran	   was	   behind	   the	   assault	   for	   fear	   that	   Peres’s	   reelection	   and	  pursuit	   of	   the	   peace	   process	   could	   leave	   Iran	   isolated	   in	   the	   region.119	   	   Ya’alon	  commented	  that	  “one	  of	  Iran’s	  main	  assumptions	  is	  that	  a	  change	  of	  governments	  in	  Israel	   will	   cause	   a	   blow	   to	   the	   peace	   process”.120	   	   Given	   that	   Ya’alon	   was	   then	   a	  career	  military	   officer	   and	   later	   joined	   forces	  with	   the	   Likud	  Party,	   not	   Labor	   (he	  currently	   serves	   as	   one	   of	   Netanyahu’s	   vice	   prime	   ministers),	   his	   statements	   on	  behalf	  of	  Peres	  should	  be	  given	  added	  credence.	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Ya’alon	  also	  attributed	  an	   Iranian	  role	  not	   just	   to	   the	  Hezbollah	  attacks	  but	  even	  to	  the	  earlier	  suicide	  bombings	  by	  Hamas	  and	  Islamic	  Jihad.121	  	  Indyk	  disputes	  this	   last	   claim,	   suggesting	   that	   only	   the	   last	   Palestinian	   suicide	   attack,	   by	   Islamic	  Jihad,	   involved	  major	   Iranian	  direction.	   	   Instead,	   he	   argues	   that	   the	  Hamas	   attack	  was	  motivated	  only	  by	   revenge	   for	   the	  killing	  of	  Yahya	  Ayyash122	   	  However,	   Savir	  mentions	   that	   Israel	   received	   word	   from	   Palestinian	   intelligence	   services	   that	  Hamas	  detainees	  reported	  a	  similar	  reading	  of	  Iran’s	  intentions.123	  	  Christopher	  had	  told	   the	   press	   that	   “we	   think	   Iran	   is	   deeply	   involved	   in	   this	   [the	   Hamas	   and	   PIJ	  attacks]	  at	  various	  levels	  –	  encouragement,	  funding,	  and	  perhaps	  some	  direction”.124	  	  Did	  the	  Policy	  Succeed?	  Somewhat	   counterintuitively,	   I	   believe	   the	   answer	   to	   this	  question	   actually	  yes.	   	   Peres	   failed	   to	  win	  his	   election,	   and	  American	  officials	   afterwards	   concluded	  that	  their	  efforts	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  campaign	  period	  had	  begun	  to	  work	  against	  his	  cause.	   	  However,	  the	  prime	  minister	  would	  never	  even	  have	  been	  able	  to	  seriously	  contest	  the	  election	  without	  the	  lavish	  support	  he	  was	  receiving	  from	  Washington.	  	  Without	  such	  help	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  envision	  Peres	  coming	  as	  he	  did	  within	  less	  than	  one	   percent	   of	  winning	   the	   1996	   election,	   a	  margin	   small	   enough	   to	   suggest	   that	  there	  was	  a	  good	  chance	  he	  actually	  could	  have	  won.	  	  	  I	   believe	   that	   Palestinian	   efforts	   should	   also	   be	   viewed	   as	   a	   success,	  while	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Jordanian	  and	  broader	   international	  efforts	  should	  be	  coded	  a	   failure.	   	  Finally,	   the	  Iranian	  attempt,	  if	  there	  was	  one,	  should	  be	  coded	  a	  cruel,	  Machiavellian	  success.	  	  Of	  course,	   this	   analysis	   relies	   heavily	   upon	   rather	   complex	   counterfactual	   scenarios.	  	  However,	  I	  know	  of	  no	  other	  technique	  for	  judging	  the	  efficacy	  of	  the	  policy	  that	  was	  actually	  chosen	  in	  this	  instance	  against	  possible	  alternative	  approaches.	  
<The	  American	  Approach>	  My	   argument	   here	   is	   somewhat	   at	   odds	  with	   the	   conventional	  wisdom	   on	  this	   case.	   	   For	   instance,	   Peres	   biographer	   Michael	   Bar-­‐Zohar	   writes	   that	   Sharm’s	  “impact	   on	   Israel’s	   public	   opinion	   was	   nil.	   	   Peres	   still	   hadn’t	   understood	   that	  international	   conferences	   had	   no	   influence	   on	   Israelis;	   a	   single	  military	   operation	  would	  have	  been	  much	  more	  effective”.125	  	  French	  journalist	  Charles	  Enderlin	  claims	  that	  the	  sad	  truth	  of	  Sharm	  was	  that	  it	  “will	  have	  no	  impact	  on	  Israeli	  opinion”.126	  Peres	  advisor	  Yossi	  Beilin	  volunteered	  that	  Sharm	  “had	  no	  impact,”	  that	  the	  candidate’s	   visits	   to	   Qatar	   and	   Oman	   “didn’t	   add	   anything,”	   and	   that	   “the	   gap	  between	  the	  situation	  on	  the	  ground…	  and	  the	  ceremonies”	  may	  have	  been	  seen	  by	  many	   Israelis	   “as	   something	   very	   artificial	   effort	   to	   gain	   some	   votes	   in	   the	   last	  moment”.127	   	   However,	   Beilin	   acknowledged	   that	   the	   basis	   for	   his	   claims	   was	  “because	  he	  lost	  in	  the	  end,”	  not	  because	  “it	  didn’t	  improve	  his	  vote	  share”.128	  Similarly,	  Martin	   Indyk	  claims	   that	  Clinton	  was	  simultaneously	  meddling	   in	  Israel	  and	  Russia	  but	  “in	  one	  case	  it	  worked,	  in	  the	  other	  case	  it	  didn’t”.	  	  Then	  again,	  Indyk	  also	  admits	   that	  “I’ve	  got	   to	  be	  careful	  about	   ‘worked’	  because,	   just	  because	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Peres	  lost	  and	  Yeltsin	  won	  doesn’t	  mean	  [that]”.129	  Yet	  in	  order	  to	  reach	  valid	  inferences	  in	  this	  regard,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  parse	  U.S.	   efforts	  over	   time	   into	   separate	   sub-­‐periods.	   	   For	   instance,	   Indyk	  believes	   that	  “our	  efforts	  were	  counterproductive	  at	   the	  end,	  we	  went	   too	   far,	  Clinton	  went	   too	  far,	   it	   became	   obvious	   in	   the	   later	   stages	   of	   the	   campaign	   that	   it	   was	   creating	   a	  backlash	  –	  it	  looked	  like	  interference	  and	  people	  didn’t	  like	  it”.130	  	  Although	  Dennis	  Ross	   recognizes	   that	   “at	   one	   level	   everything	   that	   Clinton	   did	   short	   of	   that	   last	  interview	  really	  did	  help	  Peres	  in	  a	  way	  that	  might	  have	  made	  him	  the	  winner	  had	  it	  not	  been	  for	   the	  Israeli-­‐Arab	  backlash	  over	  what	  had	  happened	   in	  Lebanon,”131	  he	  also	  rightly	  points	  out	   in	  his	  book	  that	  Clinton’s	   later	  efforts	  to	  boost	  Peres	   in	   late	  April	   and	   early	   May	   did	   not	   boost	   Peres’s	   poll	   numbers.132	   	   However,	   the	  administration’s	  earlier	  efforts	  –	  most	  notably	   its	   leading	  role	  pulling	   together	   the	  conference	   at	   Sharm	   –	   do	   seem	   to	   have	   played	   a	   crucial	   role	   in	   resuscitating	   the	  prime	  minister’s	  standing	  after	  the	  wave	  of	  suicide	  bombings	  that	  spring.	  	  	  Whereas	   one	   week	   before	   the	   conference	   Peres	   was	   polling	   three	   points	  down	   from	   Netanyahu,	   two	   weeks	   afterwards	   he	   was	   six	   to	   eight	   points	   up,	   a	  relative	   difference	   of	   between	   nine	   and	   eleven	   percentage	   points.133	   	   It	   therefore	  makes	  sense	  that,	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Clinton	  visits	  to	  Egypt	  and	  Israel,	  Peres’s	  advisor	  Uri	  Savir	  reportedly	  responded	  to	  Bill	  Clinton’s	  hug	  and	  comment	  “Uri,	   I	  hope	  I’ve	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helped	   somewhat”	   by	   saying	   “more	   than	   I	   can	   express	   to	   you,	   Mr.	   President”.134	  	  Ross	  concurs	  that	  “the	  summit	  served	  its	  purpose	  in	  Israel.	  	  As	  Shimon	  Peres	  stood	  before	   the	  cameras	  of	   the	  world	  media	  with	  Arab	   leaders,	   the	   Israeli	  public	   saw	  a	  regional	  transformation”.135	  Thus,	  judged	  by	  the	  evidentiary	  standard	  set	  out	  and	  defended	  in	  the	  theory	  chapter	   of	   this	   dissertation	   –	   contributory	   causation	   –	   the	   1996	   case	   of	   Peres’s	  defeat	  should	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  success	  for	  American	  diplomacy	  given	  that	  it	  added	  to	  political	   strength	   of	   the	   president’s	   favored	   Israeli	   partner.	   	   The	   fact	   that	   Peres	  ultimately	  lost	  the	  election	  obscures	  the	  fact	  that	  American	  diplomacy	  strengthened	  his	  position	  as	  a	  candidate	  and	  enabled	  him	  to	  nearly	  win	  the	  election.	   	  Had	  Peres	  run	   a	   less	   lackluster	   campaign,136	   had	   Syria	   kept	   its	   promises	   to	   discourage	  Hezbollah	   from	   attacking	   Israel,	   or	   had	   a	   stray	   Israeli	   bomb	  not	   fallen	   on	   the	  UN	  facility	   at	   Qana,	   U.S.	   support	   probably	   could	   have	   put	   Peres	   over	   the	   top.	   	   In	   this	  sense,	   the	   1996	   case	   should	   be	   coded	   a	   “narrow	   success”	   at	   the	   goal	   of	   trying	   to	  impact	   Israel’s	   leadership	   contest,	   even	   if	   the	   outcome	   was	   not	   to	   America’s	  liking.137	  The	  case	  should	  also	  be	  coded	  a	  “broader	  success”	  given	  (A)	  that	  a	  Peres	  win	  would	   have	   advanced	   Washington’s	   hopes	   for	   peace	   and	   (B)	   that	   such	   partisan	  intervention	   was	   remarkably	   cost-­‐free	   in	   the	   event	   of	   a	   Netanyahu	   win.	   	   Indyk	  insists	  that	  “if	  Peres	  had	  been	  elected…	  we	  would	  have	  finished	  a	  Syrian	  deal,	  I	  was	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137 Obviously, this analysis hinges upon a number of tenuous counterfactuals.  However, I know of no other 
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confident	   of	   that”.138	   	   Ross	  writes	   “I	   am	   convinced	   that	   had	  Peres	  been	   elected	   in	  1996,	  we	  would	  have	  been	  able	  to	  conclude	  a	  Syrian	  deal	  within	  a	  year’s	  time”.139	  Nor	  does	  it	  seem	  that	  U.S.	  intervention	  deserves	  blame	  for	  spoiling	  bilateral	  relations.	  	  After	  the	  election,	  both	  Netanyahu	  and	  Clinton	  faced	  strong	  incentives	  to	  emphasize	   their	   eagerness	   to	   work	   together	   in	   good	   faith.	   	   Further,	   the	   general	  consensus	   in	   the	   literature	   is	   that	   the	  awful	   tenor	  of	   relations	  during	  Netanyahu’s	  first	   term	   was	   attributable	   to	   contradictory	   basic	   preferences	   and	   incongruent	  policy	  win	  sets,	  not	  as	  a	  result	  of	  bad	  blood	  from	  the	  1996	  campaign.140	  Incidentally,	  it	  is	  also	  important	  to	  address	  two	  prominent	  myths	  about	  what	  drove	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  1996	  election:	  blank	  votes	  cast	  by	  Arab-­‐Israeli	  voters	  and	  an	   autarkist	   Netanyahu	   campaign	   propelled	   by	   nationalist	   resentment	   at	   outside	  meddling	   in	   Israeli	   affairs.	   	   For	   instance,	   observers	   frequently	   suggest	   that	   blank	  Arab	   ballots	   singlehandedly	   tipped	   the	   result	   against	   Peres,	   pointing	   out	   that	   this	  segment	  of	  the	  population	  comprises	  about	  a	  fifth	  of	  Israel’s	  citizen	  population	  and	  was	  incensed	  by	  Operation	  Grapes	  of	  Wrath.	  Clayton	  Swisher	  claims	   that	   “Peres	   lost	  support	   from	  the	  usually	  pro-­‐Labor	  Arab	   Israeli	   voters	   –	   twenty	   percent	   of	   the	   country’s	   population	   –	   following	   the	  Israeli	   military’s	   shelling	   of	   the	   UN	   refugee	   camp	   in	   Qana	   in	   southern	   Lebanon.	  	  Outraged	  at	  the	  killing	  of	  over	  one	  hundred	  civilians,	  most	  Arab	  Israelis	  condemned	  Peres	  as	  a	   ‘war	  criminal’	  and	  boycotted	  the	  elections.141	   	  Indyk	  suggested	  that	  as	  a	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139 Ross, The Missing Peace, 244. 
140 For an article that raises the alternative perspective, see James Zogby, “Cash, Campaigning and Quite a 
Few Cooks,” Al-Ahram Weekly, January 28, 1999. 
141 Clayton E. Swisher, The Truth About Camp David (Nation Books, 2004), 7. 
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result	  of	  “the	  loss	  of	  the	  Arab	  vote,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  Operations	  Grapes	  of	  Wrath,”	  Peres	  “lost	  10%.	  	  I	  think	  that	  was	  decisive…	  at	  that	  point	  the	  Arabs	  represented	  10%	  of	  the	  electorate…	  maybe	  he	  got	  1%	  from	  this	  10%”.142	  	  Dennis	  Ross	  concurs	  that	  “you	  had	  a	   lot	   of	   Arabs	   cast	   blank	   ballots	   and	   that	   probably	   cost	   –	   I	   think	   given	   the	   small	  margin	   of	   defeat,	   had	   that	   not	   been	   the	   case,	   Peres	   would	   have	   won”.143	   	   This	  argument	  was	  echoed	  by	  both	  Israeli	  politicians	  and	  by	  scholars.144	  However,	   this	  argument	   rests	  upon	   faulty	  assumptions.	   	  Contrary	   to	  claims	  by	   Swisher,	   there	   was	   not	   a	   massive	   Arab	   boycott	   in	   1996.	   	   In	   fact,	   Arab-­‐Israeli	  turnout	  in	  1996	  was	  77%,	  higher	  than	  in	  any	  other	  Israeli	  election	  to	  date	  in	  the	  last	  four	  decades.145	  	  Nor	  was	  the	  rate	  at	  which	  Arabs	  voted	  for	  Peres	  anywhere	  near	  as	  low	   as	   suggested	   by	   Indyk.	   	   In	   fact,	   Arabs	   voted	   for	   Peres	   at	   a	   rate	   of	   88%,	   and,	  among	   those	   who	   did	   not	   spoil	   their	   ballots,	   that	   figure	   actually	   rises	   to	   a	  remarkable	   95%.146	   	   Although	   the	   rate	   of	   Arab	   abstention	   by	   blank	   ballot	   for	   PM	  was	   somewhat	   high	   in	   1996,	   7.3%	   relative	   to	   the	   national	   rate	   of	   4.7%,	   the	  absolutely	   number	   of	   such	   Arab	   ballots	   was	   22,912,	   not	   enough	   to	   have	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singlehandedly	   swayed	   the	   result,	   since	   Peres	   ultimately	   lost	   by	   nearly	   30,000	  votes.147	   	  Such	  estimates	  are	  especially	  problematic	  given	  that	  only	  about	  8,000	  of	  those	  blank	  Arab	  ballots	  were	  likely	  cast	  by	  conscious	  choice.148	  Instead,	   the	   truth	   seems	   to	   lie	   somewhere	   in	   between.	   	   The	   Arab	   vote	  mattered,	  and	  Operation	  Grapes	  of	  Wrath	  seriously	  alienated	  likely	  Arab	  voters,	  but	  blank	  ballots	  alone	  did	  not	  sway	  the	  election.	  	  In	  reality	  Peres	  would	  have	  needed	  a	  major	  increase	  not	  just	  in	  valid	  ballots	  but	  also	  in	  Arab-­‐Israeli	  turnout	  beyond	  even	  the	  unusually	  high	  rate	  of	  77%.	  	  Indeed,	  this	  was	  one	  of	  the	  unexpected	  weak	  points	  of	   Peres’s	   campaign;	   his	   policy	   advisor	   Savir	   and	   campaign	   director	   Moishe	  Theumim	  both	   reflected	   that	   the	   campaign’s	   turnout	   among	  Arab-­‐Israelis,	   though	  high,	  was	  still	  less	  than	  they	  had	  been	  anticipating.149	  	   However,	   the	   story	   of	   turnout	   in	   the	   1996	   Israeli	   election	   would	   be	  incomplete	  without	  looking	  at	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  equation,	  given	  that	  the	  Likud’s	  turnout	  was	  also	  much	  higher	   than	  had	  been	  expected.	   	  Part	  of	  this	  was	  caused	  by	  religious	   right-­‐wing	   voters	   who	   refused	   to	   participate	   in	   exit	   polling.	   	   However,	  another	   part	   of	   the	   story	   has	   to	   do	   with	   outside	   funding	   and	   endorsement	   for	  Netanyahu	   beyond	   Israel’s	   borders.	   	   Just	   as	   the	   Lubavitch	   Rebbe,	   leader	   of	   New	  York-­‐based	  messianic	  Chabad	  movement,	  played	  a	   critical	   role	   in	   scuttling	  Peres’s	  1990	  efforts	   to	   form	  a	  pro-­‐peace	  government,	   in	  1996	  his	   longtime	  aide	  on	   Israel	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issues,	   Australian	   mining	   tycoon	   Joseph	   Gutnick,	   played	   a	   key	   role	   in	   saving	  Netanyahu	   two	   years	   after	   the	   rabbi’s	   death.	   	   “Diamond	   Joe”	   Gutnick	   was	  responsible	   for	   an	   iconic	   billboard	   campaign	   before	   the	   vote	   proclaiming	   that	  “Netanyahu	   is	   good	   for	   the	   Jews”	   and	  directed	  a	  massive	   infusion	  of	   international	  cash	   that	  gave	  Netanyahu	  unexpectedly	  high	   turnout	  during	   the	  election,	  enabling	  him	  to	  beat	  U.S.	  and	  Labor	  expectations	  of	  the	  likely	  election	  results.150	  Also,	   Netanyahu’s	   highly	   effective	   negative	   campaign	   strategy	   was	   crafted	  primarily	  by	  an	  American	  advisor,	  Republican	  consultant	  Arthur	  Finkelstein.	  	  Israeli	  journalists	   report	   that	   at	   one	   point	   Bibi	   told	   his	   staff	   “you	   all	   answer	   to	   Arthur”	  now.151	  	  A	  joint	  investigation	  by	  Ha’aretz	  and	  the	  New	  York	  Jewish	  Week	  discovered	  that	  Finkelstein	  had	  been	  introduced	  to	  Netanyahu	  and	  funded	  to	  help	  him	  by	  Ron	  Lauder,	  a	  wealthy,	  New	  York-­‐based	  Jewish	  community	  activist.152	  	  Netanyahu	  might	  not	  have	  received	  an	  advance	  from	  Random	  House	  to	  write	  his	  1993	  book,	  A	  Place	  
among	   the	   Nations,	   without	   intervention	   and	   a	   personal	   guarantee	   by	   Lauder,	  enabling	  Bibi	  promote	  his	  message	  before	  Israel’s	  formal	  campaign	  period.153	  Additionally,	  Netanyahu	  probably	  solicited	  King	  Hussein	  of	  Jordan’s	  gestures	  on	   his	   behalf.	   	   The	   U.S.,	   Palestinian,	   and	   broader	   international	   efforts	   to	   bolster	  Peres	  provoked	  no	  small	  measure	  of	  outrage	  on	  the	  right	  –	  including	  accusations	  by	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Netanyahu	   and	   others	   that	   Washington	   was	   violating	   its	   ally’s	   sovereignty.154	  	  However,	   such	   claims	   need	   to	   be	   viewed	   skeptically	   as	   a	   politically	   self-­‐serving	  narrative	  that	  is	  no	  less	  opportunistic	  than	  Labor’s	  specious	  claims	  that	  U.S.	  actions	  had	  absolutely	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  meddling.	  	  Even	  leaving	  aside	  the	  broader	  issue	  of	  efforts	  by	  Tehran	  to	  bolster	  the	  Israeli	  right,	  Likud’s	  victory	  also	  rested	  on	  outside	  meddling	   in	   its	   favor	   –	   meddling	   that	   it	   welcomed	   and	   probably	   solicited.	  	  Netanyahu	   blasted	   both	   Peres	   and	   Rabin	   for	   being	   the	   beneficiaries	   of	   Yasser	  Arafat’s	  political	  support,	  but	  Barak	  rightly	  retorted	  where	  Peres	  stayed	  silent	  that	  Netanyahu	  was	  probably	  the	  favored	  choice	  of	  Sheikh	  Ahmed	  Yassin,	  the	  founder	  of	  Hamas,	  whose	  group’s	  attacks	  may	  have	  also	  been	  aimed	  at	  spoiling	  the	  ballot.155	  
<The	  Palestinian	  Approach>	  Assessing	  efficacy	  of	  other	  LSI	  efforts	   in	  1996	  –	  by	   the	  PA,	   for	   instance	  –	   is	  somewhat	   more	   challenging,	   especially	   given	   their	   chronological	   overlap	   with	  similar	  U.S.	  efforts.	  	  Certainly,	  the	  PA’s	  cooperation	  on	  security	  and	  other	  issues	  was	  critical	   for	   giving	  Peres	   a	   chance	   to	   recover	   from	   the	  February	  and	  March	   suicide	  bombings,	   so	   in	   this	   regard	   their	   contribution	  should	  also	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	   success.	  	  Although	   measuring	   specific	   contributions	   more	   precisely	   is	   not	   feasible,	   it	   is	  important	   to	   recognize,	  as	  Dennis	  Ross	  concluded	   in	   response	   to	   the	   first	  wave	  of	  terror	  attacks	  in	  1996,	  that	  “without	  a	  serious	  crackdown	  by	  Arafat	  on	  Hamas	  and	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Islamic	  Jihad,	  there	  would	  be	  no	  peace	  process	  and	  no	  Peres	  government”.156	  
<The	  Broader	  International	  Community’s	  Approach>	  	   Similarly,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  pinpoint	  the	  exact	  contribution	  of	  broader	  efforts	  to	  bolster	  Peres	  during	   this	  period.	   	  However,	   it	   is	   likely	   that	   their	   contribution	  was	  fleeting	   because	   their	   support	  was	   shown	   to	   be	   so	   flimsy.	   	   As	   noted	   above,	   Yossi	  Beilin	  remains	  skeptical	  that	  the	  Qatari	  and	  Omani	  gestures	  were	  seen	  positively	  by	  Israel’s	  public	  because	  of	  the	  gap	  between	  words	  and	  deeds	  in	  a	  time	  of	  terrorism.	  Yet	  it	  is	  interesting	  to	  ponder	  whether	  this	  might	  not	  have	  been	  the	  case	  had	  the	  second	  campaign	  of	  terrorism	  from	  the	  north	  in	  1996	  not	  occurred.	  	  The	  optics	  of	  Arab	  and	  European	  backing	   for	  Peres	  were	  almost	   immediately	  undermined	  by	  the	   sudden	  wave	  of	   international	   condemnation	   that	   followed	   the	  deaths	  at	  Qana.	  	  Instead	  of	  backing	  Israel,	  Qatari	  diplomats	  boycotted	  a	  peace	  process	  meeting	  later	  that	  month	   in	   protest,	   the	   UN	  General	   Assembly	   passed	   a	   resolution	   condemning	  Israel	   for	   the	   violence,	   and	   European	   press	   decried	   the	   Israeli	   campaign	   as	  tantamount	   to	   war	   crimes.157	   	   Boutros	   Boutros-­‐Ghali	   even	   issued	   a	   UN	   report	  suggesting	  that	  Israel	  may	  have	  intentionally	  attacked	  the	  facility	  at	  Qana.158	  This	   Israeli	   bombing	   at	   Qana	   and	   the	   broader	   context	   of	   Lebanese-­‐Israeli	  violence	  erased	  the	  perceived	  gains	  of	  Sharm	  and	  Peres’s	  trip	  to	  the	  Gulf.	  	  Otherwise,	  the	  massive	  showing	  Arab	  support	  against	   terrorism	  probably	  would	  have	  carried	  over	  much	  more	   firmly	   through	   the	  election	  period.	   	  But	   the	  attacks	  by	  Hezbollah	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General Assembly Condemns Israeli Attacks on Civilians,” Reuters News, April 26, 1996; “Gulf Press 
Condemns ‘Blind’ U.S. Military Support for Israel,” Agence France-Presse (AFP), April 30, 1996. 
158 Boutros-Ghali, Unvanquished, 263. 
	  	   394	  
revealed	  the	  frailness	  of	  multilateral	  enthusiasm	  for	  Israel	  and	  therefore	  weakened	  their	  attempts	  at	  LSI	  while	  bolstering	  the	  narrative	  of	  the	  Israeli	  right.	   	  It	  was	  only	  after	   the	   second	   round	   of	   attacks	   on	   Israel	   and	   the	   massacre	   at	   Qana	   that	   the	  politically	  moderate	   IDF	   chief	   of	   staff	   Amnon	   Lipkin-­‐Shahak	   allegedly	   complained	  that	  “the	  peace	  camp	  just	  lost	  the	  elections”.159	  	  	  
<The	  Jordanian	  Approach>	  Another	  observation	  worth	  noting	  is	  the	  disastrous	  nature	  of	  King	  Hussein	  of	  Jordan’s	  temporary	  flirtation	  with	  a	  marriage	  of	  convenience	  to	  the	  Likud.	  	  Despite	  the	  king’s	  initial	  impression	  that	  Netanyahu	  would	  be	  better	  for	  Jordanian	  interests	  than	   a	   full	   term	   under	   Peres,	   the	   new	   PM’s	   provocative	   posture	   toward	   the	  Palestinians	  and	  a	  botched	  Israeli	  assassination	  plot	  against	  Khaled	  Meshal	  inside	  of	  Jordanian	   territory	   soon	   persuaded	   Hussein	   that	   he	   had	   been	   sorely	  mistaken	   to	  place	   his	   trust	   in	   the	   Likud	   leader.160	   	  He	   soon	   “severed	  his	   personal	   relationship	  with	  Netanyahu”.161	   	  As	  Marwan	  Muasher	   later	   reflects,	   the	  king	   found	  Netanyahu	  was	  “someone	  who	  did	  not	  keep	  his	  word,	  and	  he	  often	  retreated	  on	  commitments	  made	   to	   Jordan	  without	   consideration	   for	   its	   delicate	   situation”;	   after	   the	  Meshal	  assassination	   attempt	   “the	   king	   felt	   that	   Netanyahu	   had	   essentially	   spit	   on	   the	  Jordan-­‐Israel	  peace	  treaty…	  almost	  caus[ing]	  the	  king	  to	  abrogate	  the	  treaty”.162	  Avi	   Shlaim	   may	   be	   overreaching	   when	   he	   claims	   that	   “Hussein’s	   not-­‐so-­‐subtle	   support	   for	  Netanyahu	  probably	   tipped	   the	   [electoral]	  balance	   in	  his	   favor”	  by	   enabling	   Netanyahu	   “to	   tell	   the	   Israeli	   public	   that…	   he	   was	   acceptable	   as	   a	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partner	  to	  their	  favourite	  Arab	  leader”.163	  	  No	  doubt,	  Netanyahu	  certainly	  seemed	  to	  appreciate	   the	   Jordanian	   gesture,	  making	  King	  Hussein	   the	   first	   foreign	   leader	   he	  called	  on	  the	  phone	  to	  consult	  with	  after	  his	  election	  victory.164	   	  However,	  there	  is	  little	   to	  support	   the	  notion	   that	   in	  hindsight	  King	  Hussein	  would	  have	  viewed	  this	  effort	   as	   beneficial	   for	   Jordanian	   interests.	   	   Thus,	   the	   attempt	   by	   Jordan	   to	   back	  Netanyahu	  in	  1996	  should	  be	  coded	  as	  a	  narrow	  success	  but	  a	  broader	  failure.165	  
<The	  Iranian	  Approach>	  	   Perhaps	   the	   biggest	   “success”	   story	   of	   outside	   intervention	   during	   Israel’s	  1996	  election	  should	  be	  the	  alleged	  attempt	  by	  Iran.	  	  If	  indeed	  some	  segment	  of	  the	  leadership	   in	   Tehran	   (probably	   the	   IRGC	   with	   backing	   from	   Supreme	   Leader	  Khamene’i)	  decided	   its	   interests	  were	  served	  by	  weakening	  Peres	  and	  encouraged	  the	   attacks	   that	   spring	   by	  Hamas,	   Islamic	   Jihad,	   and/or	  Hezbollah	   to	   achieve	   this	  aim,	   then	   from	   their	   perspective	   this	   episode	   should	   be	   judged	   a	   remarkably	  effective,	  albeit	  cruel,	  success.	  Combined,	   these	   two	   waves	   of	   terror	   against	   Israel	   ultimately	   enabled	  Netanyahu	   to	   edge	   out	   Peres.	   	   In	   so	   doing,	   the	   terror	   attacks	   also	   would	   have	  furthered	  the	  broader,	  strategic	  objectives	  of	  those	  Iranian	  officials	  by	  scuttling	  the	  Oslo	   process	   between	   Israel	   and	   the	   PA	   and	   ensuring	   that	   Damascus	   remained	  aligned	  with	  Tehran.	  	  Although	  this	  episode	  did	  heighten	  U.S.	  threat	  perceptions	  vis-­‐
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à-­‐vis	   Iran,166	   Washington	   was	   already	   engaged	   in	   trying	   to	   isolate	   the	   Iranian	  regime,	   and	   the	   actors	  who	   likely	   spearheaded	   this	   Iranian	   intervention	   in	   Israeli	  politics	  actually	  benefit	  domestically	  from	  prolonged	  enmity	  with	  the	  U.S.	  	  
Coding	  the	  Observable	  Implications	  
1.	  Perceptions	  of	  Sender	  Interests:	  	   In	   1996,	   the	   United	   States	  went	   to	   extraordinary	   length	   to	   salvage	   Israel’s	  Labor	   government	   at	   the	   polls.	   	   Leadership	   theory	   (Theory	  #4)	   provides	   a	   better	  explanation	  for	  this	  pattern	  of	  behavior	  than	  do	  theories	  one	  through	  three.	  	  Lobby-­‐legislative	   politics	   (Theory	   #2)	   predicts	   that	   the	   U.S.	   should	   not	   have	   intervened	  because	  it	  should	  not	  have	  seen	  its	  interests	  as	  being	  at	  stake.	  	  Thus,	  the	  occurrence	  of	  meddling	  in	  1996	  is	  not	  congruent	  with	  the	  predictions	  of	  the	  theory.	  	   Bureaucratic	   politics	   (Theory	   #3)	  would	   have	   predicted	  meddling	   because	  working	  level	  officials	  in	  executive	  agencies	  tend	  to	  see	  American	  interests	  at	  stake	  in	   Israeli	   elections.	   	   Thus,	   the	   basic	   outcome	   is	   congruent	   with	   the	   theory’s	  predictions.	   	   However,	   the	   causal	   processes	   along	   the	   way	   do	   not	   fit	   with	   the	  dynamics	   of	   a	   bureaucracy-­‐driven	   process.	   	   The	   two	   main	   pathways	   of	  administration	  support	  were	  symbolic	  declarations	  of	  support	  and	  practical	  actions	  of	  support,	  and	  both	  pathways	  were	  top-­‐down	  rather	  than	  bottom-­‐up	  affairs.	  Rhetorical	   gestures	   of	   support,	   such	   as	   Clinton’s	   visits	   to	   Sharm	   el-­‐Sheikh	  and	  Rabin’s	  gravesite,	  were	  matters	  of	  flashy	  high	  politics	  not	  lowly	  organizational	  calculations.	  	  And	  almost	  every	  concrete	  action	  that	  the	  United	  States	  took	  to	  bolster	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Peres	  came	  in	  the	  form	  of	  security	  assistance	  above	  and	  beyond	  what	  bureaucrats	  had	  determined	  was	  appropriate	  for	  meeting	  Israel’s	  defense	  needs.	  Perhaps	  the	  most	  telling	  example	  is	  the	  Nautilus	  laser	  system.	  	  Giving	  Israel	  access	  to	  the	  Nautilus	  meant	  reinvigorating	  a	  weapons	  program	  that	  the	  Pentagon	  had	  all	  but	  given	  up	  on	  for	  being	  faulty	  and	  too	  expensive.	  	  In	  fact,	  the	  Nautilus	  was	  eventually	  abandoned	  after	  another	  decade	  of	  wasted	  money	  for	  the	  same	  reasons	  its	  prospects	  had	  originally	  been	  doubted.167	   	  None	  of	   these	  dynamics	   fit	  with	   the	  predictions	  of	  the	  bureaucratic	  politics	  approach.	  	  Bruce	  Riedel	  acknowledges	  that	  “I	  was	  at	  the	  Pentagon	  [as	  a	  political	  appointee]	  at	  the	  time,	  and	  we	  were	  coming	  up	  with	  whatever	  security	  help	  we	  could	  give	  Israel,	  including	  this	  fancy	  laser	  system…	  called	  the	  Nautilus…	  which	  the	  Israelis	  were	  very	  enthusiastic	  about	  which	  frankly	  our	  own	  scientists	  thought	  was	  a	  pipe	  dream	  which	  wouldn’t	  work”.168	  	   National	  interests	  theory,	  which	  views	  foreign	  policy	  behaviors	  as	  the	  result	  of	   rational	   calculations	   of	   state	   interest	   from	   a	   unitary	   frame	   of	   reference,	   is	   also	  consonant	  with	  U.S.	  backing	  for	  Peres.	  	  However,	  it	  cannot	  explain	  his	  initial	  support	  from	  the	  broader	  international	  community	  only	  to	  abandon	  his	  cause	  after	  Lebanon.	  Regional	  leaders	  issued	  condemnations	  in	  ways	  that	  undermined	  their	  initial	  gestures	  of	  support	  for	  Peres	  at	  Sharm	  in	  the	  face	  of	  terror.	  	  If	  backing	  Israel	  against	  terrorists	   was	   in	   their	   national	   interests	   before,	   why	   not	   after?	   	   One	   probable	  explanation	  is	  that	  these	  leaders	  feared	  internal	  threats	  to	  their	  authority	  if	  they	  did	  not	  condemn	  Grapes	  of	  Wrath	  and	  Qana.	  	  However,	  this	  involves	  the	  incorporation	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of	  sub-­‐state	  sources	  of	  threat	  and	  a	  leader-­‐centric	  frame	  of	  reference	  that	  fit	  better	  with	  Theory	  #4	  than	  the	  national	   interests	  approach.	   	  Further,	  one	  would	  be	  hard	  pressed	   to	   find	   a	   leader	  under	   greater	   internal	   threat	   than	  Arafat	   for	   cooperating	  with	   Israel’s	   government	   that	   spring,	   and	   yet	   he	   pursued	   a	   path	   that	  much	  more	  stolidly	  supportive	  of	  Peres	  than	  did	  most	  of	  his	  neighbors.	  	   Just	  as	  these	  non-­‐U.S.	  cases	  tend	  to	  fit	  better	  with	  leadership	  theory	  than	  the	  unitary	  national	  interests	  approach,	  so	  too	  do	  the	  specifics	  of	  America’s	  intervention	  on	  behalf	  of	  Peres.	  	  The	  idea	  for	  Sharm	  may	  have	  secretly	  originated	  with	  Peres,169	  and	   the	   president’s	   advisors	   helped	   persuade	   him	   that	   “you	   may	   not	   save	   the	  process	   if	  you	  go,	  but	   if	  you	  don’t	  go,	   I	   think	  we	  are	  going	  to	   lose	   it”.170	   	  However,	  from	   that	   point	   forward,	   President	   Clinton	   spearheaded	   the	   process,	   assembling	  world	   leaders	   from	   twenty-­‐nine	   countries	   as	   well	   as	   the	   Secretary	   of	   the	   UN,	  including	  representatives	  from	  thirteen	  Arab	  countries.171	  	   Further,	   his	   actions	   emerged	   from	   a	   personal	   conviction	   that	   he	   was	  obligated	  to	  honor	  Rabin’s	  legacy	  through	  the	  person	  of	  Shimon	  Peres.	  	  Dennis	  Ross	  explains:	  “you	  have	  got	  to	  understand	  that	  in	  my	  mind	  Clinton	  almost	  reveres	  Rabin	  because	   of	   everything	   he	   embodies,	   so	   it’s	   hard	   to	   exaggerate	   his	   own	   sense	   of	  personal	  commitment	  to	  trying	  to	  get	  Peres	  elected”.172	  	  This	  personal	  sense	  of	  duty	  is	  widely	  echoed	  by	  other	  observers	  of	  the	  president’s	  behavior	  at	  the	  time.	  	  Miller	  explains	  that	  Clinton	  was:	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“devastated	  by	  the	  assassination.	  	  Clinton	  recalls	  being	  told	  by	  Tony	  Lake	  that	  Rabin	  had	   been	   shot.	   	   He	   remembers	   calling	   Hillary,	   and	   she	   came	   down	   from	   the	  residence	   and	  held	  him,	  while	   they	   talked	   about	   the	  prime	  minister.	   	   Lake	   recalls	  that	  telling	  Clinton	  that	  Rabin	  had	  died	  was	  the	  hardest	  thing	  he	  would	  ever	  do:	   ‘it	  was	  as	  if	  someone	  punched	  him	  in	  the	  stomach.’	  Rahm	  Emanuel	  told	  me	  that,	  seeing	  Clinton	  later,	  ‘he	  was	  white’	  and	  ‘stricken	  beyond	  politics’	  	  But	  Steve	  Grossman	  [then	  chairman	  of	  AIPAC]	  put	  it	  best:	  ‘something	  in	  Clinton	  died	  when	  Rabin	  died’…	  rarely	  had	  the	  death	  of	  any	  foreign	  leader	  affected	  an	  American	  president	  so	  deeply”.173	  	  Warren	   Christopher	   agrees	   that	   “I	   had	   never	   seen	   any	   news	   affect	   Clinton	   so	  profoundly”.174	   	   Indeed,	  Clinton	  makes	  the	  astonishing	  statement	  that	  “by	  the	  time	  he	  [Rabin]	  was	  killed,	  I	  had	  come	  to	  love	  him	  as	  I	  had	  rarely	  loved	  another	  man”.175	  	  Indyk	  insists	  that	  this	  background	  helped	  fuel	  Clinton’s	  desire	  to	  bolster	  Peres,	  since	  “from	  Clinton’s	  point	  of	  view	  this	  wasn’t	  just	  about	  politics	  –	  this	  was	  about	  Rabin’s	  legacy,	  which	  he	  felt	  really	  heavy	  responsibility	  to	  try	  to	  fulfill”.176	  	  2.	  Perceptions	  of	  Close	  Contests	  Given	  that	  America’s	  efforts	  to	  bolster	  Peres	  began	  in	  full	  force	  after	  the	  first	  wave	  of	  terrorist	  attacks	  in	  February	  and	  March,	  there	  is	  a	  strong	  empirical	  basis	  for	  the	  notion	  that	  a	  close	  contest	  was	  brewing	  in	  Israeli	  domestic	  politics.	   	  Peres	  had	  already	   called	   early	   elections	   for	   the	   end	   of	   May,	   and	   the	   attacks	   catapulted	  Netanyahu	   into	  a	   sudden	   lead	   in	  public	  polling.	   	  From	  that	  point	   forward,	   the	  U.S.	  administration	  remained	  strongly	  engaged	  in	  trying	  to	  shape	  the	  outcome	  of	  Israel’s	  election,	   behavior	   in	   fitting	  with	   the	   close	   state	   of	   opinion	   polling	   until	  when	   the	  voting	  finally	  took	  place	  at	  the	  end	  of	  May.	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Thus,	   in	   this	   regard	   the	  case	  offers	   little	   to	  distinguish	  between	  Theory	  #1,	  which	   anticipates	   that	   meddling	   should	   always	   be	   perfectly	   attuned	   with	   actual	  opportunities	   abroad,	   and	  Theory	  #4,	  which	   argues	   that	   leaders	  who	  misperceive	  opportunities	  may	  mistakenly	  enact	  LSI	  either	  too	  often	  or	  too	  rarely	  depending	  on	  their	   personal	   biases.	   	   Given	   that	   Clinton	   correctly	   perceived	   that	   a	   close	   Israeli	  election	  was	  obviously	  brewing,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  disentangle	  which	  theory	  offers	  the	  more	  appropriate	  prediction	  solely	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  this	  episode	  alone.	  	  3.	  Patterns	  of	  Domestic	  Debate:	  One	   of	   the	   most	   striking	   features	   of	   the	   1996	   case	   is	   its	   informality,	   a	  hallmark	  of	  my	  argument	  for	  this	  project.	  	  Because	  LSI	  is	  often	  driven	  by	  top	  leaders,	  foreign	   policy	   meddling	   tends	   to	   bear	   the	   imprint	   of	   their	   unique	   needs	   and	  capabilities.	   	   In	   particular,	   leaders	   communicate	   their	   deliberations	   and	   demands	  for	  intervention	  through	  informal	  channels	  to	  avoid	  sharing	  information	  with	  other	  sender	   state	   actors	   in	   ways	   that	   would	   diminish	   the	   effort’s	   effectiveness	   by	  producing	  a	  foreign	  backlash	  or	  causing	  personal	  political	  harm.	  Thus,	   according	   to	   leadership	   theory	   we	   should	   expect	   the	   emergence	   of	  informal	  channels	  of	  communication	  either	   internally	  or	  across	  borders.	   	  Thus,	  we	  should	   take	   special	   note	   of	   the	   verbal	   lines	   of	   communication	   between	   Savir	   and	  Ross,	   Theumim	   and	   Indyk,	   and	   Furst/Schoen	   to	   the	   White	   House.	   	   Also,	   the	  involvement	  of	  the	  White	  House	  political	  team	  on	  a	  decidedly	  foreign	  policy	  matter	  is	  also	  quite	  telling	  –	  and	   indicative	  of	   the	  personal	  salience	  that	   this	  episode	  held	  for	   the	   president.	   	   As	   Indyk	   remarks	   in	   my	   interview	   with	   him	   “all	   of	   this	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background	  coordination	  was	  not	  in	  cables”	  and	  often	  “it	  was	  done	  on	  the	  political	  side	  of	  the	  [White	  House]	  shop,	  not	  the	  policy	  side”.177	  	  	  On	  the	  same	  note,	  a	  top	  State	  Department	  official	  involved	  in	  administration	  deliberations	  during	  this	  period	  noted	  that,	   in	  spite	  of	  all	  the	  enormous	  efforts	  the	  U.S.	   was	   exerting	   in	   the	   name	   of	   getting	   Shimon	   Peres	   elected	   “I	   don’t	   recall	   any	  memo…	   Christopher	   would	   not	   have	   wanted	   anything	   about	   that	   in	   writing.	  	  Conversations	  on	  this	  topic	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  done	  on	  the	  verbal	  level	  and	  very	  close	  held	  within	  the	  government	  in	  terms	  of	  distribution”	  even	  though	  such	  efforts	  made	  it	  more	  difficult	  to	  coordinate	  internally.178	  Bruce	  Riedel	  agrees	  that	  deliberation	  over	  meddling	  was	  done	  verbally	  at	  the	  time	  and	  was	  not	  written	  down:	  	  “BR:	  There	  probably	  is	  [sic]	  not	  the	  notes	  to	  show	  that.	  DW:	  Why	  not?	  BR:	  Because	  you’re	  not	  going	  to	  say	  that	  our	  security	  assistance	  is	  linked	  to	  a	  political	  party.	  DW:	  Even	  in	  private?	  BR:	  Not	  on	  a	  memo.	  DW:	  Verbally?	  BR:	  But	  verbally,	  yeah.	  	  Certainly,	  Dennis	  and	  Martin	  understood	  what	  we	  were	  trying	  to	  do	  and	  were	  very	  enthusiastic	  to	  help	  make	  it	  work.	  DW:	   And	   the	   president	   was	   fully	   onboard	   with	   this	   as	   well,	   right?	  BR:	  The	  president	  was	  fully	  onboard.”179	  	  Thus,	  American	  actions	  matched	  a	  pattern	  of	  behavior	  best	  explained	  by	  Theory	  #4.	  	  4.	  Cycles	  of	  Domestic	  Power:	  	   The	   1996	   case	   offers	   a	   strong	   test	   for	   leadership	   theory	   over	   the	   lobby-­‐
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legislative	  approach.	  	  Not	  only	  does	  the	  theory	  call	  for	  Congress	  and	  lobby	  groups	  to	  be	  more	  influential	  during	  elections	  years,	  but	  they	  should	  be	  doubly	  powerful	  when	  a	  president’s	  reelection	  is	  at	  stake.	  	  Because	  these	  groups	  tend	  to	  oppose	  meddling	  in	   Israel’s	   internal	   politics,	   the	   year	   1996	   should	   not	   have	   seen	   American	  intervention	  in	  the	  politics	  of	  the	  Jewish	  state.	  	  And	  yet	  Clinton	  pulled	  off	  not	  one	  but	  two	   episodes	   of	   high-­‐profile	   and	   domestically	   risky	   meddling	   simultaneously:	   he	  intervened	   in	   both	   Israeli	   politics	   and	   in	   Russian	   politics,	   making	   unpopular	  concessions	  to	  Boris	  Yeltsin	  such	  as	  postponing	  NATO	  enlargement	  in	  order	  to	  help	  him	  defeat	  the	  resurgent	  Communist	  Party	  in	  Russia’s	  upcoming	  elections.	  	   Clinton	  tried	  to	  turn	  meddling	  in	  Israel’s	  politics	  during	  his	  reelection	  year	  to	  his	  own	  electoral	  benefit.	  	  He	  used	  the	  1996	  AIPAC	  summit	  as	  a	  communal	  outreach	  opportunity	   for	   his	   administration,	   showcasing	   his	   unprecedented	   backing	   for	  Israel’s	  defense	  in	  the	  face	  of	  terrorism	  and	  garnering	  soaring	  praise	  from	  Peres	  at	  the	   event.180	   	   At	   one	   point	   during	   this	   visit,	   Peres	   even	   when	   so	   far	   as	   to	   feign	  ignorance	   when	   somebody	   asked	   him	   a	   question	   about	   Clinton’s	   Republican	  challenger,	  Senator	  Bob	  Dole.181	  In	   this	   regard,	   Clinton’s	   desire	   to	   meddle	   in	   Israeli	   politics	   helped	   fuel	  domestic	   benefits	   rather	   than	   precluding	   them.	   	   Thus,	   going	   into	   a	   presidential	  election,	   Clinton	   successfully	   outmaneuvered	   domestic	   political	   forces	   who	   may	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have	   preferred	   for	   him	   to	   take	   a	   more	   hands-­‐off	   approach	   to	   Israel’s	   internal	  domestic	  politics.	  	  Therefore,	  with	  regard	  to	  cycles	  of	  domestic	  power,	  the	  1996	  case	  provides	  unusually	  strong	  evidence	  against	  the	  lobby-­‐legislative	  approach.	  	  5.	  Bureaucratic	  Freelancing:	  	   There	   seems	   to	  have	  been	  very	   little	  unauthorized	  behavior	   in	   this	   case,	   in	  part	  because	  Clinton	  was	  undertaking	  a	  popular	  U.S.	  policy.	   	  The	  country	  with	   the	  most	   notable	   freelancing	   appears	   to	   have	   been	   Jordan,	   where	   King	   Hussein	   was	  embarking	  on	  a	  policy	  of	  favoritism	  for	  Netanyahu,	  an	  Israeli	  politician	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  prevailing	  sentiment	  of	  the	  Jordanian	  public	  and	  government	  bureaucracy.182	  One	   poll	   in	   Jordan,	   albeit	   restricted	   to	   university	   graduates,	   showed	   a	  preference	  for	  Peres	  at	  71%	  versus	  only	  15%	  decided	  for	  Netanyahu183	  	  The	  king’s	  interest	  in	  seeing	  Netanyahu	  elected	  did	  not	  stop	  instances	  of	  leaks	  in	  April	  and	  May	  whereby	  lower-­‐level	  officials	  showed	  their	  displeasure	  with	  the	  Likud	  and	  revealed	  a	  more	  broadly-­‐held	  desire	  for	  Labor	  to	  win	  the	  Israeli	  election.184	  	   However,	   these	   dynamics	   seem	   to	   have	   been	   an	   exception	   to	   the	   rule.	  	  Overall,	  meddling	   during	   the	   1996	   Israeli	   election	  was	   undertaken	   as	   a	   top-­‐down	  effort.	   	  Even	  the	  Jordanian	  case,	   the	  one	  where	  the	  most	  disgruntled	  freelancing	   is	  evident,	  was	  driven	  by	  the	  firm	  preferences	  of	  a	  single	  top	  ruler,	  predicated	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  interpersonal	  relationships	  and	  personal	  –	  not	  widely	  held	  –	  beliefs.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182 Another instance might have been Iran if LSI was pursued without the approval of President Rafsanjani. 
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  6.	  Consistency	  of	  Message:	  Israeli	   voters	   could	   not	   have	   misunderstood	   the	   Clinton	   administration’s	  strong	   preference	   for	   Shimon	   Peres	   and	   his	   pro-­‐peace	   platform,	   given	   how	  consistently	  the	  U.S.	  hammered	  home	  the	  message.	  	  After	  the	  attacks	  by	  Hamas	  and	  Islamic	   Jihad,	   Clinton	   recorded	   a	   message	   for	   Israeli	   television,	   explaining	   that	  America	   would	   stand	   beside	   Israel	   in	   its	   time	   of	   need	   while	   seeking	   peace.	   	   He	  repeated	  the	  same	  message	  at	  Sharm	  and	  in	  his	  public	  appearances	  in	  Israel.	  	  Then,	  when	  Peres	   visited	  Washington,	   the	  U.S.	   staged	   two	  major	   signing	   ceremonies	   for	  agreements	   to	   fight	   terror,	   one	   with	   Secretary	   of	   Defense	   Perry	   on	   the	   threat	   of	  Hezbollah	  and	  one	  with	  Clinton	  on	  broader	  counterterrorism	  issues.	   	  Both	  of	  these	  ceremonies	  were	  scheduled	  to	  allow	  for	  live	  broadcast	  on	  Israeli	  nightly	  news.	  This	  message	   came	   through	   loud	   and	   clear	   to	   Israelis	   who	  were	   listening.	  	  For	   example,	   the	   news	   anchor	   on	   a	   popular	   Israeli	   television	   program	   described	  Clinton’s	  handling	  of	  the	  prime	  minister’s	  visit	  to	  Washington	  as	  “an	  unprecedented	  mobilization	  of	  support	  such	  as	  has	  never	  been	  known	  in	  the	  past	  by	  a	  U.S.	  president	  in	  favor	  of	  an	  electoral	  candidate	  in	  a	  democratic	  country”.185	  Eventually,	  Clinton’s	  consistent	  favoritism	  may	  have	  elicited	  a	  backlash	  with	  voters	  inclined	  to	  support	  the	  Likud.	  	  For	  example,	  at	  one	  Netanyahu	  rally	  even	  the	  mere	  mention	  of	  Clinton	  elicited	  boos	  from	  the	  audience.186	   	  This	  fits	  with	  broader	  research	  which	  finds	  that	  partisan	  intervention	  has	  differential	  effects	  depending	  on	  the	   sub-­‐audience:	   backers	   of	   the	   favored	   faction	   in	   the	   target	   state	  may	   respond	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
185 Mahoney, “Clinton Irks Israeli Opposition by Backing Peres.” 
186 Sarah Honig, “Netanyahu Wows Ra’anana with His English,” Jerusalem Post, May 3, 1996. 
	  	   405	  
positively	  to	  LSI	  (as	  do,	  I	  suspect,	  undecided	  voters	  in	  the	  center),	  but	  partisans	  of	  the	  disfavored	  faction	  understandably	  respond	  more	  negatively.187	   	  However,	  even	  this	  negative	  response	  confirms	  that	  Clinton’s	  message	  was	  getting	  through.	  	  Voters	  there	   received	   his	  message	   that	   an	   Israeli	   government	   led	   by	   Labor	   pursuing	   the	  peace	   process	   could	   count	   on	   American	   support	   to	   help	   it	   achieve	   its	   objectives.	  	  And,	  as	  noted	  above,	  this	  U.S.	  message	  tended	  to	  help	  the	  Peres	  campaign	  overall.	  	  7.	  Suitability	  of	  Message:	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	   the	  broader	   international	   effort	   to	   strengthen	  Peres	   fell	  flat	  once	   it	  became	  clear	   that	   their	  support	  would	  not	  withstand	  another	  round	  of	  fighting	  between	  Israel	  and	  a	  terrorist	  group.	  	  Granted,	  Israel	  could	  have	  designed	  a	  better	  operational	  approach	  than	  the	  misguided	  effort	  to	  instigate	  refugee	  flows	  out	  of	   southern	   Lebanon,	   but	   there	   were	   limits	   on	   how	   much	   better	   another	   Israeli	  strategy	  could	  have	  been	  given	  that	  Hezbollah	  was	  intentionally	  placing	  its	  forces	  in	  areas	   full	   of	   Lebanese	   civilians.	   	   Leaving	   aside	   the	   United	   States,	   the	   broader	  international	  reaction	  to	  Operation	  Grapes	  of	  Wrath	  and	  Qana	  destroyed	  the	  image	  of	  solidarity	  against	  terror	  that	  world	  leaders	  had	  tried	  to	  foster	  at	  Sharm.	  Peres	  and	  Clinton	  had	  sought	   to	   frame	  Sharm	  as	  a	  breakthrough	   in	   Israel’s	  efforts	   to	   combat	   terror,	   but	   the	   events	   the	   following	   month	   undermined	   their	  ability	  to	  sell	  this	  message	  persuasively.	   	  Peres	  had	  gone	  so	  far	  as	  to	  claim	  that	  the	  anti-­‐terrorism	   conference	   was	   an	   “events	   [sic]	   that	   exceeds	   any	   normal	   political	  achievement,”	  belonging	  alongside	  Oslo	  I,	  Oslo	  II,	  and	  the	  peace	  with	  Jordan	  as	  one	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of	   Israel’s	   biggest	   breakthroughs	   in	   regional	   diplomacy.188	   	   Certainly,	   Peres	   could	  still	   count	   on	   American	   backing	   –	   unprecedented	   across	   a	   range	   of	   issues	   –	   but	  Clinton’s	  declaration	  that	  the	  summit	  “stands	  as	  proof	  and	  promise	  that	  this	  region	  has	  changed	  for	  good”	  189	  was	  clearly	  undermined	  by	  the	   international	  community	  falling	  back	  into	  old	  patterns	  of	  condemning	  Israel	  for	  how	  it	  fought	  terror.	  There	   were	   also	   limits	   on	   how	   far	   the	   U.S.	   could	   undermine	   established	  public	  beliefs	   in	   Israel	   that	  Peres	  was	  a	  wheeler-­‐dealer	  without	  much	  aptitude	   for	  security	  affairs.	   	  When	  Peres	  formed	  his	  government	  after	  the	  Rabin	  assassination,	  he	  kept	  the	  defense	  portfolio	  for	  himself	  and	  appointed	  Ehud	  Barak	  foreign	  minister	  instead,	  despite	   the	   fact	   that	  Barak	  was	  one	  of	   the	  most	  decorated	   soldiers	   in	   the	  history	  of	   the	   IDF.	   	  When	  Peres	  came	   to	  Washington	   that	  April,	  he	  signed	  defense	  memoranda	  not	   just	  with	   the	  president	  but	  also	  with	   the	  Secretary	  of	  Defense,	  an	  action	  undertaken	  in	  his	  capacity	  as	  minister	  of	  defense.	  	   Highlighting	  Peres’s	  defense	  responsibilities	  aimed	   to	  draw	  attention	   to	  his	  security	   credentials,	   both	   present	   and	   past.	   	   Clinton	   stretched	   these	   credentials	  when	   he	   claimed	   that	   in	   “his	   earliest	   days”	   Peres	   “helped	   establish	   Israel’s	  military”.190	   	   The	   Israeli	   paper	   Ma’ariv	   also	   expressed	   its	   surprise	   that	   Clinton	  seemed	  to	  offer	  an	  unprecedented	  approval	  of	  the	  prime	  minister’s	  role	  in	  violating	  U.S.	   proliferation	   safeguards	   in	   the	   1960s,	   noting	   that	   “it	   is	   doubtful	   that	   an	  American	   leader	   ever	   applauded	   on	   a	   public	   stage	   where	   the	   prime	   minister	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
188 Peres remarks in Clinton, “The President’s News Conference with Prime Minister Shimon Peres of 
Jerusalem.” 
189 William J. Clinton, “Remarks at the Opening of the Summit of the Peacemakers in Sharm al-Sheikh, 
Egypt” (Public Papers of President William Jefferson Clinton, March 13, 1996). 
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Israel	   was	   being	   praised	   for	   being	   the	   patron	   of	   the	   nuclear	   facility	   in	   Dimona”	  before	   the	   1996	   AIPAC	   conference.191	   	   However,	   Peres’s	   inconclusive	   war	   with	  Hezbollah	   seems	   to	   have	   spoken	   far	   louder	   than	   anything	   a	   signing	   ceremony	   or	  rhetorical	  U.S.	  praise	  could	  do	  for	  his	  image	  as	  a	  defense	  thinker.	  	   In	  both	   instances,	   there	   seem	   to	  have	  been	  external	   limits	  on	   the	  extent	   to	  which	  Clinton	  could	  conceivably	  press	  certain	  messages	  with	  the	  Israeli	  public.	  	  No	  doubt,	  Clinton’s	  promises	  of	  steadfast	  U.S.	  support	  stuck	  firmly.	  	  However,	  his	  claims	  that	  Shimon	  Peres	  was	  really	  Mr.	  Security	  or	  that	  the	  Middle	  East	  had	  undergone	  a	  lasting	  transformation	  in	  the	  fight	  against	  terrorism	  tended	  to	  ring	  hollow.	  	   Thus,	   by	   the	   eve	   of	   the	   Israeli	   election,	   President	   Clinton	   had	   successfully	  communicated	  only	  half	  of	  his	  message:	  America	  would	  continue	  to	  back	  Israel	  on	  the	   path	   to	   peace,	   but	   it	   could	   not	   persuasively	   promise	   that	   such	   support	  would	  end	  Israeli	  bloodshed	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  terrorists.	  	  Thus,	  the	  Israeli	  public	  went	  to	  the	  polls	  torn	  about	  the	  future	  of	  the	  peace	  process	  and	  their	  support	  for	  Peres.	  	  In	  the	  end,	  Netanyahu	  won	  the	  election,	  but	  he	  eked	  out	  the	  smallest	  of	  possible	  victories,	  with	  the	  Labor	  Party	  even	  outpacing	  his	  Likud	  by	  two	  seats	  in	  the	  Knesset.	  	   In	   this	   instance,	   the	   American	   message	   was	   as	   well-­‐suited	   to	   the	   Israeli	  public	  as	  it	  possibly	  could	  have	  been,	  but	  there	  were	  limits	  on	  how	  far	  that	  message	  could	  be	  sold	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  objective	  constraints.	  	  This	  provides	  some	  support	  for	  Theory	   #1,	   given	   the	   role	   of	   objective	   circumstances,	   national	   interests,	   and	   old	  patterns	  of	  enmity	  for	  constraining	  international	  intervention	  in	  Israeli	  politics.	  However,	  Clinton	  and	  Arafat’s	  steadfast	  efforts	  to	  communicate	  their	  support	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for	   the	   peace	   process,	   fighting	   terror,	   and	   therefore	   working	   with	   Peres	   were	  responsible	   for	  giving	  him	  a	   fighting	  change	   to	  contest	   that	  election.	   	  Both	  Clinton	  and	  Arafat	  played	  a	  major	  role	  in	  giving	  Peres	  a	  fighting	  chance	  in	  the	  1996	  Israeli	  election,	   despite	   these	   upper	   limits	   on	   their	   influence	   or	   their	   considerable	  shortcomings	  at	  other	  points	  in	  time.	  	  Therefore,	  this	  also	  provides	  some	  support	  for	  Theory	  #4,	  highlighting	  the	  role	  of	  foreign	  leaders	  for	  determining	  LSI	  during	  one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  elections	  in	  the	  history	  of	  the	  Mideast	  peace	  process.	  Finally,	   the	   fact	   that	   Clinton	   went	   above	   and	   beyond	   what	   most	   of	   his	  advisors	  thought	  was	  judicious	  in	  stating	  an	  American	  preference	  also	  fits	  best	  with	  an	  understanding	  of	  LSI	  that	  is	  primarily	  driven	  from	  the	  top	  down.	  	  The	  content	  of	  Clinton’s	  messaging	  may	  have	  gone	  overboard,	  rubbing	  some	  Israelis	  the	  wrong	  way	  and	   giving	   the	   Likud	   a	   tool	   for	  mobilizing	   voters	   towards	   the	   end	   of	   the	   election	  period.	   	  But	   the	  explanation	   for	   this	  potentially	   sub-­‐optimal	  approach	  can	  only	  be	  attributed	  to	  the	  beliefs	  and	  preferences	  of	  the	  man	  sitting	  in	  the	  Oval	  Office.	  
Clinton,	  Case	  #3:	  Netanyahu	  –	  “who	  the	  fuck	  does	  he	  	  think	  he	  is?”	  (1996-­‐1999)192	  	  	  	  There	   was	   little	   love	   lost	   between	   President	   Clinton	   and	   Prime	   Minister	  Netanyahu,	   and	   allegedly	   after	   their	   first	   meeting	   in	   June	   1996	   since	   the	   Israeli	  election	  Clinton	  vented	  to	  his	  aides,	  asking	  “who	  the	  fuck	  does	  he	  think	  he	  is?	  	  Who’s	  the	  fucking	  superpower	  here?”193	   	  However,	  Miller	  says	  that	  believed	  the	  best	  way	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
192 Quote is attributed to President Clinton in Miller, The Much Too Promised Land, 273. 
193 Ibid. 
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to	  advance	  the	  peace	  process,	  at	  least	  for	  the	  foreseeable	  future,	  was	  “working	  with	  Netanyahu,	   not	   against	   him”.194	   	   And	   yet	   with	   time,	   as	   Netanyahu	   accepted	   two	  hard-­‐fought,	   partial	   agreements	   with	   the	   Palestinian	   Authority	   only	   to	   abandon	  them,	  it	  seemed	  that	  cooperation	  with	  Netanyahu	  had	  run	  its	  course.	  Consequently,	   the	  United	  States	  worked	  out	  oust	  Netanyahu	   from	  office.	   	   It	  worked	  hard	  to	  persuade	  Arafat	  to	  postpone	  a	  Palestinian	  unilateral	  declaration	  of	  independence	   that	   had	   been	   scheduled	   before	   the	   vote,	   and	   at	   least	   one	   of	   Ehud	  Barak’s	  foreign	  campaign	  advisors	  assisted	  him	  in	  Israel	  at	  the	  (informal)	  request	  of	  the	  president	  of	   the	  United	  States.	   	   It	  publicly	   laid	   the	  blame	   for	  Wye’s	  collapse	  at	  Israel’s	  feet	  and	  took	  every	  opportunity	  to	  make	  clear	  the	  president’s	  dissatisfaction	  with	  Israel’s	  current	  leadership.	  In	   the	   end,	   Netanyahu	  was	   crushed	   by	   Barak	   in	   a	   landslide	   defeat,	   by	   one	  metric	  the	  most	  decisive	  election	  in	  Israel’s	  history	  up	  until	  that	  date.195	   	  Although	  the	  size	  of	  Barak’s	  electoral	  victory	  makes	  it	  difficult	  to	  pinpoint	  areas	  in	  which	  the	  U.S.	  made	   the	   crucial	  marginal	  difference	   that	  put	  him	  over	   the	   top,	  Washington’s	  efforts	  do	  seem	  to	  have	  contributed	  to	  his	  victory	  by	  creating	  an	  environment	  that	  was	  generally	  favorable	  to	  his	  campaign	  narrative	  and	  efforts	  to	  win	  office.	  	  	  	  
Coding	  the	  Dependent	  Variables	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
194 Ibid., 272. 
195 Barak beat Netanyahu 56% to 44% in the second direct prime ministerial election in Israel’s history.  
Until then, election for Israel’s highest office was conflated with a legislative vote according to party lists, 
so margins of victory bore less directly on a PM’s mandate to rule, and typically these margins were also 
much smaller.  The 1996 election was Israel’s first direct vote, but, as noted above, it was won by less than 
1%.  The 2001 prime ministerial election, the last in which the country’s leader was directly elected under 
the reformed rules before they were changed back, would turn out to be an even bigger upset, with Barak 
losing to Sharon 38% to 62%, a gap twice as large as Barak’s victory in 1999. 
	  	   410	  
(Occurrence	  and	  Efficacy)	  Did	  LSI	  Occur?	  	   Yes.	   	   In	   1999,	   the	   United	   States	   intervened	   in	   Israeli	   politics	   at	   the	   direct	  expense	  of	  Benjamin	  Netanyahu.	   	  Other	  actors	   intervened	  in	  Israeli	  politics	  during	  this	  period	  as	  well,	   including	   the	  Palestinian	  Authority,	  Egypt,	  Britain,	  Russia,	   and	  others.	  	  The	  following	  sections	  outline	  their	  efforts	  according	  to	  sender	  state.	  
<The	  American	  Approach>	  	   Barry	  Rubin	  has	  explicitly	  argued	   that	  America	  did	  not	  meddle	   in	   the	  1999	  Israeli	  election.196	  	  He	  is	  wrong.	  American	   officials	   reached	   the	   conclusion	   that	   their	   earlier	   intervention	   in	  1996	  was	  too	  overt.	   	  However,	  they	  did	  not	  decide	  that	  meddling	  in	  Israeli	  politics	  was	  unwise,	  only	  that	  it	  should	  be	  less	  obvious.	  	  Thus,	  the	  Clinton	  team	  again	  tried	  to	   bolster	   Labor	   against	   the	   Likud,	   but	   now	   they	   did	   so	   in	   a	   more	   circumspect	  manner.197	  	  Whereas	  the	  modus	  operandi	  of	  American	  meddling	  in	  1996	  was	  active	  communication	  of	  a	  U.S.	  preference	  to	  the	  Israeli	  public,	  in	  1999	  their	  byword	  was	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
196 He argued that “American actions were designed not to defeat Netanyahu but to punish him for 
disagreements and what the White House saw as his bad faith… given this situation, the feelings of US 
officials towards Netanyahu and Clinton’s refusal to invite him to Washington or meet him did not 
constitute interference in Israel’s election process… no doubt, there was a perception of American 
involvement, but that does not mean this was Clinton’s intention or behaviour”. Rubin, “External Factors in 
Israel’s 1999 Elections,” 215. 
197 For instance, Wolf Blitzer reported from the White House on the eve of Israel’s election that “from 
President Clinton on down, officials in Washington, U.S. officials have been very anxious not to do 
anything that would - - would be seen as interfering in domestic Israeli politics.  They acknowledge they 
made a mistake along those lines in 1996, signaling very strongly their desire for the then-Labor Party 
leader, Shimon Peres, to emerge as the party victor.  They didn’t want to make that same mistake this time.  
They played a very, very low-key role… that’s what they’ve been trying to do.  Behind the scenes, though, 
they make no secret, though, they would like to see Ehud Barak emerge as Israel’s next prime minister”: 
“Israel Decides: Barak Looks Likely to Be Elected; White House Hoping for Next Prime Minister to 
Follow Rabin Model,” CNN News Day (Cable News Network (CNN), May 17, 1999). See also Zogby, 
“Cash, Campaigning and Quite a Few Cooks”; Ross, The Missing Peace, 491; Paul Taylor, “U.S. Tries to 
Quietly Stymie Bibi,” Reuters News, April 27, 1999. 
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“passive	  communication,”	  in	  hopes	  of	  avoiding	  a	  backlash.198	  	   Clinton	   and	   his	   team	   viewed	   the	  Wye	   summit	   as	   their	   final	   attempt	   to	   get	  Netanyahu	  to	  produce	  on	  the	  Palestinian	  track.	  	  When	  the	  prime	  minister	  returned	  to	  Israel	  and	  started	  having	  second	  thoughts	  about	  implementing	  the	  agreement,	  the	  administration	  began	   to	   reconsider	   its	   strategy	  of	  working	  with	   instead	  of	  against	  him.	   	   Instead,	  they	  adopted	  a	  mixed	  strategy	  of	  partial	  LSI,	  whereby	  their	  aim	  was	  not	  to	  remove	  him	  above	  all	  else	  but	  rather	  to	  increase	  the	  pressure	  on	  him	  to	  either	  implement	  the	  memorandum	  or	  to	  vacate	  his	  office	  for	  somebody	  who	  would.199	  	   For	  two	  years	  prior	  to	  Israel’s	  1999	  election,	  Barak	  had	  been	  receiving	  help	  from	   American	   and	   British	   campaign	   specialists,	   Stanley	   Greenberg	   and	   Philip	  Gould,	  who	  were	  advising	  him	  on	  how	  to	  modernize	  and	  rebrand	  the	  Labor	  Party.200	  	  Their	   call	   to	   reframe	   the	  Labor	  Party	   so	   it	  would	   appear	  more	   inclusive	   seems	   to	  have	  played	  a	  key	  role	   in	  Barak’s	  decision	   to	  run	  under	   the	  new	  banner	  of	  a	   “One	  Israel”	   alliance	   in	   cooperation	   with	   two	   additional	   small	   parties.201	   	   As	   I	   discuss	  below,	  during	  the	  lead-­‐up	  to	  elections	  in	  1999	  both	  of	  these	  individuals	  worked	  in	  Israel	  at	  the	  direction	  of	  their	  own	  heads	  of	  government,	  Clinton	  and	  Blair,	  and	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  wonder	  whether	  they	  were	  there	  in	  such	  a	  capacity	  earlier	  on	  as	  well.	  	   Once	  Netanyahu’s	  government	  collapsed	  in	  early	  1999,	  moving	  the	  elections	  up	  to	  May	  of	  that	  year,	  the	  United	  States	  engaged	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  efforts	  designed	  to	  hurt	   Netanyahu	   in	   the	   race.	   	   Indyk	   reveals	   that	   he	   was	   involved	   in	   an	   effort	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198 Rabinovich, Waging Peace, 121. 
199 Ross, The Missing Peace, 482, 488. 
200 Andrew Grice and Mary Dejevsky, “New Labour Helped Barak to Victory,” The Independent (London), 
May 19, 1999. See also “Blair’s Latest Victory,” The Guardian (UK), May 19, 1999; Leslie Susser, 
“Barak’s Uphill Battle,” Jerusalem Report, January 18, 1999. 
201 Grice and Dejevsky, “New Labour Helped Barak to Victory.” 
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reconfigure	   U.S.	   aid	   to	   Israel	   in	   a	   manner	   that	   would	   have	   boosted	   benefits	   for	  Israel;	  the	  effort	  was	  nixed	  by	  the	  White	  House	  after	  Netanyahu’s	  government	  fell	  so	  as	  to	  deny	  him	  the	  chance	  to	  claim	  relations	  with	  Washington	  were	  on	  even	  keel:	  	  “MI:	  There	  was	  a	  moment	  there	  after	  Wye	  before	  the	  elections,	  during	  the	  election	  period,	  after	  his	  government	  had	  come	  down,	  Bibi	  had	  been	  negotiating	  with	  us	  a	  shift	  in	  the	  foreign	  aid	  arrangements	  whereby	  we	  would	  merge	  grant	  aid	  –	  um,	  from	  loans	   to	   grants	   –	   phase	   out	   the	   economic	   assistance	   and	   increase	   the	   military	  assistance…	  We	  had	  been	  negotiating	   for	   some	   time.	   	   I	   had	  been	  negotiating	  with	  Yuval	  [sic,	  Ya’akov]	  Ne’eman,	  who	  was	  his	  finance	  minister,	  a	  good	  guy.	  But	  we	  were	  now	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  the	  campaign,	  and	  Bibi	  suddenly	  wanted	  the	  deal.	  	  He	  was	  giving	  up	  on	  all	   the	   things	  he	  had	   insisted	  on	   to	  make	   the	  deal.	   	  And	  because	   I	  had	  been	  involved	  in	  negotiations,	  I	  wanted	  the	  deal,	  too.	  	  And	  the	  word	  came	  from	  the	  White	  House	  don’t	  do	  the	  deal.	  DW:	  Because	  they	  had	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  elections	  in	  mind?	  MI:	  They	  did	  not	  want	  to	  do	  anything	  with	  Bibi	  to	  suggest	  that	  with	  the	  United	  States	  that	  everything	  was	  ok…	  DW:	  At	  a	  certain	  point	  our	  focus	  seems	  to	  have	  shifted	  from	  “let’s	  try	  and	  move	  the	  process	  forward	  with	  Bibi”	  to	  “we	  can’t	  move	  the	  process	  forward	  with	  Bibi”	  [MI:	  to	  “let’s	  get	  Barak	  elected”].	  	  Do	  you	  remember	  the	  turning	  point	  with	  that?	  MI:	  As	  soon	  as	  the	  government	  came	  down.	  	  	  DW:	  So	  it	  was	  the	  moment	  the	  election	  period	  started?	  MI:	  Yeah,	  it	  was	  a	  no-­‐brainer.”202	  	  	  	   At	   this	   point,	   the	  Clinton	   administration	   attacked	  Bibi	   by	   engaging	   in	  what	  one	   Israeli	  analyst	  called	  “snub	  diplomacy,”	   finding	  ways	  to	  criticize	  Netanyahu	  or	  dodge	   meetings	   with	   him	   to	   signal	   American	   displeasure.203	   	   Clinton	   declined	   to	  meet	  with	  Netanyahu	  during	  the	  election	  period,	  even	  though	  he	  had	  been	  willing	  to	  do	   so	   just	   beforehand	   when	   it	   seemed	   there	   was	   still	   a	   chance	   of	   implementing	  Wye.204	   	  Clinton	  met	  twice	  more	  with	  Arafat	  but	  made	  it	  clear	  to	  the	  press	  that	  he	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   413	  
definitely	   would	   not	   be	   receiving	   Netanyahu	   in	   Washington.205	   	   Meanwhile,	   PM	  candidate	  for	  Israel’s	  Center	  Party	  Yitzhak	  Mordechai	  was	  invited	  to	  a	  White	  House	  ceremony	  honoring	  Yitzhak	  Rabin,	   chatting	   briefly	  with	   Clinton	   and	  meeting	  with	  national	  security	  advisor	  Sandy	  Berger	  and	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Madeleine	  Albright.206	  	  The	  president	  also	  found	  time	  for	  Shimon	  Peres	  and	  Leah	  Rabin	  at	  the	  White	  House	  event,	  though	  he	  refused	  to	  make	  time	  for	  a	  sitting	  prime	  minister.207	  	   This	  campaign	  of	  snubbing	  Netanyahu	  was	  carried	  out	  more	  broadly	  below	  the	  level	  of	  the	  president.	  	  Less	  than	  two	  weeks	  before	  the	  Israeli	  election,	  Secretary	  Albright	  further	  articulated	  American	  displeasure,	  remarking	  in	  a	  public	  speech:	  	  	  “as	  we	  await	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  Israeli	  elections,	  our	  focus	  has	  been	  on	  encouraging	  compliance	  with…	  Wye,	  and	  urging	  both	  sides	  to	  avoid	  unhelpful	  unilateral	  acts.	  	  On	  the	   Palestinian	   side,	   we	   have	   seen	   serious	   efforts	   to	   prevent	   terrorist	   strikes,	   to	  renounce	  the	  [previous]	  Palestinian	  Covenant	  and	  to	  avoid	  a	  unilateral	  declaration	  of	   statehood.	   	   On	   the	   Israeli	   side,	   implementation	   has	   stalled	   and,	   unfortunately,	  unilateral	   settlement	  activity	  has	  persisted.	   	  This	   is	  a	  source	  of	   real	  concern	   to	  us,	  because	  of	  its	  destructive	  impact	  on	  the	  ability	  to	  pursue	  peace”.208	  	  	  She	  also	  refused	  a	  meeting	  with	  Netanyahu’s	  foreign	  minister,	  Ariel	  Sharon,	  when	  he	  came	  to	  Washington	  for	  other	  meetings.209	  	  	  Further,	  the	  secretary	  canceled	  plans	  to	  visit	  the	  region	  in	  January,	  with	  her	  spokesperson	  Jamie	  Rubin	  citing	  the	  fact	  that	  her	  trip	  “was	  designed	  to	  be	  at	  the	  end	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of	   the	  12-­‐week	  period	   that	  would	  have	   involved	   the	   implementation	   in	   full	   of	   the	  Wye	  Agreement,	  which	  obviously	  hasn't	  happened…	  that	  purpose	  of	   the	   trip	   is	  no	  longer	  operative”	  because	  “on	  the	  Israeli	  side…	  nothing	  has	  been	  done	  to	  implement	  the	   second	   phase	   of	   the	   further	   re-­‐deployment	   or	   other	   parts	   of	   the	   Wye	  Agreement”.210	  	  Rubin	  responded	  to	  an	  op-­‐ed	  by	  Israel’s	  ambassador	  to	  Washington,	  who	   accused	   the	   PA	   of	   breaching	   the	   agreement,	   by	   defending	   Palestinian	  compliance	  and	  insisting	  that	  responsibility	  for	  moving	  forward	  lay	  with	  Israel.211	  	   Vice	   President	   Al	   Gore	   gave	   a	   speech	   to	   the	   pro-­‐Oslo	   Israel	   Policy	   Forum	  calling	  for	  the	  parties	  to	  implement	  Wye	  “as	  signed”	  and	  “with	  no	  new	  conditions,”	  a	  statement	   seen	   by	   the	   Likud	   “implicit	   criticism”	   since	   Netanyahu	   had	   called	   for	  additional	  Palestinian	  actions	  upon	  his	  return	  to	  Israel	  before	  he	  would	  implement	  the	  agreement.212	  	  Also,	  Ha’aretz	  reported	  that	  PM	  Netanyahu	  would	  not	  attend	  the	  World	  Economic	  Forum	  in	  Davos	  because	  Gore	  refused	  to	  meet	  with	  him	  there.213	  	   Secretary	  of	  Defense	  William	  Cohen	  found	  himself	  sucked	  into	  the	  dispute	  as	  well.	   	   He	   had	   plans	   to	   avoid	   Netanyahu	   during	   a	   visit	   to	   Israel	   to	  meet	   with	   the	  defense	   minister.	   	   However,	   once	   it	   became	   clear	   he	   would	   come	   under	   public	  pressure	  to	  meet	  with	  the	  prime	  minister,	  he	  took	  the	  appointment	  but	  “in	  order	  to	  maintain	   neutrality”	   immediately	   added	   meetings	   to	   his	   agenda	   with	   Bibi’s	   two	  biggest	  competitors,	  Barak	  from	  Labor	  and	  Mordechai	  from	  the	  Center	  Party.214	  	  Nor	  did	  Cohen	   shy	   away	   from	   remarking	   that	  Netanyahu	  had	  asked	   for	   their	  meeting,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
210 Jamie Rubin, “U.S. Department of State: Daily Press Briefing,” M2 Presswire, January 14, 1999. 
211 Zogby, “Cash, Campaigning and Quite a Few Cooks.” 
212 “Gore Urges Mideast Parties to Stick to Wye Accord,” Reuters News, January 12, 1999; Zogby, “Cash, 
Campaigning and Quite a Few Cooks.” 
213 “Press Digest, Israel (Feb 1),” Reuters News, February 1, 1999. 
214 Danna Harman, “Cohen ‘Maintains US Neutrality’ by Meeting All PM Candidates,” Jerusalem Post, 
March 14, 1999; Millikin, “Breaking with Tradition, Cohen Not to See Netanyahu on Israel Trip.” 
	  	   415	  
contradicting	  the	  prime	  minister’s	  claim	  that	  the	  U.S.	  had	  suggested	  the	  event.215	  	   The	  U.S.	   also	   floated	   threats	   that	   certain	   aid	   to	   Israel	  would	   be	  withheld	   if	  Netanyahu	   were	   reelected.	   	   Allegedly,	   Undersecretary	   of	   State	   Stuart	   Eizenstat	  remarked	  on	  a	  visit	  to	  Israel	  that	  the	  $1.2	  billion	  in	  additional	  aid	  that	  was	  pledged	  to	  Israel	  at	  Wye	  would	  be	  withheld	  pending	   implementation	  of	   Israel’s	  obligations	  under	   the	   agreement,	   whereas	   $400	  million	   pledged	   to	   the	   PA	   at	  Wye	   would	   go	  forward	   as	   planned.	   	   However,	   the	   administration	   soon	   denied	   such	   allegations,	  which	   were	   leaked	   to	   the	   press	   by	   an	   anonymous	   Israeli	   official	   who	   accused	  Washington	  of	  using	  aid	  to	  interfere	  in	  Israeli	  politics	  at	  Netanyahu’s	  expense.216	  	  	  Whether	  or	  not	   this	   specific	   step	  was	  a	  conscious	  American	  attempt	  at	  LSI,	  the	   administration	   did	  what	   it	   could	   to	   preclude	   any	   sort	   of	   additional	   aid	   being	  disbursed	   that	   could	   be	   turned	   to	   Netanyahu’s	   electoral	   advantage.	   	   Washington	  rejected	  an	  Israeli	  proposal	  to	  provide	  Israel	  with	  a	  third	  of	  the	  Wye	  aid	  in	  exchange	  for	   implementing	   the	   first	   of	   three	   territorial	   withdrawals,217	   and	   SecDef	   Cohen	  reiterated	  that	  “we	  hope	  to	  see	   full	   implementation	  very	  soon	  and	  we	  hope	  to	  see	  [Congressional]	  funding	  that	  was	  promised	  during	  Wye,	  but	  the	  two	  go	  together”.218	  	   Next,	   the	   U.S.	   exerted	   a	   major	   effort	   to	   dissuade	   Chairman	   Arafat	   from	  unilaterally	  declaring	  a	  Palestinian	   state	  on	  May	  4th,	   a	  date	   just	   two	  weeks	  before	  Israel’s	  election	  that	  signified	  the	  formal	  end	  date	  for	  final	  status	  negotiations	  under	  the	  Oslo	  Accords.	  	  Netanyahu	  hoped	  to	  use	  a	  unilateral	  declaration	  of	  independence	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(UDI)	  by	  the	  Palestinians	  to	  his	  electoral	  advantage,	  citing	  it	  as	  proof	  of	  Arafat’s	  bad	  intentions	  and	  threatening	  to	  annex	  West	  Bank	  territory	  in	  retaliation.	  	   The	  fact	  that	  American	  officials	  worked	  hard	  to	  get	  Arafat	  to	  back	  down	  from	  his	  threats	  of	  UDI	   is	  no	  secret,	  and	  their	  efforts	  throughout	  that	  winter	  and	  spring	  have	   been	   carefully	   documented.219	   	   However,	   what	   has	   not	   been	   previously	  demonstrated	  was	   that	   the	  U.S.	  was	   especially	  motivated	   to	  delay	  Palestinian	  UDI	  because	  of	   the	   Israeli	   domestic	   angle.	   	   According	   to	  Dennis	  Ross:	   “we	  were	   really	  concerned	   how	   damaging	   this	   would	   be	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   Israeli	   elections…	  Arafat	   declaring	   a	   state	   unilaterally…	   that	   was	   just	   seen	   as	   something	   that	  absolutely	   could	   roil	   the	   election	   and	   play	   to	   Bibi’s	   benefit…	   it	   added	   urgency	   to	  what	  we	  were	  trying	  to	  do.	  	  But	  let	  me	  be	  clear:	  the	  fact	  is	  we	  were	  against	  a	  UDI	  not	  simply	   for	   political	   reasons.	   	   It	   was	   a	   bad	   policy”.220	   	   This	   was	   confirmed	   by	  Palestinian	  officials	  as	  well.221	  	   Finally,	  American	  officials	  and	  private	  citizens	  worked	  behind	  the	  scenes	  to	  bolster	  Barak’s	  campaign	  apparatus.	   	  As	  noted	  above,	  Stanley	  Greenberg	  had	  been	  working	   with	   Barak	   for	   roughly	   two	   years	   to	   modernize	   and	   rebrand	   the	   Labor	  Party.	  	  With	  the	  start	  of	  the	  campaign,	  American	  efforts	  on	  his	  behalf	  were	  stepped	  up.	  	  Barak	  showed	  off	  his	  U.S.	  “dream	  team”	  advisors,	  including	  not	  just	  Greenberg,	  but	   also	   James	   Carville	   and	   Bob	   Shrum,	   all	   of	   whom	   had	   played	   a	   major	   role	   in	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Clinton’s	  own	  electoral	  victories.222	  	  Martin	  Indyk	  confirmed	  that	  at	  least	  Greenberg	  (and	  perhaps	  all	  three)	  had	  been	  sent	  to	  help	  Barak	  at	  Clinton’s	  own	  direction:	  	  “DW:	  Greenberg	  certainly	  had	  deep	  connections	  to	  the	  Democratic	  campaign	  establishment,	  but	  was	  he	  there	  [in	  1996]	  at	  Clinton’s	  behest?	  MI:	  Later	  on,	  yes,	  with	  Barak,	  but	  with	  Peres	  I	  don’t	  know…	  Barak	  is	  an	  interesting	  example	  where	  there	  was	  even	  more	  involvement	  by	  the	  president.	  	  He	  had	  all	  of	  his	  people.	   	   He	   sent	   over	   them	   all…	   Clinton	   sent	   his	   best	   people	   to	   help	   get	   Barak	  elected”.223	  	  Greenberg	  told	  the	  New	  York	  Times	  himself	  that	  he	  “regularly	  briefs	  the	  president	  on	  the	  progress	  of	  the	  Labor	  leader’s	  campaign”.224	  As	   in	   1996,	   the	   behind-­‐the-­‐scenes	   team	   of	   Doug	   Schoen	   and	   Zev	   Furst	  provided	   Barak	   with	   outside	   analysis	   and	   operated	   as	   a	   link	   between	   Clinton’s	  political	  advisors	  and	  the	  Barak	  camp.225	  	  And	  unlike	  Barak’s	  dream	  team,	  they	  were	  paid	  by	  American	  and	  European	  businessmen,	  not	  out	  of	  the	  Labor	  Party	  budget.	  	   American	   soft	   money	   was	   also	   a	   major	   issue	   in	   the	   campaign.	   	   Whereas	  Netanyahu	  had	  edged	  out	  Peres	   in	  1996	  with	  a	  major	   infusion	  of	  soft	  money	  from	  abroad,	   this	   time	   around	   the	   Labor	   team’s	   strategy	   relied	   heavily	   on	   fighting	   fire	  with	   fire.	   	  Millions	   of	   U.S.	   dollars	  were	   donated	   either	   to	   shell	   organizations	   that	  echoed	   pro-­‐Barak	   messages	   or	   directly	   to	   companies	   from	   whom	   the	   Barak	  campaign	   needed	   services.	   	   Although	   Barak’s	   American	   consultants	   were	   not	  directly	  implicated	  in	  the	  effort,	  the	  head	  of	  their	  Israeli	  consulting	  outfit,	  the	  tactic	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
222 Uri Dan, “Bibi Battered by Bill’s Boys’ Barbs,” New York Post, January 10, 1999; Adam Nagourney, 
“Sound Bites over Jerusalem,” New York Times (Magazine), April 25, 1999; Dafna Linzer, “U.S. 
Campaign Tactics Helping Barak,” Associated Press, May 13, 1999. 
223 Indyk, “Interview with the Author.” 
224 David Bar-Illan, “Why Bibi Fell: Netanyahu Is Done in at Last - Not Least by Washington,” National 
Review, June 14, 1999. 
225 “Barak Relies on More Than U.S. Hired Guns; Hillary Clinton’s Dual Roles Raise Questions; Congress 
Includes Pork in Kosovo Relief Package,” CNN Inside Politics (Cable News Network (CNN), May 18, 
1999). 
	  	   418	  
was	   reminiscent	   of	   their	   reliance	   of	   soft	   money	   in	   Clinton’s	   1996	   reelection	  campaign,	   and	   the	   head	   of	   their	   Israeli	   consulting	   outfit	   was	   later	   convicted	   of	  violating	   Israeli	   finance	   laws	   by	   masterminding	   these	   foreign	   gifts	   in	   support	   of	  Barak.226	  	  Many	  of	  his	  most	  prominent	  donors	  were	  also	  supporters	  of	  the	  president,	  although	  there	  is	  no	  evidence	  they	  made	  donations	  at	  his	  personal	  direction.	  227	  	  	   Again,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   recognize	   that	   Israeli	   politicians	   are	   traditionally	  pragmatic	  about	  such	  outside	  intervention,	  attacking	  it	  when	  it	  helps	  their	  rivals	  but	  encouraging	   it	   when	   it	   helps	   their	   cause.	   	   Center	   Party	   candidates	   Yitzhak	  Mordechai	  and	  Amnon	  Lipkin-­‐Shahak	  flew	  to	  the	  U.S.	  and	  directly	  raised	  funds	  from	  wealthy	  American	  Jews	  for	  their	  campaign,	  and	  the	  party	  also	  established	  a	  new	  U.S.	  charity	   to	   bankroll	   its	   political	   projects.228	   	   A	   network	   of	   pro-­‐Likud	   charities	  misappropriated	   American	   donations	   for	   charity	   to	   Netanyahu’s	   campaign,	  including	  alms	  raised	  explicitly	   for	   children’s	   causes.229	   	  Partisan	  organizations	  on	  both	  the	  right	  and	  the	   left	  paid	   for	  roundtrip	   flights	   to	   Israel	  so	  expats	   in	  America	  could	  return	  to	  vote	  in	  the	  election.230	  	  Barak’s	  campaign	  advisors	  had	  their	  offices	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burglarized,	  both	   in	   Israel	   and	   the	  U.S.,	   presumably	  by	   their	  political	   rivals.231	   	  As	  will	   be	   explained	   below,	   the	   Likud	   also	   used	   the	   perks	   of	   incumbency	   to	   solicit	  favorable	  intervention	  on	  their	  behalf	  from	  Moscow.	  	   It	   is	   even	  possible	   that	  Clinton’s	   team	  played	  a	   role	   in	  encouraging	  Yitzhak	  Mordechai,	   candidate	   from	   the	   Center	   Party,	   to	   drop	   out	   of	   the	   race	   and	   endorse	  Ehud	   Barak,	   a	   move	   that	   gave	   Labor	   a	   major	   boost	   on	   the	   eve	   of	   the	   election.	  	  Although	  Mordechai	  already	  bore	  a	  grudge	  against	  Netanyahu	  and	  probably	  decided	  to	  drop	  out	  for	  self-­‐interested	  reasons,	  his	  decision	  ask	  voters	  “to	  give	  a	  chance	  to	  Barak”	  was	  an	  unexpected	  boon	  for	  the	  left.232	  	  However,	  when	  I	  asked	  Indyk	  about	  whether	  the	  U.S.	  played	  a	  role	  in	  encouraging	  Mordechai’s	  action,	  he	  replied	  “I	  can’t	  say	  that’s	  what	  I	  was	  doing”.233	  
<The	  Palestinian	  Approach>	  	   The	  Palestinian	  Authority	  did	  a	  number	  of	  things	  during	  the	  1999	  election	  to	  strengthen	   Ehud	   Barak.	   	   They	   even	   felt	   they	   deserved	   credit	   for	   helping	   him	   get	  elected,	  which	  contributed	  to	  their	  irritation	  when	  his	  victory	  speech	  laid	  down	  red	  lines	  for	  final	  status	  talks	  that	  seemed	  to	  go	  against	  his	  pro-­‐peace	  persona.234	  	   The	   Palestinians	   shelved	   their	   plans	   for	   unilateral	   declaration	   of	  independence	  (UDI),	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  Arafat	  had	  consistently	  referred	  to	  May	  4th	  as	  a	  “sacred	  date”.235	  	  On	  April	  28th,	  Arafat	  called	  a	  vote	  by	  the	  PLO	  Central	  Council	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that	  decided	  not	  to	  declare	  independence	  on	  May	  4th,	  with	  the	  chairman	  now	  saying	  “we	  don’t	  have	  to	  consecrate	  our	  state	  because	  we	  are	  already	  practicing	   it	  on	  the	  ground”.236	  	  His	  decision	  to	  delay	  UDI	  was	  no	  doubt	  influenced	  in	  part	  by	  pressures	  and	  concessions	  from	  the	  international	  community.	  	  Arafat	  was	  encouraged	  to	  delay	  this	  action	  by	  Egypt,	  Britain,	  France,	  Germany,	  Jordan,	  Japan,	  and	  others.237	  	   However,	  Palestinian	  officials	  were	  also	  keenly	  aware	  that	  their	  action	  would	  have	  implications	  for	  Israeli	  politics.	  	  For	  instance,	  Jamal	  Al-­‐Tarifi,	  a	  member	  of	  the	  PA	  cabinet,	  explained	  in	  an	  interview	  with	  the	  Arabic	  language	  newspaper	  Al-­Sharq	  
Al-­Awsat	  that	  “we	  regard	  the	  principle	  of	  declaring	  the	  Palestinian	  state	  [on	  May	  4]	  as	  a	  sacred	  one…	  but	  there	  are	  discussions	  with	  the	  Europeans,	  Americans,	  and	  our	  Arab	  brothers	  that	  revolves	  around	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  are	  Israeli	  elections	  and	  other	  conditions	  and	  events	  with	  affect	  and	  are	  affected	  by	  the	  Palestinian	  decision”.238	  	   A	  handful	  of	  top	  Palestinian	  officials	  met	  regularly	  leading	  up	  to	  this	  period	  with	  Israeli	  leftists	  at	  the	  home	  of	  Egypt’s	  ambassador	  to	  Israel,	  Mohamed	  Basiouny.	  	  At	   these	  meetings,	   they	   brainstorm	   how	   to	   get	   Netanyahu	   to	  move	   on	   the	   peace	  process	  or	  to	  make	  way	  for	  somebody	  else	  who	  would.	  	  Occasionally,	  Dennis	  Ross	  or	  Aaron	   Miller	   would	   touch	   base	   by	   telephone	   or	   the	   American	   ambassador,	   Ned	  Walker,	  would	   come	  by.	   	   Saeb	  Erekat	   recalls	   that	   the	  meetings	  entailed	   “collusion	  between	  me	  and	  members	  of	   the	   Israeli	  opposition…	  a	  cabal	  of	  me	  and	  my	   Israeli	  sympathizers…	  we	  developed	  certain	  ideas	  about	  how	  to	  deal	  with	  Netanyahu	  and	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we	  contacted	  the	  Americans	  with	  it	  and	  gave	  them	  something”.239	  	  	  Historian	  Ahron	  Bregman	  argues	  that	  these	  discussions	  helped	  set	  the	  stage	  for	  Wye	   by	   exploring	   the	   sort	   of	   centrist	   deal	   that	   Netanyahu	  might	   face	   serious	  pressure	  to	  adopt	  and	  then	  encouraging	  the	  Americans	  to	  call	  a	  summit	  at	  which	  he	  would	  be	  forced	  to	  make	  a	  decisive	  choice	  one	  way	  or	  another.240	  	  Bregman	  points	  out	   that	   another	   one	   of	   the	   PA	   in	   these	   talks,	   Hassan	   Asfour,	   admitted	   that,	   as	   a	  result,	   “we	   felt…	   that	  we	   had	   a	   victory	  when	   Barak	   came	   to	   power…	   because	  we	  prepared	  it…	  we…	  the	  Americans…	  some	  Israelis.	  	  We	  felt	  it	  was	  a	  victory	  for	  us”.241	  	  	  Yossi	   Beilin	   insists	   that	   his	   only	   motivation	   in	   these	   talks	   was	   to	   get	  Netanyahu	  to	  move	  on	  the	  peace	  process,	  not	  to	  oust	  him.242	  	  However,	  as	  I	  noted	  in	  the	  theory	  chapter	  for	  this	  dissertation,	  firsthand	  admissions	  of	  meddling	  should	  be	  taken	  as	  more	  credible	  than	  denials	  because	  they	  are	  “admissions	  against	  interest”	  and	  therefore	  less	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  self-­‐interest	  of	  the	  speaker.	  	   Then,	  on	  the	  eve	  of	  the	  Israeli	  election,	  Arafat	  made	  a	  public	  statement	  calling	  on	   Israeli	   voters	   “to	   elect	   peace”.243	   	   PLO	  Executive	   Committee	  member	   Suleiman	  Najjab	  elaborated	  more	  explicitly	   that	   “the	  elections	  are	  an	   internal	   Israeli	  matter	  but	  we	  are	  partners	  in	  a	  peace	  process…	  the	  Palestinian	  people,	  who	  suffered	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  Netanyahu,	  are	  hanging	  their	  hopes	  on	  anyone	  but	  him”.244	  	  This	  echoes	  an	  earlier	  message	  from	  a	  top	  PA	  legislator,	  Hanan	  Ashrawi,	  suggesting	  that:	  	  “we	  should	  not	  directly	   interfere	   in	   these	  elections…	   the	  only	   interference	  we	  can	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carry	   out	   is	   by	   raising	   issues	   for	   discussion…	  we	   should	   work	   to	   enhance	   a	   real	  peace	  camp	  and	  address	  the	  Israeli	  public	  during	  these	  decisive	  months	  to	  explain	  to	  them	  that	  Israelis	  would	  pay	  the	  price	  for	  destroying	  the	  peace	  process	  and	  warn	  them	  against	  the	  dangers	  of	  the	  rightwing	  mentality”.245	  	  Lastly,	  I	  have	  heard	  it	  argued	  that	  Arafat	  was	  working	  overtime	  to	  prevent	  terrorist	  attacks	  in	  the	  election	  period,	  but	  I	  cannot	  prove	  it	  without	  firmer	  evidence	  first.246	  
<The	  British	  Approach>	  	   Britain	   exerted	   a	   range	   of	   efforts	   to	   help	   Barak	   win	   the	   election.	   	   First,	   it	  worked	  in	  coordination	  with	  other	  governments	  to	  discourage	  Arafat	  from	  pursuing	  his	  proposal	  for	  UDI.247	  	  Blair	  personally	  met	  with	  Arafat	  in	  March	  to	  dissuade	  him	  from	  going	  ahead	  as	  planned.248	  	  Blair	  also	  signed	  onto	  an	  EU-­‐wide	  effort	  that	  gave	  Arafat	  a	  crucial	  exit	  ramp,	  proclaiming	  on	  March	  25th	  that	  Europe	  would	  look	  kindly	  on	  Palestinian	  efforts	  at	  independence	  if	  they	  would	  agree	  to	  postpone	  action	  by	  a	  year	  and	  to	  engage	  in	  final	  status	  talks	  in	  the	  meantime.249	  	   Additionally,	  Blair	  played	  a	  key	  role	  in	  giving	  Ehud	  Barak	  campaign	  support	  in	   advance	   of	   the	   elections.	   	   As	   noted	   above,	   Blair’s	   own	   political	   advisor,	   Philip	  Gould,	   had	   been	  working	  with	  Barak	   for	   nearly	   two	   years	   to	   help	  modernize	   and	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rebrand	   his	   Labor	   Party	   base.	   	   My	   discussions	  with	   a	   well-­‐placed	   former	   aide	   to	  Blair	  have	  confirmed	  that	  the	  prime	  minister	  “definitely	  directed	  Gould	  to	  do	  it”.250	  	  According	  to	  Newsweek,	  Blair	  also	  encouraged	  Barak	  to	  take	  on	  Greenberg,	  who	  had	  helped	  the	  British	  prime	  minister	  with	  his	  successful	  campaign	  in	  1997.251	  	   Another	  important	  player	  in	  the	  British	  decision	  was	  Lord	  Michael	  Levy,	  who	  was	   a	   tennis	   partner	   and	   close	   confidante	   to	  Blair	   –	   and	   soon	  became	   the	  British	  prime	  minister’s	  Mideast	  envoy.	  	  Allegedly,	  the	  Gould	  mission	  was	  recommended	  to	  Blair	  by	  Lord	  Levy	  at	  the	  encouragement	  of	  his	  son	  Daniel,	  who	  currently	  serves	  as	  an	  analyst	  at	  the	  New	  America	  Foundation	  but	  at	  the	  time	  worked	  as	  an	  operative	  within	  the	  Israeli	  Labor	  Party.252	  	  Lord	  Levy	  also	  donated	  large	  amounts	  of	  his	  own	  money	   to	   Israeli	   organizations	   established	   to	   aid	   Barak’s	   electoral	   campaign,	  information	  later	  leaked	  by	  private	  investigators	  (presumably	  at	  the	  direction	  of	  one	  of	  their	  British	  or	  Israeli	  rivals).253	  
<The	  Egyptian	  Approach>	  	   The	  Egyptians	  also	   tried	   to	  help	  Barak	   in	   the	  1999	  vote.	   	  Although	  he	   later	  soured	   on	   Barak,	   proclaiming	   there	   was	   no	   difference	   between	   him	   and	  Netanyahu,254	  Egypt’s	  foreign	  minister,	  Amr	  Moussa,	  told	  Clinton	  in	  advance	  of	  the	  Israeli	  election	  that	  they	  should	  be	  doing	  all	  they	  could	  to	  replace	  Netanyahu	  with	  a	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more	  pro-­‐peace	  leader.255	  	  Yossi	  Beilin	  reports	  Moussa	  telling	  him	  that	  Egypt	  would	  do	  all	   it	  could	  to	  prevent	  a	  Palestinian	  UDI;	  moreover,	  he	  says	  Moussa	  asked	  for	  a	  secret	  promise	   from	  Barak	  he	  would	  exert	  early	  efforts	  on	   the	  peace	  process	  as	  a	  means	   of	   sweetening	   a	   UDI	   deal	   for	   the	   PA.256	   	  Mubarak’s	   foreign	   policy	   advisor,	  Osama	  el-­‐Baz,	   told	  Beilin	   that	  he	  was	  working	  hard	   to	  help	  Washington	  postpone	  the	  date	   for	  UDI	  by	  six	  months,	  which	  would	   fall	   long	  after	   the	  Israeli	  elections,257	  and	   there	  was	   some	   talk	   that	   the	  EU’s	  March	  25th	  Berlin	  Declaration	   on	   the	   topic	  came	   about	   through	   a	   Franco-­‐Egyptian	   diplomatic	   initiative.258	   	   Also,	   as	   noted	  above,	   the	   Egyptian	   ambassador	   to	   Tel	   Aviv,	   Mohamed	   Basiouny,	   hosted	   regular	  meetings	  between	  the	  PLO	  and	  members	  of	  the	  Israeli	  opposition	  –	  meetings	  which	  some	  observers	  claim	  were	  aimed	  at	  toppling	  PM	  Netanyahu.	  
<The	  Russian	  Approach>	  	   Perhaps	   the	  most	   surprising	   intervention	   during	   the	   1999	   Israeli	   elections	  was	   that	   of	  Russia.	   	  Whereas	  Moscow	  used	   to	  be	   a	  dirty	  word	   in	   Israeli	   domestic	  politics	   when	   the	   Soviet	   Union	  was	   aligned	  with	   the	   region’s	   radical	   Arab	   states,	  strategic	  circumstances	  had	  changed	  dramatically.	  	  By	  1999,	  Russia	  was	  grasping	  for	  strategic	   role	   in	   the	   region,	   and	   immigrants	   from	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   had	   come	   to	  comprise	  a	  new	  swing	  vote	  worth	  13.8%	  of	  the	  Israeli	  electorate.259	  	   That	   year,	   political	   leaders	   in	   Moscow	   chose	   to	   endorse	   the	   Likud	   Party	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
255 Taylor Branch, The Clinton Tapes: Wrestling History with the President (Simon and Schuster, 2010), 
514. 
256 Beilin, The Path to Geneva, 84. 
257 Ibid., 84–5. 
258 “Palestinian Radio Reports ‘Egyptian-French Initiative’ on Statehood,” BBC Monitoring Service Middle 
East (Translated from March 22nd Voice of Palestine radio broadcast, March 24, 1999). 
259 Vladimir Khanin, “Israeli ‘Russian’ Parties and the New Immigrant Vote,” in Israel at the Polls, 1999, 
ed. Daniel Judah Elazar and M. Benjamin Mollov (Frank Cass, 2001), 101. 
	  	   425	  
under	   Prime	  Minister	   Netanyahu.	   	   They	   engaged	   in	   a	   sudden	   flurry	   of	   back-­‐and-­‐forth	  state	  visits,	  and	  Russian	  PM	  Yevgeny	  Primakov	  went	  so	   far	  as	   to	  say	  “I	  don’t	  really	  want	  to	  interfere	  in	  Israeli	  politics…	  but	  if	  I	  were	  an	  Israeli	  citizen,	  I’d	  vote	  for	  Mr.	  Netanyahu	  in	  these	  coming	  elections”.260	  	   These	  declarations	  came	  about	  through	  active	  solicitation	  by	  members	  of	  the	  Likud,	  who	  used	  the	  perks	  of	  their	  incumbency	  to	  woo	  Moscow.	  	  As	  foreign	  minister,	  Ariel	   Sharon	   undertook	   three	   trips	   two	  months	   to	   the	   Russian	   and	   admitted	   to	   a	  journalist	  that,	  although	  the	  nominal	  purpose	  of	  his	  travel	  was	  to	  limit	  Russian	  arms	  sales	  to	  Syria	  and	  Iran,	  “two	  thirds	  of	  the	  Russian	  Israelis	  are	  for	  Bibi	  now…	  if	  I	  can	  get	  that	  up	  to	  over	  70	  percent,	  that’s	  it”.261	   	  Israel	  urged	  the	  IMF	  to	  approve	  a	  $4.8	  billion	   loan	   to	   Russia,	   and	   there	  were	   rumors	   Israel	   even	   tried	   to	   scale	   back	   U.S.	  sanctions	  on	  Russia	   that	   they	  had	  advocated	   for	  only	   the	  previous	  year	   regarding	  Iran.262	  	  Sharon’s	  meetings,	  ostensibly	  for	  military	  purposes,	  were	  pursued	  over	  the	  objections	   Israel’s	   minister	   of	   defense,	   Moshe	   Arens	   –	   who	   felt	   that	   the	   risks	   of	  alienating	  Washington	  for	  Moscow	  outweighed	  the	  benefits	  of	  such	  travel.263	  	  	  Did	  the	  Policy	  Succeed?	  	   Yes.	   	  Overall,	   the	  American,	   Palestinian,	   and	  broader	   international	   effort	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bolster	   Ehud	   Barak	   went	   exceptionally	   well.	   	   Barak	   won	   by	   a	   landslide,	   despite	  facing	   considerable	   challenges	   at	   the	   start	   of	   his	   campaign.264	   	   He	   was	   no	   doubt	  aided	   by	   surprising	   (if	   fleeting)	   unity	   on	   the	   center-­‐left	   and	   fragmentation	   on	   the	  right	  among	  PM	  Netanyahu’s	  governing	  coalition.265	  	  But	  the	  external	  effort	  did	  help	  facilitate	   Netanyahu’s	   defeat	   by	   denying	   him	   a	   convenient	   Palestinian	   crisis	   and	  making	   clear	   that	   it	   was	   he	   who	   bore	   responsibility	   for	   spoiling	   relations	   with	  Washington.	   	   Indyk	   reflects	   that	   “what	  mattered	  more	   in	   the	   end…	   it	  wasn’t	   that	  Peres	  had	  such	  a	  great	  relationship	  with	  Clinton,	   it’s	   that	  Bibi	  had	  such	  a	  bad	  one.	  	  And	   that	  hurt	  Bibi…	   if	   you	  do	   things	   to	   screw	  up	   the	   relationship	  with	   the	  United	  States,	  that	  will	  hurt	  you	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  Israeli	  public”.266	  	  	  Netanyahu	  even	  aired	  televisions	  commercials	  featuring	  a	  misleading	  Clinton	  quote	  saying	  positive	   things	  about	  his	   leadership	  style.267	   	  But	   it	  was	   too	   little	   too	  late	  to	  dispel	  the	  notion	  that	  Netanyahu	  had	  upset	  Washington	  and	  the	  relationship	  had	   suffered	   for	   it.	   	   Israelis	   received	   the	   message	   loud	   and	   clear	   that	   the	   U.S.	  administration	  felt	  little	  other	  than	  disdain	  for	  their	  head	  of	  government.268	  	  	  	   One	   possible	   lesson	   to	   draw	   from	   the	   1999	   case	   could	   be	   that	   American	  intervention	  succeeds	  only	  when	  it	  is	  extremely	  passive.	  	  This	  argument	  holds	  that	  by	  acting	  intently	  neutral,	   the	  U.S.	  may	  have	  denied	  Bibi	  a	  means	  of	  mobilizing	  his	  base	  against	  external	  intervention.	  	  An	  anonymous	  U.S.	  official	  is	  quoted	  as	  follows:	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  “as	   long	   as	   we	   keep	   a	   low	   profile	   and	   stick	   to	   the	   posture	   of	   support	   the	  implementation	  of	  the	  Wye	  agreement	  and	  opposing	  unilateral	  acts…	  I	  think	  we	  are	  on	   safe	   ground…	  we’ve	   been	   in	   a	   couple	   of	   Israeli	   elections	   before	   and	  we	   know	  where	  the	  landmines	  are.	  	  If	  we	  got	  into	  showing	  a	  direct	  preference,	  we	  would	  step	  on	  those	  landmines”.269	  	  	   However,	  this	  would	  be	  a	  misreading	  of	  the	  1999	  case.	  	  Washington	  has	  tried	  staying	   overtly	   neutral	   before,	   including	   in	   the	   1984	   Israeli	   elections	   when	   the	  Reagan	   administration	   sidelined	   the	   peace	   process	   and	   avoided	   expressing	   a	  preference	  in	  hopes	  that	  decreased	  conflict	  with	  Israel	  would	  help	  the	  left	  beat	  out	  the	   right.270	   	   The	   1984	   approach	  was	   extremely	  misguided,	   enabling	   the	   Likud	   to	  recover	   from	   a	   massive	   deficit	   in	   the	   polls	   since	   Washington	   did	   nothing	   to	  demonstrate	  its	  displeasure	  with	  the	  right	  wing’s	  resistance	  to	  the	  peace	  process.	  	   The	  U.S.	  approach	  in	  1999	  was	  passive	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  sought	  to	  avoid	  a	  sense	  of	   explicit	   endorsement	   such	   as	  was	   created	   in	  1996	  by	  President	   Clinton’s	  efforts	   on	   behalf	   of	   Shimon	   Peres.	   	   However,	   it	   was	   not	   passive	   in	   the	   sense	   of	  hoping	  that	   total	  U.S.	  withdrawal	   from	  the	  peace	  process	  and	  from	  Israeli	  political	  affairs	  would	  help	  advance	  American	  national	  interests.	  	   The	   importance	   of	   this	   distinction	   was	   highlighted	   by	   none	   other	   than	  Netanyahu’s	  own	  communications	  director,	  David	  Bar-­‐Illan,	  who	  wrote	   a	  National	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Journal	   article	   the	   following	   month	   entitled	   “Why	   Bibi	   Fell”.	   	   In	   it,	   he	   blames	   an	  American	  “disinformation	  campaign”	  for	  Netanyahu’s	  defeat,	  arguing	  that	  “hardly	  a	  day	  passed	  without	  a	  Washington	  story	  about	  Netanyahu’s	  failure	  to	  keep	  his	  word:	  on	  the	  Wye	  agreement,	  building	  in	  Jerusalem,	  and	  even	  on	  Israeli-­‐Russian	  relations”.	  	  Although	  the	  U.S.	  administration	  stopped	  short	  of	  “outright	  endorsement	  of	  Barak,”	  he	  blames	  it	  for	  taking	  “active	  measures”	  at	  Netanyahu’s	  expense.271	  	  	   One	   could	   also	   claim	   that	   this	   distinction	   proves	   negative	   LSI	   is	   more	  effective	   than	   positive	   LSI	   –	   that	   is,	   undermining	   foreign	   leaders	   might	   be	   more	  effective	   or	   easier	   to	   pursue	   than	   efforts	   to	   bolster	   them.	   	   However,	   this	  interpretation	  also	  misses	  part	  of	   the	  story.	   	  Although	  pressures	   from	  Congress	  or	  pro-­‐Israel	  lobbyists	  did	  not	  prevent	  the	  U.S.	  administration	  from	  trying	  to	  discredit	  Netanyahu,	  Clinton	  certainly	  had	  additional	  levers	  at	  his	  disposal	  for	  demonstrating	  favoritism	  when	  Labor	  leaders	  were	  in	  charge.	  	  Thus,	  positive	  and	  negative	  LSI	  seem	  to	  involve	  inherent	  tradeoffs,	  and	  neither	  appears	  much	  stronger	  than	  the	  other.	  	  	  	  
Coding	  the	  Observable	  Implications	  
1.	  Perceptions	  of	  Sender	  Interests:	  	   The	   fact	   that	   America	   tried	   to	   influence	   the	   1999	   Israeli	   election	   fits	   with	  three	  of	  the	  four	  theories	  tested	  by	  this	  dissertation.	  	  Theory	  #1	  (national	  interests)	  holds	  that	  America	  should	  carry	  out	  LSI	  whenever	  its	  interests	  are	  at	  stake;	  thus,	  a	  major	  election	  at	  the	  height	  of	  the	  Oslo	  era	  should	  have	  been	  especially	  inviting	  for	  U.S.	  intervention.	  	  Theory	  #2	  (lobby-­‐legislative	  politics)	  predicts	  that	  LSI	  should	  not	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have	  taken	  place,	  since	  these	  domestic	  forces	  tend	  to	  prefer	  America	  staying	  out	  of	  Israeli	  political	  contests.	  	  Theory	  #3	  (bureaucratic	  politics)	  expects	  persistent	  LSI	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  peace	  process	  because	  working-­‐level	  officials	   in	  the	  executive	  branch	  tend	   to	   see	   common	   cause	   with	   Arab	  moderates	   and	   Israeli	   liberals.	   	   Theory	   #4	  (leadership)	   holds	   that	   LSI	   should	   occur	   whenever	   the	   top	   political	   leaders,	  especially	  the	  president,	  feel	  that	  intervention	  is	  warranted.	  	   In	   this	   case,	   theory	   number	   two	   does	   not	   fit	   with	   the	   data.	   	   It	   is	   open	   to	  debate	  whether	  legislators	  and	  lobbyists	  detracted	  from	  the	  administration’s	  effort	  to	   bring	   down	   Netanyahu,	   but	   they	   certainly	   were	   not	   driving	   it.	   	   Nor	   does	   the	  bureaucratic	  politics	  approach	  (Theory	  #3)	  seem	  to	  fit	  with	  the	  case	  evidence,	  since	  intervention	  was	   driven	  much	  more	   by	   administration	   principals	   such	   as	   Clinton	  and	  Albright	  than	  by	  lower	  level	  members	  of	  the	  career	  bureaucracy.	  	  Indyk	  notes:	  	  “MI:	  Barak	  is	  an	  interesting	  example	  where	  there	  was	  even	  more	  involvement	  by	  the	  president…	   you	   have	   to	   understand	   the	   agony	  we	  went	   through	  with	   Netanyahu,	  and	  this	  was	  the	  president’s	  highest	  priority,	  to	  try	  and	  make	  peace…	  and	  so	  there	  was	  a	  great	  deal	  of	   frustration	  on	  the	  president’s	  part	  with	  him,	  and	  so	  the	  switch	  was	   immediate	   once	   the	   government	   came	   down.	   It	   was	   ‘how	   do	   we	   get	   Barak	  elected?’	  DW:	   And	   that	   was	   coming	   from	   Clinton	   as	   well	   as	   from	   others?	  MI:	  Oh,	  yeah,	  absolutely”.272	  	  For	  Albright,	  the	  matter	  was	  also	  personal.	  	  Aaron	  Miller	  explains:	  	  “we	  [originally]…	  sensed	  that	  what	  little	  progress	  could	  be	  made	  needed	  the	  prime	  minister’s	   cooperation.	   	  Not	  everyone	  shared	   this	  view,	  especially	   the	  secretary	  of	  state.	   	  Madeleine	  Albright…	  cared	  deeply	  about	  Arab-­‐Israeli	  peace	  and	  worked	   for	  over	  a	  year	  to	  lay	  the	  groundwork	  for	  the	  president’s	  successful	  summit	  at	  Wye.	   	  I	  know	  she	  felt	  patronized	  by	  Bibi,	  whom	  she	  would	  have	  loved	  to	  rough	  up”.273	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Beilin	  agrees	  that	  Albright	  had	  little	  patience	  for	  Netanyahu,	  noting	  that	  as	  early	  as	  1998	   “I	   had	   never	   seen	   her	   so	   angry.	   	   The	   procrastination	   [by	   Netanyahu]	   had	  become	   a	   personal	   insult	   to	   her”.274	   	   When	   she	   met	   with	   Barak	   in	   1997,	   she	  wondered	  “wouldn’t	   it	  be	   terrific	   if	  we	  could	  deal	  with	  him	  as	  prime	  minister?”275	  	  The	   fact	   that	   the	  most	  critical	  administration	  statements	  came	  especially	   from	  her	  fits	  with	  Theory	  #4.	  	  In	  fact,	  nearly	  every	  senior	  member	  of	  the	  U.S.	  administration	  was	   acquainted	   with	   Barak	   and	   liked	   what	   they	   saw,	   considering	   him	   a	   possible	  successor	  to	  Rabin	  for	  his	  pro-­‐peace	  agenda	  and	  his	  airtight	  security	  credentials.276	  National	  interests	  theory	  is	  also	  consonant	  with	  the	  occurrence	  of	  American	  intervention	  in	  this	  case,	  but	  it	  cannot	  explain	  why	  the	  means	  and	  style	  of	  LSI	  was	  so	  different	   in	  1999	   than	   it	  was	   in	  1996.	   	   In	  order	   to	  explain	   this	  variance,	  one	  must	  take	  into	  account	  the	  particular,	  subjective	  lessons	  drawn	  by	  top	  American	  officials	  from	   1996.	   	   Because	   the	   conventional	   wisdom	   at	   the	   White	   House	   was	   that	   the	  president’s	  efforts	  caused	  a	  harmful	  backlash	  in	  1996	  by	  being	  too	  overt,	  they	  took	  a	  more	   cautious	   approach	   in	  1999.	   	  However,	   the	   objective,	   empirical	   basis	   for	   this	  change	   in	  behavior	  between	  cases	   is	  highly	  questionable,	  which	  should	  cast	  doubt	  on	  the	  validity	  of	  Theory	  #1	  for	  fully	  explaining	  behavior	  in	  this	  case.	  The	   1996	   American	   attempt	   was	   actually	   successful	   in	   important	   regards.	  	  Although	  some	  rhetorical	  backlash	  did	  emerge	  from	  the	  Likud	  that	  year,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  determine	  whether	  that	  rhetorical	  backlash	  actually	  affected	  the	  polls	  or	  changed	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turnout.	   	   And	   despite	   the	   more	   restrained	   U.S.	   posture	   in	   1999,	   we	   still	   saw	  extensive	   reliance	   on	   such	   complaints	   by	   the	   Likud	   politicians	   during	   their	  campaign.	   	   Despite	   a	   more	   subdued	   U.S.	   approach	   this	   time	   around	   –	   and	   clear	  reliance	  by	  the	  Likud	  on	  soliciting	  outside	  intervention	  from	  Moscow	  and	  from	  pro-­‐Likud	   individuals	   in	   the	  West	  –	  Netanyahu’s	   team	  continued	  to	  bank	  on	  criticizing	  perceived	  external	  meddling	  as	  a	  winning	  political	  strategy	  in	  1999.277	   	  Not	  only	  is	  there	  reason	  to	  doubt	  whether	  or	  not	  this	  sort	  of	  rhetorical	  backlash	  actually	  drives	  political	  outcomes	  –	  there	  is	  also	  reason	  to	  doubt	  whether	  it	  is	  even	  truly	  responsive	  to	   the	   presence	   or	   absence	   of	   actual	   American	   meddling	   behavior.	   	   In	   short,	   the	  change	   in	  behavior	   from	  1996	   to	  1999	  has	   a	  much	   clearer	   subjective	  basis	   in	   the	  minds	  of	  top	  U.S.	  officials	  than	  it	  does	  in	  verifiable	  empirics.	  	  2.	  Perceptions	  of	  Close	  Contests	  The	  fact	  that	  American	  intervention	  only	  began	  in	  earnest	  once	  Netanyahu’s	  government	  fell	  to	  a	  vote	  of	  no	  confidence	  points	  to	  the	  importance	  of	  a	  perceived	  close	   contest	   for	   bringing	   about	   outside	   intervention.	   	   This	   is	   an	   observable	  implication	  on	  which	  only	  theories	  one	  and	  four	  pose	  clear	  predictions.	   	  However,	  this	  case	  is	  difficult	  to	  parse	  between	  those	  two	  theories.	  	  Theory	  #1	  expects	  that	  the	  closeness	  of	   contests	   should	  be	  objectively	   translated	   into	   intervention	  behaviors,	  whereas	   Theory	   #4	   expects	   that	   closeness	   must	   be	   filtered	   through	   subjective	  perceptions	  of	  top	  leaders	  first.	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One	   fact	   that	   seems	   to	   support	   Theory	   #4	   over	   the	   national	   interests	  approach	   is	   that	   Barak	   and	   Netanyahu	   were	   actually	   more	   closely	   matched	   far	  earlier	   than	  when	   the	  U.S.	   actually	   launched	  LSI.	   	  Although	  American	   intervention	  only	   really	  began	   in	   the	  early	  months	  of	  1999,	  Barak	  and	  Netanyahu	  were	   tied	   in	  polls	  as	  long	  before	  that	  as	  mid-­‐1998.278	  Also,	   the	  attention	  of	   top	  U.S.	  officials	  might	  have	  been	  an	   important	   factor.	  	  Clinton	  was	   absorbed	   in	   an	   impeachment	   fight	  with	  Congress	  until	   February	  12th,	  when	   he	   was	   finally	   acquitted	   by	   the	   Senate.	   	   As	   observers	   noted,	   this	   personal	  imperative	  seriously	  distracted	  the	  president	  from	  Mideast	  issues,	  and	  he	  could	  not	  reengage	   in	   the	   matter	   himself	   until	   afterwards,	   leaving	   tough	   decisions	   to	   his	  cabinet	  members	  and	  staff	  deputies	  instead.279	  	  3.	  Patterns	  of	  Domestic	  Debate:	  	   The	   theories	   also	   offer	   contradictory	   expectations	   with	   regard	   to	   the	  patterns	  by	  which	  domestic	  actors	  in	  the	  sender	  state	  discuss	  and	  undertake	  LSI.	  	  In	  order	   for	   theories	   two	   or	   three	   to	   apply,	   domestic	   structural	   forces	   such	   as	  legislators,	   lobbyists,	   and	   bureaucrats	   must	   be	   informed	   and	   influential	   when	  important	  decisions	  about	  LSI	   are	  being	  made,	   and	   these	  policies	   should	  be	  made	  through	   formal	   decision	   channels.	   	   However,	   if	   Theory	   #4	   is	   correct	   and	   leaders	  tend	  to	  intervene	  of	  their	  own	  accord,	  meddling	  should	  be	  discussed	  and	  deployed	  via	  decision	  channels	  that	  are	  much	  more	  informal	  in	  nature.	  	   Given	  that	  the	  effort	  to	  bring	  down	  Netanyahu	  was	  intentionally	  less	  explicit	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than	   past	   U.S.	   efforts,	   it	   makes	   sense	   that	   the	   1999	   case	   best	   reflects	   leadership	  theory	  in	  this	  regard.	  	  Snub	  diplomacy	  was	  used	  by	  top	  administration	  principals	  to	  communicate	   their	   intended	  preferences.	   	  A	  whispering	  campaign	  was	  carried	  out	  by	   anonymous	   administration	   officials,	   launching	   accusations	   against	   the	   Israeli	  prime	  minister	  and	  acknowledging	   in	  private	   that	   their	  preference	  was	   for	  him	  to	  lose.280	   	   President	   Clinton	   and	   Prime	  Minister	   Blair	   both	   quietly	   urged	   their	   own	  political	   consultants	   to	   go	   aid	   Barak,	   and	   the	   work	   of	   these	   consultants	   were	  bolstered	   by	   indirect	   donations	   from	   some	   of	   Clinton	   and	   Blair’s	   biggest	   backers.	  	  These	  patterns	  fit	  with	  the	  dynamics	  of	  Theory	  #4,	  but	  there	  is	  little	  to	  suggest	  that	  domestic	   structural	   forces	   such	   as	   Congress,	   the	   pro-­‐Israel	   lobby,	   or	   career	  bureaucrats	  did	  anything	  to	  lead	  these	  various	  efforts	  through	  informal	  channels.	  	  4.	  Cycles	  of	  Domestic	  Power:	  	   Another	   observable	   implication	   of	   the	   theories	   is	   that	   domestic	   structural	  forces	  in	  the	  sender	  state	  should	  be	  especially	  influential	  during	  certain	  periods	  of	  the	  political	  cycle.	  	  For	  instance,	  early	  in	  a	  president’s	  term,	  the	  bureaucratic	  politics	  approach	  should	  be	  especially	  powerful,	  whereas	  Congress	  and	  pro-­‐Israel	  lobbyists	  should	  be	  strongest	  before	  U.S.	  elections	  or	  during	  periods	  of	  divided	  government.	  	   Mid-­‐term	   elections	   had	   already	   passed,	   but	   President	   Clinton’s	   ability	   to	  pursue	  LSI	  still	  should	  have	  been	  severely	  constrained	  in	  1999.	  	  The	  results	  of	  that	  election	  sustained	  Republican	  majorities	  in	  both	  the	  House	  and	  the	  Senate.	  	  The	  only	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time	  when	  Clinton	  presided	  over	  a	  united	  government	  was	  1993	  to	  1995,	  when	  he	  was	  much	   less	  engaged	   in	  meddling	   towards	   Israel.	   	   Instead,	  he	  pursued	  his	  most	  active	   campaigns	   of	   intervention	   during	   divided	   government,	   a	   fact	   that	   seems	   to	  provide	  strong	  evidence	  against	   lobby-­‐legislative	  theory.	   	  These	  periods	  of	  divided	  government	  offer	  a	  simple	  “hoop	  test”	  for	  Theory	  #2,	  and	  yet	  the	  theory	  fails	  even	  to	  surmount	  even	  that	  especially	  simple	  challenge.	  	   Further,	  executive	  power	  should	  have	  been	  perhaps	  at	  its	  lowest	  ebb	  in	  early	  1999	  given	  that	  President	  Clinton	  had	  only	  recently	  been	  impeached	  by	  the	  House	  of	  Representatives.	   	  Widespread	  speculation	  at	   the	   time	  suggested	  that	   the	  executive	  branch	   would	   remain	   weakened	   by	   this	   bruising	   battle,	   even	   after	   Clinton	   was	  officially	  acquitted.281	  	  Yet	  even	  then,	  at	  one	  of	  the	  lowest	  points	  in	  executive	  power	  in	   American	   history,	   the	   Clinton	   administration	   undertook	   leadership	   selection	  intervention	   in	   Israeli	   politics.	   	   This	   provides	   even	   greater	   evidence	   against	   the	  lobby-­‐legislative	  approach	  at	  a	  time	  when	  its	  explanatory	  power	  should	  be	  greatest.	  	  5.	  Bureaucratic	  Freelancing:	  	   Efforts	  below	  the	   level	  of	   the	  president	  to	  pursue	  LSI	  offer	  evidence	  for	  the	  bureaucratic	   politics	   approach	   (Theory	   #3)	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   leadership	   theory	  (Theory	  #4).	   	  However,	   if	   such	   freelancing	   is	   conditional	  on	   the	  oversight	   style	  of	  the	  president,	  then	  some	  explanatory	  power	  still	  remains	  for	  leadership	  theory.	  	   And	   yet	   this	   episode	   offers	   firm	   evidence	   in	   favor	   of	   Theory	   #4.	   	   In	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comparison	   to	   1996,	   the	   1999	   case	   was	   certainly	   conducted	   by	   a	   much	   broader	  array	   of	   officials	   inside	   the	   executive	   branch.	   	   Whereas	   previously	   it	   was	   the	  president	  flying	  overseas	  and	  making	  sweeping	  statements	  of	  support	  for	  the	  Labor	  Party	  in	  Israel,	  now	  Clinton	  gave	  more	  responsibility	  to	  his	  advisors	  to	  communicate	  these	   messages	   to	   the	   Israeli	   public.	   	   However,	   the	   president	   remained	   actively	  engaged	  in	  the	  issue,	  and	  these	  efforts	  were	  clearly	  undertaken	  at	  his	  direction,	  not	  in	  contravention	  of	  his	  authority.	  	  Thus,	  in	  this	  category	  as	  well,	  Theory	  #4	  provides	  the	  most	  compelling	  available	  explanation	  for	  the	  case	  material,	  not	  Theory	  #3.	  	  6.	  Consistency	  of	  Message:	  The	  volume	  of	  Clinton’s	  message	  for	  Israeli	  voters	  was	  substantially	  weaker	  in	   1999	   than	   it	   had	   been	   in	   1996.	   	   Previously,	   the	   president	   had	   been	   almost	  painfully	   outspoken	   for	   an	   issue	   area	   usually	   shrouded	   in	   smoke	   and	   mirrors:	  recording	  messages	   for	   Israeli	   television,	   visiting	   Israel	   to	   address	   the	  public,	   and	  staging	  a	  massive	  summit	  Sharm	  that	  was	  geared	  toward	  an	  Israeli	  audience.	   	  This	  time	  around,	  expressions	  of	  American	  discontent	  tended	  to	  be	  less	  authoritative	  and	  less	  direct,	  muttered	  off	  camera	  by	  his	  subordinates.	  	  They	  did	  not	  deviate	  from	  this	  message	  of	  discontent,	  but	  it	  was	  projected	  at	  a	  much	  lower	  level	  of	  intensity.	  It	   is	   difficult	   to	   gauge	   what	   impact	   this	   change	   had	   on	   the	   efficacy	   of	  American	  intervention.	  	  The	  conventional	  wisdom	  within	  the	  Clinton	  camp	  was	  that	  the	   president’s	   diminished	   role	   this	   time	   around	   helped	   strengthen	   the	   effort	   by	  precluding	  a	  backlash	  by	  the	  Likud.	  	  However,	  as	  noted	  above,	  this	  claim	  is	  seriously	  debatable.	   	   The	   decreased	   American	   profile	   did	   little	   to	   prevent	   the	   Likud	   from	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attacking	  foreign	  favoritism	  as	  a	  central	  campaign	  theme.	  	  It	  is	  entirely	  possible	  that	  Washington’s	  more	  reticent	  posture	  may	  actually	  have	  helped	  Netanyahu	  by	  making	  the	  its	  message	  less	  firm	  and	  authoritative	  if	  not	  less	  clear.	  Either	  way,	   this	   pattern	   of	   behavior	   fits	   best	  with	   Theory	   #4.	   	   In	   order	   to	  explain	  the	  variance	  in	  means	  and	  style	  between	  the	  1996	  and	  1999	  cases,	  one	  must	  take	   into	  account	   the	   subjective	   lessons	  drawn	  by	   top	  American	  officials	   from	   the	  1996	   case.	   	   Changes	   in	   messaging	   do	   not	   make	   sense	   according	   to	   a	   national	  interests	   theory	   approach,	   since	  whatever	   strategy	  was	   truly	  optimal	   should	  have	  been	  pursued	   in	  both	   episodes,	   not	   just	   one	  of	   them.	   	  Nor	  does	   a	   bureaucratic	   or	  lobby-­‐legislative	  logic	  for	  the	  change	  in	  approach	  make	  sense,	  given	  that	  the	  Clinton	  administration	  was	  more	  concerned	  with	  backlash	  from	  within	  Israel	  than	  backlash	  from	  other	  actors	  at	  home.	  	  7.	  Suitability	  of	  Message:	  The	  strength	  and	  severity	  of	  Clinton’s	  message	  to	  Israeli	  voters	  in	  1999	  was	  also	  weaker	  than	  it	  was	  in	  1996.	  	  Whereas	  the	  previous	  contest	  was	  framed	  by	  the	  president	  as	  a	  good	  and	  evil	  contest	  for	  the	  soul	  of	  the	  Middle	  East,	   in	  1999	  it	  was	  about	   implementation	   of	   the	   Wye	   Memorandum	   –	   and	   interim	   deal	   about	   yet	  another	  interim	  deal.	   	  Although	  the	  quality	  of	  bilateral	  relations	  was	  under	  greater	  strain	  this	  time	  around,	  in	  1996	  Clinton	  had	  an	  enormous	  range	  of	  positive	  gifts	  at	  his	   disposal	   that	   he	   showered	   upon	   Israel’s	   Labor	   government	   in	   hopes	   of	  persuading	  the	  Israeli	  public	  that	  Washington’s	  backing	  was	  reliable	  and	  essential.	  	  	  The	   difference	   is	   perhaps	  most	   clear	   in	   the	   dispute	   over	  Wye	   aid	   in	   early	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March	  of	  that	  year.	  	  When	  the	  Clinton	  administration	  was	  faced	  with	  accusations	  by	  an	  anonymous	  Israeli	  official	  that	  they	  had	  been	  trying	  to	  politicize	  the	  $1.2	  billion	  of	   bonus	   aid	   by	  making	   it	   conditional	   on	   how	   Israel	   voted	   –	   an	   accusation	  which	  may	  or	  may	  not	  have	  been	  true	  –	  the	  administration	  ran	  from	  the	  claim	  and	  denied	  it	   rather	   than	   suggesting	   that	   Netanyahu’s	   behavior	   disqualified	   his	   government	  from	   receiving	   extra	   foreign	   assistance,	   originally	   earmarked	   only	   for	   good	  behavior.	  	  	  Washington’s	   reticence	   in	   this	   regard	   was	   characteristic	   of	   the	   broader	  passivity	   in	   its	   1999	   approach.	   	   Given	   that	  Barak	  ultimately	  won	   the	   election	   and	  won	   it	   handily,	   it	   is	   tempting	   to	   conclude	   that	   the	   American	   approach	  must	   have	  been	   calibrated	   optimally.	   	   However,	   the	   empirical	   reality	   is	   somewhat	   more	  complex	   than	   that,	   and	   it	   is	   quite	   possible	   that	   Washington’s	   reticence	   to	   pose	  firmer	   consequences	   for	   Netanyahu’s	   behavior	   might	   have	   actually	   neutralized	  some	  of	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  America’s	  role.	   	   I	  remain	  skeptical	  of	  the	  conventional	  wisdom	  on	  this	  case,	  although	  my	  ability	  to	  disprove	  it	   is	  more	  limited	  here	  than	  I	  would	  like.	  Either	  way,	   again	   the	   difference	   in	   approach	   cannot	   be	   traced	   back	   to	   any	  theory	   but	   the	   leadership	   approach.	   	  Whether	   or	   not	   the	   Clinton	   administration’s	  change	  in	  strategy	  was	  optimal	  or	  suboptimal,	   it	  was	  a	  result	  of	  perceptions	  at	  the	  top	   echelons	   of	   U.S.	   political	   leadership,	   not	   a	   result	   of	   any	   sort	   of	   pressure	   from	  below	  within	  the	  executive	  branch	  or	  from	  other	  branches	  of	  U.S.	  government.	  In	  conclusion,	   this	  case	   is	  best	  explained	  by	   leadership	  theory.	   	  None	  of	   the	  other	  three	  theories	  that	  stress	  international	  or	  domestic	  structural	  forces	  provide	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the	   sort	  of	   explanatory	  power	   to	  persuasively	  explain	   the	  dynamics	  of	  occurrence	  and	   efficacy	   in	   the	   American	   effort	   to	   bring	   down	   Netanyahu	   during	   the	   Israeli	  elections	  of	  1999.	   	  
Clinton,	  Case	  #4:	  Barak,	  the	  sinking	  ship	  (1999-­‐2001)	  	  
	  	  Ehud	  Barak’s	   election	   victory	   rekindled	  hopes	   in	  Washington	   that	   the	  Oslo	  process	  might	  yet	  come	  to	  a	  fruitful	  conclusion.	  	  However,	  a	  perverse	  consequence	  of	   the	   electoral	   reform	   that	  made	   the	   selection	   of	   Israel’s	   prime	  minister	   a	   direct	  choice	  for	  Israeli	  voters	  was	  that	  the	  public	  felt	  greater	  freedom	  to	  split	  their	  ticket,	  voting	  for	  a	  broader	  range	  of	  parties	   in	  the	  Knesset	  even	  as	  their	  choice	  for	  prime	  minister	  was	  narrowed.	  	  Thus,	  although	  Barak	  won	  by	  an	  impressive	  margin	  in	  his	  race	  to	  become	  prime	  minister,	  his	  party’s	  margin	  actually	  decreased,	  forcing	  him	  to	  rely	  on	  special-­‐interest	  parties	  in	  his	  coalition	  to	  a	  greater	  degree	  than	  ever	  before.	  Labor	  slid	  from	  36	  to	  26	  seats	  (even	  counting	  its	  One	  Israel	  alliance	  partners	  Gesher	  and	  Meimad),	  while	  Likud	  fell	  from	  32	  to	  19.	   	  Whereas	  in	  1981	  they	  held	  a	  combined	  95	  out	  of	  120	  seats	  in	  the	  Knesset,	  by	  1999	  these	  two	  mainstream	  parties	  held	  only	  45.282	   	  Barak	  initially	  formed	  a	  very	  large	  coalition,	  but	  it	  simultaneously	  depended	  among	  others	  on	  both	  the	  seventeen	  votes	  of	  the	  burgeoning	  Shas	  Party	  and	  anti-­‐religious	  parties	   such	  as	   the	  dovish	  Meretz	   (now	  at	   ten	   seats)	  and	  Natan	  Sharansky’s	  Russian	  party,	  Yisrael	  Ba’Aliyah,	  at	  six.	  	  Yet	  somehow,	  by	  the	  summer	  of	  2000,	  all	  three	  of	  these	  parties	  had	  resigned	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
282 Peretz and Doron, “Sectarian Politics and the Peace Process: The 1999 Israel Elections,” 266. 
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from	   the	   coalition,	   along	  with	   Labor’s	   One	   Israel	   alliance	   partner	   Gesher,	   a	   small	  Sephardic	  party.283	   	  No	  doubt,	  Barak	  was	  seeking	  to	  advance	  a	  controversial	  peace	  agenda	   in	   the	   context	  of	   some	  very	  difficult	   internal	   tensions	  within	   the	   coalition.	  	  However,	  like	  Netanyahu	  before	  him,	  Barak	  exacerbated	  these	  tensions	  by	  showing	  a	  remarkable	  ineptitude	  for	  managing	  intrapersonal	  conflicts.	   	  Barak’s	  government	  continued	   to	   garner	   support	   from	   the	   six-­‐member	   Center	   Party	   and	   some	   of	   the	  smaller	   religious	   parties,	   but	   he	   presided	   over	   a	   rump	  minority	   government	   that	  collapsed	   in	  November	   following	  a	  new	   intifada,	  with	  elections	   for	  prime	  minister	  being	  set	  for	  the	  following	  February.	  Thus,	   Barak	   come	   into	   power	   at	   the	   head	   of	   one	   of	   Israel’s	   largest	  governments	   but	   left	   power	   atop	   one	   of	   its	   smallest.	   	   These	   repeated	   coalitional	  difficulties	   were	   not	   lost	   on	   his	   American	   backers.	   	   In	   2000	   Clinton	   told	   his	  chronicler	  for	  the	  Clinton	  Tapes	  that	  he	  worried	  “Barak’s	  political	  constraints	  were	  tighter	  than	  Rabin’s”.284	   	  This	  concern	  for	  Barak’s	  political	  standing	  permeated	  U.S.	  policy	  toward	  Israel	  for	  the	  remainder	  of	  the	  Clinton	  administration.	  Although	  I	  argue	  that	  American	  backing	  benefitted	  Barak	  in	  the	  short	  term,	  it	  ultimately	  backfired	  –	  albeit	  not	  by	  making	   Israeli	  voters	  upset	  over	  meddling.	   	   In	  the	   narrow	   sense,	   administration	   efforts	   failed	   to	   help	   Barak	   save	   his	   sinking	  government,	  and	  he	  went	  down	  in	  a	  crushing	  loss	  to	  Ariel	  Sharon	  that	  February.	  	  In	  the	  broader	  sense,	  these	  actions	  backfired	  by	  isolating	  Arafat	  such	  that	  it	  spoiled	  the	  negotiating	  process	  and	  encouraged	  him	  to	  embrace	  violence.	  	  In	  the	  end,	  efforts	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
283 The leader of Gesher, David Levy, pulled his party out in protest of the prime minister’s policies, 
including multiple back channels that made a mockery of his authority as minister for foreign affairs. 
284 Branch, The Clinton Tapes, 614. 
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save	  the	  peace	  process	  through	  Barak	  abetted	  its	  destruction	  via	  a	  second	  intifada.	  	  
Coding	  the	  Dependent	  Variables	  (Occurrence	  and	  Efficacy)	  Did	  LSI	  Occur?	  	   Yes.	  	  Washington	  went	  to	  great	  lengths	  to	  bolster	  Ehud	  Barak	  inside	  of	  Israel.	  	  The	  most	  notable	  element	  of	  this	  effort	  was	  the	  U.S.	  campaign	  to	  intentionally	  frame	  and	  publicize	  the	  narrative	  of	  what	  happened	  at	  the	  2000	  Camp	  David	  summit	  in	  a	  manner	   that	   boosted	   Barak’s	   standing	   and	   rewarded	   Israel	   for	   his	   purported	  bravery	  –	  at	   the	  expense	  of	  Arafat	  and	  the	  PA.	   	  Although	  these	  descriptions	  of	   the	  summit	   definitely	   accorded	   with	   one	   possible	   interpretation	   of	   what	   transpired	  there,	   they	   were	   part	   of	   an	   ill-­‐advised,	   conscious	   campaign	   by	   American	   officials	  that	  held	  Barak’s	  personal	  standing	  centrally	  in	  mind.	  	   However,	   the	   framing	   of	   Camp	   David	   was	   not	   the	   only	   American	   action	  colored	  by	  concern	  for	  Barak’s	  domestic	  position	  –	  just	  the	  one	  in	  which	  it	   figured	  most	  prominently	  among	  other	  possible	  goals.	   	  U.S.	  handling	  of	   the	  peace	  process	  from	  late	  1999	  to	  early	  2001	  was	  also	  suffused	  with	  a	  running	  background	  concern	  for	   shoring	   up	   the	   health	   of	   Barak’s	   One	   Israel	   government.	   	   In	   these	   less	   clear	  instances,	   it	   is	  often	  difficult	  to	  disentangle	  three	  mutually	  complementary	  strands	  in	  U.S.	   thinking:	   Clinton’s	   personal	   empathy	   for	   Israeli	   peacemaking,	   deference	   to	  Barak’s	  tactical	   judgment,	  and	  concern	  for	  helping	  Barak’s	  domestic	  position.	   	  Still,	  the	  latter	  was	  an	  element	  of	  Clinton’s	  thinking	  throughout	  much	  of	  this	  period.	  Clinton	   also	   permitted	   Barak	   to	   sidestep	   his	   political	   advisors	   in	  contravention	  to	  protocol.	  	  The	  PM	  spent	  inordinate	  amounts	  of	  time	  on	  the	  phone	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consulting	  with	  Clinton	  to	  explain	  his	  political	  needs	  directly.285	  	  Indyk	  explains:	  	  “Clinton	   was	   incredibly	   attentive	   to	   Barak’s	   political	   requirements,	   and	   so	   that	  meant	  that	  whenever	  Barak	  called	  him	  up	  and	  said	  ‘I	  need	  you	  to	  do	  this,	  I	  need	  you	  to	   do	   that,’	   Clinton	   said	   ‘yes,	   sir’…	   and	   the	   president	   was	   taking	   his	   calls…	   at	   a	  certain	  point,	   they	  became	  the	  two	  desk	  officers!	  …	  they	  were	  dealing	  mostly	  with	  each	  other.”286	  	  Dennis	  Ross	  echoes	  this	  perspective	  as	  well,	  telling	  Aaron	  Miller	  in	  an	  interview	  for	  his	  book	  that	  “every	  time	  in	  the	  last	  year	  we	  wanted	  to	  be	  tough	  on	  Barak,	  he’d	  just	  call	  the	  president	  and	  go	  around	  us.	  	  I’d	  say	  to	  Sandy,	  he	  can’t	  take	  every	  Barak	  call,	  and	  Sandy	  would	  answer	   ‘I	  can’t	  stop	   it’.”287	   	  Throughout	  much	  of	   their	  remaining	  tenure	   in	   office,	   Clinton	   spent	   a	   sizeable	   portion	   of	   conversations	   with	   Barak	  focused	  on	  the	  latter’s	  political	  constraints.288	  I	   will	   divide	   the	   following	   discussion	   into	   six	   sections.	   	   In	   it,	   I	   discuss	   U.S.	  efforts	   over	   a	   handful	   of	   periods:	   (1)	   during	   Barak’s	   initial	   consultations	   with	  Clinton,	  (2)	  on	  the	  Syrian	  track,	  (3)	  in	  preparation	  for	  Camp	  David,	  (4)	  during	  that	  summit,	  (5)	  in	  the	  summit’s	  immediate	  aftermath,	  and	  (6)	  through	  the	  next	  autumn.	  
<1.	  Initial	  Consultations>	  	   When	  Barak	  first	  visited	  Washington	  in	  July	  of	  1999,	  he	  explained	  to	  Clinton	  his	  desire	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  Syria	  track	  while	  reaching	  an	  agreement	  with	  Arafat	  to	  put	  his	   Wye	   obligations	   on	   a	   brief	   hold.	   	   Clinton	   had	   hoped	   to	   move	   soon	   on	   the	  Palestinian	  front,	  but	  he	  deferred	  to	  Barak’s	   judgment	  and	  even	  “tried	  to	  explain…	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
285 In addition to the quote below, for this point see also Daniel C. Kurtzer et al., The Peace Puzzle: 
America’s Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace in the Post-Cold War Era [FORTHCOMING] (US Institute of 
Peace & Cornell University Presses, 2012), chap. 3. 
286 Indyk, “Interview with the Author.” 
287 Miller, The Much Too Promised Land, 311. 
288 Sandy Berger cited in the Telhami chapter of Kurtzer et al., The Peace Puzzle. 
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Barak’s	  political	  considerations”	  to	  Yasser	  Arafat.289	  	  This	  initiative	  culminated	  in	  an	  agreement	   on	   September	   5th	   at	   Sharm	   el-­‐Sheikh	   giving	   Barak	   a	   reconfirmed	   but	  delayed	   schedule	   for	   implementing	   further	   withdrawals	   from	   the	   West	   Bank,	  releasing	   Palestinian	   prisoners,	   and	   reaching	   a	   final	   status	   deal.	   	   In	   practice,	  however,	  Barak	  used	  it	  to	  put	  the	  Palestinian	  track	  on	  hold	  even	  longer	  so	  he	  could	  court	  Damascus.	  	  	  And	   even	   though	   President	   Clinton	   knew	   of	   Barak’s	   desire	   to	   delay	  implementing	  Israel’s	  obligations	  under	  Wye,	  he	  declared	  during	  their	  July	  meeting	  that	  he	  would	  urge	  Congress	  to	  expedite	  the	  $1.2	  billion	  in	  bonus	  aid	  that	  Israel	  was	  pledged	  under	   the	  Memorandum	  –	  exactly	   the	  aid	   that	  his	   government	   refused	   to	  give	  Netanyahu	  before	  those	  obligations	  were	  100%	  discharged.290	  
<2.	  The	  Syrian	  Track>	  	   At	  key	  junctures,	  Miller	  believes	  President	  Clinton	  was	  “conditioned	  to	  accept	  the	  counsel	  of	  [Barak]	  without	  pushing	  back,”	  enabling	  the	  prime	  minister	  to	  tailor	  the	  talks	  with	  Damascus	  to	  suit	  his	  own	  domestic	  preferences.291	  	  The	  two	  sides	  also	  discussed	  a	   range	  of	  measures	   that	   the	  U.S.	   could	   take	   to	  help	  Barak	   sell	   a	   Syrian	  deal	  to	  the	  Israeli	  public	  and	  to	  bolster	  his	  coalition	  in	  such	  a	  contingency.	  	  One	  such	  measure	   that	   they	  were	   exploring	  was	   the	   possibility	   of	   a	   formal	  mutual	   defense	  treaty	  between	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Israel,	  complete	  with	  American	  nuclear	  guarantees.292	  At	  the	  culmination	  of	  a	  series	  of	  productive	  negotiations,	  Barak	  backed	  away	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
289 John Lancaster, “Clinton, Optimistic for Mideast Peace, Pledges Help,” Washington Post, September 
24, 1999. 
290 Charles Babington, “Clinton Wants Aid to Israel Expedited: Barak Promises to Reinvigorate Search for 
Lasting Peace in the Middle East,” Washington Post, July 20, 1999. Because of the collapse of Camp David 
and the subsequent intifada, these are obligations that Israel has still not implemented to date. 
291 Miller, The Much Too Promised Land, 284. 
292 Bruce Riedel, “Camp David: The US-Israeli Bargain,” Bitter Lemons, July 15, 2002. 
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from	  making	  a	  full	  offer	  to	  return	  the	  Golan	  to	  his	  Syrian	  interlocutor,	  FM	  Farouq	  Al-­‐Sharaa.	   	   By	   all	   accounts,	   he	   had	   become	   concerned	   by	   new	   signs	   that	   the	   Israeli	  public	  and	  his	  coalition	  partners	  might	  not	  support	  such	  a	  deal.293	   	  Yet	  afterwards	  Clinton	  	  criticized	  the	  Syrians	  rather	  than	  the	  Israelis,	  despite	  long	  knowing	  that	  full	  Israeli	   withdrawal	   would	   be	   the	   price	   for	   peace	   on	   this	   particular	   front.294	   	   To	  strengthen	  his	  hand	  at	  home,	  Barak	   then	   leaked	  a	  draft	  U.S.	   agreement	   that	  when	  viewed	   in	   a	   vacuum	   incorrectly	   attributed	   very	   large	   concessions	   to	   the	   Syrian	  negotiators.	   	   Yet	   this	   move	   that	   elicited	   no	   real	   consequences	   from	   an	   empathic	  Washington.295	  	  Looking	  back,	  Indyk	  reflects	  that:	  	  “in	  hindsight,	  we	  shouldn’t	  have	  allowed	  Sharaa	  to	  go	  home	  empty-­‐handed;	  Clinton	  should	  have	  pressed	  Barak	  to	  be	  more	  forthcoming	  at	  that	  moment,	  not	   later.	   	  But	  Clinton	   had	   always	   been	   particularly	   sensitive	   to	   the	   political	   situation	   in	   Israel…	  there	  was	   also	   a	   predisposition	   in	   Clinton’s	   peace	   team	   to	   avoid	   second-­‐guessing	  Israeli	  leaders	  who	  were	  committed	  to	  taking	  risks	  for	  peace”.296	  	  Clinton	  later	  blew	  up	  at	  Barak	  for	  the	  time	  when	  “I	  went	  to	  Shepherdstown	  and	  was	  told	  nothing	  by	  you	  for	  four	  days”.297	  Then,	   at	   a	   make-­‐or-­‐break	   summit	   with	   an	   ailing	   Hafez	   al-­‐Assad,	   Clinton	  deferred	  to	  Barak’s	  desire	   to	  make	  an	  offer	   to	   the	  Syrians	   that	  was	  carefully	  stage	  managed	   in	  a	  manner	  that	  Clinton	   later	  complained	  made	  him	  feel	   like	  a	  “wooden	  Indian	  doing	  your	  bidding”.298	  	  Albright	  explains:	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  “Always	   the	  micromanager,	   Barak	   produced	   a	   complete	   script	   for	   the	   President’s	  use	  with	  Asad.	   	   In	  a	  manner	  I	   thought	  patronizing,	  he	  said	   it	  would	  be	   fine	   for	  the	  President	  to	  improvise	  the	  opening	  generalities,	  but	  the	  description	  of	  Israel’s	  needs	  had	  to	  be	  recited	  word	  for	  word.	  	   “President	  Clinton	  went	  along	  with	  this	  process	  for	  several	  reasons.	  	  He	  had	  more	   hope	   than	   the	   rest	   of	   us	   that	   the	   initiative	   would	   succeed,	   and	   certainly	  Barak’s	   offer	   was	   more	   forthcoming	   than	   any	   other	   the	   Syrians	   were	   likely	   to	  receive.	  	  The	  President	  had	  also	  promised	  to	  support	  those	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  who	  were	  willing	  to	  run	  risks	  for	  peace;	  astute	  diplomatic	  strategist	  or	  not,	  Barak	  led	  the	  region	  in	  this	  category”.299	  	  Although	   this	   offer	  was	   at	   least	   a	   feasible	   one,	  more	  was	   needed	   to	   clinch	   a	   deal	  given	  that	  the	  window	  of	  opportunity	  for	  peace	  with	  Syria	  was	  closing	  for	  reasons	  explored	  below.	   	  Yet	  Clinton	  and	  his	   team	  oversold	   the	   Israeli	  offer	  as	   “very,	   very	  serious	  efforts,”	  suggested	  the	  ball	  was	  now	  solely	  in	  Assad’s	  court,	  and	  did	  nothing	  to	  refute	  Barak’s	  claim	  that	  Geneva	  proved	  the	  Syrian	  leader	  did	  not	  want	  peace.300	  
<3.	  Back	  to	  the	  Palestinian	  Track>	  Barak	   then	   returned	   to	   the	  Palestinian	   track.	   	  However,	  he	  argued	   that	   the	  political	  logic	  of	  Oslo	  was	  politically	  unsustainable.	  	  Under	  prior	  agreements,	  Israel	  was	  obligated	   to	   carryout	  a	   series	  of	   interim	  concessions	   that	  he	   felt	  were	   far	   too	  risky.	   	   Instead,	  he	  proposed	   jumping	  straight	  to	   final	  status	  negotiations	  to	  bypass	  the	   issue	   of	   this	   steady	   bloodletting.301	   	   Thus,	   he	   sought	   to	   hold	   a	  make-­‐or-­‐break	  summit	  on	  final	  status	  issues	  as	  soon	  as	  possible	  while	  dodging	  even	  those	  interim	  steps	  he	  had	  personally	  accepted	  to	  take	  at	  Sharm.	  He	  was	   still	   formally	   obligated	   under	   the	   agreement	   to	   release	   a	   group	   of	  Palestinian	   prisoners	   and	   to	   transfer	   three	   villages	   on	   the	   outskirts	   of	   East	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Jerusalem	  to	  the	  Palestinian	  Authority’s	  control,	  a	  step	  formally	  known	  as	  the	  third	  further	  redeployment	  (FRD).	  	  In	  his	  eagerness	  to	  get	  to	  a	  summit,	  Barak	  encouraged	  Clinton	   to	   promise	   Arafat	   that	   he	   would	   get	   Israel	   would	   fulfill	   these	   obligations	  before	  a	  summit	  could	  occur.302	  	  However,	  after	  Arafat	  agreed,	  Barak	  reneged	  on	  the	  promise	   to	   transfer	   the	   villages	   and	   released	   a	   pitiful	   three	   prisoners,	   an	   action	  Arafat	  rightly	  argued	  was	  probably	  worse	  than	  releasing	  none	  at	  all.303	  Barak	   made	   the	   decision	   not	   to	   carry	   out	   the	   third	   FRD	   in	   response	   to	  Palestinian	   violence	   on	   the	   anniversary	   of	   Israel’s	   independence	   and	   Palestinian	  
Naqba	  Day	  that	  May	  15th.	  	  Yet	  he	  did	  so	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  caused	  him	  almost	  as	  much	  damage	   as	   if	   he	  had	   carried	   them	  out	   anyway.	   	  He	  went	   through	   the	   challenge	  of	  gaining	   approval	   from	   the	   Knesset	   and	   cabinet	   before	   declining	   to	   transfer	   the	  villages,	  and	  he	  forced	  Clinton	  to	  break	  his	  own	  word	  to	  Chairman	  Arafat.	  By	  the	  time	  they	  did	  go	  to	  Camp	  David,	  Barak’s	  mishandling	  of	  interim	  issues	  had	  needlessly	  used	  up	  goodwill	  on	  the	  Palestinian	  side.	  	  He	  rushed	  the	  parties	  into	  a	  final	  status	  summit	  without	  having	  sufficient	  authorized	  his	  negotiators	  to	  explore	  how	   truly	   unprepared	   they	   were	   on	   the	   issue	   that	   would	   ultimately	   scuttle	   the	  summit:	   Jerusalem.	   	  To	  be	   fair,	  Arafat	  certainly	  should	  have	  done	  more	  to	  prevent	  violence	   that	   May,	   and	   he	   should	   have	   been	   more	   tolerant	   of	   exploring	   realistic	  compromises	   on	   Jerusalem.	   	   However,	   Barak’s	   mishandling	   of	   Israel’s	   prior	  commitments	   did	   detract	   from	   the	   possibility	   of	   success	   at	   Camp	  David,	   and	   this	  pattern	   of	   behavior	  was	   enabled	  by	   a	   deferential	   and	   empathic	   President	   Clinton,	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who	  took	  Barak’s	  domestic	  needs	  into	  consideration	  so	  much	  in	  the	  immediate	  term	  that	  they	  made	  his	  job	  much	  harder	  in	  the	  final	  accounting.	  Israeli	   negotiator	   Gilead	   Sher	   believes	   that	   the	   Americans	   were	   deeply	  focused	  on	  Israeli	  domestic	  politics	  at	  the	  time.	  	  He	  explains:	  	  “When	   the	   talks	   with	   the	   Syrians	   collapsed,	   that’s	   the	   famous	   Geneva	   meeting	  between	  Clinton	  and	  Hafez	  al-­‐Assad,	  and	   the	  speeding	  up	  of	   the	  negotiations	  with	  the	   Palestinians	   as	   a	   consequence,	   during	   that	   period	   I	   believe	   that	   the	  American	  administration	  was	  quite	  concerned	  about	  the	  capability	  of	  the	  prime	  minister	  and	  his	  government	  to	  deliver	  the	  goods	  once	  an	  agreement	  is	  hopefully	  attained”304	  	  
<4.	  Camp	  David	  and	  Aftermath>	  Barak	  arrived	  at	  the	  summit	  politically	  weakened.	  	  Multiple	  parties	  had	  quit	  his	  coalition,	  and	  he	  arrived	  in	  the	  U.S.	  a	  day	  late	  after	  having	  faced	  an	  excruciating	  vote	   of	   no	   confidence	   in	   the	   Knesset.	   	   The	   opposition	   failed	   gather	   the	   61	   votes	  needed	  to	  bring	  down	  his	  government,	  but	  his	  side	  garnered	  even	  less	  votes,	  coming	  out	   52	   to	   54.305	   	   Barak	   argued	   that	   his	   mandate	   came	   directly	   from	   the	   Israeli	  people,	  not	  the	  parliament,	  and	  he	  planned	  to	  assemble	  an	  alternative	  coalition	  that	  would	   bring	   pro-­‐peace	   parties	   back	   into	   the	   government	   after	   the	   summit,	   but	   it	  was	  certainly	  not	  an	  encouraging	  basis	  for	  heading	  off	  to	  a	  make-­‐or-­‐break	  moment	  on	   final	   status.	   	   Clinton	   incorrectly	   writes	   in	   his	   memoirs	   that	   Barak	   “had	   just	  survived	  a	  no-­‐confidence	  vote	  in	  the	  Knesset	  by	  only	  two	  votes,”	  but	  either	  way	  he	  was	   clearly	   aware	   of	   the	   Israeli	   prime	   minister’s	   difficult	   domestic	   situation.306	  Bruce	  Riedel	   says	   Barak	   also	   brought	   poll	   data	  with	   him	   to	   Camp	  David	   showing	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how	  exposed	  he	  was	  in	  Israel,	  and	  he	  shared	  these	  figures	  with	  President	  Clinton.307	  	  	  At	   multiple	   points	   throughout	   the	   summit,	   Clinton	   deferred	   to	   Barak’s	  political	   judgment	  despite	  misgivings	  by	  him	  or	  his	  aides.	   	  For	   instance,	   just	  a	   few	  days	  into	  the	  summit,	  the	  American	  team	  was	  planning	  to	  confront	  both	  sides	  with	  a	  paper	  that	  outlined	  some	  possible	  bridging	  proposals.	   	  However,	  President	  Clinton	  decided	  over	  the	  objections	  of	  his	  aides	  to	  shelve	  the	  paper	  in	  favor	  of	  a	  much	  softer	  document	  listing	  U.S.	  understandings	  of	  both	  sides’	  positions,	  since	  he	  didn’t	  want	  to	  “jam”	  the	  Israelis	  too	  hard.308	  	  Both	  Israeli	  and	  Palestinian	  negotiators	  later	  said	  that	  their	   complaints	  about	   the	  document	  had	  been	   tactical	  bargaining	  maneuvers,	  not	  genuine	  objections,	   and	  observers	  have	   suggested	   that	   removing	   the	  U.S.	   bridging	  plan	  was	  a	  key	  moment	  where	  Camp	  David	  went	  off	  the	  rails.309	  While	  at	  Camp	  David,	  the	  Israeli	  and	  American	  teams	  discussed	  possible	  U.S.	  measures	  to	  bolster	  Barak’s	  position	  in	  the	  even	  that	  a	  final	  status	  deal	  was	  clinched	  at	   the	   summit.310	   	  Then,	   as	   it	  became	   increasingly	  obvious	   that	   the	   summit	  would	  fail	  and	  that	   the	  Palestinian	  side	  was	   leaking	  many	  of	  Barak’s	  biggest	  concessions,	  the	  American	  and	  Israeli	  teams	  began	  to	  consult	  over	  what	  Washington	  could	  do	  to	  salvage	  Barak’s	  political	  position,	  drawing	  on	  previous	  discussions	  of	  what	  might	  be	  done	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  successful	  agreement.	  These	   discussions	   took	   place	   at	   meetings	   between	   Clinton	   and	   Barak,	  between	   Bruce	   Riedel	   and	   Danny	   Yatom,	   and	   between	   Dennis	   Ross	   and	   Dan	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Meridor.	  	  During	  these	  meetings,	  Israeli	  officials	  laid	  out	  a	  stunningly	  broad	  range	  of	  suggested	  American	  steps,	  including:	  praising	  Israel’s	  boldness	  at	  Camp	  David	  in	  the	  face	   of	   Palestinian	   obstinacy;	   outreach	   to	   Europe	   and	   Arab	   states	   on	   the	  matter;	  recognizing	   Jerusalem	   as	   the	   capital	   of	   Israel	   and	  moving	   the	   U.S.	   embassy	   there	  from	  Tel	  Aviv;	  a	  memorandum	  of	  understanding	  on	  economic	  and	  military	  foreign	  assistance	  paid	  upfront	   for	   interest	   relief;	   a	   formal	  mutual	   defense	   treaty	  with	   an	  American	   nuclear	   umbrella;	   weapons	   transactions	   including	   submarines,	   Arrow	  missile	   defense	   batteries,	   still-­‐to-­‐be-­‐produced	   advanced	   F-­‐22	   jets,	   high-­‐tech	  intelligence	   systems,	   and	   Tomahawk	   cruise	   missiles;	   an	   increase	   in	   defense	  acquisitions	   from	   Israeli	  manufacturers;	   a	   promise	   to	   oppose	  Palestinian	  UDI	   and	  oppose	   UN	   membership	   for	   such	   a	   state;	   and	   de	   facto	   absolving	   Israel	   from	   its	  obligation	  to	  carry	  out	  the	  third	  further	  withdrawal	  from	  the	  West	  Bank.311	  	  When	  a	  deal	  had	  looked	  more	  promising,	  the	  two	  sides	  even	  discussed	  a	  $35	  billion	  Marshall	  Plan-­‐style	  fund	  for	  Israelis,	  Palestinians,	  and	  Jordanians	  that	  Clinton	  agreed	  to	  fundraise	  from	  the	  international	  community.	  	  Of	  this	  fund,	  $15	  billion	  was	  to	   be	   exclusively	   for	   Israel’s	   benefit,	   including	   modernization	   of	   the	   IDF	   (early	  warning	   aircraft,	   attack	   submarines,	   helicopters,	   and	   Arrow	   batteries)	   and	   to	  finance	   redeployment	   of	   the	   IDF	   and	   settlers	   from	   the	   West	   Bank	   and	   the	  construction	  of	  new	  infrastructure	  and	  border	  facilities.312	  American	  officials	  were	  by	   and	   large	  willing	   to	   consider	  nearly	   all	   of	   these	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measures.	   	  Riedel	  says	  “basically	  Clinton’s	  approach	  was	  very	  simple:	  he	  said	   ‘yes,	  whatever	  you	  need’.	  And	  when	  he	  would	  meet	  with	  his	  team	  after	  the	  fact,	  he	  would	  simply	  say	  ‘I	  made	  the	  decision,	  we’re	  going	  to	  do	  this’.”313	  	  The	  Israelis	  even	  tabled	  a	  draft	  mutual	  defense	  treaty,	  and	  the	  two	  sides	  began	  discussions	  about	  how	  to	  get	  it	   through	   Congress.314	   	   Once	   it	   became	   clear	   a	   final	   status	   deal	   would	   not	   be	  reached,	  Clinton	  told	  his	  aides	  he	  was	  actually	  considering	  moving	  the	  embassy	  to	  Jerusalem,315	  his	  team	  gave	  tacit	  support	  for	  Israel	  to	  avoid	  its	  obligation	  for	  a	  third	  FRD,316	   and	   they	   announced	   a	   new	   package	   of	   measures	   to	   upgrade	   strategic	  relations	  and	  modernize	  the	  IDF.317	  	  Perhaps	  more	  importantly,	  they	  also	  engaged	  in	  the	   PR	   offensive	   requested	   by	   the	   Israelis	   that	   selectively	   framed	   one	   possible	  interpretation	   of	   the	   events	   at	   Camp	   David	   in	   a	  manner	   I	   will	   argue	  was	   a	   risky	  move	  that	  ultimately	  backfired,	  to	  the	  overall	  detriment	  of	  the	  peace	  process.	  Barak	   made	   an	   unprecedented	   decision	   at	   Camp	   David	   to	   offer	   the	  Palestinians	  control	  and	  even	  sovereignty	  over	  parts	  of	  East	  Jerusalem.	  	  Although	  PA	  negotiators	   felt	   they	   were	   entitled	   to	   the	   whole	   of	   East	   Jerusalem	   under	  international	  law,	  and	  it	  turns	  out	  Arafat	  was	  not	  prepared	  to	  settle	  for	  less	  than	  full	  sovereignty	  over	  the	  Temple	  Mount	  and	  the	  land	  underneath	  it,	  Barak	  did	  go	  farther	  than	  most	  well-­‐informed	  observers	  expected	  any	  Israeli	  leader	  to	  suggest.	  	  The	  U.S.	  team,	  including	  the	  president,	  were	  very	  impressed	  at	  the	  time	  by	  his	  proposals	  and	  felt	   that	   the	  Palestinian	   team	  made	  a	  major	  misjudgment	  by	  neither	  accepting	   the	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Barak’s	  proposals	  nor	  responding	  with	  creative	  offers	  of	  their	  own.	  	  Thus,	  when	  the	  summit	   finally	   collapsed	   after	   two	   weeks	   of	   intensive	   debate,	   the	   president	   was	  furious	  at	  Arafat	  and	  very	  concerned	  that	  Barak	  was	  politically	  exposed.	  It	   is	   important	   to	   recognize	   that	   this	   understanding	   of	   what	   happened	   at	  Camp	   David	   is	   a	   selective	   interpretation	   of	   the	   events	   that	   transpired	   there,	   and	  certain	  observers	  on	  all	  three	  sides	  take	  issue	  with	  it.318	  	  And	  no	  doubt	  the	  American	  team	   clearly	   did	   not	   understand	   the	   Palestinian	   side’s	   red	   lines	   at	   Camp	  David,	   a	  symptom	   of	   having	   jumped	   into	   talks	   on	   final	   status	   issues	   without	   sufficiently	  exploring	   the	   positions	   of	   both	   sides	   on	   Jerusalem	   first.	   	   Even	   if	   one	   chooses	   to	  accept	   the	   Clinton	   administration’s	   narrative	   of	   events	   at	   Camp	   David,	   one	   can	  certainly	  question	  the	  advisability	  of	  its	  decision	  to	  go	  public	  with	  it.	  
<5.	  The	  Aftermath	  of	  Camp	  David>	  	   Towards	   the	   end	   of	   the	   summit,	   Aaron	  David	  Miller	   and	  Martin	   Indyk	   had	  been	  tasked	  with	  drafting	  a	  statement	  for	  the	  president	  to	  read	  at	  the	  closing	  press	  conference.	  	  The	  draft	  they	  wrote	  was	  even	  handed	  and	  did	  not	  include	  criticism	  of	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the	  Palestinian	  team.319	  	  This	  was	  in	  accordance	  with	  a	  prior	  promise	  the	  president	  had	  made	  to	  Chairman	  Arafat	  in	  order	  to	  persuade	  him	  to	  attend	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  	  When	  Arafat	  voiced	  his	  concerns	  that	  the	  ground	  was	  not	  yet	  prepared	  for	  a	  summit,	  President	  Clinton	  promised	  Arafat	  he	  would	  not	  blame	  him	  if	  they	  could	  not	  reach	  an	  agreement	  at	  Camp	  David.320	  	   Clearly,	   Arafat	   had	   upset	   the	   president,	   and	   Clinton	   was	   not	   reluctant	   to	  make	  him	  sweat	  if	  it	  would	  help	  Barak	  politically.	  	  On	  the	  last	  day	  of	  the	  summit,	  the	  president’s	   staff	   changed	   this	   statement	   in	   accordance	   with	   his	   wishes	   to	   praise	  Barak’s	   bravery	   in	   the	   face	   of	   a	   disappointing	   Palestinian	   response.321	   	   Thus,	   the	  final	  statement	  “damn[ed]	  Arafat	  with	  faint	  praise,”	  in	  effect,	  showering	  Barak	  with	  glowing	   praise	   while	   “crediting	   Arafat	   for	   little	   more	   than	   showing	   up”.322	   	   The	  statement	  read	  as	  follows:	  	  “Prime	  Minister	  Barak	  showed	  particular	  courage,	  vision,	  and	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	   historical	   importance	   of	   this	  moment.	   	   Chairman	  Arafat	  made	   it	   clear	   that	   he,	  too,	  remains	  committed	  to	  the	  path	  of	  peace”.323	  	  Albright	   notes	   that	   “with	   Israeli	   and	   American	   negotiators	   now	   free	   to	   provide	  background	   to	   the	   press,	   the	   imbalance	   in	   the	   President’s	   words	   gained	   added	  weight,”	   and	   Enderlin	   heard	   anonymous	   remarks	   from	   U.S.	   and	   Israeli	   officials	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endorsing	   this	  version	  of	  events.324	   	  Clinton	  acknowledges	   in	  his	  memoirs	   that	  his	  intention	   in	   the	  statement	  was	  “to	  give	  Barak	  some	  cover	  back	  home	  and	   indicate	  what	  had	  occurred”.325	  	  Ross	  also	  explains	  that	  the	  statement	  	  	  “would	  be	  seen	  as	  implicit	  criticism	  of	  Arafat	  –	  something	  his	  performance	  at	  Camp	  David	  warranted…	  something	  I	  felt	  Barak	  would	  need	  domestically.	   	  The	  President	  was	  very	  keen	  to	  help	  Barak,	   feeling	  that	   if	  we	  could	  shore	  him	  up	  politically	  now,	  we	  could	  keep	  the	  process	  alive.	  	  That	  was	  uppermost	  in	  the	  President’s	  mind	  when	  he	   spoke	   to	   the	  press	   at	   the	  White	  House.	   	  He	   [then]	  went	  well	   beyond	   the	  press	  statement,	   explaining	   what	   Barak	   had	   done,	   how	   he	   was	   motivated	   by	   Israeli	  security	  needs	  throughout,	  how	  it	  took	  great	  courage	  to	  adopt	  positions,	  especially	  on	   Jerusalem,	   that	  were	   difficult	   but	   ultimately	   visionary	   in	  meeting	   Israeli	   needs	  and	  making	  peace	  possible…	  his	  target	  audience	  was	  the	  Israeli	  public”.326	  	  	  	  When	   asked	   how	   much	   this	   concern	   for	   Barak’s	   domestic	   standing	   played	   into	  Clinton’s	  decision	  over	  how	  to	  frame	  Camp	  David	  to	  the	  press	  after	  the	  fact,	  Martin	  Indyk	  said	  “totally	  –	  one	  hundred	  percent”.327	  	   The	  next	  day,	  the	  president	  expanded	  on	  his	  comments,	  holding	  an	  extended	  interview	  with	  Israeli	  television	  that	  Indyk	  now	  reveals	  was	  actually	  done	  at	  Barak’s	  request.328	   	   In	   it,	   Clinton	   announced	   that	   “Prime	   Minister	   Barak	   in	   no	   way	   ever	  compromised	  the	  vital	   interests	  of	  the	  security	  of	  the	  State	  of	  Israel…	  I	  don’t	  think	  that	  he	  will	   ever	  do	  anything	   that	  he	  believes	  undermines	   the	  vital	   interest	  of	   the	  people	   of	   Israel	   and	   Jerusalem”.	   	   He	   also	   noted	   that	   “in	   view	   of	   the	   courageous	  actions	   that	   the	   Prime	  Minister	   and	   the	   Israeli	   team	   took	   at	   the	   summit…	   I	   think	  some	  review	  and	  strengthening	  is	  in	  order”	  for	  the	  U.S.-­‐Israel	  relationship,	  including	  new	  funding	  and	  technology	  transfers	  to	  help	  modernize	  the	  IDF.	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He	  even	  proclaimed	  “you	  know,	  I	  have	  always	  wanted	  to	  move	  our	  embassy	  to	  West	  Jerusalem.	  	  We	  have	  designated	  a	  site	  there…	  in	  light	  of	  what	  has	  happened,	  I’ve	  taken	  [my	  prior]	  decision	  [not	  to	  move	  the	  embassy]	  under	  review	  and	  I’ll	  make	  a	  decision	  sometime	  between	  now	  and	   the	  end	  of	   the	  year	  on	   that”.	   	  Also,	  he	  said	  that	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  deal	  “I	  would	  do	  whatever	  I	  could	  do	  to	  persuade	  the	  people	  to	  support	  it”	  and	  that	  a	  fund	  for	  compensating	  refugees	  would	  be	  open	  to	  not	  just	  to	  Palestinians	  but	  also	  Jews	  who	  fled	  from	  to	  Israel	  from	  Arab	  countries.329	  	   For	  the	  next	  two	  months,	  Clinton	  and	  his	  aides	  continued	  this	  public	  relations	  offensive,	   telling	   world	   leaders	   from	   Europe	   and	   the	   Arab	   world	   that	   Barak	   had	  been	  a	  responsible	  stakeholder	  at	  Camp	  David	  but	  Arafat	  was	  not.	  	  Some	  even	  went	  so	  far	  as	  to	  call	  it	  a	  conscious	  “campaign”	  directed	  by	  Barak	  and	  backed	  by	  Clinton	  to	  control	  the	  narrative	  of	  what	  took	  place	  at	  Camp	  David.330	  	  	  Even	  if	  their	  narrative	  of	  what	  happened	  at	  Camp	  David	  was	  correct	  –	  which	  is	  itself	  debatable	  –	  the	  decision	  to	  broadcast	  it	  so	  aggressively	  was	  a	  policy	  choice	  that	   was	   heavily	   contingent	   on	   concern	   for	   the	   stability	   of	   Barak’s	   government.	  	  Clinton	   could	   have	   kept	   his	   dissatisfaction	   and	   pressure	   on	   Arafat	   private,	   but	  instead	  he	  chose	  to	  openly	  endorse	  criticisms	  of	  Arafat’s	  behavior	  to	  help	  Barak	  look	  good	  back	  home.	  	  And,	  as	  we	  all	  know	  from	  the	  political	  science	  literatures	  on	  both	  media	  studies	  and	  on	  audience	  costs,	  “going	  public”	  has	  its	  benefits	  but	  it	  also	  runs	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the	  risk	  of	  stiffening	  political	  positions	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  a	  dispute.331	  
<6.	  The	  Fall	  of	  2000>	  An	   especially	   problematic	   aspect	   of	   this	   public	   relations	   campaign	  was	   the	  suggestion	  by	  Barak	  that	  he	  went	  to	  Camp	  David	  not	  to	  reach	  a	  final	  agreement	  with	  the	   Palestinians	   but	   to	   expose	   Arafat	   for	   an	   extremist	  who	  was	   not	   interested	   in	  making	  peace.	   	  This	   stylized	  description	  of	  history	  was	  at	   stark	  odds	  with	  Barak’s	  actual	   behavior,	   let	   alone	   Arafat’s,	   but	   he	   endorsed	   the	   message	   on	   the	  recommendation	   of	   his	   pollsters,	   over	   the	   objection	   of	   his	   policy	   team.332	   	   His	  advisors	   actually	   continued	   final	   status	   talks	   with	   the	   Palestinian	   Authority	   on	   a	  near-­‐daily	  basis	  although	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  intifada	  threw	  those	  negotiations	  into	  disarray.333	  	  At	  first,	  negotiators	  on	  all	  three	  sides	  hoped	  that	  a	  second	  summit	  was	  a	  matter	   of	   time,	   although	   they	  hoped	   to	   reach	   a	   basic	   understanding	   on	   Jerusalem	  before	  committing	  to	  such	  a	  visible	  second	  attempt	  at	  a	  deal.	  	   Even	  the	  outbreak	  of	  large-­‐scale	  violence	  did	  not	  actually	  kill	  the	  negotiating	  process,	  at	  least	  not	  immediately.	  	  Despite	  his	  claim	  to	  have	  ripped	  the	  mask	  off	  of	  a	  deceitful	  Arafat,	  Barak	  had	  gambled	  his	  political	  survival	  on	  the	  peace	  process,	  and	  he	  was	  not	  yet	  ready	  to	  abandon	  it.	  	  In	  effect,	  he	  was	  betting	  that	  a	  peace	  deal	  would	  be	  his	   salvation.	   	  Although	  Clinton’s	  advisors	   told	  him	  that	   the	  violence	  needed	   to	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stop	  before	  final	  status	  concessions	  could	  realistically	  be	  tenable	  again,	  “ultimately	  he	  [Clinton]	  was	  prepared	  to	  defer	  to	  Barak	  because	  it	  was	  Barak’s	  political	  life	  that	  was	  on	  the	  line.	  	  He	  didn’t	  agree	  with	  him	  often”	  at	  that	  point.334	  	  	  Thus,	  the	  United	  States	  engaged	  in	  extensive	  efforts	  to	  help	  him	  reach	  a	  deal	  despite	   increasing	   waves	   of	   Palestinian	   terrorism	   and	   harsh	   Israeli	   retaliation	  measures.	  	  U.S.	  diplomatic	  efforts	  at	  this	  point	  included	  crisis	  summits	  in	  France	  and	  Egypt	   that	   mixed	   final	   status	   issues	   with	   damage	   control,	   as	   well	   as	   the	  announcement	  of	  President	  Clinton’s	  parameters	  for	  peace	  in	  December.	  	   At	  that	  point,	  the	  Israelis	  agreed	  to	  Clinton’s	  proposal,	  but	  Arafat	  squandered	  the	  opportunity.	   	  Under	  heavy	  pressure	  from	  the	  U.S.	  to	  declare	  whether	  or	  not	  he	  accepted	   the	  parameters	   as	   the	  basis	   for	   further	  negotiation,	  Arafat	   said	   both	   yes	  and	   no	   –	   while	   at	   the	   same	   time	   endorsing	   a	   list	   of	   fundamental	   objections	   that	  vitiated	   the	   parameters	   of	   any	   real	   content.	   	   From	   the	   American	   perspective,	   his	  answer	  was	  effectively	  a	  “no”.	  	  Barak	  still	  went	  through	  the	  effort	  of	  making	  one	  last	  stab	  at	  a	  deal	  in	  the	  form	  of	  negotiations	  in	  Taba	  that	  January,	  but	  he	  simultaneously	  pursued	   grandstanding	   and	  military	  measures	   that	   undermined	   the	   talks,	   and	   he	  claimed	   that	   his	   negotiators	  were	   not	   authorized	   to	   do	   anything	   but	   demonstrate	  Arafat’s	  true	  nature.	  	  	  In	  the	  end,	  the	  talks	  closed	  some	  gaps	  but	  achieved	  no	  formal	  agreements,	  and	  Barak	  was	  clobbered	  by	  Ariel	  Sharon	  during	  February	  elections.	  	  Did	  the	  Policy	  Succeed?	  	   Temporarily,	   yes;	   overall,	   no.	   	   For	   a	   brief	   period	   of	   about	   two	   months,	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Clinton’s	  endorsement	  of	  how	  Barak	  handling	  of	  Camp	  David	  actually	  did	  strengthen	  the	   Israeli	   leader,	   granting	   his	   government	   a	   new	   lease	   on	   political	   life.	  	  Unfortunately,	  however,	  this	  was	  done	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  unnecessarily	  put	  too	  much	  pressure	  on	  Arafat	  and	  made	  an	  explosion	  of	  violence	  in	  the	  territories	  more	  likely.	  	  This	  miscalculation	  helped	  bring	  about	  the	  end	  of	  both	  Barak’s	  premiership	  and	  the	  broader	   Oslo	   peace	   process.	   	   Earlier	   efforts	   to	   defer	   to	   Barak’s	   judgments	   on	   the	  Syrian	   track	   backfired	   there	   as	   well	   because	   they	   were	   done	   in	   a	   manner	   that	  indulged	  his	  poor	  tactical	  judgment	  on	  how	  to	  actually	  pursue	  peace.	  	   On	  the	  Syrian	  track,	  sensitivity	  to	  Barak’s	  immediate	  political	  needs	  backfired	  in	   the	   form	   of	   failure	   on	   two	   fronts:	   at	   either	   strengthening	   his	   own	   political	  standing	  or	  at	  advancing	  the	  peace	  process.	  	  Assad	  was	  unwilling	  to	  make	  a	  deal	  at	  Geneva,	   and	   Clinton	   attributes	   this	   final	   setback	   with	   Damascus	   to	   the	   way	   that	  Barak,	   with	   American	   backing,	   mishandled	   his	   genuine	   opportunity	   at	  Shepherdstown.	  	  Clinton	  notes	  that	  “we	  tried	  for	  two	  hours	  to	  get	  some	  traction	  on	  the	  Syrians,	  all	  to	  no	  avail.	  	  The	  Israeli	  rebuff	  in	  Shepherdstown	  and	  the	  leak	  of	  the	  working	   document	   in	   the	   Israeli	   press	   had	   embarrassed	   Assad	   and	   destroyed	   his	  fragile	   trust.	   	  And	  his	  health	  had	  deteriorated	  even	  more	   than	   I	  knew.	   	  Barak	  had	  made	   a	   respectable	   offer.	   	   If	   it	   had	   come	   at	   Shepherdstown,	   an	   agreement	  might	  have	  emerged.	  	  Now,	  Assad’s	  first	  priority	  was	  his	  son’s	  succession”.335	  	   In	   the	   end,	   these	   efforts	   to	   shield	   Barak’s	   domestic	   popularity	   actually	  harmed	  his	  position	  more	  than	  it	  helped	  him.	  	  It	  exposed	  him	  to	  critics	  at	  home	  for	  being	  willing	  to	  give	  up	  most	  of	   the	  Golan	  without	  giving	  him	  the	  actual	  prize	  of	  a	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peace	   treaty	   with	   Syria.	   	   His	   standing	   in	   the	   polls	   plummeted,	   and	   his	   coalition	  began	   to	   fray.336	   	   In	   the	   absence	   of	   a	   treaty,	   Barak	   withdrew	   unilaterally	   from	  Lebanon	  to	  keep	  his	  campaign	  promise	  of	  getting	  out	  within	  a	  year,	  but	  this	  fed	  into	  Hezbollah’s	  narrative	  of	  victory	  through	  violence.	  	  It	  also	  set	  the	  stage	  for	  violence	  in	  the	  Palestinian	  territories	  later	  that	  year	  and	  narrowed	  Arafat’s	  negotiating	  space	  at	  Camp	  David.	   	  Arafat	  vented	  both	  before	  and	  during	   the	  summit	  about	   the	  difficult	  position	  he	  had	  been	  put	  in	  by	  freezing	  the	  Palestinian	  track	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  Syrian	  one	  and	  then	  withdrawing	  from	  Lebanon	  without	  a	  deal.337	  	   The	  American	   efforts	   after	  Camp	  David	  did	   give	  Barak	   an	   important	  boost.	  	  Even	   though	   Barak	   and	   his	   advisors	   feared	   their	   government	   was	   in	   for	   an	  imminent	   collapse,338	   he	   actually	   survived	   a	   final	   vote	   of	   no	   confidence	   in	   the	  Knesset	   just	   before	   a	   three	   month	   parliamentary	   recess,	   giving	   him	   substantial	  breathing	  room	  to	  reach	  an	  agreement	  with	  the	  PA.339	  	   Dennis	  Ross	  agrees	  that	  the	  president’s	  efforts	  made	  a	  real	  difference,	  at	  least	  until	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Intifada:	  	  DW:	  Do	  you	  think	  that	  these	  efforts	  to	  shore	  up	  Barak	  had	  consequences	  of	  any	  sort?	  Or	  benefits?	  	  Ross:	   I	   think	  it	  definitely	  helped	  Barak	  in	  the	  immediate	  aftermath	  of	  Camp	  David.	  	  Without	  a	  doubt.	   	  The	  problem	  is	  once	  the	  intifada	  began,	  then…	  we	  lost	  whatever	  impact	   we	   were	   going	   to	   have,	   it	   was	   trumped	   by	   that.	   	   Had	   it	   not	   been	   for	   the	  intifada,	  I	  think	  that	  what	  the	  president	  did	  would	  have	  made	  a	  huge	  difference….	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We	  weren’t	  in	  the	  first	  instance	  decisive,	  but	  I	  think	  the	  president’s	  posture	  was	  definitely	  helpful.	   	   	  You	  know,	  he	  did	  a	   lot.	   	  He	  went	  out	  and	   I	   said	  he	  did	  an	  interview	  with	  Israeli	  TV.	   	   In	  the	  way	  he	  presented	  things	  and	  cast	  them,	  I	  think	  it	  did	  a	  lot	  to	  shore	  Barak	  up	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  Camp	  David….	  Likud	  members	  were	   just	   in	   a	   state	  of	   despair	  because	   their	   attitude	  was	  ‘the	   public’s	   ready	   for	   it,	   there’s	   nothing	   we	   can	   do	   to	   stop	   it,	   and	   it’s	   going	   to	  happen’.	   	  This	  was	  the	  attitude	  a	  month	  after	  Camp	  David	  and	  a	  month	  before	  the	  intifada.	  	  So	  if	  there	  was	  no	  intifada,	  I	  think	  the	  attitudes	  in	  Israel…	  backed	  whatever	  Barak	  would	  have	  signed	  up	  to.	  	  This	  was	  Arafat’s	  historic	  strategic	  blunder”.340	  	   	  The	  effort	  to	  shore	  up	  Barak	  was	  pursued	  at	  the	  direct	  expense	  of	  Chairman	  Arafat,	   a	  move	   that	  would	   prove	   to	   be	   not	   just	   unnecessary	   but	   also	   costly.	   	   As	   a	  result,	   Yasser	   Arafat	   both	   isolated	   and	   very	   upset,	   and	   he	   felt	   that	   Clinton	   had	  broken	  a	  specific	  promise	  not	  to	  blame	  him.	   	  The	  negotiators	  held	  high	  hopes	  that	  meetings	   between	   the	   leaders	   at	   the	  UN	  General	  Assembly	   that	   September	  would	  yield	   enough	   of	   an	   understanding	   to	   allow	   for	   a	   second	   summit.	   	   However,	   a	  flustered	  Arafat	  was	  in	  no	  state	  to	  hold	  substantive	  talks	  and	  blew	  up	  at	  Albright	  as	  well	  as	  other	  Americans,	  such	  as	  journalist	  Christiane	  Amanpour.341	  	  Indyk	  explains:	  	  “MI:	  Clinton	  reneged	  on	  that	  commitment	  because	  he	  wanted	  to	  help	  Barak,	  but,	  yes,	  in	  the	  process,	  Arafat	  felt	  that	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Israel	  were	  ganging	  up	  on	  him,	  and	  that	  became	  even	  more	  clear	  after	  Camp	  David,	  as	  I	  described,	  and	  this	  was	  all	  under	  Barak’s	  urgings,	   and	   then	  we	   tried	   to	   corner	  him	  after	  Camp	  David,	   and	  he	  decided	  that	  the	  intifada	  was	  very	  convenient	  for	  him.	  	  DW:	  When	  he	  blew	  up	  at	  the	  UN,	  Arafat,	  at	  UNGA,	  was	  it	  because	  of	  this	  feeling	  of	  being	  cornered?	  	  MI:	  For	  Arafat?	  	  Oh	  yeah,	  absolutely.	  	  Arafat	  was	  also	  a	  performer.	  	  He	  would	  use	  his	  anger	  when	  it	  suited	  him.	  	  But	  he	  was	  clearly	  under	  a	  lot	  of	  pressure.”342	  	   By	  alienating	  Arafat	  at	  a	  critical	  turning	  point	  in	  the	  process,	  Clinton’s	  actions	  may	  have	  contributed	  to	  Arafat’s	  willingness	  to	  turn	  to	  violence	  to	  achieve	  his	  aims.	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This	   is	   not	   to	   suggest	   that	   Arafat	  would	   have	   been	   ready	   or	  willing	   to	   agree	   to	   a	  realistic	   final	   status	   deal	   that	   fall,	   or	   that	   he	   should	   be	   absolved	   of	   grave	   moral	  culpability	   for	   encouraging	   the	   Second	   Intifada.	   	  However,	   the	  Oslo	  process	  might	  not	   have	   been	  destroyed	  by	   violence	   if	   the	  U.S.	  was	   not	   so	   quick	   to	   push	  Arafat’s	  back	   against	   a	   wall.	   	   In	   time,	   both	   sides	   might	   have	   seen	   their	   interests	   in	   a	  reasonable	   partial	   deal	   on	   final	   status	   issues,	   one	   that	   postponed	   insoluble	   issues	  such	  as	   the	  Temple	  Mount	  but	   codified	  many	  of	   their	   common	  understandings	  on	  issues	  such	  as	  territories,	  borders,	  and	  perhaps	  even	  refugees	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  major	  framework	  agreement	  for	  peace	  between	  Israel	  and	  a	  provisional	  State	  of	  Palestine.	  Retrospectively,	  experts	  have	  noted	  that	  even	  if	  one	  considers	  Clinton’s	  effort	  to	   lay	   the	   blame	   at	   Arafat’s	   feet	   empirically	   correct,	   “he	   would	   have	   been	   better	  advised,	  as	  a	  mediator,	   to	   reserve	  his	   judgment	   for	  a	   later	   time”.343	   	  As	  a	   result	  of	  this	  miscalculation,	  Clinton’s	   efforts	  backfired	   in	  a	  manner	   that	   likely	  undermined	  the	  peace	  process,	  the	  very	  same	  ultimate	  goal	  he	  was	  originally	  seeking	  to	  advance	  by	  choosing	  to	  bolster	  Barak.	  	  Indeed,	  Aaron	  Miller	  argues	  the	  following:	  	  “I	   can't	   help	   thinking	   our	   behavior	   in	   blaming	   the	   Palestinians	   and	   facilitating	  Barak's	   campaign	   to	   delegitimize	   Arafat	   as	   a	   partner	   was	   immature	   and	  counterproductive.	  	   [Barak’s	   negotiator]	   Sher	   now	   admits	   that	   whether	   or	   not	  Arafat	  deserved	  it	  (and	  in	  Sher's	  view	  he	  did)	  'the	  finger	  pointing'	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  summit	  was	  'completely	  contrary	  to	  what	  was	  needed	  then'…	  Looking	  back	  now,	  the	  only	   course	   of	   action	   that	  might	   have	   preempted	   the	   violence	  would	   have	   been	   a	  decision	   by	   Clinton,	   Arafat,	   and	   Barak	   at	   the	   summit	   to	   develop	   a	   coordinated	  strategy	   and	   pursue	   Israeli-­‐Palestinian	   negotiations	   for	   the	   next	   six	   months,	  including	  attending	  to	  the	  bubbling	  tensions	  on	  the	  ground”.344	  	  Consequently,	  at	  key	  junctures	  after	  the	  summit	  –	  most	  notably	  the	  new	  UN	  General	   Assembly	   session	   in	   September	   –	   Arafat	   appeared	   personally	   alienated	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regarding	  the	  process	  and	  angry	  at	  Washington.345	  	  Arafat	  found	  himself	  defeated	  in	  advance	   “everywhere	   he	   went,”	   even	   finding	   himself	   cut	   off	   from	   usually	  sympathetic	   such	   as	   Jacques	  Chirac,	  which	   Indyk	   thinks	  make	  Arafat	   “more	   angry	  and	  paranoid	   as	   the	  pressure	  mounted”.346	   	   Further,	  Barak	  made	   things	  worse	  by	  bragging	  to	  the	  press	  on	  his	  way	  to	  the	  UNGA	  that	  	  Further,	   this	   is	   the	   period	   in	   which	   Arafat’s	   strategic	   calculus	   was	   likely	  crystallized	  in	  the	  lead-­‐up	  to	  the	  intifada	  that	  soon	  broke	  out.	  	  Although	  he	  probably	  did	  not	  precipitate	  the	  initial	  violence,	  it	  seems	  quite	  clear	  that	  Arafat	  chose	  to	  ride	  the	   tiger	   of	   public	   anger	   against	   Israel	   rather	   than	   tamping	   down	   violence	   lest	   it	  scuttle	  ongoing	  talks.	  	  Political	  analyst	  Yezid	  Sayigh	  agrees	  that:	  	  “The	  eruption	  of	  the	  intifada	  in	  autumn	  of	  2000	  offered	  Arafat	  [an]	  opportunity.	  	  The	  killing	   of	   unarmed	   Palestinian	   demonstrators,	   including	   children,	   by	   Israeli	   fire	  appeared	   instantly	   both	   to	   restore	   his	   international	   standing,	   energise	   [sic]	  vociferous	   Arab	   support	   and	   reverse	   the	   political	   tables	   on	   Barak.	   	   Arafat’s	  instinctive	  reaction	  was	  to	  maintain	  this	  advance,	  which	  in	  a	  crude	  sense	  required	  a	  daily	  death	  toll”.347	  	  Miller	  agrees	  that	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  know	  for	  sure	  whether	  a	  different	  handling	  of	  the	  end	  of	  Camp	  David	  might	  have	  held	  off	  the	  intifada,	  but	  he	  insists	  that	  Arafat	  fed	  the	  intifada	  once	  it	  broke	  out	  to	  salvage	  his	  own	  standing	  because	  he	  was	  cornered.348	  	   Further,	   the	   effort	   to	   isolate	   Arafat	   in	   the	   short-­‐term	   had	   long-­‐term	  consequences	   for	   the	   balance	   of	   power	   within	   Israeli	   politics.	   	   Israeli	   negotiator	  Gilead	   Sher	   reflects	   that	   “assigning	   the	   blame	  was	   correct...	   but	   not	   to	   assign	   the	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blame	  on	  camera	  without	  leaving	  any	  space	  for	  further	  negotiations,	  and	  by	  putting	  this	   tag	   of	   non-­‐partner	   on	   the	   Palestinian	   side	   this	   actually	   had	   a	   side-­‐effect	   of	  crushing	  the	  peace	  camp	  in	  Israel.	  	  This	  became	  an	  axiomatic	  outcome	  of	  the	  Camp	  David	  conference,	  which	  was	  not	  at	  all	  conducive	  to	  the	  peace	  process”.349	  Thus,	   although	   the	  U.S.	   approach	   to	  bolstering	  Barak	  did	   yield	   some	   short-­‐term	  benefits,	  they	  caused	  deeply	  negative	  consequences	  for	  the	  broader	  American	  goal	  of	  promoting	  the	  peace	  process.	  	  They	  also	  resulted	  in	  an	  immediate	  failure	  as	  well	  by	  undermining	  Barak	  as	  well.	   	  The	  unfolding	  crisis	   forced	  Barak	  to	  call	  early	  elections,	  and	  he	  was	  crushed	  at	  the	  polls	  by	  Ariel	  Sharon,	  losing	  by	  nearly	  25%.	  	  	  
Coding	  the	  Observable	  Implications	  
1.	  Perceptions	  of	  Sender	  Interests:	  	   The	   different	   theories	   offer	   distinct	   predictions	   about	   when	   and	   how	  leadership	  selection	  intervention	  should	  occur	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  how	  different	  relevant	  actors	   in	   the	  sender	  state	  perceive	  national	   interests	  being	  at	  stake.	   	  For	   instance,	  the	   lobby-­‐legislative	  approach	   (Theory	  #2)	   is	  not	   congruent	  with	   the	   fact	   that	  LSI	  occurred	   because	   pro-­‐Israel	   lobbyists	   and	   sympathetic	   members	   of	   Congress	  generally	   do	   not	   tend	   to	   believe	   that	   American	   interests	   are	   at	   stake	   in	   internal	  Israeli	  political	   contests.	   	  National	   interests	   theory	  and	   the	  bureaucratic	   approach	  (theories	  one	  and	  three)	  fit	  with	  the	  occurrence	  of	  LSI	  in	  this	  case	  but	  for	  the	  wrong	  reasons.	   	   Rather,	   I	   believe	   that	   leadership	   theory	   (Theory	   #4)	   offers	   the	   best	  explanation	  for	  the	  causal	  processes	  that	  produced	  intervention	  in	  this	  case	  due	  to	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how	  leaders	  subjectively	  perceived	  U.S.	  national	  interests	  at	  the	  time.	  	   The	  context	  in	  which	  meddling	  took	  place	  was	  remarkably	  top-­‐down,	  and	  it	  was	   systematically	   colored	   by	   President	   Clinton’s	   desire	   to	   help	   aid	   Barak’s	  domestic	  situation.	   	  Indyk’s	  stark	  claim	  that	  Clinton	  and	  Barak	  spoke	  so	  frequently	  they	   became	   de	   facto	   desk	   officers	   on	   the	   issue	   helps	   highlight	   their	   personal	  interest	  and	  involvement	  in	  the	  issue.	   	  And	  the	  context	  in	  which	  most	  of	  the	  actual	  measures	   that	   comprised	   LSI	   were	   pursued	   involved	   not	   the	   permanent	  bureaucracy	  but	  rather	  the	  president	  and	  his	  top	  political	  appointees.	  	   The	   packages	   of	   U.S.	   handouts	   for	   Barak	   that	   were	   first	   explored	   on	   the	  Syrian	   track,	   then	   the	   Palestinian	   track,	   and	   then	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   a	   final	   status	  agreement	   were	   initiatives	   spearheaded	   by	   the	   president	   and	   Barak	   and	   then	  carried	  out	  by	  key	  aides	  such	  as	  Ross	  and	  Riedel.	   	  It	  was	  not	  done	  at	  the	  executive	  agency	   level,	   possibly	   for	   fear	   of	   leaks,	   possibly	   because	   the	   measures	   under	  consideration	  were	  being	  pursued	  for	  their	  political	  optics,	  not	  objective	  necessity.	  	  The	  weapon	   systems	   under	   consideration,	   for	   instance,	   were	   not	   being	   proposed	  because	  the	  Pentagon	  judged	  them	  necessary	  for	  Israeli	  security.	  	   Similarly,	   the	   president’s	   framing	   of	   the	   events	   at	   Camp	   David	   were	   not	  something	   that	   legislators,	   lobbyists,	   or	   bureaucrats	   could	   really	   influence.	   	   The	  retelling	  was	  a	  matter	  of	  how	  the	  top	  folks	  experienced	  events,	  and,	  judging	  by	  later	  dissents	   from	  Malley	   and	   others,	   even	   this	  was	   a	   subjective	   interpretation	   by	   the	  president.	   	   Anyway,	   the	   president’s	   end-­‐of-­‐summit	  message	   involved	   re-­‐writing	   a	  neutral	   statement	   at	   his	   direction,	   and	   he	   elaborated	   on	   it	   even	   further	   in	   his	  remarks	  for	  the	  question	  and	  answer	  session,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  his	  interview	  with	  Israeli	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television	  the	  following	  day	  at	  Barak’s	  request.	  	   At	  the	  core	  of	  this	  element	  in	  the	  American	  meddling	  were	  Clinton’s	  personal	  relationships,	   a	   factor	   that	   should	   not	   matter	   under	   national	   interests	   theory.	   	   If	  Clinton	  was	  not	   so	  personally	   caught	   up	   in	  Barak	   and	   frustrated	  with	  Arafat,	   it	   is	  likely	   that	  he	  would	  not	  have	  approved	   the	   sort	  of	   zero-­‐sum	  media	  message	  after	  the	  summit	  that	  the	  United	  States	  decided	  to	  propagate.	  	  An	  objective	  interpretation	  of	  national	  interests	  probably	  would	  not	  have	  produced	  the	  sort	  of	  LSI	  attempt	  that	  the	  president’s	  personal	  relationships	  and	  passions	  brought	  about.	  	  2.	  Perceptions	  of	  Close	  Contests	  The	  theories	  also	  differ	  with	  regard	  to	  LSI	  timing	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  there	  was	  an	  objective	  close	  contest	  brewing	  in	  the	  politics	  of	  the	  sender	  state.	  	  National	   interests	   theory	   expects	   that	  meddling	   attempts	   should	  only	  occur	  when	  objective	  circumstances	  abroad	  merit	  them,	  whereas	  leadership	  theory	  predicts	  that	  such	  attempts	  should	  be	  skewed	  by	  subjective	  readings	  of	  such	  foreign	  goings-­‐on.	  Indeed,	  Barak’s	  government	  was	  a	  sinking	  ship	  from	  day	  one	  of	  his	  tenure	  in	  office,	  but	   if	  anything	  the	  American	  administration	  overestimated	  his	  vulnerability	  in	  a	  manner	   that	  both	   increased	   the	   frequency	  with	  which	   it	   tried	   to	  shore	  up	  his	  standing	  and	  made	  it	  more	  difficult	  to	  do	  so	  once	  he	  really	  needed	  help.	  	  At	  the	  root	  of	   these	  decisions	  was	  Washington’s	  underestimation	  of	   the	  amount	  of	  ruin	   left	   in	  Barak’s	  hold	  on	  power.	  For	  instance,	  this	  sort	  of	  thinking	  facilitated	  the	  decision	  to	  support	  Barak’s	  ridiculous	  proposal	   to	  Sharaa	  at	  Shepherdstown	  and	   then	   to	   support	  his	  middling	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offer	  at	  Geneva	  during	  Assad’s	  last	  days.	  	  These	  decisions	  let	  him	  pursue	  the	  Syrian	  track	   aggressively	   but	   then	   chicken	   out	   at	   the	   last	   minute,	   causing	   irreversible	  damage	  to	  his	  coalition	  relationships	  while	  decreasing	  his	  odds	  of	  being	  able	  to	  take	  back	  home	  a	  peace	  treaty	  with	  Syria	  and	  a	  package	  of	  American	  rewards	  that	  might	  actually	   strengthen	   the	   prime	   minister’s	   standing	   in	   domestic	   Israeli	   politics.	  	  Clinton’s	  inclination	  to	  defer	  to	  Barak’s	  judgment	  and	  his	  concern	  for	  pushing	  Barak	  to	  hard	  in	  the	  short	  term	  against	  his	  perceived	  domestic	  constraints	  actually	  made	  his	  domestic	  straightjacket	  even	  tighter	  in	  the	  long	  run	  and	  missed	  one	  of	  the	  best	  chances	  in	  the	  history	  of	  the	  process	  to	  forge	  peace	  between	  Israel	  and	  Syria.	  Similar	  damage	  was	  also	  caused	  by	  the	  less	  off-­‐base	  but	  still	  erroneous	  belief	  that	  Barak’s	  government	  could	  not	  sustain	  carrying	  out	  the	  third	  FRD	  and	  release	  of	  Palestinian	   prisoners	   as	   per	   Clinton’s	   promise	   to	   Arafat	   as	   well	   as	   Israel’s	  obligations	  under	  Sharm	  and	  Wye.	  	  Yes,	  Barak’s	  coalition	  government	  was	  seriously	  fraying	  at	  this	  point,	  but	  what	  was	  the	  point	  of	  going	  to	  a	  final	  status	  summit	  if	  the	  prime	  minister	  was	  truly	  so	  weak	  that	  he	  did	  not	  have	  the	  legitimacy	  to	  make	  good	  on	   comparatively	   small,	   overdue	   obligations	   on	   the	   interim	   process?	   	   In	   the	   end,	  these	  subjective	  interpretations	  of	  Barak’s	  domestic	  standing	  seriously	  impeded	  the	  administration’s	  desire	  to	  bolster	  his	  standing	  after	  the	  summit	  collapsed	  in	  failure.	  	  3.	  Patterns	  of	  Domestic	  Debate:	  	   The	   theories	   also	   differ	   over	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   domestic	   actors	   in	   the	  sender	   state	   are	   included	   in	   the	   deliberation	   process	   for	   LSI.	   	   Leadership	   theory	  predicts	   that	   the	   president	   and	   his	   top	   advisors	   should	   exclude	   bureaucrats,	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legislators,	   and	   lobbyists	   from	  discussions	  of	  meddling	  and	   therefore	  pursue	   their	  deliberations	   through	   informal	   decision	   channels.	   	   Meanwhile,	   theories	   two	   and	  three	   expect	   for	   these	   domestic	   structural	   forces	   to	   be	   included,	   informed,	   and	  influential	  in	  the	  course	  of	  such	  deliberation.	  	   So	  to	  what	  extent	  were	  these	  other	  actors	  in	  the	  loop	  during	  this	  period?	  	  In	  reality,	  not	  much	  at	  all.	   	  Yes,	   the	  administration	   faced	  pressures	   from	  Congress	  on	  some	  tangentially	  related	  issues,	  but	  its	  efforts	  to	  shower	  Israel’s	  government	  with	  bonus	   aid	   were	   generally	   looked	   on	   with	   favor	   by	   legislators	   and	   the	   pro-­‐Israel	  lobby.	   	   Nor	  was	   the	   career	   bureaucracy	   particularly	   outspoken	   on	   suggested	   U.S.	  concessions	  to	  shore	  up	  Barak’s	  government.	  	   Congress	  did	  pressure	  Clinton	  to	  endorse	  a	  threat	  to	  cut	  off	  U.S.	  aid	  to	  the	  PA	  should	  it	  pursue	  another	  shot	  at	  unilateral	  declaration	  of	  independence	  that	  fall,	  and	  Hillary’s	  senate	  campaign	  even	  broke	  with	  Bill	  to	  say	  that	  she	  endorsed	  the	  bill.	  	  But	  he	  just	  dodged	  the	  issue	  and	  said	  it	  would	  be	  dealt	  with	  in	  time.	  	  Similarly,	  President	  Clinton	  did	  discuss	  his	   frustration	  with	  Congress	  on	   the	   Jerusalem	  embassy	   issue,	  but	  he	  announced	   that	  he	  was	   reconsidering	  his	  opposition	   to	   such	  a	  move	   to	  aid	  Barak	   the	  day	   after	  Camp	  David,	   not	   in	   response	   to	   any	   impending	  Congressional	  initiatives	  on	  the	  topic.	  	  And	  when	  it	  became	  clear	  that	  circumstances	  in	  the	  region	  did	  not	  warrant	   such	  a	  new	  policy	  move,	  Clinton	   shelved	   the	   idea	  without	   fear	  of	  much	  pressure	  from	  Congress.	  	   Instead,	  American	  deliberations	  about	  meddling	  were	  exceptionally	  informal	  during	   this	   period.	   	   Offline	   discussions	   between	   top	   Israelis	   and	   top	   Americans	  helped	  frame	  the	  possible	  packages	  of	  goodies	  for	  Barak’s	  government	  in	  the	  wake	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of	  talks	  on	  the	  different	  peace	  tracks.	  	  And	  Clinton’s	  decision	  to	  pursue	  a	  propaganda	  offensive	   after	   the	   summit	   to	  make	  Barak	   look	   good	  was	   taken	   at	   the	   last	  minute	  and	  pursued	  through	  his	  revision	  of	  his	  public	  press	  statements	  as	  well	  as	  through	  a	  series	   of	   private	   communications	   to	   foreign	   leaders	   and	   an	   anonymous	   whisper	  campaign	  to	  the	  press.	  	  4.	  Cycles	  of	  Domestic	  Power:	  	   Theory	   #2	   predicts	   that	   the	   power	   of	   legislators	   and	   lobbyists	   should	   be	  preponderantly	   high	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	   election	   cycle	   or	   during	   periods	   of	   divided	  government,	  since	  the	  president	  must	  face	  greater	  domestic	  accountability.	   	  Under	  these	  criteria,	  American	  LSI	  toward	  Israel	  during	  2000	  serves	  as	  an	  especially	  easy	  test	  for	  the	  lobby-­‐legislative	  approach	  that	  it	  fails	  due	  to	  the	  occurrence	  of	  any	  LSI	  that	  year,	  let	  alone	  of	  the	  most	  consequential	  episodes	  of	  it	  in	  U.S.-­‐Israel	  relations.	  	   The	  fact	  that	  the	  effort	  was	  pursued	  via	  carrots	  no	  doubt	  made	  such	  an	  end	  run	  around	  the	  legislative	  branch	  easier	  for	  the	  president.	  	  Yes,	  his	  proposals	  would	  cost	   the	   U.S.	   a	   great	   deal	   of	   money	   as	   well	   as	   access	   to	   advanced	  weaponry	   and	  extension	  of	  new	  U.S.	  commitments.	  	  However,	  he	  expressed	  with	  confidence	  to	  his	  aides	   that	   he	   felt	   he	   could	   outmaneuver	   any	   possible	   opposition	   in	   Congress	   on	  these	  issues,	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  these	  measures	  were	  carrots	  probably	  helped.	  	   Clinton	   did	   feel	   loyalty	   to	   his	   party,	   his	   intended	   successor,	   and	   his	   wife	  running	  for	  senate.	  	  Indeed,	  he	  chose	  the	  date	  for	  Camp	  David	  in	  large	  part	  to	  avoid	  stealing	  any	  of	  Gore’s	  spotlight	  during	  the	  Democratic	  Convention	  at	  the	  end	  of	  that	  summer.	   	   However,	  what	   interested	   Clinton	   even	  more	   than	   these	   issues	  was	   his	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legacy,	  and	  the	  Mideast	  peace	  process	  had	  become	  his	  core	  legacy	  project	  by	  the	  end	  of	   his	   presidency.	   	   Thus,	   the	   end	   of	   his	   term	   mattered,	   but	   less	   so	   because	   it	  increased	  the	  leverage	  of	  Congress	  and	  the	  pro-­‐Israel	  lobby	  over	  his	  decisions	  than	  because	  it	  forced	  him	  to	  step	  up	  efforts	  on	  the	  process	  to	  beat	  the	  ticking	  clock.	  	  5.	  Bureaucratic	  Freelancing:	  	   Theory	  #3	  anticipates	  that	  often	  meddling	  should	  be	  driven	  by	  working	  level	  officials	   in	  executive	  agencies.	   	  Leadership	   theory,	  on	   the	  other	  hand,	  expects	   that	  such	   intervention	   should	   be	   the	   province	   of	   higher-­‐level	   officials,	   primarily	   the	  president;	   at	   the	   very	   least	   it	   expects	   that	   freelancing	   in	   the	   executive	   agencies	  should	  be	  relatively	  uncommon	  and	  subject	  first	  to	  lax	  oversight	  from	  above.	  	  	   In	  this	  case,	  the	  president	  was	  actively	  involved	  in	  overseeing	  this	  issue,	  and	  no	  freelancing	  took	  place.	   	  When	  there	  were	  messages	  being	  given	  to	  the	  press	  on	  background	   or	   to	   foreign	   leaders,	   the	   messages	   were	   given	   in	   accordance	   to	   the	  president’s	  command	  that	  Barak	  should	  come	  out	  as	  the	  hero	  of	  Camp	  David.	  	  These	  messages	   amplified	   the	   president’s	   theme;	   they	   were	   not	   communicated	   in	  contravention	  to	  his	  authority.	   	  Therefore,	  theory	  #4	  provides	  a	  better	  explanation	  of	  this	  data	  than	  does	  the	  bureaucratic	  politics	  approach.	  	  6.	  Consistency	  of	  Message:	  President	  Clinton	  remained	  consistent	   in	  his	   framing	  of	  Camp	  David	  and	   in	  what	   he	   argued	   should	   be	   the	   legacy	   of	   that	   summit	   for	   U.S.-­‐Israel	   relations,	   to	  Barak’s	  benefit.	  	  One	  thing	  that	  undermined	  this	  message	  somewhat,	  however,	  was	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the	  end	  of	  Clinton’s	  term	  and	  the	  Supreme	  Court’s	  declaration	  that	  George	  W.	  Bush	  was	  the	  victor	  in	  that	  November’s	  presidential	  election.	   	  As	  will	  be	  explored	  in	  the	  following	   chapter,	   Bush	   had	   criticized	   Clinton	   for	   getting	   too	   involved	   in	   Israeli	  politics	   and	   the	   peace	   process,	   and	   he	   also	   had	   close	   relations	   with	   Barak’s	  opponent,	   Ariel	   Sharon.	   	   Arafat	   also	  may	   have	   rejected	   the	   Clinton	   Parameters	   –	  which	   were	   probably	   Barak’s	   last,	   best	   hope	   to	   stay	   in	   office	   –	   based	   on	   the	  misguided	  belief	   that	  Bush	  would	  be	   firmer	   towards	   Israel	   in	   the	  manner	   that	  his	  father	   had	   been	   over	   settlements	   and	   loan	   guarantees.	   	   To	   the	   extent	   that	   these	  issues	  mattered	  at	   all,	   they	  were	  most	   germane	   to	   the	   expectations	  of	  Theory	  #4,	  which	  holds	  that	  the	  individuals	  who	  hold	  the	  highest	  offices	  in	  the	  land	  matter	  for	  the	  occurrence	  and	  efficacy	  of	  LSI.	  	  Then	  again,	  perhaps	  the	  suitability	  of	  messaging	  mattered	   much	   more	   –	   had	   Clinton	   been	   able	   to	   remain	   in	   office	   another	   few	  months,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  envision	  it	  making	  the	  difference	  in	  Barak’s	  election	  effort.	  	  7.	  Suitability	  of	  Message:	  One	  of	  the	  main	  reasons	  the	  president’s	  message	  to	  the	  Israeli	  public	  failed	  to	  ultimately	   rescue	   Barak	   was	   that	   it	   was	   skewed	   in	   a	   direction	   that	   did	   not	   suit	  Barak’s	   eventual	   needs.	   	   Although	   the	   narrative	   of	   Barak	   as	   hero	   in	   the	   face	   of	   a	  stubborn	   Arafat	   did	   help	   in	   the	   immediate	   term,	   it	   was	   compounded	   in	   a	  problematic	  manner	  by	  the	  outbreak	  of	  violence	  between	  Israelis	  and	  Palestinians.	  	  	  If	  Barak	   really	  believed	   in	  his	   corollary	   claim	   that	  Arafat’s	   comportment	   at	  Camp	  David	   proved	   that	   he	  was	   not	   a	   partner,	   he	   should	   have	   formed	   a	   national	  unity	  government	  and	  cut	  off	  all	  peace	  talks	  –	  if	  not	  immediately,	  then	  at	  least	  at	  the	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outbreak	   of	   violence.	   	   However,	   Barak’s	   desire	   to	   have	   it	   both	   ways	   made	   him	  extremely	   vulnerable	   to	   criticisms	   from	   the	   Israeli	   right	   that	   he	   was	   not	   tough	  enough	  on	  the	  Palestinians.	  	  By	  continuing	  to	  green-­‐light	  actions	  that	  treated	  Arafat	  was	   a	   partner	   from	   Camp	   David	   all	   the	   way	   through	   Taba,	   including	   crisis	  management	  meetings	  and	  ongoing	  talks	  between	  negotiators	  on	  final	  status	  issues,	  Barak’s	   own	   message	   made	   him	   look	   more	   like	   a	   frier,	   or	   “sucker”,	   than	   a	   bold,	  heroic	  leader.	  	  Although	  this	  element	  of	  the	  Israeli	  message	  was	  not	  as	  central	  to	  the	  American	  messaging	  at	  the	  time,	  at	  the	  very	  least	  it	  was	  facilitated	  by	  the	  American	  message	  claiming	  that	  Arafat	  was	  an	  obstacle	  at	  Camp	  David.	  Not	   only	   was	   this	   message	   not	   suitable	   to	   ultimately	   helping	   Barak,	   it	   was	  contradictory	   to	  U.S.	  national	   interests.	   	   It	  was	  neither	  a	  product	  of	  pressure	   from	  lobbyists	   and	   legislators,	   nor	   the	   result	   of	   some	   organizational	   process	   or	  bureaucratic	  self-­‐interest	  from	  below.	  	  Rather,	  it	  was	  a	  message	  that	  was	  selected	  by	  President	   Clinton	   at	   the	   encouragement	   of	   Barak	   in	   an	   attempt	   to	   shore	   up	   the	  Israeli	   prime	   minister	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   president’s	   subjective	   emotions	   and	  beliefs,	  perhaps	  with	   input	   from	   top	  political	   appointees	  but	  not	   from	  any	   further	  below	   on	   the	   bureaucratic	   totem	   pole.	   	   In	   short,	   messaging	   biases	   in	   this	   case	  provide	  better	  support	  for	  leadership	  theory	  than	  any	  of	  its	  structural	  competitors.	  	  	  
Conclusion	  
With	  the	  end	  of	  Bill	  Clinton’s	  second	  term	  as	  president,	  a	  great	  deal	  changed	  for	   LSI.	   	   Clinton	   cared	   deeply	   about	   achieving	   a	   final	  Mideast	   settlement	   and	   had	  been	  prepared	  to	  exert	  personal	  effort	  and	  political	  capital	  until	  his	  final	  moments	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in	   office	   to	   achieve	   one.	   	   And,	   as	   Indyk	   suggestes,	   Clinton	  was	   a	   “political	   junkie”	  when	   it	   came	   to	   Israeli	   politics.350	   	  No	   longer	  would	   the	  person	   in	   the	  Oval	  Office	  watch	  Israeli	  politics	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  intense,	  personal	  interest.	  Furthermore,	  the	  violence	  on	  the	  ground	  that	  emerged	  during	  his	  last	  year	  in	  office	   skewed	   the	  political	  playing	   field	  against	  moderates	   in	  both	  Palestinian	  and	  Israeli	  politics	  for	  some	  time	  to	  come.	  	  His	  personal	  efforts	  to	  isolate	  Yasser	  Arafat	  as	  a	   means	   of	   both	   exerting	   pressure	   on	   the	   chairman	   and	   of	   helping	   Ehud	   Barak	  backfired,	  feeding	  into	  a	  right-­‐wing	  mantra	  that	  Israel	  need	  not	  make	  sacrifices	  for	  peace	   because	   it	   has	   no	   partner.	   	   In	   his	   fury	   of	   the	   moment,	   Clinton	   may	   have	  unintentionally	  aided	  this	  dynamic	  by	  “ranting”	  to	  his	  successor	  and	  his	  principals	  during	   the	   transition	   –	   including	   on	   Inauguration	   Day	   –	   that	   Arafat	   was	  singlehandedly	  responsible	  for	  ruining	  the	  peace	  process.351	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
350 Indyk, “Interview with the Author.” 
351 Quote is from Powell in Miller, The Much Too Promised Land, 321. See also Janine Zacharia, “Clinton 
Blamed Arafat for Failure – Cheney,” Jerusalem Post, January 16, 2004; Dick Cheney, “Remarks by the 
Vice President to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council Followed by Brief Question and Answer Session 
(Beverly Hills, California)” (White House website archives, January 14, 2004). 
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Chapter	  VII.	  
~	  
The	  George	  W.	  Bush	  Years	  
(2001-­2009)	  
	  	   George	   W.	   Bush	   spoke	   out	   against	   Clinton’s	   heavy	   involvement	   in	   Israeli	  policy,	   and	   he	   pledged	   on	   the	   campaign	   trail	   that	   “America	   will	   not	   interfere	   in	  Israeli	   elections	   when	   I’m	   president”.1	   	   However,	   he	   did	   not	   keep	   this	   promise:	  during	  his	   two	   terms	  as	  president,	   the	  United	  States	   engaged	   leadership	   selection	  intervention	  (LSI)	  toward	  Israel	  multiple	  times,	  including	  during	  two	  Israeli	  election	  campaigns.	   	   Still,	   Bush’s	   natural	   inclination	   was	   to	   disengage	   from	   the	   peace	  process,	  except	  at	  moments	  of	  great	  crisis	  or	  obvious	  opportunity,	  a	  tendency	  that	  affected	  the	  timing,	  direction,	  and	  efficacy	  with	  which	  his	  government	  pursued	  LSI.	  In	   2002	   and	  2003,	   President	  Bush	   took	   a	   number	   of	  measures	   that	   helped	  Sharon	  win	  reelection,	  partly	  in	  appreciation	  for	  Israel	  keeping	  a	  low	  profile	  in	  the	  lead-­‐up	  to	  the	  Second	  Iraq	  War.	  	  Because	  of	  the	  low	  priority	  that	  Bush	  attributed	  to	  the	   peace	   process	   at	   this	   time,	   he	   was	   willing	   to	   back	   an	   incumbent	   right-­‐wing	  Israeli	   leader,	  who	   had	   not	   yet	   given	   proof	   of	   his	   claimed	   desires	   to	   advance	   the	  two-­‐state	   solution,	   over	   a	   Labor	   candidate	   with	   much	   clearer	   credentials	   in	   that	  regard.	   	   	   Further,	   Bush’s	   beliefs	   about	   the	   peace	   process	   decreased	   the	   perceived	  cost	  of	  using	  methods	   to	  strengthen	  Sharon	   that	   involved	  giving	   Israel	  a	   free	  pass	  settlement	   expansion	   and	   the	   Road	  Map.	   	   This	   decreased	   the	   broader	   efficacy	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Terry M. Neal, “Bush Alleges U.S. Wasn’t Neutral on Israeli Vote,” Washington Post, May 23, 2000. 
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American	  LSI	  by	  diminishing	  the	  likelihood	  that	  its	  efforts	  would	  yield	  a	  net	  benefit	  for	  U.S.	  interests	  and	  the	  peace	  process.	  In	  2004	  and	  2005,	  Bush	  stepped	  up	  his	  efforts	  to	  support	  Sharon	  in	  light	  of	  the	  prime	  minister’s	  plan	   for	  unilateral	   Israeli	  disengagement	   from	   the	  Gaza	  Strip	  and	   a	   few	   isolated	   settlements	   in	   the	   northern	   West	   Bank.	   	   Most	   notably,	   the	  President	  Bush	  drafted	  a	  public	   letter	   to	   Sharon	   that	  was	   consciously	  designed	   to	  strengthen	  his	  hand	  within	   Israeli	   politics	   and	  within	   the	  Likud	  Party	  by	  granting	  Israel	  concessions	  on	  final	  status	  issues	  such	  as	  refugees,	  borders,	  and	  settlements.	  	  There	  were	  definite	  down-­‐sides	  to	  such	  measures,	  given	  that	   they	  upset	  U.S.	  allies	  and	   ultimately	   failed	   to	   keep	   disengagement	   from	   undermining	  Mahmoud	   Abbas.	  	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   there	  was	   now	   a	   stronger	   case	   to	   be	  made	   that	   American	   LSI	  might	  now	  be	  aiding	  a	  two-­‐state	  solution,	  provided	  one	  believes	  that	  disengagement	  was	  a	  step	  in	  this	  direction,	  since	  LSI	  helped	  enable	  Sharon’s	  withdrawal	  from	  Gaza.	  During	  this	  same	  time	  period,	  the	  United	  States	  government	  also	  engaged	  in	  a	  drawn-­‐out	  battle	  to	  get	  certain	  Israeli	  officials	  fired	  for	  their	  allegedly	  lying	  about	  sensitive	   arms	   sales	   to	   China.	   	   Because	   of	   the	   president’s	   disengaged	   style	   of	  management,	   this	   instance	   of	   low-­‐level	   LSI	   took	   place	   as	   a	   result	   of	   bureaucratic	  freelancing,	  something	  that	  did	  not	  happen	  under	  Bush’s	  predecessor.	  Finally,	  after	  Sharon’s	  death	  President	  Bush	  struggled	  to	  form	  the	  same	  sort	  of	   relationship	   with	   Ehud	   Olmert	   as	   he	   had	   had	   with	   Ariel	   Sharon.	   	   Whereas	   he	  helped	  Sharon	  win	  reelection	  in	  2003	  and	  strongly	  backed	  Sharon	  in	  the	  lead-­‐up	  to	  disengagement	   from	  Gaza,	   Bush	   could	   not	   evince	   similar	   enthusiasm	   for	   Olmert’s	  proposal	  for	  a	  second	  round	  of	  Israeli	  withdrawals	  from	  the	  West	  Bank,	  and	  Olmert	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felt	  as	  though	  he	  came	  away	  from	  Washington	  empty	  handed.	  Belatedly,	  in	  2007	  and	  2008	  Bush	  warmed	  up	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  bolstering	  Olmert	  once	   it	   became	   clear	   that	   the	   parties	   were	   prepared	   to	   reengage	   on	   final	   status	  issues.	   	   He	   praised	   Olmert’s	   leadership	   at	   Annapolis	   and	   visited	   Israel	   twice	  thereafter	  with	   an	   eye	   toward	  helping	  boost	   the	   Israeli	   premier,	   but	   his	   detached	  approach	  to	  managing	  the	  issue	  eventually	  caused	  the	  effort	  to	  fray	  and	  to	  fail,	  amog	  other	   reasons	   because	   the	   negotiations	   could	   have	   benefitted	   from	   American	  bridging	  proposals.	  	  Rice	  sought	  to	  help	  Tzipi	  Livni	  win	  the	  Israeli	  elections	  in	  early	  2009,	  but	  at	  that	  point	  the	  American	  effort	  was	  too	  little,	  too	  late.	  Throughout	  Bush’s	  presidency,	  Rice	  was	   the	  president’s	  key	  advisor	  on	   the	  Israel	   file,	   especially	  when	   it	   came	   to	  matters	  of	   leadership	  selection	   intervention.	  	  Because	  the	  president	  could	  not	  buy	  into	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Colin	  Powell’s	  approach,	  which	  called	  for	  greater	  U.S.	  engagement	  with	  the	  Palestinian	  Authority	  even	  while	  Yasser	  Arafat	  remained	  in	  power,	  Condoleezza	  Rice	  was	  increasingly	  authorized	  to	  act	   on	   the	   issue	   –	   such	   that	   her	   biographer	   Glenn	   Kessler	   claims	   that	   she	   was	  secretly	  given	  the	  administration’s	  Israel	  file	  as	  far	  back	  as	  2002.2	  Along	  with	   the	  president,	  no	   individual	   shaped	  American	  LSI	   toward	   Israel	  from	   2001	   to	   2009	   more	   than	   Rice.	   	   She	   argued	   for	   U.S.	   backing	   of	   Sharon	   in	  advance	  of	  the	  2003	  Israeli	  elections,	  and	  she	  negotiated	  Bush’s	  letter	  on	  final	  status	  issues	  used	  to	  bolster	  Sharon	  during	  disengagement.	  	  She	  pushed	  for	  the	  Annapolis	  process	  that	  helped	  build	  Olmert	  up,	  and	  her	  rapport	  with	  Livni	  led	  to	  a	  last-­‐minute	  effort	  to	  affect	  the	  2009	  elections	  on	  the	  last	  day	  of	  Rice’s	  term	  as	  secretary	  of	  state.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Glenn Kessler, The Confidante: Condoleezza Rice and the Creation of the Bush Legacy (Macmillan, 
2007), 124. 
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No	  doubt,	  George	  Bush	  came	  to	  office	  having	  been	  dealt	  an	  inordinately	  bad	  hand	   on	   Arab-­‐Israeli	   issues.	   	   However,	   his	   instincts	   to	   disengage	   from	   the	   issue	  detracted	   from	   his	   effectiveness	   in	   the	   region,	   both	   with	   regard	   to	   leadership	  selection	   intervention	  and	  broader	  peace	  process	   issues.3	   	  This	   tendency	   indelibly	  marked	  his	  approach	  to	  leadership	  selection	  intervention	  in	  Israeli	  politics.	  	  
George	  W.	  Bush,	  Case	  #1:	  Sharon:	  A	  soulmate	  in	  the	  war	  on	  terror,	  2001-­‐20054	  	  	   Although	   it	   remains	   in	   dispute	   whether	   Sharon’s	   legacy	   advanced	   or	  hindered	   the	   prospects	   for	   a	   two-­‐state	   solution,	   he	   undoubtedly	   underwent	   a	  transformation	  in	  his	  attitude	  towards	  cooperation	  with	  Washington.	  	  In	  the	  1980s	  he	  made	  a	  name	  for	  himself	  as	  an	  anti-­‐American	  provocateur	  within	  Israel’s	  right-­‐wing	  camp,	  making	  him	  a	  repeated	  target	  for	  negative	  instances	  of	  LSI.	  The	   prime	   minister’s	   instincts	   sometimes	   returned	   to	   the	   provocative,	  especially	   towards	   the	   Palestinians	   –	   especially	   with	   his	   infamous	   September	   28,	  2000	   visit	   to	   the	   Temple	   Mount	   –	   but	   he	   came	   to	   approach	   cooperation	   with	  Washington	   as	   a	   prerequisite	   for	   successful	   governance.	   	   Perhaps	   having	   learned	  from	  the	  downfall	  of	  Likud	  prime	  ministers	  Shamir	  and	  Netanyahu	  before	  him,	  he	  now	  gave	  serious	  attention	  to	  cultivating	  relations	  with	  the	  American	  president	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 For the latter argument, see Aaron David Miller, The Much Too Promised Land: America’s Elusive 
Search for Arab-Israeli Peace (Bantam Books, 2008), chap. 9; Dennis Ross, Statecraft: And How to 
Restore America’s Standing in the World (Macmillan, 2008), chap. 12; Dennis Ross and David Makovsky, 
Myths, Illusions, and Peace (Penguin Group, 2009), chap. 4; Daniel C. Kurtzer et al., The Peace Puzzle: 
America’s Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace in the Post-Cold War Era [FORTHCOMING] (US Institute of 
Peace & Cornell University Presses, 2012), chap. 4 & 5. 
4 The phrase “soulmate in the war on terror” is from Kessler, The Confidante, 123. 
	  	   475	  
minimizing	   conflict	   in	   bilateral	   relations.	   	   Of	   course,	   he	   remained	   a	   hardliner	   on	  security	   issues	  and	  governed	  for	  most	  of	  his	  premiership	  at	  the	  head	  of	  the	  Likud,	  but	  within	  these	  constraints	  his	  strategy	  toward	  the	  U.S.	  focused	  on	  conciliation.5	  	   Thus,	   although	   he	   had	   been	   treated	   as	   persona	   non	   grata	   under	   President	  Bush’s	   father,	   now	   Sharon	  was	  well-­‐positioned	   for	   a	   strong	   personal	   relationship	  with	  the	  American	  president.	   	  The	  younger	  Bush	  had	  met	  Sharon	  on	  a	  memorable	  first	  visit	  to	  Israel	  in	  1998.	  	  Serving	  as	  foreign	  minister	  at	  the	  time,	  Sharon	  took	  the	  governor	   from	  Texas	   on	   a	   helicopter	   tour	   that	   left	   a	   strong	   impression	   of	   Israel’s	  strategic	  vulnerability	  and	  Sharon’s	  status	  as	  a	  war	  hero	  from	  a	  savage	  frontier.6	  The	  Al	  Qaeda	  attacks	  on	  9/11	  only	  heightened	  Bush’s	  sense	  of	  commitment	  to	  Sharon,	  leading	  him	  to	  view	  the	  prime	  minister,	  in	  the	  words	  of	  Washington	  Post	  reporter	  Glenn	  Kessler,	  as	  a	  “soulmate	  in	  the	  war	  on	  terror”.7	   	  From	  Colin	  Powell’s	  vantage	   point,	   the	   attacks	   seemed	   to	   heighten	   Bush’s	   instinct	   of	   “Sharon	   good,	  Arafat	   bad”.8	   	   Bush	   felt	   an	   affinity	   bold	   leaders	   who	   did	   not	   shy	   away	   from	  unilateralism,	  and	  his	  low	  estimation	  of	  the	  peace	  process	  helped	  pave	  the	  way	  for	  a	  close	  relationship	  between	  the	  two	  leaders,	  even	  ase	  Sharon	  used	  the	  IDF	  to	  try	  and	  crush	  the	  second	  Palestinian	  intifada.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Miller, The Much Too Promised Land, 322; Nahum Barnea and Ariel Kastner, Backchannel: Bush, 
Sharon and the Uses of Unilateralism, Saban Center for Middle East Policy Monograph #2 (Brookings 
Institution, 2006), 11–12; Aluf Benn, “Sharon Tiptoes Gingerly with Washington,” Ha’aretz, January 5, 
2003. 
6 George W. Bush, Decision Points (Random House, 2010), 399–400; Bruce O. Riedel, “Interview with the 
Author”, April 9, 2011; Condoleezza Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington 
(Random House, 2011), 51; Miller, The Much Too Promised Land, 323. 
7 Kessler, The Confidante, 123. 
8 Quote from Powell is cited in Karen DeYoung, Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell (Random House, 2007), 
356. 
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Coding	  the	  Dependent	  Variables	  (Occurrence	  and	  Efficacy)	  Did	  LSI	  Occur?	  	   Yes,	   in	   three	  different	   regards.	   	  During	   the	   Israeli	  election	  campaign	   in	   late	  2002	   and	   early	   2003,	   the	   Bush	   administration	   took	   steps	   to	   strengthen	   relations	  between	   Israel	  and	   the	  United	  States	   in	  ways	   that	  were	   intended	   to	  ease	  Sharon’s	  battle	   for	   reelection.	   	   In	   2004	   and	   2005,	   the	  U.S.	   then	  made	   gestures	   designed	   to	  strengthen	  Sharon’s	  hand	   internally	   as	  he	   sought	   to	  promote	   a	  plan	   for	  unilateral	  disengagement	   from	   Gaza.	   	   And,	   finally,	   during	   this	   same	   time	   period	   the	   U.S.	  government	  also	  undertook	  a	   lower-­‐level	  effort	   to	  squeeze	  out	  a	  handful	  of	  senior	  officials	  from	  Israel’s	  Ministry	  of	  Defense.	  Thus,	  during	  the	  Bush-­‐Sharon	  years,	  America	  pursued	  three	  attempts	  at	  LSI:	  (1)	  positive,	  authoritative	  intervention	  to	  bolster	  Sharon,	  which	  should	  be	  coded	  as	  “grand”	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   it	   aimed	   to	   affect	   the	   content	   of	   the	   Israeli	   government	  through	  an	  election,	  not	  just	  the	  internal	  strength	  among	  its	  members;	  (2)	  positive,	  authoritative	   intervention	  again	  on	  behalf	   of	   Sharon,	   coded	  as	   “petit”	   in	   the	   sense	  that	  it	  aimed	  to	  affect	  the	  internal	  balance	  of	  power	  within	  a	  fixed	  coalition;	  and	  (3)	  negative,	   non-­‐authoritative	   intervention	   against	   certain	   Israeli	   officials	   in	   the	  defense	  sector,	  pursued	   in	  a	  context	  of	  detached	  oversight	  by	   the	  president.9	   	  The	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 The distinction between “grand” and “petit” intervention laid out in my theory chapter and applied here 
gets somewhat fuzzy for two reasons. First, the flex-term nature of the Israeli election system blurs the 
distinction between times when an LSI attempt aims to change the content of a governing coalition versus 
times when it aims merely to affect the internal balance of power. Indeed, it is a matter of semantics, but 
one could argue that, had the U.S. not pursued LSI in 2004 and 2005 to help Sharon carry out 
disengagement, (and had Sharon decided to still disengage) the shape of the coalition probably would have 
changed. Second, the terminology of “grand” and “petit” should only be taken to refer to the scope of the 
sender state’s intentions for meddling, not the means by which it chooses to do so. One could reasonably 
argue that the concessions that Bush granted Israel as part of LSI were actually greater in 2004 and 2005, 
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following	  sub-­‐sections	  will	  be	  organized	  to	  address	  these	  three	  cases	  in	  order.	  	  I	  also	  briefly	  explore	  efforts	  by	  other	  countries	  to	  affect	  Israeli	  politics	  during	  this	  period,	  including	  apparent	  attempts	  by	  Egypt,	  the	  European	  Union,	  and	  Britain	  in	  particular.	  
<Sub-­Case	  1:	  Sharon	  Faces	  Reelection>	  	   Condoleezza	  Rice	  writes	  in	  her	  memoirs	  it	  was	  clear	  from	  the	  start	  that	  Ariel	  Sharon	   “came	   to	   power	   to	   defeat	   the	   Palestinians	   resistance,	   not	   to	   negotiate”.10	  	  Further,	  Sharon	  feared	  being	  sold	  out	  by	  a	  United	  States	  so	  eager	  for	  Arab	  allies	  that	  it	  would	  pressure	  Israel	  to	  accept	  an	  agreement	  with	  the	  PA	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  ongoing	  violence.	   	   Indeed,	   his	   concern	   was	   so	   great	   that	   a	   month	   after	   9/11	   he	   publicly	  warned	   Bush	   not	   to	   repeat	   Munich	   1938	   by	   abandoning	   Israel	   like	   Britain	   and	  France	  abandoned	  Czechoslovakia.11	  	  Although	  the	  seeds	  of	  a	  possible	  confrontation	  between	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Israel	  were	  certainly	  present,	  cooperation	  ultimately	  won	  out.	  	  Sharon’s	  eagerness	  to	  build	  a	  working	  relationship	  with	  Washington	  dovetailed	  well	  with	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  administration’s	  goal	  –	  except	  perhaps	  excluding	  Powell	  –	  was	  to	  “calm	  the	  region,”	  not	  to	  restart	  negotiations.12	  	   President	  Bush’s	  outreach	   to	  Sharon	  began	   in	  earnest	   in	  April	  of	  2002,	   less	  than	  a	  month	  after	  the	  IDF	  launched	  Operation	  Defensive	  Shield,	  reoccupying	  most	  of	   the	  West	   bank	   in	   response	   to	   a	  major	   suicide	   bombing	   that	   struck	   a	   Passover	  celebration	  at	   the	  Netanya	  Park	  Hotel.	   	   In	   response	   to	  a	  question	   from	  a	  reporter,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the years in which the scope of American intervention should be coded as “petit”. However, given the 
complexity of the conceptual matter at hand, the present terminology still seems the best possible solution 
for the time being. 
10 Rice, No Higher Honor, 53. 
11 The incident produced enormous pressure from American officials until Sharon issued a public apology. 
The American ambassador to Washington, Daniel Kurtzer, even urged Israeli Labor Party leaders Shimon 
Peres and Benyamin Ben-Eliezer to attack Sharon for his statements until an apology was issued – a 
possible act of LSI freelancing. Barnea and Kastner, Backchannel, 20. 
12 Rice, No Higher Honor, 54. 
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Bush	  said	  “I	  do	  believe	  Ariel	  Sharon	  is	  a	  man	  of	  peace,”	  language	  that	  shocked	  even	  Rice	  and	  Powell.13	  	  And	  although	  he	  occasionally	  urged	  Sharon	  in	  private	  to	  live	  up	  to	  the	  title,	  Kessler	  notes	  that	  Bush	  “never	  publicly	  backed	  off	  that	  statement”.14	  	   For	   a	   second	   time	   later	   that	   year,	   Sharon	   responded	   to	   a	   terror	   attack	   by	  besieging	   Arafat’s	   Ramallah	   compound,	   the	  Muqataa.	   	   However,	   when	   it	   became	  clear	   that	   the	   siege	   was	   causing	   diplomatic	   difficulties	   for	   Washington	   as	   it	  assembled	  a	  coalition	  for	  war	  with	  Iraq,	  Sharon	  chose	  to	  back	  down	  –	  purportedly	  as	  a	  favor	  to	  Bush.15	  	  Rice	  met	  with	  Sharon’s	  chief	  of	  staff	  and	  informal	  envoy	  to	  the	  American	   administration,	   Dov	   “Dubi”	  Weissglas,	   and	   explained	   her	   concerns:	   “we	  are	   in	   the	   middle	   of	   building	   support	   for	   a	   very	   tough	   operation	   in	   Iraq.	   	   It	   is	  extremely	  important	  for	  there	  to	  be	  a	  coalition…	  President	  Bush	  is	  the	  best	  thing	  to	  ever	  have	  happened	  to	  you	  –	  he	  looks	  at	  Sharon	  as	  a	  partner.	  	  You	  don’t	  do	  this	  to	  a	  partner”.	   	  Weissglass	  went	  down	  the	  street	  to	  phone	  Sharon	  from	  a	  Cosi	  sandwich	  shop,	  and	  returned	   to	  Rice	  explaining	   that	   “I	  know	  the	  man.	   	  He	  will	  never	  hurt	  a	  partner”.16	  	  The	  siege	  ended	  the	  next	  day.	  	   When	   Sharon	   visited	   the	   White	   House	   the	   following	   month,	   Iraq	   figured	  prominently	  on	  the	  agenda.	   	  According	  to	  Washington	  Post	  editorial	  writer	  Jackson	  Diehl,	   the	   prime	   minister	   gave	   assurances	   he	   would	   be	   flexible	   on	   Iraq,	   and	   he	  received	  Bush’s	  gratitude:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Ibid., 140; Peter Slevin and Mike Allen, “Bush: Sharon a ‘Man of Peace’,” Washington Post, April 19, 
2002; Ron Fournier, “Bush Stumbles with Mideast Rhetoric,” Associated Press, April 19, 2002. 
14 Kessler, The Confidante, 262 n. 4. 
15 For indications of the administration’s concern over Iraq coalition-building as a consideration for U.S. 
Israel policy at this point in time, see, inter alia, DeYoung, Soldier, 387; Aluf Benn, “Sharon Asked U.S. 
for a ‘Diplomatic Recess’ Until After Primaries in Likud,” Ha’aretz, November 12, 2002. 
16 Quotes are from Barnea and Kastner, Backchannel, 40–41. For a mostly-similar set of quotes on the 
incident – which also cite the Iraq coalition concern and the personal Bush-Sharon angle – see Kessler, The 
Confidante, 125. 
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  “Bush	  asked	  Sharon	  to	  avoid	  disturbing	  an	  American	  campaign	  against	  Iraq,	  either	  by	   staging	   sensational	   operations	   such	   as	   the	   recent	   siege	   of	   Yasser	   Arafat,	   or	   by	  jumping	   into	   the	   war	   itself.	   	   Sharon	   promised	   to	   cooperate…	   the	   old	   general	  emerged	  beaming…	  in	  effect,	  Sharon	  and	  Bush	  had	  worked	  out	  their	  own	  road	  map,	  one	   that	   supplanted	   the	   paper	   distributed	   by	   the	   United	   States	   to	   the	   European	  Union,	   Russia	   and	   United	   Nations	   [where]	   Sharon	   has	   basically	   ignored	   that	  initiative”.17	  	  Sharon’s	   national	   unity	   government	   with	   Labor	   soon	   collapsed	   on	   October	   30th	  when	  the	  left-­‐wing	  party’s	  leader,	  Benyamin	  “Fuad”	  Ben-­‐Eliezer,	  refused	  to	  support	  the	  government’s	  budget	  over	   the	  major	   financial	   subsidies	   it	  gave	   to	  settlements.	  	  Elections	  were	  set	   for	   January	  28th,	  2003,	  and	  Sharon	  called	   in	  his	  political	  capital	  with	   Bush	   by	   explicitly	   sending	   envoys	   to	   ask	   that	   the	   Road	   Map’s	   release	   be	  delayed	  until	  after	  it	  was	  more	  politically	  convenient	  for	  Sharon.	  First,	   he	   sent	  Weissglas	   to	  Washington	  with	   a	   request	   that	   the	  Road	  Map’s	  release	  be	  postponed	  until	  after	  the	  Likud’s	  primaries	  on	  November	  28th,	  along	  with	  administration	  calls	   for	  Israel	  to	  transfer	  tax	  revenues	  to	  the	  Palestinian	  Authority	  that	  it	  had	  withheld	  since	  the	  early	  days	  of	  the	  intifada.18	  	  Then,	  he	  sent	  a	  message	  through	   Danny	   Ayalon,	   the	   Israeli	   ambassador	   in	   Washington,	   asking	   for	   the	  administration	   to	   delay	   release	   of	   the	   Road	   Map	   even	   further	   until	   the	   Israeli	  election	   itself	   had	   taken	   place.19	   	   Marwan	   Muasher,	   who	   was	   Jordanian	   foreign	  minister	  at	   the	   time,	  confirms	   that	   the	   Israelis	  had	  asked	  Washington	   to	  postpone	  the	  Road	  Map’s	  release	  until	  after	  the	  Israeli	  elections	  scheduled	  for	  January.20	  	   The	  American	   response	  was	   favorable.	   	   The	   senior	  NSC	   staffer	   for	  Mideast	  affairs,	   Flynt	   Leverett,	   objected	   to	   the	   proposal,	   but	   Rice,	   the	   vice	   president,	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Jackson Diehl, “Editorial: Back Door to Bush,” Washington Post, November 4, 2002. 
18 Benn, “Sharon Asked U.S. for a ‘Diplomatic Recess’ Until After Primaries in Likud.” 
19 Ahron Bregman, Elusive Peace: How the Holy Land Defeated America (Penguin, 2005), 243. 
20 Marwan Muasher, The Arab Center: The Promise of Moderation (Yale University Press, 2008), 170. 
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president	  disagreed	  with	  him:	  	  “Condoleezza	  Rice	  and	  Vice	  President	  Dick	  Cheney	  bought	   the	   Israeli’s	   logic.	   	  Rice	  said	  to	  Leverett,	  chief	  drafter	  of	  the	  roadmap,	  ‘We	  can’t	  go	  through	  with	  it,’	  insisting	  that	  releasing	  the	  plan	  would	  amount	  to	  US	  intervention	  in	  Israeli	  politics.	  	  Leverett	  argued	  back	   ‘if	  we	  pull	   the	  roadmap	  simply	  because	  Ariel	  Sharon	  has	  called	  for	  an	  early	  election,	  and	  we	  don’t	  want	   to	  make	   life	  politically	  difficult	   for	  him,	   then	  we	  
are	  intervening	  in	  Israeli	  politics.	  	  We’re	  just	  intervening	  in	  a	  different	  direction.’	  But	  the	  president	  was	  persuaded,	  and	  the	  roadmap	  was	  put	  on	  hold.”21	  	  Powell’s	   biographer,	   Karen	  DeYoung,	   explains	   that	   in	   subsequent	   diplomatic	  with	  Europe,	   “Bush	   refused	   to	   sign	  off	   on	   its	   [the	  Road	  Map’s]	   release,	   arguing	   that	  no	  new	   demands	   should	   be	   made	   of	   Prime	   Minister	   Sharon	   until	   after	   the	   Israeli	  elections	   scheduled	   for	   late	   January.	   	   Powell,	   who	   had	   assured	   the	   other	   Quartet	  members,	   the	   Palestinians	   and	   Arab	   allies	   that	   publication	   of	   the	   document	   was	  imminent,	  was	   left	   to	   explain	   the	   delay”.22	   	   On	   December	   18th,	   just	   days	   before	   a	  Quartet	  meeting	  where	  the	  Road	  Map	  was	  previously	  intended	  to	  be	  unveiled,	  Colin	  Powell	   told	   the	   press	   that	   “we	   think	   it	   would	   be	   wiser	   in	   this	   instance	   for	   us	   to	  continue	  work	  on	  the	  road	  map	  and	  wait	  until	  after	  the	  Israeli	  election	  is	  over”.23	  	   Meanwhile,	   Sharon	   continued	   to	   tamp	   down	   on	   possible	   points	   of	   friction	  with	   the	   administration	   (although	   continuing	   to	   promote	   settlement	   expansion).	  	  These	   measures	   included	   minimizing	   daylight	   between	   Israeli	   and	   American	  positions	   in	   public	   statements,	   agreeing	   after	   the	   Likud	   primary	   to	   transfer	   tax	  revenues	   to	   the	  PA,	   putting	   a	   halt	   to	   Israeli	   officials	  muttering	   to	   the	   press	   about	  retaliating	   in	   the	   event	   of	   an	   Iraqi	   missile	   strike	   during	   the	   war,	   and	   delaying	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Quote is drawn from Bregman, retelling events on the basis of his interview with Leverett: Bregman, 
Elusive Peace, 243. 
22 DeYoung, Soldier, 425. 
23 “U.S. Puts the Brakes on the Road Map,” Middle East Economic Digest, December 20, 2002. 
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authoritative	  criticisms	  of	  the	  Road	  Map	  until	  after	  the	  election.24	  Sharon	  sent	  Weissglas	  to	  Washington	  yet	  again	  in	  January,	  with	  a	  request	  for	  American	  loan	  guarantees	  to	  help	  Israel	  weather	  an	  economic	  slump	  caused	  by	  the	  intifada.	   	   In	   advance	  of	  Weissglas’s	   visit,	   Sharon’s	   team	  made	   it	   clear	   to	   the	  press	  that	   their	   objective	   for	   the	   visit	   would	   be	   a	   positive	   statement	   from	   the	  administration	  indicating	  it	  would	  look	  favorably	  on	  loan	  guarantees	  and	  would	  not	  demand	  a	  settlement	   freeze	  as	  a	  prerequisite.	   	  Ha’aretz	   reporter	  Aluf	  Benn	  mused	  that	   “the	   results	   of	   the	   delegations	   talks	   about	   U.S.	   assistance	   this	   week	   in	  Washington	   will	   clarify	   whether	   the	   Bush	   administration	   remains	   behind	   Sharon	  and	  is	  ready	  to	  issue	  a	  statement	  to	  help	  him	  in	  the	  elections”.25	  	  	   In	  stark	  contrast	  with	  his	  father,	  who	  had	  firmly	  refused	  to	  grant	  Israel	  loan	  guarantees	  until	   it	   committed	   in	   advance	   to	   a	   broad	   settlement	   freeze,	  George	  W.	  Bush	  used	  seems	  to	  have	  used	  loan	  guarantees	  as	  a	  means	  of	  bolstering,	  rather	  than	  undermining,	   a	  Likud	  prime	  minister.	   	   In	  a	   statement	   that	  was	   read	  by	   the	   Israeli	  press	  as	  a	  nod	  of	  support	  for	  Sharon	  that	  “could	  not	  have	  come	  at	  a	  better	  time	  for	  the	  Likud,”	  Bush’s	  NSC	  spokesperson,	  Sean	  McCormack,	  issued	  a	  statement	  after	  the	  Weissglas	   visit	   indicating	   support	   for	   the	   Israeli	   request	   for	   $8	   billion	   in	   loan	  guarantees	  in	  $4	  billion	  in	  supplementary	  aid.26	  	  	  Even	  after	  the	  elections	  had	  taken	  place	  and	  Arafat	  had	  agreed	  to	  appoint	  an	  empowered	  PA	  prime	  minister	  (which	  had	  become	  another	  condition	  for	  release	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Benn, “Sharon Tiptoes Gingerly with Washington.” 
25 Benn also reported that “officials in Sharon’s office expect the Bush administration to issue a positive 
statement tomorrow after the talks with the Weisglass delegation tomorrow [sic]. Such a declaration, 
officials in Jerusalem hope, will feature vows that U.S. security aid and loan guarantees are on the way to 
Israel”: see Ibid.  
26 Nathan Guttman, “A Warm Relationship: Bush Has Received Sharon in the White House Seven Times. 
Clearly, the President Favors the Prime Minister,” Ha’aretz, January 27, 2003. 
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the	  Road	  Map),	  Bush	  “still	  held	  the	  road	  map	  back,	  apparently	  to	  give	  Sharon	  time	  to	  form	  a	  new	  coalition	  government,”	  at	  least	  according	  to	  historian	  Ahron	  Bregman.27	  	  Although	   some	   of	   these	   actions	   viewed	   in	   isolation	   might	   have	   seemed	   innocent	  enough,	   the	   broader	   picture	   was	   that	   the	   Bush	   administration	   was	   “made	   every	  effort	   not	   to	   create	   the	   impression	   that	   there	  might	   be	   a	   problem	   of	   any	   kind	   in	  Jerusalem-­‐Washington	   relations”	  and	  even	   “that	   the	  U.S.	  will	   step	   forward	   to	   save	  Israel’s	  economy”.28	  	  Sharon	  had	  survived	  two	  years	  of	  war	  against	  the	  Palestinians	  “without	   a	   single	   significant	   crisis	   with	   the	   Americans,	   without	   a	   single	   dollar	   of	  American	  aid	  being	  placed	  in	  danger”.29	  	  Instead,	  he	  emerged	  with	  the	  clear	  backing	  of	  Washington.	  
<Sub-­Case	  2:	  Sharon	  Considers	  Disengagement>	  On	   April	   14th,	   2004,	   President	   Bush	   made	   a	   major	   gesture	   of	   support	   for	  Sharon,	  releasing	  a	  letter	  that	  seemed	  to	  grant	  Israel	  unprecedented	  concessions	  on	  final	  status	   issues.	   	  Bush	  released	  the	   letter	  by	  reading	  it	  aloud	  at	  their	   joint	  press	  conference	  pictured	  above,	  and	  he	  also	  announced	  that	  “I’ve	  been	  proud	  to	  call	  the	  Prime	   Minister	   my	   friend…	   I	   commend	   Prime	   Minister	   Sharon	   for	   his	   bold	   and	  courageous	  decision	   to	  withdraw	  from	  Gaza	  and	  parts	  of	   the	  West	  Bank.	   	   I	   call	  on	  the	  Palestinians	  and	  their	  Arab	  neighbors	  to	  match	  that	  boldness	  and	  courage”.30	  On	  refugees,	  the	  letter	  stated	  that	  “a	  solution	  to	  the	  Palestinian	  refugee	  issue	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Bregman, Elusive Peace, 248. 
28 Guttman, “A Warm Relationship”; “White House Announces Talks with Israel on Request for Special 
Aid,” Associated Press, January 23, 2003; Yoni Ben-Menahem, “Israel ‘Very Encouraged’ by US 
Announcement on Aid,” BBC Monitoring Service Middle East (Translated from January 25th edition of 
Voice of Israel Radio, January 23, 2003). 
29 Guttman, “A Warm Relationship.” 
30 George W. Bush, “President Bush Commends Israeli Prime Minister Sharon’s Plan: Remarks by the 
President and Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in Press Availability” (White House website archives, 
April 14, 2004), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/04/20040414-4.html. 
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as	   part	   of	   any	   final	   status	   agreement	   will	   need	   to	   be	   found	   through	   the	  establishment	  of	   a	  Palestinian	   state,	   and	   the	   settling	  of	  Palestinian	   refugees	   there,	  rather	   than	   in	   Israel”.	   	  On	  borders	  and	  settlements,	   the	   letter	  pronounced	   that	   “in	  light	   of	   new	   realities	   on	   the	   ground,	   including	   already	   existing	   major	   Israeli	  population	   centers,	   it	   is	   unrealistic	   to	   expect	   that	   the	   outcome	   of	   final	   status	  negotiations	  will	  be	  a	  full	  and	  complete	  return	  to	  the	  armistice	  lines	  of	  1949”.31	  	  	  	   According	   to	   the	  U.S.	   ambassador	   to	   Israel	   at	   the	   time,	   Daniel	   Kurtzer,	   the	  letter	  was	  solicited	  by	  Sharon	  himself	  as	  a	  means	  to	  strengthen	  his	  hand	  within	  the	  Israeli	   cabinet	   on	   disengagement.32	   	   Kessler	   notes	   that	   “Sharon	   also	   drove	   a	   hard	  bargain.	   	  Weissglas	   told	   Rice	   that	   the	   plan	  would	   be	   difficult	   to	   sell	   to	   the	   Israeli	  public	   because…	   the	   government	   could	   not	   point	   to	   any	   concessions	   from	   the	  Palestinians.	  	  Israel	  needed	  something	  from	  the	  United	  States.	  	  ‘In	  the	  absence	  of	  the	  Palestinians,	  it	  is	  you	  guys,’	  he	  told	  Rice”.33	  According	   to	   Rice,	   “to	  make	   this	   advance	   toward	   peace,	   Dubi	   said,	   Sharon	  needed	   to	   assure	   the	   public	   that	   a	   few	  of	   the	  most	   established	   settlements	   in	   the	  West	  Bank	  would	  remain	  intact	  in	  any	  future	  peace	  agreement…	  to	  signal	  that	  those	  big	  population	  blocks…	  would	  be	  included	  in	  Israel”.34	  Nor	  were	  these	  concessions	  trivial,	  although	  the	  administration	  could	  claim	  that	  any	  commitment	  was	  subject	  to	  a	  mutually	  agreed-­‐upon	  solution	  between	  the	  parties.	  	  The	  IDF’s	  own	  international	  law	  expert	  could	  not	  believe	  his	  eyes	  when	  he	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 George W. Bush, “Letter from President Bush to Prime Minister Sharon” (White House website archives, 
April 14, 2004), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/04/20040414-3.html. 
32 Former US Ambassador to Israel Daniel C. Kurtzer, “Interview with the Author”, June 2011. 
33 Kessler, The Confidante, 127. 
34 Rice, No Higher Honor, 280–281. 
	  	   484	  
read	   the	   draft	   letter,	   convinced	   the	   Bush	   would	   never	   agree	   to	   such	   changes	   in	  longstanding	  American	  public	  positions.35	  	   Although	  such	  efforts	  at	  “petit”	  LSI	  tend	  to	  be	  tied	  in	  with	  helping	  encourage	  a	   particular	   policy	   initiative	   in	   the	   target	   state	   –	   in	   this	   case,	   disengagement	   –	   by	  definition	   they	   also	   involve	   a	   conscious	   effort	   to	   influence	   the	   internal	   balance	   of	  power	   within	   that	   country’s	   sitting	   government,	   partly	   as	   a	   means	   toward	   that	  policy	  end.	  	  In	  this	  instance,	  the	  intent	  to	  meddle	  in	  Israeli	  domestic	  politics	  was	  part	  of	  the	  Sharon	  team’s	  thinking,	  and	  it	  was	  also	  clear	  on	  the	  American	  side.	  	   For	   instance,	   Kastner	   and	   Barnea	   report	   that	   “some	   in	   the	  White	   House…	  argued	   that	   Sharon	   would	   require	   strong	   U.S.	   political	   backing	   to	   overcome	   the	  inevitable	  domestic	  opposition	  to	  Gaza	  Disengagement,”	  and	  such	  voices	  ultimately	  prevailed.36	   	   Further,	   the	   Americans	  made	   clear	   that	   the	   extent	   of	   disengagement	  would	   condition	   the	   level	   of	   domestic	   backing	   that	  Bush	  would	   extend	   to	   Sharon,	  with	   Hadley	   telling	   his	   Israeli	   interlocutors	   that	   “we	   will	   return	   boldness	   for	  boldness”.37	  	  Still,	  tough	  Israeli	  bargaining	  was	  important	  for	  eliciting	  the	  American	  concessions;	  Sharon	  even	  delayed	  his	  flight	  to	  Washington	  until	  the	  wording	  of	  the	  letter	  was	  finalized	  in	  a	  draft	  considered	  suitable	  to	  his	  political	  needs	  at	  home.38	  	   It	   took	   until	   August	   of	   2005	   for	   the	   government	   of	   Israel	   to	   actually	  implement	   its	   plan	   for	   unilateral	   disengagement,	   and	   in	   that	   time	   the	   U.S.	  administration’s	  concern	  for	  Sharon’s	  domestic	  standing	  continued	  to	   influence	   its	  foreign	   policy	   behavior.	   	   The	   authors	   of	   an	   upcoming	   study	   on	   the	   Bush	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Barnea and Kastner, Backchannel, 42–43. 
36 Ibid., 40. 
37 Ibid., 40–41. 
38 Ibid., 42–43. 
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administration’s	   diplomacy	   on	   the	   peace	   process	   conclude	   that	   “as	   domestic	  opposition	   in	   Israel	   grew,	   the	   Bush	   administration	   became	   more	   and	   more	  preoccupied	  with	  Sharon’s	  political	  problems	  and	  what	  could	  be	  done	  to	  strengthen	  his	  hand.	   	  The	   ‘illegal	  outposts’	  which	   Israel	  had	  previously	  committed	   to	  remove,	  but	   did	   not,	   virtually	   disappeared	   from	   the	   agenda…	   once	   the	   administration	  became	   obsessed	   with	   bolstering	   Sharon’s	   political	   fortunes”	   and	   that	   this	  preoccupation	   emerged	   mainly	   from	   the	   priorities	   and	   concepts	   of	   the	  administration’s	  top	  principals.39	  	   This	   concern	   also	   contributed	   to	   the	   administration’s	   lackluster	   efforts	   to	  persuade	  Ariel	  Sharon	  to	  discuss	  disengagement	  with	  the	  new	  Palestinian	  president,	  Abu	  Mazen.	   	   Kessler	   explains	   that	   Rice	   did	   not	   put	  much	   effort	   into	   encouraging	  Israel	  to	  negotiate	  or	  coordinate	  its	  actions	  with	  the	  Palestinians	  in	  part	  because	  she	  “wanted	  to	  protect	  Sharon.	  	  She	  felt	  the	  venerable	  Israeli	  prime	  minister	  was	  taking	  a	  tremendous	  gamble,	  potentially	  breaking	  up	  the	  Likud…	  this	  left	  the	  Palestinians	  with	  the	  sort	  end	  of	  the	  stick”.40	   	  Miller	  quotes	  a	  U.S.	  official	   intimately	  involved	  in	  these	   efforts	   as	   saying	   that	   he	   or	   she	   “doubts	   that	   the	   president	   would	   have	  pressured	  Sharon	  at	  a	  time	  when	  he	  was	  undertaking	  such	  a	  bold	  and	  costly	  course	  at	  home”.41	  	   Meanwhile,	  the	  administration	  continued	  its	  efforts	  to	  build	  Sharon	  up	  with	  a	  steady	   flow	   of	   positive	   public	   statements.	   	   In	   April	   of	   2005,	   President	   Bush	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Besides, the thinking went that removing settlements was a more valuable deliverable and that therefore 
it did not make sense to simultaneously pressure the Israeli government to do both during a period in which 
it was facing a considerable internal crisis. The quote above is from Kurtzer et al., The Peace Puzzle, 329. 
40 Kessler, The Confidante, 127–128. 
41 Miller, The Much Too Promised Land, 355. 
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welcomed	  Sharon	  to	  his	   family	  ranch	  in	  Crawford,	  Texas,	  and	  declared	  that	  “Prime 
Minister Sharon is showing strong visionary leadership by taking difficult steps to 
improve the lives of people across the Middle East -- and I want to thank you for your 
leadership. I strongly support his courageous initiative to disengage from Gaza and part 
of the West Bank”.42 
When Israel was actually carrying out the disengagement effort in August of that 
year, Rice called the event “really quite a dramatic moment in the history of the Middle 
East” and praised the prime minister for showing himself to be “enormously 
courageous”.43  At the same time, White House Press Secretary Dana Perino told the 
media that “the President continues to support Prime Minister Sharon and what he has 
called a very bold initiative; it’s very courageous… we agree that the disengagement will 
only make Israel stronger.  We agree with Prime Minister Sharon on that.  And the 
President has also said that this will bring our two countries together”.44  In short, the 
Bush administration set out to strengthen Sharon’s domestic standing when he proposed 
disengagement as well as when he finally set out to implement it. 
<Sub-­Case	  3:	  The	  Yaron	  Affair>	  	   In	  2004	  and	  2005,	  the	  United	  States	  government	  also	  worked	  at	  a	  lower	  level	  to	   “interven[e]	   directly	   and	   bluntly	   in	   Israeli	   domestic	   policy”	   in	   hopes	   of	   getting	  certain	   Israeli	   officials	   removed	   from	   office.45	   	   Allegedly,	   Israeli	   officials	   at	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 George W. Bush, “Remarks with Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon (at Prairie Chapel Ranch, 
Crawford, Texas)” (State Department website archives, April 11, 2005), http://2001-
2009.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/44499.htm. 
43 Joel Brinkley and Steven R. Weisman, “Rice Urges Israel and Palestinians to Sustain Momentum,” New 
York Times, August 18, 2005. 
44 Dana Perino, “Press Gaggle with Dana Perino - White House Daily Press Briefing” (White House Press 
Releases and Documents, Office of the Press Secretary, August 18, 2005). 
45 Yossi Melman, “Defense Ministry Continues to Ban Security Exports to China,” Ha’aretz, August 21, 
2008. 
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Ministry	  of	  Defense	  had	  carried	  out	  an	  arms	  deal	  with	  China	  (and	  then	  deceived	  the	  Pentagon	  it)	  that	  involved	  transferring	  advanced	  technology	  that	  would	  significantly	  boost	   Chinese	   anti-­‐radar	   capabilities	   against	   the	   U.S.	   in	   the	   event	   of	   a	   war	   over	  Taiwan.	   	   The	   PRC	   had	   purchased	   approximately	   100	   Harpy	   unmanned	   aerial	  vehicles	   from	   Israel	   in	   1999,	   and	   in	   late	   2004	   the	   Pentagon	   concluded	   that	   Israel	  was	  giving	   those	  drones’	   a	  major	   technological	  upgrade	   rather	   than	   just	   repairing	  them	  in	  Israel	  as	  the	  MoD	  had	  claimed.46	  	   In	   response,	   the	  Americans	  demanded	   the	   resignation	  of	   the	  ministry’s	   top	  civilian	  employee,	  Director	  General	  Amos	  Yaron,	  as	  well	   as	   three	  of	  his	  aides	  who	  were	  involved	  in	  hammering	  out	  the	  new	  Harpy	  deal	  with	  China	  in	  2003.47	  	  In	  order	  to	  keep	   the	   conflict	   contained	  and	  perhaps	   to	   limit	  backlash,	  U.S.	   officials	  publicly	  denied	   that	   this	  was	   their	  aim,	  enabling	   the	   Israelis	   to	  claim	  that	  no	  such	  demand	  was	  being	  made.	  	  However,	  repeated	  media	  stories	  on	  the	  issue	  quoting	  anonymous	  sources	  kept	  the	  conflict	  festering.48	  As	  the	  dispute	  lingered	  on,	  Washington	  also	  issued	  a	  number	  of	  threats	  and	  even	  imposed	  targeted	  sanctions.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  shunning	  Yaron	  for	  the	  remainder	  of	  the	  dispute,	  the	  Pentagon	  insisted	  that	  the	  Harpy	  drones	  should	  not	  be	  returned	  to	   China	   in	   their	   current	   state.49	   	   The	   U.S.	   government	   suspended	   Israeli	  participation	   in	   certain	   military	   co-­‐development	   projects,	   most	   notably,	   the	   F-­‐35	  Joint	  Strike	  Fighter	  aircraft,	  and	  froze	  the	  delivery	  of	  certain	  equipment	  to	  the	  IDF,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Ze’ev Schiff, “The Americans Are Going Too Far,” Ha’aretz, November 3, 2005. 
47 Yitzhak Benhorin, “Crisis with U.S. over Arms Sales,” Yediot Ahronot (online), June 12, 2005. 
Somewhat confusingly, Director General Yaron also holds the rank of retired Major General in the IDF, 
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East (Translated from December 16th edition of Voice of Israel radio, December 16, 2004). 
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including	   night	   vision	   goggles.50	   	   Perhaps	  more	   notably,	   it	   quietly	   suspended	   the	  joint	  strategic	  dialogue	  that	  had	  been	  an	  institutionalized	  component	  of	  the	  bilateral	  relationship	   since	   the	   Reagan	   administration,	   according	   to	   the	   logic	   that	   Amos	  Yaron	  co-­‐chaired	  these	  talks.51	  In	   short,	   Washington	   pursued	   a	   policy	   of	   aiming	   to	   influence	   Israeli	  leadership	   selection	   in	   a	   normally	   domestic	  matter	   –	   albeit	   at	   a	   technocratic	   and	  somewhat	  non-­‐political	  working	   level.	   	  As	  will	  be	  discussed	  below,	   this	  attempt	  at	  meddling	   came	   from	  a	   similar	   level	   in	   the	  American	  bureaucracy	  and	  was	  more	  a	  bottom-­‐up	  initiative	  than	  a	  top-­‐down	  one.	  	  It	  depended	  upon	  official	  approval	  or	  at	  least	   forbearance	   from	   Bush	   administration	   principals,	   but	   it	   is	   a	   much	   more	  pronounced	   instance	   of	   bureaucratic	   freelancing	   than	   was	   ever	   witnessed	   under,	  say,	   President	   Clinton,	   who	   had	   a	   much	   more	   active	   approach	   to	   oversight	   and	  management	  on	  peace	  process	  issues	  than	  Bush	  ever	  did.	  
<Sub-­Case	  4:	  Non-­U.S.	  Attempts>	  	   The	  United	  States	  was	  not	  the	  only	  government	  prepared	  to	  meddle	  in	  Israeli	  politics	  during	  this	  period.	  	  Indeed,	  Egypt,	  Britain,	  and	  the	  EU	  all	  tried	  their	  hand	  at	  influencing	  Israeli	  politics	  under	  Sharon.	  	  However,	  as	  might	  be	  expected,	  they	  took	  sought	  a	  different	  intermediate	  objective	  than	  the	  Bush	  administration	  did,	  seeking	  to	  undermine	  Sharon	  rather	  than	  empower	  him	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  the	  left.	  	   Israeli	  political	  scientists	   Jonathan	  Rynhold	  and	  Gerald	  Steinberg	  claim	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Conal Urquhart, “U.S. Acts over Israeli Arms Sales to China,” The Guardian (UK), June 12, 2005; Aluf 
Benn, “U.S. Keeping Israel Out of Prestigious Fighter Plane Program,” Ha’aretz, October 12, 2005. 
51 Benn, “U.S. Keeping Israel Out of Prestigious Fighter Plane Program”; Carol Migdalovitz, “CRS Report 
for Congress - Israel: Background and Relations with the United States” (Congressional Research Service, 
Library of Congress, Report RL33476, June 6, 2008), 30, 32. Confusingly, Migdalovitz agrees that these 
dialogues were suspended over the Harpy deal but dates the suspension as taking place in 2003, but 
Urquhart and Benn date the start of U.S. sanctions to late 2004 and early 2005, which makes more sense. 
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Bush’s	   partisan	   intervention	   on	   behalf	   of	   Sharon	   “was	   in	   stark	   contrast	   to	   the	  behavior	  of	  the	  other	  major	  powers	  involved	  in	  the	  peace	  process,”	  who	  preferred	  to	  see	  Mitzna	  win	   in	   2003.52	   	   Jackson	  Diehl	   at	   the	  Washington	   Post	   also	   argued	   that	  Europe	  and	  the	  Arab	  states	  tried,	  unsuccessfully,	  to	  give	  Labor	  a	  boost.53	  Rynhold	   and	   Steinberg	   imply	   that	   the	   European	   Union	   and	   other	   Quartet	  members	  were	  especially	  upset	  about	  the	  American	  decision	  to	  delay	  releasing	  the	  Road	  Map	  because	  they	  hoped	  to	  use	  the	  event	  to	  influence	  the	  election.	  	  Indeed,	  Per	  Stig	  Moeller,	   the	  Foreign	  Minister	  of	  Denmark	  (which	  held	  the	  rotating	  presidency	  of	  the	  EU	  at	  the	  time),	  expressed	  his	  frustration	  over	  the	  American	  decision,	  noting	  his	   preference	   that	   the	   Road	  Map	   be	   released	   in	   time	   to	   shift	   the	   Israeli	   vote,	   no	  doubt	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  left:	  “it	  is	  very	  important,	  in	  the	  EU’s	  opinion,	  that	  the	  voters	  of	  Israel	  know	  what	  the	  world	  thinks	  about	  the	  situation…	  being	  an	  enlightened	  voter	  means	  that	  you	  have	  the	  information	  on	  which	  to	  build	  your	  vote”.54	  	   Rynhold	  and	  Steinberg	  claim	  that	  “the	  Egyptian	  government	  tried	  lamely	  and	  failed	   miserably	   to	   assist	   the	   Israeli	   left	   in	   the	   elections”.55	   	   Most	   notably,	   they	  invited	   leading	   members	   of	   two	   leftwing	   Israeli	   opposition	   parties,	   Labor	   and	  Meretz,	   to	  Cairo	   for	  high-­‐profile	   consultations	  but	  not	  MKs	   from	   the	  Likud.56	   	  The	  Egyptians	  did	  receive	  Sharon’s	  national	  security	  advisor	  a	  few	  days	  later,	  but	  oddly	  enough	   even	   this	   visit	   was	   discussed	   in	   the	   press	   as	   an	   effort	   to	   help	   Labor	   by	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Jonathan Rynhold and Gerald Steinberg, “The Peace Process and the Israeli Elections,” Israel Affairs 10, 
no. 4 (Summer 2004): 181–204. 
53 Jackson Diehl, “Editorial: Axis of Inaction,” Washington Post, January 27, 2003. 
54 “U.S. Puts the Brakes on the Road Map.” 
55 Rynhold and Steinberg, “The Peace Process and the Israeli Elections,” 193. 
56 The MKs received in Cairo were Yossi Sarid, Yossi Beilin, and Ephraim Sneh. The visits are noted in: 
“Two Israeli Politicians in Egypt for Rare Talks,” Reuters News, January 5, 2003; “Sharon Adviser in 
Egypt for Talks on Peace Efforts,” Reuters News, January 8, 2003. 
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demonstrating	  that	  Israel’s	  neighbors	  were	  willing	  to	  be	  responsible	  stakeholders	  in	  helping	   to	   clamp	   down	   on	   terrorist	   violence;	   anyway,	   the	   Egyptians	   did	   not	   shy	  away	   from	   criticizing	   Sharon’s	   policies	   in	   their	   discussions	   about	   the	   Halevy	  meeting.57	  	  Additionally,	  the	  Egyptians	  convened	  a	  conference	  of	  Palestinian	  factions	  where	  they	  hoped	  to	  reach	  an	  accord	  that	  would	  call	  of	  terrorist	  attacks	  in	  advance	  of	  the	  Israeli	  election.	  	  The	  effort	  failed,	  but	  Diehl	  argues	  that	  it	  nonetheless	  revealed	  how	  “pathetically,	  the	  Egyptians	  and	  moderates	  among	  the	  Palestinians	  fancied	  that	  the	  proposed	  cease-­‐fire	  statement	  would	  somehow	  sway	  voters	  toward	  Mitzna”.58	  	   Perhaps	   the	   most	   blatant	   effort	   to	   bolster	   Mitzna	   came	   from	   the	   United	  Kingdom,	  where	   Blair	   “effectively	   endorsed…	   Amram	  Mitzna,	   by	   receiving	   him	   at	  Number	  10	  [Downing	  Street]	  during	  the	  course	  of	  the	  campaign”.59	  	  Blair	  announced	  his	  intention	  to	  invite	  Mitzna	  in	  early	  December,	  soon	  after	  the	  former	  general	  was	  selected	  as	  the	  Labor	  Party’s	  candidate	  for	  prime	  minister.60	  His	   team	  claimed	   that	   the	   invitation	  was	   for	  a	   routine	  meet-­‐and-­‐greet	  with	  the	  leader	  of	  a	  fellow	  labor-­‐movement	  party	  and	  that	  such	  meetings	  had	  happened	  before	  as	  a	  routine	  diplomatic	  matter	  of	  course,	  citing	  the	  fact	  that	  he	  also	  met	  with	  Ehud	  Barak	  before	  the	  Israeli	  campaign	  in	  1999.61	  	  However,	  a	  number	  of	  facts	  belie	  this	  pretense.	   	  As	  noted	  above,	   the	   intention	  behind	  British	  actions	   in	  1999	   really	  was	   to	   bolster	   Barak.	   	   Also,	   Blair	   had	   less	   than	   one	   week	   earlier	   turned	   down	   a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 “Sharon Adviser in Egypt for Talks on Peace Efforts”; “Egypt FM Blasts Israel During Meeting with 
Sharon Aide,” Agence France-Presse (AFP), January 8, 2003. 
58 Diehl, “Editorial: Axis of Inaction.” 
59 “Blair’s Middle East Blunder,” Daily Telegraph, January 30, 2003. 
60 Nigel Morris, “Blair Says Meeting Will Not Interfere with Israeli Election,” The Independent (London), 
December 5, 2002. 
61 Ibid.; Chris McGreal, “Angry Sharon Snubs Blair’s Peace Summit,” The Guardian (UK), January 6, 
2003. 
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request	   to	   meet	   with	   Sharon’s	   new	   foreign	   minister,	   Benjamin	   Netanyahu,	   when	  Netanyahu	   came	   to	   London	   that	   November.	   	   In	   the	   words	   of	   a	   disgruntled	  spokesperson	  from	  the	  Israeli	  foreign	  ministry,	  “a	  fortnight	  ago	  it	  was	  made	  clear	  to	  us	  very	  pointedly	  that	  Mr.	  Blair	  would	  not	  meet	  with	  Mr.	  Netanyahu…	  yet	  now	  he	  is	  happy	  to	  invite	  Mr.	  Mitzna”.62	  	   Blair	   had	   originally	   hoped	   to	   bring	   together	   a	   conference	   of	   Israeli	   and	  Palestinian	  advocates	  of	  peace	  in	  advance	  of	  the	  Israeli	  election	  as	  well,	  although	  the	  idea	  encountered	  too	  many	  obstacles	  to	  go	  forward.63	  	  However,	  he	  tried	  to	  salvage	  from	  it	  a	  separate	  event	  in	  London	  just	  for	  Palestinian	  officials,	  designed	  to	  highlight	  PA	   reforms	   that	   had	   already	   been	   carried	   out	   in	   the	   areas	   of	   finance	   and	  governance.64	   	  However,	  Sharon	  seized	  on	   the	   fact	   that	  Blair	  had	   invited	  Arafat	   to	  determine	   the	   makeup	   of	   the	   PA’s	   delegation	   to	   attack	   the	   plan	   for	   appeasing	  terrorism,	   and	   in	   the	   wake	   of	   dual	   suicide	   bombings	   in	   Israel,	   Sharon’s	   cabinet	  announced	  that	  it	  would	  deny	  PA	  ministers	  the	  travel	  permits	  required	  for	  them	  to	  fly	   to	   London.65	   	   Rynhold	   and	   Steinberg	   believe	   that	   the	   Palestinian	   reform	  conference	  was	  also	  aimed	  in	  part	  at	   influencing	  the	  Israeli	  vote	  in	  2003,	  although	  obviously	   it	   was	   more	   directly	   aimed	   at	   internal	   Palestinian	   dynamics	   and	  energizing	  further	  PA	  reform.66	  	  	  Did	  the	  Policy	  Succeed?	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Alan Philps, “Blair Under Attack for ‘Bias’ over Israeli Poll,” Daily Telegraph, January 6, 2003. 
63 Morris, “Blair Says Meeting Will Not Interfere with Israeli Election.” 
64 Arafat had not yet appointed Abu Mazen as prime minister. McGreal, “Angry Sharon Snubs Blair’s 
Peace Summit.” 
65 Ibid.; Chris McGreal, “Israeli Anger at Talks with Sharon Rival,” The Guardian (UK), January 9, 2003. 
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   Yes	   and	   No.	   	   In	   the	   narrow	   sense,	   all	   of	   the	   American	   efforts	   to	   influence	  Israeli	  politics	  during	  the	  Sharon	  period	  succeeded	  at	  their	  intended	  objective,	  be	  it	  bolstering	  Sharon	  or,	   in	  isolated	  case	  of	  the	  China	  arms	  fiasco,	  getting	  Amos	  Yaron	  fired.	   	   Efforts	   by	   the	   UK	   and	   other	   members	   of	   the	   international	   community	   to	  bolster	  Labor	  during	  the	  2003	  Israeli	  election	  probably	  failed	  at	  their	  objective.	  	   On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  question	  of	  broader	  efficacy	  is	  much	  more	  difficult	  to	  answer	   persuasively	   in	   the	   affirmative.	   	   Although	   U.S.	   efforts	   to	   bolster	   Sharon	  seemed	  effective	   at	   strengthening	  his	   hand	  within	   Israel,	   they	  did	   so	  by	  means	  of	  shortchanging	  vigorous	  U.S.	  diplomacy	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  peace	  process.	  	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  the	  two-­‐state	  solution	  was	  the	  ultimate	  objective	  of	  U.S.	  policy	  –	  and	  both	  Bush	  and	   Rice	   are	   quite	   outspoken	   about	   this,	   including	   in	   their	  memoirs	   –	   bolstering	  Sharon	  in	  the	  immediate	  term	  came	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  other	  elements	  of	  pushing	  for	  such	  a	  solution.	  	  Of	  course,	  Sharon’s	  bold	  scheme	  for	  disengagement	  from	  Gaza	  and	  parts	  of	  the	  West	  Bank	  could	  have	  yielded	  major	  progress	  in	  this	  direction,	  but	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  Bush	  administration	  tried	  to	  bolster	  him	  contributed	  in	  small	  part	  to	  its	  failure	  to	  do	  so,	  allowing	  Hamas	  instead	  of	  the	  PLO	  to	  fill	  the	  security	  vacuum	  created	  by	  disengagement.	  
<Sub-­Case	  1:	  Evaluating	  2002	  and	  2003>	  American	  backing	  for	  Sharon	  seemed	  to	  help	  his	  hand	  internally	  in	  2002	  and	  2003.	   	   For	   instance,	   Rynhold	   and	   Steinberg	   conclude	   that	   “the	   support	  demonstrated	  by	   the	  U.S.	   government	   and	  President	  George	  W.	  Bush	   for	   Sharon’s	  policies…	   was	   a	   central	   factor	   in	   his	   domestic	   political	   standing”.67	   	   When	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Ibid., 191. 
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administration	  in	  Washington	  decided	  to	  shelve	  the	  Road	  Map	  until	  after	  the	  2003	  Israeli	   elections,	   it	   was	   clear	   to	   observers	   in	   Israel	   that	   Sharon	   was	   getting	   “full	  back-­‐up	   from	  Bush”	  and	   that	   “with	  Bush	   siding	  with	   the	  Likud,	  Mitzna	  will	   find	   it	  difficult	  to	  demonstrate	  to	  the	  public	  that	  his	  political	  plan	  is	  better,”	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	   its	  main	  element	  was	  unilateral	  Israeli	  withdrawal	  provided	  talks	  with	  the	  PA	  were	  unproductive.68	  	  When	   Sean	  McCormack	   suggested	  before	   the	   elections	   that	  America	  would	  look	  favorably	  on	  emergency	  aid	  and	  loan	  guarantees,	  it	  was	  seen	  as	  a	  sign	  that	  	  “throughout	   the	   election	   campaign	   in	   Israel,	   the	   American	   administration	   made	  every	  effort	  not	  to	  create	  the	  impression	  that	  there	  might	  be	  a	  problem	  of	  any	  kind	  in	  Jerusalem-­‐Washington	  relations,	  and	  the	  latest	  declaration	  makes	  it	  clear	  that	  not	  only	   is	   everything	  A-­‐okay,	   but	   that	   the	  U.S.	  will	   now	   step	   forward	   to	   save	   Israel’s	  economy…	  [Bush]	  is	  making	  sure	  to	  remove	  any	  evidence	  of	  friction”.69	  	  In	  the	  lead-­‐up	  to	  elections,	  Sharon	  campaigned,	  even	  within	  the	  Likud,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	   his	   strong	   relations	   with	   Bush.70	   	   New	   York	   Times	   reporter	   James	   Bennet	  explained	   that	   delaying	   release	   of	   the	   Road	   Map	   would	   help	   Sharon	   because	   he	  would	  otherwise	  be	  “expected	  to	  either	  give	  it	  the	  thumbs-­‐up	  or	  thumbs-­‐down…	  it	  would	  force	  him	  to	  essentially	  endorse,	  accept	  these	  very	  specific	  steps	  including	  a	  settlement	   freeze…	   which	   would	   be	   extremely	   unpopular	   with	   the	   base	   of	   his	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Aluf Benn, “Full Back-Up from Bush,” Ha’aretz, December 22, 2002. 
69 Guttman, “A Warm Relationship.” 
70 Ferry Biedermann, “Sharon Now Leftist of the Right,” Inter-Press Service (IPS), November 27, 2002. 
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support	  on	  the	  right	  and	  could	  possibly	  even	  cost	  him	  the	  election”.71	  However,	   it	   is	   much	   less	   clear	   whether	   backing	   Sharon	   actually	   yielded	  benefits	   for	   the	   two-­‐state	   solution.	   	   In	   June	   of	   2002,	   Sharon	   had	   previously	  suggested	  he	  was	  prepared	  to	  make	  “painful	  concessions”	  without	  elaborating	  what	  that	  meant,72	  and	   then	   that	  December	  he	   indicated	  his	  acceptance	  of	  a	  Palestinian	  state	  in	  his	  remarks	  at	  the	  Herzliya	  conference,	  a	  statement	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  Likud	  Party’s	  official	  position.73	  	  However,	  he	  remained	  unwilling	  to	  implement	  American	  proposals	  for	  getting	  there,	  including	  the	  Mitchell	  Commission’s	  plan	  for	  ending	  the	  violence	  or	  even	  Israel’s	  likely	  obligations	  under	  the	  draft	  Road	  Map.	  When	   Bush	   called	   Sharon	   a	  man	   of	   peace,	   it	   was	   seen	   by	   some	   as	   a	   gaffe	  rather	  than	  a	  statement	  of	  official	  policy.74	  	  Rice	  recalls	  that	  Colin	  Powell	  was	  not	  the	  only	  one	  among	   the	  president’s	   advisors	  who	  were	  worried	  by	   the	   action:	   “I	   fully	  agreed	  at	  the	  time	  that	  the	  President	  had	  made	  a	  mistake”	  and	  that	  “I	  thought	  we’d	  done	  long-­‐term	  damage	  to	  our	  relations	  in	  the	  Arab	  world,”	  while	  Powell	  cried	  out	  “do	  you	  have	  any	  idea	  how	  this	  plays	  on	  Arab	  TV?”.75	  	  	  Althoguh	   Rice	   eventually	   came	   around	   to	   believing	   that	   the	   vote	   of	  confidence	   encouraged	  Sharon	   to	  moderate,76	  Bush	   complained	   to	   Sharon	  at	   least	  once	  in	  the	  year	  that	  followed	  that	  “I’ve	  taken	  a	  lot	  of	  shit	  for	  calling	  you	  a	  man	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 “Interview: James Bennet Discusses Middle East Violence, Upcoming Elections There and a Possible 
U.S. War with Iraq,” Fresh Air (National Public Radio (NPR), December 19, 2002). 
72 “Sharon Declares He’s Prepared to Make ‘Painful Concessions’,” Baltimore Sun, June 12, 2002. 
73 Itamar Rabinovich, The Lingering Conflict: Israel, the Arabs, and the Middle East, 1948-2011 
(Brookings, 2011), 151–152. 
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75 Quotes are from Rice, No Higher Honor, 140. 
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peace”.77	   	  Although	  Sharon’s	  ultimate	   turn	  toward	  disengagement	  persuaded	  Bush	  and	  Rice	   that	   the	  prime	  minister	  had	  earned	   the	  moniker,	   at	   this	  point	   there	  was	  little	  evidence	  to	  indicate	  that	  he	  would	  do	  so.	  	  Rice	  cites	  Sharon’s	  stated	  willingness	  to	  grant	  “painful	  concessions”	  as	  proof	  he	  was	  ready	  to	  moderate,	  but	  the	  remarks	  are	   only	   truly	   salient	   in	   hindsight,	   starting	   in	   the	   end	   of	   2003.78	   	   Then	   again,	   if	  Bush’s	  support	  did	  indeed	  encourage	  Sharon	  to	  moderate,	  it	  could	  be	  considered	  a	  very	  positive	  development.	   	  Also,	  allowing	  Sharon	  to	  delay	  responding	  to	  the	  Road	  Map	  probably	  elicited	  a	  more	  positive	  response	  from	  him	  in	  the	  end,	  although	  it	  may	  also	  have	  decreased	  Labor’s	  ability	  to	  serve	  as	  a	  check	  on	  his	  party’s	  preferences	  in	  the	  Knesset	  and	  the	  coalition.79	  Backing	   Sharon	   did	   come	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   American	   relations	  with	   other	  allies,	   however.	   	   Although	   it	   does	   not	   appear	   that	   any	   European	   and	   Arab	   states	  actually	  scaled	  back	  their	  relations	  with	  Washington,	  the	  threat	  was	  actually	  there.	  	  In	  August	  of	  2001	  the	  Saudis	  had	  already	  threatened	  to	  sever	  their	  alliance	  if	  Bush	  did	   not	   do	   more	   press	   for	   Israeli	   restraint,80	   and	   days	   after	   the	   “man	   of	   peace”	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 There is some disagreement over the timing and content of this follow-up remark. Miller says that Bush 
said to Sharon at the Aqaba summit in 2003: “I’ve taken a lot of shit for calling you a man of peace… 
we’ve got to find a way to move ahead”. Meanwhile, Kessler says “Bush publicly never backed off that 
statement, but in 2002 he privately rebuked Sharon when the Israeli leader began to repeat the comment to 
the president. Bush interrupted Sharon when he began to say he was a ‘man of peace and security,’ 
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harder on the peace part.’ Then, adding a bit of colloquial language that at first seemed to baffle Sharon, 
Bush jabbed: ‘I said you were a man of peace. I want you to know I took immense crap for that’. See 
Miller, The Much Too Promised Land, 352; Kessler, The Confidante, 262 n. 4. 
78 Rice, No Higher Honor, 219. 
79 Labor chose not to join the government – and Mitzna promised not to, just prior to the vote – but the 
thinking among many in advance of the early 2003 vote was that Labor would probably return to the 
coalition as a junior partner, constraining extremists within the Likud. Inter alia, see John H. Aldrich et al., 
“Coalition Considerations and the Vote,” in The Elections in Israel, 2003, ed. Asher Arian and Michal 
Shamir (Transaction Publishers, 2005), 143–166. 
80 Allegedly, the Saudis had warned “starting today, you’re from Uruguay, as they say. You go your way, I 
go my way”. Robert G. Kaiser and David B. Ottaway, “Saudi Leader’s Anger Revealed Shaky Ties: Bush’s 
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statement	  the	  Saudis	  nearly	  abandoned	  a	  summit	  with	  the	  president	  at	  his	  ranch	  in	  Crawford,	  Texas,	  when	  they	  decided	  he	  was	  not	  inclined	  to	  rein	  Sharon	  in.81	   	  Bush	  saw	   the	   Saudi	   stunt	   in	   April	   as	   a	   sign	   “America’s	   pivotal	   relationship	   with	   Saudi	  Arabia	  was	  about	  to	  be	  seriously	  ruptured”.82	  Similarly,	  the	  Jordanians	  felt	  that	  the	  American	  decision	  to	  repeatedly	  delay,	  and	   eventually	   water	   down,	   the	   Road	   Map	   verged	   on	   an	   out	   and	   out	   “betrayal”;	  	  Marwan	   Muasher,	   the	   point	   man	   for	   the	   plan,	   complained	   that	   Washington	   was	  “leaving	  me	  and	  others	  who	  had	   supported	   the	  Administration	  out	   in	   the	   cold”.	   83	  	  Overall,	  America’s	  allies	  in	  the	  Arab	  world	  and	  the	  European	  Union	  were	  dismayed,	  believing	   that	   “thanks	   to	   the	  American	  president’s	   coddling,	   Israel’s	   leading	   hawk	  will	  now	  entrench	  himself	   for	   another	   term”.84	   	  The	  EU	   foreign	  ministers	  were	   so	  frustrated	   when	   Powell	   informed	   them	   about	   the	   Road	   Map’s	   delay	   that	   they	  canceled	  a	  joint	  news	  conference	  they	  had	  planned	  with	  the	  secretary	  in	  protest.85	  
<Sub-­Case	  2:	  Evaluating	  2004	  and	  2005,	  re:	  Sharon>	  Once	  again,	  the	  Bush	  administration’s	  efforts	  to	  bolster	  Sharon	  wee	  relatively	  successful	   in	   the	   narrow	   sense	   and	   more	   mixed	   in	   the	   broader	   sense.	   	   Rice	  concluded	  that	  “we’d	  helped	  Sharon	  immensely	  with	  President	  Bush’s	  letter	  of	  April	  2004”.86	   	  Expert	  observers	  Barnea	  and	  Kastner	   feel	   that	   the	   letters	   filled	  a	   crucial	  need	  for	  Sharon,	  since	  “for	  political	  and	  diplomatic	  reasons,	  he	  needed	  a	  needed	  a	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81 DeYoung, Soldier, 385–386; Rice, No Higher Honor, 140–141. 
82 Bush, Decision Points, 402. 
83 Bregman, Elusive Peace, 244. For the latter quote, see also Muasher, The Arab Center, 173. 
84 Diehl, “Editorial: Axis of Inaction.” See also  
85 Benn, “Full Back-Up from Bush.” 
86 Rice, No Higher Honor, 332. 
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strong	   return	   on	   the	   considerable	   investment	   of	   political	   capital	   that	   Gaza	  Disengagement	  required.	   	  Within	  Israel,	  Sharon	  needed	  robust	  U.S.	  support	  to	  help	  him	   win	   his	   battle	   with	   the	   right-­‐wing	   of	   his	   own	   Likud	   Party,”	   and	   that	   sort	   of	  backing	  is	  exactly	  what	  he	  got.87	  	  Although	  even	  full-­‐fledged	  American	  support	  was	  not	   enough	   to	   enable	   Sharon	   to	   get	   the	   plan	   endorsed	   by	   a	   party	   referendum	  internal	  to	  the	  Likud,	  he	  was	  ultimately	  able	  to	  get	  the	  cabinet’s	  endorsement.	  	  The	  administration	  helped	  boost	  Sharon’s	  hand	   in	   that	  vote	  by	   indicating	   that	   its	  April	  2004	   commitments	   would	   not	   apply	   if	   Netanyahu	   and	   Sharon’s	   other	   rivals	   had	  their	  way	  and	  were	  able	  to	  pass	  a	  seriously	  watered	  down	  plan	  for	  disengagement.88	  However,	  again	  these	  gestures	  on	  behalf	  of	  Sharon	  alienated	  America’s	  allies	  in	   the	   Arab	   world	   and	   in	   Europe.	   	   When	   Rice	   asked	   Bill	   Burns,	   director	   for	   the	  Bureau	  of	  Near	  Eastern	  Affairs,	  what	  the	  reaction	  was	  like	  to	  Bush’s	  letter	  in	  April	  of	  2004,	  he	  implied	  that	  all	  hell	  was	  breaking	  loose	  in	  the	  region.89	  	  The	  King	  of	  Jordan	  cancelled	  an	  upcoming	  White	  House	  visit	  in	  protest	  of	  the	  letters	  and	  only	  agreed	  to	  reschedule	  when	   the	  president	  agreed	   to	  a	   Jordanian	  exchange	  of	   letters	   in	  which	  Bush	   promised	   that	   none	   of	   his	   concessions	   to	   Sharon	   would	   be	   allowed	   to	  prejudice	   final	   status	   negotiations.90	   	   European	   reactions	   to	   the	   letters	   were	  extremely	  harsh.	   	  Allegedly,	  Solana	  described	   the	   letter	  as	  a	  stab	   in	   the	  EU’s	  back,	  and	   the	   firm	   protest	   issued	   by	   EU	   members	   left	   a	   lasting	   impression	   that	   was	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Sharon’s original proposal “as a bold initiative that could advance the cause of peace, and it is this plan he 
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recalled	  with	  concern	  by	  some	  on	  the	  Bush	  team.91	  	  The	   exchange	   of	   letters	   also	   came	   with	   mixed	   results	   on	   the	   issue	   of	  settlement	  activity.	   	  On	  one	  hand,	  the	  American	  concessions	  elicited	  in	  return	  a	  set	  of	   understandings	   with	   Sharon’s	   advisors	   that	   the	   Israeli	   government	   would	  restrain	  itself	  in	  the	  future	  by	  restricting	  settlement	  growth,	  removing	  unauthorized	  outposts,	  lifting	  some	  roadblocks,	  and	  ensuring	  that	  the	  West	  Bank	  barrier	  was	  built	  only	   according	   to	   security	   and	  not	  political	   considerations,	   as	  well	   as	   transferring	  tax	  revenues	  to	  the	  PA.92	   	  However,	  because	  the	  administration	  was	  so	  focused	  on	  helping	   disengagement	   move	   forward,	   it	   repeatedly	   let	   the	   Israelis	   violate	   these	  understandings,	  meaning	  that	  these	  understandings	  were	  of	  considerably	  less	  value	  than	  initially	  might	  have	  seemed	  to	  be	  the	  case.93	   	  For	   instance,	  virtually	  no	  illegal	  outposts	  were	  ever	  removed	  by	  the	  Sharon	  government,	  and,	  according	  to	  the	  Bush	  team’s	   ambassador	   in	   Tel	   Aviv	   at	   the	   time,	   “the	   Bush	   administration	   did	   not	  regularly	  protest	  Israel’s	  continuing	  settlement	  activity”.94	  Arguably,	   if	   disengagement	   itself	   had	   seriously	   advanced	   the	   two-­‐state	  solution,	   these	   concerns	   could	  perhaps	  be	  brushed	  aside.	   	  However,	   that	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  have	  been	  the	  case.	  	  Because	  of	  Sharon’s	  insistence	  on	  framing	  the	  action	  as	  a	  wholly	  unilateral	  move,	  it	  weakened	  Abu	  Mazen’s	  ability	  to	  claim	  that	  the	  way	  of	  negotiations	  could	  truly	  deliver	  for	  Palestinian	  national	  aspirations.	  Sharon	   was	   so	   focused	   on	   getting	   out	   of	   Gaza	   with	   a	   minimum	   of	   settler	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violence	   that	   the	   IDF	   left	   three	   days	   earlier	   than	   the	   PLO	  had	   been	   led	   to	   expect,	  exacerbating	  the	  security	  vacuum	  on	  the	  ground.95	  	  This	  enabled	  Hamas	  supporters	  to	  flood	  the	  settlements,	  destroy	  greenhouses	  preserved	  for	  Palestinian	  usage,	  and	  launch	  rockets	   from	  Gaza	  with	   impunity	  over	   the	  years	   that	   followed	  –	  something	  that	  would	   have	   been	   impossible	   had	   the	   security	   transition	   followed	   the	   phased	  model	   in	  West	  Bank	  cities	  such	  as	   Jenin	   that	   the	   IDF	  pursued	   in	   later	  years	  under	  Olmert.	  	  By	  overdoing	  unilateralism	  in	  2005,	  Sharon	  undermined	  the	  enthusiasm	  in	  Washington	   and	   in	   Israel	   for	   further	   steps	   of	   this	   sort.	   	   Although	   Washington	  welcomed	  the	  Israeli	  withdrawal	  in	  late	  2005	  as	  a	  major	  step	  forwards	  for	  peace,	  it	  had	  no	  stomach	  for	  further	  Israeli	  withdrawals	  from	  the	  West	  Bank	  months	  later.	  	  The	  responsibility	  for	  mismanaging	  withdrawal	  in	  2005	  primarily	  rests	  with	  Sharon	   himself.	   	   However,	   the	  Bush	   team’s	   approach	  was	   clearly	   not	   sufficient	   to	  elicit	  better	  behavior,	  and	  this	  discrepancy	  seems	  attributable	  to	  Bush’s	  detachment	  and	   desire	   to	   build	   Sharon	   up.	   	   The	   United	   States	   decided	   not	   to	   push	   Sharon	   to	  really	  negotiate	  the	  withdrawal	  and	  instead	  tried	  to	  encourage	  him	  to	  “coordinate”	  with	  Abu	  Mazen,	  but	  even	  that	  effort	  was	   lacking	   in	  buy-­‐in	   from	  the	  president.	   	   In	  such	   a	   context,	   there	   was	   only	   so	   much	   American	   bureaucrats	   could	   do	   to	   elicit	  suitable	  Israeli	  behavior.	  Clearly,	  Sharon	  was	  reluctant.	   	  Observers	  note	  that	  “Sharon	  was…	  unwilling	  to	   talk	   with	   the	   Palestinians	   about	   disengagement”	   and	   “wanted	   the	   withdrawal	  defined	   entirely	   as	   an	   Israeli	  move	  made	   for	   Israeli	   interests”.	   96	   	   Rice	   and	  Danin	  explain	  that	  they	  worked	  hard	  to	  press	  Sharon	  to	  at	  least	  coordinate	  his	  efforts	  with	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Abbas,97	  but	  when	  Rice	  did	  raise	  the	  issue	  with	  Sharon,	  she	  says	  he	  “assured	  me	  that	  he	  would	  but	  reminded	  me	  that	  he	  had	  a	  lot	  of	  work	  to	  do	  in	  Israel	  first”.98	  As	  noted	  above,	   Bush	   and	   Rice	   did	   little	   to	   seriously	   push	   Sharon	   on	   the	   matter,	   in	   part	  because	   of	   their	   interest	   in	   strengthening	   him	   to	   pursue	  withdrawal.	   	   In	   the	   end,	  these	  low-­‐priority	  efforts	  achieved	  very	  little:	  “only	  by	  pulling	  teeth	  did	  we	  get	  him	  to	  agree	  to	  allow	  some	  technical	  discussions	  that	  took	  place	  3	  or	  4	  months	  before	  on	  things	  that	  needed	  to	  be	  done,	  ‘where’s	  the	  key	  to	  the	  barn?’	  type	  stuff’.”99	  Thus,	  the	  administration’s	  approach	  of	  giving	  Sharon	  a	  relatively	  free	  hand	  to	  help	   him	   pursue	   disengagement	   certainly	   helped	   Sharon,	   but	   its	   impact	   on	  furthering	   the	   two-­‐state	   solution	   is	   more	   questionable.	   	   The	   effort	   was	   clearly	  successful	  in	  the	  narrow	  sense,	  but	  broader	  efficacy	  is	  much	  more	  mixed.	  
<Sub-­Case	  3:	  The	  Yaron	  Affair>	  	   The	   bureaucratic	   dispute	   known	   as	   the	   Yaron	   Affair	   was	   resolved	   in	   a	  manner	   that	   furthered	   American	   objectives	   in	   both	   the	   narrow	   and	   the	   broader	  sense.	   	  Narrowly	  speaking,	  America	  had	   its	  way	  by	  getting	  Amos	  Yaron	   fired	   from	  his	   position	   as	   director	   general	   at	   the	   Israeli	   Ministry	   of	   Defense.	   	   It	   had,	   at	   one	  point,	   floated	  a	  demand	  to	  have	  three	  other	  officials	  tied	  to	  the	  China	  deal	   fired	  as	  well,	  but	  the	  Yaron	  dismissal	  was	  Washington’s	  core	  objective.100	  	   Further,	   the	   U.S.	   was	   able	   to	   impose	   some	   lasting	   changes	   on	   how	   Israel	  conducts	   arms	   sales	   with	   China	   or	   other	   states	   of	   military	   concern.	   	   The	   Harpy	  drones	  were	   not	   returned	   to	   China	   in	   their	   upgraded	   state,	   and	   the	   Israelis	  were	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forced	   to	   cancel	   the	   deal	   –	   to	   Beijing’s	   great	   dismay.	   	   In	   fact,	   Israel’s	   defense	   ties	  with	  China	  have	  taken	  nearly	  half	  a	  decade	  to	  begin	  recovering	  from	  the	  dispute.101	  	  As	   part	   of	   resolving	   the	   dispute,	   Israeli	  Minister	   of	   Defense	   Shaul	  Mofaz	   signed	   a	  classified	   memorandum	   of	   understanding	   with	   Secretary	   of	   Defense	   Rumsfeld	   in	  which	  they	  committed	  to	  consult	  more	  extensively	  in	  advance	  of	  future	  Israeli	  arms	  exports.102	   In	   response	   to	   American	   pressure,	   the	   Israeli	   government	   agreed	   to	  abide	   in	   the	   future	   by	   guidelines	   set	   forth	   in	   the	  Wassenaar	   Arrangement	   export	  control	   regime,	   the	   successor	   to	  COCOM,	  although	   Israel	  did	  not	   formally	   sign	   the	  agreement.103	   	   Finally,	   the	   ministry	   of	   defense	   established	   a	   special	   bureau	  specifically	   to	   provide	   oversight	   for	   military	   exports	   in	   response	   to	   American	  pressure.104	   	   On	   a	   whole	   range	   of	   issues,	   “Israel…	   capitulated	   completely	   to	  American	  dictates”.105	  
<Sub-­Case	  4:	  The	  Other	  Guys>	  	   Clearly,	  Arab	  and	  European	  efforts	  to	  build	  up	  Sharon’s	  rival,	  Amram	  Mitzna,	  in	  the	  2003	  Israeli	  elections	  did	  not	  get	  the	  Labor	  candidate	  elected.	  	  The	  question	  of	  whether	   it	  contributed	  at	  all	   to	   the	  ability	  of	  his	  campaign	   is	  another	  matter.	   	  The	  best	  answer	  is	  probably	  that	  the	  impact	  of	  these	  efforts	  was	  negligible	  because	  they	  did	   little	   to	   persuade	   the	   Israeli	   public	   that	   Mitzna’s	   program	   would	   be	   able	   to	  succeed	  by	  finding	  a	  viable	  partner	  on	  the	  Palestinian	  side	  with	  whom	  to	  cooperate.	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   Sharon	   attacked	   the	   British	   effort	   to	   intervene	   in	   the	   election	   head	   on,	  complaining	   about	   the	   prime	  minister’s	   invitation	   to	  Mitzna	   and	   attacking	   his	   PA	  reform	   conference	   as	   “legitimising	   terrorists”.106	   	   As	   noted	   above,	   a	   spokesperson	  from	  Israel’s	  foreign	  ministry	  pointed	  out	  the	  inconsistency	  of	  inviting	  Mitzna	  after	  just	   having	   spurned	   a	   request	   to	  meet	   with	   Netanyahu.	   	   Some	   suggest	   that	   Blair	  knew	  Mitzna	   would	   probably	   not	   win	   and	   was	   therefore	   aimed	   instead	   to	   boost	  Labor’s	   hand	  within	   a	   National	   Unity	   Government	   that	  might	   be	   formed,	   but	   this	  was	  probably	  too	  subtle	  a	  scheme,	  even	  if	  it	  might	  have	  been	  a	  fall-­‐back	  strategy.107	  	  In	   the	  end,	  Blair	   felt	  driven	  by	   realities	  on	   the	  ground	   to	   close	   ranks	  with	  Sharon	  after	  the	  election	  by	  congratulating	  him	  on	  his	  political	  victory.108	  	  	  Although	  the	  British	  attempt	  at	  meddling	  seems	  to	  have	  provided	  Israel	  with	  a	  pretext	  to	  block	  Blair’s	  conference	  showcasing	  Palestinian	  reforms,109	  the	  British	  did	   not	   seem	   to	   suffer	   lasting	   consequences	   for	   the	   earlier	   dispute;	   as	   one	   Israeli	  official	  observed:	  “it’s	  business	  as	  usual.	  	  Nobody	  is	  looking	  for	  a	  broiges	  [Yiddish	  for	  row].	  There	  are	  skirmishes	  but	  we’re	  not	  getting	  worked	  up	  about	  it”.110	  	   Rynhold	   and	   Steinfeld	   suspect	   that	   the	   European	   and	   Arab	   efforts	   to	   help	  Mitzna	   may	   have	   backfired	   because	   the	   Israeli	   public	   harbors	   longstanding	  suspicions	   about	   the	   trustworthiness	   of	   these	   actors.111	   	   However,	   they	   offer	   no	  evidence	   to	  demonstrate	   that	   this	  blanket	   trend	  was	  an	   important	  causal	   factor	   in	  the	  case.	  	  Probably	  closer	  to	  the	  truth,	  Jackson	  Diehl	  claims	  that	  these	  efforts	  failed	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because	   they	   “only	   show[ed]	   that	   Israeli	   voters	   know	   the	  difference	  between	   real	  Palestinian	  reform	  and	  meaningless	  conferences”.112	  In	  short,	  these	  third-­‐party	  efforts	  to	  build	  up	  Amram	  Mitzna	  and	  undermine	  Sharon	   probably	   did	   little	   to	   nothing	   to	   influence	   the	   Israeli	   vote.	   	   Although	   the	  magnitude	  of	  external	  impact	  by	  these	  actors	  is	  typically	  low	  already,	  their	  influence	  was	   further	   diminished	   in	   this	   case	   for	   two	   important	   reasons.	   	   First	   of	   all,	   they	  were	  pushing	   for	   a	  position	   that	  was	  widely	  discredited	   at	   the	   time	  within	   Israel.	  	  Mitzna	  was	  running	  on	  a	  peace	  platform	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  the	  second	  intifada,	  in	  an	  era	  when	   roughly	  70%	  of	   Israelis	  were	   telling	  pollsters	   that	   they	   felt	   the	  Palestinians	  were	  not	  genuine	  in	  their	  professed	  desire	  for	  peace	  –	  a	  figure	  up	  by	  more	  than	  20%	  relative	  to	  previous	  years.113	  	  Second,	  they	  were	  pushing	  for	  a	  point	  of	  view	  that	  was	  consistently	   undermined	   by	   the	   actions	   of	   Washington.	   	   In	   the	   face	   of	   contrary	  actions	  by	  Israeli	  public	  opinion	  and	  Israel’s	  number	  one	  patron,	  the	  ability	  of	  Arabs	  and	  Europeans	  to	  foster	  an	  alternative	  perspective	  was	  further	  undermined.	  	  
Coding	  the	  Observable	  Implications	  
1.	  Perceptions	  of	  Sender	  Interests:	  	   The	   four	   theories	   tested	   by	   this	   dissertation	   pose	   mutually	   exclusive	  predictions	  across	  a	  range	  of	  observable	   implications.	   	  Those	  theories	  are	  national	  interests	   theory	   (Theory	   #1),	   lobby-­‐legislative	   politics	   (Theory	   #2),	   bureaucratic	  politics	   (Theory	   #3),	   and	   leadership	   theory	   (Theory	   #4).	   	   One	   category	   in	   which	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they	  pose	  contradictory	  expectations	  is	  the	  area	  of	  perceptions	  of	  sender	  interests.	  Theory	  #1	  expects	  that	  interpretations	  of	  sender	  interests	  should	  be	  faithful	  reflections	   of	   objective	   reality	   –	   thus,	   LSI	   behavior	   should	   occur	   in	   periods	  when	  objective	   opportunities	   are	   indeed	   greater.	   	   Theory	   #2	   expects	   that	   LSI	   should	  generally	  not	  occur	  towards	  Israel	  because	  members	  of	  the	  pro-­‐Israel	  lobby	  and	  of	  Congress	  tend	  to	  see	  American	  interests	  as	  equally	  identified	  with	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  aisle	  in	  Israel,	  not	  with	  a	  particular	  faction	  within	  Israeli	  politics.	  	  Theory	  #3	  expects	  that	   LSI	   should	   occur	   frequently	   and	   in	   a	   consistent	   manner	   because	   the	   main	  bureaucratic	  body	  on	   these	   issues,	   the	  State	  Department’s	  Bureau	  of	  Near	  Eastern	  Affairs,	  tends	  to	  identify	  the	  Israeli	   left	  and	  an	  active	  peace	  process	  with	  being	  the	  best	  hope	  for	  American	  interests	  in	  the	  region.	  	  Finally,	  Theory	  #4	  predicts	  that	  the	  occurrence	  of	  LSI	   should	  vary	  according	   to	   subjective	  beliefs	  of	   top	   leaders	   in	   the	  sender	   state:	   their	   assessments	   of	   counterparts,	   their	   expectations	   for	   leadership	  contests	  in	  other	  polities,	  and	  their	  personal	  priorities	  for	  regional	  politics.	  Theory	  #2	  does	  a	  poor	  job	  of	  explaining	  American	  meddling	  behavior	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  perceived	  sender	  interests.	  	  For	  one	  thing,	  the	  theory	  expects	  America	  not	  to	  meddle	  in	  Israeli	  politics	  at	  all;	  LSI	  should	  simply	  not	  occur	  on	  this	  dyad.	  	  Further,	  it	  mis-­‐ascribes	   American	   motivations	   for	   related	   behavior	   at	   the	   time.	   	   Walt	   and	  Mearsheimer	  suggest	  that	  “the	  Bush	  administration	  decided	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  2002	  that	  the	  Road	  Map	  was	  the	  best	  way	  to	  resolve	  the	  Israeli-­‐Palestinian	  conflict.	   	  But	  little	  progress	  was	  made	  in	  implementing	  it	  until	  the	  spring	  of	  2003,”	  at	  which	  point	  the	  heads	  of	  pro-­‐Israel	  lobby	  groups	  pressured	  the	  administration	  to	  accept	  Israeli	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reservations	  to	  the	  plan.114	  However,	   their	   narrative	   of	   events,	  which	   relies	   primarily	   upon	   the	   lobby-­‐legislative	  approach	  for	  explaining	  U.S.	  behavior,	  misses	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  American	  administration	  was	  initially	  disinterested	  in	  the	  Road	  Map	  at	  high	  levels,	  part	  of	  why	  Bush	  was	  so	  willing	  to	  part	  with	  it	  until	  after	  Israeli	  elections	  had	  taken	  place.	  	  It	  is	  not	   that	   the	   Bush	   administration	  was	   deterred	   from	   imposing	   the	   Road	  Map	   but	  rather	   that	   the	   president	   cared	   so	   little	   about	   the	   effort	   that	   he	   was	   willing	   to	  negotiate	  its	  delay	  as	  a	  favor	  to	  his	  Israeli	  partner.	  	  As	  of	  the	  morning	  of	  December	  18th,	  2002,	  when	  Bush	  had	  already	  agreed	  to	  postpone	  releasing	  the	  Road	  Map,	  the	  president	  confessed	  to	  staff	  that	  he	  had	  not	  yet	  even	  read	  the	  document.115	  	  Powell	  obviously	  cared	  about	   the	  measure,	  having	  spearheaded	  revisions	  of	   the	   text	  with	  America’s	  partners	  in	  the	  Quartet,	  but	  the	  president	  remained	  ambivalent.	  Walt	   and	   Mearsheimer	   understand	   Bush’s	   2004	   letter	   as	   a	   gesture	   of	  domestic	  pandering	  during	  an	  election	  year	  and	  sign	  of	  the	  president’s	  subservience	  to	  pro-­‐Israel	  lobbyists,	  forcing	  him	  to	  give	  up	  on	  the	  Road	  Map	  in	  favor	  of	  unilateral	  Israeli	  measures.116	  	  However,	  there	  is	  little	  evidence	  to	  support	  these	  claims,	  and	  it	  seems	  the	  Bush	  team	  genuinely	  believed	  Sharon’s	  measures	  would	  help	  achieve	  the	  Road	  Map	  rather	  than	  seeing	  them	  as	  counterproductive	  but	  necessary	  concessions	  to	  domestic	  political	  forces.	   	  The	  initial	  private	  reaction	  within	  the	  White	  House	  to	  Sharon’s	  plan	  was	  actually	  quite	  enthusiastic,	  and	   the	  Bush	   letter	  came	  about	  as	  a	  result	   of	   extensive	   bargaining	   with	   the	   government	   of	   Israel,	   not	   the	   pro-­‐Israel	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy (Macmillan, 
2007), 212 as well as 213–214. 
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   506	  
lobby.117	   	   Rice	   describes	   feeling	   “the	   pending	   Israeli	   withdrawal	   offered	   the	  potential	  to	  jump-­‐start	  movement	  toward	  a	  two-­‐state	  solution”.118	  	  Even	  Arab	  heads	  of	   state	  were	   described	   as	  more	   actively	   involved	   in	   debating	   the	   letter	  with	   the	  administration	  than	  members	  of	  the	  pro-­‐Israel	  lobby.	  Nor	   does	   Theory	   #3	   provide	   a	   persuasive	   explanation	   for	   how	   perceived	  sender	   interests	   may	   have	   produced	   American	   LSI	   behavior	   during	   the	   Sharon	  years.	  	  Working	  level	  officials	  at	  the	  State	  Department	  may	  have	  sought	  intervention	  in	  Israeli	  politics	  during	  this	  period	  but	  certainly	  not	  on	  behalf	  of	  Sharon.	  	  	  Allegedly,	   the	   American	   ambassador	   in	   Tel	   Aviv,	   Daniel	   Kurtzer,	   urged	  members	   of	   the	   Labor	   Party	   to	   attack	   Sharon	   publicly	   for	   his	   comments	   in	   2001	  comparing	  America	  and	  Israel	   to	  Britain	  and	  Czechoslovakia	  at	  Munich	  in	  1938.119	  	  This	  may	  have	  been	  an	  instance	  of	  pro-­‐Labor	  freelancing	  on	  his	  part,	  but	  it	  certainly	  contradicted	  administration	  policy	  to	  support	  Sharon	  in	  the	  years	  that	  followed.	  	  In	   late	  2002,	  David	  Satterfield,	  a	  deputy	  assistant	  secretary	  at	  NEA,	  assured	  the	  Jordanians	  that	  the	  administration	  had	  no	  intention	  to	  delay	  release	  of	  the	  Road	  Map	   beyond	   its	   scheduled	   December	   release	   date.120	   	   Satterfield	   urged	   the	  Jordanians	   to	   continue	   requesting	   Bush’s	   public	   endorsement	   of	   the	   Road	   Map,	  since	   it	   was	   evident	   that	   the	   White	   House	   remained	   less	   enthusiastic	   about	   the	  proposal.121	   	   In	   the	  end,	   the	  White	  House’s	  perspective	  on	   the	  Road	  Map	   trumped	  the	  preferences	  of	  the	  bureaucracy.	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Again,	  in	  2004,	  State	  Department	  officials	  resisted	  the	  Bush	  letter	  to	  Sharon.	  	  The	  State	  Department’s	  Deputy	  Legal	  Adviser,	  Jonathan	  Schwartz,	  who	  had	  been	  the	  main	   point	   person	   for	   the	   nexus	   of	   legal	   and	   policy	   issues	   on	   the	   peace	   process	  going	   back	   to	   the	   Clinton	   administration,	   tried	   to	   get	   the	   president	   to	   scale	   back	  concessions	   in	   his	  April	   letter	   to	   Sharon	   to	   the	   point	  where	   Sharon	   felt	   the	   letter	  would	   have	   provided	   him	   no	   real	   domestic	   benefits	   back	   in	   Israel.122	   	   At	   the	   last	  minute,	  Powell	  and	  Burns	  also	  worked	  with	  the	  Jordanians	  and	  others	  to	  try	  to	  scale	  back	  language	  of	  the	  letter	  as	  well	  but	  were	  unable	  to	  produce	  results.123	  Meanwhile,	   the	   strong	   personal	   beliefs	   of	   top	   American	   officials	   –	  particularly,	  assessments	  of	   their	   Israeli	   counterparts	  –	  seem	   intricately	  bound	  up	  with	   Washington’s	   reasons	   for	   pursuing	   LSI.	   	   These	   dynamics	   provide	   strong	  evidence	   in	   favor	   of	   Theory	   #4	   as	   well	   as	   evidence	   against	   the	   expectations	   of	  Theory	  #1,	  the	  national	  interests	  approach.	  In	  time,	  Bush	  and	  Rice	  had	  come	  to	  feel	  personally	  invested	  in	  Ariel	  Sharon’s	  success.	   	  Bush	  writes	  that	  “I’ve	  always	  wondered	  what	  might	  have	  been	  possible	  if	  Ariel	  Sharon	  had	  continued	  to	  serve…	  I	  believe	  he	  could	  have	  been	  part	  of	  a	  historic	  peace”.124	   	   He	   felt	   that	   “Sharon	  made	   clear	   –	   at	   Aqaba	   and	   later	   in	   his	   landmark	  Herzliya	   speech	   –	   that	   he	   had	   abandoned	   the	   Greater	   Israel	   policy,	   an	   enormous	  breakthrough”.125	   	   Rice	   says	   that	   “we’d	   come	   to	   see	   Sharon	   as	   crucial	   to	   peace,	   a	  view	  that	  would	  have	  been	  unthinkable	  in	  the	  dark	  days	  of	  2001”.126	  	  She	  writes	  that	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they	   saw	   the	   creation	   of	   the	  Kadima	  Party	   in	   late	   2005	   as	   an	   act	   “identified	  with	  finalizing	   Israel’s	   borders…	   I	  was	   confident	   and	   so	  was	   the	  President	   that	   Sharon	  was	  willing	   to	   take	   the	   remaining	   ones	   toward	   the	   establishment	   of	   Palestine”.127	  	  Upon	   hearing	   of	   Sharon’s	   stroke,	   she	   says	   that	   both	   of	   them	   prayed	   for	   his	  well-­‐being;	  after	  hearting	  that	  Sharon	  had	  passed	  away,	  Rice	  says	  that	  she	  cried.128	  	   A	   stark	   indicator	   of	   the	   subjective	   nature	   of	   these	   perceptions	   was	   the	  considerable	   variation	   within	   the	   American	   administration,	   especially	   early	   on.	  	  When	  Bush	  called	  Sharon	  a	  man	  of	  peace,	  even	  Rice	  disagreed	  with	  the	  choice.	  	  And	  Colin	  Powell	   felt	  even	  more	  strongly	  at	   the	   time.	   	  His	  biographer,	  Karen	  DeYoung,	  writes	  that	  the	  very	  same	  month,	  April	  of	  2002,	  Secretary	  Powell	  seemed	  to	  feel	  “it	  was	  becoming	  increasingly	  clear	  that	  neither	  leader	  [in	  the	  conflict]	  was	  capable	  of	  constructing	   a	   lasting	   peace	   –	   Arafat	   would	   never	   take	   the	   first	   steps	   to	   get	   the	  process	   under	   way,	   [but]	   Sharon	   would	   never	   make	   the	   territorial	   concessions	  necessary	  to	  complete	   it”.129	   	   It	  also	  appears	   that	  Powell	   felt	   the	  Road	  Map	  should	  have	  been	  released	  in	  December	  of	  2002	  but	  was	  overruled	  by	  the	  White	  House.130	  	   It	  was	  clear	  that	  Bush	  and	  Sharon	  felt	  a	  tight	  bond,	  what	  drives	  Glenn	  Kessler	  to	   describe	   Sharon	   as	   “a	   soulmate	   in	   the	  war	   on	   terror”.131	   	   They	   communicated	  through	  an	  empowered	  channel	  of	   their	  main	  deputies,	   spearheaded	  by	  Weissglas	  on	   the	   Israeli	   side	  and	  Rice	  on	   the	  American	  one.132	   	  Bush	   received	  Sharon	  at	   the	  White	  House	  more	  than	  any	  other	  foreign	  leader	  –	  seven	  times	  in	  just	  two	  years	  by	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the	  point	   the	  prime	  minister	  was	  up	   for	   reelection.133	   	   Sharon’s	   visit	   to	   the	  White	  House	  for	  the	  April	  2004	  Bush	  letter	  was	  his	  tenth.134	  It	  makes	  sense	   that	   this	   tight	  personal	  bond	   felt	  by	  Bush	   influenced	  his	  LSI	  choices.	   	   For	   example,	   his	   NSC	   Mideast	   advisor,	   Elliott	   Abrams,	   recalls	   that	   “the	  President	  had	  his	  closest	  relations	  with	  foreign	  leaders	  who	  in	  his	  view	  took	  risks,	  were	   strong	   leaders,	   used	   their	   power	   to	   do	   something:	   Koizumi,	   Blair,	   John	  Howard,	  Sharon…	  the	  huge	  opposition	  in	  Likud,	  losing	  votes	  in	  Likud	  organs,	  having	  to	  split	  the	  party	  he	  was	  a	  founder	  of,	  all	  of	  this	  really	  impressed	  the	  President,	  so	  he	  wanted	  to	  help.	  	  That’s	  what	  led	  to	  the	  April	  14,	  2004	  letter”.135	  	  2.	  Perceptions	  of	  Close	  Contests	  Another	  area	  where	  the	  theories	  diverge	  is	  the	  perception	  of	  close	  leadership	  contests	   in	   the	   target	  polity.	   	  Although	   theories	  2	  and	  3	  are	   relatively	  agnostic	  on	  this	  dimension,	   theories	  1	  and	  4	  pose	  clear,	   contradictory	  predictions.	   	  Theory	  #1	  suggests	   that	   states	   should	   pursue	   LSI	   behavior	   that	   accurately	   reflects	   objective	  empirical	  features	  of	  the	  impending	  leadership	  shaping	  up	  abroad	  but	  should	  not	  be	  influenced	  by	  sub-­‐state	  dynamics	  within	  the	  sender	  state,	  which	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  unitary.	   	  Theory	  #4	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  emphasizes	  the	  finite	  attention	  and	  political	  capital	  that	  leaders	  in	  the	  sender	  state	  have	  to	  allocate	  according	  to	  their	  subjective	  personal	  priorities.	  	  If	  Theory	  #4	  is	  correct,	  we	  should	  therefore	  expect	  to	  see	  rates	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 Diehl, “Editorial: Back Door to Bush.” 
134 Enderlin, The Lost Years, 233. 
135 Abrams interview quoted in Kurtzer et al., The Peace Puzzle, 322–323. Technically, these events took 
place after the April 2004 letter, not beforehand, but presumably Abrams was talking about Sharon’s 
prospective willingness to take on these risks. 
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of	  LSI	  increase	  when	  leaders	  see	  strong	  personal	  benefits	  to	  pursuing	  such	  behavior	  but	  that	  such	  effects	  can	  be	  overpowered	  when	  leaders	  in	  the	  sender	  state	  face	  more	  pressing	  immediate	  distractions	  such	  as	  a	  war	  or	  political	  scandal.	  The	  best	  explanation	  for	  why	  leadership	  theory	  seems	  to	  provide	  a	  better	  fit	  for	  the	  data	  in	  these	  cases	  than	  national	  interests	  theory	  can	  be	  traced	  back	  to	  the	  contradictory	  positions	  sketched	  out	  by	  President	  George	  Bush	  and	  Prime	  Minister	  Tony	  Blair	  in	  the	  lead-­‐up	  to	  Israeli	  elections	  in	  January	  of	  2003.	  	  Both	  pursued	  LSI,	  but	  the	  contradictory	  directions	  in	  which	  they	  did	  so	  can	  in	  part	  be	  traced	  back	  to	  their	  subjective	  interpretation	  of	  the	  impending	  contest	  in	  Israeli	  politics.	  Bush	  had	  long	  been	  disinterested	  in	  Israeli	  politics	  or	  peace	  process	  affairs,	  and	   he	   was	   notably	   focused	   on	   preparations	   for	   the	   Iraq	   war	   at	   the	   time.	   	   This	  increased	  the	  possible	  benefits	  of	  Sharon’s	  goodwill	  in	  Bush’s	  estimation	  –	  including	  diminishing	   risks	   of	   another	   high-­‐profile	   siege	   on	   Arafat	   and	   hushing	   up	   talk	   of	  Israeli	  retaliation	  in	  the	  event	  of	  an	  Iraqi	  missile	  strike	  –	  while	  decreasing	  the	  likely	  costs	  of	  failing	  to	  promote	  peace	  talks	  with	  the	  Palestinians.136	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   Blair’s	   attention	   to	   the	   conflict	   and	   his	   preference	   for	  Labor	   Party	   politicians	   in	   Israel	   was	   longstanding,	   going	   back	   at	   least	   to	   the	  Netanyahu	   and	  Barak	  days.	   	   Blair	  was	   criticized	   by	   some	   for	   piling	   on	  during	   the	  Likud’s	  corruption	  scandal	  by	  choosing	  to	  back	  Amram	  Mitzna,137	  but	   in	  reality	  he	  had	  been	   laying	   the	   groundwork	   to	   reach	   out	   to	  Mitzna	   since	   before	   that	   scandal	  broke,	  at	  a	  time	  when	  Mitzna	  was	  faring	  even	  more	  dismally	  in	  Israeli	  polls	  (one	  poll	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 Benn, “Sharon Asked U.S. for a ‘Diplomatic Recess’ Until After Primaries in Likud”; Guttman, “A 
Warm Relationship”; DeYoung, Soldier, 387; Barnea and Kastner, Backchannel, 40–41; Kessler, The 
Confidante, 125; Diehl, “Editorial: Back Door to Bush.” 
137 Philps, “Blair Under Attack for ‘Bias’ over Israeli Poll.” 
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that	   week	   predicted	   Labor	   would	   take	   20	   Knesset	   seats	   compared	   to	   40	   for	   the	  Likud).138	  	  	  In	   short,	   Blair’s	   decision	   to	   back	   Mitzna	   at	   the	   time	   was	   probably	   driven	  more	   by	   personal	   convictions	   than	   objective	   assessments	   of	   whether	   or	   not	   the	  Israeli	   Labor	   candidate	   stood	   a	   likely	   shot	   of	  winning	   the	  premiership.	   	   As	   Israeli	  journalist	   Shmuel	  Rosner	   reflects,	   the	  British	  effort	   to	  help	  Mitzna	  was	   “pathetic...	  misreading	   the	   political	   context,	   reading	   too	   much	   Ha’aretz...	   letting	   ideological	  differences	  win	  over	  strategic	  thinking...	  letting	  ideology	  win	  over	  cold	  calculation	  of	  cost-­‐benefit	  and	  chances	  to	  have	  impact”.139	  Some	  other	  observers	  surmised	  that	  Blair	  also	  had	  his	  own	  internal	  concern	  at	   the	   time	   –	  winning	   domestic	   plaudits	   for	   promoting	   the	   Road	  Map	   in	   a	   visible	  exchange	  for	  pledging	  Britain’s	  backing	  for	  a	  war	  on	  Iraq	  –	  but	  again	  this	  motivation	  was	  a	  sub-­‐state	  factor	  more	  germane	  to	  leadership	  theory	  than	  the	  unitary	  national	  interests	   approach.140	   	   The	   route	   to	   Bush’s	   intervention	   on	   behalf	   of	   Sharon	  was	  through	  concessions	  that	  the	  president	  cared	  surprisingly	  little	  about,	  in	  part	  due	  to	  his	  coincidental	  preparation	  for	  the	  invasion	  of	  Iraq	  at	  the	  time;	  the	  route	  to	  Blair’s	  intervention	  on	  behalf	  of	  Sharon’s	  opponent	  traced	  back	  to	  the	  his	  own	  unrealistic	  hopes	  for	  Mitzna’s	  success.	  	  The	  gap	  in	  behavior	  across	  the	  two	  LSI	  attempts	  is	  best	  explained	  by	  reference	  to	  Theory	  #4.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 For the earlier efforts by Blair, see Morris, “Blair Says Meeting Will Not Interfere with Israeli Election.” 
For the 20-to-40 poll numbers, see Timothy Heritage, “Israeli Dove Plots How to Close Election Gap on 
Sharon,” Reuters News, December 2, 2002. 
139 Shmuel Rosner, “Interview with the Author,” June 15, 2011. 
140 “Blair’s Middle East Blunder.” 
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3.	  Patterns	  of	  Domestic	  Debate:	  	   Another	   pertinent	   type	   of	   observable	   implication	   is	   the	   structure	   of	  deliberation	   leading	   up	   to	   leadership	   selection	   intervention.	   	   The	   arguments	   that	  focus	  on	  domestic	  structural	  forces	  –	  theories	  2	  and	  3	  –	  expect	  lobbies,	  Congress,	  or	  the	   bureaucracy	   to	   be	   both	   informed	   and	   influential	   when	   important	   decisions	  about	  LSI	  are	  being	  made.	   	  However,	  if	  top	  leaders	  are	  able	  to	  undertake	  LSI	  while	  leaving	   these	   stakeholders	   in	   the	   dark,	   that	   would	   seem	   to	   support	   Theory	   #4	  instead,	   as	   would	   consultations	   through	   informal	   channels	   by	   these	   leaders	   with	  their	  favored	  protégés	  in	  the	  target	  state.	  	   In	   this	   regard,	   the	   episodes	   of	   American	   intervention	   into	   Israeli	   politics	  during	  the	  Sharon	  years	  fit	  the	  expectations	  of	  leadership	  theory	  much	  better	  than	  the	   bureaucratic	   or	   lobby-­‐legislative	   approaches.	   	   Meddling	   was	   often	   discussed	  through	  unusual	  channels	  between	  U.S.	  and	  Israeli	  officials	  as	  well	  as	  among	  officials	  within	   the	  American	  government,	  usually	  with	   little	  or	  no	  consultation	  with	  other	  officials	  in	  Washington.	  	   American	  communications	  with	  Israeli	  officials	  on	  the	  matter	  were	  handled	  through	  extremely	  unusual	  channels.	   	  Barnea	  and	  Kasnter	  wrote	  an	  entire	  volume	  predicated	   upon	   the	   argument	   that	   Sharon	   “valued	   secrecy	   and	   did	   not	   trust	   the	  standard	   channels	   of	   communication”	   for	   dealing	   with	   Washington,	   therefore	  operated	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  cut	  out	  both	  pro-­‐Israel	  activists	  in	  the	  U.S.	  and	  diplomatic	  intermediaries.	   	   He	   “appointed	   an	   emissary	   who	   would	   bypass	   not	   only…	   [the]	  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  but	  also	  the	  U.S.	  Embassy	  in	  Tel	  Aviv,	  the	  Israeli	  Embassy	  in	  Washington	   DC,	   and	   the	   American	   Jewish	   leaders	   who	   had	  mediated	   between	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past	   Israeli	   governments	   and	  U.S.	   administrations”.141	   	  When	   he	   appointed	   Silvan	  Shalom	   to	   be	   Israel’s	  minister	   of	   foreign	   affairs,	   the	   prime	  minister	   informed	  him	  that	  he	  could	  have	  the	  whole	  world	  as	  his	  portfolio	  except	  for	  the	  White	  House	  and	  certain	  parts	  of	  the	  State	  Department.142	  	  	  In	  an	  especially	  notable	  instance,	  when	  LSI	  was	  being	  deliberated	  by	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Israel	  in	  late	  2002	  Sharon	  actually	  cancelled	  a	  visit	  by	  Efraim	  Halevy,	  the	  head	  of	  his	  national	   security	  council,	   in	  order	   for	  his	  personal	  envoy,	  Weissglas,	   to	   lead	  the	  meetings.	   	  Ha’aretz	  correspondent	  Aluf	  Benn	  wrote	  that	  the	  more	  technocratic	  Halevy	   was	   being	   sidelined	   so	   that	   LSI-­‐related	   discussions	   would	   be	   confined	   to	  more	  political	  channels:	  	  “Sharon	   chose	   to	   send	  Weisglass	   instead	   of	  Halevy	  with	   the	  message	   so	   as	   not	   to	  entangle	  Halevy	  in	  partisan	  political	  issues.	  	  Government	  sources	  said	  he	  preferred	  Halevy	   to	   be	   free	   to	   deal	   with	   strategic	   issues	   like	   the	   coming	   war	   with	   Iraq.	  	  Officially,	  the	  PMO	  [Prime	  Minister’s	  Office]	  said	  Weisglass	  was	  going	  to	  Washington	  to	   ‘continue	   the	  prime	  minister’s	  discussions	  about	  raising	   financial	  aid	   for	   Israel.’	  	  But	  he	  traveled	  alone,	  without	  any	  professional	  consultations	  prior	  to	  the	  trip,	  nor	  any	  prior	  talks	  with	  either	  the	  treasury	  or	  the	  defense	  ministry,	  which	  needs	  U.S.	  aid	  because	   of	   budget	   cutbacks.	   	   The	   treasury’s	   own	   staff	  work	   on	   the	   aid	   request	   to	  Washington	  is	  not	  finished”.143	  	   Further,	  the	  deliberations	  being	  held	  within	  the	  American	  government	  on	  LSI	  toward	   Israel	   during	   the	   Sharon	   period	   were	   also	   quite	   irregular	   and	   informal.	  	  Powell	   was	   formally	   Bush’s	   point	   person	   for	   the	   region,	   but	   instead	   he	   was	  increasingly	  cut	  out	  of	  real	  decision-­‐making	  in	  favor	  of	  Rice.	  	  As	  Kessler	  puts	  it	  “Rice	  had	  secretly	  taken	  over	  the	  Israeli-­‐Palestinian	  account	  in	  2002…	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  first	   term,	   Powell’s	   State	   Department	   largely	   became	   irrelevant	   to	   U.S.-­‐Israel	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 Both quotes are from Barnea and Kastner, Backchannel, 8. 
142 Ibid., 11. 
143 Benn, “Sharon Asked U.S. for a ‘Diplomatic Recess’ Until After Primaries in Likud.” 
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relations	  as	  Rice	  and	  Weissglas	  dealt	  directly	  with	  each	  other	  at	  the	  behest	  of	  Bush	  and	  Sharon”.144	  Not	   only	   was	   the	   State	   Department	   bureaucracy	   frequently	   cut	   out	   of	  decision-­‐making	  on	  these	  issues,	  but	  so	  was	  Congress	  and	  the	  pro-­‐Israel	  lobby.	  	  For	  instance,	   the	   administration	  made	  preliminary	  decisions	  on	   the	  Road	  Map	  and	  on	  emergency	  aid	  plus	  loan	  guarantees	  for	  Israel	  at	  the	  end	  of	  2002	  in	  order	  to	  bolster	  Sharon.	   	   Yet	   they	   only	   got	   into	   substantial	   give-­‐and-­‐take	   with	   Congress	   and	  lobbyists	  on	  these	  issues	  in	  the	  spring	  of	  the	  following	  year,	  once	  a	  draft	  text	  for	  the	  Road	   Map	   was	   more	   widely	   available	   and	   the	   administration	   was	   fine-­‐tuning	  conditions	  for	  the	  new	  financial	  aid	  to	  Israel.145	   	  When	  it	  was	  actually	  deliberating	  what	   to	   do	   about	   LSI	   in	   advance	   of	   Israel’s	   elections,	   the	   administration	   had	   a	  relatively	  free	  hand	  from	  pressures	  on	  behalf	  of	  these	  domestic	  forces.	  	  4.	  Cycles	  of	  Domestic	  Power:	  	   To	  the	  extent	  that	  domestic	  structural	  forces	  are	  salient	  factors	  for	  decision-­‐making,	  we	  should	  expect	  LSI	  behavior	  to	  be	  almost	  wholly	  driven	  by	  these	  factors	  during	   certain	   periods	   of	   the	   sender	   state’s	   political	   calendar.	   	   If	   Theory	   #2	   is	  correct	  that	  lobbies	  and	  legislators	  matter	  greatly	  for	  American	  LSI,	  then	  meddling	  should	   be	   totally	   driven	   by	   these	   groups’	   preferences	   during	   periods	   of	   divided	  government	   or	   in	   the	   lead-­‐up	   to	   elections	   in	   the	   United	   States.	   	   If	   Theory	   #3	   is	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correct	  that	  bureaucrats	  are	  very	  important	  for	  determining	  LSI,	  then	  bureaucratic	  preferences	   should	   be	   preponderant	   at	   the	   start	   of	   first	   presidential	   terms.	  	  However,	   if	  meddling	   behavior	   fails	   to	  meet	   one	   or	   both	   of	   these	   criteria,	   then	   it	  would	  appear	  that	  one	  or	  both	  of	  these	  domestic	  structural	  explanations	  has	  failed	  an	   easy	   hoop	   test	   in	   a	   critical	   case,	   which	   should	   also	   give	   us	   confidence	   in	  alternative	  models,	  such	  as	  leadership	  theory	  or	  the	  national	  interests	  approach.	  	   It	   seems	   as	   though	   both	   domestic	   structural	   theories	   fail	   to	   produce	  consistent,	   persuasive	   results	   in	   this	   regard.	   	   The	   bureaucratic	   politics	   approach	  expects	   high	   rates	   of	   meddling,	   and	   according	   to	   the	   cycles	   of	   domestic	   power	  argument	   these	   rates	   should	   be	   almost	   certain	   when	   bureaucratic	   input	   over	  outcomes	   is	   especially	   high	   –	   meaning	   at	   the	   start	   of	   presidential	   terms,	   before	  political	  appointees	  are	   fully	  settled	   in	  place.	   	  However,	   the	   instances	  of	  American	  LSI	  toward	  Israeli	  politics	  took	  place	  in	  every	  year	  except	  Bush’s	  first	  year	  in	  office,	  suggesting	  that	  the	  bureaucratic	  politics	  approach	  in	  this	  episode	  should	  be	  treated	  with	  increased	  skepticism.	  	   Further,	   LSI	   behavior	   seems	   relatively	   impervious	   to	   the	   U.S.	   electoral	  calendar	  or	  dynamics	  of	  divided	  government	  during	  the	  Sharon	  period.	  	  Democrats	  controlled	   the	   Senate	   (albeit	   by	   a	   razor-­‐thin	  margin)	   for	  most	   of	   Bush’s	   first	   two	  years	   in	  office,	  but	  LSI	  seems	  no	  rarer	   then	  relative	   to	  his	  second	  two	  years	  when	  government	  control	  was	  totally	  united	  under	  the	  Republican	  Party.	   	  LSI	  took	  place	  both	   before	   an	   American	   election	   in	   2004	   and	   just	   after	   a	   U.S.	   election	   in	   2002,	  suggesting	   that	   the	   timing	   of	   elections	   also	   has	   little	   impact	   on	   the	   president’s	  behavior	   in	   this	   arena.	   	   And,	   as	   noted	   above,	  Walt	   and	  Mearsheimer’s	   claim	   that	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Bush	  backed	   Israel	   on	  unilateral	  withdrawal	  during	  a	   reelection	  year	  primarily	   to	  win	  votes	  or	  for	  fear	  of	  the	  pro-­‐Israel	  lobby	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  fit	  with	  the	  data.	  	  And,	  although	  it	  is	  tough	  to	  envision	  him	  saying	  otherwise,	  Bush	  seemed	  confident	  when	  he	  insisted	  in	  private	  to	  the	  Jordanian	  and	  Palestinian	  delegations	  at	  Aqaba	  that	  he	  did	  not	  fear	  the	  lobby	  or	  the	  Christian	  right	  when	  promoting	  the	  Road	  Map.146	  	  5.	  Bureaucratic	  Freelancing:	  	   Instances	  of	  bureaucratic	  freelancing,	  in	  which	  working-­‐level	  officials	  pursue	  LSI	  without	  the	  express	  authorization	  of	  the	  president,	  provide	  possible	  support	  for	  Theory	  #3.	   	  However,	  the	  leadership	  approach	  expects	  that	  this	  support	  should	  be	  tempered	   by	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   freelancing	   is	   first	   conditional	   on	   presidential	  styles	   of	   management	   and	   oversight.	   	   If	   bureaucratic	   freelancing	   occurs	   in	   all	  administrations,	   then	   that	  would	   seem	   to	  provide	  much	   stronger	  evidence	   for	   the	  bureaucratic	   approach	   than	   if	   freelancing	   is	   only	   contained	   to	   those	   instances	   in	  which	   the	   president	   exercises	   a	   lax	   overall	   style	   of	   management	   and	   exhibits	   a	  disinterested	   approach	   to	   overseeing	   the	   execution	   of	   bilateral	   relations	  with	   the	  target	  state.	  	   This	  case	  does	  include	  at	  least	  one	  clear	  episode	  of	  bureaucratic	  freelancing	  –	  the	   Yaron	  Affair	   –	   and	   that	   episode	   fits	  with	   the	   tempered,	   leadership-­‐contingent	  framework	   for	   working	   level	   behavior.	   	   Like	   Reagan	   before	   him,	   President	   Bush	  demonstrated	   a	   very	   removed	   approach	   to	   formal	   decision-­‐making	   and	   a	   strong	  disinterest	  in	  handling	  the	  Israel	  or	  peace	  portfolios	  on	  a	  regular	  basis.	  	  Indeed	  one	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observer	  of	  Arab-­‐Israeli	   issues	   called	  Bush	   “the	  disengager”	   and	   characterized	  his	  decision-­‐making	   as	   reducible	   to	   “many	   ‘if	   I	   do	   this	   on	   the	   peace	   process,	   don’t	  bother	  me	   again’	  moments”.147	   	   It	   should	   come	   as	   little	   surprise	   that	   the	   notable	  episodes	  of	  bureaucratic	   freelancing	   in	   this	  dissertation	  on	   the	  U.S.-­‐Israel	  directed	  dyad	  occurred	  only	  under	  the	  presidencies	  of	  Reagan	  and	  Bush	  43.	  	   This	  mindset	   seems	   to	  have	   translated	   into	  administration	  behavior	  on	   the	  Yaron	  Affair	  itself.	   	  The	  demand	  that	  Yaron	  be	  fired	  allegedly	  originated	  with	  Doug	  Feith	   and	  was	   supported	  by	  Paul	  Wolfowitz.148	   	  Although	   it	   seems	  as	   though	  Rice	  and	   Rumsfeld	   signed	   off	   on	   the	   penalties	   demanded	   by	   these	   officials,	  administration	   support	   seems	   to	   end	   there.149	   	   Barnea	   and	   Kastner	   report	   that	  “Neither	   President	   Bush	   and	   his	   staff,	   nor	   Prime	   Minister	   Sharon	   and	   his	   staff	  wanted	  to	  involve	  themselves	  in	  this	  issue,	  and	  because	  of	  this	  neglect,	  the	  ‘Chinese	  Affair’	   started	   to	   have	   a	   noticeable	   impact	   on	   bilateral	   relations…	  Bush’s	   advisors	  chose	   to	   distance	   themselves	   from	   the	   affair:	   they	   regarded	   the	   matter	   as	   the	  Department	  of	  Defense’s	  problem.	   	   In	   the	   end,	   the	   ‘Chinese	  Affair’	  was	   allowed	   to	  rumble	   on”.150	   	   Also,	   a	   few	   members	   of	   Congress	   echoed	   Feith’s	   message	   by	  threatening	  that	  arms	  firms	  doing	  sensitive	  business	  with	  China	  would	   lose	  access	  to	  the	  U.S.	  market,	  but	  the	  odds	  of	  a	  Congressional	  embargo	  against	  Israel’s	  defense	  manufacturing	   flagship	   were	   probably	   low,	   since	   this	   arms	   sales	   are	   an	   area	   in	  which	  the	  pro-­‐Israel	  lobby’s	  influence	  on	  the	  legislative	  branch	  is	  quite	  effective.151	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  6.	  Consistency	  of	  Message:	  The	   effectiveness	   of	   LSI	   is	   likely	   to	   depend	   upon	  whether	   the	   sender	   state	  acts	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  validates	  the	  campaign	  narrative	  of	  one	  political	  faction	  in	  the	  target	  polity	  at	   the	  expense	  of	   its	   rivals.	   	  Thus,	  LSI	  should	  be	  more	  effective	  when	  messaging	  is	  consistent	  and	  clear,	  a	  condition	  for	  which	  the	  theories	  offer	  divergent	  predictions.	   	   Theory	   #1	   anticipates	   that	   consistent	   messaging	   should	   be	  unproblematic,	   since	   foreign	   policy	   by	   the	   sender	   state	   is	   made	   in	   a	   relatively	  unitary	  and	  consensual	  manner.	   	  Theory	  #2	  expects	  lobbyists	  and	  legislators	  to	  be	  in	  a	  strong	  position	  to	  undermine	  the	  government’s	  LSI	  message,	  as	  does	  Theory	  #3	  for	  bureaucratic	  actors.	  	  Finally,	  Theory	  #4	  argues	  that	  the	  consistency	  and	  clarity	  of	  messaging	  –	  and	  therefore	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  American	  LSI,	  should	  be	  conditioned	  by	  the	  coordination	  and	  commitment	  of	  top	  U.S.	  officials.	  To	  what	   extent	   was	   the	   American	   administration	   reliable	   in	   its	  messaging	  when	  it	  came	  to	  LSI?	  	  According	  to	  Ha’aretz	  journalist	  Nathan	  Guttman,	  in	  advance	  of	   the	   2003	   Israeli	   elections	   the	   Bush	   team’s	   message	   came	   through	   quite	  effectively:	  “the	  bottom	  line	  is	  clear	  –	  for	  the	  first	  time	  since	  the	  1990s,	  the	  American	  administration	   is	   not	   trying	   to	   help	   the	   Labor	   	   candidate	   to	  win	   the	   election,	   and	  many	  believe	  that	  Bush	  is	  doing	  just	  the	  opposite…	  he	  is	  making	  sure	  to	  remove	  any	  evidence	   of	   friction	   or	   problems	   from	   the	   field”.152	   	   To	   the	   extent	   that	   Powell	  advocated	   a	   different	   line,	   he	  was	  marginalized	   from	   handling	   the	   Israeli	   file	   and	  was	   not	   in	   a	   position	   to	   undermine	   the	   administration’s	   attempts	   at	   meddling.	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Although	  Powell	  and	  others	  at	  the	  State	  Department,	  as	  well	  as	  Flynt	  Leverett	  at	  the	  NSC,	   may	   have	   wanted	   to	   release	   the	   Road	  Map	   in	   December	   of	   2003,	   they	   said	  nothing	  in	  public	  to	  contradict	  the	  president’s	  position.	  	  On	  instructions	  from	  Bush,	  Secretary	   Powell	   reluctantly	   conveyed	   to	   his	   European	  partners	   from	   the	  Quartet	  that	  the	  Road	  Map	  would	  simply	  have	  to	  wait.	  	  7.	  Suitability	  of	  Message:	  	   Finally,	   there	   is	   the	   question	   of	   the	   message	   expressed	   by	   officials	   in	   the	  sender	  state.	  	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  it	  suits	  political	  mindsets	  among	  the	  selectorate	  in	  the	   target	   polity	   and	   validates	   the	   campaign	   narrative	   of	   the	   sender’s	   favored	  protégé,	   LSI	   efforts	   are	   likely	   to	   succeed.	   	   Theory	   #1	   anticipates	   that	   this	   should	  always	   be	   the	   case,	   but	   theories	   2	   through	   4	   expect	   that	   this	   appropriateness	   of	  message	   should	   be	   conditioned	   by	   biases	   imposed	   either	   by	   institutional	   or	  personal	  preferences.	  For	  instance,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  explain	  efforts	  by	  Tony	  Blair	  or	  Hosni	  Mubarak	  to	  bolster	  Amram	  Mitzna	  and	  the	   Israeli	   left	   in	   the	  2003	  elections	  as	  anything	  but	  wishful	   thinking,	   given	   how	   poorly	   Mitzna	   was	   polling.	   	   Especially	   given	   that	  America	  was	   throwing	   its	   lot	   in	  with	   Sharon,	   the	  message	   being	   conveyed	   by	   the	  pro-­‐Labor	  leaders	  was	  starkly	  at	  odds	  with	  both	  Israeli	  public	  opinion’s	  distrust	  of	  the	  Palestinians	  and	  the	  prevailing	  international	  environment.	  Further,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  envision	  America	  projecting	  the	  same	  message	  it	  did	  in	  during	  this	  period	  had	  somebody	  other	  than	  Bush	  been	  president.	   	  For	  instance,	  had	  Gore	  been	  crowned	  the	  victor	  of	  America’s	  election	  in	  2000,	  it	  may	  have	  backed	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Israel	   during	   the	   intifada,	   but	   it	   likely	   would	   not	   have	   specifically	   strained	   to	  minimize	  disagreements	  with	  Israel	  in	  order	  to	  ease	  Sharon’s	  race	  for	  reelection.	  Given	   that	   Bush	   did	   seek	   to	   bolster	   Sharon,	   however,	   the	   message	  communicated	   by	   his	   actions	   was	   in	   fact	   well-­‐suited	   to	   this	   objective.	   	   Pledging	  emergency	  aid	  in	  advance	  of	  Israel’s	  elections	  reassured	  Israeli	  voters	  in	  2003	  	  that	  their	   concerns	   about	   the	   economy	   could	   be	   addressed	   under	   Sharon,	   as	   did	  assurances	  that	  the	  U.S.	  would	  not	  peg	  loan	  guarantees	  this	  time	  around	  to	  a	  freeze	  in	   settlement	   construction,	   something	   the	   Likud	   would	   not	   likely	   accept.	   	   Bush’s	  backing	  in	  2004	  was	  somewhat	  less	  effective,	  however,	  because	  the	  selectorate	  that	  mattered	  was	  less	  open	  to	  his	  influence.	  	  His	  indication	  that	  America	  would	  reward	  disengagement	  helped	  Sharon	  with	  domestic	  opinion	  and	  probably	   in	   the	   cabinet,	  but	   it	   could	   not	   help	   him	   win	   the	   Likud	   Party	   referendum	   because	   Likud	   voters	  cared	  less	  about	  American	  backing	  than	  continued	  retention	  of	  the	  territories.	  	  	   	  
George	  W.	  Bush,	  Case	  #2:	  Olmert,	  the	  weak	  politician,	  2006-­‐2008	  	  	  	   After	  Ariel	  Sharon	  suffered	  two	  strokes	  in	  December	  of	  2005	  and	  January	  of	  2006,	  the	  Israeli	  leader	  was	  permanently	  incapacitated.	  	  He	  was	  therefore	  replaced	  by	  his	  designated	  successor,	  Ehud	  Olmert.	   	  Olmert	  was	  named	  the	  new	  head	  of	  the	  Kadima	  Party	   and	   ran	   as	   the	  party’s	   leader	   in	   the	   elections	   already	   scheduled	   for	  March	   of	   that	   year.	   	   The	   party	   won	   considerably	   fewer	   seats	   than	   expected	   (29	  mandates	   as	   opposed	   to	   the	   40	   previously	   projected),	   and	   he	   formed	   a	   coalition	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government	  in	  which	  Labor	  was	  the	  main	  junior	  partner.153	  	  On	  one	  hand,	  the	  new	  prime	  minister’s	  party	  held	  fewer	  seat	  than	  his	  predecessor	  had	  won	  in	  2003,	  but	  on	  the	   other	   he	   now	   served	   at	   the	   head	   of	   a	   government	  more	   clearly	   committed	   to	  setting	  Israel’s	  final	  borders,	  having	  brought	  in	  Labor	  and	  jettisoned	  the	  remaining	  members	  of	  the	  rump	  Likud	  Party.	  	  He	  also	  ran	  on	  a	  platform	  of	  pursuing	  a	  second	  round	  of	  unilateral	  Israeli	  withdrawals,	  this	  time	  pledging	  to	  remove	  most	  of	  the	  far-­‐flung	  settlements	   located	  deep	   inside	  of	   the	  West	  Bank,	  a	  proposal	   that	  ultimately	  became	  known	  as	  Olmert’s	  plan	  for	  “realignment”.154	  	  
Coding	  the	  Dependent	  Variables	  (Occurrence	  and	  Efficacy)	  Did	  LSI	  Occur?	  	   No,	   then	   yes.	   	   During	   the	   first	   half	   of	   Ehud	   Olmert’s	   term	   in	   office,	   the	  American	   government	   generally	   declined	   to	   bolster	   his	   standing	   internally	  within	  Israel.	  	  His	  team	  sought	  strong	  endorsement	  of	  realignment	  upfront	  in	  order	  to	  give	  him	   a	   boost	   so	   that	   he	   could	   implement	   this	   controversial	   plan,	   aimed	   at	   setting	  Israel’s	  final	  borders.	  	  Yet	  Olmert	  was	  rebuffed	  by	  Washington.	  	  	  The	  administration	  strongly	  backed	  Israel’s	  2006	  war	  against	  Hezbollah	  but	  it	  continued	  to	  take	  a	  number	  of	  steps	  that	  suggested	  LSI	  was	  still	  not	  part	  of	  the	  its	  agenda	  toward	  Israel.	   	  These	  steps	  included	  focusing	  much	  more	  on	  bolstering	  the	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Anne Barnard, “With Lead in Israel’s Polls, Kadima Lays Out Plans,” Boston Globe, March 10, 2006; Scott 
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government	   in	   Lebanon	   rather	   than	   the	   one	   in	   Jerusalem	   during	   the	   war,	  subsequently	  discouraging	  Olmert	  from	  restarting	  talks	  with	  Syria,	  and	  rejecting	  his	  request	  for	  a	  U.S.	  military	  strike	  on	  Syria’s	  nuclear	  reactor	  at	  al-­‐Kibar.	  	   By	   mid-­‐2007,	   however,	   the	   administration	   perceived	   a	   major	   strategic	  opportunity	  that	  led	  to	  reconsideration	  of	  LSI	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  Kadima	  Party	  and	  its	  leaders.	   	  Rice	  saw	  Hamas’s	  coup	  in	  Gaza	  as	  a	  major	  clarifying	  moment	  that	   lay	  the	  groundwork	   for	   a	  major	   final	   push	   on	   the	   peace	   process.	   	   As	   such,	   the	   pro-­‐peace	  leaders	   at	   the	   head	   of	   Israel	   and	   the	   PLO,	   Olmert	   and	   Abbas,	   came	   to	   be	   seen	   as	  crucial	   assets	   for	   Washington’s	   policies	   and	   interests	   in	   the	   region.	   	   Thus,	   the	  administration	  soon	  took	  a	  number	  of	  steps	  that	  seem	  in	  part	  to	  have	  been	  aimed	  at	  building	  up	  Olmert	  as	  well	  as	  his	  foreign	  minister	  and	  successor,	  Tzipi	  Livni.	  	  These	  gestures	   included:	   public	   rhetoric	   filled	   with	   glowing	   praise,	   the	   Annapolis	  Conference,	   two	  presidential	  visits	   to	  Israel,	  and	  a	  memorandum	  of	  understanding	  trumped	  up	  to	  make	  Livni	  look	  good	  before	  Israeli	  elections	  in	  early	  2009.	  
<Sub-­Case	  1:	  LSI	  Non-­Occurrence>	  	   When	  Olmert	  came	  to	  office	  as	  prime	  minister	  in	  2006,	  his	  reputation	  and	  his	  agenda	  were	   staked	  on	   realignment.	   	  And,	   like	   Sharon	  before	  him,	  he	   approached	  the	   idea	  of	  unilateral	  disengagement	  with	  the	  hope	  that	  Washington	  would	   fill	   the	  gap	   caused	   by	   leaving	   the	   Palestinians	   out	   of	   the	   equation.	   	   In	   place	   of	   formal	  Palestinian	   concessions,	   he	   sought	  American	  ones	   to	   compensate	   Israeli	   sacrifices	  and	  to	  help	  offset	  some	  of	  the	  plan’s	  inherent	  risks.	  	  The	  specific	  concessions	  being	  sought	   by	   Olmert’s	   team	   included:	   formal	   American	   endorsement	   with	   strong	  diplomatic	   backing,	   formal	   recognition	   of	   Israeli	   lines	   after	  withdrawal	   (including	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controversial,	  major	  settlement	  blocks	  Ariel,	  Ma’ale	  Adumim,	  and	  Gush	  Etzion),	  and	  support	   for	   footing	   the	   bill	   for	   moving	   settlers	   and	   certain	   IDF	   installations	  (estimated	  at	  $10	  to	  $18	  billion).155	   	  Allegedly,	  Olmert	  was	  so	   focused	  on	  securing	  American	  backing	   for	   the	  plan	   that	  one	  of	  his	   first	  questions	   for	  his	   staff	  after	   the	  March	   elections	   was	   something	   along	   the	   lines	   of	   “so	   when	   can	   we	   go	   to	  Washington?”.156	  	  The	  trip	  happened	  within	  a	  month	  of	  him	  being	  sworn	  in.	  	   However,	   the	   administration	   made	   clear	   both	   publicly	   and	   in	   private	   that	  such	  backing	  would	  not	  be	   forthcoming	  on	   the	  prime	  minister’s	  visit	   to	   the	  White	  House.157	  	  Olmert	  dropped	  his	  requests	  for	  aid	  or	  recognition	  of	  specific	  settlement	  blocks	   in	  advance	  of	   the	   trip,	  and,	   in	   the	  words	  of	  one	  analyst,	  before	   the	  meeting	  “both	   sides	   had	   lowered	   expectations	   below	   the	   Dead	   Sea”.158	   	   Although	   the	  president	   praised	  Olmert’s	   thinking	   as	   “bold	   ideas,”	   he	   steered	   clear	   of	   endorsing	  specifics	  or	  suggesting	  that	  the	  time	  was	  right	  for	  implementing	  them	  yet.159	  	  Olmert	  was	   discouraged	   from	   pursuing	   realignment	   before	   first	   trying	   talks	   with	   Abu	  Mazen	   and	   the	   PA,	   all	   this	   in	   the	   context	   of	   Hamas’s	   victory	   in	   the	   2006	   PLC	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elections	  –	  suggesting	  the	  plan	  would	  be	  a	  non-­‐starter	  for	  the	  near	  future.160	  	   In	   short,	   the	   reception	   for	   Olmert’s	   realignment	   plan	   was	   lukewarm.	   	   The	  Bush	  team	  was	  open	  to	  the	  idea	  in	  the	  longer	  term	  but	  were	  unwilling	  to	  support	  it	  without	  Israel	  first	  building	  the	  groundwork	  for	  an	  international	  consensus	  around	  the	  plan	  by	  trying	  out	  talks	  with	  the	  Palestinian	  Authority	  first.161	  	  U.S.	  backing	  was	  not	  out	  of	  the	  question,	  but	  it	  was	  basically	  withheld	  for	  the	  time	  being.	  	  As	  the	  New	  York	   Times	   foreign	   desk	   put	   it,	   the	   official	   reaction	  was	   	   “2	   cheers	   for	   Olmert	   in	  Washington”.162	  	   In	  public,	  Olmert	  tried	  to	  put	  a	  positive	  face	  on	  the	  result,	  remarking	  at	  the	  end	   of	   their	   press	   conference	   that	   “I	   am	   grateful	   to	   the	   President…	   for	   his	  willingness	  to	  examine	  together	  with	  me	  these	  new	  ideas	  –	  as	  he	  called	  them,	  bold	  ideas”	  and	   later	  declaring	   that	   “I	  am	  very,	  very,	  very	  satisfied	  with	   the	  president’s	  comments”.163	  	  However,	  it	  was	  clear	  that,	  by	  the	  standards	  his	  team	  had	  set	  for	  the	  visit	   in	  advance,	   the	  prime	  minister	  had	  “returned	  home	  almost	  empty	  handed”164	  	  Multiple	  observers	  described	  the	  American	  response	  to	  Olmert’s	  solicitation	  of	  LSI	  as	  a	  “cold	  shoulder,”165	  “cold	  support,”166	  or	  “pour[ing]	  cold	  water”167	  (though	  to	  be	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fair,	   a	   former	   State	  Department	   official	   disputed	   this	   characterization).168	   	   Dennis	  Ross	   explains	   that	  Olmert	   “needed	   something	   from	  America…	   to	   show	   that,	   as	   he	  evacuated	   seventy	   settlements…	   he	   garnered	   meaningful	   commitments	   from	   the	  United	  States,”	  but	  this	  support	  was	  not	  forthcoming.169	  	   The	   debate	   over	   realignment	   was	   quickly	   overtaken	   when	   Israel	   was	  launched	   into	   war	   after	   three	   of	   its	   soldiers	   were	   taken	   hostage	   by	   Hamas	   and	  Hezbollah	   in	   the	   summer	  of	   2006.	   	   Indeed,	   after	   the	  war	  Olmert	   said	   that	   he	  was	  putting	  aside	  the	  plan	  for	  Israeli	  withdrawals	  in	  order	  to	  focus	  on	  rehabilitating	  the	  home	  front	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  rocket	  attacks	  on	  Israel’s	  north.170	  	  Yet	  during	  the	  period	  that	   follows,	   there	   are	   three	   indicators	   that	   the	  Bush	   administration	   continued	   to	  operate	  without	   the	   desire	   to	   bolster	   Olmert	   as	   part	   of	   its	   agenda	   for	   the	   region.	  	  First,	   the	  administration’s	  approach	  to	  the	  2006	  war	  –	  or	  at	   least	   its	  recollection	  –has	   been	   littered	   with	   considerations	   of	   LSI	   towards	   Lebanese	   politics	   without	  comparable	  discussions	  of	  LSI	  towards	  Israel.	   	  Second,	  the	  administration	  declined	  to	   provide	   support	   for	   Olmert’s	   decision	   to	   restart	   negotiations	   with	   Syria,	  something	  it	  likely	  would	  have	  done	  if	  LSI	  was	  one	  of	  its	  priorities.	   	  And,	  third,	  the	  administration	  rejected	  Israeli	  appeals	  to	  launch	  an	  American	  military	  strike	  on	  the	  Syrian	  nuclear	  reactor	  at	  al-­‐Kibar.	  	   In	  his	  memoirs,	  President	  Bush	  describes	  his	  thinking	  toward	  the	  2006	  war	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as	   follows:	   “in	   the	   short	   run,	   I	   wanted	   to	   see	   Hezbollah	   and	   their	   backers	   badly	  damaged.	  	  In	  the	  long	  run,	  our	  strategy	  was	  to	  isolate	  Iran	  and	  Syria	  as	  a	  means	  to	  reduce	  their	  influence	  and	  encourage	  change	  from	  within”.	  	  As	  the	  war	  dragged	  on,	  he	  admits	  that	  “I	  started	  to	  worry	  that	  Israel’s	  offensive	  might	  topple	  Prime	  Minister	  Siniora’s	   democratic	   government”.171	   	   Rice	   agrees	   that	   the	   president	   was	   “very	  worried	  that	  the	  Siniora	  government	  might	  be	  in	  real	  danger	  of	  collapsing”	  and	  that	  he	  gave	  his	  aides	  a	  handwritten	  strategy	  memo	  insisting	  that	  ‘we	  couldn’t	  abandon	  democratic	  forces	  and	  their	  foothold	  in	  Lebanon”.172	   	  She	  says	  that	  the	  NSC	  agreed	  “to	  press	  the	  Israelis	  on	  all	  fronts	  to	  restrain	  from	  attacks	  that	  punished	  our	  allies	  in	  Beirut”	   and	   explains	   that	   she	   envisioned	   UNSCR	   1701	   as	   “one	   step	   toward	  strengthening	  our	  allies	  in	  Beirut”.173	  Although	   Rice	   describes	   recognizing	   that	   Olmert	   would	   face	   domestic	  pressures	   to	  make	  a	   strong	  response	   to	   the	   terrorist	  kidnappings,174	   there	   is	   little	  else	   in	   their	   writings	   to	   suggest	   similar	   concern	   for	   the	   domestic	   standing	   of	  perceived	  pro-­‐peace	  or	  democratic	  allies	  in	  Israel.	  	  Of	  course,	  this	  does	  not	  disprove	  LSI,	  but	  the	  discrepancy	  is	  one	  piece	  among	  many	  that	  seem	  to	  paint	  a	  fuller	  picture	  of	   American	   intentions	   at	   the	   time.	   	   In	   fact,	  most	   American	   leaders	   seem	   to	   have	  been	  horrified	  with	  Israeli	  mismanagement	  of	  the	  war	  efforts,	  especially	  in	  light	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  Washington	  had	  expended	  considerable	  diplomatic	  capital	   in	  order	  to	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enable	  the	  Israeli	  military	  campaign.175	  	  Additionally,	  Rice	  reports	  having	  especially	  infuriating	   interactions	   with	   both	   Olmert	   and	   even	   more	   so	   with	   his	   minister	   of	  defense	   from	   the	   Labor	   Party,	   Amir	   Peretz.176	   	   For	   her,	   the	   war	   was	   “my	   most	  frustrating	   time	   because	   every	   time	   you	   thought	   you	   had	   it	   done,	   it	   would	  unravel”.177	  The	   war	   hobbled	   Olmert	   politically,	   ending	   far	   short	   of	   its	   proclaimed	  objective	   of	   destroying	   Hezbollah.	   	   A	   board	   of	   inquiry	   was	   formed	   to	   investigate	  mismanagement	  of	   the	  war,	   the	  Winograd	  Commission,	  and	   its	   shadow	  hung	  over	  the	  government	  for	  almost	  a	  year	  and	  a	  half,	  releasing	  a	  preliminary	  report	  in	  April	  of	  2007	  and	  a	  final	  report	  in	  January	  of	  2008.	  	  The	  report	  posed	  major	  criticisms	  of	  both	  Olmert	  and	  Peretz,	  the	  latter	  of	  whom	  was	  forced	  to	  leave	  the	  cabinet	  in	  June	  of	  2007	  when	  defeated	  by	  Ehud	  Barak	  for	  leadership	  of	  the	  Labor	  Party.	  	  Olmert’s	  own	  political	  survival	  was	  also	  thrown	  into	  question	  by	  the	  report.	  When	   the	   preliminary	   findings	   were	   released	   in	   April	   of	   2007,	   many	  observers	   thought	   it	  would	   spell	   the	   end	  of	  his	   career.	   	  Over	   a	  hundred	   thousand	  protesters	  called	  for	  him	  to	  step	  down,	  his	  popularity	  had	  fallen	  to	  single	  digits,	  and	  even	  Livni	  called	  for	  him	  to	  leave	  office.178	   	  However,	  he	  refused	  to	  step	  aside,	  and	  since	  both	  Kadima	  and	  Labor	  were	  polling	  poorly	  having	  been	  tarnished	  by	  the	  war,	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neither	  party	  was	  willing	  to	  force	  new	  elections.179	   	  Although	  Bush’s	  spokesperson	  stated	   that	   the	   president	   considered	   Olmert	   “essential	   in	   working	   toward	   a	   two-­‐state	  solution,”180	  perhaps	  more	  telling	  was	  Secretary	  Rice’s	  decision	  to	  cancel	  a	  trip	  to	   Israel,	   which	   her	   own	   spokesperson	   admitted	  was	   due	   to	   effect	   the	  Winograd	  report’s	  findings	  were	  having	  on	  the	  domestic	  situation	  within	  Israel.181	  	  Doubtless,	  Olmert	   would	   have	   liked	   to	   use	   Rice’s	   visit	   to	   highlight	   the	   cachet	   he	   held	   with	  Washington,	   but	   the	   secretary	   (who,	   as	  will	   be	   discussed	   further	   below,	   had	   very	  close	  ties	  with	  Livni)	  denied	  him	  that	  opportunity.	  The	  Bush	  administration	  also	  demonstrated	  a	  marked	  reluctance	  to	  embrace	  the	  Olmert	   government’s	   approach	   to	  Syria	   issues	  as	  well.	   	  By	  early	  2007,	  Olmert	  had	   approached	   Bush	   with	   a	   request	   for	   help	   restarting	   peace	   talks	   with	   Syria;	  however,	  the	  president	  indicated	  he	  opposed	  the	  idea	  and,	  while	  he	  would	  not	  block	  the	   Israeli	   effort,	   he	   would	   not	   himself	   participate.182	   	   This	   was	   a	   major	   blow	   to	  Olmert’s	   endeavor	   because	   initially	   the	   Syrians	   insisted	   on	   public	   American	  mediation	  of	  the	  talks,	  since	  one	  of	  their	  main	  objectives	  was	  to	   lift	  the	  diplomatic	  
cordon	  sanitaire	  imposed	  on	  the	  regime	  by	  Washington.183	  	  Instead,	  Olmert	  initiated	  mediation	   and	   conveyance	   of	   private	   messages	   through	   Turkish	   intermediaries	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starting	   in	   February	   of	   2007	   and	   only	   built	   up	   to	   five	   rounds	   of	   acknowledged,	  indirect	   proximity	   talks	   with	   Ankara’s	   assistance	   starting	   in	   May	   of	   2008.184	   	   In	  addition	   to	   Bush’s	   discouragement,	   Rice	   has	   also	   warned	   the	   Israelis	   against	  pursuing	   talks	   with	   Syria	   in	   the	   wake	   of	   Olmert’s	   first	   outreach	   to	   Damascus	  through	   the	  Turks	   in	  early	  2007.185	   	  Given	   that	  both	   the	   Israelis	  and	  Syrians	  were	  looking	  to	  Washington	  to	  play	  a	  key	  role	  in	  the	  talks,	  however,	  one	  might	  have	  Bush	  to	  be	  more	  open	  to	  the	  idea	  if	  bolstering	  Olmert	  figured	  prominently	  on	  his	  agenda	  for	  the	  region.	  Finally,	  the	  last	  main	  example	  of	  this	  trend	  was	  the	  administration’s	  response	  to	   an	   Israeli	   request	   for	   an	   American	  military	   on	   Syria’s	   suspected	   illicit	   nuclear	  reactor	  at	  al-­‐Kibar.	  	  According	  to	  Vice	  President	  Cheney,	  Olmert	  came	  to	  Washington	  in	   June	   of	   2007,	   begging	   for	   a	   U.S.	   strike	   against	   what	   he	   viewed	   as	   a	   possible	  existential	  threat	  to	  Israel,	  and	  threatening	  to	  take	  military	  action	  if	  Washington	  did	  not.186	  	  Bush	  also	  recalls	  fielding	  a	  phone	  call	  from	  Olmert	  in	  which	  the	  Israeli	  leader	  said	   “George,	   I’m	   asking	   you	   to	   bomb	   the	   compound”.187	   	   However,	   when	   the	  president	   asked	   his	   advisors	   for	   a	   show	   of	   hands	   at	   an	   NSC	   meeting	   later	   that	  month,	  the	  vice	  president	  was	  the	  only	  one	  who	  advocated	  doing	  as	  Olmert	  asked.188	  	  Rice	   argued	   that	   denying	   Olmert’s	   request	   would	   probably	   force	   him	   to	   take	   the	  diplomatic	  route	  of	  pressuring	  Syria	  with	  American	  help	  at	  the	  United	  Nations	  and	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IAEA,	  and	  Bush	  decided	  to	  counsel	  Olmert	  on	  pursuing	  the	  diplomatic	  route.189	  As	  we	  now	  know,	  on	  September	  6th	  the	  Israelis	  would	  decide	  to	  go	  it	  alone,	  using	  military	   force	  to	  take	  out	  the	  reactor	  at	  al-­‐Kibar	  themselves.190	   	  The	  episode	  stands	   as	   yet	   another	   moment	   in	   which	   Bush’s	   behavior	   seems	   to	   suggest	   that	  fulfilling	  Olmert’s	  domestic	  needs	  was	  not	  a	  pressing	  concern	  for	  him.	  	  However,	  this	  decision,	  made	  in	  June	  of	  2007,	  came	  at	  a	  turning	  point,	  at	  which	  the	  president	  and	  secretary	  of	  state’s	  strategic	  thinking	  began	  to	  reconsider	  how	  Olmert	  factored	  into	  American	  interests.	  	  
<Sub-­Case	  2:	  LSI	  Occurrence>	  The	  month	  of	  June	  in	  2007	  imposed	  a	  massive	  shock	  on	  the	  administration’s	  strategic	  thinking	  toward	  the	  region.	  	  Whereas	  Fatah	  and	  Hamas	  had	  been	  trying	  to	  hold	  together	  a	  Palestinian	  unity	  government	  since	  the	  Mecca	  Accords	  concluded	  in	  March,	   the	  Hamas	   takeover	   of	   Gaza	   that	   June	   changed	   Palestinian	   politics	   and,	   in	  turn,	  how	  the	  administration	  viewed	  prospects	  for	  peace.	  	  Whereas	  the	  previous	  co-­‐mingling	   of	   Palestinian	   factions	   since	   Mecca	   and	   perhaps	   as	   far	   back	   as	   the	   PLC	  elections	   in	   January	   of	   2006	  had	   served	   to	   discourage	  American	   involvement,	   the	  Islamic	  Resistance	  Movement’s	  military	  vigor	  precipitated	  a	  crisis	  that	  was	  seen	  by	  Washington	   as	   a	   call	   to	   action.	   	   Some	   observers	   predicted	   that	   American	  involvement	  in	  the	  peace	  process	  would	  only	  decrease	  (since	  Hamas’s	  capture	  of	  the	  Gaza	  Strip	  obviously	  complicated	  certain	  aspects	  of	  trying	  to	  forge	  peace),	  but	  such	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189 Ibid.; Bush, Decision Points, 421. 
190 Neither Syria nor Israel admitted what had transpired, which minimized pressure for blowback and 
allowed the Syrian-Israeli talks to resume soon thereafter. 
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analysts	  were	  proven	  wrong,	  at	  least	  for	  the	  remainder	  of	  Bush’s	  second	  term.191	  As	   will	   be	   discussed	   in	   the	   next	   chapter	   of	   this	   dissertation,	   the	   Bush	  administration	   inaugurated	   a	   strategy	   that	   outsiders	   labeled	   “West	   Bank	   First”	  (WBF),	   aiming	   to	   marginalize	   Hamas	   by	   boosting	   the	   appeal	   of	   the	   Palestinian	  Authority	   leadership	   in	   the	  West	  Bank	  under	  Mahmoud	  Abbas	  and	  Salam	  Fayyad.	  	  The	   plan	   focused	   on	   improving	   quality	   of	   life	   for	   West	   Bank	   Palestinians	   while	  simultaneously	   trying	   to	   jump-­‐start	   negotiations	   between	   Israel	   and	   the	   PLO.	  	  Whereas	  only	  one	  month	  earlier	  Olmert’s	  political	  future	  had	  been	  in	  question,	  and	  the	   agenda	   of	   discussions	   with	   Washington	   focused	   mainly	   on	   areas	   of	  disagreement	  (for	  instance,	  both	  negotiations	  with	  Syria	  and	  military	  strikes	  against	  its	  reactor	  at	  al-­‐Kibar),	  he	  was	  now	  positioned	  to	  be	  a	  key	  partner	  in	  U.S.	  plans.192	  Relations	  between	  Olmert	  and	  Abu	  Mazen	  had	  been	  fraught	  since	  Mecca	  and	  the	   talks	   between	   them	   had	   been	   confined	   largely	   to	   fighting	   over	   confidence-­‐building	  measures	  instead	  of	  addressing	  core	  issues.	  	  Now,	  they	  held	  a	  quadrilateral	  summit	   at	   Sharm	   el-­‐Sheikh	   at	   the	   end	   of	   June	   in	  which	   they	   announced	   plans	   to	  move	  forward	  with	  substantive	  negotiations,	  while	  Olmert	  handed	  over	  hundreds	  of	  millions	  of	  dollars	  in	  withheld	  Palestinian	  tax	  revenues	  and	  released	  250	  Palestinian	  prisoners	  as	  a	  gesture	   to	  Abbas.193	   	  When	  Olmert	  went	   to	  meet	  Bush	  at	   the	  White	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191 See, for example, Adam Entous, “Hamas Takeover in Gaza Would Short-circuit U.S. Plans,” Reuters 
News, June 13, 2007. 
192 To be fair, Olmert’s June visit to the White House was scheduled at the end of May, shortly before the 
Hamas coup in Gaza. However, the visit initially seems to have been aimed to focus on Syrian, Iranian, and 
Palestinian affairs (with considerable disagreement on roadblocks and Syrian issues) but probably would 
not have showcased the sort of cooperation over Palestinian issues that the visit achieved in the end. 
“Israeli Leader Olmert to Visit Bush,” Associated Press, May 31, 2007. 
193 Steven Erlanger, “Backing Fatah and Abbas, Egypt Organizes Summit Meeting for Palestinian Leader,” 
New York Times, June 22, 2007; Ellen Knickmeyer, “Olmert Makes ‘Gesture of Goodwill’; At Summit in 
Egypt, Israeli Leader Pledges to Seek Release of 250 Palestinian Prisoners,” Washington Post, June 26, 
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House	  a	  week	  earlier,	  he	  praised	  the	  new	  PA	  emergency	  government	  led	  by	  Fayyad	  as	  a	  partner	  for	  peace	  and	  pledged	  to	  improve	  Palestinian	  freedom	  of	  movement	  in	  the	   West	   Bank.194	   	   In	   effect,	   Olmert	   granted	   many	   of	   the	   concessions	   to	   Abbas	  upfront	  that	  they	  had	  only	  recently	  been	  arguing	  over.	  Rice	  says	   they	  even	  agreed	  at	  Sharm	  to	  begin	   tackling	   final	   status	   issues	   in	  Israeli-­‐Palestinian	   talks,	   although	   Olmert	   refused	   to	   acknowledge	   this	   in	   public,	  presumably	  for	  reasons	  having	  to	  do	  with	  the	  stability	  of	  his	  domestic	  coalition.195	  	  Still,	  she	  believed	  the	  ground	  was	  now	  ripe	  for	  a	  major	  push	  on	  core	  peace	  process	  issues	   and	   had	   been	   urging	   the	   president	   since	   early	   June	   to	   call	   for	   a	   major	  international	   conference	   that	   she	   hoped	   “would	   help	   sustain	   the	   good	   guys	  [meaning	  Olmert	  and	  Abbas]	  by	  giving	  international	  momentum	  to	  the	  process”.196	  Wary	   of	   multilateral	   diplomacy	   or	   raised	   expectations,	   Bush	   asked	   if	   they	  could	  call	  it	  an	  “international	  meeting”	  instead	  of	  a	  conference,	  to	  which	  Rice	  quickly	  assented	  (ironically	  enough,	  Bush	  either	  glossed	  over	  or	  forgot	  his	  prior	  objections	  and	  called	  it	  a	  “conference”	  in	  his	  memoirs).197	  	  He	  announced	  the	  administration’s	  plan	   in	   July,	   although	   he	  made	   clear	   from	   the	   start	   that	   what	   would	   become	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2007; Ellen Knickmeyer and Scott Wilson, “Israelis, Arabs Meeting to Shore Up Abbas; Portion of Tax 
Revenue Unfrozen to Aid Fatah,” Washington Post, June 25, 2007. 
194 “Olmert: New Palestinian Government a Peace Partner,” Reuters News, June 16, 2007; “Israeli PM, Top 
US Officials to Discuss Revitalizing Mideast Talks,” Agence France-Presse (AFP), June 18, 2007; Jennifer 
Loven, “Bush and Olmert Seek to Bolster Abbas After Palestinian Split.pdf,” Associated Press, June 19, 
2007. 
195 Rice, No Higher Honor, 581. Kershner points out that Olmert refused to do so in public; see Isabel 
Kershner, “Mideast Leaders Show Support for Abbas as Hamas Releases Tape of Israeli,” New York Times, 
June 26, 2007. Olmert’s reluctance was presumably due to coalitional concerns and continued through even 
the Annapolis period.  Two of his secondary coalition partners, Shas and Yisrael Beitenu, were resistant to 
the idea, and he hoped to avoid provoking a domestic crisis, while the fact that he was discussing issues 
such as Jerusalem, borders, security, and refugees eventually became an open secret. 
196 Rice, No Higher Honor, 600–601. 
197 The memoirs point is from Kurtzer et al., The Peace Puzzle, 450. Bush, Decision Points, 408; Rice, No 
Higher Honor, 601. 
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Annapolis	  gathering	  was	  Rice’s	  project,	  as	  he	  played	  a	  distant,	   supervisory	  role.198	  	  In	  lieu	  of	  firm	  agreements	  between	  the	  parties,	  Rice	  shifted	  focus	  toward	  on	  getting	  strong	   turnout	   for	   the	   symbolic	   event,	   garnering	   roughly	   50	   delegations	   in	  attendance.199	  The	   administration	   also	   bumped	   up	   rhetoric	   in	   support	   of	   Olmert	   and	   his	  government.	  	  For	  instance,	  Rice	  gave	  a	  speech	  in	  the	  weeks	  before	  the	  conference	  to	  a	  gathering	  in	  Jerusalem,	  where	  she	  expansively	  lauded	  Olmert’s	  role:	  	  “This	  nation	  has	  a	  proud	  tradition	  of	  leaders…	  who	  used	  their	  position	  of	  strength	  to	  extend	   their	  hand	  confidently	   to	  historic	   enemies	  and	   to	   seek	  peace…	  we	   think	  of	  Menachem	  Begin…	  Yitzhak	  Rabin…	  Ariel	   Sharon	  and	  of	   course,	   I	   think	  now	  of	  my	  good	   friend	   and	   your	   great	   leader,	   Prime	   Minister	   Ehud	   Olmert…	   The	   Prime	  Minister	  has	  spoken	  eloquently	  about	  Israel’s	  concern	  for,	  in	  his	  words,	  the	  feelings	  of	   indignity	   and	   hardship	   that	   Palestinians	   feel	   and	   about	   the	   need	   for	   Israeli	  leaders,	  as	  Yitzhak	  Rabin	  did,	   to	  take	  chances,	  great	  chances	  for	  peace.	   	  This	   is	  the	  path	   that	  Ariel	  Sharon	   laid	  out	  at	  Aqaba…	  that	   is	  why	  we	   intend	   to	  hold	  a	  serious	  and	   substantive	  meeting	   in	  Annapolis…	   that	   is	  what	  great	   leaders	  do.	   	  They	  make	  hard	   decisions	   confidently	   for	   the	   sake	   of	   peace…	   and	   I	   believe	   we	   have	   two	  democratic	   leaders	   in	  Prime	  Minister	  Olmert	   and	  President	  Abbas	  who	  know	   that	  the	  best	  way	  to	  serve	  their	  citizens	  is	  to	  build	  a	  basis	  for	  peace”.200	  	  At	  the	  Annapolis	  welcome	  dinner,	  Rice	   lauded	  Olmert	  and	  Abbas,	  proclaiming	  that	  “without	  your	  leadership	  and	  your	  courage,	  we	  wouldn’t	  be	  here	  tonight”.201	  	  Bush”	  argued	  in	  his	  address	  to	  the	  summit	  that	  the	  time	  was	  right	  for	  a	  push	  on	  the	  peace	  process	  first	  and	  foremost:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198 George W. Bush, “President Bush Discusses the Middle East” (White House website archives, July 16, 
2007). In the initial announcement, Bush explained that “Secretary Rice will chair the meeting”.  For 
subsequent discussions of this element, see also Glenn Kessler and Michael Abramowitz, “Eyes Will Be on 
Bush At Talks on Mideast: Delegates to Gauge President’s Support For Rice’s Efforts,” Washington Post, 
November 24, 2007. 
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“because	   Palestinians	   and	   Israelis	   have	   leaders	   who	   are	   determined	   to	   achieve	  peace…	  Prime	  Minister	  Olmert	  has	  expressed	  his	  understanding	  of	  the	  suffering	  and	  indignities	  felt	  by	  the	  Palestinian	  people.	  	  He’s	  made	  clear	  that	  the	  security	  of	  Israel	  will	   be	   enhanced	   by	   the	   establishment	   of	   a	   responsible,	   democratic	   Palestinian	  state.	  	  With	  leaders	  of	  courage	  and	  conviction	  on	  both	  sides,	  now	  is	  the	  time	  to	  come	  together	  and	  seek	  the	  peace	  that	  both	  sides	  desire”.202	  	  He	   also	   commended	   Olmert	   and	   Abbas,	   saying	   “congratulations	   for	   your	   strong	  leadership”.203	  	   Perhaps	  most	   striking	  was	   the	   president’s	   decision	   to	   conduct	   not	   one	   but	  two	  state	  visits	   to	   Israel	   in	   the	   following	  six	  months,	   in	   January	  and	  May	  of	  2008.	  	  The	  visits	  are	  especially	  striking	  not	  just	  for	  their	  frequency	  but	  for	  the	  fact	  that	  he	  had	  thus	  far	  visited	  Israel	  not	  once	   in	  his	  seven	  years	  since	  becoming	  president	   in	  2001.	   Many	  observers	  alleged	  that	  the	  visits	  were	  photo	  opportunities	  designed	  to	  shore	  up	  Olmert,	  especially	  given	  that	  the	  Winograd	  Commission	  was	  set	  to	  issue	  its	  final	   report	   that	   January	   and	   that	  Olmert	   faced	   a	  mounting	   corruption	   scandal	   by	  May.	   	  Daniel	  Levy	  argued	  as	  much,	   telling	   the	  New	  York	  Times	   that	  Bush’s	   January	  visit	   “an	   act	   of	   fidelity	   to	  Olmert”.204	   Calev	  Ben-­‐David	  wrote	   in	   the	   Jerusalem	  Post	  that	  “there	  can	  be	  little	  doubt	  that	  President	  Bush’s	  decision	  to	  join	  in	  Israel’s	  60th	  anniversary	  celebration	  here	  next	  week,	  just	  five	  months	  after	  making	  his	  very	  first	  trip	  here,	  was	  designed	   in	  part	   to	  boost	  Olmert’s	  depressed	  public	   standing	   as	  he	  overseas	   a	   post-­‐Annapolis	   process	   that	  Washington	   has	   invested	  much	   effort	   and	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prestige	  in	  getting	  under	  way”.205	  Bush	  continued	  to	  praise	  Olmert’s	   leadership.	   	  During	  his	   January	  visit,	  at	  a	  news	  conference	  with	  the	  prime	  minister,	  Bush	  said	  	  	  “I	  want	  to	  thank	  you	  for	  being	  a	  partner	  in	  peace…	  I’m	  so	  please	  to	  have	  –	  to	  watch	  two	  leaders,	  you	  and	  President	  Abbas,	  work	  hard	  to	  achieve	  that	  vision…	  I	  wouldn’t	  be	   standing	   here	   if	   I	   did	   not	   believe	   that	   you,	   Mr.	   Prime	  Minister,	   and	   President	  Abbas	   and	  your	  negotiators	  were	   serious…	  our	   job	   is	   to	  help	  you	   seize	   that…	   I’ve	  come	  away	  impressed	  by	  your	  steadfast	  desire	  to	  not	  only	  protect	  your	  people	  but	  to	  implement	  a	  vision	  that	  will	  lead	  to	  peace”.206	  	  When	  questioned	  by	  a	   reporter	   about	   the	   limited	  visible	  progress	  achieved	   in	   the	  post-­‐Annapolis	   negotiations	   and	   whether	   greater	   U.S.	   pressure	   might	   be	   helpful,	  Bush	  lashed	  out	  at	  the	  reporter	  in	  defense	  of	  Olmert,	   insisting	  that	  “you	  just	  heard	  the	  man	  talk	  about	  their	  desire	  to	  deal	  with	  core	  issues”.207	  In	  advance	  of	  his	  return	  visit	  in	  May,	  the	  president	  told	  reporters	  that	  “I	  have	  great	  relations	  with	  the	  Prime	  Minister.	  	  I	  find	  him	  to	  be	  a	  frank	  man,	  an	  honest	  man,	  and	   open	  man,	   a	   guy	   easy	   to	   talk	   to,	   and	   somebody	  who	   understands	   the	   vision	  necessary	   for	   Israeli	   security”.208	   	   But	   when	   asked	   further	   whether	   Olmert	   was	  essential	  for	  peace	  talks	  to	  proceed,	  given	  that	  he	  might	  have	  to	  step	  down,	  	  one	  of	  the	   journalists	   in	   the	   room	   reported	   that	   “Bush	   stressed	   that	   these	   were	  government	   processes	   and	  observed	   that	   the	   likes	   of	   Foreign	  Minister	  Tzipi	   Livni	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and	  Defense	  Minister	   Ehud	  Barak	  were	   also	   intimately	   involved”.209	   	   Although	   he	  technically	  said	  that	  Olmert	  and	  Abu	  Mazen	  were	  “necessary	  to	  get	  a	  good	  deal,”210	  the	  media	  read	  his	  comments	  in	  the	  opposite	  direction,	  interpreting	  his	  statements	  to	  mean	   that	   “peace	   does	   not	   depend	   on	   Olmert”	   and	   that	   Livni	   and	   Barak	  were	  “possible	  replacements”211.	  Rice	  makes	   clear	   that	   they	   approached	   their	   trip	   to	   Israel	   that	  May	  with	   a	  concern	  in	  mind	  about	  “the	  need	  to	  bolster	  Olmert	  against	  the	  growing	  storm	  clouds	  of	  legal	  and	  political	  trouble”	  that	  he	  was	  now	  facing.212	  	  As	  I	  will	  discuss	  below,	  this	  sentiment	  was	   aided	  by	   the	   fact	   that	   by	   this	   point	  Bush	   and	  Rice	  were	   extremely	  impressed	  by	  Olmert’s	  desire	  to	  reach	  a	  deal	  and	  therefore	  sought	  to	  work	  with	  him	  as	  much	  as	  possible	  for	  as	  long	  as	  he	  might	  remain	  in	  power.	  	  Also,	  Olmert’s	  advisors	  told	  the	  media	  that	  they	  were	  leaning	  towards	  giving	  the	  Americans	  a	  wish	  list	  for	  high-­‐tech	  weapons	   sales	  during	   the	  visit	   and	   that	   they	  had	  been	   told	  by	   the	  Bush	  team	  that	  they	  should	  expect	  to	  be	  pleasantly	  surprised	  by	  the	  American	  reaction.213	  	  Senior	   diplomatic	   sources	   in	   Israel	  were	  quoted	   claiming	   that	   a	  main	   objective	   of	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Bush’s	  visit	  was	  to	  give	  PM	  Olmert	  an	  infusion	  of	  moral	  support.214	  Facing	  a	  difficult	  battle	  to	  retain	  leadership	  of	  the	  Kadima	  Party	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  his	  growing	  legal	  problems,	  Olmert	  pledged	  at	  the	  end	  of	  July	  not	  to	  contest	  the	  primary	   and	   to	   resign	   once	   a	   new	   party	   leader	   was	   chosen.	   	   True	   to	   form,	   he	  resigned	   in	  September	  after	  Livni	  was	   chosen	   to	  head	   the	  party.	   	  However,	  under	  Israeli	   law	   Livni	   could	   not	   be	   named	   prime	  minister	   without	   forming	   a	   renewed	  coalition	  agreement,	  which	  she	  was	  unable	  to	  achieve.215	  	  Thus,	  Israel	  went	  to	  new	  elections,	  which	  were	  set	  for	  February	  10th,	  2009.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  December,	  violence	  escalated	  coming	  from	  Gaza,	  and	  Olmert’s	  caretaker	   government	   ultimately	   decided	   that	   it	   had	  no	   choice	   but	   to	   engage	   in	   a	  full-­‐scale	  military	  operation	  against	  Hamas.	  	  As	  Operation	  Cast	  Lead	  came	  to	  a	  close	  that	   January,	   Condoleezza	   Rice	   took	   gestures	   that	   were	   intended	   to	   bolster	   her	  friend	  and	  colleague	  Tzipi	  Livni.	  	  Rice	  explains	  that	  “Tzipi	  Livni,	  who	  would	  stand	  for	  election	   as	   prime	  minister	   in	   a	   few	   weeks,	   called”	   and	   asked	   for	   America	   not	   to	  endorse	  the	  resolution	  it	  had	  been	  negotiating	  in	  the	  UN	  Security	  Council.	  	  Rice	  says	  she	  asked	  Livni	  “	   ‘would	  it	  help	  if	  the	  U.S.	  abstains?’	   ‘Yes,	  it	  would,’	  she	  answered”.	  	  Rice	   claims	   this	   influenced	   her	   decision	   to	   abstain	   instead	   of	   voting	   for	   the	  resolution,	  even	  though	  Olmert	  brags	  that	  he	  persuaded	  President	  Bush	  to	   impose	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this	  decision	  on	  his	  secretary	  of	  state.216	  Then,	   on	   Rice’s	   second	   to	   last	   day	   as	   secretary,	   Livni	   called	   and	   asked	   for	  another	   favor,	   insisting	   that	   they	   codify	   existing	   U.S.-­‐Israel	   understandings	   about	  security	  arrangements	  for	  the	  end	  of	  the	  war	  as	  a	  memorandum	  of	  understanding.	  	  Rice	  describes	  the	  remainder	  of	  the	  episode	  as	  follows:	  	  	  “Tzipi	   Livni	  was	  on	   the	  phone.	   ‘I	   need	   to	   come	   there	   and	   sign	   the	  document.	   	  We	  need	  a	  visible	  demonstration	  that	   the	  U.S.	  will	  guarantee	   these	  arrangements,’	   she	  said.	  ‘Tzipi,	  there	  isn’t	  time.	  I’m	  leaving	  office	  tomorrow.	  Why	  don’t	  we	  just	  make	  an	  announcement	   in	   our	   respective	   capitals?’	   But	   she	   persisted.	   ‘I’m	   leaving	   tonight,	  and	  I’ll	  be	  there	  tomorrow	  morning.’	  I	  realized	  that	  the	  Israelis	  needed	  this	  one	  last	  show	   of	   support	   and	   that	   Tzipi,	   because	   of	   her	   bid	   to	   become	   prime	   minister,	  needed	  it	  most	  of	  all.	  I	  guess	  I	  can	  do	  this	  one	  more	  time,	  I	  decided.	  And	  so,	  one	  hour	  before	  I	  said	  good-­‐bye	  to	  the	  State	  Department,	  I	  sat	  in	  the	  Treaty	  Room	  and	  signed	  a	   memorandum	   of	   understanding...	   I	   said	   good-­‐bye	   to	   Tzipi	   at	   the	   seventh-­‐floor	  elevator.	  ‘Thank	  you,’	  she	  said,	  ‘for	  your	  friendship	  and	  your	  support	  of	  Israel.	  Come	  visit.	   You’ll	   always	   be	   welcome.’	   I	   hugged	   her,	   thanked	   her	   for	   all	   we’d	   done	  together,	  and	  wished	  her	  good	  luck	  in	  the	  elections.”217	  	  After	  the	  ceremony,	  Livni	  got	  emotional	  in	  response	  to	  a	  reporter’s	  question	  on	  the	  matter;	   she	  did	  not	  get	   flustered	  when	  one	  questioner	  accused	  her	  of	  war	  crimes,	  but	  a	  reporter	  from	  Al	  Jazeera	  asked	  her	  if	  the	  MOU	  and	  her	  visit	  were	  a	  pre-­‐election	  gimmick	   on	   her	   part,	   she	   got	  worked	   up,	   responding	   “nonsense…	   there	   are	   four-­‐letter	  words	  that	  I	  don’t	  want	  to	  use”.218	  	  Did	  the	  Policy	  Succeed?	  	   Not	   really.	   	   The	   administration’s	   record	   on	   LSI	   issues	   was	  mixed	   in	   every	  period,	   with	   some	   pluses	   and	   minuses	   in	   the	   immediate	   term	   but	   few	   lasting	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benefits	   for	  peace.	   	   In	   each	  period,	   the	   administration	   seems	   to	  have	  undermined	  the	  efficacy	  of	   its	  efforts	  by	  operating	  as	   though	   time	  was	  on	   its	   side,	  except	   for	  a	  temporary	   exception	   in	   the	   end	   of	   2007.	   	   Thus,	   the	   administration	   never	   quite	  exerted	  enough	  political	  capital	  to	  push	  through	  results	  that	  would	  be	  really	  lasting	  –	  for	  the	  two-­‐state	  solution	  and	  for	  the	  position	  of	  peacemakers	  in	  Israeli	  politics.	  	  In	  each	   sub-­‐case,	   the	   administration	   seemed	   to	   postpone	   tough	   choices	   for	   another	  day,	  pulling	  its	  punches	  in	  ways	  that	  lowered	  the	  efficacy	  of	  LSI.	  	  This	  was	  the	  case	  with	  regard	  to	  realignment,	  Syria,	  Annapolis	  talks,	  and	  the	  2009	  Israeli	  election.	  	   Shortly	   after	   Olmert	   was	   elected	   prime	   minister,	   the	   American	  administration	  missed	  an	  opportunity	  to	  help	  him	  pursue	  realignment.	  	  He	  solicited	  American	  LSI	  in	  the	  form	  of	  overt	  diplomatic	  backing,	  recognition	  of	  specific	  Israeli	  settlement	  blocs,	  and	  financial	  support	  to	  backstop	  Israeli	  actions.	   	  Although	  these	  requests	   were	   quite	   substantial,	   so	   was	   the	   possible	   up-­‐side.	   	   Whereas	   Sharon’s	  disengagement	   called	   for	   the	   removal	   of	   approximately	   9,000	   settlers	   from	  settlements,	  mainly	   in	   the	   Gaza	   Strip,	   Olmert’s	   plan	   aimed	   to	   remove	   as	  many	   as	  90,000	   settlers	   from	  most	   of	   the	   Israeli	   settlements	   deep	   in	   the	  West	   Bank.219	   	   If	  Bush	   and	  Rice	   really	   believed,	   as	   they	   have	  written,	   that	   Sharon’s	   disengagement	  plan	  represented	  a	  major	  step	  toward	  a	  two-­‐state	  solution,	  then	  Olmert’s	  proposal	  should	  have	  been	  seen	  in	  comparison	  as	  a	  giant	  leap	  forward.	  	   However,	   the	   administration	   applied	   the	   brakes	   to	   Olmert’s	   planning	   and	  acted	  as	  though	  it	  had	  all	  of	  the	  time	  in	  the	  world	  in	  which	  to	  address	  the	  process.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
219 For the 9,000 figure, see “Israel’s Disengagement Plan: 2005” (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
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Instead	  of	  giving	  the	  prime	  minister	  a	  green	  light	  and	  public	  signs	  of	  encouragement	  (i.e.	   concessions)	   in	  order	   to	   turn	  his	   ideas	   into	  concrete	   Israeli	  withdrawals	   from	  territory	   in	   the	  West	   Bank,	   they	   pushed	   him	   to	   negotiate	  with	   Abu	  Mazen	   first	   –	  either	  to	  achieve	  something	  through	  negotiation	  with	  moderates	  in	  the	  PA	  instead	  of	  by	   Israeli	   fiat	  or	   to	  at	   least	  build	  up	  broader	  diplomatic	  backing	   for	   the	  plan	   from	  American	  allies	  in	  Europe	  and	  the	  Arab	  world.	  These	   were	   exactly	   the	   sorts	   of	   critiques	   to	   which	   Bush	   and	   Rice	   were	  subjected	  for	  their	  support	  of	  Sharon’s	  disengagement	  plan	  in	  2004	  and	  2005,	  so	  it	  is	  important	  to	  at	  least	  be	  consistent	  in	  judging	  the	  Bush	  administration’s	  actions.	  	  It	  would	   be	   unfair	   to	   criticize	   them	   for	   giving	   concessions	   to	   Israel,	   ignoring	   PA	  moderates,	   and	   upsetting	   America’s	   allies	   in	   Europe	   and	   the	   Arab	   world	   in	   one	  instance	  and	  then	  criticize	  them	  for	  missing	  out	  on	  a	  chance	  for	  Israeli	  withdrawals	  by	  doing	  just	  the	  opposite	  in	  the	  other	  instance.	  In	  this	  episode,	  the	  Bush	  team	  did	  take	  into	  consideration	  the	  importance	  of	  trying	  to	  negotiate	  a	  deal	  with	  PA	  moderates	  and	  it	  did	  take	  into	  consideration	  the	  reaction	  it	  would	  get	  from	  Europe	  and	  the	  Arab	  world.	  	  Rice	  recalls	  that	  right	  after	  Sharon	  was	   incapacitated	  and	  Olmert	  was	  made	  acting	  premier,	  he	   “reminded	  me	  that	  Sharon	  had	  sent	  him	   to	   the	  United	  States	   the	  year	  before	   to	  outline	  plans	   for	  further	   ‘separation’	   from	  the	  Palestinians.	   	   I	  didn’t	   like	   the	  sound	  of	   that	   term	  but	  thought	  that	  it	  could	  be	  shaped	  to	  mean	  a	  negotiated	  solution	  –	  not	  a	  unilateral	  one	  –	   to	   the	  Palestinian	  question”.220	   	   And	  numerous	  news	   reports	   stress	   the	   concern	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American	  officials	  had	  in	  mind	  for	  European	  and	  Arab	  reactions	  this	  time	  around.221	  	  	  Kastner	  and	  Barnea	  claim	  that	  administration	  officials	  remembered	  the	  outraged	  EU	  response	   to	   Bush’s	   2004	   letter	   encouraging	   Sharon	   to	   pursue	   a	   unilateral	  disengagement	  and	  that	   it	  discouraged	  them	  from	  encouraging	  Olmert	  to	  pursue	  a	  second	  round	  of	  withdrawals	  in	  2006.222	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  Bush	  team	  forced	  Olmert	  to	  shelve	  realignment	  for	  the	  time	  being	  by	  denying	  him	   the	  LSI	  he	   sought	   from	   the	  United	  States.	   	   It	   can	  be	   argued	  whether	   this	  was	  good	  or	  bad	   for	   the	   two-­‐state	   solution.	   	  As	  noted	  above,	  Dennis	  Ross	  believes	  that	  greater	  American	  backing	  would	  have	  elicited	  positive	  results	  for	  peace.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  argument	  for	  consistency	  provided	  here	  might	  justify	  exactly	   the	   approach	   the	   Bush	   administration	   took	   to	   urging	   Olmert	   to	   pursue	  withdrawals	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  negotiated	  solution.	  However,	  this	  policy’s	  likely	  effect	  on	  Olmert’s	  standing	  is	  less	  complicated	  to	  deduce.	   	  That	   is,	  while	   the	  broader	  efficacy	   implications	  of	  American	  actions	  were	  rather	   ambiguous,	   the	   implications	   for	   narrow	   efficacy	   seem	   logically	   quite	  straightforward.	   	  Denying	  Olmert	   the	  backing	  he	  sought	  undermined	  his	  ability	   to	  pursue	  his	  main	  policy	  program	  for	  addressing	  the	  conflict	  and	  demonstrated	  that	  he	  had	  a	  comparatively	  weaker	  relationship	  with	  Washington	  than	  his	  predecessor,	  Sharon.	   	   One	   of	   his	   main	   political	   rivals,	   former	   foreign	   minister	   and	   Likud	   MK	  Silvan	  Shalom	  told	   the	   Jerusalem	  Post	  upon	  Olmert’s	   return	   from	  Washington	   that	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the	  visit	  was	  “you	  can’t	  hide	  the	  discord”	  between	  him	  and	  Bush	  and	  that	  the	  visit	  was	   “far	   from	  successful”	   considering	   that	   the	  prime	  minister’s	  main	  objective	   for	  the	  visit	  had	  been	  to	  obtain	  American	  endorsement	  for	  realignment.223	   	  Numerous	  journalists,	   in	   both	   Israel	   and	   the	  U.S.,	   commented	  on	   the	   gap	  between	   the	  prime	  minister’s	  goals	  and	  the	  Bush	  administration’s	  response	  during	  the	  visit.224	  The	  second	  main	  area	  where	  the	  administration’s	  approach	  to	  LSI	  seems	  to	  touch	  on	  peace	  process	  issues	  is	  Israel’s	  relations	  with	  Syria.	  	  The	  U.S.	  position	  was	  clearly	   deleterious	   for	   a	   negotiated	   peace,	   strongly	   discouraging	   Olmert	   from	  reaching	  out	  to	  the	  government	  in	  Damascus	  to	  talk	  peace,	  a	  position	  that	  may	  not	  have	  been	  so	  severe	  had	  LSI	  been	  part	  of	  the	  U.S.	  agenda	  toward	  Israel.	  	  By	  refusing	  to	   participate	   in	   the	   talks	   and	   even	   discouraging	   the	   Israelis	   from	   engaging	   with	  Syria,	   the	   Americans	  made	   it	   much	   harder	   to	   launch	   peace	   negotiations.	   	   It	   took	  another	   year	   until	   talks	   were	  moving	   in	   full	   force,	   and	   even	   then	   they	   never	   got	  beyond	  proximity	  talks,	  arguably	  in	  large	  part	  because	  of	  Syria’s	  unsatisfied	  interest	  in	  U.S.	  carrots.	  	  And,	  while	  Bush	  never	  entirely	  warmed	  up	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  Israeli	  talks	  with	  Damascus,	  the	  U.S.	  changed	  its	  posture	  by	  the	  end	  of	  2007	  from	  a	  right	  light	  to	  a	  yellow	  one,	  right	  around	  the	  time	  when	  it	  shifted	  from	  non-­‐LSI	  to	  LSI.225	  	  However,	  Washington	   continue	   to	   be	  wary	   of	   the	   talks	   for	   reasons	   unrelated	   to	   LSI,	  mainly	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involving	  the	  regime’s	  domestic	  issues	  and	  its	  misbehavior	  in	  Lebanon	  and	  Iraq.226	  	  Again,	  the	  administration	  emphasized	  other	  near-­‐term	  priorities	  instead	  of	  seeking	  to	  seize	  promising	  openings	  for	  cementing	  progress	  on	  the	  peace	  process.	  	   Next,	  there	  is	  the	  question	  of	  Olmert’s	  standing	  and	  how	  it	  intertwined	  with	  the	  Annapolis	  process.	  	  This	  was	  the	  administration’s	  main	  endeavor	  related	  to	  LSI	  during	  the	  Olmert	  years.	  	  It	  is	  easy	  to	  dismiss	  the	  administration’s	  efforts	  as	  a	  failure	  solely	   on	   the	   grounds	   that	   it	   never	   extracted	   any	   sort	   of	   agreement	   between	   the	  parties	   from	   the	  Annapolis	   talks.	   	   However,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   evaluate	   efficacy	   in	  terms	   of	   the	   criterion	   set	   forth	   in	   the	   theory	   for	   this	   dissertation	   –	   that	   is,	  contributory	   causation	   rather	   than	   necessary-­‐and-­‐sufficient	   causation.	   	   It	   is	   also	  important	   to	   recognize	   where	   opportunities	   were	   created	   that	   might	   not	   have	  existed	  before,	  even	  if	  those	  opportunities	  were	  not	  ultimately	  utilized.	  	   In	   terms	   of	   narrow	   efficacy,	   the	   administration’s	   backing	   for	   Olmert	   did	  contribute	   to	  his	  standing,	  even	   if	   its	  help	  was	  not	  decisive	   in	   the	  end	   for	  keeping	  him	   in	   office.	   	   To	   be	   fair,	   as	   one	   journalist	   points	   out,	   “Olmert	   [was]	   the	   most	  unpopular	  prime	  minister	   in	   Israel’s	   history,”	   giving	   the	  U.S.	   a	   rather	   tough	   set	   of	  circumstances	  with	  which	   to	  work.227	   	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	   this	  domestic	  weakness	  probably	   gave	   Olmert	   much	   greater	   incentive	   to	   make	   bold	   moves	   on	   the	   peace	  process	  because	  his	  political	  outlook	  was	  so	  endangered.228	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Still,	  American	  efforts	  probably	  boosted	  his	  domestic	  standing.	   	  Whereas	   in	  May	  of	  2007	  Olmert’s	  approval	   rating	  hit	   as	   low	  as	  3%	  (with	   some	   Israelis	   joking	  that	   the	   margin	   of	   error	   might	   put	   this	   figure	   into	   the	   negatives),	   his	   popularity	  gradually	   rose	   through	   the	   time	   of	   the	   peace	   meeting	   at	   Annapolis	   to	   the	   point	  where	   his	   approval	   rating	   now	   range	   from	   22-­‐41%,	   depending	   on	   metrics.229	  	  Although	  some	  of	  this	  bump	  was	  attributed	  by	  observers	  to	  public	  discussions	  of	  his	  fight	  with	  prostate	  cancer	  and	  his	  handling	  of	  the	  strike	  on	  the	  Syrian	  reactor	  at	  al-­‐Kibar,230	   the	   timing	   of	   this	   bump	   suggests	   that	   his	   involvement	   in	   the	   Annapolis	  process	  was	  probably	  its	  main	  source,	  in	  spite	  of	  some	  public	  skepticism	  about	  what	  sort	  of	  lasting	  effects	  the	  conference	  itself	  would	  actually	  produce.	  A	   plurality	   of	   Israelis	   thought	   that	   Bush’s	   January	   visit	   to	   Israel	   would	  strengthen	   Olmert	   politically,231	   and	   during	   this	   period	   Kadima	   finally	   closed	   a	  yawning	  gap	  with	  the	  Likud,	  provided	  Livni	  ran	  instead	  of	  Olmert	  -­‐	  probably	  on	  the	  basis	   of	   the	   party’s	   perceived	   role	   on	   the	   negotiating	   process.232	   	   Although	   a	  majority	  of	   voters	   still	   seemed	   to	   think	   that	  Olmert	   should	   resign,	   now	   there	  was	  also	  a	  majority	  in	  favor	  of	  either	  no	  resignation	  or	  having	  a	  different	  Kadima	  leader	  take	  over	  the	  reins.233	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   Of	   course,	   Olmert	   was	   eventually	   brought	   down	   by	   factors	   beyond	  Washington’s	   control.	   	   His	   domestic	   standing	   was	   consistently	   tarnished	   by	   two	  sources	   of	   weakness	   that	   outside	   supporters	   generally	   could	   not	   ameliorate:	   the	  2006	  war	   and	  perceptions	  of	   corruption.	   	  The	  public	  was	  deeply	  dissatisfied	  with	  him	  after	  the	  war,234	  and	  the	  Winograd	  Commission’s	  subsequent	  investigation	  was	  a	   Sword	   of	   Damocles,	   menacingly	   dangling	   over	   his	   head.	   	   Although	   he	   survived	  both	  rounds	  of	   reporting	  by	   the	  Commission	  and	   the	  second	  one	   turned	  out	   to	  be	  less	  critical	  than	  anticipated,	  a	  majority	  of	  the	  public	  still	  thought	  he	  should	  resign	  when	  asked	  each	  time,	  both	  in	  April	  of	  2007	  and	  in	  January	  of	  2008.235	  	  Similarly,	   his	   growing	   file	   of	   corruption	   cases	   seriously	   detracted	   from	   his	  domestic	   standing,	   both	  within	   the	   coalition	   and	  with	   the	  public	   at	   large.	   	  Olmert	  faced	  allegations	  corruption	  from	  his	  first	  days	  on	  office	  as	  prime	  minister.	   	  Just	  as	  one	  case	  against	  him	  was	  closed	  in	  November	  of	  2007,	  two	  new	  cases	  were	  opened.	  	  In	  the	  end,	  the	  May	  2008	  testimony	  of	  a	  onetime	  supporter,	  U.S.	  businessman	  Morris	  Talansky	  finally	  broke	  the	  camel’s	  back,	  when	  he	  admitted	  giving	  about	  $150,000	  to	  Olmert	   over	   15	   years	   and	   that	   Olmert	   had	   tried	   to	   aid	   one	   of	   his	   business	  ventures.236	  	  Talansky’s	  testimony	  finally	  drove	  the	  Labor	  Party	  to	  push	  Olmert	  into	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resigning	   and	  making	  way	   for	   a	  new	  head	  of	  Kadima.237	   	  When	  Livni	   came	   to	   the	  fore,	  Labor	  was	  willing	  to	  join	  a	  new	  government	  with	  Kadima	  at	  the	  helm,	  but	  Shas	  would	   no	   longer	   oblige.238	   	   In	   the	   end,	   there	   was	   little	   Washington	   could	   do	   to	  prevent	  the	  judicial	  inquiry	  from	  proceeding	  or	  Olmert’s	  coalition	  from	  collapsing.	  Still,	  the	  administration’s	  efforts	  to	  bolster	  Olmert	  did	  seem	  to	  strengthen	  his	  hand,	   enabling	   and	   encouraging	   him	   to	   pursue	   serious	   talks	   with	   the	   Palestinian	  Authority	  under	  Abbas.	  	  One	  could	  argue	  that	  these	  efforts	  were	  a	  total	  failure	  in	  the	  broader	   sense	   of	   efficacy,	   since	   no	   negotiated	   agreement	   ever	   came	   out	   of	   these	  talks.	   	  However,	   it	   is	  highly	   likely	  that	  the	  American	  support	  Olmert	  was	  receiving	  enabled	  and	  encouraged	  him	   to	  pursue	   the	   first	   substantive	  negotiations,	   even	  on	  core	   issues,	   in	  nearly	  a	  decade	  of	  deadlock	  between	  Israelis	  and	  Palestinians.	   	  The	  parties	  narrowed	  gaps	  considerably	  on	  a	  range	  of	  issues,	  including	  administration	  of	  holy	  sites	  in	  Jerusalem,	  arrangements	  for	  safeguarding	  Israeli	  security	  from	  within	  the	  West	  Bank,	  and	  specific	  proposals	  for	  territorial	  swaps	  along	  the	  1967	  line.239	  Also,	  the	  effort	  created	  opportunities	  that	  the	  parties	  might	  then	  have	  done	  a	  better	  job	  of	  seizing.	  	  Olmert	  made	  a	  major,	  comprehensive	  proposal	  to	  Abbas	  when	  he	  was	  nearly	  on	  his	  way	  out,	   that	   the	  Palestinian	   leader	  might	  have	  been	  wise	  to	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respond	   to	   more	   substantively	   if	   not	   accept.240	   	   And	   when	   it	   became	   clear	   that	  Abbas	   would	   not	   accept	   the	   Olmert	   proposal,	   the	   U.S.	   administration	  might	   have	  been	  wiser	  to	  try	  and	  codify	  the	  existing	  understandings	  between	  the	  parties	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  major	  interim	  agreement	  on	  a	  range	  of	  core	  issues	  that	  would	  have	  moved	  the	  parties	  closer	  to	  a	  two-­‐state	  solution	  and	  created	  more	  momentum	  for	  peace.	  But	   none	   of	   these	   opportunities	   would	   even	   have	   been	   available	   without	  encouraging	   and	   bolstering	   Olmert	   to	   pursue	   substantive	   talks	   in	   the	   first	   place.	  	  Additionally,	  much	  of	  the	  progress	  made	  in	  talks	  between	  the	  parties	  –	  although	  not	  accepted	   as	   a	   basis	   for	   negotiation	   by	   Netanyahu	   –	   will	   probably	   inform	   future	  negotiations	  at	  some	  eventual	  point	  down	  the	  road.	  	  Thus,	  if	  any	  effort	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  LSI	  should	  be	  judged	  a	  particular	  success	  in	  terms	  of	  efficacy,	  it	  should	  probably	  be	   the	   administration’s	   Annapolis	   push,	   from	   late	   2007	   through	   early	   2008.	  	  However,	  even	  then	  the	  administration	  probably	  should	  have	  done	  more	  to	  ensure	  that	  these	  opportunities	  bore	  fruit	  –	  but	  this	  would	  have	  required	  an	  investment	  of	  political	   capital	   beyond	   what	   President	   Bush	   seemed	   willing	   to	   consider:	   for	  instance,	   a	   leadership	   summit	   with	   Olmert	   and	   Abbas,	   American	   parameters	   as	  bridging	  proposals,	  or	  pressuring	  the	  parties	  to	  conclude	  an	  interim	  agreement.	  What	   U.S.	   officials	   did	   try	   to	   do	  was	   to	   bolster	   Livni	   in	   the	   lead-­‐up	   to	   the	  impending	   elections	   in	   Israel	   by	   framing	   the	   outcome	   of	   Operation	   Cast	   Lead.	  	  However,	  they	  did	  so	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  was	  insufficient	  for	  achieving	  American	  aims	  and	   actually	   helping	   to	   get	   her	   elected.	   	   Thus,	   they	   may	   have	   helped	   boost	   her	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standing	   but	   nowhere	   near	   enough.	   	   The	   effort	  was	  moderately	   successful	   in	   the	  narrow	  sense	  but	  not	  successful	  enough	  to	  be	  decisive	  or	  to	  have	  any	  sort	  of	  benefits	  in	  the	  broader	  sense	  for	  advancing	  the	  peace	  process.	  Although	  Livni	  ultimately	  failed	  to	  become	  Israel’s	  next	  prime	  minister,	  there	  is	   a	   good	   chance	   American	   support	   raised	   her	   standing.	   	   Carol	   Migdalovitz,	   an	  analyst	  for	  CRS,	  concludes	  that	  Livni	  “may	  have	  been	  aided	  by	  her	  efforts	  to	  project	  strength	  and	  determination	  during	  the	  Gaza	  conflict,	  when	  she	  held	  her	  own	  beside	  an	  array	  of	   foreign	  interlocutors	  seeking	  an	  early	  end	  to	  the	  fighting”.241	   	   Jonathan	  Marcus	  writes	  in	  the	  Washington	  Quarterly	  that	  Livni’s	  close	  relationship	  with	  Rice	  was	  seen	  as	  an	  asset	  at	  least	  in	  her	  primary	  battle	  in	  September	  of	  2008,	  a	  race	  she	  won	  by	  only	  one	  percent.242	   	  Members	  of	  the	  opposition	  attacked	  her	  for	  failing	  to	  completely	  stop	  the	  Security	  Council	  Resolution	  criticizing	  Israel	  during	  the	  war,	  so	  it	   is	   likely	   that	   America	   voting	   for	   the	   measure	   would	   have	   made	   her	   look	   even	  worse	  to	  Israeli	  voters,	  undermining	  one	  of	  the	  main	  elements	  of	  her	  appeal	  –	  strong	  diplomatic	  relations	  with	  Washington.243	   	  The	  MOU	  may	  have	  helped	  repair	  Livni’s	  image	   some	   in	   this	   regard.	   	   However,	   even	   though	   the	   Israeli	   public	   was	   very	  satisfied	  with	   the	  government’s	   conduct	   in	   the	  war,	   it	   is	   generally	  agreed	   that	   the	  main	  beneficiary	  of	  the	  conflict	  was	  the	  Israeli	  right.244	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Tzipi	   Livni	   and	   Kadima	   received	   twenty-­‐eight	   seats	   in	   the	   2009	   Israeli	  elections,	  one	  more	  than	  Netanyahu’s	  Likud.	  	  However,	  the	  right-­‐wing	  bloc	  grew	  to	  sixty-­‐five	  out	  of	  120	  seats	   in	  the	  Knesset,	  which	  destroyed	  Livni’s	  ability	  to	  form	  a	  government	  of	  her	  own	  and	  enabled	  Netanyahu	  to	  become	  the	  next	  prime	  minister.	  	  Thus,	  although	  framing	  the	  war’s	  conclusion	  may	  have	  helped	  Livni	  at	  least	  contend	  the	  election,	  the	  war	  itself	  probably	  harmed	  her	  more	  than	  helped.	  	  Voters	  emerged	  much	  more	  concerned	  about	   “the	  security	  situation”	   than	   “the	  political	   issues	  of	  a	  Palestinian	  state	  and	  the	  Golan	  Heights”.245	   	  As	  a	  result,	   the	  campaign	  narrative	  of	  the	  Likud	  and	  its	  partners,	  such	  as	  Yisrael	  Beiteinu,	  appeared	  more	  salient	  to	  Israeli	  voters	   than	   the	   narratives	   of	   Kadima,	   Labor,	   and	   Meretz	   which	   focused	   on	   a	  negotiated	  solution	  mediated	  by	  Washington.	  	  Perhaps	  a	  more	  effective	  strategy	  for	  boosting	   Livni	   and	   therefore	   the	   two-­‐state	   solution	   would	   have	   been	   to	   invest	  American	  political	   capital	   in	   signing	   some	   sort	   of	   interim	   agreement	   or,	   in	   lieu	   of	  that,	  publishing	  some	  suggested	  U.S.	  parameters	  in	  advance	  of	  the	  Israeli	  vote.	  	  The	  Bush	  administration’s	   approach	  of	  not	  wanting	   to	  push	   for	  peace	  harder	   than	   the	  parties	  were	  willing	  to	  go	  themselves	  in	  retrospect	  may	  have	  aided	  Bibi’s	  election.	  	  
Coding	  the	  Observable	  Implications	  
1.	  Perceptions	  of	  Sender	  Interests:	  	   The	   various	   theories	   tested	   by	   this	   dissertation	   offer	   mutually	   exclusive	  predictions	  across	  seven	  dimensions	  of	  observable	  implications.	  	  The	  first	  category	  is	   perceptions	   of	   sender	   interests.	   	   National	   interests	   theory	   (Theory	  #1)	   expects	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that	   the	   timing	  of	   LSI	  occurrence	   should	  be	  driven	  primarily	  by	  objective,	   unitary	  national	  interests	  of	  the	  United	  States.	  	  The	  lobby-­‐legislative	  approach	  (Theory	  #2)	  anticipates	   that	   occurrence	   should	   vary	   according	   to	   the	   institutionally-­‐driven	  preferences	  of	  (pro-­‐Israel)	  lobbyists	  and	  members	  of	  Congress	  and	  that	  LSI	  should	  therefore	   tend	   not	   to	   occur,	   since	   these	   groups	   tend	   to	   oppose	   intervention	   into	  Israeli	   domestic	   affairs.	   	   The	   bureaucratic	   politics	   approach	   (Theory	   #3)	   expects	  that	   meddling	   should	   be	   consistent	   and	   frequent	   given	   the	   high	   priority	   that	  working-­‐level	  officials,	  especially	  in	  the	  State	  Department’s	  Bureau	  of	  Near	  Eastern	  Affairs,	   attribute	   to	   advancing	   the	   peace	   process.	   	   Finally,	   the	   agency-­‐based	  approach	   of	   leadership	   theory	   (Theory	   #4)	   predicts	   that	   occurrence	   should	   be	  driven	  by	  the	  subjective	  beliefs	  of	  the	  very	  highest	   levels	  of	  political	   leaders	  in	  the	  government	  of	  the	  sender	  state.	  	   Given	   that	   LSI	   occurred	   at	   some	   times	   but	   not	   others	   during	   the	   Olmert	  years,	   it	   is	   difficult	   to	  make	  a	  persuasive	   case	   for	   either	  Theory	  #2	  or	  Theory	  #3.	  	  One	   of	   them,	   the	   lobby-­‐legislative	   approach,	   predicts	   LSI	   should	   never	   happen,	  whereas	   the	   other	   one,	   the	   bureaucratic	   approach,	   expects	   it	   to	   occur	   almost	  constantly.	   	   Instead,	   the	   best	   contenders	   for	   fitting	   the	   data	   in	   this	   observable	  implications	   category	   seem	   to	   be	   the	   national	   interests	   and	   leadership-­‐based	  approaches.	  	   However,	   the	   national	   interests	   based	   approach	   is	   comparative	  weak	   for	   a	  number	  of	  reasons.	  	  First	  of	  all,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  explain	  why	  the	  Bush	  administration	  strongly	  endorsed	  unilateral	  disengagement	   in	  one	  period	  (2004-­‐2005)	  but	  saw	   it	  as	   an	   obstacle	   to	   peace	   in	   another	   period	   (2006).	   	   Second,	   one	  might	   easily	   have	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expected	   the	   U.S.	   government	   to	   disengage	   further	   from	   the	   peace	   process	   after	  Hamas	   firmly	   entrenched	   itself	   in	   part	   of	   the	   Palestinian	   territories	   –	   clearly	   an	  obstacle	  to	  peace	  –	  but	  this	  expectation	  was	  also	  proven	  wrong.	  	  Third,	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  explain	   why	   Washington	   would	   support	   pulling	   Syria	   into	   a	   pro-­‐Western	   orbit	  through	  peace	  negotiations	  in	  the	  1990s	  but	  oppose	  doing	  so	  when	  the	  opportunity	  presented	  itself	  in	  the	  late	  2000s,	  with	  Israel	  finally	  seeking	  to	  engage	  Damascus	  in	  talks	  once	  again.	  Taking	  up	  just	  the	  last	  example	  for	  heuristic	  purposes,	  it	  becomes	  quite	  clear	  that	  individual-­‐level	  factors	  were	  important	  for	  explaining	  the	  divergent	  paths	  taken	  by	   Israel	   and	   the	   U.S.	   in	   this	   regard.	   In	   fact,	   it	   seems	   Bush	   and	   Olmert	   took	  diametrically	  opposite	   lessons	  from	  the	  previous	  year’s	  Lebanon	  war:	  Bush	  took	  it	  as	   proof	   of	   Syria’s	   terrorist	   nature,	   part	   of	   an	   evil	   axis	   with	   Hezbollah	   and	   Iran;	  Olmert	  took	  it	  as	  proof	  of	  Syria’s	  strategic	   importance	  and	  focused	  on	  the	  possible	  benefits	   of	   peeling	   Syria	   away	   from	   these	   allies.246	   	   Similarly,	   the	   Bush	   team	  resented	  Syrian	  meddling	  in	  Lebanon	  and	  Iraq	  and	  pointed	  to	  human	  rights	  issues	  internal	   to	  the	  country;	  Olmert’s	  government	  did	  not	  particularly	  care	  about	  these	  American	  concerns.247	  	  Also,	  some	  saw	  Olmert’s	  Syria	  gamble	  as	  a	  cynical	  bid	  to	  save	  his	  own	  skin	  rather	  than	  a	  genuine	  strategic	  endeavor,	  when	  in	  fact	  the	  plan	  seems	  to	  have	  had	  the	  full	  backing	  of	  the	  national	  security	  establishment	  within	  Israel.248	  	  And	   other	   American	   leaders,	   such	   as	   Nancy	   Pelosi	   and	   Barack	   Obama	   saw	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247 “U.S. ‘Unlikely’ to Want Israel-Syria Negotiations - Israel Radio,” BBC Monitoring Service Middle 
East (Translated from June 18th edition of Voice of Israel Radio, June 18, 2007). For a retrospective 
discussion of these areas of disagreement, see also Solomon, “Divisions Surface Between U.S., Israel on 
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negotiations	  with	  Syria	  in	  a	  very	  different	  strategic	  light	  than	  did	  President	  Bush.249	  	   It	  also	  turns	  out	  to	  be	  quite	  difficult	  to	  explain	  the	  shift	  from	  non-­‐LSI	  to	  LSI	  during	  the	  Olmert	  years	  without	  looking	  at	  the	  subjective	  perceptions	  of	  President	  Bush	   and	   Secretary	   Rice.	   	   Probably	   the	   main	   reason	   why	   the	   American	  administration	  shied	  away	  from	  endorsing	  disengagement	  à	  la	  Olmert	  was	  because	  Rice	  herself	  now	  saw	  better	  prospects	  for	  a	  negotiated	  solution.250	  	   Also,	  Bush	  and	  Rice’s	  perceptions	  of	  their	  counterparts	  seem	  to	  have	  carried	  important	   causal	   weight.	   	   The	   president’s	   own	   relationship	   with	   Olmert	   was	  “cordial”	  but	  not	  warm	  at	  the	  start.251	   	  His	  enthusiasm	  for	  the	  prime	  minister	  only	  picked	   up	   later	   on.	   	   Bush	   writes	   in	   his	   memoirs	   that	   the	   low-­‐key,	   self-­‐assured	  unilateral	   Israeli	   strike	   on	   al-­‐Kibar	   “made	   up	   for	   the	   confidence	   I	   had	   lost	   in	   the	  Israelis	  during	  the	  Lebanon	  War”.252	  	  Then,	  Rice	  reports	  that,	  “during	  the	  President’s	  trip	  in	  January	  [of	  2008	  to	  Israel],	  we’d	  both	  been	  impressed	  by	  Olmert’s	  desire	  to	  get	  a	  deal”.253	   	  Then,	  when	  Olmert	  explained	   to	  her	  his	  personal	  bottom	   lines,	   she	  was	  quite	   taken	  with	  him,	   asking	  Hadley	   to	   “tell	   the	  President	  he	  was	   right	  about	  Olmert.	   	   He	   wants	   a	   deal…	   frankly	   he	   might	   die	   trying	   to	   get	   one”.254	   	   Then,	   in	  advance	  of	   their	  May	  return	  visit	   to	   Israel,	   allegedly	  Bush	  said	   “it	   sounds	   like	  he’s	  serious	   –	   really	   serious,”	   to	   which	   Rice	   replied	   “Yes,	   he	   is…	   and	   he	   knows	   he’s	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running	  out	  of	  time”.255	  Rice	   also	   reports	   that	   her	   relationship	   with	   Tzipi	   was	   full	   of	   warmth	   and	  mutual	  admiration,	  explaining	  that	  “ending	  the	  conflict	  between	  Arabs	  and	  Israelis	  was	   her	  mission	   in	   Israeli	   politics”	   and	   she	   “spoke	  movingly”	   about	   giving	   up	   the	  Revisionist	  dream	  of	  a	  Greater	  Israel.256	  	  Rice	  felt	  that	  “the	  good	  thing	  about	  Tzipi	  is	  that	  she	  is	  a	  problem	  solver	  and	  we’d	  developed	  a	  relationship	  of	  trust”.257	  In	  short,	  it	  seems	  difficult	  to	  explain	  American	  behavior	  in	  first	  rejecting	  LSI	  and	  then	  pursuing	   it	  without	  consideration	  of	   individual-­‐level	  variables,	  particular	  the	   subjective	   perceptions	   of	   American	   interests	   on	   the	   parts	   of	   Bush	   and	   Rice.	  	  Thus,	  Theory	  #4	  seems	  the	  most	  persuasive	  in	  this	  particular	  regard.	  	  2.	  Perceptions	  of	  Close	  Contests	  The	  next	  area	  where	  the	  theories	  diverge	  is	  perceptions	  of	  close	  contests	  in	  the	   target	   state.	   	   Although	   theories	   2	   and	   3	   do	   not	   offer	   clear	   predictions	   in	   this	  regard,	   theories	   1	   and	   4	   do.	   	   If	   attempts	   at	   intervention	   are	   timed	   according	   to	  objective	  opportunities	  abroad,	  then	  that	  should	  increase	  our	  confidence	  in	  national	  interests	   theory.	   	   If	  attempts	  at	   intervention	  are	  spaced	   less	   rationally,	   skewed	  by	  the	  perceptions	  that	  top	  leaders	  hold	  in	  the	  sender	  state	  about	  political	  contests	  in	  the	  target	  state,	  then	  that	  should	  raise	  confidence	  in	  Theory	  #4.	  However,	  the	  Olmert	  years	  do	  not	  give	  us	  much	  in	  the	  way	  of	  data	  with	  which	  to	   compare	   the	   theories.	   	   The	   only	   objective	   political	   contest	   in	   which	   American	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officials	  seemed	  to	  get	  involved	  was	  the	  lead-­‐up	  to	  the	  2009	  Israeli	  elections.	  	  In	  that	  instance	   the	  U.S.	   intervention	  was	  not	  particularly	  proactive;	   rather,	  Rice’s	  actions	  that	  we	  are	  aware	  of	  seemed	  to	  be	  prompted	  by	  her	  friend	  Tzipi	  Livni’s	  solicitation	  of	  U.S.	  support.	  	  Thus,	  American	  intervention	  was	  carried	  out	  on	  an	  individual	  basis	  and	  was	  timed	  according	  to	  the	  secretary’s	  personal	  attention	  span	  rather	  than	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  proactive,	  government-­‐wide	  effort	  to	  muster	  American	  assets	  in	  a	  way	  that	  would	  maximize	   the	   chances	   of	   influencing	   the	   outcome	   of	   Israel’s	   elections.	  	  This	  provides	  some	  weak,	   tentative	  support	   for	  Theory	  #4,	  but	   it	   is	   rather	   limited	  evidence	  for	  claiming	  anything	  broader	  than	  that.	  	  3.	  Patterns	  of	  Domestic	  Debate:	  	   The	   theories	   offer	   divergent	   predictions	   with	   regard	   to	   the	   patterns	   of	  decision-­‐making	  within	  the	  sender	  government	  leading	  up	  to	  LSI.	  	  Theories	  2	  and	  3	  expect	  other	  sections	  of	  government	  in	  the	  sender	  state	  to	  be	  well-­‐informed	  about	  plans	   for	   intervention	   and	   to	   be	   influential	   in	   shaping	   the	   content	   or	   direction	   of	  those	   plans.	   	   Theory	   #4	   expects	   top	   leaders	   in	   the	   sender	   state	   to	   leave	   other	  domestic	   actors	   –	   Congress,	   lobbyists,	   and	   bureaucrats	   –	   basically	   in	   the	   dark,	   so	  that	  they	  can	  avoid	  domestic	  criticism	  for	  their	  actions	  and	  so	  that	  they	  can	  prevent	  leaks	  that	  would	  undermine	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  meddling	  abroad.	  	   Again,	  evidence	  is	  somewhat	  sparse	  in	  this	  regard,	  perhaps	  because	  the	  era	  in	   question	   is	   so	   recent.	   	   However,	   one	   particularly	   suggestive	   episode	   was	   the	  administration’s	   cold	   shoulder	   response	   to	   Olmert	   when	   he	   sought	   speedy	  endorsement	  for	  unilateral	  disengagement	  from	  the	  West	  Bank.	  	  On	  the	  same	  week	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he	  visited	  the	  White	  House,	  he	  gave	  a	  joint	  address	  to	  both	  chambers	  of	  Congress,	  in	  which	  he	  was	  given	  a	  heroic	  welcome	  with	  more	  than	  a	  dozen	  standing	  ovations.258	  	   That	   gathering	  would	  have	  given	  Olmert	   anything	  he	  wanted	  were	   it	  up	   to	  them.	   	  And	   the	   lobby	  group	   they	  were	  most	   responsive	   to	  on	   these	   issues,	  AIPAC,	  had	   already	   chosen	   to	   endorse	   unilateral	   disengagement	   when	   Ariel	   Sharon	  pursued	  the	  policy	  exactly	  one	  year	  before.259	  	  Both	  groups	  cooperated	  to	  pass	  a	  bill	  through	   the	   House	   of	   Representatives	   the	  week	   of	   Olmert’s	   visit	   to	   choke	   off	   the	  flow	   of	   U.S.	   aid	   to	   the	   Palestinian	   Authority,	   drawing	   the	   ire	   of	   the	   Bush	  administration.	  260	   	  It	  is	  striking	  that	  the	  Bush	  administration	  that	  very	  same	  week	  prevailed	   in	  the	  area	  of	  blocking	  West	  Bank	  disengagement	  (and	  avoiding	  LSI),	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  reasons	  that	  would	  have	  held	  almost	  no	  sway	  with	  actors	  in	  Congress:	  buy-­‐in	   from	  European	   and	   Arab	   allies,	   not	  wanting	   to	   legitimate	   large	   settlement	  blocs,	  and	  trying	  to	  build	  up	  Abu	  Mazen	  and	  moderates	  in	  the	  Palestinian	  Authority.	  	  It	  appears	  that	  in	  the	  sub-­‐area	  of	  LSI,	  the	  dynamics	  of	  U.S.	  decision-­‐making	  toward	  Israel	  were	  unusually	  weighted	   toward	   top	   leaders	   in	   the	  White	  House	  and	  Foggy	  Bottom,	  ignoring	  the	  desires	  of	  pro-­‐Israel	  lobbyists	  and	  members	  of	  Congress.	  	  4.	  Cycles	  of	  Domestic	  Power:	  	   The	   political	   calendar	   in	   the	   sender	   state	   also	   offers	   some	   areas	   for	  inferential	   leverage	   over	   the	   theories.	   	   Theory	   #2	   expects	   that	   lobbyists	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
258 The number is pegged at between sixteen and eighteen. See Erlanger, “2 Cheers for Olmert in 
Washington”; Nathan Guttman, “Olmert ‘Very Pleased’ with US Support. Bush Congress Applaud West 
Bank Pullout Plan,” Jerusalem Post, May 25, 2006. 
259 Ron Kampeas, “Sharon Triumphs: Disengagement Wins Ringing Endorsement,” Jewish Telegraphic 
Agency (JTA), May 27, 2005; James Besser, “AIPAC and Sharon Get What They Need,” Jewish Journal, 
May 26, 2005. 
260 Jill Abrams, “House Votes to Cut Aid to Palestinians,” Associated Press, May 23, 2006. 
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legislators	  should	  be	  especially	  predominant	  during	  periods	  of	  electoral	  politics	   in	  which	   the	   government	   is	   divided	   or	   when	   America	   is	   about	   to	   undergo	   another	  round	  of	  elections.	  	  Theory	  #3	  expects	  that	  LSI	  should	  be	  especially	  common	  in	  the	  first	   year	   of	   a	   president’s	   term	   because	   he	   is	   only	   just	   beginning	   to	   impose	   his	  political	  appointees	  on	  the	  bureaucracies,	  giving	  working	  level	  officials	  even	  greater	  leeway	  to	  imprint	  their	  preferences	  on	  national	  policy	  outcomes.	  	   Both	  of	  these	  theories	  do	  a	  relatively	  poor	  job	  of	  explaining	  variation	  in	  LSI	  behavior	  across	  the	  episodes	  according	  to	  cycles	  of	  domestic	  power.	   	  For	  instance,	  LSI	  did	  occur	  during	   the	   first	  year	  of	  Bush’s	  second	  term,	  something	   that	   fits	  with	  the	  expectations	  of	  Theory	  #3,	  when	  he	  went	  to	  bat	  for	  Sharon,	  but	  his	  efforts	  were	  actually	  more	   concerted	   in	   this	   attempt	   in	   2004	   than	   in	   2005,	   a	   period	   in	  which	  bureaucratic	   preferences	   should	   have	   been	   relatively	   less	   influential	   on	   the	  outcome,	   not	   more.	   	   Bureaucratic	   preferences	   were	   reflected	   in	   the	   Yaron	   Affair	  during	  those	  same	  years,	  but	  the	  effort	  started	  in	  2004	  rather	  than	  2005.	   	  Nor	  can	  cycles	  of	  bureaucratic	  power	  do	  anything	  to	  explain	  the	  shift	  from	  non-­‐LSI	  to	  LSI	  in	  Bush’s	  second	  to	  last	  year	  in	  office.	  	   Meanwhile,	  we	  should	  expect	  American	  LSI	  to	  be	  much	  rarer	  in	  the	  last	  two	  years	  of	  Bush’s	  presidency	  according	  to	  Theory	  #2,	  but	  this	   is	  simply	  not	  the	  case.	  	  The	  Democrats	  took	  both	  the	  House	  and	  the	  Senate,	  imposing	  the	  strongest	  divided	  government	   constraints	   that	   Bush	   had	   to	   face	   any	   time	   in	   his	   two	   terms	   as	  president,	  and	  yet	  during	  that	  period	  his	  government	  shifted	  away	  from	  non-­‐LSI	  and	  pursued	  a	  policy	  of	  reengaging	  in	  Israeli	  domestic	  politics	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  incumbent	  party	   and	   its	   leaders.	   	   Under	   Theory	   #2	   and	   the	   cycles	   of	   domestic	   power	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framework,	  we	  should	  have	  expected	  LSI	  to	  be	  unusually	  difficult	  in	  2007	  and	  2008,	  not	  more	  likely	  to	  occur.	  One	   could	   argue	   that	  Bush	  was	   freer	   to	  pursue	  LSI	   in	  his	   last	   two	  years	   in	  office	  because	  he	  no	  longer	  feared	  removal	  from	  power.	  	  However,	  one	  could	  make	  a	  similar	   argument	   about	   midterm	   elections	   in	   2006,	   when	   he	   was	   avoiding	   LSI.	  	  Further,	  2006	  could	  have	  been	  a	  great	  opportunity	   for	  him	   to	  pursue	  LSI	  because	  the	  means	  to	  do	  so	  would	  have	  been	  relatively	  popular	  at	  home	  with	  Congress	  and	  supporters	  of	  the	  pro-­‐Israel	  lobby	  –	  in	  short,	  allowing	  Olmert	  a	  free	  hand	  to	  pursue	  disengagement	   with	   an	   American	   imprimatur.	   	   To	   do	   so	   could	   have	   been	   smart	  electoral	   strategy	   if	   employed	   properly,	   but	   to	   their	   credit	   Bush’s	   team	   seems	   to	  have	  had	  other,	  more	  policy-­‐relevant,	  concerns	  in	  mind.	  	  Thus,	  Theory	  #2	  finds	  only	  limited	   support,	   even	   with	   regard	   to	   periods	   of	   the	   domestic	   calendar	   when	   the	  theory	  should	  hold	  an	  especially	  powerful	  sway	  over	  the	  data.	  	  	  5.	  Bureaucratic	  Freelancing:	  	   Another	   area	   in	   which	   some	   of	   the	   theories	   offer	   different	   observable	  implications	   is	   in	   the	   area	   of	   bureaucratic	   freelancing.	   	   If	   efforts	   at	   LSI	   are	  undertaken	  by	  working-­‐level	  officials	   in	   the	  sender	  state	  on	  a	  very	   frequent	  basis,	  then	  that	  should	  provide	  some	  rather	  strong	  evidence	   for	  Theory	  #3.	   	  However,	   if	  these	  freelance	  attempts	  at	  LSI	  are	  relatively	  rare	  and	  heavily	  conditioned	  upon	  lax	  executive	   control	   by	   the	   president,	   then	   that	   should	   provide	   some	   mitigating	  evidence	  for	  Theory	  #4.	  	   The	  fact	  is	  that	  the	  Olmert	  years	  offers	  us	  very	  little	  evidence	  for	  adjudicating	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between	  the	  theories	  in	  either	  direction,	  since	  freelancing	  by	  U.S.	  officials	  does	  not	  seem	   to	   have	   taken	   place.	   	   Perhaps	   the	   most	   logical	   explanation	   fits	   with	   the	  approach	  of	   leadership	  theory,	  but	  that	   is	  circumstantial	  evidence	  at	  best.	   	  That	   is,	  freelance	   LSI	   may	   have	   stopped	   during	   the	   Olmert	   years	   because	   the	   president	  finally	  had	  an	  empowered	  secretary	  of	  state	  on	  these	  issues,	  to	  whom	  he	  could	  look	  as	   a	   designated	   enforcer	   for	   administration	   objectives	   toward	   Israel.	   	   Whereas	  Powell	  was	  disenfranchised	  from	  being	  the	  president’s	  point	  person	  on	  Israel	  issues	  as	  early	  as	  2002,	  Rice	  was	  only	  put	   into	  a	   formal	  position	  of	  authority	  at	  the	  State	  Department	   in	  2005.	   	  One	  instance	  of	   freelancing	  did	  occur	   in	  2004	  into	  2005,	  the	  Yaron	  Affair,	  but	   that	  was	  more	  of	  a	  Pentagon	   issue	   than	  a	  State	  Department	  one,	  and	   once	   Rice	   was	   settled	   in	   at	   Foggy	   Bottom	   the	   freelancing	   basically	   stopped.	  	  From	  then	  on,	  the	  president	  had	  an	  empowered	  enforcer	  for	  managing	  Israel	  issues	  on	  a	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  basis,	  so	  his	  detached	  manner	  may	  not	  have	  mattered	  so	  much.	  	  In	  this	  regard,	  the	  dynamics	  of	  Bush	  43’s	  second	  term	  on	  Israel	  policy	  resembled	  that	  of	  his	  father’s,	  when	  James	  Baker	  served	  as	  the	  administration’s	  point	  person	  both	  for	  pursuing	  LSI	  and,	  implicitly,	  for	  ensuring	  that	  freelancing	  did	  not	  occur.	  	  6.	  Consistency	  of	  Message:	  In	  order	   for	  LSI	   to	  be	   effective	   at	   achieving	   its	   intended	  objectives,	   it	  must	  articulate	  some	  sort	  of	  message	  in	  a	  clear	  and	  consistent	  manner	  to	  members	  of	  the	  target	   state’s	   selectorate.	   	   Theory	   #1	   anticipates	   that	   this	   should	   a	   be	   relatively	  unproblematic	  task,	  since	  the	  sender	  state	  should	  behave	  in	  a	  unitary	  manner	  when	  crafting	   foreign	   policy.	   	   Theories	   2	   and	   3	   expect	   the	   institutional	   preferences	   of	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lobbyists,	   legislators,	  or	  bureaucrats	  to	   foul	  up	  the	  consistency	  of	  messaging	  when	  LSI	   is	   being	   pursued.	   	   Theory	   #4	   argues	   that	   the	   consistency	   and	   clarity	   of	  messaging	  should	  only	  be	  sub	  par	  and	  detract	  from	  efficacy	  when	  top	  leaders	  in	  the	  sender	  state	  are	  having	  a	  difficult	  time	  coordinating	  amongst	  themselves.	  	   The	   administration	   did	   at	   times	   send	   confusing	   signals	   to	   Israeli	   voters	   in	  contradiction	   to	   its	   intended	  message.	   	  For	   instance,	  when	   the	  administration	  had	  particularly	   low	  regard	   for	  Olmert	  and	  had	  reason	   to	  expect	  he	  might	  be	  replaced	  after	  the	  first	  Winograd	  Commission	  report	  was	  released,	  Bush’s	  spokesperson	  said	  that	  the	  president	  thought	  Olmert	  was	  “essential”	  for	  peace	  –	  something	  that	  might	  have	  suggested	  that	  the	  administration	  was	  pursuing	  LSI	  at	  the	  time,	  even	  though	  it	  was	  not.	  	   	  And	  yet	  when	  the	  administration	  really	  was	  seeking	  to	  bolster	  Olmert	  in	  May	  of	  the	  following	  year,	   the	  president	  speculated	  to	  reporters	  that	  Olmert	  could	  be	  replaced	  by	  Livni	  or	  Barak	  without	  damage	  being	  done	  to	  the	  two-­‐state	  solution	  –	  something	  that	  might	  have	  suggested	  that	  the	  U.S.	  was	  not	  backing	  Olmert,	  when	  in	  fact	  it	  sought	  to	  do	  so.	   	  These	  confusing	  comments	  from	  the	  White	  House	  certainly	  did	  not	  reinforce	  the	  administration’s	  intended	  message.	  	   Given	  that	  Rice	  admits	  that	  she	  and	  the	  president	  approached	  the	  May	  2008	  state	  visit	  to	  Israel	  with	  the	  objective	  of	  bolstering	  Olmert	   in	  mind,	  the	  president’s	  speech	   to	   the	   Knesset	   on	   that	   visit	   stands	   as	   a	   particular	   striking	   sign	   that	   the	  administration’s	  message	  coordination	  was	  beginning	  to	  fray.	  	  In	  what	  was	  probably	  intended	  as	  a	  backhanded	  swipe	  at	  candidate	  Barack	  Obama’s	  calls	  for	  engagement	  with	  Iran	  and	  Syria,	  the	  president	  proclaimed	  the	  following:	  	  “Some	  seem	  to	  believe	  we	  should	  negotiate	  with	  terrorists	  and	  radicals,	  as	  if	  some	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ingenious	  argument	  will	   persuade	   them	   they	  have	  been	  wrong	  all	   along.	  We	  have	  heard	  this	  foolish	  delusion	  before…	  We	  have	  an	  obligation	  to	  call	  this	  what	  it	  is	  –	  the	  false	  comfort	  of	  appeasement,	  which	  has	  been	  repeatedly	  discredited	  by	  history”.261	  	  However,	   the	   remark	   was	   also	   interpreted	   by	   some	   as	   a	   dig	   against	   Olmert’s	  negotiations	   with	   the	   PA	   and	   especially	   Syria,	   since	   the	   Israeli	   government	   went	  public	  about	  its	  secret	  ties	  to	  Damascus	  later	  that	  week.262	  	  Also,	  the	  Bush’s	  speech	  was	   a	   “complete	   identification	   with	   Israel	   and	   its	   threat	   perceptions…	   and	   was	  virtually	  silent	  on	  the	  very	  peace	  process	  over	  which	  he	  was	  allegedly	  presiding”.263	  	  Even	  Rice	  thought	  noticed	  this	  about	  the	  speech	  and	  thought	  it	  was	  a	  mistake:	  	  	  “I	  had	  reviewed	  and	  approved	  the	  speech.	   	  Now,	   listening	  to	   it,	   I	   thought	   it	  should	  have	   done	   more.	   	   Somehow	   the	   President	   should	   have	   used	   the	   moment	   to	  challenge	   the	   Israelis	   to	   make	   tough	   decisions	   –	   the	   peace	   process	   wasn’t	   even	  mentioned.	   	  How	  did	   I	   let	   that	  happen?	   	   I	  wondered.	   	   I’m	  certain	   that	   there	  would	  have	   been	   no	   objection	   to	   language	   about	   Annapolis	   –	   but	   somehow	   it	   didn’t	   get	  done.	  	  It	  was	  a	  missed	  opportunity	  for	  diplomacy”.264	  	   These	   mixed	   messages	   seem	   to	   have	   been	   mainly	   an	   issue	   intra-­‐administration	  coordination	   in	   support	  of	  LSI	  and	  probably	   resulted	   from	   the	   fact	  that	  the	  president	  was	  much	  less	  engaged	  and	  disciplined	  on	  Israel	  issues	  than	  his	  secretary	   of	   state.	   	   Thus,	   even	  when	  he	  devoted	   enough	   attention	   to	   conduct	   two	  state	   visits	   to	   Israel	   in	   less	   than	   six	  months,	   the	   coordination	  was	   less	   than	   ideal.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
261 George W. Bush, “President Bush Addresses Members of the Knesset” (White House website archives, 
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262 For instance, a New York Times editorial remarked that “Everybody knew President Bush was aiming 
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The	  United	  States	  was	  not	  preemptively	  abandoning	  Olmert,	  but	  some	  of	  its	  signals	  unintentionally	  may	   have	   relayed	   this	   notion.	   	   Thus,	   it	   becomes	   quite	   difficult	   to	  explain	  the	  dissonance	  in	  American	  messaging	  without	  considering	  that	  they	  might	  have	  been	  mix-­‐ups	  on	  the	  executive	  side,	  evidence	  that	  fits	  best	  with	  Theory	  #4.	  	  7.	  Suitability	  of	  Message:	  	   In	  addition	  to	  questions	  of	  consistency,	  the	  theories	  also	  offer	  leverage	  over	  the	  matter	  of	  whether	  messages	  conveyed	  by	  LSI	  are	  actually	  suitable	  to	  the	  political	  needs	   of	   the	   protégé	   faction	   in	   the	   target	   state.	   	   Theory	   #1	   anticipates	   that	  messaging	  should	  always	  be	  suitable	  to	  the	  protégé’s	  needs,	  given	  that	  there	  should	  be	   little	   in	   the	  way	  of	  domestic	   constraints	   in	   the	  sender	  state	  keeping	   its	   leaders	  from	  projecting	  an	  appropriate	  signal.	   	  Theories	  2	  through	  4,	  however,	  expect	  that	  the	   suitability	   of	   messaging	   should	   be	   conditioned	   by	   the	   institutional	   biases	   or	  personal	  beliefs	  of	  actors	  within	  the	  sender	  state.	  	   When	   it	   came	   to	   realignment,	  observers	   in	   Israel	   certainly	  got	   the	  message	  that	  Washington	  was	  not	  willing	  to	  go	  to	  bat	  for	  disengagement	  and	  their	  new	  prime	  minister	  in	  the	  way	  it	  had	  done	  under	  Sharon.	  	  As	  noted	  above,	  Olmert	  was	  attacked	  by	  leading	  Likud	  MK	  Silvan	  Shalom	  for	  failing	  to	  win	  Washington’s	  support.	  	  And,	  as	  noted	   above,	   Israeli	   observers	   commented	   a	   the	   time	   on	   the	   “cold	   shoulder”	   and	  “cold	  water”	  with	  which	  Washington	  was	  responding	  to	  Olmert’s	  requests.	  	   The	   impact	   of	   Washington’s	   posture	   was	   also	   affected	   by	   questions	   of	  suitability	  when	   it	   came	   to	   promoting	  Olmert	   during	   the	   Annapolis	   process.	   	   The	  message	  that	  America	  would	  reward	  the	  positions	  of	  Olmert	  and	  Livni	  came	  through	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quite	  clearly.	   	  However,	  Bush	  did	  little	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  relationship	  would	  be	  in	  trouble	   if	   somebody	  opposed	   to	   this	  program,	  such	  as	  Netanyahu,	   came	   to	  power.	  	  Nor	   did	   the	   administration’s	   actions	   do	  much	   to	   dispel	   popular	   skepticism	   about	  whether	   the	   Kadima	   program	   could	   actually	   deliver	   tangible	   rewards	   on	   the	  question	  of	  peace.	  	   For	  example,	  around	  the	  time	  of	  the	  Annapolis	  meeting,	  the	  Israeli	  public	  was	  torn	  between	  hope	  and	  doubt.	  	  Afterwards,	  only	  16%	  of	  voters	  believed	  the	  parties	  would	  reach	  their	  objective	  of	  an	  agreement	  by	  the	  end	  of	  Bush’s	  term,	  and	  a	  large	  plurality	  of	  them	  thought	  that	  the	  summit	  was	  a	  failure.265	  	  In	  advance	  of	  the	  event,	  roughly	   70%	   of	   Israeli	   voters	   supported	   holding	   the	   conference,	   but	   roughly	   the	  same	  numbers	  believed	  that	  it	  would	  not	  tangibly	  advance	  the	  peace	  process.266	  	  In	  advance	   of	   Bush’s	   January	   2008	   visit	   to	   Israel,	   only	   21%	   of	   respondents	   polled	  thought	   that	  his	  visit	  would	  advance	  negotiations	   (although	  admittedly	   this	   figure	  may	  have	  been	  conditioned	  by	  statements	  that	  he	  would	  not	  be	  holding	  a	  trilateral	  meeting	  during	  his	  visit).267	  	   When	  Bush	  called	  Olmert	  an	   “honest	  guy,”	   the	   statement	  generated	   similar	  doubts.	   	   Israeli	   voters	   had	   long	   viewed	   their	   prime	  minister	   as	   the	  most	   corrupt	  politician	   in	  the	  country,	  and	  so	  the	  statement	  strained	  credibility.	   	  For	   instance,	  a	  write	  for	  the	  magazine	  Commentary	  mused	  that	  the	  statement	  was	  a	  good	  reminder	  “why	   international	   politics	   is	   so	   often	   a	   swamp	   of	   dissimulation”.268	   	   One	   Israeli	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magazine	  wrote	  that	  the	  president’s	  statements	  were	  a	  clear	  sign	  that	  “Bush	  [was]	  tr[ying]	   to	   prop	   up	   Olmert,”	   but	   singled	   out	   his	   surprising	   praise	   for	   the	   prime	  minister’s	   ethics	   and	   strategic	   sense.	   	   It	   	   went	   on	   to	   argue	   that	   Bush’s	   praise	   for	  Olmert	   as	   a	   “strategic	   thinker”	  was	   “another	   title	  most	   Israelis	  would	   find	   absurd	  considering…	  his	  abysmal	  handling	  of	  the	  Second	  Lebanon	  War”.269	  	   Short	   of	   demonstrating	   sort	   of	   concrete	   deliverable	   to	   show	   that	   the	  Annapolis	   process	   was	   working,	   the	   American	   support	   for	   Olmert	   and	   Livni	  eventually	   ran	   up	   against	   the	   serious	   doubts	   of	   the	   Israeli	   public.	   	   The	  administration’s	  message	   that	   the	   parties	  were	   free	   to	   agree	   or	   not	   agree	   as	   they	  saw	   fit	   and	   that	  Washington	  would	   not	   pressure	   them	   or	   offer	   bridging	   proposal	  was	   not	   just	   a	   poor	  mediating	   strategy,	   it	   also	   had	   costs	   as	   a	   diplomatic	   posture.	  	  Without	  some	  sort	  of	  tangible	  achievements	  for	  Kadima	  to	  highlight,	  the	  Likud	  was	  given	  a	  powerful	  weapon	  against	  the	  ruling	  party	  in	  the	  campaign.	   	  Thus,	  as	  noted	  above,	   a	   large	  proportion	   of	   the	  public	   thought	   that	   the	   security	   situation	  was	   an	  extremely	  pressing	  problem	  at	   the	   time	  of	   the	  2009	  elections,	  but	  very	   few	  voters	  surveyed	  though	  that	  the	  political	  negotiations	  with	  the	  Palestinians	  or	  Syria	  were	  of	  similar	  priority.	  	  	   Ironically	  enough,	  the	  Bush	  administration	  left	  office	  doing	  exactly	  the	  sorts	  of	  things	  with	  regard	  to	  LSI	  for	  which	  the	  president	  and	  his	  allies	  had	  attacked	  the	  Clinton	  team.	  	  As	  a	  candidate,	  Bush	  had	  attacked	  Clinton	  for	  using	  LSI	  against	  Israel	  and	   pledged	   that	   “America	   will	   not	   interfere	   in	   Israeli	   elections	   when	   I’m	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
269 “Bush Tries to Prop up Olmert and Abbas,” Israel Today Magazine, May 13, 2008. For what it is worth, 
it is not clear that Bush actually said these words – the language seems to be a quote from a journalist at the 
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president”.270	   	  The	   first	  years	  of	  his	  presidency	  were	  defined	  by	  a	  mindset	   toward	  Israel	  policy	  characterized	  as	  ABC,	  standing	  for	  “anything	  but	  Clinton,”	  and	  his	  team	  instructed	   bureaucrats	   at	   the	   State	   Department	   to	   stop	   using	   the	   word	   “peace	  process”	   in	   official	   communications.271	   	   And	   Bush’s	   backers	   attacked	   Clinton’s	  summitry	  for	  –	  among	  other	  reasons	  –	  being	  mere	  photo	  opportunities.272	  	   Yet	  in	  the	  end	  Bush	  did	  almost	  exactly	  these	  things	  with	  regard	  to	  his	  use	  of	  LSI	   toward	   Israeli	   politics.	   	   He	   and	   his	   secretary	   of	   state	   conducted	   leadership	  selection	  intervention	  in	  Israeli	  politics,	  trying	  to	  bolster	  the	  standing	  of	  the	  Kadima	  Party	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   its	   rivals,	   including	   in	   the	   run-­‐up	   to	   the	   2009	   Israeli	  elections.	  	  They	  endorsed	  the	  mission	  of	  final	  status	  talks	  on	  the	  Israeli-­‐Palestinian	  peace	  process,	  and	  they	  took	  on	  much	  of	  the	  pageantry	  associated	  with	  this	  process.	  	  And	   they	   held	   both	   a	   high-­‐profile	   summit	   at	   Annapolis	   and	   an	   entirely	   symbolic	  MOU	  signing	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  build	  up	  moderates	  on	  both	  sides	  –	  without	  actually	  then	  producing	  any	  sort	  of	  deliverable	  product	  from	  those	  efforts.	  	   Many	   of	   these	   trends	   were	   the	   product	   of	   objective	   circumstances,	   the	  domain	  of	  the	  national	  interests	  approach	  (Theory	  #1).	  	  For	  instance,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  explain	  why	  Bush	  and	  Rice	  came	  to	  endorse	  the	  sort	  of	  Clintonesque	  approach	  that	  their	   administration	   had	   originally	   opposed	   without	   pointing	   to	   fundamental,	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underlying	  American	   interests	   in	   Israeli-­‐Palestinian	   talks	  and	  a	   two-­‐state	  solution.	  	  Similarly,	   it	   is	   difficult	   to	   explain	   why	   their	   efforts	   at	   LSI	   were	   ultimately	   so	  unsuccessful	   without	   taking	   into	   consideration	   the	   constraints	   of	   their	   objective	  circumstance	   –	   particularly,	   the	   deep	   skepticism	   of	   Israeli	   voters,	   especially	   since	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  Oslo	  peace	  process.	  	   However,	   elements	   of	   this	   effort	   and	   the	   relatively	   suitability	   of	   America’s	  projected	  message	  were	  distinctively	  Bush	  or	  distinctively	  Rice.	  	  Bush’s	  tendency	  to	  misspeak	   or	  misjudge	   Israeli	   politics	   came	   to	   the	   fore	   with	   his	   jarring	   praise	   for	  Olmert’s	  honesty	  and	  strategic	  acumen,	  as	  it	  did	  with	  his	  Knesset	  speech	  that	  lashed	  out	   against	   those	  who	  would	   appease	   evil	  while	   completely	   forgetting	   to	  mention	  the	  ongoing	  peace	  process	  that	  his	  administration	  was	  trying	  to	  shepherd.	  	  Similarly,	  the	   administration’s	   reluctance	   to	   nudge	   the	   parties,	   at	   least	   in	   private,	   to	   bridge	  their	   remaining	   gaps	   or	   to	   put	   out	   American	   parameters	   for	   peace,	   something	  Bush’s	   predecessor	   and	   successor	   both	   were	   willing	   to	   do	   –	   seems	   reflective	   of	  Bush’s	  distinct	  personal	  disposition	  on	  these	  issues.	  	  Secretary	  Rice’s	  willingness	  to	  get	  involved	  in	  the	  2009	  Israeli	  elections	  but	  only	  in	  response	  to	  direct	  solicitation	  by	  her	  friend	  Tzipi	  Livni,	  also	  seem	  to	  reflect	  Rice’s	  own	  attention	  span	  and	  personal	  stakes	  in	  the	  Israeli	  electoral	  contest.	  Thus,	  although	   the	  pressures	  of	  objective	   international	  circumstances	  seem	  to	  be	  more	  pronounced	  with	  regard	  to	  this	  particular	  observable	  implication	  of	  the	  theories,	  there	  is	  considerable	  support	  for	  the	  leadership	  approach	  (Theory	  #4)	  in	  this	   area	   as	  well.	   	   Therefore,	   looking	   across	   the	   board,	   variation	   in	  Washington’s	  approach	   to	  meddling	   in	   Israeli	   politics	   during	   the	  Olmert	   years	   seems	   to	   fit	   best	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with	   an	   approach	   that	   emphasizes	   the	   agency	   of	   top	   American	   leaders.	   	   The	  suitability	  of	  American	  messaging	  for	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  Kadima	  Party	  was	  influenced	  by	   both	   objective	   constraints	   and	   the	   idiosyncratic,	   subjective	   dispositions	   of	  President	   Bush	   and	   Secretary	   Rice,	   but	   only	   leadership	   theory	   holds	   persuasively	  across	  all	  seven	  categories	  of	  observable	  implications.	  	  
Conclusion	  
	   In	  all,	  George	  W.	  Bush	  demonstrated	  an	  ambivalent	  approach	  toward	  internal	  Israeli	   leadership	   contests.	   	   He	   had	   pledged	   on	   the	   campaign	   trail	   that	   his	  administration	  would	   not	  meddle	   in	   Israeli	   politics,	   and	   indeed	   he	   did	   not	   try	   to	  prop	  up	  the	  Israeli	  peace	  camp	  while	  the	  second	  intifada	  was	  raging.	   	  However,	   in	  time	  he	  was	  sucked	  into	  Israeli	  affairs	  on	  the	  side	  of	  the	  right-­‐wing	  incumbent,	  Ariel	  Sharon,	  who	  soon	  convinced	  the	  president	  that	  he	  too	  had	  the	  two-­‐state	  solution	  in	  mind	  as	  an	  ultimate	  objective.	   	  Yet	   the	  measures	   that	  he	  requested	   to	  prop	  up	  his	  standing	   came	   at	   direct	   expense	   of	   the	   peace	   process,	   temporarily	   sidelining	   the	  Road	  Map	  and	  granting	  one-­‐sided	  concessions	  to	  Israel	  on	  final	  status	  issues.	  	   Similarly,	  Bush	  sought	  to	  have	  it	  both	  ways	  after	  Sharon	  had	  departed	  from	  the	  political	  scene.	  	  He	  rebuffed	  Ehud	  Olmert’s	  request	  for	  help	  so	  he	  could	  pursue	  a	  second	   round	   of	   unilateral	   Israeli	   disengagements	   that	   might	   have	   advanced	   the	  cause	  of	  peace	  in	  more	  lasting	  ways	  that	  Sharon’s	  disengagement	  from	  primarily	  the	  Gaza	  Strip.	   	  Then,	  when	  Gaza	  truly	  fell	  into	  Hamas’s	  hands,	  Bush	  finally	  warmed	  to	  the	   idea	   of	   brokering	   Israeli-­‐Palestinian	   negotiation	   process	   and	   embracing	   PM	  Olmert	   as	   a	   means	   to	   reaching	   a	   lasting	   deal.	   	   However,	   his	   ambivalence	   about	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getting	   too	   engaged	   in	   the	   actual	   process,	   either	   by	   suggesting	   U.S.	   bridging	  proposals	  or	  pushing	  hard	  on	  the	  parties	  for	  an	  interim	  agreement,	  put	  limits	  on	  the	  sustainability	  of	  such	  a	  process.	   	  And,	  although	  he	  gave	  Secretary	  Rice	  a	  relatively	  free	   hand	   to	   innovate	   policy	   in	   this	   area,	   his	   lack	   of	   interest	   to	   provide	   concrete,	  specific	  backup	  on	  Israeli-­‐Palestinian	  issues	  may	  have	  weakened	  her	  hand.	  President	  Bush’s	  overriding	  focus	  on	  giving	  Israel	  a	  free	  hand	  to	  fight	  terror	  won	   him	   the	   admiration	   of	   many	   Israelis,	   and	   his	   general	   approach	   meant	   that	  bilateral	  ties	  grew	  friendlier	  as	  the	  years	  went	  by.	   	  However,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  prospects	  for	  a	  two-­‐state	  solution	  seemed	  to	  grow	  more	  remote	  over	  his	  two	  terms	  in	  office.	  	  Nor	  were	  these	  improved	  bilateral	  ties	  sustainable:	  Bush’s	  policies	  let	  the	  peace	   process	   continue	   to	   unravel	   in	   ways	   that	   ultimately	   boosted	   Benjamin	  Netanyahu’s	  ability	   to	  return	  to	  power	   in	  early	  2009.	   	  While	  security	  coordination	  between	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Israel	  has	  continued	  to	  expand	  since	  Bush	  left	  office,	  what	   has	   followed	   in	   the	   diplomatic	   realm	   has	   consequently	   been	   one	   of	   the	  frostiest	  periods	  in	  public	  ties	  to	  date.	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Part	  II.	  
~	  WASHINGTON’S	  MEDDLING	  FOR	  PEACE	  IN	  PALESTINIAN	  POLITICS	  	  	  
	   Just	   as	   the	   United	   States	   has	   sought	   to	   engineer	   leadership	   outcomes	   in	  Israeli	  domestic	  politics,	  so	  has	  it	  been	  meddling	  for	  decades	  in	  the	  political	  affairs	  of	  the	  Palestinian	  people.	  	  The	  Palestine	  cases	  are	  often	  intricately	  bound	  up	  in	  the	  Israeli	   cases,	   and	   together	   they	   provide	   a	   comprehensive	   history	   of	   American	  meddling	   for	   peace	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   Israeli-­‐Palestinian	   conflict.	   	   This	   section	  represents	  the	  other	  side	  of	  that	  coin.	  	  It	  begins	  with	  American	  efforts	  to	  undermine	  the	   PLO	   prior	   to	   the	   Oslo	   peace	   process	   and	   then	   explores	   efforts	   to	   bolster	   or	  undermine	  various	  PA	   leaders	   such	   as	  Yasser	  Arafat,	  Mahmoud	  Abbas,	   and	  Salam	  Fayyad,	  examining	  up	  through	  the	  end	  of	  the	  George	  W.	  Bush	  administration.	  Studying	  the	  U.S.-­‐Palestine	  directed	  dyad	  also	  yields	  benefits	  for	  nomothetic	  reasons.	   Although	   this	   dissertation	   devotes	   much	   greater	   attention	   to	   internal	  validity	   than	   external	   validity	   because	   of	   the	   rudimentary	   state	   of	   the	   research	  agenda	   on	   LSI	   at	   this	   point	   in	   time,	   I	   hope	   to	   at	   least	   pose	   tentative	   claims	  with	  regard	  to	  generalizability	  of	  the	  arguments	  contained	  in	  the	  prior	  Israel	  chapters.	  I	   pursue	   a	   three-­‐pronged	   approach	   for	   exploring	   generalizability.	   	   This	  strategy	  includes:	  (1)	  documenting	  attempts	  to	  meddle	  in	  Israeli	  politics	  by	  senders	  other	  than	  the	  U.S.,	  (2)	  studying	  American	  attempts	  to	  meddle	  in	  Palestinian	  politics,	  and	  (3)	  noting	  similar	  U.S.	  interventions	  in	  Iranian	  politics	  as	  part	  of	  a	  much	  shorter	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set	   of	   shadow	   cases	   contained	   in	   the	   conclusion	  of	   this	   dissertation.	   	   The	  present	  section,	  which	  focuses	  specifically	  on	  the	  Palestine	  cases,	  therefore	  represents	  only	  the	  second	  element	  of	  this	  three-­‐pronged	  approach.	  Studying	  Palestine	  takes	  us	  a	  good	  distance	  beyond	  what	  we	  would	  be	  able	  to	  claim	   from	   only	   looking	   at	   episodes	   of	   LSI	   within	   Israel	   alone.	   	   The	   Palestinian	  people	  have	  had	  a	  different,	   if	  related,	  historical	  experience	  from	  Israeli	  Jews;	  they	  are	  overwhelmingly	  drawn	  from	  a	  different	  ethnic	  and	  religious	  grouping;	  and	  they	  have	  much	   less	   favorable	   relations	  with	  Washington.	   	   Further,	   the	  Palestine	   cases	  allow	  us	  to	  compare	  U.S.	  meddling	  in	  an	  established	  democracy	  with	  intervention	  in	  a	  quasi-­‐authoritarian	  polity	  where	  electoral	  institutions	  are	  much	  less	  consolidated	  and	  Washington	  deeply	  fears	  the	  alternative	  to	  continued	  rule	  by	  the	  incumbent.	  	  Some	  Tentative	  Similarities:	  	   Overall,	   I	   find	   that	  most	   of	   the	   patterns	   from	   the	   U.S.-­‐Israel	   directed	   dyad	  carry	   over	   to	   the	   Palestine	   cases	   as	   well.	   	   The	   best	   explanation	   for	   variation	   in	  America’s	   leadership	  selection	  intervention	  behavior	  in	  bilateral	  relations	  over	  the	  years	   continues	   to	   be	   the	   role	   of	   top	   leaders	   in	   the	   sender	   state.	   	   This	   applies	   to	  matters	  of	  both	  occurrence	  and	  efficacy.	  	  For	  instance,	  the	  best	  explanation	  for	  why	  Jimmy	  Carter	  was	  open	  to	  working	  with	  the	  PLO	  yet	  George	  Shultz	  sought	  to	  replace	  it	  comes	  down	  to	  staffing	  and	  personal	  beliefs,	  not	  changes	   in	  American	  structural	  interests	   or	   behavior	   by	   bureaucrats,	   lobbyists,	   and	   legislators.	   	   Similarly,	  personality	  provides	  the	  best	  explanation	  for	  why	  James	  Baker	  was	  more	  effective	  at	  marginalizing	  the	  PLO	  than	  his	  predecessor,	  Shultz.	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   Generally	  speaking,	  the	  tendency	  toward	  pretenses	  applies	  to	  the	  Palestinian	  cases	  as	  well.	   	  Officials	  were	  much	  more	  willing	   in	  private	  to	  admit	   that	   their	  goal	  was	   to	   build	   up	   or	   break	   down	   support	   for	   Palestinian	   leaders	   than	   they	   were	  inclined	  to	  say	  so	  in	  public.	   	  Rather	  than	  saying	  “vote	  for	  Fatah”	  in	  2006,	  American	  officials	  mainly	  tried	  to	  use	  covert	  financial	  aid	  and	  campaign	  consulting	  to	  benefit	  the	  PLO	  in	  its	  electoral	  efforts	  against	  Hamas.	  	  Even	  when	  American	  officials	  went	  so	  far	  as	  to	  drop	  hints	  that	  aid	  might	  be	  revisited	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  Hamas	  victory	  –	  a	  comparatively	   smaller	   component	  of	   the	  U.S.	   effort	   at	  LSI	  –	   it	  did	  not	   come	   in	   the	  form	  of	  an	  explicit	  statement	  urging	  voters	  not	  to	  vote	  for	  Hamas.	  	  Often,	  American	  officials	  receive	  Abu	  Mazen	  with	  new	  pledges	  of	  foreign	  assistance	  and	  lofty	  rhetoric	  praising	  the	  PA’s	  courageous	  man	  of	  peace,	  but	  they	  generally	  do	  not	  explicitly	  call	  for	  the	  Palestinian	  to	  support	  him	  as	  a	  condition	  for	  future	  American	  backing.	  	  The	  message	  is	  no	  doubt	  there,	  but	  it	  is	  communicated	  implicitly	  and	  by	  insinuation.	  	   Overall,	  American	  officials	  also	  tended	  to	  avoid	  implementing	  or	  debating	  LSI	  in	  a	  highly	  public	   arena,	   continuing	  a	   trend	   from	   the	   Israeli	   case	   I	  have	   chosen	   to	  refer	   to	   as	   the	   “paper	   paradox”.	   	   Instead,	   they	   prefer	   irregular	   decision	   channels	  where	  communication	  is	  off-­‐line	  and	  verbal,	  or	  at	  least	  on	  a	  very	  restricted,	  limited	  access	  basis.	  	  Thus,	  for	  instance,	  the	  top	  USAID	  official	  in	  charge	  of	  Palestinian	  affairs	  described	  being	  aware	  of	  a	  general	  West	  Bank	  First	  strategy	  following	  the	  Gaza	  coup	  in	  2007,	  but	  that	  he	  never	  once	  saw	  a	  memo	  to	  prove	  it.1	  	  	  Some	  Tentative	  Differences:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Howard Sumka, “Interview with the Author”, November 3, 2011. 
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   There	   are	   definitely	   a	   few	   differences	   across	   the	   cases,	   most	   of	   which	   are	  objective	   structural	   constraints.	   	   I	   believe	   that	   these	   help	   explain	   some	   major	  background	  variation	  across	  dyads	  but	   typically	  not	  within	  them	  over	  time.	   	  Thus,	  they	  provide	  relevant	  scope	  conditions	  for	  the	  theory:	  it	  seems	  to	  matter	  much	  more	  for	   fine-­‐grained,	   variation	   within	   dyads	   than	   it	   does	   for	   coarser	   variation	   when	  comparing	  dyads.	  First	  of	  all,	  American	  presidents	  have	  much	  fewer	  assets	  at	  their	  control	  for	  effectively	   influencing	   Palestinian	   politics	   due	   to	   the	   overall	   edifice	   of	   American	  diplomacy	   toward	   the	   conflict.	   	   There	   is	  much	   less	   an	  American	  president	   can	  do	  within	  the	  constraints	  of	  traditional	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy	  toward	  the	  region,	  Israel,	  and	  the	  Palestinian	  people	  that	  will	  realistically	  make	  Palestinian	  voters	  or	  elites	  happy	  in	  the	  manner	  they	  can	  towards	  Israel.	  	  This	  does	  not,	  however,	  mean	  that	  American	  LSI	  toward	  Palestine	  never	  succeeds	  or	  never	  involves	  the	  mustering	  of	  substantial	  political	  or	  fiscal	  assets.	  	   Second,	   the	   paper	   paradox	   seems	   to	   be	   bounded	   by	   an	   important	   scope	  condition:	  it	  tends	  not	  to	  apply	  when	  referring	  to	  terrorist	  groups	  that	  are	  perceived	  as	   being	   outside	   the	   bounds	   of	   ordinary	   politics.	   	   Variations	   in	   how	   observers	  perceive	  these	  groups	  in	  the	  sender	  state	  and	  the	  target	  polity	  may	  lead	  to	  instances	  in	  which	  the	  sender	  explicitly	  admits	  trying	  to	  marginalize	  a	  group	  like	  the	  PLO	  pre-­‐1993	  or,	  in	  recent	  years,	  Hamas,	  may	  result	  in	  LSI	  being	  much	  less	  effective	  due	  to	  a	  rally-­‐around-­‐the-­‐flag	   effect.	   	   However,	   within	   the	   realm	   of	   competitive	   politics	   –	  including	  bolstering	   the	  moderate	   leaders	  who	   face	   these	   extremist	   factions	   –	   the	  tendency	   is	   still	   to	   deny	   LSI	   and	   couch	   it	   in	   fantastical	   pretenses	   remains.	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Americans	  rarely	  admit	  in	  public	  that	  a	  desire	  to	  rig	  Palestinian	  politics	  in	  toto,	  even	  if	  they	  admit	  that	  they	  want	  to	  keep	  extremists	  such	  as	  Hamas	  out	  of	  power.	  	   Third,	  America’s	  LSI	  behavior	  seems	  to	  fit	  with	  an	  established	  problematique	  from	  the	   fields	  of	  dictatorship	  and	  democratization	  studies.	   	  Whereas	   in	   the	   Israel	  cases	  Washington	   felt	   free	   to	   intervene	   in	   some	   episodes	  but	   not	   in	  many	  others,	  support	   becomes	   somewhat	   more	   frequent	   when	   the	   sender	   state	   fears	   the	  occurrence	  of	  “one	  man,	  one	  vote,	  one	  time,”	  allowing	  perceived	  radical	  extremists	  to	  seize	  power	  and	  to	  prevent	  future	  contests	  (what	  I	  henceforth	  refer	  to	  as	  the	  “one	  vote	  problematique,”	  or	  OVP	  for	  short).	  In	  turn,	  this	  seems	  to	  contribute	  to	  long-­‐term	  resentment	  of	  the	  sender	  state,	  decrease	   returns	   over	   time	   to	   sender	   state	   meddling	   attempts,	   increase	   risks	   of	  revolutionary	   change	   due	   to	   the	   obstruction	   of	   gradual	   reform,	   and	   degrade	  democratic	  institutions	  in	  the	  target	  polity.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  this	  approach	  is	  not	  always	   suboptimal,	   especially	   is	   only	   temporary	   and	   prevents	   the	   target	   from	  shifting	  global	  blocs	   and	  political	  directions	  dramatically.	   	  This	  dynamic	   is	   a	   long-­‐recognized	  pattern	  in	  certain	  areas	  of	  IR	  and	  comparative	  politics,	  2	  and	  scholars	  are	  just	  beginning	  to	  apply	  it	  to	  the	  area	  of	  leadership	  selection	  intervention	  as	  well.3	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 For the (mostly critical) literature on this phenomenon, see Mark J. Gasiorowski, U.S. Foreign Policy and 
the Shah: Building a Client State in Iran (Cornell University Press, 1991); Noam Chomsky, Deterring 
Democracy (Macmillan, 1992); Julia Sweig, Friendly Fire: Losing Friends and Making Enemies in the 
Anti-American Century (Public Affairs, 2006); Gavan McCormack, Client State: Japan in the American 
Embrace (Verso, 2007); Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert Owen Keohane, Anti-Americanisms in World 
Politics (Cornell University Press, 2007); Hilton L. Root, Alliance Curse: How America Lost the Third 
World (Brookings Institution Press, 2008); Jason Brownlee, Democracy Prevention: The Politics of the 
U.S.-Egyptian Alliance [Forthcoming] (Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
3 These issues emerged during discussions of LSI behavior at a conference at Yale University in which the 
author recently participated, sponsored by the Leitner Program in International and Comparative Political 
Economy in the Macmillan Center for International Studies. The theme emerged in papers presented by 
myself, by Jason Brownlee, and by the conference organizer, Nikolay Marinov.  Marinov’s work in 
progress makes the most explicit connection between these behavior and the dynamics of LSI in a certain 
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  Why	  these	  Differences	  are	  Limited:	  No	  doubt,	  this	  trend,	  when	  it	  applies,	   is	  a	  major	  sign	  of	  evidence	  in	  favor	  of	  national	   interests	   theory,	   since	   it	   suggests	   that	   perhaps	   objective	   institutions	   and	  political	   circumstances	   in	   the	   target	  polity	  do	  exert	   a	  major,	  background	  effect	  on	  rates	   of	   occurrence	   and	   efficacy	   for	   episodes	   of	   LSI.	   	  However,	   this	   finding	   comes	  with	  a	  number	  of	  caveats.	  First,	  this	  generalized	  pattern	  of	  behavior	  only	  seems	  to	  occur	  in	  those	  cases	  where	   the	   one	   vote	   problematique	   pertains.	   	   That	   is,	   officials	   in	   the	   sender	   state	  hold	   a	   consensus	   opinion	   that	   the	   opposition	   would	   seize	   power	   and	   ravage	   the	  political	  system	  if	  given	  the	  chance.	  	  Thus,	  it	  applies	  in	  the	  Palestine	  cases	  only	  when	  such	  an	  extra-­‐systemic	  contender	  for	  power	  exists,	  such	  as	  the	  PLO	  before	  Oslo	  or	  Hamas	   since	   2006.	   	   However,	   the	   dynamic	   is	   somewhat	   less	   pertinent	   for	   the	  Palestine	  dyad	  in	  other	  periods.	  	  It	  also	  applies	  to	  the	  Iran	  cases	  before	  1979	  but	  not	  any	  of	  the	  post-­‐revolutionary	  Iran	  cases	  or	  any	  of	  the	  cases	  on	  the	  Israel	  dyad.	  	  Second,	  the	  tendencies	  identified	  in	  the	  other	  dyads	  may	  still	  apply,	  just	  more	  weakly.	  	  For	  instance,	  even	  in	  rare	  instances	  when	  American	  LSI	  behavior	  verged	  on	  being	   explicit	   instead	   of	   implicit,	   such	   as	   Bush’s	   2002	   speech	   calling	   for	   new	  leadership	  in	  the	  PA,	  the	  language	  was	  couched	  in	  generalities	  instead	  of	  calling	  out	  Arafat	  by	  name,	  and	  prominent	  administration	  dissent	  (Powell)	  worried	  that	  being	  so	  explicit	  would	  backfire.4	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
sub-set of global LSI cases, although I feel he be writing off the broad range of LSI cases that do not 
display this sort of pattern: http://www.yale.edu/leitner/democracyEdge.html 
4 Condoleezza Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington (Random House, 2011), 144. 
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Third,	  one	  of	  the	  biggest	  determinants	  of	  success	  or	  failure	  of	  these	  attempts	  continues	  to	  be	  a	  question	  of	  American	  leaders’	  political	  will.	   	  Variation	  in	  efficacy	  across	   the	   various	   episodes	   seems	   to	   depend	   considerably	   on	  whether	   or	   not	   the	  president	  (or	  secretary	  of	  state)	  is	  willing	  to	  expend	  the	  political	  capital	  required	  to	  have	   a	   genuine	   impact	   in	   Palestinian	   affairs,	   something	   that	   is	   very	   often	   quite	  personal.	  	  For	  instance,	  Clinton	  was	  more	  willing	  to	  invest	  efforts	  to	  pursue	  genuine	  peace	   talks	   than	   George	   W.	   Bush,	   something	   that	   repeatedly	   undermined	   Bush’s	  ability	   to	  bolster	  perceived	  Palestinian	  moderates	  within	   the	  PA.	   	  Similarly,	  he	  did	  more	  to	  strengthen	  Salam	  Fayyad	  than	  Abu	  Mazen	  in	  2002/03	  in	  part	  because	  of	  the	  strong	  Texas	  bond	  between	  the	  two	  leaders	  –	  and	  also	  because	  it	  was	  easier	  for	  him	  to	  deliver	  the	  sort	  of	  support	  that	  would	  help	  Fayyad	  than	  the	  sort	  of	  aid	  that	  would	  have	   helped	   Abu	  Mazen.	   	   Indeed,	   the	   baseline	   for	   success	  may	   be	   tougher	   in	   the	  Palestinian	  cases	  due	  to	  the	  domestic	  costs	  of	  reaching	  out	  to	  the	  PA	  and	  prevailing	  skepticism	  among	   the	  Palestinians,	   but	   the	   variation	   in	  who	   succeeds	   versus	  who	  fails	  across	  the	  cases	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  matter	  of	  personal	  will	  and	  commitment.	  Indeed,	   even	   in	   directed	   dyads	   during	   periods	   when	   this	   problematique	  applies,	  there	  is	  still	  considerable	  variation	  in	  intervention	  behavior	  over	  time.	  	  The	  history	   of	   American	   intervention	   in	   Palestinian	   politics	   demonstrates	   that	   U.S.	  officials	   do	   not	   pursue	   objectively	   comparable	   interventions	   in	   objectively	  comparable	  circumstances.	   	  The	  OVP	  serves	  as	  an	  extremely	  powerful	  background	  factor	  for	  explaining	  variation	  across	  dyads	  and	  even	  within	  dyads	  over	  very,	  very	  long	   spans	   of	   time.	   	   Yet	   it	   fails	   to	   explain	   fine-­‐grained	   variation	   when	   the	   basic	  health	  (or	  lack	  thereof)	  of	  democratic	  institutions	  is	  held	  constant.,	  which	  is	  most	  of	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the	   time	   	   Provided	   polities	   are	   not	   undergoing	   major	   earthquakes	   in	   the	  fundamental	  nature	  of	  political	  contestation	  within	  them,	  in	  all	  other	  times	  the	  best	  explanation	  for	  LSI	  behavior	  on	  that	  dyad	  still	  seems	  to	  be	  the	  agency	  of	  top	  leaders.	  	  Even	   in	   those	   rare	  moments	   of	   regime	   type	   change-­‐over,	   such	   as	   in	   1993/94	   for	  Palestine	  or	  1978/79	  for	  Iran,	  the	  role	  for	  top	  leaders	  remains	  crucial.	  Thus,	  the	  following	  section	  notes	  the	  differences	  between	  the	  Israel	  dyad	  and	  the	  Palestine	  dyad	  attributable	  to	  the	  OVP	  but	  goes	  on	  to	  document	  the	  substantial	  remaining	   variation	   attributable	   only	   to	   the	   dynamics	   of	   leadership	   theory.	  	  Although	   it	   focuses	  mainly	  on	  American	  efforts	   to	  determine	   the	   leadership	  of	   the	  Palestinian	  Authority,	  which	  was	  established	  only	  in	  1994,	  it	  briefly	  considers	  prior	  efforts	  to	  undermine	  the	  PLO	  for	  additional	  analytical	  leverage.	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Chapter	  VIII.	  	  
~	  
Palestinian	  Politics,	  Pre-­Oslo	  
(1986-­1993)	  
	  
U.S.	   foreign	   policy-­‐makers	   have	   had	   strong	   opinions	   on	  Palestinian	   politics	  since	  at	  least	  the	  1970s,	  when	  Arab	  leaders	  anointed	  the	  PLO	  as	  the	  sole	  legitimate	  representative	   of	   the	   Palestinian	   people	   in	   1974.	   	   One	   former	   advisor	   to	   Henry	  Kissinger	   reflected	   that	   the	   secretary	   “believed	   [the	   PLO]	   could	   never	   become	  participants	   in	   the	   peace	   process;	   he	   thought	   that	   they	   would	   always	   play	   the	  ‘spoiler’	  role”.1	  	  Kissinger	  then	  proceeded	  to	  promise	  Israel	  that	  America	  would	  not	  to	  negotiate	  with	  the	  PLO,	  but	  this	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  intended	  as	  a	  gesture	  toward	  Israel,	  not	  a	  means	  of	  shaping	  the	  intra-­‐Palestinian	  balance	  of	  power.	  	  Jimmy	  Carter	  was	   extremely	   eager	   to	   engage	   the	  PLO,	   but	   this	  was	  because	  he	   felt	   they	  were	   a	  stakeholder	   that	   could	   not	   be	   ignored,	   not	   out	   of	   a	   desire	   to	   bolster	   the	   group’s	  authority.	  
Palestine,	  Case	  #1:	  Shultz	  and	  Baker	  look	  for	  local	  leadership,	  1986-­‐1993	  	  	   Yet	   U.S.	   officials	   did	   not	   enact	   these	   preferences	   into	   policies	   intended	   to	  shape	   the	   balance	   of	   power	  within	   Palestinian	   politics	   until	   the	   1980s.	   	   In	   1986,	  George	   Shultz	   embarked	  on	   a	   campaign	   to	   help	   Israel	   and	   Jordan	  marginalize	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Robert B. Oakley, “Interview with Ambassador Robert B. Oakley”, July 7, 1992, 38, The Foreign Affairs 
Oral History Collection of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training (ADST), Library of 
Congress. 
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PLO	   in	   favor	  of	  pro-­‐Jordanian	  elites	   living	   in	   the	  West	  Bank.	   	  His	  successor,	   James	  Baker,	  also	  tried	  to	  empower	  local	  elites	  in	  the	  territories	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  the	  PLO	  in	  Tunis.	  	   In	  retrospect,	  Baker’s	  effort	  was	  much	  more	  effective	  than	  Shultz’s.	  	  Whereas	  Baker’s	   endeavor	   bring	   about	   the	   landmark	   conference	   at	  Madrid	   in	   1991,	   Shultz	  had	   virtually	   nothing	   to	   show	   for	   his	   attempts	   to	   engineer	   outcomes	   in	   internal	  Palestinian	   politics.	   	   In	   the	   sections	   that	   follow,	   I	   argue	   that	   this	   was	   largely	  attributable	   to	   the	   personal	   differences	   separating	   Baker	   and	   Shultz.	   	   Shultz’s	  resistance	   to	   the	  PLO	  was	   strongly	   rooted	   in	   ideology,	  while	  Baker’s	   attitude	  was	  based	   on	   pragmatic	   and	   tactical	   grounds.	   	   Shultz’s	   hopes	   for	   the	   endeavor	   were	  rooted	  in	  wishful	  thinking	  and	  not	  matched	  with	  comprehensive	  follow-­‐through,	  but	  James	  Baker	  was	  tenacious	  in	  his	  dogged	  pursuit	  of	  getting	  local	  Palestinian	  elites	  to	  negotiate	  on	  their	  own	  without	  the	  PLO.	  	  
Coding	  the	  Dependent	  Variables	  (Occurrence	  and	  Efficacy)	  Did	  LSI	  Occur?	  	   Yes,	   in	   both	   periods.	   	   Shultz	   tried	   to	   nurture	   an	   alternative,	   pro-­‐Jordanian	  leadership	   on	   the	   West	   Bank	   in	   order	   to	   marginalize	   the	   PLO.	   	   Baker	   sought	   to	  empower	  local	  Palestinian	  leaders	  to	  negotiate	  for	  themselves	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  the	  PLO.	   	   However,	   Baker	   tempered	   his	   effort	   by	   seeking	   to	   get	   Yasser	   Arafat’s	   tacit	  acceptance	  that	  the	  PLO	  could	  not	  participate	  in	  official	  peace	  talks	  and	  would	  have	  to	  be	  represented	  instead	  by	  local	  leaders	  from	  the	  territories.	  	  Baker	  also	  invested	  a	  great	  deal	  more	  in	  terms	  of	  political	  capital	  and	  diplomatic	  effort	  than	  did	  Shultz.	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<Sub-­Case	  1:	  Shultz	  versus	  the	  PLO>	  When	  King	  Hussein	  engaged	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  win	  the	  backing	  of	  Yasser	  Arafat	  and	  the	  PLO	  for	  peace	  talks	  with	  Israel,	  Israeli	  officials	  under	  Peres	  began	  exploring	  ways	  to	  bolster	  the	  king’s	  influence	  in	  the	  West	  Bank	  in	  order	  to	  boost	  his	  leverage	  relative	   to	   the	  PLO.	   	  Peres’s	  aides	  described	   their	  effort	  under	  a	  number	  of	   telling	  titles,	   calling	   it	   a	   plan	   for	   an	   Israeli-­‐Jordanian	   “condominium”	   or	   “functional	  compromise”	   over	   the	   West	   Bank,	   envisioning	   the	   “re-­‐Jordanization”	   of	   the	   area	  through	   Israeli	   “devolution”.2	   	   Consultations	   between	   the	   two	   governments	  regarding	  how	  to	  promote	  the	  condominium	  idea	  began	  in	  late	  1985	  during	  secret	  consultations	   between	   the	   king	   and	   Peres	   about	   how	   to	   get	   the	   peace	   process	  moving	   again.	   	   This	   resulted	   in	   new	   forms	   of	   cooperation	   on	   the	   ground,	   such	   as	  Israel’s	  appointment	  of	  a	  pro-­‐Jordanian	  mayor	  at	  Nablus	  as	  a	  pilot	  project	  in	  place	  of	  Israeli	  military	  administration.3	  	  	  What	   got	   American	   attention	   was	   when	   King	   Hussein’s	   negotiations	   with	  Arafat	  fell	  through	  in	  February	  of	  1986.	  	  The	  king	  gave	  a	  rambling	  three-­‐and-­‐a-­‐half	  hour	  speech	  denouncing	  the	  PLO	  and	  began	  to	  hint	  at	  his	   intention	  to	  displace	  the	  organization	  in	  the	  West	  Bank.4	  	  Observers	  began	  to	  wonder	  whether	  his	  statements	  signaled	   a	   broader	  move	  by	   Jordan	   against	   the	  PLO’s	   authority	   in	   the	  West	  Bank,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 For “devolution,” see Henry Kamm, “Israelis Expect Effort by Hussein to Woo West Bank Palestinians,” 
New York Times, February 25, 1986; Judith Miller, “Peres Says He’ll Foster Palestinian Self-Rule,” New 
York Times, February 27, 1986. For the other titles, see Yossi Melman and Daniel Raviv, Behind the 
Uprising: Israelis, Jordanians, and Palestinians (Greenwood Press, 1989), 188. 
3 Adam Garfinkle, Israel and Jordan in the Shadow of War: Functional Ties and Futile Diplomacy in a 
Small Place (St. Martin’s Press, 1992), 123. 
4 “Hussein Drops a Yearlong Effort to Join in a Peace Bid with Arafat,” New York Times, February 20, 
1986; Judith Miller, “Hussein Questions Who Should Speak for Palestinians,” New York Times, February 
23, 1986; John Rice, “Hundreds Of Palestinians From West Bank Hear Hussein In Amman,” Associated 
Press, February 27, 1986. 
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and	   the	   Israeli	   government	   under	   Peres	   expressed	   its	   intentions	   to	   move	   ahead	  swiftly	  with	  boosting	  Jordanian	  influence	  in	  the	  area,	  including	  the	  appointment	  of	  additional	  mayors	  in	  Ramallah,	  al-­‐Bireh,	  and	  Hebron.5	  The	  king	  also	  expressed	  his	  desire	  to	  “liberate”	  both	  the	  Palestinians	  and	  the	  PLO,	   hinting	   at	   efforts	   he	  would	   pursue	   in	   coming	  months	   to	   back	   an	   anti-­‐Arafat	  insurgency	   within	   Fatah	   through	   a	   faction	   led	   by	   former	   Fatah	   intelligence	   czar	  Atallah	   Atallah	   (aka	   Abu	   Zaim).6	   The	   kingdom	   also	   pledged	   to	   reduce	   military	  operations	  by	  the	  group	  against	  of	   Israel,	  and	   in	   July	  of	  1986	   it	  moved	  against	   the	  PLO’s	   representation	   in	   Jordan,	   closing	   down	   25	   Fatah	   offices	   throughout	   the	  country	   and	   expelling	   the	   PLO’s	   top	   representative,	   Khalil	  Wazir	   (aka	   Abu	   Jihad),	  from	  the	  country.7	   	   (Ironically,	   the	  king’s	   justification	   for	  expelling	  Wazir	  was	   that	  the	   PLO	   had	   tried	   to	   conduct	   LSI	   against	   the	  monarchy’s	   interests,	  meddling	   in	   a	  Jordanian	  by-­‐election	  by	  giving	  payments	  aimed	  at	  boosting	  a	  pro-­‐PLO	  candidate’s	  chances).8	   	   The	   Jordanians	   and	   Israelis	   cooperated	   on	   West	   Bank	   infrastructural	  projects,	  and	  the	  king	  even	  began	  to	  extend	  development	  aid	  and	  passport	  services	  to	   Palestinian	   refugees	   in	   the	   Gaza	   Strip,	   even	   though	   Gaza	   had	   been	   occupied	  before	  1967	  by	  Egypt,	  not	  the	  Jordanians.9	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Kamm, “Israelis Expect Effort by Hussein to Woo West Bank Palestinians”; Miller, “Peres Says He’ll 
Foster Palestinian Self-Rule.” See also Allyn Fisher, “Israeli Prime Minister Says More Autonomy In Store 
For West Bank,” Associated Press, February 9, 1986. 
6 Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993 
(Oxford University Press, 1999), 588; Rice, “Hundreds Of Palestinians From West Bank Hear Hussein In 
Amman”; “PLO Summons Rebel Officer,” Associated Press, April 9, 1986; Charles P. Wallace, “Relations 
With PLO Worsen as Jordan Closes 25 Fatah Offices,” Los Angeles Times, July 8, 1986; “Report: 
Palestinian Military Leader Wants Arafat Ouster, Israel Peace Talks,” Associated Press, July 11, 1986.  
7 Avi Shlaim, Lion of Jordan: The Life of King Hussein in War and Peace (Random House, Inc., 2009), 
440; John Rice, “Jordan, PLO Struggle for Heart of West Bank,” Associated Press, July 9, 1986. 
8 Tony Walker, “Hussein Says PLO Tried To Affect Jordan Election,” Financial Times, July 16, 1986. 
9 Charles P. Wallace, “Hussein Gets Support from Palestinian: Ex-Gaza Mayor Joins King in Break With 
PLO Over Peace Effort,” Los Angeles Times, July 20, 1986. 
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In	   July,	   the	   king	   floated	   plans	   for	   a	   major	   West	   Bank	   Development	   Plan,	  hoping	  to	  raise	  $1.3	  billion	  with	  the	  help	  of	  foreign	  donors	  to	  win	  public	  support	  for	  Jordan	  through	  economic	  development	  and	  to	  bolster	  the	  position	  of	  pro-­‐Jordanian	  elites,	  although	  the	  program	  was	  framed	  in	  terms	  of	  humanitarian	  and	  demographic	  justifications.10	   	   American	   backing	   for	   the	   plan,	   including	   an	   initial	   installment	   of	  $4.5	   million,	   was	   announced	   before	   the	   plan	   had	   even	   been	   made	   final,	   co-­‐announced	   by	   a	   spokesperson	   at	   the	   State	   Department	   and	   an	   advisor	   on	   Vice	  President	  George	  Bush’s	  visit	  to	  the	  region	  at	  the	  end	  of	  July.11	   	  Also	  during	  Bush’s	  visit,	   America’s	   East	   Jerusalem	   consulate	   arranged	   a	   reception	   of	   Palestinian	  notables	  to	  meet	  with	  the	  vice	  president,	  among	  whom	  pro-­‐Jordan	  mayors	  and	  West	  Bank	  members	  of	  the	  Jordanian	  parliament	  figured	  prominently.12	  Shultz	   had	  been	   seeking	   to	  boost	  Palestinian	  quality	   of	   life	   since	  1983,	   but	  the	   initiative	   took	   on	   real	   momentum	   as	   a	   campaign	   of	   LSI	   when	   the	   Jordanians	  volunteered	   to	   take	   on	   a	   more	   active	   role	   with	   an	   eye	   toward	   creating	   a	   new	  political	  presence	  on	   the	  ground.13	   	   Shultz	   spearheaded	   the	   reenergized	  American	  initiative,	  promoting	  a	  West	  Bank	  Quality	  of	  Life	  (QoL)	  plan	  that	  was	  now	  privately	  intended	  to	  boost	  monarchists	  in	  the	  territories.	  	  In	  order	  to	  enable	  the	  $4.5	  million	  pledge	  to	  Hussein’s	  West	  Bank	  plan,	  the	  Secretary	  also	  hunted	  down	  a	  pot	  of	  unused	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Tony Walker, “Jordan Offers West Bank Aid: Analysis of Five-year Economic Development Plan for 
Palestinians in Israeli-occupied Territory,” Financial Times, July 15, 1986. 
11 Barry Schweid, “U.S. Channeling Aid To Palestinians Through Jordan For First Time,” Associated 
Press, July 31, 1986; Gerald M. Boyd, “Jordan to Funnel U.S. Aid to West Bank,” New York Times, 
August 1, 1986. 
12 W. Dale Nelson, “Bush Holds Reception For Palestinians, Some Stay Away,” Associated Press, July 29, 
1986; Gerald Boyd, “Bush in ‘Spirited’ Session with Palestinians, Is Firm on the PLO,” New York Times, 
July 30, 1986. 
13 George Pratt Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: Diplomacy, Power and the Victory of the American Ideal 
(Scribner’s, 1993), 443–444. 
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USAID	  funds	  that	  could	  be	  redirected	  for	  the	  purpose.14	  	  	  In	  the	  following	  two	  years,	  the	  administration	  continued	  to	  allot	  QoL	  money	  directly	  to	  Jordan	  in	  order	  to	  help	  finance	  its	  West	  Bank	  Development	  Plan.	   	  Given	  the	  tight	  fiscal	  climate	  on	  the	  Hill,15	  Shultz	  himself	  worked	  to	  help	  free	  up	  money	  for	  the	   fund,	   obtaining	   another	   $14	  million	   in	   1987	   and	   $5.7	  million	   in	   1988	   for	   the	  project.16	  	  American	  officials	  also	  stepped	  up	  to	  help	  mediate	  an	  agreement	  between	  Jordan	  and	  Israel	  to	  allow	  the	  first	  bank	  from	  an	  Arab	  country	  to	  open	  a	  branch	  in	  the	  West	  Bank	  since	  1967.17	  	  	  	   Files	   from	   the	   Reagan	   Library	   fit	   this	   interpretation	   of	   administration	  actions.	  	  In	  advance	  of	  a	  visit	  by	  Hussein	  to	  the	  White	  House	  in	  June	  of	  1986,	  Shultz	  explained	   to	   the	  president	   that	  one	  of	   “our	  basic	  goals”	   for	   “what…	  we	  want	   from	  this	   visit”	   was	   to	   “encourage	  more	   active	   Jordanian	   role	   on	  West	   Bank	   and	   seek	  details	  of	  the	  steps	  he	  wants	  Israel	  to	  take”.18	  	  Shultz	  explained	  that	  “what…	  the	  king	  want[s]	   from	   this	   visit”	   was,	   among	   other	   goals,	   to	   “seek	   support	   for	   his	   new	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Schweid, “U.S. Channeling Aid To Palestinians Through Jordan For First Time”; Boyd, “Jordan to 
Funnel U.S. Aid to West Bank.” 
15 Sara Fritz, “Plans for Extra Foreign Aid Elicit Outrage in Congress: White House to Seek Additional 
$1.3 Billion While Domestic Programs Are Being Cut,” Los Angeles Times, January 30, 1986; Bernard 
Gwertzman, “Shultz to Press Congress for Increase in Current Foreign Aid Budget,” New York Times, 
January 1, 1987. 
16 Charles P. Wallace, “Jordan’s West Bank Plan Faltering : Only $20 Million in Aid Raised Toward $1-
Billion Goal,” Los Angeles Times, March 4, 1987; Dan Fisher, “Israeli Protests Block U.S. Plan for Aid to 
West Bank,” Los Angeles Times, March 3, 1987; Allistair Lyon, “Jordanian Bank to Open Two More West 
Bank Branches,” Reuters News, September 15, 1987; John Rice, “Official Defends Aid Program, Promises 
Larger Projects,” Associated Press, January 30, 1988; Rana Sabbagh, “Jordan to Continue West Bank 
Development Program,” Reuters News, July 4, 1988; Barry Schweid, “US To Maintain Aid To Palestinians 
Despite Jordan’s Abandonment Of Fund,” Associated Press, July 29, 1988. 
17 Garfinkle, Israel and Jordan in the Shadow of War, 113–114, 131. For more on the bank, see Andrew 
Whitley, “Israel Approves Arab-Owned Bank In Nablus,” Financial Times, September 19, 1986; Morris 
Draper, “Interview with Ambassador Morris Draper”, February 27, 1991, 64, The Foreign Affairs Oral 
History Collection of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training (ADST), Library of Congress. 
18 “Your Meeting with King Hussein of Jordan, June 9-10, 1986 - Memorandum for the President from 
George P. Shultz”, June 5, 1986, Collection “Ross, Dennis Files”, Box 5, Folder “Chron File-June 1986, 
Dennis Ross (3 of 3),” Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. 
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strategy	   of	   building	   an	   Arab	   consensus	   that	   will	   eliminate	   the	   PLO’s	   veto	   over	   a	  renewed	  peace	  process,”	  to	  “urge	  that	  we	  press	  the	  Israelis	  for	  rapid	  agreement	  to	  appointed	   Arab	   mayors,	   expanded	   Arab	   municipal	   boundaries	   and	   reopening	   of	  Jordanian	  bank	  branches	  in	  West	  Bank,”	  and	  to	  “seek	  financial	  help	  for	  GOJ’s	  West	  Bank	  efforts”.19	  	  Shultz	  argued	  that	  “what	  can	  be	  achieved	  from	  this	  visit”	  was	  “West	  Bank:	  achieve	  agreement	  on	  precise	  steps	  to	  raise	  with	  the	  GOI	  and	  on	  what	  Jordan	  can	  do	  independently”.20	  	   The	  talking	  points	  for	  the	  president	  that	  Shultz	  sent	  over	  read	  as	  follows:	  	  “-­‐-­‐	  …of	   course	  we	   support	   your	   view	   that	   an	   alternative	   Palestinian	   leadership	   is	  necessary.	  -­‐-­‐strengthening	  the	  West	  Bankers’	  ability	   to	  control	   their	  own	   lives	  offers	   the	  best	  chance	  of	  developing	  a	  Palestinian	  leadership	  able	  to	  move	  with	  you	  toward	  peace.	  -­‐-­‐to	  that	  end,	  we	  agree	  it	  is	  time	  to	  move	  on	  quality	  of	  life	  issues	  on	  the	  West	  Bank.	  	  We	  want	  to	  be	  helpful	  and	  wish	  to	  concentrate	  our	  efforts	  on	  practical	  steps	  which	  can	  be	  achieved	  quickly.	  	  	  -­‐-­‐I	   have	   asked	   Secretary	   Shultz	   to	   explore	   with	   you	   how	   we	   can	   help	   you	   move	  forward	   on	   appointing	   local	   Arab	   mayors,	   expanding	   Arab	   municipal	   boundaries	  and	  establishing	  a	  bank	  on	  the	  West	  Bank.	  -­‐-­‐I	  am	  very	  interested	  in	  additional	  thoughts	  you	  might	  have	  on	  how	  we	  nurture	  an	  alternative	  Palestinian	  leadership	  and	  what	  your	  game-­‐plan	  is	  for	  doing	  so”.21	  	  	  	  Ross’s	   suggested	   talking	  points	   for	   the	  president	   for	   the	   same	  meeting	  noted	   that	  “you	   are	   clearly	   taking	   steps	   to	   bolster	   your	   position	   on	   the	   West	   Bank	   and	   to	  cultivate	  such	  a	  partner”	  and	  asked	  about	  “your	  next	  steps	  on	  the	  West	  Bank	  as	  you	  try	  to	  cultivate	  a	  Palestinian	  partner”.22	  After	  the	  meeting,	  a	  draft	  memo	  entitled	  “Hussein	  Follow-­‐Up”	  was	  written	  by	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 “Talking Points for the President’s Meeting with King Hussein (June 9, 1986) - Memorandum for the 
President from George P. Shultz”, June 5, 1986, Collection “Ross, Dennis Files”, Box 5, Folder “Chron 
File-June 1986, Dennis Ross (3 of 3),” Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. 
22 “Talking Points for Your Meeting with King Hussein, Monday, June 9, 5:00 PM”, n.d., Collection “Ross, 
Dennis Files”, Box 5, Folder “Chron File - June 1986, Dennis Ross (1 of 3),” Ronald Reagan Presidential 
Library. 
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Dennis	   Ross	   for	   national	   security	   advisor	   John	   Poindexter	   to	   George	   Shultz	  summarized	   findings	   from	   the	   meeting.	   	   It	   was	   designated	   “privacy	   channel,”	  presumably	  due	   to	   the	  sensitivity	  of	   talking	  about	   such	  deliberations	  openly.	   	  The	  text	  reads	  as	  follows:	  	  “I	   feel	   strongly	   about	   being	   responsive	   to	   King	   Hussein.	   	   I	   know	   you	   do	   as	   well.	  	  During	   his	   visit,	   the	   King	   asked	   us	   to	   provide	   money	   for	   his	   efforts	   to	   build	   the	  moderate-­‐Jordanian	  position	  on	  the	  West	  Bank,	  and	  I	  know	  you	  have	  been	  trying	  to	  come	  up	  with	  additional	  monies	  to	  be	  helpful	   in	  that	  regard.	   	  (We	  are	  also	  looking	  into	   additional	   funding	   sources).	   	   In	   addition,	   the	   King	   asked	   used	   to	   help	   him	  politically	  in	  his	  efforts	  to	  ‘close	  all	  doors’	  to	  Arafat.	  	  That	  means	  following	  up	  with	  the	  Israelis,	  Saudis,	  Egyptians	  Europeans,	  and	  others.	  	  Here	  the	  follow-­‐up	  seems	  less	  well	  developed	  and	  also	  less	  coherent.	  	  I	  think	  we	  need	  an	  agreed	  posture	  on	  what	  and	  how	  much	  we	  will	  do	  and	  say	  to	  each.	  	  	  	  I	   realize	   that	   supporting	   the	   King’s	   efforts	   to	   undermine	   Arafat	   and	   nurture	   an	  alternative	  leadership	  may	  be	  controversial.	  	  Some	  may	  feel	  that	  the	  King	  will	  fail	  or	  that	  there	  can	  be	  no	  alternative	  to	  Arafat.	  	  I	  am	  concerned	  that	  if	  we	  look	  lukewarm	  in	   our	   support	   we	   will	   guarantee	   his	   failure,	   and	   I	   am	   convinced	   that	   Arafat	   is	  incapable	  of	  ever	  negotiating	  peace	  with	  Israel”.23	  	   In	  January	  of	  1987,	  the	  president	  signed	  a	  National	  Security	  Study	  Directive	  on	  the	  Middle	  East	  peace	  process	  in	  which	  the	  number	  two	  item	  was:	  	  “How	  can	  we	  strengthen	  Jordan’s	  role	  in	  the	  peace	  process	  and	  its	  efforts	  to	  assert	  leadership	  on	  the	  Palestinian	  question?	   	  What	   further	   steps	   could	  we	   take,	   e.g.,	   in	   the	  Quality	  of	  Life	   area	   or	   in	   our	   bilateral	   relations,	   to	   strengthen	   the	   King’s	   hand?”24	   	   At	   the	  planning	  group	  that	  March	  for	  the	  NSSD	  that	  would	  result,	  Shultz	  led	  discussions	  of	  the	  West	  Bank	  and	  his	  QoL	  idea.25	  When	  the	  president	  received	  Yitzhak	  Shamir	  at	  the	  White	  House	  in	  February	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 “Hussein Follow-Up - Memorandum for John M. Poindexter from Dennis Ross”, June 23, 1986, 
Collection “Ross, Dennis Files”, Box 5, Folder “Chron File - June 1986, Dennis Ross (1 of 3),” Ronald 
Reagan Presidential Library. 
24 Ronald Reagan, “National Security Study Directive, Number 4-87”, January 22, 1987, Collection “Ross, 
Dennis Files”, Box 7, Folder “Chron File, March 1987,” Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. 
25 “National Security Planning Group Meeting: US Policy in Middle East”, February 12, 1987, Collection 
“Ross, Dennis Files”, Box 7, Folder “Chron File, February 1987,” Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. 
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1987,	  he	  urged	  the	  prime	  minister	  in	  their	  plenary	  meeting	  that	  “it’s	  very	  important	  that	  we	  build	  on	   the	  progress	   taking	  place	   in	   the	  West	  Bank.	   	  That	  will	  help	  keep	  alive	  the	  prospect	  for	  peace.	  	  We	  must	  keep	  moving	  in	  that	  direction”.26	  	  The	  talking	  points	   for	  his	  private	  meeting	  with	  the	  prime	  minister	  read	  “we	  must	  press	  ahead	  and	  build	  on	  the	  concrete	  progress	  that	   is	  being	  made	  in	  the	  West	  Bank	  and	  Gaza.	  	  The	  appointment	  of	  Arab	  mayors,	  the	  opening	  of	  the	  bank	  in	  Nablus,	  the	  expansion	  of	   municipal	   boundaries,	   are	   important	   steps	   in	   the	   right	   direction.	   	   The	   must	  continue	   and	   be	   followed	   on	   by	   other	  measures”.27	   	  However,	   it	   is	   clear	   from	   the	  limited-­‐distribution	   pre-­‐briefs	   for	   that	   meeting	   that	   Shultz	   remained	   the	   point	  person	  for	   the	  Quality	  of	  Life	   initiative	  and	  that	  NSC	  officials	   felt	   the	  program	  was	  directed	  toward	  the	  objective	  of	  “show[ing]	  that	  moderates	  can	  deliver”.28	  In	   March	   of	   1987,	   as	   the	   president	   authorized	   Shultz	   to	   seek	   additional	  money	   in	   the	   foreign	   assistance	   budget	   for	   Hussein’s	   development	   plan,	   Robert	  Oakley	   suggested	   Frank	   Carlucci	   tell	   the	   secretary	   that	   “the	   president	   was	   very	  much	   taken	  with	  your	  plan	   for	  moving	   ahead…	   [and]	  he	  believes	   strongly	   that	   an	  essential	   first	   step	   is	   getting	   additional	  monies	   for	   the	  West	  Bank	   to	  demonstrate	  our	   seriousness	   and	   to	   make	   clear	   that	   life	   can	   and	   will	   improve	   for	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 “Memorandum of Conversation: Plenary Meeting with Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir of Israel”, 
February 18, 1987, Collection “Ross, Dennis Files”, Box 7, Folder “Chron File, February 1987,” Ronald 
Reagan Presidential Library. 
27 “Talking Points for the President’s Meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Shamir”, February 18, 1987, 2, 
Collection “Ross, Dennis Files”, Box 7, Folder “Chron File, February 1987,” Ronald Reagan Presidential 
Library. 
28 “Pre-Brief of Shamir Visit, February 18, 11:00 Am - Memorandum for Frank C. Carlucci from Robert B. 
Oakley”, February 17, 1987, Collection “Ross, Dennis Files”, Box 7, Folder “Chron File, February 1987,” 
Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. 
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Palestinians”.29	  	  However,	  the	  impression	  over	  at	  the	  NSC	  was	  that	  Shultz	  needed	  to	  do	  more	  to	  follow	  up	  within	  the	  State	  Department	  to	  make	  his	  request	  for	  a	  second	  year	  of	  funding	  for	  Hussein’s	  West	  Bank	  plan	  a	  reality.30	  That	  summer,	  officials	  explored	  the	  possibility	  of	  Shultz	  going	  to	  the	  region	  again	   in	   the	   fall	   in	   order	   to	   “explain	   importance	   we	   attach…	   of	   doing	   more	   in	  territories,	   developing	   plan,	   putting	   together	   U.S.-­‐Jordanian	   team	   to	   monitor	   and	  shape	  progress”	  along	  with	  perhaps	  a	  U.S.-­‐Israel	   team	  as	  well.31	   	  However,	  by	  that	  point	   attention	   had	   mostly	   shifted	   toward	   futile	   diplomatic	   efforts	   trying	   to	  reconstruct	  the	  April	  1987	  London	  Accords	  with	  Shamir’	  support.32	  	   When	   the	   first	  Palestinian	   intifada	  broke	  out	   in	  December	  of	  1987,	   the	  U.S.	  continued	   to	   promote	   the	   idea	   of	   a	   joint	   Jordanian-­‐Palestinian	   delegation	   and	   to	  promote	  Hussein’s	  development	  plan	  until	  the	  king	  severed	  all	  ties	  to	  the	  West	  Bank	  in	   July	   of	   1988.33	   	   Receiving	   two	   Palestinian	   leaders	   from	   the	   territories	   in	   late	  January,	  Shultz	  dismissed	  when	  “the	   two	   talked	  of	   the	  PLO’s	   leading	  and	  essential	  role,”	  chiding	  them	  that	  “the	  PLO	  has	  a	  reality	  problem”.34	  	  	  Shultz	  reflects	  that	  “the	  PLO	  was	  not	  in	  the	  lead	  in	  this	  uprising	  and	  chances	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 “Draft Memorandum for the Honorable George P. Shultz from Frank C. Carlucci (attached to ‘Middle 
East Peace - Memorandum for Frank C. Carlucci from Robert B. Oakley’)”, March 14, 1987, Collection 
“Ross, Dennis Files”, Box 7, Folder “Chron File, March 1987,” Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. 
30 “$30 Million for the West Bank - Memorandum for Frank C. Carlucci from Robert B. Oakley”, March 
11, 1987, Collection “Ross, Dennis Files”, Box 7, Folder “Chron File, March 1987,” Ronald Reagan 
Presidential Library. 
31 “Secretary Shultz Trip to the Middle East - Schedule 1, Scenario 1 for Secretary Trip”, July 31, 1987, 
Collection “Ross, Dennis Files”, Box 7, Folder “Chron File, July 1987,” Ronald Reagan Presidential 
Library.     
32 “Shultz Agenda for Today’s Meeting with the President - Memorandum for Frank C. Carlucci from 
Robert B. Oakley”, July 29, 1987, Collection “Ross, Dennis Files”, Box 7, Folder “Chron File July 1987,” 
Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. 
33 Barry Schweid, “Shultz Urges Palestinians to Form Delegation with Jordan,” Associated Press, March 3, 
1988; Schweid, “US To Maintain Aid To Palestinians Despite Jordan’s Abandonment Of Fund.” 
34 Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 1020. See also David K. Shipler, “Shultz to Meet 2 Prominent Palestinians 
on Unrest,” New York Times, January 27, 1988; Barry Schweid, “Palestinians Urge Shultz to Support 
International Peace Force,” Associated Press, January 27, 1988. 
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were,	   I	   thought,	   that	   it	   would	   never	   fully	   regain	   its	   earlier	   monopoly	   over	  Palestinian	   politics…	   the	   intifada	   bore	   the	   promise	   of	   a	   new	   generation	   of	  Palestinians,	  with	  new	  leaders	  trying	  to	  take	  hold	  of	  their	  own	  affairs”.35	   	  When	  he	  PLO	  ultimately	  met	  the	  administration’s	  explicit	  criteria	  for	  recognition,	  he	  and	  the	  president	   opened	   a	   dialogue	   with	   the	   PLO	   in	   December	   of	   1988.	   	   And,	   although	  Shultz	   felt	   obligated	   to	   engage	   the	   group	   after	   it	   had	   fulfilled	   stringent	   U.S.	  requirements	  for	  recognition,	  he	  also	  turned	  down	  repeated	  chances	  to	  pursue	  this	  possibility	  much	  earlier	  until	  events	  forced	  his	  hand.36	  
<Sub-­Case	  2:	  Baker	  versus	  the	  PLO>	  Like	  its	  predecessor,	  the	  new	  American	  administration	  was	  hard	  pressed	  to	  do	  something	  to	  address	  the	  intifada	  and	  perceived	  an	  opportunity	  to	  engage	  with	  Palestinians	  from	  the	  West	  Bank	  and	  Gaza.	  	  However,	  rather	  than	  pursuing	  LSI	  as	  an	  inherently	   desirable	   objective,	   the	   Bush	   administration	   pursued	   it	   on	   pragmatic	  grounds,	  mainly	   as	   a	  means	   to	   an	   end.	   	   It	   imposed	   limits	  on	   its	  dialogue	  with	   the	  PLO,	  but	  it	  also	  recognized	  the	  limits	  of	  what	  could	  realistically	  be	  achieved	  without	  the	   buy-­‐in	   of	   the	   PLO’s	   leadership.	   	   Thus,	   the	   Bush	   administration	   observed	   self-­‐imposed	   limits	   on	   its	   efforts	   to	   marginalize	   the	   group.	   	   It	   also	   did	   more	   than	  Reagan’s	  team	  to	  enlist	  support	  from	  friendly	  Arab	  capitals	  forcing	  the	  PLO	  to	  accept	  a	   format	   at	   Madrid	   where	   Palestinian	   representation	  was	   handled	   by	   individuals	  living	  within	  the	  West	  Bank	  and	  Gaza,	  rather	  than	  by	  PLO	  officials	  from	  Tunis.	  Even	  when	  the	  administration	  pursued	  a	  dialogue	  with	  the	  PLO	  in	  1989	  and	  early	   1990,	   it	   pursued	   the	   Israeli	   plan	   for	   Palestinian	   elections	   in	   a	   manner	   that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 1017. 
36 Ibid., 1034–1045. 
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aimed	  to	  marginalize	  the	  official	  organization	  based	  in	  Tunis.	   	  For	  instance,	  Dennis	  Ross	  recalls	  that	  when	  he	  met	  with	  a	  group	  of	  Palestinians	  from	  the	  territories,	  he	  still	   sought	   to	   discourage	   them	   from	   deferring	   to	   the	   PLO	   and	   “hoped	   to	   build	  pressure	  on	  Arafat	  and	  the	  PLO	  by	   letting	   those	   in	   the	   territories	  know	  what	   they	  had	  to	  gain”.37	  	  He	  reports	  hoping	  to	  determine	  whether	  “the	  ‘internal	  PLO’	  [would]	  be	   prepared	   to	   engage	   in	   the	   search	   for	   a	   political	   solution	   without	   the	   external	  PLO’s	  sanction”.38	   	  The	  U.S.	  continued	  to	   insist	   that	   the	  participants	   in	  multilateral	  peace	  negotiations	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  elections	  could	  not	  be	  official	  members	  of	  the	  PLO	  in	  order	  to	  assuage	  remaining	  Israeli	  concerns	  about	  the	  organization.	  Baker	   reports	   that	   his	   thinking	   at	   the	   time	   was	   influenced	   by	   his	   Mideast	  advisors,	  who	  argued	  that	  	  “The	  Intifada	  demonstrated	  a	  divergence	  between	  the	  PLO	  in	  Tunis	  and	  Palestinians	  living	   in	   the	   territories…	   this	   simple	  reality	   raised	   the	  possibility	   that	  Palestinians	  within	   the	   territories	  might	   be	  willing	   at	   long	   last	   to	   negotiate	   their	   own	   destiny	  instead	  of	  waiting	  for	  the	  PLO	  to	  act.	   	  If	  the	  Palestinians	  from	  within	  decided	  to	  do	  something	  for	  themselves,	  the	  PLO’s	  authority	  would	  be	  diminished.”39	  	  And,	  although	  the	  U.S.	  maintained	  a	  dialogue	  with	  the	  PLO	  until	  1990,	  its	  objectives	  and	  extent	  were	  consciously	  quite	  limited:	  	  “In	  Tunis,	  Robert	  Pelletreau,	  had	  been	  conducting	  a	  dialogue	  with	  low-­‐level	  officials	  of	  the	  PLO.	  	  Yasir	  Arafat	  was	  pointedly	  excluded	  from	  this	  endeavor.	  	  His	  reputation	  as	   a	   terrorist	  was	   so	   ingrained	   in	  American	  public	  opinion	   that	  no	  administration	  could	  deal	  with	  him	  openly.	  	  No	  solution	  was	  possible,	  however,	  without	  at	  least	  his	  private	   acquiescence	   to	   a	   separate	   dialogue	   between	   Israel	   and	   Palestinians	   from	  the	   territories.	   	  We	  would	   continue	   the	   inherited	  U.S.-­‐PLO	  dialogue	  at	   a	   low	   level,	  but	   the	   Egyptians	   would	   be	   available	   to	   talk	   directly	   with	   Arafat.	   	   Our	   primary	  tactical	   objective	  was	   to	   persuade	   him	   to	   accept	   negotiations	   between	   Israel	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Dennis Ross, The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace (Macmillan, 
2004), 56. 
38 Ibid., 57. 
39 James A. Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War & Peace, 1989-1992 (G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 
1995), 117. 
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Palestinians	   in	   the	   territories.	   	   In	   effect,	   we	   were	   asking	   Arafat	   to	   disenfranchise	  
himself	   on	   the	   grounds	   of	   political	   expedience:	   there	   was	   no	   way	   a	   Shamir-­led	  
government	  would	  ever	  negotiate	  with	  the	  PLO”.40	  	  Thus,	  in	  the	  secretary’s	  May	  1989	  speech	  to	  AIPAC,	  he	  announced	  that	  “it	   is…	  high	  time	  for	  political	  dialogue	  between	  Israeli	  officials	  and	  Palestinians	  in	  the	  territories	  to	  bring	  about	  a	  common	  understanding	  on	  these	  and	  other	  issues.	   	  Peace,	  and	  the	  peace	  process,	  must	  be	  built	  from	  the	  ‘ground	  up’.	  	  Palestinians	  have	  it	  within	  their	  power	  to	  help	  define	  the	  shape	  of	  this	  initiative”.41	  This	  effort	  fell	  apart	  with	  the	  end	  of	  Israel’s	  national	  unity	  government	  in	  the	  spring	  of	  1990,	   since	   the	  NUG’s	   termination	  meant	   that	   Shamir	  now	  backed	  away	  from	  the	  Palestinian	  elections	  initiative	  that	  previously	  bore	  his	  name.	  	  However,	  in	  early	   1991	   after	   the	   end	   of	   the	   Gulf	   War,	   Baker	   felt	   obligated	   launch	   his	   own	  program	  for	  the	  peace	  process,	  since	  he	  had	  promised	  Arab	  and	  European	  coalition	  members	  that	  the	  United	  States	  would	  give	  the	  peace	  process	  its	  due	  attention	  after	  the	  defeat	  of	  Iraq.42	  At	   this	   point,	   he	   resumed	   the	   effort	   to	  marginalize	   the	   PLO	   and	   empower	  local	  leaders,	  perceiving	  the	  empowerment	  of	  local	  elites	  as	  the	  only	  way	  to	  launch	  a	  peace	  conference	   that	   the	  Shamir	  government	   in	   Israel	  would	  accept.	   	  He	  also	   felt	  that	  Arafat’s	  bad	  bet	  –	  throwing	  the	  PLO’s	  lot	  in	  with	  Saddam	  Hussein	  –	  would	  boost	  American	  leverage	  for	  getting	  the	  organization	  to	  assent	  to	  a	  conference	  without	  its	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Ibid., 118. Emphases added. 
41 James Baker, “Address by the Honorable James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State Before the American-
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Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict’ - Speech Text, Memorandum from Richard Haass for Nicholas 
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direct	  participation.	  	  No	  doubt,	  the	  PLO	  had	  been	  weakened	  by	  siding	  with	  the	  losing	  side	   in	   the	  Gulf	  War,	   but	  Baker’s	  decision	   to	   launch	  an	   initiative	   at	   this	   time	   took	  advantage	  of	  the	  PLO’s	  financial	  and	  diplomatic	  weakness	  in	  order	  to	  consolidate	  its	  marginalization	  by	  forcing	  it	  to	  accept	  representation	  from	  within	  the	  territories.	  In	  advance	  of	  Baker’s	   first	   trip	  to	  the	  region	  after	  the	  war,	  Ross	  recalls	  that	  the	  secretary’s	  strategy	  memo	  called	  for	  America’s	  Arab	  partners	  to	  “help	  promote	  credible	  Palestinian	  leaders	  in	  the	  territories	  as	  negotiating	  partners	  with	  Israel”.43	  	  He	   recalls	   that	   Baker	   than	   reassured	   the	   Israelis	   that	   the	   language	   required	   for	  participation	   in	   the	   conference	   would	   “fence	   out	   the	   PLO”.44	   	   As	   a	   result,	   the	  eventual	  Palestinian	  delegation	  to	  the	  conference	  was	  comprised	  of	  individuals	  from	  the	  territories	  such	  as	  Hanan	  Ashrawi,	  Haidar	  Abdel	  Shafi,	  Ghassan	  Khatib,	  and	  Saeb	  Erekat,	  who	  were	  close	  to	  the	  PLO	  but	  did	  not	  have	  a	  formal	  affiliation	  at	  the	  time.	  	  Baker’s	  account	  also	  reflects	  these	  objectives.	   	  He	  met	  with	  local	  Palestinian	  leaders	   from	   the	   territories	   a	   whopping	   eleven	   times	   in	   the	   run-­‐up	   to	   Madrid,	  mostly	   in	   the	   region	   but	   also	   in	  Washington	   or	   Amman	   in	   order	   to	   negotiate	   the	  modalities	   for	   Palestinian	   participation.45	   	   In	   his	   first	   such	   meeting,	   he	   told	   his	  counterparts	  that	  “I	  have	  sat	  with	  leaders	  of	  eight	  Arab	  states,	  and	  all	  said	  they	  will	  not	  support	  your	  leadership	  [i.e.	  the	  PLO]…	  you	  are	  moderate	  people	  of	  good	  sense.	  	  You	  have	  to	  realize	  that	  we’re	  not	  going	  to	  renew	  a	  dialogue	  with	  the	  PLO	  in	  the	  face	  of	  Arafat’s	  embrace	  of	  Saddam	  Hussein”.46	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44 Ibid., 71. 
45 For a listing of these meetings, see Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, 423, 445, 450, 465–466, 491, 496, 
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Baker	  says	  that	  he	  asked	  the	  leaders	  of	  Arab	  states	  to	  help	  him	  “fence	  out	  the	  PLO,”	   including	   King	   Fahd	   of	   Saudi	   Arabia,	   President	   Mubarak	   of	   Egypt,	   King	  Hussein	   of	   Jordan,	   and	   even	   President	   Assad	   of	   Syria.47	   	   He	   also	   made	   clear	   to	  Shamir	  that	  he	  would	  not	  accept	  Israeli	  claims	  that	  Palestinians	  from	  the	  territories	  were	   too	   close	   to	   the	   PLO	   or	   demands	   that	   they	   sign	   some	   sort	   of	   document	  disavowing	   the	   organization.48	   	   He	   also	   worked	   to	   assuage	   the	   concerns	   of	  frightened	   or	   frustrated	   Palestinian	   negotiating	   partners	   leading	   up	   to	   the	  conference,	   arranging	   for	   their	   bodyguards	   to	   get	   extra	   training	   from	   the	   Secret	  Service	   and	   setting	   up	   a	   White	   House	   meeting	   with	   the	   president	   for	   Faisal	   al-­‐Husseini,	  who	  had	  played	  a	  major	   role	   in	   sorting	  out	  Palestinian	  participation	  but	  was	  never	  going	  to	  be	  approved	  by	  the	  Likud	  leadership	  in	  Israel	  to	  attend.49	  	  Did	  the	  Policy	  Succeed?	  	   Yes	  for	  Baker,	  no	  for	  Shultz.	  	  James	  Baker’s	  LSI	  effort	  was	  largely	  successful,	  but	  George	  Shultz’s	  bid	  at	  leadership	  selection	  intervention	  was	  an	  outright	  failure.	  The	  PLO	  was	  never	  fully	  of	  one	  mind	  or	  fully	  in	  control	  of	  events	  in	  the	  territories,	  but	   throughout	   this	   period	   it	   remained	   the	   single	  most	   powerful	   actor	   in	   internal	  Palestinian	   politics.	   	   Shultz	   took	   on	   too	   ambitious	   a	   goal–	   changing	   the	   internal	  balance	   of	   forces	   in	   Palestinian	   society	   –	   whereas	   Baker	   focused	   on	   the	   more	  realistic	   tactical	   objective	   of	   getting	   to	   a	   conference	   without	   the	   PLO	   included.	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Further,	  he	  did	  much	  more	   to	  harness	  American	  assets	   to	  advance	  his	  plan,	  while	  Shultz	  did	  comparatively	  little	  to	  achieve	  a	  much	  more	  difficult	  goal.	  	  
<Sub-­Case	  1:	  Shultz	  versus	  the	  PLO>	  At	   the	   time,	   some	   observers	   argued	   that	   the	   plan	   the	   condominium	   plan	  backed	  by	  Shultz	  was	  yielding	  benefits.	  	  For	  instance	  a	  journalist	  for	  the	  Wall	  Street	  
Journal	  reported	  being	  told	  by	  Morris	  Draper,	   the	  American	  consul	  general	   in	  East	  Jerusalem	  at	  the	  time,	  that	  “efforts	  to	  develop	  an	  alternative	  leadership	  to	  the	  PLO	  ‘have	  so	  far	  not	  been	  wildly	  successful.’	  	  Still,	  he	  insisted,	  ‘now	  there	  are	  Palestinian	  figures	  publicly	  critical	  of	  the	  PLO’.”50	  	  American	  mediation	  did	  play	  a	  major	  role	  in	  helping	  wrap	  up	  the	  Jordanian-­‐Israeli	  agreement	  for	  a	  Jordanian	  bank	  to	  open	  up	  in	  the	  Palestinian	  territories,	  and	  this	  helped	  bind	  Palestinian	  commerce	  and	  finance	  to	  Amman	  while	  PLO	  leaders	  were	  still	   forced	  to	  carry	  money	  into	  the	  West	  Bank	  by	  hand.51	   	   Shimon	   Peres	   concluded	   that	   after	   the	   American,	   Jordanian,	   and	   Israeli	  efforts	   had	   allowed	   “a	   recognizable	   change	   in	   the	   orientation	   of	   Judean	   and	  Samarian	   inhabitants	   from	   pro-­‐PLO	   to	   pro-­‐Jordanian,”	   but	   Adam	   Garfinkle	   aptly	  points	  out	   that	   the	  prime	  minister’s	   claims	  may	  have	  been	   shaped	  by	  his	  political	  needs	  at	  the	  time	  rather	  than	  being	  a	  true	  assessment	  of	  events	  on	  the	  ground.52	  Although	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  how	  big	  a	  role	  the	  U.S.	  played	  in	  the	  appointment	  of	  pro-­‐Jordanian	  mayors	   (it	   clearly	   supported	   the	   idea	   later	   in	   the	   year),	   the	   Israeli	  military	  commission	  in	  the	  West	  Bank	  following	  through	  with	  the	  appointment	  of	  a	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number	  of	  new	  mayors	  in	  major	  Palestinian	  cities	  who	  were	  privately	  affiliated	  with	  the	  Jordanian,	  monarchist	  cause	  to	  undermine	  the	  appeal	  of	  the	  PLO.	  	  For	  instance,	  the	   Jordanian	   foreign	   minister’s	   uncle,	   Zafer	   al-­‐Masri,	   was	   appointed	   mayor	   of	  Nablus	   and	   presented	   as	   a	   hopeful	   standard	   bearer	   for	   the	   new	   political	  movement.53	  	  However,	  al-­‐Masri	  was	  assassinated	  in	  March	  of	  1986	  by	  members	  of	  the	  PLO	  in	  an	  act	  that	  was	  seen	  as	  a	  setback	  to	  the	  plan,	  and	  his	  funeral	  was	  turned	  into	  a	  PLO	   rally,	  making	  a	  mockery	  of	  King	  Hussein’s	   efforts.54	   	  Draper	  notes	   that	  similar	  problems	  were	  experienced	  by	  the	  new	  mayor	  of	  Bethlehem,	  Elias	  Freij,	  as	  well:	   “he	  was	   considered	   as	   an	   ‘Uncle	   Tom’	   by	   a	   lot	   of	   the	   Palestinians	   and	   then	  when	   American	   would	   show	   up	   at	   his	   house	   regularly	   that	   added	   to	   his	   woes.	  	  Sometimes	  that	  increased	  the	  threats	  on	  his	  life”.55	  Tom	  Friedman	  went	   so	   far	  as	   to	  decry	   that	   “the	  murder…	  of	  Nablus	  Mayor	  Zafer	  el-­‐Masri,	  apparently	  by	  Palestinian	  extremists,	  appears	  to	  have	  destroyed	  –	  for	  now	  –	  whatever	  remained	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  Middle	  East	  peace	  process.	  	  It	  has	  also	  cut	  off	   abruptly	   recent	   attempts	   to	   cultivate	   a	   ‘legitimate,’	   ‘pragmatic’	   Palestinian	  leadership	   in	   the	   West	   Bank	   that	   could	   counterbalance	   the	   Palestine	   Liberation	  Organization	   (PLO)”.56	   	  And,	  while	  Friedman’s	   claim	  was	  overwrought,	   the	  act	  did	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scare	   off	   other	   moderate	   Palestinian	   elites.	   	   Immediately	   afterwards,	   both	   men	  under	  consideration	  to	  be	  appointed	  mayor	  of	  al-­‐Bireh	  dropped	  out	  of	  the	  race,	  and	  one	  of	  them	  even	  took	  out	  a	  advertisement	  in	  an	  East	  Jerusalem	  newspaper	  to	  draw	  attention	  to	  his	  decision.	  	  A	  candidate	  for	  mayor	  of	  Ramallah	  told	  journalists	  at	  the	  same	  paper	  he	  had	  never	  even	  asked	  for	  the	  job.57	  The	  act	  also	  stood	  as	  a	  sign	  that	  the	  PLO	  would	  not	  be	  cowed.	  	  And	  later	  on	  when	  Shultz	  went	  to	  meet	  with	  a	  hand-­‐picked	  group	  of	  local	  Palestinian	  moderates,	  the	  PLO	  forbid	  the	  meeting	  and	  forced	  his	  moderates	  to	  cancel.58	  	  When	  the	  intifada	  broke	  out,	  Shultz	  privately	  remarked	  that	  “what	  Shamir	   fails	   to	  understand	   is	   that	  Hussein’s	  position	  as	  a	  spokesman	  for	  the	  Palestinians	  is	  eroding	  with	  each	  passing	  day,”	   but	   he	   never	   formulated	   a	   viable	   strategy	   to	   get	   Shamir	   onboard	   for	   his	  diplomatic	  solution,	  nor	  did	  he	  do	  much	  to	  step	  up	  his	  foreign	  assistance	  budgeting	  for	   rescuing	   the	   Jordanian	  option	   through	   the	  development	  plan.59	   	   In	   fact,	   at	   this	  point,	  economic	  development	   in	  the	  territories	  was	  fraying	  terribly,	  and	  the	  newly	  empowered	   resistance	   leadership	   was	   avowedly	   anti-­‐Jordanian.60	   	   The	   chance	   to	  fully	  buy	  into	  Jordan’s	  West	  Bank	  plans	  was	  probably	  long	  past.	  Furthermore,	   the	   administration’s	  weak	   financial	   commitment	   to	  Hussein’s	  West	  Bank	  plan	  undermined	  its	  effectiveness.	   	  Administration	  efforts	  to	   follow	  the	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initial	   $4.5	  million	   in	   July	   of	   1986	  with	   an	   additional	   $30	  million	   fell	   through	   the	  following	  March.61	   	  By	  July	  of	  1987,	  administration	  officials	  were	  still	   trying	  to	  get	  approval	   for	   the	   line	   item	   $30	  million	   and	  were	   now	   forced	   to	   think	   in	   terms	   of	  trying	   to	  “breathe	  new	  life	   into	  efforts	   there”	  rather	   than	  to	  ensure	   their	  bold	  and	  comprehensive	   success.62	   	   Even	   as	   late	   as	   September	   of	   that	   year,	   officials	   were	  having	  difficulty	  nailing	  down	  a	  source	  for	  another	  round	  of	  U.S.	  funding.	  	  NSC	  files	  describe	  a	  “need	  to	  appoint	  person	  to	  take	  charge	  of	  efforts	  to	  improve	  cooperative	  and	  developmental	   steps	  on	   the	  ground	   in	  West	  Bank/Gaza.	   	   $30	  million	  must	  be	  tied	   to	  plan	   for	  next	  6-­‐12	  months.	   	  Shamir,	  Hussein	  and	  Palestinians	  must	  see	  our	  commitment	  here”.63	   	   Bureaucrats	   and	  Palestinians	  both	  were	  becoming	   skeptical	  about	   how	   much	   the	   QoL	   program	   was	   actually	   going	   to	   achieve,	   something	   I	  explore	   in	   greater	   detail	   below.	   	   The	   Jordanians	  were	   increasingly	   forced	   to	   scale	  back	  the	  program	  for	  lack	  of	  outside	  funds.64	  Overall,	  the	  plan	  failed	  to	  achieve	  its	  objectives.	  	  As	  Yehuda	  Lukacs	  writes	  in	  his	  book	  on	  Israeli-­‐Jordanian	  relations,	   Jordan’s	  five-­‐year	  development	  plan	  “failed	  to	   materialize	   owing	   to	   a	   lack	   of	   enthusiasm	   by	   the	   potential	   donors,”	   the	   Masri	  assassination	  was	  “the	  first	  concrete	  signal	  that	  there	  were	  limits	  to	  the	  imposition	  of	   the	   Israeli-­‐Jordanian	   condominium	   ideas,”	   and	   that	   the	   parties	   “failed	   in	   their	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hope	   to	   inflict	   a	   fatal	   blow	   to	   the	   PLO	   through	   the	   condominium	   scheme”.65	   Avi	  Shlaim	   writes	   that	   when	   “the	   discussion…	   turned	   to	   Jordan’s	   West	   Bank	  Development	  Plan…	  the	  Israelis	  promised	  to	  use	  their	  influence	  in	  Washington,	  but	  the	  American	  response	  was	  disappointing”.66	  
<Sub-­Case	  2:	  Baker	  versus	  the	  PLO>	  James	  Baker’s	  efforts	  to	  empower	  local	  Palestinian	  leaders	  to	  speak	  for	  their	  people	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  the	  PLO	  basically	  succeeded.	  	  He	  was	  unable	  to	  achieve	  this	  result	   in	  1989	  and	  1990,	   and	   the	  Oslo	  Accords	   sidelined	   local	   leaders	  by	  bringing	  the	  PLO	  front	  and	  center,	  but	  arguably	  this	  never	  would	  have	  been	  possible	  without	  Madrid	  building	  up	  the	  peace	  camp	  in	  Israel	  and	  persuading	  many	  in	  Israel	  that	  the	  PLO	  was	  isolated	  enough	  to	  be	  eager	  to	  cut	  a	  deal.	  Dennis	  Ross	  blames	  the	  policy’s	  initial	  failure	  in	  1990	  on	  the	  staunch	  position	  of	   the	   Israeli	   prime	  minister	   at	   the	   time,	   Likud	   leader	  Yitzhak	   Shamir.	   	  He	   argues	  that	  the	  effort	  in	  which	  Israel	  also	  took	  part	  	  “to	  circumvent	  and	  weaken	  the	  PLO	  in	  Tunis	  was	  defeated	  by	  [Shamir’s]	  inability	  to	  hold	   the	   line	   against	   the	   Israeli	   right.	   	   Had	   he	   permitted	   the	   Palestinians	   in	   the	  negotiations	   to	   demonstrate	   that	   they	   were	   producing	   increasing	   Palestinian	  independence,	  had	  he	  stopped	  the	  Israeli	  actions	  that	  most	  outraged	  Palestinians	  –	  land	  confiscation,	  continued	  settlement	  activity,	  daily	  humiliations	  at	  checkpoints	  –	  he	  might	   have	   truly	   empowered	   the	  Palestinians	   from	   the	   territories	   and	  made	   it	  possible	   for	   the	   ‘internal	   PLO’	   to	   become	   an	   alternative	   to	   Yasir	   Arafat’s	   PLO	   in	  Tunis.	  	  But	  he	  did	  not.	  	  His	  insensitivity	  to	  Palestinian	  needs	  and	  concerns	  mirrored	  Arafat’s	  insensitivity	  and	  indifference	  to	  Israeli	  needs	  a	  decade	  later”.67	  	  However,	  with	  the	  push	  for	  a	  multilateral	  conference	  after	  the	  Gulf	  War,	  Baker	  got	  another	  shot.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Lukacs, Israel, Jordan, and the Peace Process, 170. 
66 Shlaim, Lion of Jordan, 441. 
67 Ross, The Missing Peace, 82. 
	   597	  
	   Of	   course,	   the	   PLO	   continued	   to	   be	   supported	   by	   “the	   vast	   majority	   of	  Palestinians”.68	  	  However,	  Baker	  found	  an	  opportunity	  to	  parley	  support	  form	  Arab	  capitals	  and	  the	  grudging	  acceptance	  of	  Shamir	  into	  an	  initiative	  to	  get	  a	  Palestinian	  delegation	  composed	  of	  empowered	  local	  elites	  instead	  of	  PLO	  officials.	   	  What	  was	  important	  was	   that	   he	   did	   not	   try	   to	   push	   this	   gambit	   too	   far,	   squeezing	   the	   PLO	  beyond	  what	   the	  group	   itself	  would	  accept,	  albeit	   reluctantly.	   	  For	   instance,	  Faisal	  al-­‐Husseini,	   who	   coordinated	   the	   meetings	   and	   later	   joined	   the	   talks	   as	   another	  member	  of	  the	  local	  leadership	  insisted	  that	  “the	  meetings	  with	  James	  Baker…	  were	  decided	  by	  the	  PLO.	   	  Both	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Israel	  know	  this	  perfectly	  well”.69	  	  But	   their	   willingness	   to	   finesse	   the	   difference	   enabled	   them	   to	   empower	   local	  Palestinian	  leaders	  to	  the	  point	  where	  they	  could	  attend	  without	  the	  PLO	  and	  return	  home	  to	  a	  heroes’	  welcome.70	  	  	  	   The	   PLO	   showed	   itself	   reluctant	   but	   ultimately	  willing	   to	   permit	   the	   peace	  push	  to	  proceed	  as	  planned	  without	  its	  direct	  involvement.	   	  There	  were	  numerous	  opportunities	   to	  block	   the	  effort,	  but	   they	  chose	  not	   to	  do	  so.	   	  Baker	  notes	   that	  at	  many	  of	  his	  meetings	  with	  local	  Palestinian	  elites,	  they	  mentioned	  having	  received	  specific	   letters	   of	   blessing	   or	   encouragement	   from	   the	   PLO	   for	   their	  meetings,	   in	  contrast	   to	   when	   the	   PLO	   vetoed	   Shultz’s	  meeting	  with	   Palestinian	   leaders	   years	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Emad Fraitakh, “Intifada: Now the War Among the Palestinians: The Secular-Fundamentalist Schism on 
the West Bank,” Washington Post, November 24, 1991. 
69 Faisal Husseni, “Palestinian Politics After the Gulf War: An Interview with Faisal Husseini,” Journal of 
Palestine Studies 20, no. 4 (Summer 1991): 106. 
70 Robert Mahoney, “Palestinians Home to Hero’s Welcome, Prepare for Israeli Talks,” Reuters News, 
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before.71	   	   The	   PLO	   signed	   off	   on	   Baker’s	   September	   meeting	   with	   Ashrawi	   in	  Amman,	   something	  particularly	  helpful	  because	   it	  helped	  move	  ahead	  Palestinian-­‐Jordanian	   talks	   on	   the	   specific	   modalities	   for	   their	   joint	   delegation.72	   	   The	   PLO’s	  National	   Council	   also	   held	   a	   full	   vote	   in	  Algiers	   to	   green	   light	   participation	   in	   the	  conference	  at	  Madrid;	  Arafat	  faced	  considerable	  pressure	  to	  say	  no	  and	  preclude	  a	  non-­‐PLO	   role,	   but	   he	   pushed	   for	   a	   positive,	   if	   vague,	   official	   answer	   instead.73	  	  Despite	  having	  earlier	   insisted	  on	  naming	   the	  conference	  delegates	  himself,	  Arafat	  eventually	  relented.74	  	  Even	  certain	  PLO	  hardliners	  such	  as	  Farouq	  Qaddoumi	  signed	  off	   on	   sending	   the	   local	   delegates	   to	  Madrid	   instead	   of	   PLO	  officials	   because	   they	  had	  concluded	  that	  the	  latter	  option	  was	  not	  a	  realistic	  choice.75	  	   Thus,	  Baker’s	  effort	  should	  be	  termed	  a	  narrow	  and	  a	  broader	  success.	  	  They	  bolstered	   local	   Palestinian	   leaders	   a	   moderate	   but	   significant	   amount,	   and	   in	   so	  doing	  he	  was	  able	  to	  bring	  about	  a	  major	  landmark	  event	  in	  the	  history	  of	  the	  peace	  process.	  	  For	  a	  time,	  Madrid	  helped	  break	  the	  taboo	  on	  direct	  negotiations	  between	  Israel,	  the	  Palestinians,	  and	  their	  neighbors,	  and	  it	  launched	  a	  series	  of	  multilaterals	  meetings	  which	  helped	  begin	  to	  socialize	  the	  parties	  to	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  other	  side	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Baker recalls that “they gave me a letter from Yasir Arafat stating that he had empowered them to 
represent his interests. (And I received a similar pro forma letter at every subsequent meeting I had with 
them.)” Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, 423. 
72 Wafa Amr and David Hirst, “PLO Sends Single Emissary in Protest at Peace Plan,” The Guardian (UK), 
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Times, September 24, 1991; William C. Mann, “Palestinians Compromise to Aid Peace Effort,” Associated 
Press, September 26, 1991. 
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on	  a	  range	  of	  core	  issues.76	  
	  
Coding	  the	  Observable	  Implications	  
1.	  Perceptions	  of	  Sender	  Interests:	  	   The	   four	   theories	   studied	   by	   this	   dissertation	   predict	   a	   range	   of	   mutually	  exclusive	  observable	  implications,	  which	  enable	  researchers	  to	  use	  the	  data	  to	  test	  the	   theories	   against	   each	   other.	   	   These	   theories	   are	   national	   interests	   theory	  (Theory	  #1),	  lobby-­‐legislative	  politics	  (Theory	  #2),	  bureaucratic	  politic	  (Theory	  #3),	  and	   leadership	   theory	   (Theory	   #4).	   	   For	   instance,	   the	   theories	   pose	   divergent	  predictions	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  how	  actors	  in	  the	  sender	  state	  perceive	  their	   interests	  and,	   in	  turn,	  how	  this	  bears	  upon	  variation	  in	  the	  occurrence	  of	  LSI	  behavior.	  	   Theory	   #1	   expects	   that	   actors	   in	   the	   sender	   state	   should	   interpret	   their	  interests	  uniformly	   and	   in	   line	  with	  objective	  national	   interests;	   thus,	   variation	   in	  LSI	   occurrence	   should	   consistently	   reflect	   objective	   opportunities	   over	   time.	  	  Theory	   #2	   expects	   that	   LSI	   toward	   Palestinian	   politics	   should	   be	   relatively	   rare,	  since	   members	   of	   Congress	   and	   the	   pro-­‐Israel	   lobby	   should	   expect	   Palestinian	  leaders	  to	  adhere	  to	  unrealistically	  high	  standards	  of	  friendliness	  to	  Israel.	  	  Because	  of	   their	   tendency	   to	   identify	   with	   Israeli	   positions	   over	   Palestinian	   ones,	   these	  actors	   should	   tend	   to	   ignore	   differences	   between	   Palestinian	   hardliners	   and	  Palestinian	  moderates,	  making	   it	  much	  harder	   to	   elicit	   a	   policy	   of	   support	   for	   the	  latter	   over	   the	   former.	   	   Theory	   #3	   expects	   that	   LSI	   toward	   Palestinian	   politics	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 For what Madrid achieved, see Daniel C. Kurtzer et al., The Peace Puzzle: America’s Quest for Arab-
Israeli Peace in the Post-Cold War Era [forthcoming] (US Institute of Peace & Cornell University Presses, 
2012), 81–83. 
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should	   be	   near-­‐constant,	   since	   members	   of	   the	   bureaucracy	   who	   work	   on	   these	  issues	   full-­‐time	   should	   tend	   to	   over-­‐emphasize	   rather	   than	   under-­‐emphasize	  differences	  between	  Palestinian	  moderates	  and	  Palestinian	  hardliners,	  calling	  for	  a	  policy	   of	   backing	   the	   former	   over	   the	   latter.	   	   Finally,	   Theory	   #4	   expects	   that	   the	  occurrence	  of	  LSI	  should	  vary	  according	  to	  the	  subjective	  beliefs	  and	  idiosyncrasies	  of	  top	  leaders	  in	  the	  sender	  state.	  	  This	  includes	  their	  assessments	  of	  counterparts,	  their	   expectations	   for	   leadership	   contestation	   in	   Palestinian	   affairs,	   and	   their	  personal	  priorities	  for	  regional	  politics.	  	   Theory	   #2	   offers	   a	   reasonable	   model	   of	   Congressional	   preferences	   during	  this	  period,	  but	  it	  does	  not	  provide	  a	  persuasive	  model	  for	  LSI	  behavior,	  suggesting	  that	   the	   link	  between	   the	   two	   factors	   is	   rather	  weak.	   	  Members	  of	  Congress	  were	  determined	  to	  marginalize	  the	  PLO	  and	  occasionally	  outflanked	  the	  administration	  on	   the	   issue,	   but	   they	   were	   not	   particularly	   engaged	   in	   efforts	   to	   nurture	   an	  alternative	   leadership	   in	   the	   territories.	   	   For	   instance,	   Ted	   Kennedy	   called	   for	  administration	  backing	  of	  Jordan’s	  West	  Bank	  development	  plan,	  but	  there	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  much	  Congressional	   interest	   in	  the	  matter	  beyond	  this	  event.77	   	  Rather	  than	  seeking	  to	  promote	  King	  Hussein’s	  development	  plan,	  AIPAC	  displayed	  a	  stance	  tended	  toward	  skepticism	  and	  neutrality.78	  	  Yet	  for	  reasons	  discussed	  below,	  the	  lobby	  seems	  to	  have	  played	  little	  role	  in	  the	   executive	   branch’s	   main	   difficult	   with	   Congress	   regarding	   the	   plan	   –	   that	   is,	  efforts	  to	  elicit	  funds	  for	  supporting	  Jordan’s	  efforts	  in	  the	  West	  Bank.	  	  This	  difficulty	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 John Rice, “Senator Backs West Bank Aid Plan,” Associated Press, December 13, 1986. 
78 For AIPAC discussions of the issue, see “West Bank Realities,” Near East Report 30, no. 27 (July 7, 
1986); “Editorial: What Do They Want?” Near East Report 30, no 28, (July 21, 1986); “Jordanian Plan 
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emerged	  from	  the	  camp	  of	  fiscal	  conservatives,	  not	  from	  backers	  of	  Israel.	  	  	  And	  although	  Baker	  worked	  to	  build	  up	  local	  nationalist	  elites	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  the	  Tunis-­‐based	  official	  PLO,	  the	  pro-­‐Israel	  community	  took	  a	  dim	  view	  of	  these	  activists.	   	   For	   instance,	   AIPAC’s	   weekly	   newsletter	   bashed	   Hanan	   Ashrawi	   as	   a	  “media	   darling”	   with	   extremist	   views	   and	   highlighted	   her	   case	   as	   proof	   of	   “the	  difficulty	   Israel	   faces	   in	   finding	   responsible	   Palestinians	   it	   can	   negotiate	   with”.79	  	  Other	  articles	  by	  Near	  East	  Report	  throughout	  that	  year	  took	  a	  similarly	  dim	  view	  of	  these	  activists’	  true	  preferences.80	  	  Further,	  the	  simple	  fact	  that	  LSI	  occurred	  during	  both	  periods,	  while	  Theory	  #2	  predicts	  that	  LSI	  should	  be	  relatively	  unlikely,	  seems	  to	  contradict	  the	  expectations	  of	  the	  theory.	  	   Meanwhile,	  Theory	  #3	  does	  not	  fare	  much	  better.	  	  Although	  its	  prediction	  of	  very	  frequent	  LSI	  is	  congruent	  with	  basic	  outcomes	  in	  the	  data,	  the	  causal	  processes	  leading	  to	  this	  overlap	  do	  not	  fit	  with	  the	  expectations	  of	  the	  bureaucratic	  approach.	  	  Theory	  #3	  cannot	  explain	  why	  Shultz’s	  effort	   to	  marginalize	  the	  PLO	  was	  so	  much	  more	   severe	   than	   Baker’s	   subsequent	   attempt.	   	   Further,	   the	   executive	   branch’s	  decision	   to	   marginalize	   the	   PLO	   in	   1989	   and	   1990	   when	   it	   had	   a	   functioning	  dialogue	   with	   the	   group	   was	   more	   an	   expression	   of	   presidential	   interests	   than	  bureaucratic	  desires.	  	  As	  Baker	  recalls,	  the	  PLO	  dialogue	  was	  kept	  at	  a	  low	  level	  and	  studiously	   avoided	   engaging	   Arafat	   because	   of	   political	   considerations,	   since	   “his	  reputation	   as	   a	   terrorist	   was	   so	   ingrained	   in	   American	   public	   opinion	   that	   no	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 “Hanan Ashrawi: Media Darling,” Near East Report 35, no. 16 (April 22, 1991). 
80 “The Peace Agenda: The Palestinians,” Near East Report 35, no. 40 (October 7, 1991); “No Concessions 
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administration	   could	   deal	   with	   him	   openly”.81	   	   As	   is	   noted	   below,	   it	   also	   cannot	  explain	  why	  assistant	  secretary	  Dick	  Murphy’s	  long-­‐suffering	  attempt	  to	  meet	  with	  moderate	  Palestinian	  delegates	  from	  the	  territories	  was	  vetoed	  at	  the	  last	  minute	  by	  President	   Reagan,	   who	   felt	   strongly	   that	   no	   individual	   even	   remotely	   associated	  with	  the	  PLO	  should	  be	  allowed,	  even	  if	  the	  ultimate	  effect	  of	  such	  a	  meeting	  might	  be	  to	  undermine	  the	  PLO	  overall	  by	  empowering	  individuals	  from	  the	  territories.	  	   The	   best	   explanation	   for	   why	   Shultz	   pursued	   more	   ambitious	   goals	   with	  regard	   to	   Palestinian	   politics	   than	   Baker	   comes	   down	   to	   personal	   beliefs.	   	   Shultz	  pursued	   goals	   that	   were	   unrealistic	   (especially	   relative	   to	   the	   limited	   amount	   of	  resources	  he	  was	  willing	  to	  commit	  to	  their	  fulfillment)	  compared	  to	  Baker	  because	  of	  how	  he	   felt	  about	   the	  PLO.	   	  This	  offers	  evidence	   in	   favor	  of	  Theory	  #4	   that	   the	  national	  interests	  approach	  of	  Theory	  #1	  cannot	  incorporate	  or	  explain.	   	  American	  efforts	   to	   marginalize	   the	   PLO	   should	   have	   been	   relatively	   consistent	   across	  administrations,	   since	   the	   group	   continued	   to	   be	   rejected	   by	   the	   ruling	   Israeli	  government	   and	   still	   engaged	   in	   terrorism	   (especially	   if	   one	   focuses	   on	   behavior	  Baker’s	  in	  1991	  and	  excludes	  1989	  and	  early	  1990,	  which	  I	  am	  largely	  doing	  here).	  Whereas	  its	  predecessor	  had	  looked	  for	  an	  active	  role	  that	  would	  involve	  for	  the	   PLO	   in	   the	   peace	   process,	   the	   Reagan	   team	   felt	   that	   the	   group	   was	   simply	  irredeemable,	  at	  least	  until	  its	  final	  days	  in	  office	  when	  the	  PLO	  accepted	  U.S.	  terms	  for	   recognition.	   	   This	   sentiment	   was	   personal,	   and	   it	   was	   visceral.	   For	   instance,	  Philip	   Wilcox,	   a	   deputy	   assistant	   secretary	   covering	   Palestinian	   issues	   for	   Near	  Eastern	  Affairs	  and	   later	  a	   consul	  general	   in	   Jerusalem,	  argues	   that	  Shultz’s	  policy	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toward	   the	   area	   was	   heavily	   shaped	   by	   his	   beliefs	   about	   Palestinian	   leaders,	  especially	  Arafat	  at	  the	  PLO.	  	  He	  recalls	  that	  “George	  Shultz	  had	  a	  kind	  of	  a	  visceral	  loathing	  of	  terrorism,	  and	  he	  identified	  Yasser	  Arafat	  and	  the	  PLO	  with	  terrorism”.82	  	  Shultz	   writes	   in	   his	   memoirs	   that	   he	   even	   surprised	   his	   counterparts	   in	   allied	  nations	  with	  the	  vehemence	  of	  his	  opposition	  to	  terrorism.83	  At	  an	  AIPAC	  dinner	  in	  1987,	  Shultz	  –	  normally	  rather	  reserved	  –	  even	  led	  the	  crowd	  in	  an	  impromptu	  chant	  of	  “PLO,	  hell	  no!”.84	  	  However,	  Wilcox	  believes	  that	  the	  reason	  Shultz	   took	  this	  unexpected	  departure	  had	  more	  to	  do	  with	   the	  secretary’s	  visceral	  loathing	  for	  the	  PLO	  than	  it	  did	  with	  any	  sort	  of	  pressure	  from	  the	  pro-­‐Israel	  lobby.85	   	   Shultz’s	   main	   deputy	   for	   Mideast	   affairs,	   assistant	   secretary	   of	   state	  Richard	  Murphy,	   insisted	   that	   “when	   there	  was	   the	   issue	  of,	  what	  was	  very	  hot	   in	  the	  80s,	  when	  would	  we	  talk	  to	  the	  PLO,	  Shultz	  was	  rock	  hard	  on	  honoring	  the	  1975	  pledge…	   was	   he	   quote-­‐unquote	   afraid	   of	   the	   Congress,	   afraid	   of	   AIPAC?	   	   I	   don’t	  think,	   I	  wouldn’t	  describe	  him	  in	  that	  way…	  Shultz	   just	  said,	   look,	   the	  position	  has	  been	  clear	  since	   ’75…	   foreswear	  violence”.86	   	  Shultz	  himself	   reflects	   that	   “whether	  the	  PLO	  was	  strong	  or	  not,	  I	  did	  not	  regard	  the	  PLO	  as	  reliable	  or	  moderate”.87	  	  As	  is	  explored	   in	  more	  detail	   below,	   Shultz	  had	   considerable	   cachet	  with	   the	  pro-­‐Israel	  community,	   and	   his	   policies	   reflected	   their	   views	   because	   they	   shared	   a	   common	  worldview,	  not	  because	  of	  transactional	  bargaining	  between	  the	  two	  sides.	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Baker’s	  thinking	  on	  the	  issue	  was	  much	  less	  a	  matter	  of	  principle	  and	  more	  an	  issue	  of	  practicality.	  	  He	  sat	  down	  with	  Palestinian	  leaders	  from	  the	  territories	  in	  July	   of	   1991	   and	   explained	   that,	   while	   the	   United	   States	   was	   not	   seeking	   to	  determine	  who	   should	   rule	   them,	   it	  did	  believe	   that	  overt	   insistence	  on	  a	   role	   for	  Palestinians	   from	   the	  diaspora	  or	   from	  East	   Jerusalem	  at	   this	  point	  would	  kill	   the	  process.	  Baker	   insisted	   that	   “it’s	  not	   a	  question	  of	   fairness	  or	  what	   is	   right.	   	   It’s	   a	  question	  of	  reality,”	  since	  the	  Israelis	  would	  never	  accept	  a	  dialogue	  with	  the	  PLO	  so	  long	  as	  the	  Likud	  was	  in	  power.	  88	  These	   two	   secretaries	   of	   state	   may	   also	   have	   been	   influenced	   by	   the	   role	  played	  by	   their	  boss,	   the	  president.	   	  Like	  Shultz,	  Reagan	  had	  strong	   feelings	  about	  the	  PLO,	  whereas	  Bush	  was	  inclined	  to	  defer	  to	  Baker’s	  instincts.	  	  President	  Reagan	  evinced	   such	   strong	   opinions	   on	   the	   PLO	   that	   he	   had	   already	   blocked	   efforts	   to	  create	   a	   joint	   Jordanian-­‐Palestinian	   negotiating	   team	   in	   1985	   if	   the	   Palestinian	  participants	  were	  even	  indirectly	  connected	  with	  the	  PLO.	  	  Shultz	  recalls	  at	  first	  that	  	  “for	   all	  my	   frustration	  with	   King	  Hussein,	   I	   knew	   that	   the	   problem	   of	   Palestinian	  representation	  was	   a	   legitimate	   one	   for	   him,	   and	   a	   big	   one…	   I	   saw	   the	   president	  again	   on	   September	   5,	   just	   to	   make	   sure	   our	   views	   were	   in	   alignment.	   	   He	   was	  unswerving:	   there	   should	   be	   no	   ambiguity	   about	   our	   refusal	   to	   deal	  with	   anyone	  genuinely	  associated	  with	  the	  PLO.	  	  Murphy	  could	  meet,	  but	  only	  with	  Palestinians	  from	   the	   occupied	   territories.	   	   And	   we	   should	   press	   the	   king	   toward	   direct	  negotiations	  with	  Israel.	  	  Ronald	  Reagan	  was	  taking	  a	  personal	  stand	  on	  this,	  and	  he	  was	  steadfast”.89	  	  Even	  though	  Shultz	  thought	  “that	  we	  should	  let	  Murphy	  meet	  with	  Palestinians	  who	  were	  not	  tainted	  with	  terrorism	  or	  extremism,	  even	  if	  they	  had	  a	  slight	  association	  with	  the	  PLO,”	  but	  he	  said	  ultimately	  Reagan	  “did	  not	  want	  us	  to	  meet	  with	  anyone	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even	  remotely	  associate	  with	  the	  PLO…	  that	  was	  all	  the	  running	  room	  I	  could	  get”.90	  Meanwhile,	  Baker	  was	  aided	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  his	  boss,	  President	  Bush,	  did	  not	  care	  strongly	  enough	  about	  Palestinian	  politics	  to	  interfere	  or	  trip	  up	  his	  efforts	  in	  the	  manner	   he	   sometimes	   had	   on	   Israeli	   politics.	   	   Bush’s	   personal	   feelings	   about	  Israeli	   conduct	   sometimes	   led	   him	   to	   blurt	   out	   comments	   that	  were	   unhelpful	   to	  Baker’s	   diplomacy	   –	   such	   as	   his	   remarks	   labeling	   Jewish	   construction	   in	   East	  Jerusalem	   illegal	   settlement	   behavior	   in	   March	   of	   1990	   discussed	   in	   Chapter	   4.	  	  However,	  there	  were	  no	  such	  public	  comments	  that	  went	  off-­‐message	  from	  Bush	  on	  the	  Palestinian	  representation	   issue.	   	  Also,	  Baker	  recalls	   that	  he	  and	  the	  president	  were	   both	   extremely	   reluctant	   to	   terminate	   their	   dialogue	   with	   the	   PLO,	   even	  though	   they	   had	   kept	   it	   at	   intentionally	   low	   levels,	   but	   that	   Arafat’s	   refusal	   to	  condemn	  the	  PLF	  terrorist	  attack	  forced	  their	  hands.91	  	   Counterpart	   relationships	   and	   assessments	   also	   may	   have	   played	   an	  important	  role	  in	  the	  relative	  efficacies	  of	  these	  two	  American	  efforts.	   	  Reportedly,	  King	   Hussein	   evinced	   a	   rather	   dim	   view	   of	   the	   Reagan	   team’s	   competency,	   and	  Shultz	  recalls	  feeling	  that	  “the	  king	  acts	  like	  a	  spoiled	  child”.92	  	  Conceivably,	  this	  may	  have	  diminished	  room	  for	  effective	  coordination	  among	  the	  two	  sides	  and	  fostered	  the	   Shultz	   program’s	   failure.	   	   Meanwhile,	   Baker’s	   willingness	   to	   meet	   a	   stunning	  eleven	  times,	  mostly	  in	  region,	  with	  his	  intended	  Palestinian	  counterparts	  no	  doubt	  helped	   bolster	   their	   visibility	   and	   rapport	   between	   the	   two	   sides.	   	   He	   found	   his	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meetings	  with	   his	   Palestinian	   counterparts	   extremely	   frustrating	   at	   times,	   but	   he	  also	  seemed	  to	  hold	  both	  Ashrawi	  and	  Husseini	  in	  high	  regard.93	  	  2.	  Perceptions	  of	  Close	  Contests	  	   Another	   area	   in	   which	   some	   of	   the	   theories	   offer	   divergent	   predictions	  involves	   their	   predictions	   about	   close	   political	   contests	   in	   the	   target	   polity.	  	  Although	   theories	   2	   and	   3	   are	   somewhat	   agnostic	   on	   this	   dimension,	   Theory	   #1	  anticipates	   that	   individuals’	   subjective	  biases	   in	   the	  sender	  state	  should	  not	  shape	  their	   predictions	   about	   political	   struggles	   in	   the	   target,	   while	   leadership	   theory	  takes	  the	  opposite	  position.	  	  In	  this	  regard,	  Theory	  #4	  provides	  a	  better	  explanation	  of	  the	  data	  than	  does	  national	  interests	  theory.	  Shultz	   pursued	   his	   strategy	   for	   Palestinian	   politics	   on	   the	   basis	   of	  questionable	  empirical	  assumptions	  about	  how	  viable	  the	  PLO’s	  rivals	  actually	  were	  on	   the	  West	   Bank.	   	   His	   wishful	   thinking	   about	   the	   weakness	   of	   the	   PLO	   and	   the	  viability	  of	  boosting	  substitute	  for	  the	  group	  suggest	  that	  Theory	  #4	  offers	  the	  best	  explanation	  for	  American	  behavior	  during	  this	  period.	  For	   instance,	   in	   March	   of	   1987,	   approximately	   a	   year	   after	   Hussein’s	   split	  from	  Arafat	  and	  more	   than	  half	  a	  year	  after	  announcement	  of	   Jordan’s	  West	  Bank	  Development	  Plan,	  a	  strategy	  document	  bouncing	  around	   in	   the	  U.S.	  government’s	  national	  security	  bureaucracy	  cast	  Shultz’s	  assumptions	  under	  deep	  suspicion.	  	  The	  draft	   report	   (a	   joint	   National	   Security	   Study	   Document	   and	   National	   Security	  Decision	  Document)	  responding	  to	  President	  Reagan’s	  request	  for	  a	  strategy	  review	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on	  the	  Mideast	  peace	  process	  writ	  large,	  raised	  major	  concerns	  about	  the	  idea	  that	  Shultz’s	  efforts	  might	  actually	  sideline	  the	  PLO.	  	  The	  excerpt	  is	  somewhat	  long,	  but	  it	  is	  really	  worth	  reading	  in	  full:	  	  “Another	  way	  to	  do	  this	  [sort	  out	  Palestinian	  representation	  to	  Mideast	  peace	  talks]	  is	   to	   rebuild	   Jordan’s	   assets	   on	   the	   West	   Bank	   and	   to	   demonstrate	   to	   the	  Palestinians	   in	   the	   occupied	   territories	   that	   improvement	   of	   their	   material	  circumstances	  and	  political	  prospects	  depend	  more	  on	  Jordan	  than	  the	  PLO.	   	   [But]	  the	   chances	   that	   such	   a	   strategy	   alone	   -­‐-­‐	   i.e.	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   an	   active	   political	  process	  -­‐-­‐	  can	  yield	  continuing,	  tangible	  benefits	  are	  low.	  	  Furthermore,	  it	  is	  far	  from	  certain	  that	  Jordan	  can	  muster	  the	  requisite	  bureaucratic	  savvy,	  political	  sensitivity	  (in	  the	  occupied	  territories)	  and	  financial	  backing	  (in	  the	  international	  community)	  to	  deliver	  an	  effective	  development	  program.	  	  Even	  if	  over	  time	  Amman	  succeeds	  in	  putting	  an	  effective	  program	  in	  place,	  it	  may	  not	  be	  able	  to	  parlay	  economic	  benefits	  to	  West	  Bankers	   and	  Gazans	   for	   the	  political	   credit	  necessary	   to	   ease	   the	  way	   for	  Hussein	   to	   negotiate	   on	   their	   behalf.	   	   Finally,	   the	   development	   of	   an	   indigenous	  leadership	   in	   the	   occupied	   territories	   able	   and	   willing	   to	   carry	   its	   weight	   in	  negotiations	  with	  Israel,	  is	  a	  realistic	  prospect	  only	  over	  much	  longer	  term”.94	  	   Although	   the	  NSSD	  called	   for	   continuing	  Quality	  of	  Life	  programs,	   it	   took	  a	  narrower	   view	   of	   what	   could	   realistically	   be	   achieved,	   focusing	   much	   more	   on	  humanitarian	  objectives	  and	  boosting	   the	  environment	   for	  peace	   talks	  rather	   than	  Shultz’s	   dream	   of	   forging	   an	   alternative	   leadership	   to	   replace	   the	   PLO.95	   	   It	   also	  argued	   that	   the	   U.S.	   would	   not	   achieve	   success	   at	   even	   these	   limited	   objectives	  unless	  it	  could	  also	  “find	  ways	  to	  upgrade	  the	  political	  content	  of	  our	  interventions	  with	  Israel	  by	  addressing	  such	  politically	  symbolic	  and	  potentially	  sensitive	  areas	  as	  water	   and	   land,	   by	   “addressing	  more	   strictly	   political	   issues	   such	   as	   treatment	   of	  Palestinians	   in	   the	   territories,”	   and	   “look	   for	   ways	   to	   develop	   incipient	   political	  structures	  (e.g.,	  Council	  of	  Mayors,	  manufacturers,	  or	  professional	  associations)	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 “Draft NSSD on Middle East Peace Process”, March 17, 1987, 2, Presidential Directives, Part II, Digital 
National Security Archive. 
95 Ibid., 8–9. See also page three of the draft decision document being paired with the study directive at the 
time: NSSD “Draft NSDD on Middle East Peace Process”, March 17, 1987, 3, Presidential Directives, Part 
II, Digital National Security Archive. 
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will	  add	  to	  a	  sense	  of	  movement	  and	  build	  the	  impression	  that	  Quality	  of	  Life	  offers	  a	  real	  prospect	  for	  Palestinians	  to	  gain	  control	  over	  their	  own	  lives”.96	  Evidently,	   others	  within	   the	   American	   government	   bureaucracy	   seemed	   to	  think	  that	  Shultz’s	  strategy	  for	  undermining	  the	  PLO	  was	  unlikely	  to	  yield	  the	  sort	  of	  results	  he	  had	  previously	  been	  imputing	  to	   it.	   	   In	  short,	  he	  pursued	  a	  policy	  based	  upon	   a	  misreading	   of	   Palestinian	   politics,	   perceiving	   an	   opportunity	   that	  may	  not	  have	  actually	  been	  there.	  	  3.	  Patterns	  of	  Domestic	  Debate:	  	   Another	   area	   where	   the	   theories	   diverge	   has	   to	   do	   with	   the	   structure	   of	  deliberation	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  pursuit	  of	  leadership	  selection	  intervention.	  	  Theories	  2	  and	  3,	  which	  focus	  on	  domestic	  structural	  forces,	  expect	  lobbies,	  Congress,	  or	  the	  bureaucracy	   to	   be	   both	   informed	   and	   influential	  when	   important	   decisions	   about	  LSI	  are	  being	  made.	  	  However,	  leadership	  theory	  anticipates	  that	  top	  leaders	  should	  be	  able	  to	  undertake	  LSI	  while	  leaving	  these	  other	  internal	  stakeholders	  in	  the	  dark.	  America’s	  failure	  to	  undermine	  the	  PLO	  via	  the	  QoL	  plan	  under	  Reagan	  and	  Shultz	  cannot	  be	  attributed	  to	  lobby-­‐legislative	  pressures	  under	  Theory	  #2.	  	  Shultz	  faced	  considerable	  difficulty	  finding	  money	  on	  the	  Hill	  for	  the	  Hussein’s	  West	  Bank	  development	  plan,	  but	  it	  was	  more	  due	  to	  fiscal	  hawks	  than	  because	  of	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  pro-­‐Israel	  lobby.	  	  In	  the	  era	  of	  Gramm-­‐Rudman,	  money	  for	  foreign	  assistance	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 “Draft NSSD,” 9. 
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was	   tight	  all	   around.97	   	  When	  Shultz	  asked	   for	  $30	  million	   for	   the	   Jordanian	  West	  Bank	   development	   plan’s	   second	   year	   of	   U.S.	   support,	   it	   turned	   out	   that	   “NEA	   is	  looking	  at	  FY87	  money,	  and	  there	  is	  none	  available”.98	  But	   when	   the	   government	   came	   up	   with	   a	   plan	   for	   funding	   the	   program	  through	   reprogramming	   other	   existing	   funds,	   they	   expected	   the	   Hill	   actually	   be	  quite	   obliging.	   	   NSC	   staffer	   Robert	   Oakley	   wrote	   in	   private	   channels	   that	   “$23	  million	   could	   be	   reprogrammed	   -­‐-­‐	   with	   some	   authorizing	   legislation	   -­‐-­‐	   for	   use	   in	  Jordan.	   (Congressional	   support	   for	   money	   for	   West	   Bank	   development	   is	   quite	  strong.	  	  The	  appropriate	  House	  and	  Senate	  committee	  are	  planning	  to	  earmark	  $20-­‐30	  million	  for	  the	  West	  Bank	  in	  the	  FY	  88	  budget.)”.99	  Although	   opposition	   to	   military	   aid	   or	   advanced	   arms	   sales	   were	   high,	  probably	   a	   mark	   of	   AIPAC’s	   influence	   with	   Congress,	   this	   did	   not	   translate	   into	  perceived	  opposition	  on	  backing	   Jordan	   in	   the	  West	  Bank,	  provided	   that	  available	  funds	   could	   be	   found	   somewhere	   and	   repurposed.	   	   Oakley	   writes	   that	  “Congressional	   support	   for	  West	  Bank	   assistance	   is	   strong;	   opposition	   to	   I-­‐HAWK	  [sales]	  and	  military	  assistance	  is	  equally	  strong”.100	  	   Similarly,	   the	   role	   of	   the	   pro-­‐Israel	   lobby	   cannot	   be	   explained	   for	   the	   low	  level	  of	  U.S.	  effort	  exerted	  in	  support	  of	  Shultz’s	  West	  Bank	  program.	  	  Oakley	  wrote	  in	   private	   at	   the	   time	   that	   that	   “the	   Secretary…	   is	   admired,	   indeed	   revered,	   by	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 Fritz, “Plans for Extra Foreign Aid Elicit Outrage in Congress: White House to Seek Additional $1.3 
Billion While Domestic Programs Are Being Cut”; Gwertzman, “Shultz to Press Congress for Increase in 
Current Foreign Aid Budget.” 
98 “$30 Million for the West Bank - Memorandum for Frank C. Carlucci from Robert B. Oakley.” 
99 “$30 Million for the West Bank - Memorandum for Frank C. Carlucci from Robert B. Oakley”, April 1, 
1987, Collection “Ross, Dennis Files”, Box 7, Folder “Chron File, April 1987,” Ronald Reagan 
Presidential Library. 
100 Ibid. 
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AIPAC,	   and	   its	   leaders	   are	   reluctant	   to	   take	   him	   on	   directly”.101	   	   When	   National	  Security	  Advisor	  met	  with	  trustees	  of	  the	  Washington	  Institute	  for	  Near	  East	  Policy,	  a	   think-­‐tank	   associate	   with	   the	   pro-­‐Israel	   community,	   his	   remarks	   trumpeted	  Shultz’s	  program	  as	  something	  positive	  the	  administration	  was	  doing	  in	  the	  region	  and	  did	  not	  seem	  to	  approach	  it	  as	  an	  item	  of	  likely	  opposition.	  	  His	  written	  talking	  points	  for	  the	  meeting	  proclaimed	  the	  following:	  	  “We	   need	   to	   counter	   an	   image	   of	   drift;	   work	   in	   ways	   that	   demonstrate	   that	  moderates	  can	  deliver;	  and	  that	  fundamentalists	  don’t	  succeed…	  We	  will	  try	  to	  help	  Hussein’s	  development	  plans	  on	  the	  West	  Bank,	  the	  one	  active	  thing	  going	  on	  that	  is	  concrete	  and	  can	  build	  a	  moderate	  Palestinian	  base	  in	  time.	  	  Shamir-­‐Peres-­‐Rabin	  all	  agree	  with	  this.”102	  	  If	   anything,	   it	   seemed	   the	   NSC	   expected	   opposition	   from	   the	   group	   regarding	  specific	  Israeli	  concern	  and	  the	  idea	  of	  an	  international	  conference	  in	  the	  region	  but	  not	  on	  using	   Jordan	   to	  bolster	  Palestinian	  moderates	  as	  an	  alternative	   to	   the	  PLO.	  	  When	   asked	   if	   the	   State	   Department	   under	   Shultz	   ever	   had	   “any	   problems	   with	  Congress”	  on	  Palestinian	  affairs	  and	  whether	  the	  hill	  would	  “get	  into	  the	  act	  at	  all,”	  the	  secretary’s	  troubleshooter	  on	  peace	  process	  issues,	  Wat	  Cluverius,	  said	  “No.	  	  The	  tendency	  is	  to	  get	  involved	  when	  things	  are	  very	  high	  visibility.	  	  This	  was	  a	  period	  of	  very	  low	  visibility”.103	  	   Meanwhile,	   in	   Baker’s	   work	   with	   local	   Palestinian	   leaders,	   he	   barely	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 “Shultz’s Meeting with the President, June 26 - Memorandum from Robert B. Oakley for Frank C. 
Carlucci”, June 25, 1987, Collection “Ross, Dennis Files”, Box 7, Folder “Chron File June 1987,” Ronald 
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encountered	  any	  resistance	  from	  Congress.	  	  The	  biggest	  legislative-­‐executive	  issues	  during	  the	  push	  to	  Madrid	  were	  first,	  debates	  over	  whether	  to	  restart	  aid	  to	  Jordan	  despite	  the	  king	  having	  sided	  with	  Saddam	  in	  the	  Gulf	  War,	  and	  second,	   the	  tough	  struggle	   over	   housing	   loan	   guarantees	   to	   Israel	   in	   the	   months	   just	   before	   the	  conference.104	  	  However,	  the	  issue	  of	  Palestinian	  representation	  did	  not	  even	  really	  emerge	  as	  a	  major	  bone	  of	  contention.	  	  Nor	  did	  administration	  officials	  seem	  to	  seek	  out	   Congressional	   approval	   for	   the	   plan.	   	   	   Thus,	   U.S.	   behavior	   in	   these	   cases	   fits	  much	  better	  with	  Theory	  #4	  than	  the	  lobby-­‐legislative	  approach.	  	  4.	  Cycles	  of	  Domestic	  Power:	  	   The	  domestic	  structural	   theories	  (number	   two	  and	  three)	  expect	   that	   these	  factors	   should	   be	   especially	   predominant	   during	   certain	   periods	   of	   the	   political	  calendar	  in	  the	  sender	  state.	   	  Thus,	   if	   theory	  #2	  is	  correct	  we	  should	  expect	  to	  see	  meddling	   be	   especially	   unlikely	   during	   periods	   leading	   up	   to	   an	   election	   in	   the	  sender	  state	  –	  or	  in	  periods	  in	  which	  the	  sender	  state	  is	  under	  divided	  government.	  	  In	  short,	  because	  Congress	  is	  exceptionally	  influential	  during	  these	  periods,	  contrary	  preferences	   from	  the	  executive	  branch	  should	  be	   largely	   irrelevant.	   	  And	   if	   theory	  #3	   is	   correct,	   the	   preferences	   of	   bureaucrats	   should	   predominate	   most	   notably	  during	   the	  beginning	  of	  presidential	  administrations	  (especially	   first	   terms),	  when	  political	  appointees	  are	  not	  yet	  in	  place	  to	  hem	  in	  an	  unruly	  bureaucracy.	  	  Theories	  1	   and	   4	   on	   the	   other	   hand	   do	   not	   permit	   these	   variations	   in	   the	   sender	   state’s	  domestic	  calendar	  to	  drive	  behavior	  in	  LSI	  occurrence	  or	  efficacy.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 For the former, see Adam Garfinkle, “How Can Jordan Thaw the Ice?,” Washington Times, April 1, 
1991. For the latter, see chapter 4 of this dissertation. 
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   Neither	  of	  the	  domestic	  structural	  theories	  fares	  particularly	  well	  during	  this	  period.	   	   In	   both	   episodes,	   secretaries	   of	   state	   pursued	   major	   interventions	   in	  Palestinian	   politics	   during	   periods	   of	   divided	   U.S.	   government,	   something	   which	  Theory	   #2	   expects	   should	   be	   extremely	   unlikely.	   	   And,	   while	   the	   timing	   of	   those	  episodes	   is	   somewhat	   consonant	  with	   the	   lobby-­‐legislative	  approach’s	  predictions	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	   American	   election	   calendar,	   the	   data	   is	   consonant	   for	   the	   wrong	  reasons.	  	  True,	  neither	  Shultz	  nor	  Baker	  pursued	  as	  much	  intervention	  in	  Palestinian	  politics	  during	   their	   last	  year	   in	  office	  –	  Shultz’s	   intervention	  peaked	   in	  1986,	  and	  Baker’s	  peaked	  in	  1991.	  	  However,	  Shultz’s	  peak	  occurred	  during	  a	  midterm	  election	  year,	  something	  that	  should	  have	  been	  unlikely	  under	  Theory	  #2.	  Also,	   their	   reasons	   for	   scaling	   back	   intervention	   in	   1988	   and	   1992	  respectively	   could	   be	   plausibly	   traced	   to	   other	   factors.	   	   The	   perceived	   strategic	  underpinnings	   for	   Shultz’s	   approach	   were	   collapsing	   at	   the	   time,	   first	   with	   the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  first	  intifada	  and	  then	  with	  King	  Hussein’s	  decision	  in	  July	  of	  1988	  to	  sever	  his	  country’s	  political	  with	  the	  West	  Bank.	  	  Arguably,	  Shultz	  moved	  marginally	  closer	   to	   accepting	   the	   PLO	   during	   this	   period,	   not	   so	   much	   against	   Palestinian	  nationalism	   that	   he	   refused	   to	   deal	   even	   with	   Palestinian	   moderates	   in	   the	  territories,	  as	  Congressional	  preferences	  probably	  would	  have	  dictated	  at	  the	  time.	  	  Nor	   did	   electoral	   politics	   seem	   to	   influence	   his	   thinking	   according	   to	   speech	  evidence	  at	  the	  time.	  	  When	  Reagan’s	  chief	  of	  staff,	  Ken	  Duberstein,	  argued	  in	  1988	  that	  the	  U.S.	  couldn’t	  recognize	  the	  PLO	  because	  it	  might	  hamper	  George	  Bush’s	  race	  for	   the	  presidency,	  Shultz	  replied	  that	  “we	  really	  have	  no	  choice…	  if	   the	  PLO	  meet	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our	  conditions	  we	  have	  to	  honor	  our	  commitment	  to	  start	  a	  dialogue”.105	  Nor	   does	   the	   logic	   of	   the	   lobby-­‐legislative	   approach	   explain	   variation	   in	  Baker’s	  behavior	  over	  time.	   	  During	  the	  first	  half	  of	  1992,	  his	  attention	  toward	  the	  region	  was	  consumed	  with	  political	  intervention	  in	  Israeli	  politics	  over	  housing	  loan	  guarantees	  –	  an	  even	  more	  sensitive	  instance	  of	  LSI.	  	  Then	  in	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  year	  his	  attention	  was	  consumed	  with	  domestic	  issues	  after	  he	  was	  pulled	  back	  into	  the	  White	  House	  to	  supervise	  Bush’s	  reelection	  effort	  as	  his	  chief	  of	  staff.	  	  	   Nor	  does	  the	  bureaucratic	  approach	  provide	  a	  compelling	  explanation	  for	  the	  timing	  of	   LSI	   during	   the	  Bush	  41	   and	   later	  Reagan	  years.	   	   In	  1985,	   at	   the	   start	   of	  Reagan’s	   second	   term	   in	   office,	   U.S.	   intervention	   in	   Palestinian	   politics	   was	   less	  pronounced	   rather	   than	   more	   frequent	   in	   the	   manner	   Theory	   #3	   would	   predict.	  	  And	  although	   James	  Baker	  did	  undertake	   to	  empower	   local	  Palestinian	  moderates	  during	  President	  Bush’s	  first	  year	  in	  office,	  his	  efforts	  were	  much	  more	  pronounced	  during	   1991	   than	   in	   1989.	   	   Although	   he	   met	   eleven	   times	   with	   local	   Palestinian	  elites	  during	   the	   lead-­‐up	   to	  Madrid,	  most	  of	  which	  were	  held	   in	  East	   Jerusalem	  or	  the	  West	  Bank,	  the	  secretary’s	  never	  met	  with	  Palestinian	  moderates	  on	  the	  ground	  until	  his	  third	  year	  in	  office.106	  	  The	  timing	  of	  his	  engagement	  in	  Palestinian	  politics	  cannot	  be	  explained	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  relative	  power	  of	  the	  American	  bureaucracy	  during	  Bush	  and	  Baker’s	  early	  days	  in	  office.	  	  5.	  Bureaucratic	  Freelancing:	  	   The	   predominance	   of	   bureaucratic	   freelancing,	   in	   which	   working-­‐level	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 1035. 
106 Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, 423. 
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officials	   in	   agencies	  of	   the	   executive	  branch	  undertake	  LSI	   against	   the	  wishes	   and	  without	   the	   authorization	   of	   the	   administration’s	   principles,	   would	   serve	   as	  evidence	  in	  favor	  of	  Theory	  #3,	  the	  bureaucratic	  approach.	  	  However,	  it	  seems	  there	  were	   no	   instances	   of	   bureaucratic	   freelancing	   during	   the	   two	   periods	   covered	   by	  these	  episodes.	  	   James	  Baker	  writes	  that	  he	  was	  persuaded	  to	  overcome	  his	  initial	  hesitance	  to	  engage	  in	  the	  quagmire	  of	  Arab-­‐Israeli	  peacemaking	  when	  his	  advisors	  convinced	  him	   in	   1989	   that	   the	   intifada	   provided	   an	   opportunity	   to	   help	   empower	   local	  Palestinian	   leaders	  at	   the	  expense	  of	   the	  PLO.	   	  However,	  American	  efforts	   to	  seize	  this	  opportunity	  were	  much	  more	  concerted	  in	  1991	  than	  in	  1989	  or	  1990,	  once	  the	  secretary	  perceived	  a	   strategic	  opportunity	  and	  decided	   to	   throw	  himself	   into	   the	  effort.	   	   Nor	   was	   the	   initial	   effort	   being	   pursued	   against	   his	   wishes	   –	   he	   chose	   to	  remove	  himself	  from	  the	  effort	  somewhat,	  but	  it	  occurred	  with	  his	  full	  approval.	  	   Nor	   was	   American	   intervention	   in	   Palestinian	   politics	   during	   the	   Reagan	  period	  pursued	  without	  the	  approval	  of	  George	  Shultz.	   	   In	  fact,	   if	  the	  point	  of	  view	  articulated	   in	   the	   draft	   NSSD/NSDD	   documents	   quoted	   above	   were	   at	   all	  representative	  of	  the	  U.S.	  bureaucracy,	  it	  would	  seem	  that	  these	  officials	  were	  more	  skeptical	  of	  the	  QoL	  endeavor	  than	  the	  secretary	  himself	  was.	  	  Thus,	  there	  are	  little	  grounds	  for	  suggesting	  that	  bureaucratic	  freelancing	  was	  responsible	  for	  America’s	  intervention	  in	  Palestinian	  politics	  at	  the	  time.	  	   Nor	  was	  either	  effort	  pursued	  by	   the	   secretary	  of	   state	   against	   the	  express	  wishes	  of	  the	  president.	  	  	  In	  1986,	  the	  internal	  paper	  trail	  indicates	  that	  Shultz	  was	  keeping	  the	  president	  and	  his	  advisors	  fully	  informed	  about	  his	  plan	  to	  pursue	  LSI	  in	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Palestinian	  politics.107	  	  In	  1987,	  the	  president’s	  staff	  sought	  to	  inform	  the	  secretary	  that	   Reagan	   felt	   his	  West	   Bank	   strategy	   was	   appealing	   and	   that	   he	   should	  move	  ahead	   with	   seeking	   additional	   money	   to	   backstop	   King	   Hussein’s	   development	  plan.108	   	   As	   noted	   above,	   Baker	   also	   had	   presidential	   backing	   for	   his	   effort	   to	  undermine	  the	  PLO	  in	  the	  territories.	  	   The	   Reagan	   administration	   did	   encounter	   one	   instance	   of	   Congressional	  freelancing	  toward	  Palestinian	  politics	  in	  which	  legislators	  sought	  to	  undermine	  the	  PLO	   in	   a	  manner	   that	   the	   executive	  branch	   felt	   contradicted	   its	   initiatives	   toward	  Palestinian	  politics,	   but	   this	  was	   a	   rather	  distinct	   and	  unrelated	   episode.	   	  Toward	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Reagan	  administration,	  members	  of	  Congress	  pushed	  hard	  to	  pass	  a	  bill	  that	  would	  forcibly	  close	  the	  PLO’s	  offices	  in	  Washington	  and	  at	  the	  UN	  in	  New	  York.	  	  Although	  Shultz	  left	  open	  the	  possibility	  of	  executive	  action	  at	  a	  later	  date	  to	  close	  the	  group’s	  DC	  office,	  he	  argued	  that	  its	  New	  York	  site	  was	  subject	  to	  America’s	  treaty	  obligations	  related	  to	  the	  United	  Nations.	   	  He	  therefore	  argued	  in	  a	   letter	  to	  Congress	  that	  closing	  it	  would	  probably	  result	   in	  an	  international	   legal	  setback	  for	  the	   government	   and	   a	   “propaganda	   gain”	   for	   the	  PLO.109	   	  He	   insisted	   that	   the	  bill	  	  “does	  not	  serve	  our	  shared	  aim	  of	  reducing	  the	  political	  influence	  of	  the	  PLO”.110	  	  	  	  Ultimately,	   the	   legislation	  passed	   and	  went	   into	   force	   over	   objections	   from	  the	   administration.	   	   Shultz	   complained	   that	   the	   attorney	   general	   “will	   go	   forward	  with	  the	  law,	  as	  he	  must”	  but	  that	  “my	  opinion	  remains	  that	  it’s	  a	  very	  bad	  piece	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 “Your Meeting with King Hussein”; “Talking Points for the President’s Meeting with King Hussein”; 
“Hussein Follow-Up - Memorandum for John M. Poindexter from Dennis Ross.” 
108 “Draft Memorandum.” 
109 Charles R. Babcock, “U.S. Considers Closing PLO Office Here: Legislation to Shut U.N. Site 
Opposed,” Associated Press, August 8, 1987. 
110 Ruth Sinai, “Shultz Tells Senators He Opposes Bill to Close PLO Offices,” Associated Press, August 5, 
1987. 
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legislation”.	   	  He	  even	  said	  that	   it	  was	  “one	  of	   the	  dumber	  things	  that	   the	  Congress	  has	  done	  lately”.111	  This	  episode	  suggests	  that	  the	  PLO	  was	  so	  unpopular	  in	  the	  United	  States	  at	  the	  time,	  either	  with	  the	  general	  public	  or	  with	  the	  attentive	  pro-­‐Israel	  issue	  public,	  that	  members	  of	  Congress	  sought	   to	  outflank	   the	  executive	  branch	   towards	   it	  and	  that	   the	   government	   felt	   comfortable	   laying	   out	   its	   general	   dislike	   for	   the	   group.	  	  This	   is	  one	   instance	   in	  which	   the	  beyond-­‐the-­‐pale	  nature	  of	  a	   faction	   in	   the	   target	  polity	  –	  in	  this	  instance,	  the	  PLO	  pre-­‐Oslo	  –	  led	  actors	  in	  the	  sender	  state	  to	  publicly	  acknowledge	  their	  preference	  against	  the	  disfavored	  group.	  However,	   this	  episode	  does	  not	  vitiate	  the	  strong	  pressure	  for	  practitioners	  of	   leadership	  selection	  intervention	  to	  still	  couch	  their	  intentions	  behind	  elaborate	  pretenses,	  nor	  does	  it	  suggest	  that	  Congress	  was	  calling	  the	  shots	  when	  it	  came	  to	  the	   administration’s	   (much	   more	   important)	   pursuit	   of	   LSI	   of	   its	   own	   accord.	  	  Indeed,	   once	   the	   intifada	   broke	   out,	   Shultz	   did	   not	   shy	   away	   from	  meeting	   with	  Palestinians	  who	  were	  sympathetic	   to	   the	  PLO,	  either	   from	  the	   territories	  or	   from	  the	  United	   States,	   even	   though	  he	   could	   easily	   have	   anticipated	   the	   opposition	  he	  would	   encounter	   from	   Congress	   and	   the	   pro-­‐Israel	   community.	   	   These	   actors	  registered	  their	  protests	  after	  the	  fact	  but	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  have	  been	  a	  relevant	  part	  of	  the	  decision	  process	  at	  the	  time.	  112	  	  Nor	  did	  he	  cave	  to	  their	  pressure	  on	  the	  PLO	  office	   issue,	   since	   he	   thought	   it	   would	   strengthen	   rather	   than	   undermine	   the	  organization.	   	  And	  there	  is	  certainly	  no	  evidence	  to	  remotely	  suggest	  that	  America	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 Ruth Marcus, “U.S. Reluctantly Orders PLO to Close U.N. Mission as New Law Requires,” Washington 
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backed	   King	   Hussein’s	   West	   Bank	   gambit	   because	   of	   Congressional	   pressure	   or	  freelancing	  without	  administration	  approval.	  And,	   although	   the	   episode	   represents	   a	   weakening	   of	   the	   pretense	  imperative,	   it	   does	   not	   indicate	   an	   abnegation	   of	   its	   effects.	   	   Political	   actors	   in	  Jordan,	  the	  United	  States,	  and	  Israel	  still	  faced	  moderate	  pressure	  to	  engage	  in	  this	  sort	  of	  rhetorical	  acrobatics	  to	  ensure	  the	  success	  of	  their	  political	  initiative.	  	  Jordan’s	   massive	   patronage	   plan	   was	   justified	   by	   technocrats	   as	   a	  humanitarian	   program	   “completely	   detached	   from	   parochial	   political	  considerations,”	  but	  the	  reality	  was	  quite	  the	  opposite.113	  	  The	  king	  himself	  claimed	  that	   he	   did	   not	   seek	   to	   substitute	   for	   the	   PLO,	   despite	   acting	   in	   ways	   that	  contradicted	   this	   claim.114	   	   Jordan’s	   prime	   minister	   insisted	   that	   “we	   are	   not	  competing	  with	  any	  party,	  we	  are	  only	  helping	  the	  West	  Bank	  people.	  	  The	  plan	  has	  no	  political	  objectives”.115	  	  Yet	  the	  prime	  minister	  himself	  was	  one	  of	  the	  individuals	  nurturing	  high	  political	  hopes	  for	  the	  kingdom’s	  anti-­‐PLO	  efforts.116	  Then	  again,	  the	  Israelis	  faced	  different	  incentives,	  since	  they	  viewed	  the	  PLO	  as	   truly	   beyond	   the	   pale	   at	   this	   time,	   and	   thus	   Rabin	   even	   acknowledged	   in	  September	   of	   1986	   in	   a	   newspaper	   interview	   that	   “the	   policy	   of	   Israel	   is	   to	  strengthen	  the	  position	  of	  Jordan	  in	  Judea	  and	  Samaria	  and	  to	  strike	  at	  the	  PLO”.117	  	  Yet	   he	   issued	   these	   statements	   as	   part	   of	   a	   political	   rivalry,	   both	   with	   the	   Likud	  leadership	   in	   Israel	   taking	   over	   the	   premiership	   and	   his	   boss,	   outgoing	   prime	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 For the technocratic argument, see Walker, “Jordan Offers West Bank Aid: Analysis of Five-year 
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minister	   from	   the	   Labor	   Party	   Shimon	   Peres.	   	   	   As	   a	   matter	   of	   piloting	   executive	  policy,	  Peres	  was	  much	  more	  circumspect	  in	  his	  approach	  to	  the	  endeavor	  and	  often	  described	   the	   intervention	   according	   to	   circuitous	   euphemisms	   such	   as	  “devolution”.118	  Meanwhile,	   despite	  Washington’s	   strong	   anti-­‐PLO	   preferences	   at	   the	   time,	  when	   the	   first	   tranche	   of	   American	   money	   for	   Jordan’s	   development	   plan	   was	  announced	   Shultz’s	   spokesperson	   justified	   aid	   to	   the	   development	   program	   on	  humanitarian	  grounds	  and	  did	  not	   trumpet	   their	   anti-­‐PLO	   intentions.119	   	  The	  New	  
York	  Times	   read	   the	  America’s	  $4.5	  pledge	  as	   “seeking	   to	  provide	  King	  Hussein	  of	  Jordan	   with	   American	   support	   in	   his	   dispute	   with	   the	   Palestine	   Liberation	  Organization”	   but	   pointed	   out	   that	   the	   aide	   on	  Bush’s	   trip	  who	   co-­‐announced	   the	  plan	   “denied	   that	   in	  provide	   the	  money	   the	  United	  States	  was	   trying	   to…	   increase	  the	  chance	  for	  a	  negotiated	  Middle	  East	  settlement.	  	  He	  said	  the	  aim	  was	  a	  desire	  by	  Secretary	  of	  State	  George	  P.	  Shultz	  and	  others	  in	  the	  Administration	  to	  improve	  the	  lot	  of	  Palestinians”.120	  	  	  Thus,	   the	  PLO	  office	  episode	   in	  1987	  and	  1988	   is	  a	   fascinating	  side	  note	   in	  America’s	   behavior	   toward	   Palestinian	   politics	   during	   the	   Reagan	   administration	  and	  a	  noteworthy	  instance	  of	  Congressional	  attempts	  at	  freelancing	  LSI	  policy.	  	  But	  it	  does	  not	  contradict	  the	  bulk	  of	  what	  was	  posited	  about	  the	  dynamics	  of	  LSI	  in	  the	  Israel	  chapters	  of	  this	  dissertation.	  	  Instead,	  at	  best	  it	  refines	  our	  understanding	  thus	  far,	  making	   clear	   that	   some	   of	   the	   patterns	   described	   above	   are	   subject	   to	   scope	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conditions	  and	  apply	  in	  weaker	  or	  heterogeneous	  forms	  across	  episodes	  and	  dyads.	  	  6.	  Consistency	  of	  Message:	  LSI	  effectiveness	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  product	  of	  two	  main	  factors:	  consistency	  and	  suitability	   of	   the	  message	   that	   the	   sender	   state	   projects	   toward	   observers	   in	   the	  target	   polity.	   	   Consistency	   seems	   to	   help	   explain	   why	   American	   LSI	   toward	  Palestinian	  politics	  was	  more	  effective	   in	  1991	  than	   in	  1986,	  and	  a	  big	  part	  of	   the	  reason	  seems	  to	  be	  personal.	  	  American	  inconsistency	  in	  this	  regard	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  have	  been	  a	  matter	  of	  bureaucratic	  pressure	  or	  even	  opposition	  from	  pro-­‐Israel	  members	   of	   Congress,	   as	   expected	   by	   theories	   two	   and	   three.	   	   And	   Theory	   #1	  expects	  that	  consistent	  messaging	  should	  be	  unproblematic,	  so	  that	  also	  finds	  little	  support	  in	  the	  data	  here.	  	  Therefore,	  Theory	  #4	  seems	  to	  fit	  best	  with	  the	  data	  in	  this	  regard.	  	  At	   first,	   Shultz’s	   backing	   for	   Jordanization	   of	   the	   West	   Bank	   succeeded	   in	  conveying	   the	   impression	   that	   American	   backing	   would	   help	   the	   king	   dole	   out	  considerable	   advantages	   for	   pro-­‐Hashemite	  Palestinians.	   	   Immediately	   as	   Jordan’s	  West	   Bank	   Development	   Plan	   was	   announced,	   Shultz	   had	   already	   freed	   up	   and	  announced	   $4.5	   million	   in	   American	   assistance	   to	   underwrite	   the	   effort.	   	   While	  some	  Palestinian	  farmers	  lined	  up	  looking	  to	  cash	  in	  on	  their	  share	  of	  the	  American-­‐Jordanian	  aid,121	  the	  PLO	  attacked	  the	  development	  initiative	  as	  “the	  bribe	  the	  U.S.	  White	  House	  is	  offering	  in	  implementation	  of	  Uncle	  Sam’s	  well-­‐known	  formula…	  to	  prevent…	  the	  Palestinian	  march	  of	  national	  liberation…	  any	  development	  plan	  in	  the	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occupied	  homeland	  with	  is	  formulated	  with	  good	  intentions	  must	  take	  place	  in	  co-­‐ordination	   with	   the	   PLO,	   the	   Palestinian	   people’s	   sole	   and	   legitimate	  representative”.122	  However,	  Shultz’s	   follow-­‐through	  was	  dismal.	   	  The	  $4.5	  million	  he	   freed	  up	  for	   the	  plan	   in	   its	   first	  days	  was	  not	  a	  harbinger	  of	   a	  massive	  American	  bribe	  but	  rather	   the	   first	   of	   three	   annual	   meager	   line	   items	   demonstrating	   symbolic	   U.S.	  support	  instead	  of	  genuine	  American	  bankrolling.	  	  In	  the	  next	  six	  months	  of	  the	  plan,	  the	  U.S.	  allocated	  no	  more	  money	  to	  the	  effort,	  and	  the	  amount	  appropriately	  came	  to	  be	  described	  by	  observers	  as	  a	  “token”	  level;	  Jordan	  was	  forced	  to	  scale	  back	  its	  objectives	  by	  about	  $300	  million	  and	  had	  enormous	  difficulty	   raising	  money	   from	  other	  sources.123	   	  In	  the	  next	  two	  years,	  America	  granted	  only	  $20	  million	  more	  to	  the	   project.	   	   In	   the	   end,	   the	   Palestinians	   got	   the	  message.	   	   According	   to	   the	   draft	  1987	   NSSD/NSDD	   on	   the	   peace	   process,	   “while	   Palestinians	   in	   the	   occupied	  territories	  have	  shown	  some	  interest	  in	  Jordan’s	  announced	  development	  program,	  they	  are	  still	  waiting	  to	  see	  results	  on	  the	  ground”.124	  	   Nor	  did	  Shultz	  act	  in	  ways	  to	  suggest	  that	  America’s	  diplomatic	  might	  would	  soon	   be	   deployed	   in	   service	   of	   Jordanian	   influence	   in	   the	   West	   Bank.	   	   Close	  American	   allies	   Saudi	   Arabia	   and	   Kuwait	   gave	   to	   Palestinian	   causes	   but	   opted	   to	  circumvent	   the	   Jordanian	   development	   plan:	   Riyadh	   gave	   $9.5	   million	   to	   a	  preexisting	  joint	  Jordanian-­‐PLO	  fund	  for	  the	  West	  Bank	  instead,	  and	  Kuwait	  gave	  $5	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million	  directly	  to	  Palestinian	  universities.125	  	  U.S.	  officials	  privately	  evinced	  concern	  that	  the	  Saudi	  contribution	  “has	  provided	  Arafat	  an	  important	  boost”.126	  Finally,	  when	  Shultz	  was	  presented	  with	  an	  opportunity	  to	  double	  down	  on	  the	  Jordanian	  option	  after	  Hussein	  and	  Peres	  signed	  the	  London	  Accords	  in	  April	  of	  1987,	   the	   secretary	   refused	   to	   endorse	   it.	   	   In	   all,	   the	   message	   that	   his	   behavior	  conveyed	   was	   that	   Palestinian	   moderation	   and	   allegiance	   to	   the	   king	   would	   be	  appreciated	  but	   that	   they	  were	  not	  matters	   for	   the	   concerted	  might	  of	   the	  United	  States	  government.	  	   Baker	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  was	  extremely	  consistent	  with	  his	  effort	  to	  engineer	  outcomes	   in	   Palestinian	   politics.	   	   Whereas	   Shultz	   held	   two	   high-­‐profile	   meetings	  with	   Palestinian	   leaders	   in	   all	   of	   1988	   while	   the	   intifada	   was	   raging,	   Baker	   held	  eleven.	  	  He	  repeatedly	  enlisted	  Arab	  leaders	  to	  hammer	  home	  the	  message	  that	  the	  PLO	  would	  not	  be	  included	  in	  peace	  talks	  and	  that	  its	  only	  choices	  were	  to	  authorize	  local	  negotiators	  or	  to	  run	  the	  risk	  that	  the	  Palestinians	  would	  be	   left	  out	  entirely.	  	  The	  message,	  consistently	  articulated	  by	  Washington,	  came	  through,	  even	  to	  leaders	  of	   the	   PLO.	   	   As	   historian	   Yezid	   Sayigh	   writes,	   even	   the	   PLO	   hardliner	   Farouq	  Qaddoumi	  decided	  to	  permit	  a	  delegation	  of	  local	  elites	  to	  go	  to	  Madrid	  because	  he	  had	  concluded	  “the	  PLO	  had	  either	  to	  join	  the	  peace	  process	  [as	  it	  was	  at	  the	  time]	  or	  to	  exit	  history”.127	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7.	  Suitability	  of	  Message:	  Baker’s	  relative	  success	  compared	  to	  Shultz	  was	  also	  a	  matter	  of	  volume	  and	  content.	   	   Not	   only	   was	   the	  message	   conveyed	   by	   American	   LSI	   in	   the	   lead-­‐up	   to	  Madrid	   more	   consistent,	   but	   its	   intended	   message	   was	   also	   more	   suitable	   for	  influencing	   the	   extant	  dynamics	  of	   internal	  Palestinian	  politics.	   	  Again,	   the	  matter	  seems	  to	  come	  down	  to	  personal	  inclinations	  of	  the	  two	  secretaries	  of	  state,	  a	  matter	  for	  Theory	  #4.	  One	  can	  question	  whether	  any	  effort	  that	  aimed	  to	  substitute	  the	  Hashemite	  monarchy	  for	  the	  PLO	  had	  a	  chance	  of	  succeeding	  in	  the	  1980s.	  	  That	  is,	  Shultz’s	  plan	  was	   unsound	   because	   he	   pursued	   it	   based	   on	   an	   unrealistic	   understanding	   of	  Palestinian	   politics.	   	   Polling	   at	   the	   time	   demonstrated	   that	   roughly	   93%	   of	  Palestinians	   in	   the	   West	   Bank	   still	   saw	   the	   PLO	   as	   their	   sole	   legitimate	  representative,	  while	  allegiance	  to	  Hussein	  was	  tepid.128	  	  A	  majority	  of	  Palestinians	  preferred	   reconciliation	   between	   Jordan	   and	   the	   PLO	   over	   Hashemite	  marginalization	   of	   the	   organization.129	   	   As	   Mary	   Curtius	   noted	   in	   the	   Christian	  
Science	  Monitor,	   “Hussein's	  efforts	  to	   find	  an	  alternative	  negotiating	  partner	  to	  the	  PLO	  have	   failed.	  On	   the	  West	  Bank,	   the	  PLO	   still	   claims	   the	   loyalty	   of	   virtually	   all	  activist	  Palestinians,	  despite	  Hussein's	  inauguration	  of	  a	  five-­‐year	  development	  plan	  and	  a	   crackdown	  on	  pro-­‐PLO	  Palestinians.”130	   	   The	   effort	   soon	   came	   to	   an	   abrupt	  end	  when	  Hussein	  severed	  ties	  with	  the	  West	  Bank	  in	  July	  of	  1988.	  In	  both	  periods,	  American	  policy	  held	  that	  the	  PLO	  was	  a	  harmful	  actor	  that	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had	  yet	   to	  abandon	   its	   long-­‐held	  extremist	   tendencies.	   	  However,	  during	   the	  Bush	  years	  America’s	  strategy	  toward	  the	  PLO	  was	  to	  seek	  out	  the	  group’s	  tacit	  approval	  for	  its	  own	  marginalization,	  in	  favor	  of	  local	  elites	  from	  within	  the	  territories.	  	  And,	  although	  obtaining	   the	   group’s	   reluctant	   assent	  was	  no	   easy	   task,	   it	  was	   certainly	  more	  feasible	  than	  expecting	  the	  group	  to	  sit	  back	  quietly	  while	  the	  administration	  in	  Washington	  sought	  to	  effect	  the	  PLO’s	  total	  removal	  as	  a	  political	  force.	  	  	  National	   interests	   theory	   predicts	   that	   suitable	   messaging	   should	   not	   be	  problematic	   for	   actors	   in	   the	   sender	   state,	   since	   their	   government	   should	   be	  expected	   to	   formulate	   a	   foreign	   policy	   based	   upon	   objective	   circumstances	   at	   the	  time,	  not	  actors’	  institutional	  or	  personal	  biases.	  	  Yet	  one	  administration’s	  approach	  evinced	   a	   much	   sounder	   understanding	   of	   the	   PLO’s	   staying	   force	   as	   a	   relevant	  political	  stakeholder.	  	  Nor	  can	  this	  divergence	  in	  strategy	  be	  persuasively	  attributed	  to	   pressure	   from	  domestic	   structural	   forces	   such	   as	   Congress	   or	   the	   bureaucracy.	  	  Rather,	  it	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  matter	  of	  staffing	  at	  the	  top.	  	  This	  is	  yet	  another	  dimension	  in	  which	  the	  data	  provides	  a	  much	  better	  fit	  for	  the	  predictions	  of	  leadership	  theory	  than	  its	  structural	  competitors.	  	  	  
Conclusion	  
	   American	   efforts	   to	   marginalize	   the	   PLO	   were	   probably	   doomed	   from	   the	  start.	   	   Barring	   perhaps	   a	  more	   active	   promotion	   of	   the	   Jordanian	   option	   in	   1982	  under	   the	   Reagan	   Plan	   or	   in	   1987	   under	   the	   London	   Accords,	   the	   Palestine	  Liberation	  Organization	  had	  long	  been	  the	  de	  facto	  representative	  of	  the	  Palestinian	  people	  according	  to	  all	  relevant	  stakeholders	  other	  than	  Israel	  and	  the	  United	  States.	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Thus,	   American	   pursuit	   of	   leadership	   selection	   intervention	   against	   the	   group	  skated	  on	  rather	  thin	  ice	  from	  the	  start.	  	   Washington’s	   efforts	   were	   therefore	   most	   successful	   when	   they	   were	  premised	  upon	  a	   realistic	  assessment	  of	   this	  challenge.	   	  To	   the	  extent	   that	  George	  Shultz	  and	  Ronald	  Reagan	  aimed	  to	  replace	  the	  PLO	  with	  a	  pro-­‐Jordanian	  group	  of	  local	   Palestinian	   elites	   who	   could	   participate	   in	   a	   diplomatic	   process	   against	   the	  wishes	  of	  the	  Tunis-­‐based	  leadership	  of	  the	  PLO,	  they	  were	  pursuing	  a	  mirage.	  	  The	  fact	  that	  they	  devoted	  only	  minimal	  resources	  to	  this	  far-­‐fetched	  objective	  only	  adds	  insult	  to	  injury.	  	  In	  contrast,	  George	  H.	  W.	  Bush	  and	  James	  Baker	  aimed	  to	  build	  up	  a	  group	   of	   nationalist	   Palestinian	   elites	   so	   they	   could	   participate	   in	   a	   diplomatic	  process	   with	   the	   tacit,	   if	   reluctant,	   approval	   of	   the	   PLO.	   	   This	   effort	   at	   LSI	  demonstrated	   a	  much	   clearer	   understanding	   of	   Palestinian	   politics	   and	   therefore	  was	   better	   poised	   for	   success.	   	   Baker’s	   willingness	   to	   devote	   substantial	   political	  capital	   toward	   achieving	   this	   difficult	   yet	   feasible	   objective	   implied	   a	   rather	   keen	  sense	  of	  diplomatic	  statecraft,	  even	  if	  the	  often	  expletive-­‐prone	  Texan	  is	  not	  widely	  credited	  for	  his	  diplomatic	  demeanor.	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Chapter	  IX.	  
~	  
Palestinian	  Politics	  in	  the	  Oslo	  Era	  
(1993-­2001)	  	  	  	   In	   many	   ways,	   Palestinian	   politics	   were	   utterly	   transformed	   during	   the	  course	  of	  Bill	  Clinton’s	  presidency.	  	  He	  inherited	  a	  post-­‐Madrid	  process	  in	  which	  the	  main	   Palestinian	   interlocutors	   were	   local	   elites	   from	   the	   territories,	   but	   he	   then	  followed	  Israel’s	  lead	  and	  engaged	  the	  PLO	  with	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  landmark	  Oslo	  Accords	  in	  1993.	   	  One	  intifada	  had	  drawn	  to	  a	  close	  at	  the	  start	  of	  his	  term,	  but	  an	  even	  more	  violent	  uprising	  broke	  out	   in	   the	  course	  of	  his	   final	  year	   in	  office.	   	  The	  PLO	  went	   from	  outsides	   in	  Tunis	   to	   insiders	   in	   Jericho,	  Gaza,	  Ramallah,	   and	  other	  parts	   of	   the	   territories.	   	   In	  many	  ways	   Israel’s	   occupation	   continued,	   but	   the	  PLO	  was	   given	   administrative	   and	   security	   authority	   in	   many	   Palestinian	   cities	   and	  towns,	   and	  western	   aid	   suddenly	   began	   to	   flow	   in	   support	   of	   this	   new	   governing	  apparatus.	   	  And,	   in	  the	  eyes	  of	  some	  critics,	  Yasser	  Arafat	  ensconced	  himself	  as	  an	  autocrat,	  immune	  against	  accountability	  or	  political	  pluralism	  from	  below.	  
Palestine,	  Case	  #2:	  The	  Opening	  after	  Oslo,	  1993-­‐2001	  	  
Coding	  the	  Dependent	  Variables	  (Occurrence	  and	  Efficacy)	  Did	  LSI	  Occur?	  	   Yes	  and	  no.	  	  For	  most	  of	  his	  presidency,	  President	  Clinton	  clung	  to	  his	  faith	  in	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Yasser	   Arafat	   as	   a	   crucial	   partner	   for	   peace.	   	   This	   belief	   colored	   his	   approach	   to	  Palestinian	  politics	  throughout	  his	  two	  terms	  in	  office.	  	  	  At	  key	  moments,	  especially	  in	   1993	   and	   1998,	   President	   Clinton	   took	   considerable	   efforts	   to	   bolster	   the	  standing	  of	  Yasser	  Arafat	  and	  the	  PLO	  leadership.	  	  Also,	  in	  later	  years,	  his	  aides	  tried	  to	  meddle	  in	  Palestinian	  politics	  in	  other	  ways,	  hoping	  to	  ease	  progress	  on	  the	  peace	  process	  by	  empowering	  perceived	  moderates	  within	  the	  Palestinian	  Authority	  elite.	  	  For	   these	   reasons,	   Aaron	   David	   Miller	   suggests	   that	   American	   LSI	   in	   Palestinian	  politics	   “is	  new”	  and	   “really	  didn’t	   exist”	  before	   this	  period:	   “it	   really	   started	  with	  Clinton,”	  at	  least	  in	  its	  modern	  incarnation.1	  However,	   one	   of	   the	   biggest	  ways	   in	  which	   the	  United	   States	   strengthened	  Arafat	   and	   the	   PLO	   was	   a	   by-­‐product	   rather	   than	   a	   goal	   of	   American	   policy	   and	  therefore	  does	  not	  qualify	  as	  LSI	  per	  se.	   	  American	  actions	  during	  most	  of	  the	  Oslo	  period	   helped	   to	   consolidate	   a	   Fatah-­‐led	   autocracy	   in	   Palestine,	   de-­‐developing	  democracy	  in	  hopes	  of	  a	  shortcut	  to	  a	  permanent	  peace	  agreement.	   	  In	  this	  regard,	  Washington’s	  meddling	  in	  Palestinian	  politics	  was	  de	  facto,	  not	  deliberate.	  
<Sub-­Case	  1:	  Welcoming	  Arafat	  on	  the	  White	  House	  Lawn>	  The	   Israelis	   and	  Palestinians	  who	   concluded	   the	  Oslo	  Accords	  expected	   for	  the	  agreement	  to	  be	  endorsed	  at	  the	  White	  House	  only	  at	  the	  ministerial	   level	  and	  that	   Arafat’s	   personal	   role	   could	   be	   finessed	   for	   some	   time	   to	   come.	   	   Although	  Clinton’s	  aides	  opposed	  inviting	  Arafat	  to	  Washington,	  the	  president	  overruled	  them	  without	   warning,	   announcing	   to	   the	   press	   that	   Arafat	   was	   welcome	   to	   attend,	  supposedly	   in	  part	  to	  bolster	  Arafat	   in	  the	  role	  of	  being	  an	  advocate	   for	  the	  newly	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Aaron David Miller, “Interview with the Author”, November 4, 2011. 
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invigorated	  peace	  process.	  Yossi	  Beilin,	  a	  key	  participant	  in	  the	  Oslo	  process	  in	  its	  early	  days,	  describes	  Clinton’s	  role	  in	  the	  process:	  “At	  first,	   it	   looked	  as	  if	  there	  would	  be	  a	  ceremony	  in	  Washington,	   at	  which	   the	   agreement	  would	   be	   signed	  with	   Faisal	  Husseini	   as	   the	  leader	  of	   the	  Palestinian	  group	  in	  the	   joint	  delegation	  with	  Jordan…	  [but]	  during	  a	  flight	   to	   Cleveland	   on	   September	   10,	   Clinton	   phoned	  Rabin	   and	   proposed	   that	   he	  come	   to	   Washington	   to	   sign	   the	   agreement	   himself.	   	   Clinton	   suggested	   that	   the	  opposite	  party	  should	  be	  Arafat.	  	  Rabin	  was	  very	  hesitant,	  but	  Arafat	  was	  not”.2	  Martin	  Indyk,	  who	  covered	  Mideast	  issues	  on	  the	  NSC	  at	  the	  time,	  writes	  that	  he	  and	  National	  Security	  Advisor	  Tony	  Lake	  both	  felt	  that	  the	  American	  public	  was	  not	  ready	  to	  see	  Yasser	  Arafat	  received	  at	  the	  White	  House.	  	  In	  fact,	  he	  recalls	  Lake	  saying	   “Yasser	   Arafat	  will	   come	   to	   the	  White	  House	   over	  my	   dead	   body!”.3	   	   They	  anticipated	  the	  PLO	  to	  send	  Abu	  Mazen	  as	  the	  group’s	  main	  representation,	  since	  he	  was	   the	   PLO’s	   number	   two	   and	   thus	   the	   equivalent	   of	   Shimon	   Peres,	   who	   had	  overseen	  most	  of	  the	  last-­‐minute	  negotiations	  on	  the	  Israeli	  side	  leading	  up	  to	  Oslo.	  Indyk	   says	   Clinton	   ignored	   his	   aides’	   advice	   and	   pushed	   Rabin	   in	   a	   phone	  conversation	   to	   attend,	   even	   though	   Rabin	   was	   torn	   and	   it	   would	   mean	   Yasser	  Arafat	   would	   insist	   on	   coming	   as	   well.	   	   Soon	   after,	   the	   U.S.	   received	  word	   of	   the	  PLO’s	   exchange	   of	   letters	   of	   mutual	   recognition	   with	   Israel,	   in	   which	   the	   group	  foreswore	  violence;	  thus,	  the	  State	  Department	  moved	  to	  take	  the	  PLO	  off	  its	  list	  of	  terrorist	  organizations.	  	  At	  this	  point,	  Clinton	  was	  about	  to	  meet	  a	  press	  conference	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Yossi Beilin, The Path to Geneva: The Quest for a Permanent Agreement, 1996-2004 (Akashic Books, 
2004), 37–38. 
3 Martin Indyk, Innocent Abroad: An Intimate Account of American Peace Diplomacy in the Middle East 
(Simon and Schuster, 2009), 63. 
	   628	  
to	  discuss	  the	  new	  developments.	  	  	  Indyk	  says	  that,	   in	  preparing	  for	  the	  news	  conference,	  with	  Lake	  and	  Ross’s	  endorsement	   he	   urged	   Clinton	   “that	   he	   should	   preempt	   the	   question	   [of	  whether	  Arafat	  would	  attend]	  by	   saying	   that	  we	  had	   sent	   invitations	   to	   the	   government	  of	  Israel	   and	   the	   PLO	   and	   that	   they	   had	   informed	   us	   Shimon	   Peres	   and	   Abu	  Mazen	  would	   be	   representing	   them.	   	   The	   president	   listened	   but	   did	   not	   respond”.4	  	  However,	  when	  Clinton	  was	  asked	  whether	  Arafat	  might	  attend,	  he	  answered	  that	  “the	  people	  who	  will	   be	  here…	  are	   the	  people	   that	   the	  PLO	  and	   Israel	   decide	  will	  come.	  	  That	  is	  entirely	  up	  to	  them…	  whoever	  they	  decide	  will	  be	  here	  is	  fine	  with	  us,	  and	  we	  will	  welcome	  them”.5	  	  In	  short	  order,	  Arafat	  sent	  word	  he	  would	  attend.	  
<Sub-­Case	  2:	  De	  Facto	  Dictatorship>	  Through	   most	   of	   this	   period,	   the	   Clinton	   administration	   remained	   firmly	  behind	  Arafat	  and	  the	  Fatah	  leadership	  of	  the	  Palestinian	  Authority.	  	  It	  opposed	  the	  rise	  of	  Hamas	  and	  did	  little	  to	  help	  an	  alternative,	  third	  way	  leadership	  to	  emerge.	  	  However,	  this	  support	  was	  generally	  not	  a	  matter	  of	  conscious	  effort	  so	  much	  as	  the	  consequence	  of	  the	  White	  House	  prioritizing	  other	  elements	  of	  the	  process.	  	  The	  U.S.	  enabled	  Arafat	  to	  impose	  near-­‐dictatorial	  control	  over	  Palestinian	  politics	  almost	  as	  an	  afterthought,	  enabling	  him	  to	  cement	  his	  power	  as	  a	  byproduct	  of	  its	  diplomacy	  toward	   the	   Mideast	   peace	   process.	   	   By	   the	   time	   of	   Arafat’s	   death	   in	   2004,	   the	  Palestinian	  Authority	  was	  rated	  by	  Freedom	  House	  as	  6	  out	  of	  7	  in	  civil	  liberties	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Ibid., 65. 
5 Ibid., 65–66. 
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5	  out	  of	  7	  in	  political	  rights,	  which	  overall	  the	  group	  proclaims	  as	  “not	  free”.6	  Daniel	  Polisar	  argues	  that	  the	  early	  days	  of	  the	  Oslo	  process	  were	  structured	  in	   such	   a	   manner	   that	   the	   Palestinian	   people	   missed	   a	   major	   opportunity	   to	  establish	  a	  democracy	  in	  the	  West	  Bank	  and	  Gaza.	  	  He	  argues	  that	  the	  main	  reasons	  for	  this	  failure	  boiled	  down	  to	  a	  few	  main	  factors:	  Arafat’s	  decision	  to	  rig	  electoral	  rules	  in	  his	  favor,	  allowing	  him	  to	  rob	  the	  new	  Palestinian	  legislature	  of	  any	  viable	  tools	   for	   oversight	   or	   policy	   initiation,	   Israel’s	   decision	   to	   hand	   over	   territory	  directly	  to	  the	  PLO,	  and	  outside	  support	  for	  the	  PA’s	  finances	  and	  security	  forces.7	  Also,	   the	   PLO	   established	   an	   enormous	   new	   bureaucracy	   with	   outside	  support,	  which	  Chairman	  Arafat	  used	  as	  a	  patrimonial	  asset	  with	  which	  to	  buy	  the	  continued	   loyalty	   of	   new	   returnees	   or	   possible	   sources	   of	   local	   dissent.	   	   One	  observer	  estimated	  that	  at	   least	  50,000	  PLO	  cadres	  returned	  from	  exile	  during	  the	  1990s,	  “form[ing]	  the	  bedrock	  of	  the	  PA’s	  political	  and	  military	  administration,	  and	  hav[ing]	   been	   deployed	   to	   penetrate	   and	   take	   over	   Palestinian	   political	   and	   civil	  society	  in	  the	  West	  Bank	  and	  Gaza”.8	  	  The	  Palestinian	  public	  sector	  grew	  by	  1998	  to	  employ	  more	  people	  in	  the	  territories	  than	  either	  agriculture	  or	  manufacturing,	  with	  a	   total	  of	  90,000	  people	  being	  employed	   in	  either	   the	   civilian	  public	   sector	  or	   the	  police;	  nearly	  60	  percent	  of	  the	  PA	  budget	  was	  earmarked	  for	  salaries.9	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Since Freedom House scores are retroactive for the preceding year, these figures are from the group’s 
2005 report.  However, the numbers were the same in 2004. See sections on “Methodology” and on 
“Palestinian Authority-Administered Territories” in “Freedom in the World 2005” (Freedom House, 2005), 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2005. 
7 Daniel Aaron Roy Polisar, “Electing Dictatorship: Why Palestinian Democratization Failed” (Harvard 
University Department of Government, Doctoral Dissertation, March 2001). 
8 “The Palestinian Authority and the CIA: Who Will Protect the Guards?,” Strategic Comments 
(International Institute for Strategic Studies) 4, no. 10 (December 1998). 
9 Sara Roy, “De-Development Revisited; Palestinian Economy and Society Since Oslo,” Journal of 
Palestine Studies 28, no. 3 (Spring 1999): 70–71. 
	   630	  
Ziad	  Abu	  Amr,	   a	   former	  member	   of	   the	   Palestinian	   Legislative	   Council	   and	  chairman	   of	   its	   Political	   Committee,	   lays	   out	   the	   endemic	  weaknesses	   of	   the	   new	  Palestinian	   parliament.	   	   	  He	   explains	   that	   the	   group	   failed	   at	   its	   two	   fundamental	  functions:	   enacting	   substantive	   legislation	   and	   exercising	   oversight	   over	   the	   PA’s	  executive	  branch.10	   	  Additionally,	  he	  noted	  that	   the	  executive	  authority’s	   failure	   to	  sign	  the	  PLC’s	  Basic	  Law	  deprived	  the	  legislature	  of	  clear-­‐cut	  formal	  powers,	  and	  in	  practice	   the	   PLC	   “has	   not	   been	   permitted	   to	   monitor	   or	   influence	   government	  spending…	   thus,	   the	   widespread	   practice	   of	   bribery	   and	   extortion	   continue,	   and	  large	  sums	  of	  public	  money	  do	  not	  find	  their	  way	  to	  the	  PA’s	  budget”.11	  Glenn	  Robinson	  points	  out	   that	   the	  political	  economy	  of	  Palestinian	  politics	  in	   the	  post-­‐Oslo	  era	   “inherently	  promotes	  authoritarianism”	   since,	   like	   the	  oil	   and	  gas-­‐rich	  states	  of	  the	  Persian	  Gulf,	  the	  Palestinian	  Authority	  is	  a	  rentier	  state	  whose	  revenue	  comes	  almost	  entirely	  from	  external	  rents,	  not	  the	  taxation	  of	  citizens.	  	  The	  only	   difference	   is	   that	   “in	   this	   case,	   Palestinian	   government	   revenues	   come	  disproportionately	  from	  taxes	  on	  Palestinians	  collected	  by	  Israel	  and	  given	  directly	  to	  the	  Palestinian	  treasury	  and	  from	  foreign	  donor	  aid.	  	  Comparatively	  little	  revenue	  is	  collected	  directly	  by	  the	  Palestinian	  state	   from	  its	  people.	   	  This	  one-­‐way	  flow	  of	  money	   has	   many	   consequences,	   but	   all	   of	   them	   tend	   to	   support	   personalized	  authoritarian	  politics,	  not	  institutional	  democracy”.12	  Finally,	   observers	   point	   out	   that	   the	   PA	   has	   generally	   been	   permitted	   to	  behave	   in	   a	   manner	   that	   reflects	   these	   authoritarian	   tendencies.	   	   Elections	   are	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Ziad Abu-Amr, “The Palestinian Legislative Council: A Critical Assessment,” Journal of Palestine 
Studies 26, no. 4 (Summer 1997): 90–97. 
11 Ibid., 92. 
12 Glenn E. Robinson, “Palestine After Arafat,” Washington Quarterly 23, no. 4 (Autumn 2000): 88–89. 
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postponed,	   often	   with	   tacit	   international	   support,	   when	   it	   suits	   the	   needs	   of	   the	  incumbents.	   	   The	   judiciary	   has	   been	  weakened	   through	   the	   application	   of	   special	  security	  courts	  without	  extensive	  scrutiny	  and	  for	  highly	  political	  purposes.	  	  Arafat’s	  government	  routinely	  used	  these	  and	  other	  tools	  to	  harass	  its	  opponents,	  including	  journalists	  and	  other	  critics	  who	  operated	  within	  the	  bounds	  of	  the	  formal	  law.13	  	  	  Americans	  have	  often	  been	  criticized	  for	  being	  complicit	  in	  this	  perversion	  of	  the	  newly	  established	  Palestinian	  democracy.	  	  Indeed,	  the	  U.S.	  never	  prioritized	  the	  building	   of	   accountable	   institutions	   in	   its	   policy	   toward	   the	   Palestinian	   Authority	  and	   at	   times	   helped	   boost	   Arafat’s	   tendencies	   toward	   monopolization	   of	   power.	  	  However,	   this	   support	   for	   Palestinian	   authoritarianism	   was	   a	   byproduct,	   not	   an	  objective,	  of	  American	  foreign	  policy.	  Michele	  Dunne	   explains	   that	   from	  1993	   to	   2000,	   the	  United	   States	   “mostly	  ignored	   how	   Arafat’s	   behavior	   harmed	   nascent	   Palestinian	   institutions”.	   	   Its	  approach	  was	  to	  give	  him	  a	  free	  hand	  internally	  “as	  long	  as	  he	  cooperated	  with	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Israel	  on	  preventing	  terrorism	  and	  continuing	  negotiations…	  ‘we	  traded	  stability	  in	  the	  peace	  process	  for	  concerns	  about	  governance	  and	  corruption,’	  a	  former	  U.S.	  negotiator	  [Aaron	  David	  Miller]	  acknowledged”.14	  Dunne	  notes	   that	   the	   creation	  of	   security	   courts	  was	   something	   the	  United	  States	   actually	   pressed	  Arafat	   to	   undertake	   in	   1995	   as	   a	  means	   of	   demonstrating	  that	  he	  was	  moving	  swiftly	  to	  address	  Israel’s	  security	  concerns	  by	  moving	  against	  possible	  terrorist	  threats.	  	  Vice	  President	  Gore	  even	  praised	  Arafat’s	  pledge	  to	  create	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 See also Yezid Sayigh and Khalil Shikaki, “Strengthening Palestinian Public Institutions” (Council on 
Foreign Relations, 1999); As’ad Ghanem, The Palestinian Regime (Sussex Academic Press, 2002). 
14 Michele Dunne, “A Two-State Solution Requires Palestinian Politics,” Carnegie Papers: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace 113 (June 2010): 3. 
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the	  courts	  as	  part	  of	  “an	  important	  step	  forward	  in	  helping	  to	  build	  confidence	  in	  the	  peace	  process…	  and	  stop	  terrorism”.15	  	  She	  also	  points	  out	  that	  for	  five	  years	  the	  U.S.	  never	  seriously	  urged	  Arafat	   to	  sign	  the	  draft	  Basic	  Law	  sent	  to	  him	  by	  the	  PLC	  in	  1997,	   even	   though	  Washington	  paid	   for	   some	  of	   the	  experts	  who	  helped	  with	   the	  law’s	  drafting.16	  	  	  Thus,	   the	  United	  States	  never	  sought	  to	  make	  Arafat	   into	  a	  dictator	  and	  the	  PA	   into	   an	   autocracy,	   but	   it	   also	  did	  not	   use	   any	  of	   levers	   at	   its	   disposal	   to	   resist	  these	  developments.	   	  Thus,	   this	   sub-­‐episode	  should	  be	   coded	  as	  a	  non-­‐instance	  of	  American	   LSI	   toward	   Palestinian	   politics.	   	   Of	   course,	   the	   Clinton	   administration	  probably	  would	  have	   tried	   taken	   steps	   to	  help	  Arafat	   and	  his	  Fatah	  Party	  win	   the	  Palestinian	  Authority’s	  first	  general	  elections	  in	  1996	  if	  the	  result	  seemed	  in	  doubt,	  but	  the	  outcome	  of	  those	  elections	  was	  widely	  seen	  as	  a	  foregone	  conclusion.17	  
<Sub-­Case	  3:	  Going	  to	  Gaza>	  One	   exception	   to	   this	   unthinking	   support	   was	   President	   Clinton’s	   visit	   to	  Gaza,	  which	  was	  a	  much	  more	  conscious	  gesture	  of	  support	  for	  Arafat	  in	  the	  face	  of	  repeated	  stonewalling	  by	  Netanyahu.	   	  Clinton’s	  speech	  was	  agreed	  upon	  as	  part	  of	  the	   Wye	   River	   Memorandum	   in	   order	   to	   satisfy	   an	   Israeli	   requirement	   that	   the	  Palestinian	   National	   Council	   endorse	   Arafat’s	   earlier	   decision	   to	   change	   the	   PLO	  charter	  to	  recognize	  Israel.	  	  However,	  at	  Wye	  it	  was	  conceived	  of	  by	  the	  Americans	  as	   something	   that	   Arafat	   would	   welcome	   as	   “a	   colossal	   act	   of	   recognition,”	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Mary Curtius, “Gore Meets Arafat, Announces Plan to Use U.S. Aid to Create Gaza Job,” Los Angeles 
Times, March 25, 1995. 
16 Dunne, “A Two-State Solution Requires Palestinian Politics,” 5–6. 
17 Jay Bushinsky, “Election Challenge to Arafat Is Largely Symbolic,” Chicago Sun-Times, December 29, 
1995. 
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indeed	  the	  gesture	  put	  Arafat	   in	  “a	  buoyant	  mood	  [since]	   the	  President’s	  visit	  was	  everything	  he	  had	  hoped	  for”.18	  When	   asked	   if	   he	   could	   think	   of	   any	   notable	   instances	   of	   American	   LSI	  toward	  the	  PA,	  Aaron	  David	  Miller	  volunteered:	  “I’ll	  never	  forget	  the	  address	  to	  the	  PNC	  in	  Gaza…	  I	  mean	  Clinton	  was	  a	  master	  at	  this”.19	  	  	  Indeed,	  Clinton’s	  speech	  was	  full	  of	  soaring	  praise	  for	  the	  bold	  leadership	  of	  the	  PLO	  for	  fulfilling	  its	  obligations	  towards	  peace.	  	  He	  declared	  that	  	  	  “I	  am	  profoundly	  grateful	  to	  have	  had	  the	  opportunity	  to	  work	  with	  Chairman	  Arafat	  for	  the	  cause	  of	  peace,	  to	  come	  here	  as	  a	  friend	  of	  peace	  and	  a	  friend	  of	  your	  future,	  and	  to	  witness	  you	  raising	  your	  hands,	  standing	  up	  tall,	  standing	  up	  not	  only	  against	  what	   you	   believe	   is	   wrong,	   but	   for	   what	   you	   believe	   is	   right	   in	   the	   future…	   this	  moment	  would	  have	  been	  inconceivable	  a	  decade	  ago.	  	  No	  Palestinian	  Authority;	  no	  elections	  in	  Gaza	  and	  the	  West	  Bank;	  no	  relations	  between	  the	  United	  States	  and	  the	  Palestinians…	  next	  year	  I	  will	  ask	  the	  Congress	  for	  another	  several	  hundred	  million	  dollars	  to	  support	  the	  development	  of	  the	  Palestinian	  people…	  Mister	  Chairman,	  you	  said	  some	  profound	  words	  today	  in	  embracing	  the	  idea	  that	  Israelis	  and	  Palestinians	  can	  live	  in	  peace	  as	  neighbors.	  	  Again,	  I	  say,	  you	  have	  led	  the	  way,	  and	  we	  would	  not	  be	  here	  without	  you”.20	  	  Clinton	  also	  paired	  the	  trip	  with	  a	  visit	  to	  Bethlehem,	  in	  the	  first	  state	  visit	  by	  an	  American	  president	  to	  a	  West	  Bank	  city	  under	  Palestinian	  control.	  	  He	  toured	  the	  city	  alongside	  Arafat	  and	  was	  greeted	  by	  thousands	  of	  residents	  waving	  Palestinian	  and	  American	  flags.	   	  He	  and	  the	  PA	  leader	  joined	  together	  in	  a	  ceremony	  to	  light	  a	  Christmas	   tree	   in	   Manger	   Square.21	   	   Again,	   the	   visit	   was	   carefully	   managed	   to	  showcase	  American	  cooperation	  with	  the	  Palestinian	  leadership.	  
<Sub-­Case	  4:	  Flirting	  with	  Favorites>	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Ross, The Missing Peace, 442, 484. 
19 Miller, “Interview with the Author.” 
20 “Clinton’s Words in Gaza: Citing ‘the Waste of War’,” New York Times, December 15, 1998. 
21 “Arafat, Clinton Tour Bethlehem,” BBC Monitoring Service Middle East (Translated from December 
15th edition of Voice of Palestine radio, December 15, 1998). 
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The	   other	   exception	   to	   the	   pattern	   listed	   above	   was	   when	   presidential	  advisors	  probed	  the	  possibility	  of	  working	  with	  perceived	  PA	  moderates	  on	  a	  final	  status	   agreement	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   Arafat	   and	   his	   highest	   lieutenants.	   	   At	   Camp	  David	   in	  2000,	  Secretary	  Albright	  asked	  Abu	  Mazen	   if	  he	  would	  consider	  breaking	  with	  Arafat	   by	   endorsing	   a	   final	   status	   deal	  with	  U.S.	   backing;	   the	   following	   year,	  Bush	   administration	   officials	   also	   allegedly	   made	   similar	   advances	   toward	   both	  Farouq	  Qaddoumi	  and	  Abu	  Mazen.	  	  American	  officials	  stuck	  their	  hand	  into	  sensitive	  Palestinian	  politics	  by	  trying	  engineer	  Arafat’s	  approval	  through	  Mohammed	  Dahlan	  and	   Mohammed	   Rashid	   when	   they	   decided	   Abu	   Alaa	   and	   Abu	   Mazen	   were	   too	  resistant	  to	  a	  final	  status	  agreement.	  Before	   the	   summit,	   one	   of	   Barak’s	   negotiators	   reflects	   that	   Dahlan	   was	  getting	   preferential	   treatment	   and	   that	   “the	   U.S.	   administration	   groomed	   him	   to	  become	  the	  next	  contender”	  and	  noted	  “the	  preferential	  treatment	  he	  got	  whenever	  he	   came	   to	   Washington”.22	   	   He	   even	   had	   access	   to	   a	   car	   service	   that	   was	   not	  available	  to	  comparably	  senior	  Palestinian	  negotiators	  at	  the	  time,	  something	  which	  set	  off	  complaints	  among	  his	  colleagues.23	  Israeli	  negotiator	  Gilead	  Sher	  recalls	  the	  Palestinian	  rivalries	  really	  coming	  to	  the	  surface	  at	  Camp	  David.	   	  He	  says	  that	  “the	  first	  time	  Abu	  Mazen	  had	  abandoned	  the	   passive	   and	   indifferent	   demeanor	   he	   had	   adopted	   since	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	  summit”	  was	   to	   yell	   so	   furiously	   at	  Mohammed	  Dahlan	   for	   being	   too	   forthcoming	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Oded Eran, “Interview with the Author,” June 6, 2011. 
23 Ibid. 
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over	  the	  Temple	  Mount	  that	  “the	  loud	  exchange	  nearly	  developed	  into	  a	  fist	  fight”.24	  	  	  He	   feels	   that	   Abu	   Mazen	   and	   Abu	   Alaa’s	   attitudes	   “contrasted	   by	   the	  constructiveness”	  of	  Rashid,	  Asfour,	  and	  Dahlan	  and	   that	   “the	   two	  senior	  veterans	  were	   trapped	   in	   an	   approach	   that	   constituted	   a	   sharp	  withdrawal	   from	   positions	  that	   each	   of	   them	   had	   previously	   presented”.25	   	   He	   says	   that	   “within	   the	   divided	  Palestinian	  leadership	  Abu	  Ala	  was	  the	  strongest	  opponent	  of	  the	  summit”	  because	  “he	  had	  been	  delegitimized	  by	  his	  political	  rivals	  and	  subsequently	  marginalized”.26	  	  At	   times	   this	   visibly	   undermined	   the	   process	   itself,	   such	   as	  when	   Sher	   concludes	  that	   these	   rivalries	   had	   led	  Abu	  Alaa	   not	   to	   report	   to	  Arafat	   the	   full	   extent	   of	   the	  progress	  made	  in	  Sweden	  for	  fear	  of	  being	  undercut	  at	  home.27	  Dennis	  Ross	  acknowledges	   that	  by	   the	  end	  of	   the	  Camp	  David	  summit,	   “the	  Palestinians	   were	   tied	   complete	   in	   knots	   and	   at	   war	   with	   each	   other.”	   	  Whereas	  Rashid	   and	  Dahlan	  were	   relatively	   forthcoming	   and	   constructive,	   instead	  of	   being	  their	  usual	  constructive	  selves	  Abu	  Alaa	  and	  Abu	  Mazen	  were	  passive,	  “lookin[ing]	  for	  where	  Arafat	  was	  coming	  from”	  while	  “the	  Chairman	  remained	  mute”.28	  Also	  Swisher	  quotes	  an	  anonymous	  senior	  American	  official	  confirming	  that	  Ross	  was	  acting	  to	  “divide	  and	  conquer”	  among	  the	  Palestinian	  delegation	  because	  “Abu	   Ala	   and	   Abu	   Mazen	   were	   not	   helpful,	   and	   Dahlan	   and	   Mohammed	   Rashid	  were”.	   	   Since	   the	   latter	   two	   seemed	   “more	   forthcoming,”	   the	   idea	   was	   “to	   do	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Gilead Sher, The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Negotiations, 1999-2001: Within Reach (Routledge, 2006), 
82. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid., 44. 
27 Ibid., 52. 
28 Ross, The Missing Peace, 688. 
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negotiations	  at	  a	  lower	  level,	  to	  see	  if	  some	  of	  the	  underbrush	  could	  be	  cut	  out”.29	  And,	  although	  part	  of	   this	  effort	  was	  probably	  subconscious,	  some	  of	   it	  was	  evidently	   intentional.	   	  Clinton’s	  chief	  of	  staff	   John	  Podesta	  agrees	  that	  “there’s	  also	  then	  the	  courting	  of	  Dahlan	  and	  the	  younger	  members	  as	  being	  bolder	  in	  decision…	  and	  I	  think	  it	  was	  thought	  to	  be	  useful	  in	  giving	  a	  support	  structure	  to	  Arafat.	  	  But	  it	  was	   definitely	   a	   strong	   dynamic	   in	   the	  meetings”.30	   	  He	   notes	   that	   “I	   think	   it	  was	  partly	   conscious	   and	   partly	   subconscious.	   	   It	   was	   conscious	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   the	  younger	   guys	   had	   more	   capacity	   to	   deal.	   	   The	   subconscious	   part	   was	   that	   the	  younger	  guys	  were	  more	  simpatico,	  if	  you	  will”.31	  Further,	   it	   was	   exacerbated	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   American	   support	   for	   the	  Palestinian	   security	   services,	   provided	   via	   the	   Central	   Intelligence	   Agency	   and	  formalized	  with	  the	  Wye	  River	  Memorandum,	  seemed	  to	  be	  building	  up	  Mohammed	  Dahlan’s	  organizational	  capability	  and	  political	  reach.	  	  The	  CIA	  was	  directly	  involved	  in	   events	   on	   the	   ground,	   monitoring	   compliance	   but	   also	   helping	   to	   train	   and	  support	   the	   Palestinian	   security	   services	   in	   what	   one	   former	   participant	   called	   a	  “massive	   cover-­‐action	   program	   that	   included	   training,	   technical	   assistance,	   and	  infrastructure	   development”.32	   	   CIA	   support	   primarily	   went	   to	   the	   Preventive	  Security	  Service	  (PSS).	  	  The	  West	  Bank	  head	  of	  the	  PSS,	  Jibril	  Rajoub,	  held	  little	  favor	  in	   Washington,	   but	   its	   head	   in	   Gaza,	   Mohammed	   Dahlan	   was	   widely	   seen	   as	   an	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Clayton E. Swisher, The Truth About Camp David (Nation Books, 2004), 278. 
30 Podesta, quoted in Kurtzer et al., The Peace Puzzle, 215 and n. 25 on p. 268. 
31 Podesta, quoted in Swisher, The Truth About Camp David, 278. Emphases removed. 
32 Melissa Boyle Mahle, “A Political-Security Analysis of the Failed Oslo Process,” Middle East Policy 12, 
no. 1 (2005). See also Ilene Prusher, “Palestinians Find Fair Play Champion in the CIA,” The Guardian 
(UK), August 3, 1999; “The Palestinian Authority and the CIA: Who Will Protect the Guards?”. 
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American	  favorite.33	  	  	  However,	  a	  report	  by	  the	  International	  Institute	  for	  Strategic	  Studies	  singled	  out	   Dahlan’s	   popularity	   and	   warned	   that	   “CIA	   involvement	   brings	   considerable	  opportunities,	  but	  also	  great	  dangers	  for	  Arafat,	  the	  PA	  and	  the	  US…	  the	  CIA’s	  new	  role	   risks	   involving	   it	   in	   Palestinian	   internal	   politics	   just	   when	   they	   threaten	   to	  become	  increasingly	  bitter	  and	  divisive,	  and	  the	  struggle	  to	  succeed	  Arafat	  may	  be	  getting	  under	  way…	  The	  US	  and	  Israel	  want	  successors	  to	  Arafat	  who	  are	  not	  only	  amenable	  to	  their	  agenda	  but	  also	  wedded	  to	  them	  through	  political	  and	  economic	  ties.	   	   These	   links	   are	   being	   formed	   in	   the	   increasingly	   close	   security	   relations	  between	  Israel,	  the	  CIA,	  and	  the	  heads	  of	  the	  PA	  security	  services”.34	  	  In	  September	  2000,	  a	  prominent	  Lebanese	  journalist	  wrote	  that	  “it	  became	  evident	  during	  Camp	  David	   that	  Muhammad	  Dahlan…	   is	   the	   figure	   preparing	   to	   succeed	  Arafat.	   	   Those	  who	  have	  met	  him	  in	  Washington	  are	  praising	  him	  as	  a	  politician	  and	  saying	  from	  experience	  that	  the	  difference	  between	  him	  and	  Jibril	  al-­‐Rujub	  is	  very	  noticeable”.35	  Finally,	  there	  is	  the	  possibility	  that	  American	  officials	  even	  tried	  to	  instigate	  rivalries	   or	   bolster	   contenders	   against	   Arafat	   if	   they	   would	   be	   more	   open	   to	  accepting	  	  a	  deal	  with	  the	  Israelis.	  	  A	  prominent	  French	  journalist	  who	  has	  covered	  the	  peace	  process	  and	  Camp	  David,	  Charles	  Enderlin,	  writes	  that	  the	  U.S.	  reportedly	  tried	   a	   number	   of	   times	   to	   put	   out	   feelers	   to	   Palestinian	   leaders	   as	   to	   their	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 For instance, one observer suggested that Rajoub was seen as the “Saddam Hussein of the West Bank,” 
while Dahlan strove to be seen as the “Jacques Chirac of Gaza or Palestine”: Isabel Kershner, “The Rise & 
Rise of Colonel Dahlan,” Jerusalem Report, February 1, 1999. This was also corroborated in conversations 
by the author with Palestinian experts who observed these dynamics firsthand. 
34 “The Palestinian Authority and the CIA: Who Will Protect the Guards?”. 
35 Huda Al-Husayni, “Muhammad Dahlan and the Guarantee of the Future,” Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (Writer on 
Prospects of Palestinian Security Head Dahlan as Arafat’s Successor, September 8, 2000), World New 
Connection and FBIS edition. 
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willingness	   to	  break	  with	  Chairman	  Arafat	  and	   to	  oppose	  his	   leadership	  on	   issues	  having	  to	  do	  with	  violence	  on	  the	  ground	  or	  regarding	  the	  peace	  process.	  	  	  He	  writes	  that	  on	  July	  17th,	  2002,	  Madeleine	  Albright	  approached	  Abu	  Mazen	  and,	  possibly	  of	  her	  own	  accord,	  asked	  if	  he	  would	  break	  with	  Arafat	  publicly	  on	  the	  peace	  process,	  for	  instance	  in	  support	  of	  a	  partial	  accord	  –	  something	  his	  boss	  firmly	  rejected.36	  	  Endlerin	  adds	  that	  this	  was	  “not	  the	  first	  time	  that	  the	  Americans	  will	  try	  to	   do	   an	   end	   run	   around	   Arafat”	   and	   that	   “less	   than	   a	   year	   later,	   the	   Bush	  administration	   will	   contact	   Abu	   Mazen	   and	   Farouk	   Kaddoumi	   and	   awkwardly	  mention	  similar	  possibilities	  to	  them”.37	  Abu	  Alaa	   echoes	   this	   claim.	   	   In	  his	  post-­‐thinking	  analysis,	   he	   claims	   that	   at	  Camp	  David	  “Albright	  separately	  asked	  the	  question	  of	  both	  Abu	  Mazen	  and	  myself,	  ‘Are	  you	  ready	  to	  go	  on	  supporting	  Arafat?’	  	  Had	  the	  Americans	  concluded	  that	  there	  were	  discrepancies	  between	   the	  positions	  of	   the	  members	  of	   the	  Palestinian	   team	  regarding	   the	   intended	  agreement?	   	  Or	  had	  hints	  been	  made	   to	   the	  Americans	  by	  some	  members	  of	  the	  Palestinian	  team	  that	  there	  were	  internal	  disputes	  that	  could	  affect	  Arafat’s	  decisions?”38	  Also,	  Clayton	  Swisher	  notes	  	  that	  “in	  the	  Americans’	  eagerness	  to	  conclude	  a	  deal	   [at	   Camp	   David],	   the	   focus	   on	   presumed	   internal	   differences	   among	   the	  Palestinians	  was	  based	  on	  the	  hope	  that	  at	  some	  point	  they	  would	  pressure	  Arafat	  into	   accepting	   their	   envisioned	   compromise;	   alternatively,	   it	  might	   lead	   to	   an	   end	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Charles Enderlin, Shattered Dreams: The Failure of the Peace Process in the Middle East, 1995-2002 
(Other Press, LLC, 2003), 224. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ahmed Qurie, Beyond Oslo, the Struggle for Palestine: Inside the Middle East Peace Process from 
Rabin’s Death to Camp David (I.B. Tauris, 2008), 259. 
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run	   around	   Arafat,	   perhaps	   even	   provoking	   a	   mini-­‐coup	   within	   the	   Palestinian	  hierarchy	  that	  would	  result	  in	  agreement”.39	  	  Did	  the	  Policy	  Succeed?	  	   Yes	  and	  no.	  	  American	  efforts	  to	  build	  up	  Arafat	  at	  the	  very	  start	  of	  the	  Oslo	  period	  were	  a	  relative	  success.	  	  However,	  the	  low	  priority	  given	  to	  ensuring	  that	  the	  Palestinian	  Authority	  developed	  into	  a	  democracy	  instead	  of	  a	  one-­‐man	  show	  with	  Arafat	   as	   the	   star	  was,	   in	   retrospect,	   an	  enormous	  missed	  opportunity.	   	   President	  Clinton’s	  state	  visit	  to	  Bethlehem	  and	  Gaza	  in	  1998	  was	  a	  modest	  gesture	  that	  was	  moderately	  successful	  at	  bolstering	  the	  leadership	  of	  the	  Palestinian	  Authority	  and	  sustaining	  the	  peace	  process.	  	  Finally,	  attempts	  to	  interfere	  in	  Palestinian	  politics	  in	  the	  attempt	  to	  reach	  a	  final	  status	  framework	  agreement	  were	  by	  and	  large	  a	  failure.	  
<Sub-­Case	  1:	  Welcoming	  Arafat	  on	  the	  White	  House	  Lawn>	  Observers	   in	  on	  three	  different	  sides	  (Palestinian,	  American,	  and	  Israeli)	  all	  agreed	  that	  Clinton’s	  invitation	  for	  Arafat	  to	  attend	  the	  Oslo	  signing	  ceremony	  at	  the	  White	  House	  gave	  Yasser	  Arafat	  and	   the	  PLO	  a	  major	  political	  boost.	   	  Thus,	   in	   the	  narrow	  sense,	  it	  is	  quite	  clear	  cut	  that	  American	  LSI	  during	  this	  period	  was	  effective.	  	  However,	  questions	  of	  broader	  efficacy	  –	   that	   is,	  whether	  endorsing	  Arafat	  helped	  boost	  or	  undermine	  the	  peace	  process	  and	  American	  interests	  –	  tend	  to	  get	  wrapped	  up	  in	  deeper	  questions	  about	  Arafat’s	  legacy	  in	  light	  of	  the	  second	  intifada.	  One	   of	   Arafat’s	   main	   lieutenants,	   Abu	   Alaa,	   writes	   that	   the	   second	   signing	  ceremony	   and	   the	   invitation	   to	   Arafat	   had	   a	  major	   impact	   on	   his	   standing	  within	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Swisher, The Truth About Camp David, 279. 
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Palestinian	  politics.	  	  He	  notes	  that	  Arafat	  was	  craving	  an	  invitation	  because	  he	  	  	  “seems	   to	   have	   calculated	   that,	   if	   he	   did	   not	   sign,	   this	   could	   turn	   the	   spotlight	   on	  Mahmoud	  Abbas,	  making	  him	  appear	  to	  be	  the	  man	  of	  the	  hour,	  and	  even	  signaling	  him	   as	   the	   new	   Palestinian	   leader…	   I	   fully	   understood	   Arafat’s	   position.	   	   The	  honours	  with	  which	  he	  would	  be	  met	  at	  the	  White	  House	  would	  mark	  the	  end	  of	  the	  international	  isolation	  imposed	  upon	  him.	  	  We	  understood	  that	  many	  closed	  doors,	  especially	  in	  Arab	  capitals,	  would	  be	  opened	  to	  Yasser	  Arafat	  as	  soon	  as	  he	  had	  been	  to	  the	  White	  House”.40	  	  He	  goes	  on	  to	  explain	  the	  following	  about	  the	  agreement:	  	  “it	  meant	  that	  direct	  relations	  between	  the	  PLO	  and	  the	  USA	  would	  be	  restored,	  after	  the	  Achielle	  Lauro	  incident	  had	  led	  to	  their	  complete	  severance	  two	  years	  earlier.	  	  At	  this	  stage,	  we	  were	  very	  badly	  in	  need	  of	  American	  support	  in	  the	  face	  of	  a	  stream	  of	  opposition	   to	   the	  agreement	   from	  radical	  Palestinian	  groups	  and	  rejectionist	  Arab	  states,	   even	   before	   it	   was	   officially	   signed.	   	   Opposition	   voices	   would	   be	   notably	  muted	   after	   the	   agreement	   was	   seen	   to	   have	   the	   support	   and	   blessing	   of	   the	  Americans.	   	   That	  was	  why	  we	  were	  pleased	   to	  have	   it	   signed	  under	   the	  brightest	  spotlight	  the	  Americans	  could	  bring	  to	  bear…	  thousands	  of	  young	  men	  and	  women	  in	  the	  West	  Bank	  and	  Gaza	  took	  to	  the	  streets	  afterwards,	  carrying	  Palestinian	  flags	  and	  shouting,	  ‘Long	  live	  Palestine,	  long	  live	  Arafat’.”41	  	  Although	  on	  his	  return	  to	  the	  city	  of	  Oslo	  three	  months	  after	  the	  signing	  ceremony,	  he	  says	   “I	   felt	   that	   the	  Oslo	  atmosphere	  had	  evaporated,”	  by	   then	   the	  PLO	  Central	  Council	  had	   strongly	  endorsed	   the	  agreement.42	   	   It	  had	  enabled	  Arafat	   to	   claim	  at	  the	  PCC	  meeting	  that,	  in	  Qurie’s	  paraphrasing,	  “the	  PLO	  had	  been	  ostracized	  during	  the	  Madrid	   process,	   but	   that	   now	   it	   had	   become	   a	   political	   reality	   and	   a	   force	   to	  reckon	  with…	  [and	  that]	  the	  Palestinian	  state	  was	  coming”.43	  	   This	   perspective	  was	   also	   echoed	   by	   a	   Palestinian	   perspective	   from	  within	  the	   territories	   at	   the	   time.	   	   The	   main	   Palestinian	   leader	   at	   the	   post-­‐Madrid	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Ahmed Qurie, From Oslo to Jerusalem: The Palestinian Story of the Secret Negotiations (I.B. Tauris, 
2006), 275. 
41 Ibid., 278–279. 
42 Ibid., 288. 
43 Ibid., 286. 
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Washington	  talks	  was	  Faisal	  al-­‐Husseini,	  who	  had	  ties	  to	  the	  PLO	  but	  operated	  as	  a	  local	   elite	   from	   his	   own	   power	   base	   in	   Jerusalem.	   	   Although	   Husseini	   has	   since	  passed	  away,	  his	  nephew	  and	  former	  aide	  de	  camp,	  Kamel	  al-­‐Husseini	  believes	  that	  Arafat’s	   invitation	  to	  the	  White	  House	  ceremony	  did	  help	  the	  PLO	  market	  the	  Oslo	  agreement	  on	  the	  ground.	  	  When	  asked	  if	  he	  agreed	  with	  Abu	  Alaa’s	  thesis	  that	  the	  Arafat’s	  role	  in	  the	  signing	  ceremony	  helped	  the	  PLO’s	  standing	  as	  it	  tried	  to	  market	  the	  deal,	  Husseini	  responded	  as	  follows:	  	  “I	  think	  so.	  	  I	  think	  Abu	  Alaa	  is	  talking	  about	  the	  power	  of	  goodwill,	  the	  power	  of	  a	  new	   beginning	   and	   a	   healing	   process…	   	   I	   think	   it	   sent	   a	   message	   that	   there	   is	   a	  breakthrough.	  	  For	  the	  first	  time	  we	  and	  the	  Israelis	  are	  not	  occupied-­‐occupiers,	  we	  are	  becoming	  more	  equal	  partners.	   	  Although	   it	  doesn’t	  mean	  that	   the	  conflict	  has	  ended,	   but	   it	   begins	   a	   process	   of	   healing.	   	   And	   also	   it	   put	   the	   Palestinians	   on	   the	  world	  stage	  that	  they	  have	  never	  enjoyed.	  Accepted	  by	  the	  international	  community,	  not	  viewed	  as	  a	  terrorist	  organization…	  	  this	  is	  the	  first	  time	  that	  you	  had	  the	  whole	  formula:	  Palestine	  as	  a	  question,	  the	  leadership	  historic	  and	  also	  the	  local	  leadership	  with	  it,	  on	  the	  White	  House,	  signing	  a	  peace	  treaty…	  it	  was	  a	  moment	  of	  euphoria,	  and	  that	  helped	  us	  market	  it	  for	  a	  few	  months	  or	  a	  year	  or	  two”.44	  	   Yossi	  Beilin	  echoes	  from	  the	  Israeli	  side	  that	  Oslo	  helped	  boost	  Arafat	  and	  the	  PLO	   immensely.	   	   He	   writes	   that	   “one	   the	   Palestinian	   street,	   Hamas	   is	   the	   PLO’s	  greatest	   rival.	   	   The	   Oslo	   Agreement	   had	   strengthened	   the	   PLO	   against	   Hamas	  because	   it	   proved	   their	   ability	   to	   offer	   the	   Palestinians	   a	   genuine	   change	   in	   their	  lives,	  beyond	  eternal	  war	  with	  Israel”.45	  	  More	  importantly,	  he	  argues	  that	  Clinton’s	  decision	   changed	   Arafat’s	   status	   overnight	   and	   imbued	   the	   agreement	   and	   his	  position	   with	   newfound	   international	   acceptance	   and	   U.S.-­‐backed	   legitimacy.	   	   He	  waxes	  lyrical	  about	  the	  impact	  of	  Clinton’s	  decision:	  	  “It	  was	  Clinton	  who	   turned	   the	   signing	  of	   the	  Oslo	  Declaration	  Principles	   into	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Kamel Husseini, “Interview with the Author”, July 2011. 
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most	  prominent	  media	  event	  of	  the	  1990s.	  	  The	  signatures	  of	  Peres	  and	  Abu	  Mazen	  on	  a	  five-­‐year	  interim	  agreement	  with	  many	  question	  marks	  would	  definitely	  have	  been	  interesting	  and	  unusual,	  but	  it	  would	  not	  have	  amazed	  the	  world…	  Ultimately,	  the	  world	  will	   remember	   for	  many	  years	   the	  picture	  of	   the	   tall	  young	  man	   joining	  two	  leaders	  a	  generation	  older	  and	  much	  less	  tall.	  	  America	  had	  refused	  to	  make	  the	  Oslo	  Accords	   into	   an	  American	  proposal	   (as	   Peres	   had	   suggested	   to	   Christopher),	  but	   it	  was	  no	  longer	  important	  after	  that	  photograph.	   	  The	  Oslo	  Accords,	  signed	  at	  the	  White	  House	  on	  September	  13,	  1993,	  became	  Clinton’s	  agreement	  within	  a	  few	  hours.	  	   Clinton’s	   decision	   to	   bring	   Arafat	   and	   Rabin	   to	   Washington	   had	   broad	  implications.	   	   Arafat’s	   status	   was	   not	   mentioned	   in	   the	   Oslo	   Accords,	   nor	   in	   the	  lengthy	   talks	   that	  had	   led	   to	   the	  agreement.	   	  We	  naively	  believed	  that	   the	   issue	  of	  Arafat’s	   role	  would	  arise	  only	  when	  we	  reached	   the	  permanent	  agreement,	  not	  as	  part	   of	   the	   interim	   agreement	   and	   the	   elections	   to	   the	   independent	   Palestinian	  government.	   	  At	   the	  end	  of	  August,	   I	  was	   interviewed	  on	  Nightline	  by	  Ted	  Koppel,	  who	  asked	  if	  Arafat	  would	  come	  to	  Jericho	  to	  sign	  the	  agreement	  transferring	  Gaza	  and	   Jericho	  to	   the	  Palestinians.	   	   I	   said	   that	   this	  was	  not	  on	  the	  agenda;	   it	  sounded	  like	  a	  diplomatic	  answer,	  but	  it	  was	  the	  whole	  truth.	  	   Clinton	   brought	   forward	   the	  meeting	   between	   the	   Israeli	   and	   Palestinian	  leaders,	   and	  bypassed	  a	  great	  many	  hesitations	  and	  dilemmas.	   	  All	   at	  once,	  Arafat	  became	  legitimate,	  a	  natural	  candidate	  to	  lead	  the	  Palestinian	  Authority	  during	  the	  interim	   phases	   who	   would	   come	   on	   the	   scene	   not	   only	   for	   the	   permanent	  settlement,	   but	   in	   a	   few	   months’	   time,	   for	   the	   signature	   of	   the	   Gaza-­‐Jericho	  agreement”.46	  	  This	   assessment	  was	   also	   shared	  by	  Martin	   Indyk	  with	   the	  Americans.	   	  He	  writes	   that	   “Arafat	   craved	   international	   recognition.	   	   He	   had	   sustained	   the	  Palestinian	  cause	  all	  these	  years	  in	  part	  by	  keeping	  it	  in	  the	  international	  spotlight.	  	  To	   be	   hosted	   at	   the	   White	   House	   with	   the	   leaders	   of	   Israel	   and	   other	   world	  statesmen,	  after	  being	  treated	  as	  a	  pariah	  by	  the	  United	  States	  for	  so	  many	  decades,	  would	  be	  a	  crowning	  achievement	  for	  him	  personally	  and	  for	  the	  Palestinian	  cause…	  the	   president	   had	   clearly	   decided	   to	   open	   the	   door	   to	   Arafat,	   knowing	   he	   would	  march	  right	  through	  it.”	  	  And	  though	  his	  main	  concern	  might	  have	  been	  trying	  to	  get	  Israel’s	   public	   to	   buy	   into	   the	   event	   by	   seeing	   its	   prime	   minister	   endorse	   the	  accords,	  “if	  that	  meant	  hosting	  Arafat,	  too,	  so	  be	  it”.47	  Similarly,	   Nigel	   Parsons	  writes	   in	   his	   book	   on	   Palestinian	   politics	   that	   this	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Ibid., 37, 38–39. 
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period	  witnessed	  a	  marked	  consolidation	  of	  power	  within	  the	  PLO	  under	  Arafat.	  	  He	  notes	   that	   “the	   authoritative	   leadership	  of	   the	  PLO	   in	   exile	  was	  both	   clarified	  and	  enhanced	  by	  the	  DoP.	   	  Within	  the	  PLO,	  Arafat	  and	  Fatah	  consolidated	  their	  grip	  on	  the	   institution…	  marginalizing	   the	   leftists	   from	  decision	  making	  and	  co-­‐opting	   the	  remainder	  (most	  prominently	  FIDA)	  to	  Fatah’s	  fait	  accompli.	  	  [And]	  in	  the	  occupied	  territories,	   Israel’s	   recognition	   of	   Arafat’s	   authority	   granted	   the	   leadership	   a	  renewed	   legitimacy”.48	   	   It	   is	   quite	   feasible	   that	  Arafat’s	   participation	   in	   the	  White	  House	  signing	  ceremony	  place	  some	  role	  in	  these	  developments.	  In	  short,	  observers	  on	  all	  three	  sides	  seem	  to	  agree	  that	  in	  the	  narrow	  sense,	  this	  agreement	  helped	  bolster	  Arafat	  and	  the	  PLO	  at	  the	  end	  of	  1993.	  	  Some	  of	  these	  testimonials	  also	  seem	  to	  support	   the	  notion	  that	  backing	  Arafat	  and	  the	  PLO	  also	  helped	  achieve	  a	  success	  at	  the	  time	  in	  terms	  of	  broader	  efficacy	  by	  facilitating	  the	  acceptance	  of	  the	  Oslo	  Accords	  among	  a	  broader	  Palestinian	  audience,	  both	  within	  the	   Palestinian	   nationalist	   movement	   and	   with	   the	   general	   Palestinian	   public.	  	  Whether	   elevating	   Arafat	   as	   the	   international	   community’s	   main	   partner	   for	   the	  Oslo	   process	  was	   a	  wise	   choice	   in	   the	   long	   term	  may	   also	   need	   to	   be	  weighed	   in	  terms	   of	   his	   willingness	   to	   permit	   violence	   and	   incitement	   as	   a	   bargaining	   chip	  against	   the	   Israelis	   as	   well	   as	   his	   reluctance	   to	   sign	   onto	   a	   final,	   conflict-­‐ending	  agreement	  later	  in	  the	  decade.	   	  Thus,	   in	  the	  broader	  sense,	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  American	  effort	  probably	  has	  to	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  mixed	  record.	  
<Sub-­Case	  2:	  De	  Facto	  Dictatorship>	  	   Given	   that	  American	  policy	  under	  President	  Clinton	   tended	   to	   facilitate	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Nigel Craig Parsons, The Politics of the Palestinian Authority: From Oslo to Al-Aqsa (Psychology Press, 
2005), 43. 
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degradation	   of	   Palestinian	   democracy,	   was	   it	   a	   failure?	   	  Would	   a	  more	   proactive	  policy	   to	  preclude	  Arafat’s	  rule	  without	  accountability	  –	   that	   is,	  pursuing	  a	  certain	  brand	   of	   LSI	   at	   his	  mild	   expense,	   seeking	   to	   influence	   his	   power	   by	   also	   shaping	  Palestinian	  institutions	  –	  been	  better?	  	  Sure,	  no	  doubt.	  	  However,	  this	  is	  one	  area	  in	  which	  it	  is	  far	  easier	  to	  proclaim	  judgment	  than	  to	  actually	  expect	  better	  conduct.	  	   Michelle	   Dunne	   argues	   that	   Clinton	   administration	   policy	   shortchanged	  democratic	   institution-­‐building	   in	   the	   name	   of	   immediate	   gains	   on	   the	   peace	  process.	   	   She	   argues	   that	   this	   was,	   in	   retrospect,	   a	   major	   mistake.49	   	   I	   am	   in	  wholehearted	  agreement	  with	  her.	  	  But	  given	  that	  the	  administration	  really	  felt	  that	  a	  peace	  deal	  was	  within	  its	  grasp,	  it	  is	  unsurprising	  that	  it	  devoted	  political	  capital	  and	  diplomatic	  efforts	  to	  anything	  else	  in	  its	  relations	  with	  the	  Palestinians.	  	   American	  had	  enormous	   influence	  over	   the	  Palestinians	  during	   this	  period.	  	  For	  instance,	  the	  PA	  became	  the	  single	  largest	  recipient	  of	  American	  aid	  per	  capita	  behind	  Israel.50	  	  However,	  influence	  does	  not	  always	  equal	  leverage,	  and	  I	  doubt	  the	  administration	  could	  have	  been	  persuaded	  to	  endanger	   its	  relations	  with	  Arafat	   in	  favor	   of	   institutional	   outputs	   that	   likely	   would	   have	   aided	   the	   peace	   process	   but	  only	   in	   the	   longer	   term.	   	  Still,	   targeted	  efforts	   to	  soften	   the	  edges	  of	  his	  newfound	  superpresidential	   power	   –	   such	   as	   opposing	   security	   courts	   and	   pushing	   for	   his	  signature	  on	  the	  PLC’s	  draft	  of	   the	  Basic	  Law	  –	  would	  have	  been	  positive,	  realistic	  steps	  that	  should	  have	  been	  taken.	  	   Interestingly	   enough,	   one	   additional	   caveat	   is	   in	   order.	   	   Despite	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Dunne, “A Two-State Solution Requires Palestinian Politics.” 
50 Barry Rubin, The Transformation of Palestinian Politics: From Revolution to State-Building (Harvard 
University Press, 2001), 184. 
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desirability	  of	  putting	  institutional	  limits	  on	  Arafat’s	  power	  during	  the	  1990s,	  it	  still	  would	   have	   made	   sense	   to	   boost	   his	   showing	   and	   Fatah’s	   numbers	   in	   the	   1996	  Palestinian	   elections	   if	   their	   victory	   had	   appeared	   in	   doubt.	   	   The	   election	   was	   a	  major	  boost	  in	  the	  PLO’s	  authority	  at	  home	  and	  its	  ability	  to	  continue	  on	  the	  peace	  process.	   	  Enthusiasm	  ran	  high	   in	   the	   immediate	  aftermath	  of	   the	  1996	  Palestinian	  elections,	   although	   the	  effect	  was	  not	  particularly	   lasting.	   	   In	   a	   statement	  of	   some	  hyperbole,	   Mahmoud	   Abbas	   proclaimed	   that	   the	   election	   council	   which	   he	   had	  headed	  “has	  brought	  us	  five	  minutes	  away	  from	  independence”.51	  	  That	  enthusiasm	  and	   administrative	   strength	   was	   something	   positive	   for	   the	   U.S.	   to	   nurture	   if	   it	  seemed	   at	   risk,	   provided	   the	   government’s	   power	   did	   not	   exceed	   the	   bounds	   of	  domestic	  accountability	  and	  democratic	  institution-­‐building.	  
<Sub-­Case	  3:	  Going	  to	  Gaza>	  Overall,	   President	   Clinton’s	   trip	   to	   Bethlehem	   and	   Gaza	   did	   moderately	  contribute	   to	   its	   intended	   objectives	   of	   boosting	   the	   PA	   and	   sustaining	   the	   peace	  process.	  	  Of	  course,	  there	  were	  limits	  on	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  a	  mere	  visit	  and	  speech	  could	  bolster	  support	  for	  Arafat	  in	  light	  of	  a	  continued	  stalemate	  on	  the	  ground,	  but	  observers	   seem	   to	   agree	   that	   it	  was	   a	   strong	   gesture	   of	  American	   enthusiasm	   for	  Arafat	   and	   the	  Palestinian	  Authority.	   	  He	   suggests	   that	   it	   “underscored	   the	  notion	  that	  for	  the	  first	  time..	  we	  were	  creating	  a	  	  bilateral	  relationship”.52	  Kamel	  Husseini	  agrees	  that	  the	  visit	  probably	  was	  a	  notable	  gesture	  but	  that	  its	   lasting	   impact	   was	   probably	   minimal:	   “I	   know	   sometimes	   in	   international	  relations,	   in	  media	  communications,	  you	  go	   for	  a	  big	  event	  or	  a	  big	  milestone	  that	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creates	  some	  sort	  of	  opportunity.	  	  Yes,	  maybe	  the	  Gaza	  visit	  and	  the	  Bethlehem	  visit	  were	   important	   in	   showing	   we	   are	   a	   nation	   like	   others,	   receiving	   the	   most	  important	  leader	  on	  earth,	  and	  all	  of	  that.	  	  But	  sometimes	  people	  are	  now	  waking	  up	  to	   the	   fact	   that	   these	   ceremonies	   aren’t	   enough	   and	   that	   should	   not	   be	   your	   only	  tactic	  in	  the	  game.”53	  Israeli	   analyst	  Barry	  Rubin	  writes	   that	   “Clinton’s	  visit	   to	  Gaza	   in	  December	  1998	  marked	  a	  new	  high	  in	  U.S.	  support	  for	  the	  PA,	  though	  not	  explicit	  backing	  for	  an	   independent	  state”	  and	  he	  gave	  “a	  very	  sympathetic	  speech”.	   	  He	  says	  “officials	  saw	   Clinton’s	   visit	   as	   a	   great	   advance,	   embodying	   ‘indirect	   U.S.	   support	   for	   a	  Palestinian	  state.’	  	  Much	  of	  the	  public,	  however,	  was	  less	  enthusiastic,	  continuing	  to	  be	   critical	   of	   the	   United	   States	   and	   its	   policies”.54	   	   Israeli	   journalist	   Leslie	   Susser	  observed	  at	  the	  time	  that	  “Clinton’s	  presence	   in	  Gaza	  showed	  just	  how	  far	  the	  U.S.	  has	  moved	   toward	  endorsing	  Palestinian	  aspirations	   for	   independence”	  and	  noted	  that	  the	  U.S.	  had	  just	  come	  from	  backstopping	  a	  donors’	  conference	  in	  which	  it	  had	  persuaded	  the	  international	  community	  to	  pledge	  $1.3	  billion	  to	  the	  Palestinians.55	  	  Yossi	   Alpher	   called	   it	   “not	   a	   terribly	   positive	   moment	   for	   Israeli-­‐American	  relations…	   [but]	   a	   very	   positive	   sign	   for	   U.S.-­‐Palestinian	   relations,”	   and	   James	  Bennet	  of	   the	  New	  York	  Times	   suggested	   the	  visit	  was	  a	  major	   “nod	   to	   statehood”	  and	   Palestinian	   national	   aspirations	   as	   a	   virtual	   (if	   not	   technical)	   state	   visit.56	  	  Deborah	  Sontag	  even	  went	  so	  far	  as	  to	  write	  in	  the	  same	  paper	  that	  the	  visit	  was	  a	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54 Rubin, The Transformation of Palestinian Politics, 184. The quote he cites is from the semi-official 
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55 Leslie Susser, “Everybody’s Ally,” Jerusalem Report, January 4, 1999. 
56 Bennet’s argument is in James Bennet, “Clinton Stirs Palestinians With a Nod To Statehood,” New York 
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sign	   that	   Arafat	   was	   “riding	   high”	   politically	   and	   that	   “the	   strong,	   unbudgable	  Palestinian	   leader	   knows	   [there	   is]	   no	   serious	   challenge	   to	   his	   rule”,	   although	   it	  probably	  was	  overestimating	  his	  standing.57	  However,	   Arafat’s	   reported	   enthusiasm	   for	   the	   trip	  may	   have	   been	   reason	  enough	  for	  Clinton	  to	  visit.	  	  It	  probably	  helped	  keep	  the	  PLO	  onboard	  with	  American	  initiatives	   as	   it	   sought	   to	  pressure	  Netanyahu	   to	   implement	   the	  Wye	  Accords	   and	  then	   to	   boost	   the	   chances	   of	   Labor	   candidate	   Ehud	   Barak	   succeeding	   him	   in	   the	  1999	   Israeli	   elections.	   	   And	   the	   visit	   helped	   visibly	   helped	   cement	   overwhelming	  support	   from	   the	   Palestinian	   National	   Council	   for	   revising	   the	   PLO	   Charter	   to	  remove	   threats	   to	   Israel,	   another	   element	   that	   helped	   set	   the	   stage	   for	   political	  change	  in	  Israel	  and	  resumption	  of	  the	  peace	  process	  in	  1999.	  Thus,	  President	  Clinton’s	  Gaza	  visit	  should	  probably	  be	  coded	  as	  a	  moderate	  success,	   both	   in	   the	   narrow	   and	   broader	   senses.	   	   It	   was	   a	   simple	   gesture	   that	  showcased	  strong	  American	  with	   the	  PA	   leadership,	  and	   it	   likely	  helped	  provide	  a	  small	  addition	  infusion	  of	  momentum	  to	  the	  peace	  process	  as	  well.	  
<Sub-­Case	  4:	  Flirting	  with	  Favorites>	  	   These	   efforts,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   were	   less	   successful.	   	   Although	   working	  with	  perceived	  moderates	  within	  the	  PA	  did	  sometimes	  help	  produce	  positive	  ideas	  in	  the	  brainstorming	  phase,	  they	  did	  little	  to	  help	  achieve	  a	  final	  status	  framework	  agreement	  at	  Camp	  David	  or	  to	  change	  the	  structure	  of	   the	  Palestinian	   leadership.	  	  And	  they	  probably	  contributed	  to	  mistrust	  of	  the	  American	  team	  and	  resistance	  on	  the	  part	  of	  disfavored	  politicians	  who	  felt	  that	  a	  deal	  would	  hurt	  them	  politically.	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Aaron	  Miller	  argues	  that	  American	  efforts	  to	  play	  Palestinian	  politics	  starting	  around	   the	   time	   Camp	   David,	   against	   the	   wishes	   of	   Arafat,	   were	   a	   hopeless	   lost	  cause:	   “we	  were	   in	   the	  game	  against	   the	  great	  manipulator.	   	   I	  mean,	   this	  was	   this	  man’s	  life!	   	  I	  mean,	  we	  were	  amateurs	  –	  amateurs	  minus!	   	  It	  represented…	  a	  scene	  out	  of	  a	  Marx	  Brothers	  movie.	  	  It	  became	  comedic!”58	  Indyk	   thinks	   that	   American	   favoritism	   toward	   Dahlan	   undermined	   the	  president’s	   strategy	   for	   achieving	   a	   final	   status	   framework	   agreement	   at	   Camp	  David	  in	  2000.	  	  He	  writes	  that	  the	  U.S.	  exacerbated	  a	  dynamic	  on	  the	  Palestinian	  side	  “between	  what	  I	  call	  the	   ‘Abus’	  and	  the	   ‘Muhammads’.	   	  The	   ‘Abus,’	  Abu	  Mazen	  and	  Abu	   Alaa,	   considered	   themselves	   the	   rightful	   heirs	   to	   the	   throne,	   while	   the	  ‘Muhammads,’	   Muhammad	   Dahlan	   and	  Muhammad	   Rashid,	   were	  maneuvering	   to	  take	  power…	  our	   first	   sin	  of	   commission	  was…	   inviting	  Muhammad	  Dahlan	   to	   the	  White	  House”.59	  	  He	  elaborates	  in	  he	  memoirs	  that	  	  “unfortunately,	   in	   the	   lead-­‐up	   to	   the	   summit,	   we	   had	   managed	   to	   alienate	   Abu	  Mazen…	   Dennis	   and	   Gamal	   Helal	   had	   arranged	   for	   his	   arch-­‐rival,	   Mohammed	  Dahlan,	   to	   be	   hosted	   by	   Sandy	   Berger	   in	   the	   White	   House.	   	   This	   convinced	   Abu	  Mazen	  that	  the	  United	  States	  was	  supporting	  Dahlan	  for	  the	  succession	  to	  Arafat	  and	  thereby	  conspiring	  to	  rob	  him	  of	  his	  birthright	  as	  the	  number	  two	  official	  in	  the	  PLO.	  	  Abu	  Mazen’s	   conviction	  was	   reinforced	   in	   the	   early	   days	   at	   Camp	  David	  when	   he	  witnessed	  how	  closely	  we	  worked	  with	  Dahlan,	  who	  together	  with	  his	  key	  political	  ally,	   Muhammad	   Rachid,	   were	   the	   only	   Palestinians	   who	   seemed	   keen	   to	  achievement	   an	   agreement…	   Abu	   Mazen	   disengaged	   from	   the	   negotiations,	   even	  departing	  Camp	  David	  for	  several	  days	  to	  attend	  his	  son’s	  wedding”.60	  	  	   Journalist	  Deborah	  Sontag	  made	  a	  similar	  argument	  in	  a	  high-­‐profile	  review	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of	  Camp	  David	  and	  Oslo’s	  collapse	  that	  she	  wrote	  for	  the	  New	  York	  Times	  :	  	  “Western	   diplomats	   here	   say	   the	   Palestinians	   believed	   that	   they	   were	   being	  manipulated	   by	   the	   Americans.	   	   They	   said	   American	   officials	   had	  made	   a	   crucial	  mistake	   in	   trying	   to	   nurture	   special	   relationships	   with	   two	   younger-­‐generation	  Palestinian	   officials	   whom	   they	   thought	   were	   pragmatic:	   Muhammad	   Rashid,	   Mr.	  Arafat’s	   Kurdish	   economic	   adviser,	   and	   Muhammad	   Dahlan,	   the	   Gaza	   preventive	  security	  chief.	  	  That	  angered	  the	  veteran	  Palestinian	  negotiators,	  they	  said,	  who	  felt	  that	  the	  Americans	  were	  seeking	  to	  divide	  and	  weaken	  them.	  	   In	  the	  middle	  of	  Camp	  David,	  one	  of	  the	  negotiators,	  Abu	  Mazen,	  flew	  back	  to	  the	  Middle	  East	  for	  his	  son’s	  wedding.	  	  He	  was	  furious	  about	  the	  American	  tactics,	  a	  European	  diplomats	  [sic]	  said,	  and	  pledged	  that	  Camp	  David	  would	  never	  succeed	  if	   such	  games	  continued	  and	   that	  he	  would	  use	   the	   refugee	   issue	   to	   foil	   it,	   if	  need	  be”.61	  	  Former	   national	   security	   advisor	   Sandy	   Berger	   agrees	   that	   the	   consequences	   of	  mishandling	   of	   Abu	  Mazen	   and	   Abu	   Alaa	  were	   “unfortunate,”	   since	   now	   “the	   two	  principal	   subordinates	   to	  Arafat	  who	  had	  his	   trust	   and	   confidence	   –	   to	   the	   extent	  anyone	  had	  Arafat’s	  trust	  and	  confidence	  –	  were	  somewhat	  out	  of	  the	  picture”.62	  Shlomo	   Ben-­‐Ami,	   one	   of	   Israel’s	   participants	   in	   the	   Sweden	   back	   channel	  talks	  that	  were	  intended	  to	  narrow	  gaps	  between	  the	  parties,	  claims	  that	  Abu	  Mazen	  was	  responsible	  for	  revealing	  the	  talks	  to	  the	  media	  and	  causing	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  back	  channel	  because	  he	  “felt	  that	  he	  was	  now	  being	  bypassed	  in	  the	  talks”.63	  	  In	  this	  instance,	  Abbas	  and	  his	  camp’s	  exclusion	  from	  the	  Stockholm	  talks	  had	  more	  to	  do	  with	   intra-­‐Palestinian	   rivalries	   being	   exacerbated	   by	   Arafat	   than	   by	   the	   United	  States,	   but	   his	   position	   as	   a	   possible	   spoiler	   at	   the	   time	  was	   quite	   clear,	   even	   to	  American	  observers.64	  Ben-­‐Ami	  writes	  that	  he	  perceive	  “an	  intra-­‐Palestinian	  crisis,	  which	   stemmed	   from	   a	   battle	   for	   the	   post-­‐Arafat	   succession…	   between	   the	   Gaza	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group	   of	   the	   younger	   generation	   (Muhamed	   Dahlan,	   Muhamed	   Rashid,	   Hassan	  Assfour)	  and	  the	  old	  guard	  represented	  by	  Abu-­‐Mazen	  and	  Abu-­‐Ala”.65	  Soon	   after	   the	   collapse	   of	   the	   Sweden	   talks,	  Ross	  met	  with	  Abbas	   to	   try	   to	  soothe	  his	  ego:	  “since	  I	  was,	  in	  effect,	  working	  the	  internal	  politics	  on	  the	  Israeli	  side,	  I	   thought	   it	   useful	   to	   do	   likewise	  with	   the	  Palestinians”.66	   	  He	   says	   he	   felt	   “it	  was	  essential	   to	   see	  Abu	  Mazen.	   	   Abu	  Mazen	   is	   a	   very	   proud	  man…	  when	   insulted	   by	  others,	   he	   got	   angry	   and	   often	   got	   even…	   I	   wanted	   him	   to	   know	   that	   peace	   was	  possible	   but	   we	   were	   not	   going	   to	   get	   there	   without	   his	   help”.67	   	   He	   was	  disappointed	  with	  Abu	  Mazen’s	  response,	  however,	  calling	  him	  “uncharacteristically	  unyielding	   on	   substance”	   and	   concluding	   that	   “this	   was	   not	   the	   posture	   of	   a	  negotiator	  trying	  tactically	  to	  gain	  advantage.	  	  This	  was	  the	  posture	  of	  someone	  who	  did	   not	   want	   anything	   to	   happen	   soon	   –	   no	   doubt	   given	   his	   continuing	   anger	   at	  Dahlan	  and	  his	  unwillingness	  to	  be	  out	  in	  front	  of	  Arafat”.68	  	   The	  other	  senior	  PA	  advisor	  who	  was	   less	   than	  forthcoming	  at	  Camp	  David	  was	  Ahmed	  Qurie	  (aka	  Abu	  Alaa).	  	  Abu	  Alaa’s	  hardball	  tactics	  on	  the	  territorial	  issue,	  refusing	   to	   talk	   specifics	   before	   Israel	   recognized	   the	   principles	   he	   advocated,	  eventually	   led	   to	   a	   major	   blowup	   from	   President	   Clinton,	   who	   berated	   the	  Palestinian	  negotiator.	  	  Henceforth	  Abu	  Alaa	  was	  dejected	  and	  in	  a	  foul	  mood	  for	  the	  remainder	  of	  the	  conference,	  and	  Ross	  says	  he	  did	  not	  try	  and	  talk	  Abu	  Alaa	  out	  of	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considering	  leaving	  Camp	  David	  altogether.69	  Enderlin	   claims	   that	   in	   both	   instances	   of	   alleged	   American	   flirtation	   with	  possible	   rivals	   within	   the	   PLO	   to	   Yasser	   Arafat,	   the	   intended	   partner	   on	   the	  Palestinian	  side	  rejected	  Washington’s	  entreaties	  outright.70	  	  This	  may	  be	  subject	  to	  selection	   bias,	   given	   that	   it	   seems	  Enderlin	   is	  working	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   Palestinian	  sources	  here	  who	  sought	  to	  share	  the	  information	  as	  an	  indication	  of	  their	  loyalty	  to	  Arafat;	   thus,	   it	   is	   also	   possible	   that	   other	   recipients	   of	   such	   American	   overtures	  might	   have	   been	  more	   responsive	   but	   chosen	   to	   remain	   quiet	   about	   their	   private	  suggestions.	  	  However,	  it	  is	  certainly	  not	  encouraging	  that	  both	  alleged	  U.S.	  attempts	  to	  reach	  out	  to	  possible	  Arafat	  rivals	  were	  rejected	  so	  abruptly.	  	  	  Clayton	  Swisher	  agrees	  that	  “in	  the	  end,	  there	  was	  little	  to	  show	  for	  all	  these	  maneuvers.	   	   In	   fact,	   it	   stoked	   even	   more	   suspicion	   within	   the	   Palestinian	   team,	  resulting	   in	  more	  negotiation	  gridlock	  and	  dissension	  that	  at	  one	  point	  resulted	   in	  an	   actual	   fistfight	   between	   Abed	   Rabbo	   and	   Asfur”.71	   	   One	   of	   Barak’s	   negotiators	  who	  was	  involved	  in	  the	  preliminary	  talks	  during	  early	  2000	  said	  that	  Yasser	  Abed	  Rabbo	  and	  Saeb	  Erekat	  both	  complained	  about	  the	  preferential	  treatment	  that	  they	  felt	  Dahlan	  was	  getting	  from	  the	  Americans.72	  Thus,	  the	  American	  efforts	  to	  play	  musical	  chairs	  among	  the	  leadership	  of	  the	  Palestinian	  Authority	  were	  largely	  a	  failure.	  	  They	  did	  not	  noticeably	  strengthen	  the	  standing	  of	  moderates	  in	  Arafat’s	  inner	  circle,	  and	  they	  certainly	  did	  not	  help	  anoint	  his	  eventual	  successor.	   	  They	  also	  did	  not	  elicit	   commitments	   from	  any	  of	  Arafat’s	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lieutenants	   promising	   to	   stand	   against	   him	   if	   he	   opposed	   a	   peace	   deal	   with	   the	  Israelis.	   	   Further,	   these	   tactics	   probably	   helped	   make	   the	   possibility	   of	   a	   deal	   at	  Camp	  David	  or	   in	   its	   immediate	  aftermath	  more	  remote	  by	  alienating	  Arafat’s	   two	  most	   important	  deputies,	  Abu	  Mazen	  and	  Abu	  Alaa,	  when	   their	   constructive	   input	  was	  needed	  the	  most.	  	  Thus,	  this	  case	  should	  be	  coded	  a	  narrow	  and	  broader	  failure.	  	  
Coding	  the	  Observable	  Implications	  
1.	  Perceptions	  of	  Sender	  Interests:	  	   The	   four	   theories	   tested	   by	   this	   dissertation	   pose	   divergent	   predictions	  about	  how	  actors	  in	  the	  sender	  state	  should	  perceive	  their	  interests	  and	  thus	  about	  the	   incidence	   of	   LSI	   over	   time.	   	   National	   interests	   theory	   (Theory	   #1)	   expects	  perceptions	  of	  sender	  interests	  to	  	  be	  faithful	  reflections	  of	  objective	  reality	  and	  thus	  that	   occurrence	   of	   LSI	   should	   accurately	   reflect	   the	   interests	   of	   the	   sender	   state.	  	  The	  lobby-­‐legislative	  approach	  (Theory	  #2)	  anticipates	  that	  LSI	  should	  generally	  not	  occur	   on	   the	  Palestine	  dyad	  because	  members	   of	   Congress	   and	   the	  powerful	   pro-­‐Israel	  lobby	  tend	  not	  to	  see	  American	  interests	  aligned	  with	  supporting	  any	  faction	  of	  relative	  moderates	  among	  the	  Palestinians.	   	  The	  bureaucratic	  approach	  (Theory	  #3)	   predicts	   that	   LSI	   should	   be	   extremely	   frequent	   and	   reflect	   the	   desires	   of	  working-­‐level	   officials	   to	   advance	  U.S.	   interests	   through	   a	   peace	   process	   in	  which	  America	   bolsters	   perceived	   Palestinian	   moderates.	   	   Finally,	   leadership	   theory	  (Theory	  #4)	  focuses	  on	  the	  agency	  of	  top	  leaders	  in	  the	  sender	  state	  and	  thus	  argues	  that	  it	  is	  their	  subjective	  perceptions	  of	  U.S.	  interests	  that	  tend	  to	  drive	  LSI.	  	   The	   frequency	   of	   American	   intervention	   in	   Palestinian	   politics	   throughout	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the	   1990s	   seems	   is	   incongruent	   with	   the	   expectations	   of	   the	   lobby-­‐legislative	  approach.	  	  And	  although	  the	  high	  rate	  of	  LSI	  occurrence	  is	  more	  congruous	  with	  the	  bureaucratic	   approach,	  which	   predicts	   frequent	   intervention,	   it	   fits	   for	   the	  wrong	  reasons.	   	  Rather,	   the	  personal	  angle	  emerges	  as	  salient	   for	  most	  of	   these	  episodes	  throughout	   the	   1990s,	   something	   that	   supports	   Theory	   #4	   but	   not	   the	   national	  interests	   or	   bureaucratic	   approaches.	   	   Indeed,	   if	   the	   bureaucratic	   approach	   were	  correct,	  we	  should	  expect	  to	  see	  high	  rates	  of	  backing	  the	  PA	  leadership	  in	  both	  the	  1990s	  and	   the	  2000s,	  but	   the	  dynamics	  of	   this	   intervention	   changed	   considerably	  with	  the	  changeover	  in	  top	  political	  leadership	  in	  Washington.	  	  Whereas	  Clinton	  was	  willing	   to	   lend	  his	   support	   to	   the	   leadership	  of	   the	  PA	   for	  most	  of	  his	  presidency,	  George	  W.	  Bush	  refused	  to	  do	  so,	  especially	  during	  his	  first	  term	  in	  office.	  	   Indeed,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  tell	  the	  story	  of	  LSI	  during	  the	  Clinton	  years	  without	  looking	  to	  Clinton	  himself.	  	  The	  effect	  is	  most	  obvious	  when	  looking	  at	  the	  decision	  to	  intervene	  in	  both	  1993	  and	  1998.	   	   In	  1993,	  Clinton’s	   involvement	  grew	  out	  of	  a	  strong	  desire	  to	  build	  constituencies	  for	  peace	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  conflict,	  and	  he	  instigated	  the	  intervention	  against	  the	  advice	  of	  his	  advisors	  at	  the	  NSC.	  	  And	  he	  was	  quick	  to	  jump	  on	  the	  idea	  when	  it	  was	  floated	  at	  Wye	  River	  that	  he	  would	  visit	  the	  Palestinian	  Authority	  to	  give	  a	  major	  speech	  in	  Gaza	  to	  the	  PNC	  on	  behalf	  of	  peace.	  In	   fact,	   Clinton’s	   deep	   commitment	   to	   helping	   midwife	   a	   lasting	   peace	  between	  Israelis	  and	  Palestinians	  may	  have	  played	  a	  role	  in	  his	  unwillingness	  to	  let	  Arafat’s	   promotion	   of	   authoritarianism	   in	   the	   territories	   get	   in	   the	   way	   of	   close	  bilateral	  ties.	  	  His	  successor,	  George	  W.	  Bush,	  would	  make	  a	  much	  bigger	  deal	  about	  trying	  to	  influence	  the	  character	  of	  a	  future	  Palestinian	  state,	  something	  that	  was	  in	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part	   a	   reflection	   of	   new	   developments	   on	   the	   ground	   but	   also	   a	   function	   of	   his	  divergent	  understanding	  of	  priorities	  in	  U.S.-­‐Palestine	  relations.	  Beilin	   seems	   to	   think	   that	   President	   Clinton’s	   personality	   also	   made	   him	  more	  attuned	  to	  Palestinian	  needs	  and	  desires,	  something	  he	  would	  tap	  into	  when	  seeking	   to	   strengthen	   the	  PA	   leadership.	   	  Beilin	  writes	   that	   “Rob	  Malley,	  Clinton’s	  advisor	  on	  Middle	  Eastern	  affairs,	  and	  a	  member	  of	  the	  National	  Security	  Council,	  in	  a	   public	   appearance	   shortly	   after	   leaving	   the	   administration,	   said	   that	   President	  Clinton	  was	   the	   friendliest	   president	   to	   the	   Palestinians	  and	   the	   friendliest	   to	   the	  Israelis.	  	  He	  was	  right.	  	  It	  was	  Clinton	  who	  opened	  the	  gates	  of	  the	  United	  States	  to	  Arafat,	   and	   Arafat	   made	   more	   visits	   to	   the	   White	   House	   than	   any	   other	   foreign	  leader	   –	   thirteen	   –	   during	   the	   Clinton	   presidency….	  He	  was	  much	   closer	   to	   Israel	  than	   to	   the	   Palestinians.	   	   But	   he	   was	   not	   blind	   to	   Palestinian	   needs,	   and	   he	  understood,	  unlike	  many	  others,	  that	  being	  a	  supporter	  of	  Israel	  did	  not	  contradict	  being	   a	   supporter	   of	   the	   Palestinians”.73	   	   This	   was	   clearly	   the	   spirit	   of	   his	   more	  obvious	  interventions	  in	  Palestinian	  politics,	  most	  notably	  in	  1993	  and	  1998.	  	  2.	  Perceptions	  of	  Close	  Contests	  The	  theories	  also	  offer	  divergent	  predictions	  with	  regard	  to	  whether	  or	  not	  actors	   in	   the	   sender	   state	   perceive	   a	   close	   leadership	   contest	   in	   the	   target	   polity.	  	  Theories	  2	  and	  3	  do	  not	  offer	  clear	  predictions	  in	  this	  regard,	  but	  Theories	  1	  and	  4	  do.	   	   Theory	   #1	   predicts	   that	   LSI	   should	   occur	   in	   close	   accordance	  with	   objective	  contests	  abroad,	  but	  Theory	  #4	  argues	  that	  subjective	  biases	  or	  distractions	  should	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Beilin, The Path to Geneva, 49. 
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get	  in	  the	  way	  of	  accurately	  perceiving	  these	  actual	  dynamics.	  The	  fact	  that	  America	  did	  not	  get	  directly	   involved	  in	  promoting	  Arafat	  and	  the	  Fatah	  leadership	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  1996	  Palestinian	  Authority	  elections	  offers	  us	  little	   in	   the	  way	   of	   being	   able	   to	   distinguish	   between	   these	   two	   theories.	   	   Fatah’s	  victory	   was	   such	   a	   clear	   and	   foregone	   conclusion	   that	   there	   was	   little	   room	   for	  subjective	  biases	  to	  skew	  officials’	  personal	  forecasts.	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	   the	   fourth	   sub-­‐case	  explored	  above,	  America’s	   tentative	  flirtation	   with	   alternative	   leadership	   at	   the	   top	   of	   the	   PA,	   offers	   much	   more	  powerful	  grist	  for	  analysis.	  	  It	  was	  undoubtedly	  clear	  to	  most	  expert	  observers	  at	  the	  time	   that	  Arafat	  was	  wreaking	  havoc	  among	  his	  negotiators	  by	  playing	  upon	   their	  political	   rivalries.74	   	  However,	   in	  practice	   it	  would	  have	  been	  unrealistic	   to	  expect	  that	   this	   environment	   would	   allow	   for	   much	   more	   than	   some	   creative	  brainstorming	   with	   relative	   moderates	   within	   the	   PA.	   	   Believing	   that	   the	   United	  States	  could	  seriously	  alter	  the	  possibility	  that	  a	  final	  status	  deal	  would	  be	  accepted	  without	   some	   degree	   of	   harmony	   at	   the	   top	   echelons	   would	   have	   been	   highly	  unrealistic.	   	   And	   America’s	   ability	   to	   play	   on	   these	   rivalries	   to	   shape	   eventual	  succession	  after	  Arafat	  would	  have	  been	  equally	  remote.	  Nor	  were	   these	  misjudgments	  attributable	   to	   institutional	  biases	  caused	  by	  Congress,	  lobbyists,	  or	  bureaucrats.	   	  Instead,	  it	  seems	  as	  though	  this	  strategy	  came	  about	   as	   a	   result	   of	   wishful	   thinking	   at	   the	   very	   top	   levels	   in	   the	   Clinton	  administration,	  by	  officials	  who	  were	  so	  eager	  to	  push	  for	  a	  deal	  that	  they	  may	  have	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Omar M. Dajani, “Surviving Opportunities: Palestinian Negotiating Patterns in Peace Talks With Israel,” 
in How Israelis and Palestinians Negotiate: A Cross-Cultural Analysis of the Oslo Peace Process, ed. 
Tamara Cofman Wittes (US Institute of Peace Press, 2005), 58; Aaron David Miller, The Much Too 
Promised Land: America’s Elusive Search for Arab-Israeli Peace (Bantam Books, 2008), 292. 
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moderately	  overestimated	  the	  influence	  of	  their	  favored	  interlocutors	  at	  the	  time.	  	  3.	  Patterns	  of	  Domestic	  Debate:	  	   The	  three	  domestically-­‐oriented	  theories	  tested	  by	  this	  dissertation	  (theories	  2,	   3,	   and	   4)	   offer	   divergent	   predictions	   with	   regard	   to	   the	   patterns	   of	   domestic	  deliberation	  and	  implementation	  leading	  up	  to	  a	  policy	  of	  LSI.	  	  For	  instance,	  Theory	  #2	   expects	   that	   lobbies	   and	  members	   of	   Congress	   should	   be	   influential	   in	   sender	  state	   decision-­‐making	  before	   LSI	   is	   pursued	   and	   that	   these	   actors	   are	   likely	   to	   be	  included	   during	   the	   deliberative	   process.	   	   Theory	   #3	   anticipates	   that	   decisions	  should	  bubble	  up	  from	  the	  bureaucracy	  and	  that	  its	  leaders	  should	  be	  the	  ones	  who	  are	  well-­‐informed	  about	  the	  sender	  state’s	  plans	  before	  they	  are	  pursued.	  	  However,	  if	   top	   leaders	   in	   the	   sender	   state	   pursue	   LSI	   using	   informal	   decision-­‐making	  procedures	  while	  leaving	  domestic	  stakeholders	  in	  the	  dark,	  then	  that	  would	  seem	  to	  support	  the	  notion	  that	  the	  agency	  of	  politicians	  in	  the	  sender	  state	  is	  decisive.	  	   In	   this	   regard,	   all	   three	   cases	   of	   notable	   U.S.	   intervention	   in	   Palestinian	  politics	   under	   Clinton	   (1993,	   1998,	   and	   2000)	   fit	   with	   the	   model	   anticipated	   by	  Theory	   #4.	   	   At	   least	   the	   first	   two	   cases	   and	   probably	   the	   third	   were	   all	   decided	  verbally	  rather	  than	  on	  paper	  through	  the	  formal	  interagency	  process.	  	  For	  instance,	  in	  1993	  President	  Clinton	  invited	  Yasser	  Arafat	  to	  the	  signing	  ceremony	  at	  the	  White	  House	  without	  giving	  any	  warning	  to	  his	  advisors,	   let	  alone	  informing	  Congress	  or	  the	  wider	  bureaucracy.	  	  He	  made	  this	  decision	  by	  fiat,	  as	  a	  president	  gone	  “rogue”.	  	  If	  his	  aides	  had	  been	  calling	  the	  shots,	  he	  probably	  would	  not	  have	  pursued	  the	  idea.	  Then,	   in	   1998,	   the	   idea	   for	   a	   presidential	   visit	   to	   Gaza	   to	   address	   the	   PNC	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came	  about	  as	  a	  result	  of	  high-­‐level	  brainstorming	  among	  Clinton	  and	  his	  advisors.	  	  It	   was	   then	   offered	   to	   the	   Palestinian	   team,	   who	   eagerly	   accepted,	   without	   an	  extensive	  period	  of	  deliberation	  over	  the	  idea	  through	  standard,	  paper	  channels.	  	  It	  was	  included	  on	  a	  one-­‐page	  write-­‐up	  of	  the	  group’s	  ideas,	  but	  the	  document	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  informal	  and	  not	  a	  standard	  memo.75	  	  The	  plan	  was	  both	  proposed	  and	  adopted	   in	  a	  summit	  setting,	  where	  members	  of	  Congress,	   the	  pro-­‐Israel	   lobby,	  or	  the	  broader	  bureaucracy	  would	  have	  had	  scant	  opportunity	  to	  weigh	  in.	  	   Finally,	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  U.S.	  flirtations	  with	  perceived	  PA	  moderates	  leading	  up	  to	  Camp	  David	  seem	  to	  fit	  with	  the	  notion	  of	  an	  impressionistic	  policy	  being	  put	  in	  place	  without	  any	  sort	  of	  formal	  evaluative	  process	  being	  applied	  first.	  	  American	  outreach	   to	   members	   of	   the	   PA’s	   young	   guard	   seems	   to	   have	   been	   extremely	  impressionistic,	  and	  efforts	  by	  Albright	  or	  others	  to	  probe	  the	  willingness	  of	  the	  old	  guard	   (Abu	   Mazen,	   Abu	   Alaa,	   or	   Farouq	   Qaddoumi)	   to	   break	   with	   Arafat	   would	  likely	  have	  been	  too	  sensitive	  to	  put	  down	  on	  paper	  at	  all.	  	   In	   short,	   this	   pattern	   of	   behavior	   seems	   to	   fit	   best	  with	   leadership	   theory.	  	  Meanwhile,	   the	  lobby-­‐legislative	  approach	  and	  bureaucratic	  approach	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  find	  much	  support	  from	  the	  data	  in	  this	  regard.	  	  4.	  Cycles	  of	  Domestic	  Power:	  	   If	  Theory	  #2	  is	  correct,	  we	  should	  expect	  sender	  state	  behavior	  to	  be	  shaped	  by	  the	  preferences	  of	  lobbyists	  and	  members	  of	  Congress,	  and	  that	  influence	  should	  be	   especially	   predominant	   during	   periods	   of	   divided	   government	   and	   when	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 For discussion of how the Gaza idea came up at Wye, see  Ross, The Missing Peace, 442. 
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elections	  are	  looming	  in	  the	  sender	  state.	  	  If	  Theory	  #3	  is	  correct,	  the	  preferences	  of	  bureaucrats	   should	   be	   similarly	   influential,	   especially	   at	   the	   start	   of	   presidential	  terms.	   	   Theories	   1	   and	   4,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   expect	   that	   these	   dynamics	   tied	   to	  variations	  in	  the	  sender	  state’s	  political	  calendar	  should	  be	  relatively	  less	  important.	  	   American	   LSI	   toward	  Palestinian	   politics	   in	   1993,	   1998,	   and	   2000	   seem	   to	  contradict	   the	  expectations	  of	   the	   two	  domestically-­‐oriented	  structural	   theories	  of	  behavior.	  	  The	  United	  States	  did	  pursue	  a	  notable	  intervention	  in	  Palestinian	  politics	  during	  the	  first	  year	  of	  Clinton’s	  presidency,	  but	  it	  only	  occurred	  later	  in	  that	  year,	  when	   his	   political	   appointee	   were	   well-­‐situated	   in	   positions	   of	   power	   over	   the	  bureaucracy.	  Clinton	  even	  embraced	  the	  Palestinian	  Authority	  in	  December	  1998	  when	  his	  standing	  at	  home	  was	  perilously	   low,	   less	  than	  a	  week	  before	  his	   impeachment	  by	  the	  House	  of	  Representatives.	   	  And	  although	  Clinton	  approached	  the	   Israel	  visit	   in	  part	   as	   an	   opportunity	   to	   demonstrate	   his	   ability	   to	   continue	   doing	   things	   that	  looked	   presidential,	   the	   idea	   of	   embracing	   the	   staunch	   nationalist	   constituency	   of	  the	  Palestinian	  National	  Council	  was	  much	  more	  risky	  domestically.	   	  Yet,	  as	   James	  Bennet	  wrote	  in	  the	  New	  York	  Times,	  “in	  a	  further	  sign	  of	  how	  times	  have	  changed,	  a	  senior	  Administration	  official	  said	  tonight	  that	  he	  did	  not	  know	  if	  the	  audience	  –	  a	  lustily	   cheering	   throng	  of	   about	  700,	  mostly	  men	   in	   suits	   –	   included	   any	   suspects	  wanted	  by	  the	  United	  States.	  	  And	  he	  did	  not	  seem	  much	  interested”.76	  	   Finally,	  Clinton	  pursued	  a	  make	  or	  break	  summit	   in	   July	  of	  2000	   in	  spite	  of	  impending	  elections	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  timing	  the	  conference	  so	  it	  would	  be	  done	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Bennet, “Clinton Stirs Palestinians With a Nod To Statehood.” 
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before	  the	  Democratic	  and	  Republican	  conventions	  later	  that	  summer.	  	  However,	  his	  interest	   in	   a	   lasting	   and	   legacy-­‐boosting	   peace	   agreement	   seem	   to	   have	   exerted	  more	   influence	   of	   his	   calculations	   than	   his	   concern	   that	   embracing	   Palestinian	  moderates	  to	  get	  there	  might	  hurt	  Democrats’	  chances	  at	  the	  polls	  that	  November.	  	   Nor	   does	   it	   seem	   to	   matter	   for	   LSI	   that	   Clinton’s	   government	   went	   from	  united	  to	  divided	  after	  the	  1994	  midterm	  elections	  until	  the	  end	  of	  his	  time	  in	  office.	  	  It	  is	  difficult	  to	  envision	  in	  hindsight	  that	  Clinton	  would	  not	  have	  invited	  Arafat	  and	  Rabin	   to	   the	  White	   House	   signing	   ceremony	   for	   the	   Oslo	   Accords	   in	   1993	   if	   the	  Republicans	   had	   then	   been	   in	   control	   of	   the	   Senate	   and	   the	   House.	   	   Nor	   did	   his	  intervention	  in	  Palestinian	  politics	  drop	  off	  in	  1998	  or	  2000	  when	  the	  Republicans	  were	  the	  majority	  in	  both	  chambers	  of	  Congress.	  	   Thus,	  the	  cycles	  of	  domestic	  power	  framework	  seems	  to	  offer	  some	  notable	  evidence	  against	  the	  domestic	  structural	  models	  of	  LSI	  behavior,	  especially	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	   lobby-­‐legislative	   approach.	   	   If	   Theory	   #2	   was	   indeed	   the	   best	   model	   for	   U.S.	  intervention	   in	   Palestinian	   politics	   during	   the	   Clinton	   years,	   it	   would	   have	   been	  extremely	  unlikely	  for	  the	  data	  to	  contradict	  the	  theory’s	  expectations	  in	  this	  regard.	  	  5.	  Bureaucratic	  Freelancing:	  	   Theories	  3	  and	  4	  also	  offer	  divergent	  predictions	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  matter	  of	  bureaucratic	   freelancing.	   	   Theory	   #3	   anticipates	   that	   freelancing	   should	   be	   an	  extremely	  frequent	  occurrence	  and	  that	  it	  should	  not	  depend	  on	  presidential	  styles	  of	  management	   or	   issue	   oversight.	   	   Theory	  #4	   expects	   that	   freelancing	   should	   be	  rare	  and	  should	  only	  occur	  during	  periods	  of	  extremely	  lax	  presidential	  control.	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   Overall,	  it	  seems	  as	  though	  the	  Clinton	  era	  fits	  better	  with	  the	  predictions	  of	  leadership	   theory.	   	  Given	  that	  Clinton	  was	  an	  extremely	   involved	  president	  on	   the	  peace	  process	  and	  Palestinian	  issues,	  it	  makes	  sense	  that	  freelancing	  was	  relatively	  infrequent	   while	   he	   was	   in	   office.	   	   In	   1993,	   he	   singlehandedly	   imposed	   a	   policy	  outcome	  on	  his	  advisors,	  even	  though	  they	  had	  explicitly	  advocated	  a	  diametrically	  opposite	  policy	  position	  on	  Arafat’s	  invitation.	   	  It	  seemed	  to	  matter	  little	  that	  Tony	  Lake	  had	  proclaimed	  Arafat	  would	  be	  attending	  “over	  my	  dead	  body”.77	  	   Then,	   the	   administration’s	   political	   leadership	   allotted	   Palestinian	  democracy	  promotion	  an	  extremely	  low	  level	  of	  priority	  against	  the	  wishes	  of	  some	  bureaucrats.	   	   As	   Dunne	   points	   out,	   “diplomats	   in	   the	   field	   raised	   concerns…	   but	  officials	  in	  Washington	  were	  ‘tone	  deaf’”	  to	  these	  concerns.78	   	  These	  officials	  in	  the	  field	  proved	  themselves	  incapable	  of	  affecting	  Palestinian	  politics	  without	  stronger	  backing	   from	  Washington.	   	  Nor	   could	   the	   president’s	   advisors	   at	  Wye	  have	   easily	  imposed	  a	  visit	  to	  Gaza	  upon	  him	  if	  he	  didn’t	  feel	  comfortable	  going	  there	  in	  1998.	  	   The	  only	  episode	  that	  verges	  on	  bureaucratic	  freelancing	  during	  the	  Clinton	  years	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  the	  efforts	  of	  his	  team	  to	  reach	  out	  to	  moderates	  within	  the	  Palestinian	  Authority	  leadership	  in	  the	  year	  2000.	   	  It	  is	  conceivable	  that	  senior	  officials	  pursued	  these	  efforts	  without	   the	  president’s	  prior	  backing.	   	  For	   instance,	  Israeli	  negotiator	  Oded	  Eran	  identifies	  most	  of	  the	  preferential	  treatment	  of	  Dahlan	  as	   coming	   from	   Dennis	   Ross	   and	   George	   Tenet,	   not	   from	   President	   Clinton.79	  	  Similarly,	   there	   is	   no	   concrete	   evidence	   that	   Albright’s	   feeler	   to	   Abu	   Mazen	   was	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Indyk, Innocent Abroad, 63. 
78 Dunne, “A Two-State Solution Requires Palestinian Politics,” 3. 
79 Eran, “Interview with the Author”. 
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sanctioned	  by	  the	  White	  House.	   	  However,	  President	  Clinton	  did	  little	  to	  rein	  these	  efforts	  in,	  and,	  regardless,	  all	  three	  of	  these	  individuals	  are	  sufficiently	  senior	  to	  put	  the	   “bureaucratic”	   element	   of	   “bureaucratic	   freelancing”	   into	   serious	   question.	  	  However,	  more	  decisive	  data	  for	  this	  case	  is	  currently	  unavailable.	  	  6.	  Consistency	  of	  Message:	  One	  of	  the	  main	  drivers	  of	  LSI	  effectiveness	  seems	  to	  be	  the	  consistency	  with	  which	   actors	   in	   the	   sender	   state	   sought	   to	   convey	   their	   message	   of	   support	   to	  observers	   within	   the	   politics	   of	   the	   target.	   	   LSI	   should	   be	   more	   effective	   when	  messaging	  is	  consistent	  and	  clear,	  and	  the	  theories	  offer	  divergent	  predictions	  as	  to	  when	  and	  why	  this	   is	   likely	   to	  be	   the	  case.	   	  For	   instance,	  national	   interests	   theory	  argues	   that	  messaging	   should	  almost	  always	  be	   consistent,	   since	   challengers	   from	  within	   the	   politics	   of	   the	   sender	   state	   should	   be	   unlikely	   to	   obstruct	   repetition.	  	  Theories	  2	  and	  3	  anticipate	  that	  consistent	  messaging	  should	  be	  undermined	  when	  it	   contradicts	   with	   the	   institutional	   preferences	   of	   Congress,	   lobbyists,	   or	   the	  permanent	   bureaucracy.	   	   Theory	   #4	   argues	   that	   consistency	   depends	   upon	   the	  ability	  and	  inclination	  of	  the	  president	  to	  convey	  a	  consistent	  message.	  In	   this	   regard,	   theories	   1	   and	   4	   seem	   to	   garner	   the	   best	   support	   from	   the	  data.	  	  For	  instance,	  in	  1998	  Clinton’s	  inspiring	  words	  were	  contradicted	  by	  realities	  on	   the	   ground	   and	   resistance	   from	   Netanyahu’s	   government	   in	   Israel	   on	   the	  diplomatic	  track.	  	  However,	  his	  team	  did	  an	  extremely	  careful	  job	  of	  reinforcing	  his	  message	   by	   emphasizing	   that	   the	   PA	   was	   largely	   compliant	   with	   its	   obligations	  under	  Wye	  while	  the	  Israelis	  were	  not.	  	  This	  effort	  was	  also	  directed	  at	  a	  very	  high	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political	   level	   within	   the	   U.S.	   hierarchy	   by	   Albright,	   sometimes	   through	   her	  spokesperson,	  sometimes	  not.	  However,	  the	  bumps	  that	  Clinton’s	  embrace	  of	  Arafat	  provided,	  first	  in	  1993	  and	  again	  in	  1998,	  were	  extremely	  ephemeral,	  especially	  once	  it	  became	  clear	  that	  the	   Oslo	   process	   was	   not	   yielding	   the	   sort	   of	   benefits	   that	   Washington	   and	   the	  Israelis	  had	  originally	  promised.	  	  This	  sobering	  reality	  provided	  a	  major	  damper	  on	  the	   extent	   to	  which	   presidential	   rhetoric	   extolling	   a	   new	   era	   of	   peace	   and	   strong	  U.S.-­‐Palestine	   ties	   could	   realistically	   inspire	   the	   Palestinian	   public.	   	   Thus,	   this	  dimension	   seems	   to	   fit	   best	  with	   the	   predictions	   of	   national	   interests	   theory	   and,	  only	  secondarily,	  the	  approach	  focusing	  on	  the	  agency	  of	  leaders	  in	  the	  sender	  state.	  	  7.	  Suitability	  of	  Message:	  	   Finally,	  the	  theories	  offer	  divergent	  predictions	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  suitability	  of	  messaging	  from	  the	  sender	  state,	  and,	  in	  turn,	  the	  efficacy	  of	  LSI.	   	  Again,	  Theory	  #1	   expects	   that	   outcomes	   should	  be	   consistently	  driven	  by	  objective	   realities	   and	  interests,	   whereas	   Theories	   2	   through	   4	   expect	   that	   institutional	   interests	   or	  personal	  biases	  should	  skew	  messaging	  in	  ways	  that	  are	  not	  suitable	  for	  the	  politics	  of	  the	  target	  state.	  	  In	  this	  regard,	  Theory	  #4	  seems	  to	  explain	  the	  data	  best.	  	   American	  intervention	  in	  1993	  played	  extremely	  well	  to	  the	  notion	  that	  the	  Palestinian	  people	  were	  entering	  a	  new	  era	  in	  which	  their	  people	  and	  their	  leaders	  would	  be	  accepted	  by	  the	  international	  community.	  	  Although	  a	  ceremony	  featuring	  Mahmoud	  Abbas	  or	  Faisal	  Husseini	  would	  also	  have	  been	  exciting,	  Clinton’s	  idea	  of	  embracing	   Arafat	   in	   Washington	   helped	   drive	   home	   that	   the	   Palestinian	   people	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were	  entering	  a	  new	  era.	  Moreover,	   his	   sensitivity	   to	   Palestinian	   aspirations	   helped	   make	   for	   an	  especially	   inspiring	   speech	   to	   the	   PNC	   in	   Gaza.	   	   Aaron	   Miller	   that	   the	   president	  brought	   the	  passion	  when	  he	   came	   to	  Gaza:	   “Hanan	  Ashrawi	   recalls	   that	  no	  other	  American	   leader	  before	  him	  seemed	   to	   see	  her	  people	   ‘as	  human	  beings’.	   	  Clinton	  confirmed	  this	  impression	  for	  me	  during	  his	  remarkable	  December	  1998	  speech	  to	  the	   Palestinian	   National	   Council	   in	   Gaza	   city	   [sic].	   	   Sitting	   in	   that	   crowded	   hall	  among	   more	   than	   four	   hundred	   representatives	   of	   the	   Palestinian	   national	  movement,	  listening	  to	  the	  president	  speak	  to	  them	  about	  their	  aspirations	  as	  if	  he	  were	  speaking	  to	  a	  Democratic	  National	  Convention,	  his	  power	  and	  passion	  amazed	  me”.80	   	   The	   event	   poses	   a	   considerable	   contrast	  with	  George	  W.	  Bush’s	   lackluster	  remarks	   upon	   his	   first	   trips	   to	   Palestinian	   cities	   in	   2008	   and	   helps	   support	   the	  notion	   that	   the	   impact	  of	  Clinton’s	  speech	  a	  decade	  before	  was	  conditioned	  on	  his	  connection	  and	  charisma.	  	   A	  notable	   instance	   in	  which	   the	  message	  conveyed	  by	  U.S.	   intervention	  did	  not	  suitably	  accord	  with	  the	  dynamics	  of	  Palestinian	  politics	  was	  when	  the	  U.S.	  tried	  to	  play	   favorites	  with	  perceived	  moderates	  within	  the	  PA	   leadership	   leading	  up	  to	  Camp	   David	   in	   2000.	   	   In	   this	   instance,	   it	   was	   the	   Clinton	   team’s	   misreading	   of	  Palestinian	  politics	  that	  was	  most	  salient,	  promoting	  mistrust	  among	  the	  Palestinian	  negotiators	  and	  between	   their	  delegation	  and	   the	  United	  States.	   	  Again,	   it	  was	   the	  administration’s	  top	  leadership	  that	  skewed	  the	  messaging	  and	  in	  turn	  the	  efficacy	  of	  the	  attempt.	  	  In	  this	  regard,	  leadership	  theory	  seems	  to	  provide	  a	  better	  fit	  for	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Miller, The Much Too Promised Land, 310. 
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data	  than	  the	  theories	  that	  emphasize	  structural	  determinants	  of	  behavior.	  	  
Conclusion	  
	   President	  Clinton’s	  record	  of	  intervening	  in	  Palestinian	  internal	  politics	  was	  something	  of	  a	  mixed	  bag.	  	  He	  singlehandedly	  elevated	  Yasser	  Arafat’s	  global	  profile	  and	  internal	  standing	  by	  inviting	  him	  to	  the	  signing	  ceremony	  for	  the	  Oslo	  Accords	  that	  his	  team	  was	  staging	  on	  the	  White	  House	  lawn	  in	  1993.	  	  However,	  the	  Clinton	  team’s	  biggest	  effect	  on	  Palestinian	  politics	  was	  not	  intentional,	  per	  se;	  by	  ignoring	  Arafat’s	   growing	   power	   and	   helping	   to	   supply	   him	  with	   capabilities	   that	   put	   him	  above	  accountability,	  the	  United	  States	  unintentionally	  helped	  Arafat	  build	  a	  nascent	  PLO	  dictatorship	  in	  Gaza	  and	  the	  West	  Bank.	  	   When	  Clinton	  did	  turn	  his	  attention	  to	  the	  Palestinian	  perspective,	  his	  knack	  for	   empathy	   was	   superb.	   	   This	   enabled	   him	   to	   occasionally	   give	   Palestinian	  moderates	  an	  added	  boost,	  not	  just	  in	  1993	  but	  also	  in	  1998	  with	  his	  speech	  before	  the	   PNC	   in	   Gaza	   City,	   which	  would	   have	   been	   unthinkable	   just	   five	   years	   before.	  	  However,	  as	  facts	  on	  the	  ground	  began	  to	  undermine	  public	  enthusiasm	  for	  the	  Oslo	  process,	  his	  ability	  to	  strengthen	  the	  Palestinian	  peace	  camp	  seemed	  to	  be	  shrinking	  over	  time.	  	  	   Finally,	   as	   Clinton’s	   presidency	   came	   to	   an	   end,	   he	   found	   himself	   back	   at	  square	  one.	   	  He	  had	   invested	  heavily	   in	  Yasser	  Arafat	  over	  his	   two	  terms	   in	  office,	  and	  he	  had	  lost	  that	  bet.	  	  Arafat’s	  passive	  demeanor	  had	  undermined	  opportunities	  for	  constructive	  process	  on	  a	  final	  status	  agreement	  at	  Camp	  David,	  and	  he	  instead	  turned	  to	  violence	  as	  a	  means	  of	  ensuring	  his	  continued	  rule.	  	  Clinton’s	  aides	  tried	  to	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divide	  and	  conquer	  by	  working	  with	  certain	  preferred	  advisors	  to	  the	  PA	  chairman	  over	   others,	   also	   probing	   whether	   any	   of	   his	   senior	   lieutenants	   would	   consider	  breaking	  with	  him	  in	  support	  of	  a	  potential	  deal.	  	  Yet	  in	  the	  end	  Clinton	  and	  his	  team	  ere	  foiled	  by	  the	  very	  system	  of	  autocratic	  authority	  that	  they	  had	  allowed	  Arafat	  to	  assemble	  around	  himself	  during	  the	  preceding	  decade.	  	  As	  Aaron	  David	  Miller	  aptly	  concludes,	   “we	  were	   in	   the	   game	  against	   the	   great	  manipulator.	   	   I	  mean,	   this	  was	  this	  man’s	  life!	  	  I	  mean,	  we	  were	  amateurs	  –	  amateurs	  minus!”81	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Miller, “Interview with the Author.” 
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Chapter	  X.	  
~	  
Palestinian	  Politics,	  Post-­Oslo	  
(2001-­2009)	  	  	  	   What	   Clinton	   was	   to	   Israeli	   politics,	   Bush	   was	   to	   Palestine.	   	   Whereas	   the	  Clinton	   administration	   was	   the	   historical	   high-­‐water	   mark	   for	   American	  intervention	   in	   Israeli	   politics,	   the	   George	  W.	   Bush	   administration	   represents	   the	  most	  extensive	  period	  of	  meddling	  by	  the	  United	  States	  government	   in	  Palestinian	  political	  affairs.	  	  This	  chapter	  provides	  a	  chronicle	  of	  the	  Bush	  team’s	  various	  forays	  into	   this	   realm,	   covering	   three	   separate	  meta-­‐cases.	   	   These	   include:	   (1)	   efforts	   to	  isolate	   Arafat	   and	   strengthen	   other	   cabinet	   ministers	   in	   2002	   and	   2003,	   (2)	  attempts	  to	  lay	  the	  groundwork	  for	  a	  new	  era	  of	  Palestinian	  politics	  starting	  in	  2005	  and	  ending	  with	  Hamas’s	  victory	  in	  the	  PLC	  elections	  of	   January	  2006,	  and	  (3)	  the	  Bush	   team’s	  West	   Bank	   First	   policy	   aimed	   at	   bolstering	   Fatah	   and	   the	   PLO	  while	  sidelining	  Hamas	  in	  the	  Gaza	  Strip.	  With	  the	  peace	  process	   in	  tatters,	  an	   intifada	  raging	  on	  the	  ground,	  and	  the	  popularity	   of	   Hamas	   on	   the	   rise,	   there	   is	   no	   doubt	   that	   George	  W.	   Bush	   came	   to	  office	   facing	   a	   tougher	   set	   of	   circumstances	   than	   Clinton	   had	   experienced.1	  	  However,	   distinctive	   features	   of	   President	   Bush’s	   beliefs	   and	   style	   of	   leadership	  shaped	   his	   response	   decisively	   when	   it	   came	   to	   his	   approach	   toward	   leadership	  selection	   intervention	   in	   the	   politics	   of	   Palestine.	   	   He	   was	   convinced	   that	   the	  immediate	  source	  of	  the	  problem	  was	  not	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  peace	  agreement	  but	  rather	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Regarding Hamas’s sudden jump in popularity after the outbreak of the second intifada, see Khalil 
Shikaki, “Palestinians Divided,” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 1 (2002): 92. 
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the	   quality	   of	   Palestinian	   leadership.	   	   What	   ensued	   was	   a	   decade	   of	   greater	  meddling	   in	   Palestinian	   affairs,	   but	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   he	   displayed	   a	   lack	   of	  enthusiasm	   for	   promoting	   serious	   peace	   talks,	   his	   efforts	   at	   shaping	   Palestinian	  politics	  tended	  to	  fall	  short.	  
Palestine,	  Case	  #3:	  Replacing	  Arafat,	  2002-­‐2004	  	  	  
Coding	  the	  Dependent	  Variables	  (Occurrence	  and	  Efficacy)	  Did	  LSI	  Occur?	  	   Yes.	   	   The	   United	   States	   intervened	   extensively	   in	   Palestinian	   leadership	  selection	   during	   this	   period.	   	   First,	   it	   declared	   that	   American	   officials	   would	   not	  engage	  with	  the	  PA	  so	  long	  as	  Arafat	  was	  in	  power.	  	  It	  imposed	  a	  finance	  minister	  on	  the	  PA	  who	  was	  reputed	  for	  his	  commitment	  to	  transparency	  in	  order	  to	  decrease	  Arafat’s	   control	   over	   economic	   affairs	   and	   thus	   stem	   the	   flow	   of	   corruption.	   	   It	  temporarily	   froze	  the	  peace	  process,	  refusing	  to	  release	  the	  Road	  Map	  until	  Arafat	  appointed	   an	   empowered	   prime	  minister.	   	   And,	   although	   it	   failed	   to	   keep	   him	   in	  office,	  it	  took	  a	  number	  of	  gestures	  intended	  to	  bolster	  Abu	  Mazen	  after	  he	  had	  been	  appointed	  to	  the	  position.	  
<Sub-­Case	  1:	  Ousting	  Arafat?>	  Although	  they	  spoke	  a	  few	  times	  over	  the	  phone,	  Bush	  never	  met	  with	  Yasser	  Arafat.2	   	   In	   September	   of	   2001,	   Bush	   cancelled	   plan	   for	   a	   possible	   meeting	   with	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 George W. Bush, Decision Points (Random House, 2010), 400. 
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Arafat	   in	   person	   at	   the	   United	   Nations	   General	   Assembly.3	   	   He	   then	   had	   his	   last	  communication	  with	  the	  chairman	  after	  the	  Karine	  A	  incident	  in	  January	  2002,	  when	  a	  ship	  full	  of	  illicit	  weapons	  was	  intercepted	  by	  the	  IDF	  that	  had	  been	  linked	  to	  the	  Palestinian	  Authority.4	  	  Secretary	  Powell	  warned	  Arafat	  that	  April	  in	  Ramallah	  that,	  if	  he	  did	  not	  urgently	  move	  to	  stop	  terrorism	  against	  Israeli	  civilians,	  it	  might	  be	  his	  last	  official	  meeting	  with	  him	  or	  other	  American	  officials.5	  In	   what	   was	   a	   clear	   dig	   at	   Arafat,	   President	   Bush	   gave	   a	   speech	   from	   the	  White	  House	  Rose	  Garden	  on	  June	  24th,	  2002,	  in	  which	  he	  announced	  that	  “I	  call	  on	  the	   Palestinian	   people	   to	   elect	   new	   leaders…	   not	   compromised	   by	   terror”.	   	   He	  assured	   them	   that	   “when	   the	   Palestinian	   people	   have	   new	   leaders…	   the	   United	  States	  of	  America	  will	  support	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  Palestinian	  state...	  as	  new	  Palestinian	  institutions	   and	  new	   leaders	   emerge,	   demonstrating	   real	  performance	  on	   security	  and	  reform,	  I	  expect	  Israel	  to	  respond	  and	  work	  toward	  a	  final	  status	  agreement…	  reached	   within	   three	   years	   from	   now”.6	   	   	   The	   speech	   was	   widely	   interpreted	   to	  mean	  that	  Arafat	  was	  off-­‐limits	  for	  U.S.	  diplomacy	  and	  that	  Bush	  sought	  his	  ouster.	  From	   that	   point	   forward,	   Arafat	   was	   blacklisted	   by	  Washington.	   	   Pressure	  grew	  on	  him	  to	  appoint	  a	  prime	  minister	  to	  handle	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  governance	  of	  the	  PA,	  peace	   negotiations,	   and	   security	   affairs.	   In	   concert	   with	   Israel,	   the	   Bush	  administration	   also	   pressured	   the	   Palestinians	   starting	   in	   the	   summer	   of	   2002	   to	  call	   off	   elections	   they	   had	   scheduled	   for	   the	   following	   January,	   since	   they	   had	   no	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Karen DeYoung, Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell (Random House, 2007), 338, 356. 
4 Bush, Decision Points, 400–401. 
5 DeYoung, Soldier, 382–383; Aaron David Miller, The Much Too Promised Land: America’s Elusive 
Search for Arab-Israeli Peace (Bantam Books, 2008), 344. 
6 George W. Bush, “President Bush Calls for New Palestinian Leadership: The Rose Garden”, June 24, 
2002. 
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interest	   in	   seeing	   Arafat’s	   legitimacy	   bolstered	   in	   an	   official	   poll.7	   	   The	   U.S.	   also	  discouraged	  proposals	  for	  Palestinian	  elections	  in	  2004	  for	  similar	  reasons.8	  Initially,	   there	  was	   no	   concrete	   plan	   for	   putting	   the	   anti-­‐Arafat	   framework	  into	  action.	   	  As	  Dennis	  Ross	   recalls,	   ,	   “there	  wasn’t	   any	   immediate	   follow-­‐up	  after	  the	   speech.”9	   	   As	   a	   result,	   the	   Jordanians	   suggested,	   and	   the	   Americans	   gradually	  agreed	  to	  put	  the	  plan	  embodied	  in	  Bush’s	  speech	  into	  a	  set	  of	  steps	  for	  both	  sides	  that	  would	  help	  mobilize	  action	  on	  the	  peace	  process.10	  In	   the	   months	   that	   followed,	   isolating	   Arafat	   still	   seemed	   to	   be	   a	   main	  priority	  of	  American	  policy	  toward	  the	  Palestinians.	  	  Donald	  Rumsfeld	  remarked	  in	  a	  note	  to	  Rice	  after	  an	  October	  9th	  NSC	  meeting	  that	  “the	  reworked	  ‘roadmap’	  should	  be	  focused	  on	  the	  point	  the	  President	  made	  several	  times	  in	  the	  meeting	  –	  namely,	  that	   the	   goal	   is	   to	   weaken	   and	   eventually	   end	   the	   authority	   of	   Yassir	   Arafat.	  	  Therefore,	  each	   item	  in	  the	   ‘roadmap’	  should	  be	  checked	  to	  see	  that	   they	   focus	  on	  weakening	   Arafat”.11	   That	   same	   month,	   Rumsfeld	   complained	   that	   “France	   [still]	  continuously	   favors	   Arafat	   and	   inhibits	   US	   efforts	   to	   weaken	   him”.12	   	   One	   of	   the	  techniques	  the	  United	  States	  used	  to	  subsequently	  hem	  in	  Arafat	  was	  to	  support	  the	  appointment	  of	  a	  PA	  finance	  minister	  who	  would	  impose	  transparency	  on	  its	  overall	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Karen DeYoung, “U.S. Sets Talks with Palestinian Delegation; Decision to Meet Marks Policy Shift,” 
Washington Post, July 29, 2002; Harvey Morris, “Palestinian Elections Expected to Be Cancelled: 
Authority Will Blame Israeli Occupation,” Financial Times, December 20, 2002; Ian Fisher, “Blaming 
Israel, Palestinians Postpone Election Indefinitely,” New York Times, December 23, 2002. 
8 Khalil Shikaki, “Shikaki: No Political Will for Palestinian National Elections,” interview by Bernard 
Gwertzman, CFR Blog: Pressure Points, August 11, 2004. 
9 Dennis Ross, “Interview with the Author,” March 23, 2012. 
10 Miller, The Much Too Promised Land, 350-352; Marwan Muasher, The Arab Center: The Promise of 
Moderation (Yale University Press, 2008), 154-176. 
11 Donald Rumsfeld, “NSC Meeting October 9-Middle East - Memorandum to Honorable Condoleezza 
Rice” (Document released for “The Rumsfeld Papers” at www.rumsfeld.com, October 16, 2002). 
12 Donald Rumsfeld, “Illustrative List of Recent Examples of French Opposition to the United States” 
(Document released for “The Rumsfeld Papers” at www.rumsfeld.com, October 23, 2002). 
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finances.	  
<Sub-­Case	  2:	  Funding	  Fayyad>	  One	   of	   George	   Bush’s	   main	   concerns	   about	   the	   Palestinian	   Authority	   as	   a	  whole	   and	   Yasser	   Arafat	   in	   particular	   was	   widespread	   and	   deep-­‐seated	  corruption.13	   	  The	  main	  avenue	  Washington	  pursued	   for	   fixing	   this	   state	  of	  affairs	  was	   to	  push	   for	   the	  appointment	  of	  a	  new	   face	   to	  direct	   the	  PA’s	   finance	  ministry	  and	   ensure	   that	   the	   Palestinian	   government	   would	   adopt	   strong	   transparency	  measures.	   	  Presumably,	  this	  would	  take	  economic	  affairs	  out	  of	  Arafat’s	  hands	  and	  dry	  up	  the	  financial	  flows	  that	  had	  enabled	  the	  corruption.	  Reportedly,	   the	  United	   States	   not	   only	   pushed	   for	   the	   staffing	   shakeup	  but	  even	  worked	   to	   ensure	   that	   its	   favored	   candidate	   got	   the	   job,	   encouraging	   Salam	  Fayyad	  to	  throw	  his	  hat	  in	  the	  ring.	  	  Israeli	  journalist	  Barak	  Ravid	  wrote	  in	  Ha’aretz	  that	  Fayyad	  	  “was	  on	  his	  way	  to	  a	  brilliant	  business	  career	  when	  the	  person	  considered	  to	  be	  his	  greatest	  patron	   intervened	  –	   then	  national	  security	  adviser	   today	  U.S.	  Secretary	  of	  State	   Condoleezza	   Rice.	   	   When…	   Operation	   Defensive	   Shield	   was	   over,	   pressure	  mounted	   on	   Yasser	   Arafat	   to	   implement	   reforms.	   	   As	   a	   result,	   the	   new	   job	   of	   PA	  finance	  minister	  was	   set	  up,	   a	  post	   that	  was	   intended	   to	   take	  control	  of	   economic	  affairs	  away	  from	  the	  rais	   (Arafat)	  and	  put	  them	  in	  professional	  hands.	   	  Back	  then	  Fayyad’s	  name	  was	  mentioned	  as	  the	  leading	  candidate	  and	  because	  of	  pressure	  from	  
Rice	  and	  others,	  he	  was	  persuaded	  to	  take	  the	  job”.14	  	  	  	  Bush	   then	   encouraged	   Fayyad’s	   appointment	   in	   his	   public	   remarks.	   	   He	  praised	   “some	   talk	   of	   a	   new	   finance	   minister	   being	   promoted	   in	   the	   Palestinian	  Authority,	   a	   person	   that	   has	   got	   international	   standing”	   and	   welcomed	   Fayyad’s	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 For public discussion of this issue at the time, see “U.S. Says Palestinian Authority Needs to Reform As 
It Reconstructs: Boucher Calls for Transparency; Elimination of Corruption, Violence,” State Department 
Press Releases and Documents, May 7, 2002. 
14 Barak Ravid, “Salam Fayad: Everyone’s Favorite Palestinian,” Ha’aretz, May 27, 2007. Emphases 
added. 
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prospective	  appointment,	  explaining	  “this	  is	  a	  positive	  development,	  because	  one	  of	  the	   things	   that	  worries	   us	   in	   spending	   any	   international	   aid	   on	   an	   authority	   that	  might	  not	  keep	  good	  books,	  that	  the	  money	  might	  not	  actually	  help	  the	  Palestinian	  people	  but	  might	  end	  up	  in	  somebody’s	  pocket”.15	  	  The	  U.S.	  also	  made	  a	  major	  effort	  behind	  the	  scenes,	  pressuring	  Arafat	  to	  make	  the	  appointment..16	  In	  time,	  the	  U.S.	  helped	  persuade	  Israel	  to	  resume	  the	  flow	  of	  tax	  revenues	  to	  the	  PA	  now	  once	  Fayyad	  was	  handling	   its	   finances.	   	  As	  Rice	  explains,	   they	  worked	  hard	  at	  this	  goal	  because	  of	  the	  feeling	  that	  Fayyad	  “needed	  our	  help”.17	  	  At	  a	  series	  of	  private	  meetings	  in	  the	  fall	  and	  winter	  that	  were	  brokered	  by	  the	  U.S.,	  Fayyad	  met	  with	  Israel	  officials	  to	  make	  the	  case	  for	  restarting	  the	  flow	  of	  tax	  monies	  back	  to	  the	  PA,	   and	   he	   started	   to	   received	   funds	   in	   January,	   beginning	   with	   $60	  million	   that	  helped	   saved	   the	   PA	   from	   bankruptcy.18	   	   An	   aide	   to	   Israel’s	   minister	   of	   defense	  confirms	   that	   having	   Fayyad	   across	   the	   table	   helped	   encouraged	   the	   Sharon	  government	  to	  eventually	  restart	  tax	  revenues.19	  Rice	  reports	  helping	  to	  get	  these	  transfers	  moving	  again	  by	  calling	  Sharon’s	  advisor	   Dov	  Weissglas,	   at	   which	   point	   “I	   told	   him	   that	   Fayyad	   was	   different	   and	  asked	  him	  to	  meet	  with	  the	  finance	  minister…	  Dubi	  called	  back	  to	  say	  that	  he	  was	  impressed…	  as	  Fayyad	  continued	  to	  implement	  sound	  financial	  reforms,	  the	  Israelis	  began	   to	   deliver	   the	   tax	   revenues”.20	   	   At	   Aqaba	   in	   June	   of	   2003,	   Bush	   reportedly	  brushed	  aside	  protestations	  from	  Sharon	  that	  he	  could	  not	  transfer	  the	  Palestinians’	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Janine Zacharia, “Bush Touts New PA Finance Minister,” Jerusalem Post, May 31, 2002. 
16 David Makovsky, “The Next to Go: Yasir Arafat,” New York Times, April 14, 2003. 
17 Condoleezza Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington (Random House, 2011), 
220. 
18 James Bennet, “The Radical Bean Counter,” New York Times, May 25, 2003. 
19 Michael Herzog, “Interview with the Author”, December 4, 2010. 
20 Rice, No Higher Honor, 220. 
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withheld	  tax	  revenues,	  instructing	  Sharon	  “it	  is	  their	  money,	  give	  it	  to	  them”.21	  
<Sub-­Case	  3:	  Adopting	  Abu	  Mazen>	  In	  the	  year	  that	  followed	  Bush’s	  Rose	  Garden	  speech,	  Washington	  employed	  the	  draft	  Road	  Map	  as	  a	  means	  to	  force	  Arafat	  into	  approving	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  prime	  minister	   post	   within	   the	   PA.	   	   Although	   the	   U.S.	   approach	   frustrated	   its	   allies	   in	  Europe	  and	  the	  Arab	  world,	  its	  combination	  of	  sticks	  (refusal	  to	  deal	  with	  Arafat	  or	  let	  the	  peace	  process	  proceed	  until	  he	  created	  and	  filled	  the	  post)	  with	  carrots	  (the	  promise	   of	   the	   Road	   Map)	   to	   generate	   an	   effective,	   multilateral	   diplomatic	  campaign.	  In	   October	   of	   2002,	   the	   U.S.	   started	   floating	   drafts	   of	   the	   Road	  Map.	   	   The	  drafts	  embraced,	   among	  other	   items,	   the	  proposal	  of	  Palestinian	   reformers	   calling	  for	   an	   “empowered	   prime	   minister”	   position	   as	   a	   means	   of	   sidelining	   Arafat’s	  influence	  over	  key	  governmental	  affairs.22	   	  Yet	  by	  early	  2003,	  the	  U.S.	  was	  treating	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  prime	  ministerial	  slot	  as	  a	  firm	  prerequisite	  for	  release	  of	  the	  Road	  Map	  rather	  than	  as	  a	  requirement	  for	  its	  fulfillment.	  This	   insistence	   by	  Washington	   helped	   generate	  major	   pressure	   from	   Arab	  states	  and	  the	  Quartet	  members	  on	  him	  to	  permit	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  prime	  ministerial	  slot.	  	  In	  February	  of	  2003,	  Yasser	  Arafat	  announced	  his	  decision	  to	  appoint	  a	  prime	  minister	   in	   direct	   response	   to	   international	   pressure.	   	   After	   six	   days	   of	  meetings	  with	  Russia,	  the	  EU,	  and	  the	  United	  Nations,	  who	  urged	  him	  that	  peace	  talks	  could	  not	   proceed	  without	   the	   appointment	   of	   a	   prime	  minister,	   he	   announced	   that	   “in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Akiva Eldar, “People and Politics: Bush Likes Dahlan, Believes Abbas, and Has ‘a Problem with 
Sharon’,” Ha’aretz, June 10, 2003. 
22 James Bennet, “U.S. Offers a New Design for Mideast Peace,” New York Times, October 24, 2002. 
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light	  of	  contact	  that	  we	  conducted	  with	  members	  of	  the	  Quartet,	  I	  decided	  to	  appoint	  a	   prime	   minister”.23	   Enderlin	   confirms	   that	   Arafat	   was	   “under	   constant	   pressure	  exerted	   by	   Terje	   Larsen	   and	   Miguel	   Moratinos…	   [with]	   Hosni	   Mubarak	   and	   King	  Abdullah	  of	  Jordan”	  to	  advance	  the	  cause	  of	  Palestinian	  reform.24	  	  Former	  Jordanian	  Foreign	   Minister	   Marwan	   Muasher	   writes	   that	   Jordan	   felt	   motivated	   to	   pressure	  Arafat	  into	  finally	  appointing	  Abbas	  as	  prime	  minister	  because	  of	  a	  desire	  to	  get	  the	  Road	  Map	  released	  already.25	  But	  even	  after	   the	  position	  was	  created,	  Bush	  held	   firm	  until	  Arafat	  carried	  through	   with	   his	   pledge,	   nominating	   Abu	   Mazen	   in	   early	   March	   and	   finally	  appointing	  him	  at	  the	  end	  of	  April	  at	  the	  end	  of	  a	  long	  period	  of	  wrangling	  over	  who	  would	  control	  which	  portfolios	  in	  practice.	  	  In	  the	  interim,	  Bush	  advocated	  for	  Abu	  Mazen’s	   position,	   stating	   that	   “the	   Palestinian	   Authority	   has	   created	   the	   new	  position	   of	   prime	   minister…	   to	   be	   a	   credible	   and	   responsible	   partner,	   the	   new	  Palestinian	  prime	  minister	  must	  hold	  a	  position	  of	  authority…	  immediately	  upon	  his	  conformation,	   the	   road	   map	   for	   peace	   will	   be	   given	   to	   the	   Palestinians	   and	   the	  Israelis”.26	  Once	  Abu	  Mazen	  was	  appointed	  at	  the	  head	  of	  a	  new	  Palestinian	  government,	  the	  United	  States	  focused	  on	  building	  him	  up	  in	  that	  new	  role.	   	   In	  early	  June,	  Bush	  convened	   two	   summits	   in	   the	   region	   with	   Abu	   Mazen,	   where	   he	   celebrated	   the	  launch	   of	   the	   Road	   Map	   and	   urged	   Israeli	   and	   Arab	   leaders	   to	   back	   the	   new	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Molly Moore and John Ward Anderson, “Arafat Will Name a Prime Minister; Palestinian Yields to 
Pressure but Gives No Details on Powers of New Office,” Washington Post, February 15, 2003. 
24 Charles Enderlin, The Lost Years: Radical Islam, Intifada, and Wars in the Middle East 2001-2006, 
trans. Suzanne Verderber (Other Press, LLC, 2007), 181. 
25 Marwan Muasher, The Arab Center, 184. 
26 Ibid., 182–183. 
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Palestinian	  leader.	  Rice	  says	  that	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  Arab	  summit	  at	  Sharm	  el-­‐Sheikh	  was	  for	  the	  president	  and	  Arab	  heads	  of	  state	  from	  Jordan,	  Egypt,	  Bahrain,	  and	  Saudi	  Arabia	  to	  “meet	  with	  Palestinian	  Prime	  Minister	  Abbas	   to	   signal	   support	   for	   him	   and	   for	   	   a	  new	   effort	   with	   the	   Israelis”.27	   	   Bregman	   explains	   that,	   after	   it	   became	   clear	   the	  Arabs	  would	  not	  agree	  to	  far-­‐reaching	  gestures	  toward	  the	  Israelis	  at	  Sharm,	  “they	  decided	   to	   drop	   the	   matter	   altogether	   and,	   instead,	   to	   focus	   on	   getting	   the	   Arab	  leaders	  to	  support	  Abu	  Mazen”.28	   	  According	  to	  a	  participant	   in	  the	  summit,	   “Bush	  was	  bustling	  about…	  slapping	  all	  these	  dignified	  Arabs	  on	  the	  back	  and	  putting	  his	  arm	  round	  Abu	  Mazen	  and	  joshing	  him	  along.	  	  He	  said	  to	  those	  leaders,	  ‘you	  have	  to	  help	  this	  man’.”29	  Then,	  at	  Aqaba,	  Bush	  pushed	  the	  Israelis	  to	  support	  Abbas’s	  new	  government	  in	   the	   PA	   as	   well.	   	   When	   the	   Israeli	   Defense	   Minister	   Shaul	   Mofaz	   said	   that	   the	  Palestinian	  security	  services	  should	  demonstrate	  results	  on	  their	  own	  and	  that	  “I	  do	  not	  think	  that	  we	  can	  help	  them,”	  Bush	  allegedly	  responded	  “I	  think	  you	  can.	  	  And	  I	  think	   that	   you	  will”.30	   	   According	   to	   an	   American	   participant	   in	   the	   summit,	   “the	  President	  was	  direct	  [with	  Sharon]	  about	  the	  need	  for	  the	  Israelis	  to	  take	  action	  to	  help	  Abu	  Mazen”.31	  In	  his	  public	  remarks	  at	  the	  summit,	  Bush	  declared	  that	  he	  was:	  	  “pleased	  to	  be	  here	  with	  Prime	  Minister	  Abbas.	  	  He	  represents	  the	  cause	  of	  freedom	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Rice, No Higher Honor, 216. 
28 Ahron Bregman, Elusive Peace: How the Holy Land Defeated America (Penguin, 2005), 256. 
29 Anonymous summit participant, quoted in Ibid. This perspective is also echoed in Muasher, The Arab 
Center, 190-191. 
30 Eldar, “People and Politics: Bush Likes Dahlan, Believes Abbas, and Has ‘a Problem with Sharon’.” 
31 Anonymous U.S. official, quoted in Bregman, Elusive Peace, 257. 
	   676	  
and	   statehood	   for	   the	   Palestinian	   people.	   	   I	   strongly	   support	   that	   cause	   as	  well…	  Prime	  Minister	  Abbas	  now	  leaders	  the	  Palestinian	  Cabinet.	  	  By	  his	  strong	  leadership,	  by	  building	   the	   institutions	  of	  Palestinian	  democracy	  and	  by	  rejecting	   terror,	  he	   is	  serving	  the	  deepest	  hopes	  of	  his	  people.”.32	  	  Bush	   also	   highlighted	   pledges	   that	   Sharon	   had	   agreed	   to	   include	   in	   his	   speech,	  whereby	   the	   Israelis	   would	   seek	   to	   improve	   humanitarian	   conditions	   in	   the	  territories,	   remove	   unauthorized	   outposts,	   release	   some	   prisoners,	   and	   ensure	  eventual	   territorial	   contiguity.	   	   However,	   Sharon	   also	   rejected	   other	   American	  suggestions	   for	   the	   speech	   –	   both	   in	   terms	   of	   concrete	   proposals	   and	   in	   terms	   of	  empathizing	   with	   the	   other	   side’s	   suffering	   –	   	   and	   the	   tone	   of	   his	   speech	   was	   a	  disappointing	  surprise	  to	  both	  the	  Palestinians	  and	  Jordanians	  present.33	  Abu	  Mazen	  was	  then	  welcomed	  to	  the	  White	  House	  in	  July,	  marking	  the	  first	  time	   in	   his	   presidency	   that	   Bush	   received	   a	   Palestinian	   leader	   there.	   	   As	   Charles	  Enderlin	  writes,	  “the	  purpose	  of	   the	  visit	  was…	  primarily	  symbolic.	   	  The	  American	  administration	  wanted	  to	  send	  a	  message…	  that	  the	  Palestinian	  prime	  minister	  was	  an	   ally	   of	   the	   United	   States.	   	   Abbas	   received	   a	   check	   for	   $20	   million,	   and	   Bush	  announced	   the	   creation	   of	   an	   American-­‐Palestinian	   economic	   development	  group”.34	  	  A	  small,	  new	  tranche	  of	  $20	  million	  in	  direct	  aid	  was	  rushed	  to	  the	  PA	  as	  part	  of	   a	   symbolic	   effort	   to	   show	   support	   for	   the	   prime	  minister.	   	   The	   administration	  waived	   Congressional	   restrictions	   in	   order	   to	   provide	   the	   first	   direct	   aid	   to	   the	  Palestinian	   government	   since	   the	   PA	   was	   created	   in	   1994	   and	   worked	   with	  Congress	  to	  ensure	  its	  support	  of	  the	  plan.	  	  In	  briefings	  with	  members	  of	  Congress,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Quoted in Enderlin, The Lost Years, 192. 
33 Bregman, Elusive Peace, 261. See also Muasher, The Arab Center, 191. 
34 Enderlin, The Lost Years, 199. 
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the	  Washington	  Post	  quoted	  administration	  officials	  “stress[ing]	  the	  urgency	  of	  the	  action,	  saying	  they	  want	  to	  get	  the	  funds	  to	  the	  Palestinian	  Authority	  as	  quickly	  as	  possible	  to	  shore	  up	  Abbas	  as	  he	  tries	  to	  establish	  his	  credibility	  with	  the	  Palestinian	  people.	   	   The	   push	   for	   direct	   aid	   accelerated	   after	   the	   recent	   trip	   to	   the	   region	   by	  national	   security	   adviser	   Condoleezza	   Rice,	   during	   which	   Palestinian	   Finance	  Minister	  Salam	  Fayyad	  made	  an	  impassioned	  plea	  to	  Rice	  for	  direct	  assistance”.35	  In	  a	  press	  conference	  after	  their	  private	  meeting,	  Bush	  answered	  a	  question	  planted	   by	   Abbas’s	   team	   about	   Israel’s	   security	   barrier	   by	   saying	   that	   “it	   is	   very	  difficult	   to	   develop	   confidence	   between	   the	   Palestinians	   and	   Israel	   with	   a	   wall	  snaking	   through	   the	  West	   Bank”.36	   	   Bush’s	   comment	   thrilled	   the	   prime	  minister’s	  advisers,	   since	  he	  had	  been	  under	  particular	   pressure	   from	   the	  Palestinian	  public	  for	   not	   doing	  more	   to	   stem	   the	   advance	   of	   the	   Israeli	   barrier.37	   	   However,	   Khalil	  Shikaki	  says	  that	  Abu	  Mazen	  himself	  had	  much	  higher	  expectations	  of	  the	  U.S.	  and	  that	  his	  visit	   to	   the	  White	  House	  came	  as	  a	  huge	  disappointment.38	  According	  to	  a	  former	  Abbas	  aide,	  the	  main	  concessions	  he	  had	  been	  seeking	  were	  for	  American	  to	  help	  him	  deliver	  from	  the	  Israelis	  a	  formal	  settlement	  freeze,	  an	  end	  to	  incursions	  in	  Area	   A,	   and	   the	   reopening	   of	   Palestinian	   institutions	   in	   East	   Jerusalem,	   none	   of	  which	  he	  even	  received.39	  Bush	   did	   voice	   his	   enthusiasm	   for	   the	   new	   PA	   government	   in	   the	   days	   to	  come.	   	   This	   included	   not	   just	   Abbas	   also	   the	   reform	   government’s	   security	   chief,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Glenn Kessler, “U.S. Plans to Provide Direct Aid to Palestinians: Policy Shift Aims to Bolster Abbas and 
Counter Hamas,” Washington Post, July 9, 2003; Enderlin, The Lost Years, 199. 
36 Enderlin, The Lost Years, 200. 
37 Ibid., 197; Bregman, Elusive Peace, 269. 
38 Khalil Shikaki, “Interview with the Author”, July 2011. 
39 Diana Buttu, “Interview with the Author”, November 11, 2010. 
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Mohammed	  Dahlan,	  whom	  Bush	  had	  decided	  he	  liked	  after	  being	  briefed	  by	  him	  at	  Aqaba40:	  	  “I’m	   impressed	  by	  Prime	  Minister	  Abbas’	  vision…	   I	  believe	  him	  when	  he	  says	   that	  we	  must	   rout	  out	   [sic]	   terror	   in	  order	   for	   a	  Palestinian	   state	   to	  exist…	   I	   think	  Mr.	  Dahlan,	   his	   security	   chief,	   also	   recognizes	   that.	   	   And	  we’ve	   got	   to	   help	   those	   two	  leaders	  in	  a	  couple	  of	  ways	  to	  realize	  that	  vision	  of	  a	  peaceful	  Palestinian	  state.	  	  One	  is	   to	   provide	   help	   and	   strategy	   to	  Mr.	   Dahlan	   so	   he	   can	   lead	   Palestinian	   security	  forces	   to	   the	   dismantlement	   of	   bomb-­‐making	   factories,	   rocket-­‐making	   factories	  inside	  Gaza	  and	  the	  West	  Bank…	  We’ve	  also	  got	  to	  recognize	  that	  things	  can	  happen	  on	   the	   ground	   that	   will	   strengthen	   Mr.	   Abbas’	   hand,	   relative	   to	   the	   competition,	  moving	  –	  for	  example,	  movement	  throughout	  the	  country.”41	  	  In	  that	  same	  news	  conference,	  Bush	  also	  went	  on	  to	  praise	  Salam	  Fayyad	  and	  joked	  that	   “I	   was	   pleased	   to	   discover	   that	   he	   –	   I	   think	   he	   received	   a	   degree	   from	   the	  University	  of	  Texas,	  which	  gave	  me	  even	  more	  confidence	  when	  he	  spoke”.42	  When	   Sharon	   visited	   the	   White	   House	   a	   few	   days	   after	   Abu	   Mazen,	   the	  president	  asked	  him	  to	  make	  major	  overtures	  that	  would	  bolster	  Abbas.	  	  However,	  Sharon	   rejected	   the	   president’s	   main	   requests,	   which	   focused	   on	   achieving	   a	  settlement	  freeze	  or	  a	  temporary	  halt	  to	  construction	  of	  the	  security	  barrier.43	  	  U.S.	  efforts	  to	  get	  Israel	  to	  bolster	  Abu	  Mazen	  further	  backfired	  when	  long-­‐hyped	  Israeli	  plans	  to	  release	  Palestinian	  prisoners	  were	  scaled	  back	  to	  such	  an	  extent	  that	  much	  fewer	  prisoners	  were	  released	  than	  previously	  suggested;	  many	  of	  these	  prisoners	  were	   already	   nearing	   the	   end	   of	   their	   terms	   or	   had	   been	   arrested	   for	   common	  crimes	  such	  as	  being	  in	  Israel	  without	  permits.44	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Eldar, “People and Politics: Bush Likes Dahlan, Believes Abbas, and Has ‘a Problem with Sharon’.” 
41 “The President’s News Conference,” White House Press Releases and Documents - Federal Information 
& News Dispatch, July 30, 2003. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Glenn Kessler, “President Urges Israelis to Bolster Abbas; Sharon Resists Dramatic Action on Issues 
Important to Palestinian Prime Minister,” Washington Post, July 30, 2003. 
44 Greg Myre, “Israel Frees 330 Prisoners: Palestinians Dismiss Gesture,” New York Times, August 7, 2003; 
Jeffrey Heller, “Israeli Release of Palestinian Prisoners Backfires,” Reuters News, August 5, 2003; Mark 
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   Further,	   the	   Israelis	   did	   not	   consider	   themselves	   party	   to	   the	   hudna	   Abu	  Mazen	  had	  negotiated	  with	  the	  Islamist	  groups,	  instead	  assassinating	  a	  PIJ	  leader	  in	  mid-­‐August	  who	  was	   responsible	   for	  an	  attack	  against	   civilians	   the	  previous	  year.	  	  Hamas	   then	   retaliated	   a	   few	   days	   later,	   launching	   a	   dramatic	   suicide	   bombing	   in	  Jerusalem	  that	  killed	  over	  twenty	  Israelis	  and	  injured	  about	  100	  more,	  throwing	  the	  process	  into	  disarray.	  The	  Israelis	  severed	  relations	  with	  the	  PA	  and	  called	  off	  plans	  to	  remove	  the	  IDF	  from	  cities	  it	  had	  been	  occupying	  since	  Operation	  Defensive	  Shield	  in	  the	  spring,	  	  but	  the	  U.S.	  did	  not	  get	  actively	  engaged	  in	  bringing	  the	  two	  parties	  back	  together.45	  	  The	   Palestinian	   Legislative	   Council	   was	   set	   to	   meet	   to	   review	   the	   record	   of	   Abu	  Mazen’s	   government	   in	   its	   first	   hundred	   days,	   and	   behind	   the	   scenes	   Arafat	   was	  pushing	   for	   terms	   that	   would	   bring	   about	   the	   collapse	   of	   the	   prime	   minister’s	  government.46	   	  Although	   John	  Wolf,	   the	  president’s	   low-­‐level	   envoy,	   allegedly	   told	  the	   PLC’s	   speaker,	   Abu	   Alaa,	   that	   the	   U.S.	   would	   not	   tolerate	   the	   collapse	   of	   Abu	  Mazen’s	   government,47	   it	   did	   little	   else	   to	   change	   the	   political	   equation	   on	   the	  ground	  that	  produced	  Abu	  Mazen’s	  resignation	  on	  the	  6th	  of	  September,	  2003.	  	   	  Did	  the	  Policy	  Succeed?	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Lavie, “Israel to Release 69 Palestinian Prisoners: Palestinians Dismiss Move as Inadequate,” Associated 
Press, August 11, 2003. 
45 Omar Karmi, “PA Cuts Ties with Islamist Factions; Israel Cuts Ties with PA,” Palestine Report 10, no. 8 
(August 20, 2003); Chris Otton, “Suicide Blast Deals Crippling Blow to Peace Process,” Agence France-
Presse (AFP), August 20, 2003. 
46 “Arafat-Abbas Scrap Goes Behind Closed-doors as PM Lauds ‘Historical Leader’,” Agence France-
Presse (AFP), September 4, 2003. 
47 “Arafat, Abbas Cannot Work Together Any More - Qorei,” Agence France-Presse (AFP), September 1, 
2003; Hisham Abdallah, “Arafat Declares Roadmap Dead as Abbas Prepares to Face MPs,” Agence 
France-Presse (AFP), September 3, 2003; Chris McGreal, “Day of Decision in Abbas Feud with Arafat: 
America and Britain Fight to Save Palestinian PM Facing Key Debate,” The Guardian (UK), September 4, 
2003. 
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   In	   some	  ways,	   these	   American	   efforts	   produced	  major	   positive	   changes	   in	  Palestinian	   politics;	   in	   other	   ways,	   these	   policies	   were	   self-­‐defeating.	   	   On	   the	  positive	  side	  of	  the	  ledger,	  American	  pressure	  helped	  bring	  about	  the	  appointment	  of	  moderate	   reformers	   into	  major	  positions	  within	   the	  Palestinian	  Authority.	   	  The	  appointment	  of	  Salam	  Fayyad	  helped	   transform	  PA	   finances	   in	  ways	   that	   restored	  connectivity	  with	  the	  donor	  community	  and	  helped	  the	  Palestinians	  move	  toward	  a	  more	   transparent	   system	   of	   government	   while	   decreasing	   Arafat’s	   discretionary	  power.	  	  The	  creation	  of	  a	  prime	  minister	  post	  probably	  would	  never	  have	  happened	  without	  outside	  pressure,	  and	  Abbas	  was	  strongly	  identified	  with	  the	  peace	  process	  and	  ending	  violence.	  	   However,	   the	  U.S.	   administration’s	  attempts	   to	   sideline	  Arafat	  and	  build	  up	  Abbas	  ultimately	  floundered.	  	  The	  United	  States	  took	  a	  series	  of	  steps	  to	  strengthen	  Abbas	  but	  never	  gave	  him	  the	   level	  of	  support	  he	  really	  needed	  to	  succeed.	   	  Then,	  when	   the	   security	   situation	   convulsed	   in	  August	   of	   2003,	   the	  Bush	   team	  did	   very	  little	  to	  help	  Abu	  Mazen	  ride	  out	  the	  crisis.	   	  In	  the	  end,	  the	  U.S.	  backed	  itself	  into	  a	  corner,	  unable	   to	  engage	  with	   the	  main	  power	  broker	   in	   the	  PA	  (Arafat)	  and	  with	  little	  regard	  for	  the	  agenda	  of	  its	  main	  interlocutor	  (Abu	  Alaa).	  
<Sub-­Case	  1:	  Ousting	  Arafat?>	  Bush’s	  speech,	  and	  the	  new	  policy	  that	  it	  entailed,	  was	  a	  double-­‐edged	  sword.	  	  On	   one	   hand,	   it	   decreased	   Washington’s	   ability	   to	   advance	   the	   peace	   process	  through	  direct	  negotiations	  with	  Arafat.	   	  On	   the	  other,	   it	  build	  up	  pressure	   for	  PA	  reform.	   	   Similarly,	   holding	   back	   the	   Road	   Map	   entailed	   certain	   costs	   in	   terms	   of	  delaying	  activity	  on	  the	  peace	  process	  in	  exchange	  for	  possible	  benefits	  on	  reform.	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Thus,	   the	   policy	  was	   a	  mixed	   bag	   in	   terms	   of	   efficacy.	   	   It	   helped	   bring	   about	   the	  eventual	  creation	  of	  a	  prime	  minister	  position,	  but	  it	  did	  so	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  giving	  up	  other	  avenues	  for	  American	  influence.	  	  Had	  Abbas	  lasted	  as	  prime	  minister,	  the	  costs	  might	  have	  been	  worthwhile,	  but	  given	   that	  he	   left	  office	   toward	   the	  end	  of	  2003,	  the	   result	   was	   that	   the	   U.S.	   had	   boxed	   itself	   out	   from	   Palestinian	   politics	   for	   the	  remainder	  of	  Arafat’s	  time	  on	  this	  earth.	  The	   initial	   impetus	   for	   reform	   was	   derailed	   by	   Israeli	   actions,	   but	   the	  administration	  soon	  followed	  up	  in	  ways	  that	  ensured	  the	  policy	  would	  yield	  results.	  	  In	  September	  of	  2002,	  the	  normally	  docile	  Palestinian	  Legislative	  Council	  forced	  the	  resignation	   of	   a	   PA	   government	   in	   protest	   at	   the	   lack	   of	   administrative	   reform.48	  	  However,	  an	  Israeli	  siege	  of	  Arafat’s	  compound	  later	  that	  month	  seemed	  to	  reinforce	  his	  standing.	  	  His	  poll	  numbers	  jumped	  by	  more	  than	  ten	  percent,	  and	  the	  portion	  of	  Palestinians	  who	  felt	  PA	  reform	  could	  be	  achieved	   fell	  accordingly.49	   	  Colin	  Powell	  says	   this	   upset	   President	   Bush,	   since	   “every	   time	   we	   put	   Arafat	   in	   his	   place	   and	  started	   to	  move	   him	   to	   the	   sidelines	   [Sharon	  would	   do	   something	   and]	   suddenly	  Arafat	   is	   right	   dead	   back	   in	   the	   centre	   of	   everything…	   rather	   than	   isolating	   him	  [Sharon	  would]	  just	  bring	  him	  right	  back	  into	  the	  game”.50	  	   However,	  the	  Bush	  administration	  ensured	  further	  motion	  by	  moving,	  albeit	  slowly,	  to	  suggestions	  from	  allies,	  led	  by	  Jordan,	  to	  forge	  a	  plan	  that	  would	  turn	  the	  vision	  contained	  in	  the	  president’s	  Rose	  Garden	  speech	  into	  a	  series	  of	  parallel	  steps	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Serge Schmemann, “Council Deals Arafat a Blow by Forcing Cabinet to Quit,” New York Times, 
September 12, 2002. 
49 Yoav Appel, “Poll Shows Support Grows for Arafat Among Palestinians,” Associated Press, September 
29, 2002. 
50 Quoted with brackets in Bregman, Elusive Peace, 238. 
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for	  both	  sides	  to	  pursue.	  	  The	  administration	  began	  floating	  a	  draft	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  Road	  Map	   in	  October,	  and	   the	  document	  called	   for	  appointment	  of	  an	  empowered	  prime	   minister	   as	   one	   of	   the	   steps	   for	   the	   PA	   to	   carry	   out	   in	   phase	   one.	   	   The	  administration’s	  subsequent	  decision	  to	  upgrade	  creation	  of	  the	  premier	  post	  into	  a	  prerequisite	  for	  the	  document’s	  release	  made	  a	  major	  difference	  in	  the	  end.	  	  Hatem	  Abdel	  Qader,	  a	  younger	  generation	  Fatah	  activist,	  said	  that	  “four	  years	  ago	  we	  began	  discussing	  this	  kind	  of	  change…	  we	  discussed	  the	  issue	  with	  Chairman	  Arafat,	  but	  he	  always	  refused…	  but	  after	   the	  pressure	  brought	   to	  bear	  by	  Europe	  and	  the	  United	  States,	  he	  finally	  agreed”.51	  	   David	  Makovsky	  concurs	   that	   the	  Washington’s	   firm	   isolation	  of	  Arafat	  and	  brandishing	  of	  the	  Road	  Map	  reaped	  benefits	  in	  terms	  of	  enabling	  PA	  reform:	  	  “Because	  Mr.	  Arafat’s	  legitimacy	  at	  home	  rested	  in	  part	  on	  his	  influence	  abroad,	  the	  American	  move	  to	  isolate	  him	  aided	  his	  domestic	  critics.	  	  Mr.	  Arafat	  could	  no	  longer	  deflect	   domestic	   complaints	   about	   corruption	   in	   his	   regime,	   authoritarian-­‐style	  leadership	   and	   a	   general	   dearth	   of	   good	   governance…	   Ironically,	   it	   was	   the	  American	   position,	   read	   by	   some	   as	   a	   lack	   of	   ‘engagement,’	   that	   emboldened	   the	  authority’s	  Legislative	  Council,	  until	  now	  largely	  toothless,	  to	  push	  reform.	  	  Breaking	  from	  past	   practice,	   the	   European	  Union	   and	  United	  Nations	   envoys	   threatened	   to	  disengage,	  securing	  the	  promotions	  of	  Mr.	  Fayyad	  and	  Mr.	  Abbas”.52	  	  Menachem	  Klein	  argues	  that	  the	  reform	  discourse	  in	  Palestinian	  politics	  began	  long	  before	  and	  that	  Bush’s	  call	  for	  new	  leadership	  actually	  backfired	  by	  enabling	  Arafat	  to	   paint	   reformists	   as	   traitors	   to	   the	   national	   cause.53	   	   However,	   it	   is	   difficult	   to	  explain	  the	  timing	  of	  the	  prime	  minister	  position’s	  creation	  within	  reference	  to	  the	  enormous	  outside	  pressure	  that	  boosted	  the	  hands	  of	  reformists	  within	  the	  PA.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Hatem Abdel Qader, “A Palestinian View: We Need Democracy,” Bitter Lemons 11 - The new 
Palestinian prime minister and the conflict (March 17, 2003). 
52 Makovsky, “The Next to Go: Yasir Arafat.” 
53 Menachem Klein, “By Conviction, Not by Infliction: The Internal Debate over Reforming the Palestinian 
Authority,” Middle East Journal 57, no. 2 (Spring 2003): 207. 
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Later	   on,	   however,	   once	   Abu	   Mazen’s	   government	   had	   collapsed,	   Yasser	  Arafat	   again	   came	   to	   the	   fore.	   	  He	   appointed	  Abu	  Alaa,	   another	   longtime	  western	  interlocutor	  for	  the	  PA,	  as	  his	  new	  prime	  minister,	  but	  Abu	  Alaa	  was	  less	  willing	  to	  challenge	   Arafat	   for	   control	   over	   security	   affairs	   or	   the	   negotiations	   portfolio.54	  	  Israeli	   chatter	  expelling	  Arafat	   the	  day	  after	  Abu	  Mazen	   submitted	  his	   resignation	  reoriented	   international	  and	  domestic	  attention	  on	  the	  chairman’s	  standing	  rather	  than	   the	   issue	   of	   an	   empowered	   prime	   ministerial	   office.55	   	   And,	   along	   with	  opposition	   from	   Israel,	   American	   resistance	   helped	   prevent	   a	   new	   round	   of	   PA	  elections	   from	   taking	   place	   as	   scheduled	   in	   2004.	   	   Prominent	   observers	   believed	  that	  such	  elections	  might	  help	  undermine	  Arafat’s	  authority	  by	  sweeping	  out	   from	  the	  PLC	  many	  of	  his	  backers	   in	   the	  old	  guard,	  but	  Bush	  was	  more	   concerned	   that	  elections	  would	  re-­‐legitimate	  the	  chairman’s	  standing.56	  Three	  prominent	  experts	  on	   the	  peace	  process,	  Daniel	  Levy,	  Robert	  Malley,	  and	  Ghaith	  al-­‐Omari,	  conclude	  that	  “attempts	  to	  isolate	  and	  bypass	  Arafat…	  not	  only	  failed	  to	  reduce	  his	  standing;	  they	  also	  contributed	  to	  Fatah’s	  fragmentation	  and	  the	  loss	   of	   U.S.	   credibility	   and	   leverage”.57	   	   In	   2004,	   the	   policy	   certainly	   reduced	   U.S.	  points	   of	   leverage	   over	   Palestinian	   behavior.	   	   Arafat’s	   popularity	   had	   again	   fallen	  into	   the	   35%	   range,	   and	   a	   near-­‐majority	   supported	   the	   resignation	   of	   Abu	   Alaa’s	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Jonathan Wright, “U.S. Cautious About Korei as Palestinian Premier,” Reuters News, September 8, 2003; 
Omar Karmi, “A Week of Mayhem,” Palestine Report 10, no. 11 (September 10, 2003); Hossam Ezzedin, 
“Qorei Set to Remain Palestinian PM but Bush Rebukes Lack of Action on ‘Terror’,” Agence France-
Presse (AFP), October 28, 2003; “Qorei, Second Palestinian PM, Seeks to Avoid Fate of the First,” Agence 
France-Presse (AFP), November 12, 2003. 
55 Johorah Baker, “Arafat Center Stage, Again,” Palestine Report 10, no. 12 (September 17, 2003). 
56 Shikaki, “Shikaki: No Political Will for Palestinian National Elections.” 
57 Daniel Levy, Robert Malley, and Ghaith Al-Omari, “Ten Commandments for Mideast Peace,” The 
American Prospect 18, no. 6 (June 2007): 27. 
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successor	  government,	  but	  they	  remained	  in	  power	  until	  Arafat’s	  November	  death.58	  
<Sub-­Case	  2:	  Funding	  Fayyad>	  Fayyad’s	   standing	   since	   2002	   has	   depended	   upon	   the	   insistence	   of	  Washington	  and	  the	  Europeans	  that	  the	  flow	  of	  aid	  depends	  upon	  him	  being	   in	  an	  official	  position	  to	  ensure	  its	  expenditure	  without	  graft.59	  Yet	  he	  was	  also	  aided	  by	  an	  accident	  of	  fate:	  when	  Arafat	  was	  besieged	  for	  ten	  days	  in	  September	  of	  2002	  by	  the	  IDF,	  Fayyad	  was	  stuck	  inside	  with	  the	  chairman	  and	  was	  able	  to	  win	  his	  trust	  –	  or	  a	   least	  ameliorate	  his	  sense	  of	   threat.60	   	  Thus,	  he	  was	  reappointed	  when	  Arafat	  approved	  another	  cabinet	  a	  few	  months	  later.	  	  He	  was	  also	  aided	  by	  Rice	  and	  Bush’s	  belief	   that	  Fayyad	   “needed	  our	  help”.61	  Dennis	  Ross	  believes	   that	   the	  Bush	   team’s	  efforts	   to	   persuade	   the	   Israelis	   to	   restart	   the	   flow	  of	   tax	   transfers	   to	   the	   PA	   once	  Fayyad	  was	  in	  place	  was	  crucial	  to	  the	  new	  finance	  minister’s	  success.62	  In	  the	  broader	  sense,	  American	  backing	  for	  Fayyad	  helped	  clear	  the	  way	  for	  fiscal	  reform	  at	  the	  PA	  and	  the	  resumption	  of	  statecraft	  by	  the	  international	  donor	  community	  to	  promote	  the	  peace	  process	  and	  moderation	  in	  Palestinian	  politics.	  	  It	  is	  unlikely	  the	  $20	  million	  in	  direct	  aid	  to	  bolster	  Abbas	  would	  have	  been	  permitted	  prior	   to	   Fayyad’s	   appointment	   and	   anti-­‐corruption	   efforts.	   	   A	   news	   report	   on	   the	  $20	   million	   noted	   that	   “the	   money	   would	   be	   given	   directly	   to	   the	   Palestinian	  Finance	  Ministry.	  	  Fayyad,	  a	  former	  official	  at	  the	  International	  Monetary	  Fund,	  has	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impressed	   officials	   in	   Washington	   and	   Israel	   with	   a	   series	   of	   reforms	   he	   has	  instituted	  in	  the	  past	  year	  to	  provide	  greater	  accountability	   in	  how	  the	  Palestinian	  Authority	  disburses	  its	  funds.	  	  [At	  his	  invitation]	  a	  team	  of	  accountants	  from	  Deloitte	  &	  Touche	  works	  in	  the	  finance	  ministry	  to	  keep	  an	  eye	  on	  Palestinian	  accounts”.63	  He	   also	   posted	   the	   PA	   budget	   online	   in	   full	   as	   a	   confidence-­‐building	  transparency	  measure	   and	   promoted	   the	   idea	   of	   using	   direct	   deposits	   to	   pay	   PA	  salaries	   in	  order	   to	  decrease	   graft	   and	   favoritism	  by	  managers	   in	   the	   civil	   service	  and	  security	  sector.64	  	  He	  singlehandedly	  stopped	  other	  ministries	  from	  re-­‐spending	  revenue	   that	   they	   had	   collected	   from	   delivery	   of	   services	   by	   simply	   ordering	   all	  banks	  in	  the	  territories	  to	  stop	  cashing	  their	  checks	  and	  sending	  his	  fellow	  ministers	  a	  two-­‐line	  “for	  your	  information”	  memo	  outlining	  the	  changes.65	  	  His	  reforms	  helped	  ensure	   the	   PA’s	   financial	   health	   and	   helped	   the	   peace	   process	   by	   partially	  rehabilitating	  the	  PA	  and	  clearing	  the	  way	  for	  further	  international	  assistance.	  
<Sub-­Case	  3:	  Adopting	  Abu	  Mazen>	  Abu	  Mazen’s	   very	   appointment	   seemed	   a	   sign	   of	   initial	   American	   success.	  	  For	  instance,	  Dennis	  Ross	  catalogues	  the	  results	  of	  U.S.	  pressure	  on	  Arafat	  by	  March	  of	  2003	  as	  follows:	  	  “First,	  Palestinians	  have	  been	   insisting	  on	  reform	  of	   the	  Palestinian	  Authority,	  and	  they	  mean	  not	  just	  an	  end	  to	  corruption	  but	  also	  an	  end	  to	  Arafat's	  arbitrary	  use	  of	  power.	   Second,	   the	   international	   community	   is	   demanding	   that	   as	   the	   price	   of	  support	  -­‐-­‐	  politically	  and	  economically	  -­‐-­‐	  the	  Palestinian	  prime	  minister	  must	  truly	  be	  empowered.	  Third,	  Arafat's	  standing	  and	  support	  have	  never	  been	  so	  low	  among	  Palestinians.	  Fourth,	  Abbas	  would	  never	  have	  taken	  the	  position	  if	  it	  were	  devoid	  of	  power	  and	  Arafat	  were	  left	  to	  pull	  all	  the	  strings”.66	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  As	  the	  U.S.	  brought	  down	  Saddam	  Hussein,	  it	  seemed	  its	  power	  was	  being	  similarly	  deployed	   to	   generate	  major	   changes	   in	   Palestinian	   politics.	   	   Even	   the	   selection	   of	  Abu	  Mazen	  came	  about	  as	  a	  result	  of	  international	  pressure.	  	  At	  first,	  Arafat	  wanted	  to	  give	  the	   job	  to	  Munib	  al-­‐Masri	  but	  eventually	  buckled	  to	   foreign	  advice	  that	   the	  job	  should	  go	  to	  the	  more	  globally	  recognized	  Abbas.67	  However,	  Abbas	  ultimately	  failed,	  and	  part	  of	  the	  reason	  was	  lack	  of	  support	  from	  the	  Americans	  and	  Israelis.	  	  The	  difference	  in	  success	  between	  Abu	  Mazen	  and	  Fayyad	  was	  striking.	  	  Dennis	  Ross	  predicted	  in	  March	  of	  2003	  that	  “Abbas	  must	  be	  able	   to	   demonstrate	   that	   his	   cabinet	  will	   act	   notwithstanding	  Arafat’s	  wishes.	   	   To	  date,	   Salam	  Fayyad…	  has	   demonstrated	   that	   this	   is	   possible	   in	   an	   area	  where	   the	  international	   community	   requires	   transparency	   and	   accountability.	   	   Fayyad	   may	  well	  be	  the	  model,	  but	  even	  in	  his	  case	  Israeli	  release	  of	  revenue	  made	  it	  far	  easier	  for	  him	   to	  do	  his	   job.	   	  Obviously,	   the	   Israelis	   can	  affect	   the	  environment	   in	  which	  Abbas	  and	  his	  new	  cabinet	  will	  operate”.68	  	  	  Israel	  continued	  targeted	  killings	  in	  the	  territories,	  expanded	  a	  wall	  snaking	  through	   the	  West	  Bank,	   and	   never	   carried	   out	   promises	   to	   remove	   roadblocks	   or	  illegal	  outposts.	  	  Nor	  did	  Sharon	  agree	  to	  hold	  back	  on	  settlement	  construction.	  	  The	  Americans	  never	  did	  enough	  to	  urge	  the	  Israelis	  on	  this	  count.	  Indeed,	   the	   Israelis	   never	   had	   much	   confidence	   in	   Abbas,	   making	   them	  reluctant	  to	  grant	  concessions	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  building	  him	  up	  politically.69	  	  The	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IDF	  chief	  of	   staff	   earned	   the	   ire	  of	  Sharon’s	   team	  when	  he	   told	   the	  press	  a	  month	  after	   Abbas’s	   resignation	   that	   the	   Sharon	   government	   had	   helped	   produce	   that	  outcome	  by	  not	  making	  major	  concessions	  to	  reinforce	  his	  authority.70	  	  Rather	  than	  prisoner	   releases	   being	   done	   in	   a	   way	   that	   would	   have	   worked	   to	   Abu	   Mazen’s	  credit,	  they	  provoked	  outrage	  among	  the	  Palestinian	  public.	  	  Abu	  Mazen	  cancelled	  a	  meeting	  with	   Sharon	   in	   protest,	   and	  his	  minister	   for	   prisoner	   affairs	   attacked	   the	  them	   as	   something	   that	   “means	   nothing	   to	   us”	   and	   proof	   that	   Israel’s	   intentions	  were	  “to	  destroy	  the	  government,	  to	  destroy	  Abu	  Mazen	  personally”.71	  Abu	   Mazen	   also	   came	   away	   from	   his	   first	   visit	   to	   Washington	   extremely	  disappointed;	  by	   then,	  his	  public	   standing	  had	   fallen,	   and	  he	  hoped	   for	   something	  more	  than	  token	  financial	  aid.72	  	  Whereas	  two-­‐thirds	  of	  Palestinians	  had	  supported	  his	  initial	  appointment	  and	  a	  majority	  felt	  at	  the	  time	  that	  he	  would	  produce	  results	  on	  reform,	  quality	  of	  life,	  and	  peace	  negotiations,	  pollsters	  found	  that	  confidence	  in	  his	  ability	  to	  deliver	  had	  already	  dropped	  off	  considerably.73	   	  When	  he	  went	  to	  the	  PLC	  to	  submit	  his	  resignation	  in	  September,	  he	  was	  shoved	  by	  angry	  protesters,	  who	  assailed	  his	  failure	  to	  stop	  settlements,	  get	  meaningful	  prisoners	  released,	  and	  fight	  the	   route	   of	   the	   Israeli	   barrier.74	   	   Upon	   submitting	   his	   resignation,	   he	   blamed	  America,	   along	  with	   Israel	   and	   Arafat,	   decrying	   that	   “the	   Americans	   talk	   day	   and	  night	  of	  offering	  us	  assistance…	  but	  nothing	  comes”.75	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   In	   his	   final	   speech	   as	   prime	  minister	   to	   the	   PLC,	   Abu	  Mazen	   reviewed	   his	  government’s	  successes	  and	  failures	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  United	  States:	  	  “As	  you	  know,	  I	  paid	  an	  important	  visit	  to	  Washington	  and	  held	  a	  series	  of	  meetings	  with	  President	  Bush	  and	  with	   the	   leaders	  of	   the	  U.S.	  administration,	   the	  Congress,	  and	  U.S.	  society.	  	  The	  visit	  resulted	  in	  the	  following:	  	  First,	   renewal	   of	   the	   U.S.	   pledge	   to	  work	   for	   the	   establishment	   of	   the	   Palestinian	  state	  by	  2005	  and	  the	  termination	  of	  the	  1967	  occupation.	  	  Explicit	  U.S.	  rejection	  of	  the	  racial	  wall	  and	  an	  explicit	  call	  for	  the	  dismantling	  of	  the	  settlement	  outposts	  and	  freezing	  of	  settlement	  activity.	  	  A	   call	   coinciding	   with	   direct	   efforts	   to	   remove	   the	   roadblocks,	   lift	   the	   siege	   and	  release	  the	  prisoners.	  	  Arranging	   for	   a	   bilateral	   economic	   relationship.	   	   This	   included	   for	   the	   first	   time	  direct	  financial	  aid	  to	  the	  PNA…	  
	  
But	  regrettably,	  the	  U.S.	  administration	  did	  not	  exert	  much	  efforts	  to	  make	  Israel	  stop	  
its	  provocations	  during	  the	  period	  of	  calm,	  which	  resulted	  from	  the	  truce	  agreement,	  
and	  to	  implement	  its	  commitments	  as	  stipulated	  by	  the	  road	  map	  in	  order	  to	  advance	  
the	  peace	  process”.76	  	  Nor	  were	  his	   complaints	   just	   for	  public	   consumption.	   	  According	   to	   former	  Abbas	  aide	   Diana	   Buttu,	   his	   resignation	   was	   indeed	   shaped	   by	   disappointment	   in	   his	  backing	  from	  the	  U.S.:	  “in	  part	  it	  was	  [because]	  he	  felt	  that	  the	  Americans	  were	  not	  entirely	  supporting	  him	  –	  this	  he	  told	  me	  directly”.77	  	  Later,	  Abbas	  reflected	  that	  “the	  Americans	  were	   giving	  me	  a	  bear	  hug,	   but	   their	  words	  were	  hollow.	   	  The	   Israelis	  conceded	  nothing.	  	  My	  people	  were	  turning	  against	  me”.78	  	   Khalil	   Shikaki	  had	  predicted	   that	   these	  Road	  Map-­‐relevant	   issues	  would	  be	  especially	  important	  for	  Abbas’s	  standing:	  “the	  more	  Bush	  presses	  Sharon,	  the	  more	  that	  strengthens	  Abu	  Mazen…	  in	  the	  end,	  the	  Americans	  will	  decide	  which	  way	  the	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power	   shifts.	   	  Abu	  Mazen	   is	   entirely	  a	  product	  of	   the	   road	  map.	   	   If	   the	  Americans	  don’t	  deliver	  on	  this,	  Abu	  Mazen	  is	  gone	  –	  finished”.79	  	  He	  reflects	  that	  the	  reason	  the	  American	   effort	   failed	   was	   that	   the	   U.S.	   and	   Israel	   both	   never	   put	   in	   the	   sort	   of	  investment	   on	   politically	   difficult	   issues	   that	   would	   have	   been	   required	   to	   really	  empower	  Abbas.	  	  He	  feels	  success	  would	  have	  required	  the	  U.S.	  to	  invest	  a	  lot	  more	  money	  and	  to	  persuade	  the	  Israelis	  to	  make	  major	  changes	  on	  the	  ground.80	  Yet	   the	  U.S.	  appointed	  an	  envoy	   for	  supervising	  progress	  on	   the	  Road	  Map,	  John	  Wolf,	  who	   had	   little	  Mideast	   experience	   and	   claims	   he	  was	   selected	   for	   that	  very	  reason.81	  	  Miller	  argues	  that,	  in	  spite	  of	  Aqaba	  and	  Sharm,	  “no	  serious	  American	  diplomacy	  followed	  the	  president’s	  speech	  or	  the	  road	  map	  for	  the	  remainder	  of	  the	  president’s	   first	   term”.82	   	  Although	  the	  claim	  is	  a	  bit	  overwrought,	   it	  highlights	  the	  fact	   that	   the	  U.S.	  was	  not	   closely	  engaged	  enough	   to	  ensure	  Abu	  Mazen’s	   survival.	  Former	  U.S.	  peace	  envoy	  Anthony	  Zinni	  argues	  that	  “we	  missed	  an	  opportunity	  with	  Abu	  Mazen…	  there	  should	  have	  been	  more	  done	  to	  empower	  him”.83	  When	   asked	   if	   the	   U.S.	   ever	   made	   gestures	   toward	   Abu	   Mazen	   that	   were	  intended	   to	   build	   him	  up,	  Abu	  Alaa	   reflected	   that	   “the	   gestures	  were	  not	   the	   sort	  that	  would	  help”.84	   	  Former	  Abbas	  advisor	  Ghaith	  al-­‐Omari	   reflected	   that	   “the	  U.S.	  hug	  is	  negative	  in	  the	  region,	  but	  it’s	  not	  a	  killer.	  	  It	  all	  depends	  on	  whether	  it	  comes	  with	  real	  and	  visible	  benefits…	  there	  was	  an	  American	  bear	  hug	   for	  Abu	  Mazen.	   	   I	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Quoted in Chris McGreal, “Middle East Summit: Peace Hopes Lie Heavy on New Force,” The Guardian 
(UK), June 3, 2003. 
80 Shikaki, “Interview with the Author.” 
81 Miller, The Much Too Promised Land, 353. 
82 Ibid., 352. Emphases added. 
83 Quoted in Daniel C. Kurtzer et al., The Peace Puzzle: America’s Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace in the 
Post-Cold War Era [forthcoming] (US Institute of Peace & Cornell University Presses, 2012), 319. 
84 Ahmed Qurie (aka Abu Alaa), “Interview with the Author”, June 27, 2011. 
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think	  it	  would	  have	  worked	  though	  if	  it	  came	  with	  deliverables…	  we	  asked	  them	  to	  pay	  us	  in	  Israeli	  currency”.85	  	   Of	  course,	  there	  is	  more	  than	  enough	  blame	  to	  go	  around	  in	  this	  episode.	  	  Abu	  Mazen	   also	   blamed	   Arafat	   for	   blocking	   his	   reform	   attempts	   at	   every	   turn,	   and	  terrorist	   groups	   deserve	   due	   criticism	   for	   their	   role	   in	   ongoing	   attacks	   against	  Israeli	  civilians.	  	  And	  despite	  U.S.	  pressure	  and	  PA	  obligations	  under	  the	  Road	  Map,	  Abbas	  never	  actually	  initiated	  major	  military	  operations	  against	  Hamas	  or	  the	  other	  terrorist	  movements	  conducting	  attacks	  against	  Israeli	  civilians.	  Abbas	  instead	  insisted	  on	  incorporating	  these	  groups	  through	  a	  formal	  cease	  fire,	  by	  showing	  progress	  on	  the	  ground,	  and	  through	  eventual	  political	  integration	  rather	   than	   waging	   a	   civil	   war	   against	   them	   or	   going	   door	   to	   door	   demanding	  weapons.	  	  Yet	  even	  after	  Hamas	  abandoned	  the	  hudna	  and	  the	  PA	  severed	  relations	  with	  these	  groups,	  Abbas’s	  government	  did	  not	  carry	  out	  its	  promises	  to	  apprehend	  those	  who	  had	  perpetrated	  the	  Jerusalem	  bombing.86	  	  	  Ahron	   Bregman	   cites	   an	   interview	   in	   which	   John	   Wolf	   describes	   working	  with	   Abbas’s	   new	   security	   chief,	   Mohammed	   Dahlan,	   after	   the	   attack	   and	   being	  extremely	   disappointed	   with	   results	   on	   the	   ground.	   	   He	   says	   Wolf	   explained	   to	  Dahlan	  that:	  	  “History	  is	  about	  to	  stop,	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  roadmap,	  if	  you	  don’t	  act.’	  Wolf	  added,	  ‘do	  something,	   take	   out	   a	   factory,	   make	   some	   arrests.	   We	   need	   to	   see	   progress,	  pragmatic	   steps,	   and	   very	   fast.’	   They	   worked	   out	   a	   package	   of	   measures	   which	  Dahlan	  agreed	  to	  take.	  ‘I’ll	  do	  it,	  I’ll	  do	  it,’	  Dahlan	  said.	  ‘I’ll	  start	  tonight’…	  Wolf	  recalls	  how	  ‘all	  night	  on	  the	  one	  had	  I	  was	  getting	  calls	  from	  Palestinians	  saying	  ‘our	  guys	  are	   on	   the	   move,’	   and	   I	   was	   getting	   calls	   from	   the	   Israelis	   saying	   ‘nothing	   is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Ghaith al-Omari, “Interview with the Author”, February 2011. 
86 Chris Otton, “Palestinians Vow to Catch Bombers as Israel Freezes Contacts,” Agence France-Presse 
(AFP), August 20, 2003. 
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happening,	   we	   are	   watching	   and	   there	   is	   nobody	   moving’.’	   The	   light	   of	   morning	  brought	   American	   and	   Israeli	   intelligence	   reports	   saying	   that	   very	   little	   had	   been	  done	   by	   Dahlan’s	   security	   forces…	   He	   did,	   as	   Wolf	   remembers,	   ‘move	   against	   a	  couple	  of	   tunnels…	  and	  he	  poured	  some	  concrete	  down	  a	   few	  holes,	   and	   that	  was	  it”.87	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  Dennis	  Ross	  told	  the	  Council	  on	  Foreign	  Relations	  a	  few	  months	  later	  that	  “after	  the	  August	  19	  bus	  bombing	  in	  Israel…	  [Abu	  Mazen]	  put	  together	  a	  plan	   to	  go	  after	  Hamas	  and	   Islamic	   Jihad”	  but	   “Arafat	  blocked	   that”.88	   	  Either	  way,	  the	  new	  government	  under	  Abbas	  was	  unable	   to	  meaningfully	  deliver	  on	   security	  issues	   during	   a	   critical	   moment	   in	   the	   process.	   	   Thus,	   although	   Wolf	   did	  subsequently	   tell	   the	   PLC	   speaker	   that	   Washington	   would	   not	   let	   Abbas’s	  government	  fall,	  this	  episode	  may	  help	  explain	  why	  Washington	  was	  reluctant	  to	  go	  to	  bat	  for	  Abu	  Mazen	  in	  the	  final	  count	  that	  September.	  	   Marwan	   Muasher	   confirms	   this	   perspective,	   suggesting	   that	   Washington	  “was	  starting	   to	  blame	  Abbas...	   feeling	  he	  was	  either	  unable	  or	  unwilling	   to	   firmly	  act	  on	  security	  issues.	  	  Burns	  informed	  me	  in	  August	  that	  Abbas	  was	  starting	  to	  lose	  the	   president’s	   support	   and	   added	   that	   Palestinian	   [security]	   pledges	   to	   the	  Bush	  administration...	  had	  not	  been	  kept”.89	   	  Afterwards,	  Bush	  suggested	  that	  Abbas	  had	  not	  been	  assertive	  enough	  against	  Arafat	  and	  at	  fighting	  terrorism,	  and	  he	  told	  King	  Hussein	  that	  “he	  bet	  on	  Abbas	  and	  lost	  the	  bet”.90	  	   On	  the	  other	  hand,	  Robert	  Danin,	  who	  was	  working	  Mideast	  issues	  at	  the	  NSC	  at	  the	  time,	  feels	  that	  the	  August	  attacks	  simply	  drove	  home	  for	  the	  administration	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 Bregman, Elusive Peace, 274–275. 
88 Dennis B. Ross, “Ross: Prospects for Israeli-Palestinian Peace Bleak, Arafat to Blame for Much of the 
Problem,” interview by Bernard Gwertzman, Council on Foreign Relations website, October 20, 2003. 
89 Muasher, The Arab Center, 194. 
90 Ibid., 195-196. 
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how	  unsustainable	  the	  negotiations	  process	  launched	  at	  Aqaba	  was	  likely	  to	  be:	  	  	  “basically,	   what	   happened	   was	   that	   it	   was	   a	   short	   honeymoon	   in	   which	   we	   had	  Sharm,	  we	  had	  Aqaba,	  we	  try	  to	  get	  a	  process	  going,	  and	  you	  had	  a	  massive	  terrorist	  attack,	   I	  believe	  on	  August	  19th,	   that	   just	   sort	  of	  destroyed	  all	  momentum,	  and	  we	  then	   kind	   of	   went	   into	   this	   period	   in	   August	   and	   September	   in	   which	   it	   all	  unraveled…	  it	  was	  not	  that	  Abbas	  was	  blamed	  at	  all.	  	  I	  think	  he	  was	  seen	  as	  a	  partner	  and	  a	  very	  positive	  figure,	  an	  admirable	  one,	  but	  the	  structural	  factors	  were	  seen	  as	  too	  great	  to	  overcome,	  and	  a	  big	  part	  of	  that	  being	  Arafat”.91	  	  Thus,	   when	   the	   violence	   returned,	   the	   administration	   decided	   realities	   on	   the	  ground	  might	  preclude	  the	  success	  of	  the	  process	  launched	  at	  Aqaba.	  	  Others	  believe	  that	  this	  may	  have	  lessened	  the	  support	  that	  the	  U.S.	  was	  extending	  to	  Abu	  Mazen.92	  	  
Coding	  the	  Observable	  Implications	  
1.	  Perceptions	  of	  Sender	  Interests:	  	   The	   four	   theories	   pose	   divergent	   predictions	   about	   expected	   LSI	   behavior	  across	   a	   range	   of	   observable	   implications.	   	   One	   such	   category	   is	   perceptions	   of	  sender	   interests	   –	   along	   with	   how	   those	   perceived	   interests	   shape	   variation	   in	  occurrence.	  	  Theory	  #1	  (national	  interests	  theory)	  anticipates	  that	  LSI	  should	  occur	  directly	   in	  accordance	  with	  unitary	  objective	   interests	  of	   the	  sender	  state.	   	  Theory	  #2	  (the	   lobby-­‐legislative	  approach)	  expects	  LSI	  not	   to	  occur	  on	  the	  Palestine	  dyad	  because	   the	  pro-­‐Israel	   community	   tends	   to	  believe	   that	  Palestinian	  moderates	  are	  not	  moderate	  enough.	  	  Theory	  #3	  (the	  bureaucratic	  politics	  approach)	  holds	  that	  LSI	  should	   occur	   on	   the	   Palestine	   dyad	   because	  working-­‐level	   officials	   tend	   to	   attach	  great	   importance	   to	   factional	   differences	   in	   Palestinian	   politics.	   	   Theory	   #4	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Robert Danin, “Interview with the Author”, June 26, 2012. 
92 Shikaki, “Interview with the Author.” 
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(leadership	   theory)	   expects	   LSI	   occurrence	   to	   vary	   according	   to	   the	   subjective	  beliefs	  about	  national	  interests	  that	  are	  held	  by	  top	  officials	  in	  the	  sender	  state.	  	   The	  data	  in	  this	  area	  tend	  to	  provide	  the	  most	  support	  for	  Theory	  #4	  over	  its	  competitors	   that	   focus	   more	   on	   structural	   forces	   than	   on	   the	   agency	   of	   top	  individuals.	   	  One	  way	   in	  which	  the	  data	  seem	  to	  support	   this	  conclusion	  has	  to	  do	  with	   the	   matter	   of	   counterpart	   assessments.	   	   Individuals’	   beliefs	   about	   their	  Palestinian	  counterparts	  seemed	  to	  matter	  a	  lot	  for	  variation	  in	  LSI	  occurrence.	  	  Rice	  recalls	   that	   Fayyad	   “impressed	   us	   all	   with	   his	   determination	   to	   do	   things	   right,”	  whereas,	   “when	   the	   cautious	  Abbas	   tried	   to	   carry	  out	   reforms…	  he	  almost	   always	  backed	   off	   or	   simply	   postponed	   actions”.93	   	   Fayyad	   “needed	   our	   help,”	   but	   Abbas	  was	  expected	  to	  deliver	  before	  serious	  benefits	  would	  be	  forthcoming.94	  Administration	   principals	   had	   strong	   rapport	  with	   Fayyad,	   trusting	   him	   to	  perform,	   and	   Bush’s	   longhorns	   connection	   with	   Fayyad	   seemed	   to	   cement	   that	  strong	  belief.	   	  Fayyad	  recalls	   that	  during	  a	  meeting	  with	  Rice	  at	   the	  NSC	  in	  May	  of	  2003,	   she	  unexpectedly	   took	  him	   into	   the	  Oval	  Office:	   “the	  phone	  rings	  and	  Condi	  says	  to	  me,	  ‘you	  and	  I	  need	  to	  go	  somewhere	  alone.’	  	  She	  takes	  me	  by	  the	  hand	  and	  sits	  me	  down	  on	  a	  sofa	  in	  another	  room.	   	  Suddenly,	  I	  realize	  I’m	  in	  the	  Oval	  Office,	  and	  there	  is	  George	  W.	  Bush,	  pacing	  around,	  and	  he	  makes	  the	  Texas	  Longhorns	  sign	  at	  me,	  and	  I	  make	  it	  back”.95	  	  Barak	  Ravid	  writes	  that	  in	  subsequent	  years	  Fayyad’s	  “ties	  with	  President	  George	  W.	  Bush…	  flourished.	  	  Whenever	  they	  met,	  the	  two	  made	  sure	   they	   would	   have	   at	   least	   a	   quarter	   of	   an	   hour	   to	   reminisce	   about…	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Rice, No Higher Honor, 218–219. 
94 Ibid., 220; Shikaki, “Interview with the Author.” 
95 Quoted in Bregman, Elusive Peace, 250. 
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University	   of	   Texas	   and	   to	   get	   up	   to	   date	   about	   the	   latest	   developments	   in	   the	  American	  football	  league”.96	  Thus,	   Bush	   pursued	   divergent	   methods	   for	   bolstering	   these	   two	   favored	  Palestinian	   leaders.	   	   In	   both	   cases,	   he	  was	   pursuing	   LSI,	   but	   his	   personal	   rapport	  with	  Fayyad	  and	  his	  disinterest	  in	  providing	  the	  sort	  of	  backing	  Abbas	  really	  wanted	  –	  motivating	  the	  Israelis	  to	  transform	  quality	  of	  life	  in	  the	  territories	  –	  provided	  the	  basis	  for	  success	  in	  one	  case	  but	  failure	  in	  the	  other.	  Similarly,	   George	   Bush’s	   beliefs	   about	   Arafat	   were	   crucial	   in	   changing	   his	  approach	   to	   the	   region	   in	   2002.	   	   He	   writes	   in	   Decision	   Points	   that	   the	   Karine	   A	  episode	   that	   January	  helped	  shaped	  his	  view	  of	  Arafat	  dramatically:	   “Arafat	  sent	  a	  leader	  pleading	  his	  innocence…	  but	  we	  and	  the	  Israelis	  had	  evidence	  that	  disproved	  the	  Palestinian	  leader’s	  claim.	  	  Arafat	  had	  lied	  to	  me.	  	  I	  never	  trusted	  him	  again.	  	  In	  fact,	  I	  never	  spoke	  to	  him	  again.	  	  By	  the	  spring	  of	  2002,	  	  I	  had	  concluded	  that	  peace	  would	  not	  be	  possible	  with	  Arafat	  in	  power”.97	  For	  example,	  Rice	  explains	   that,	   in	  advance	  of	   the	  speech,	   the	  question	  that	  was	   “most	   on	   [the	   president’s]	   mind	   was	   why	   the	   PA	   could	   not	   find	   decent	  leadership.	  	  He	  knew	  many	  Palestinians,	  mostly	  living	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  and	  they	  were	   entrepreneurial	   people.	   	   He	   just	   couldn’t	   understand	   why,	   even	   under	  occupation,	  the	  Palestinians	  had	  not	  ‘found	  their	  Nelson	  Mandela’.”98	  	  She	  says	  that	  he	   “had	  become	  deeply	   convinced	   that	   the	  question	  wasn’t	  whether	   to	  establish	  a	  Palestinian	  state;	   it	  was	   ‘What	  kind	  of	  Palestinian	  state?’	   	  He	  wanted	  to	  put	  on	  the	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agenda	   the	   right	   of	   the	   Palestinians	   to	   live	   in	   freedom	  both	   from	   Israel	   and	   from	  their	  own	  corrupt	  leaders”.99	  Rice	  strongly	  supported	  the	  president’s	  instincts,	  encouraging	  him	  to	  give	  the	  speech	  against	   the	  wishes	  of	  his	  main	   cabinet	  advisors.	   	  Powell,	  Rumsfeld,	   and	  all	  opposed	   the	   speech	   due	   to	   various	   elements	   in	   it	   that	   they	   opposed.	   	   Rice	   says	  Powell	  “was	  concerned	  that	  in	  a	  speech	  denouncing	  Arafat,	  the	  United	  States	  would	  be	  seen	  as	  trying	  to	  choose	  Palestinian	  leaders,”	  and	  Bush	  explains	  that	  “Colin	  was	  worried	   that	   calling	   for	   new	   Palestinian	   leadership	   would	   embarrass	   Arafat	   and	  reduce	  the	  chance	  for	  a	  negotiated	  settlement”.100	   	  Cheney	  and	  (to	  a	   lesser	  extent)	  Rumsfeld	  were	  worried	  that	  promising	  a	  Palestinian	  state	  at	   the	  end	  of	   the	  tunnel	  would	  come	  off	  as	  rewarding	  terrorism.	  However,	   in	  a	  preview	  of	   the	   Iraq	   intelligence	  debacle	  –	  and	   in	   fitting	  with	  Theory	  #4	  –	   the	  vice	  president’s	  beliefs	  were	   themselves	  based	  on	  erroneous	  and	  subjectively	  interpreted	  evidence.	  	  Cheney	  was	  convinced	  that	  Arafat	  was	  personally	  directing	   terrorism,	   even	   though	   the	   dossier	   on	  which	   he	   based	   these	   claims	   had	  been	  deemed	  inconclusive,	  even	  by	  the	  Israeli	  minister	  responsible	  for	  intelligence	  oversight	  at	  the	  time.101	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   three	   theories	   that	   focus	   on	   objective	   structural	  factors	   fare	   rather	   poorly	   against	   the	   data	   in	   terms	   of	   perceptions	   of	   sender	  interests.	   	   As	   I	   explore	   in	  more	   detail	   below,	   the	   reaction	   to	   the	   speech	   from	   the	  diplomatic	  corps	  was	  extremely	  negative.	  	  There	  was	  no	  serious	  backing	  for	  the	  new	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policy	  of	  writing	  off	  Arafat	  from	  the	  professional	  bureaucracy.	  	  Thus,	  Theory	  #3	  is	  a	  poor	  match	  for	  the	  data.	  Also,	  Theory	  #1	  receives	  poor	  support	  from	  the	  data	  in	  this	  case.	  	  The	  idea	  of	  black-­‐listing	   Arafat	   was	   opposed	   by	   both	   Powell	   and	   by	   allies	   in	   the	   region,	  suggesting	  that	  it	  imposing	  such	  a	  policy	  not	  an	  objectively	  self-­‐evident	  U.S.	  interest.	  	  Whereas	   the	   president	   thought	   Arafat	   had	   to	   go,	   Powell	   felt	   the	   chairman	  was	   a	  reality	   in	   the	   region	   and	   that	   they	   needed	   to	   deal	  with	   him.102	   	   Also,	   Rice	   recalls	  being	  told	  by	  the	  preternaturally	  calm	  Bill	  Burns,	  director	  of	  Near	  Eastern	  Affairs	  at	  the	  State	  Department,	  that	  the	  reaction	  in	  the	  Arab	  world	  was	  “pretty	  rough,”	  which	  she	   interpreted	   to	   mean	   “all	   hell	   was	   breaking	   loose”.103	   	   Even	   the	   president’s	  parents	  questioned	  his	  judgment	  regarding	  the	  2002	  Rose	  Garden	  speech.104	  Although	  the	  speech	  and	  new	  policy	  were	  motivated	  by	  a	  spike	  in	  violence	  on	  the	  ground,105	   the	  direction	  the	  administration	  decided	  to	  take	   in	  response	  to	  that	  violence	   was	   anything	   but	   predetermined.	   	   David	   Frum,	   one	   of	   Bush’s	  speechwriters,	   agrees:	   although	   “the	   pressures	   now	   gathering	   on	   Bush	   were	  intense…	   [as]	   the	   government	   of	   almost	   every	   American	   ally	   were	   clamoring	   for	  some	  kind	  of	  pressure	  on	  Israel,”	  he	  says	  that	  “Bush	  bluntly	  refused	  to	  rescue	  Arafat	  from	  defeat…	  [since]	  Arafat	  was	  a	  liar,	  a	  thief,	  a	  killer,	  and	  a	  protector	  of	  killers”.106	  	   Nor	   does	   Bush’s	   behavior	   seem	   to	   be	   the	   result	   of	   pressure	   from	   the	   pro-­‐Israel	   community.	   	   Rice	   insists	   that	   the	  motivation	   for	   the	   speech	   came	   from	   the	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principals’	  views	  of	  realities	  in	  the	  region,	  even	  though	  she	  acknowledges	  that	  they	  had	  a	  “love	  fest”	  with	  the	  Jewish	  community	  after	  the	  new	  policy	  was	  announced.107	  Frum	  also	   argues	   that	  Bush’s	   perception	  of	  Arafat	  was	  more	   consequential	  than	   the	   organized	   pro-­‐Israel	   lobby.	   	   Although	   he	   may	   want	   to	   keep	   Evangelical	  conservatives	  happy,	  Frum	  asks	  “why	  did	  Bush	  take	  the	  stance	  he	  did?	  	  Not	  –	  as	  the	  European	  press	   insinuated	  –	  because	  of	   the	   ‘Jewish	   lobby’.	   	   That	   lobby	  exists,	   but	  what	  did	  Bush	  care	  for	  it?	  	  He	  would	  not	  need	  Jewish	  votes	  in	  2004,	  and	  he	  certainly	  would	  not	  need	  Jewish	  political	  donations.	  	  As	  a	  challenger	  in	  2000,	  Bush	  had	  raised	  nearly	  $200	  million;	  as	  an	  incumbent,	  he	  needed	  only	  to	  raise	  a	  finger	  and	  the	  skies	  would	  shower	  gold	  wherever	  he	  directed”.108	  	  Instead,	  the	  reason	  for	  Bush’s	  speech	  was	  that	  “the	  Karine	  A	  incident	  finished	  off	  Arafat	  in	  Bush’s	  eyes”.109	  	  2.	  Perceptions	  of	  Close	  Contests	  Another	   area	   in	   which	   the	   theories	   diverge	   pertains	   to	   the	   matter	   how	  perceptions	  of	  close	  contests	   in	  the	  target	  polity	  affect	  variation	  in	  LSI	  occurrence.	  	  National	  interests	  theory	  (Theory	  #1)	  holds	  that	  LSI	  should	  occur	  in	  direct	  relation	  to	   likely	   opportunities	   in	   the	   target,	  whereas	   the	   agency-­‐based	   approach	   (Theory	  #4)	   anticipates	   that	   LSI	   occurrence	   is	   more	   likely	   to	   vary	   in	   accordance	   to	   the	  subjective	  beliefs	  that	  leaders	  in	  the	  sender	  state	  hold	  about	  contests	  in	  the	  target.	  	  In	   this	  regard,	   the	  data	  seems	  to	  provide	  mixed	  evidence.	   	  Although	  there	   is	  some	  support	   for	  Theory	  #1,	  more	  evidence	  seems	   to	   support	  Theory	  #4,	   reflecting	   the	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Bush	   team’s	   aspirations	   for	   the	   future	   more	   than	   the	   objective	   realities	   they	  confronted	  on	  the	  ground.	  On	   one	   hand,	   the	   division	   within	   the	   American	   team	   seems	   to	   fit	   the	  leadership-­‐based	  approach.	  	  Powell’s	  belief	  that	  Arafat	  was	  a	  reality	  the	  U.S.	  would	  have	  to	  confront	  contrasts	  with	  Bush’s	  belief	  that	  the	  chairman	  simply	  would	  have	  to	   go.	   	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   administration’s	   calls	   for	   Arafat’s	   ouster	   were	   not	  timed	   in	  a	  vacuum.	   	  Arafat’s	  popularity	  had	   fallen	   to	  35%,	  compared	  to	  as	  high	  as	  75%	  in	  1996	  at	  the	  height	  of	  the	  Oslo	  process.110	  Rice	   explains	   that	   in	   advance	   of	   the	   president’s	   Rose	   Garden	   speech,	   “the	  Palestinian	  Authority	  had	  launched	  a	  hundred-­‐day	  reform	  plan	  for	  governance,	  but	  we	  had	  little	  confidence	  that	  it	  would	  actually	  implement	  it”.111	  	  Thus,	  they	  felt	  that	  American	  pressure	  was	  needed	  to	  make	  a	  difference,	  but	  she	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  have	  been	  impressed	  by	  existing	  efforts	  toward	  PA	  reform.	  Bush	  and	  Rice	  believed	  Salam	  Fayyad	  would	  be	  a	  strong	  choice	  for	  PA	  finance	  minister,	  but	  he	  had	  absolutely	  no	  political	  base	  within	  the	  territories.	   	  Even	  years	  later,	  the	  party	  he	  would	  found	  to	  run	  in	  the	  2006	  PLC	  elections	  would	  take	  only	  two	  seats.	   	   In	   this	   regard,	   the	   Bush	   administration	   leaders	   were	   stretching	   the	  constraints	  of	  structure	  more	  than	  they	  were	  obeying	  them.	  Then,	  when	  Washington	  chose	   to	  push	   for	   the	  creation	  of	  a	  prime	  minister	  slot	   at	   the	   PA,	   its	   sense	   of	   timing	   and	   opportunity	   on	   the	   ground	  was	   shaped	   by	  factors	  specific	  to	  Theory	  #4.	  	  In	  particular,	  U.S.	  leaders	  allowed	  the	  effort	  to	  linger	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while	  they	  dealt	  with	  other	  distractions,	  particularly,	  high-­‐level	  preparations	  to	  go	  to	  war	  with	  Iraq	  and	  their	  decision	  to	  postpone	  release	  of	  the	  Road	  Map	  until	  after	  Sharon	  had	  won	  his	  impending	  election	  in	  Israel.112	  Then,	   the	   Bush	   team	   imposed	   demands	   of	   Abbas	   that	   may	   not	   have	   been	  entirely	  realistic	  given	  the	  extremely	  difficult	  security	  and	  political	  environment	  he	  was	  facing.	  	  For	  instance,	  demanding	  that	  he	  dismantle	  terrorist	  groups	  entirely	  was	  beyond	  both	   his	   comfort	   level	   and	  what	   Chairman	  Arafat	  would	   accept.	   	  Nor	  was	  pushing	  for	  Arafat’s	  total	  isolation	  a	  particularly	  realistic	  formula	  for	  success.	  	  Also,	  it	   is	   possible	   that	   the	   Bush	   team	   was	   taken	   by	   surprise	   by	   Abu	   Mazen’s	   sudden	  resignation,	  suggesting	  that	  the	  two	  sides	  were	  not	  communicating	  very	  effectively.	  Either	   way,	   the	   Bush	   team	   took	   a	   number	   of	   steps	   that	   suggested	   its	  approach	   to	   leadership	   selection	   intervention	   was	   shaped	   more	   by	   an	   idealistic	  understanding	  of	  Palestinian	  politics	  than	  a	  cold-­‐eyed	  assessment	  of	  possibilities	  on	  the	  ground.	   	   Its	  behavior	  provides	  some	  evidence	  for	  national	   interests	  theory	  but	  more	  support	  for	  leadership	  theory.	  	  3.	  Patterns	  of	  Domestic	  Debate:	  	   Another	   area	   in	  which	   the	   theories	   diverge	   has	   to	   do	  with	   the	   patterns	   of	  domestic	   deliberation	   leading	   up	   to	   the	   pursuit	   of	   LSI	   in	   Palestinian	   politics.	   	   If	  domestic	   structural	   forces	   such	   as	   Congress,	   lobbyists,	   or	   bureaucrats	   are	   both	  informed	  about	  administration	  plans	  for	  LSI	  and	  influential	  in	  shaping	  those	  plans,	  then	   that	   would	   provide	   strong	   evidence	   for	   Theories	   2	   or	   3.	   	   However,	   if	   those	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forces	   are	   left	   in	   the	   dark	   and	   their	   preferences	   ignored,	   that	   would	   support	   the	  leadership-­‐based	  approach.	  	   In	  this	  regard,	  the	  data	  seems	  to	  provide	  stronger	  backing	  for	  Theory	  #4	  than	  the	   theories	  more	   oriented	   toward	   domestic	   structural	   forces.	   	   In	   advance	   of	   the	  Rose	   Garden	   speech,	   there	   was	   extensive,	   almost	   painstaking	   consultation	  throughout	   the	   executive	   branch,	   but	   the	   State	   Department	   had	   little	   actual	  influence	  on	  the	  content	  of	   the	  new	  policy,	  which	  was	  mainly	  driven	  by	  the	  White	  House.	   	  Aaron	  Miller,	  who	  was	  working	  at	  Foggy	  Bottom	  at	   the	   time,	  explains	   that	  “the	  president’s	   June	  24	   address	  was	   a	  White	  House	   show	  with	   a	  determined	  but	  largely	  unsuccessful	  effort	  at	  State	  to	  shape	  it…	  [the	  speech	  was]	  driven	  largely	  by	  Condi	  Rice”.113	   	  Nor	  were	  domestic	  actors	  outside	  of	   the	  White	  House	  particularly	  involved	  in	  the	  effort	  to	  get	  Salam	  Fayyad	  appointed	  as	  the	  PA	  finance	  minister.	  	  The	  State	   Department	   –	   and	   Powell,	   for	   that	   matter	   –	   were	   overruled	   when	   the	  administration	  first	  decided	  to	  postpone	  the	  Road	  Map	  in	  December	  of	  2002,	  which	  it	  later	  extended	  to	  force	  Arafat	  to	  appoint	  Abu	  Mazen.114	  	   The	   most	   visible	   Congressional	   posture	   came	   about	   as	   a	   result	   of	  administration	   efforts	   to	   get	   a	   prime	   minister	   position	   created	   and	   to	   empower	  Abbas	  once	  he	  served	  in	  that	  office.	  	  Yet	  the	  pro-­‐Israel	  lobby	  and	  the	  Hill	  were	  both	  playing	   catch-­‐up	   with	   administration	   efforts,	   not	   playing	   a	   major	   role	   in	   shaping	  them.	   	  When	   the	   Road	  Map	  was	   about	   to	   be	   released,	  with	   Palestinian	   observers	  seeing	   Abbas’s	   survival	   tied	   up	   in	   document’s	   implementation,	   AIPAC	   got	   hefty	  supermajorities	  of	  Congress	  to	  sign	  a	  letter	  urging	  the	  president	  that	  the	  PA	  should	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be	  expected	  to	  take	  the	  first	  steps	  before	  any	  concessions	  be	  asked	  of	  Israel.115	  Then,	   when	   the	   administration	   published	   the	   document,	   the	   executive	  director	  of	  the	  Conference	  of	  Presidents,	  probably	  the	  second	  most	  powerful	  group	  in	  the	  pro-­‐Israel	  community,	  told	  the	  press	  that	  “we	  want	  to	  see	  a	  process	  begin	  that	  has	  a	  real	  chance	  to	  succeed.	  	  We	  think	  the	  principles	  enunciated	  by	  the	  president	  in	  his	   June	   24	   speech	   would	   do	   that,	   and	   there	   are	   elements	   in	   the	   road	   map	   that	  contradict	  that”.116	  	  Yet	  the	  administration	  continued	  to	  push	  the	  Road	  Map	  plan.	  	  It	  did	   so	   half-­‐heartedly,	   but	   the	   reason	   probably	   had	   more	   to	   do	   with	   Bush’s	   own	  disinterest	   in	   the	  document	  and	   lack	  of	   commitment	   to	   sustaining	  progress	  on	   its	  requirements.117	  	   Similarly,	  when	  it	  came	  to	  building	  up	  Abbas	  in	  office,	  Congress	  was	  forced	  to	  play	   catch-­‐up	   with	   the	   administration’s	   preferences,	   not	   the	   other	   way	   around.	  	  When	  the	  Israelis	  tried	  to	  assassinate	  Hamas	  leader	  Abdel	  Aziz	  al-­‐Rantisi	   just	  days	  after	  Aqaba,	  Bush	  condemned	  the	  strike,	  saying	  it	  would	  not	  bolster	  Israel’s	  security	  out	  of	  concern	  that	   it	  would	  undermine	  Abbas.	   	  Unsurprisingly,	  his	  administration	  was	  condemned	  by	  members	  of	  Congress,	  who	  suggested	  that	  his	  statement	  might	  lead	  his	  critics	  “to	  think	  of	  the	  word	  hypocrisy”.118	  	   A	  few	  days	  later,	  Congressional	  staffers	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  aisle	  predicted	  a	  tough	  legislative	  fight	  if	  Bush	  tried	  to	  send	  direct	  aid	  to	  the	  Palestinian	  Authority	  in	  support	  of	  the	  new	  reformist	  government	  there.	  	  One	  staffer	  explained	  the	  sense	  on	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the	   Hill,	   which	   was	   that	   the	   Palestinians	   “just	   don’t	   deserve	   it	   yet”.119	   	   However,	  when	   Abbas	   came	   to	   Washington	   the	   following	   month,	   he	   got	   the	   aid.	   	   In	   this	  instance,	   legislators	  were	  not	   left	   in	   the	  dark	  –	  administration	  officials	  briefed	   the	  Hill	  in	  advance	  of	  waiving	  restrictions	  on	  the	  funds	  –	  but	  the	  administration	  got	  its	  way	   and	  was	   not	  moved	   by	   Congressional	   reluctance.	   	   In	   the	   end,	   administration	  consultations	  handily	  ensured	  that	  “there	  would	  be	  little	  opposition	  among	  Israel’s	  traditional	   supporters	   in	   Congress	   and	   among	   Jewish	   groups”.120	   	   Thus,	   although	  domestic	   structural	   forces	   were	   by	   no	   means	   powerless	   during	   this	   period,	   they	  were	  not	  decisive	  actors	  during	  the	  deliberative	  process	  leading	  up	  to	  LSI.	  	  4.	  Cycles	  of	  Domestic	  Power:	  	   The	   political	   calendar	   in	   the	   sender	   state	   also	   offers	   an	   opportunity	   to	  distinguish	  between	   the	  causal	  weight	  of	   the	  various	   theories.	   	  Theory	  #2	  expects	  that	   lobbyists	   and	   legislators	   should	   be	   extraordinarily	   preponderant	   during	  periods	   of	   divided	   government	   or	   in	   the	   run-­‐up	   to	   elections	   in	   the	   sender	   state.	  	  Theory	   #3	   expects	   that	   bureaucrats	   should	   be	   particularly	   influential	   over	   LSI	  behavior	  during	  the	  first	  year	  of	  presidential	  terms	  in	  office.	  	   Neither	   theory	   does	   especially	   well	   relative	   to	   the	   data	   in	   these	   episodes.	  	  Although	  working-­‐level	  officials	  at	  State	  tend	  to	  support	  LSI	  in	  favor	  of	  Palestinian	  moderates,	   there	  was	  no	  major	   LSI	   during	  Bush’s	   first	   year	   in	   office.	   	   Instead,	   his	  Rose	  Garden	  speech	  came	  the	  following	  year.	  	  Nor	  did	  impending	  midterm	  elections	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dissuade	  Bush	  from	  carrying	  out	  LSI.	   	  In	  fact,	  members	  of	  Congress	  were	  generally	  more	  supportive	  of	  his	  Rose	  Garden	  speech	  than	  the	  subsequent	  Road	  Map	  because	  the	  former	  laid	  out	  an	  ultimatum	  against	  perceived	  Palestinian	  hardliners,	  whereas	  the	  latter	  actually	  sketched	  out	  a	  role	  for	  moderates	  as	  well.	  	  Yet	  they	  were	  generally	  not	  influential	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  Rose	  Garden	  speech.	  	  Nor	  was	  Congress	  engaged	  in	  the	  Fayyad	  issue	  at	  all.	  	  And	  when	  the	  U.S.	  declined	  to	  come	  to	  Abbas’s	  rescue,	  in	  late	  2003,	  it	  had	  little	  to	  do	  with	  the	  American	  election	  calendar.	  	  5.	  Bureaucratic	  Freelancing:	  	   Another	   area	   where	   the	   theories	   diverge	   pertains	   to	   bureaucratic	  freelancing.	   	   Efforts	   by	   working-­‐level	   officials	   to	   conduct	   LSI	   against	   the	   express	  wishes	  of	  their	  bosses	  would	  provide	  strong	  evidence	  for	  Theory	  #3.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  evidence	  for	  Theory	  #4	  would	  include	  if	  such	  freelancing	  were	  rare	  or	  at	  least	  subject	  to	  the	  president	  first	  having	  a	  lax	  styles	  of	  management	  and	  issue	  oversight.	  	  In	  this	  regard,	  the	  data	  seems	  to	  provide	  stronger	  evidence	  for	  Theory	  #4.	  	   Overall,	   freelancing	   was	   quite	   rare.	   	   The	   Rose	   Garden	   speech	   was	   not	  reflective	  of	  bureaucratic	  preferences.	   	  In	  fact,	  Rice	  recalls	  that	  the	  new	  policy	  was	  strongly	   opposed	   by	   these	   actors:	   “the	   Arabists	   in	   the	   State	   Department	   were	  appalled…	   [and]	   one	   diplomat	   who	   was	   serving	   in	   the	   Middle	   East	   [even]	   told	   a	  reporter	   at	   a	   cocktail	   party	   that	   he	   could	   no	   longer	   do	   his	   job	   thanks	   to	   ‘that	  speech’.121	  	  As	  described	  above,	  Miller	  attributed	  the	  policy	  to	  the	  White	  House,	  not	  Foggy	  Bottom.	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   Rice	  was	  actively	  involved	  in	  helping	  get	  Salam	  Fayyad	  empowered,	  causing	  Barak	   Ravid	   to	   call	   her	   Fayyad’s	   patron.122	   	   Reportedly,	   she	   persuaded	   him	   to	  pursue	  his	  job	  at	  the	  finance	  ministry,	  she	  encouraged	  the	  Israelis	  to	  release	  the	  PA’s	  tax	   revenues	   to	  him,	  and	  she	  championed	  his	   request	   for	  what	  eventually	  became	  the	   $20	   million	   in	   direct	   aid	   that	   he	   and	   Abbas	   were	   awarded	   in	   July	   of	   2003.	  	  Nowhere	  was	  the	  permanent	  bureaucracy	  on	  these	  issues.	  	   During	   this	   period,	   the	   closest	   thing	   to	   a	   leading	   bureaucratic	   role	   in	  American	   LSI	   was	   John	   Wolf’s	   role	   as	   the	   administration’s	   point	   person	   for	  implementation	   of	   the	   Road	  Map	   in	   the	   summer	   of	   2003.	   	   However,	   he	  was	   fully	  authorized	   to	   perform	   this	   role.	   	   Bush	   delegated	   to	   him,	   and	   the	   principals	   left	   a	  vacuum	  that	  he	  apparently	  struggled	  to	  fill.	  	  6.	  Consistency	  of	  Message:	  One	   of	   the	   main	   determinants	   of	   efficacy	   seems	   to	   be	   whether	   or	   not	   the	  messaging	   implicit	   in	  LSI	   is	   conveyed	   in	  a	   consistent	  manner	   toward	  observers	   in	  the	  target	  polity.	   	  Theory	  #1	  anticipates	  that	  this	  should	  be	  the	  case,	  but	  the	  other	  theories	  posit	  likely	  culprits	  for	  why	  this	  might	  not	  be	  the	  case.	  	  The	  data	  in	  this	  case	  seems	  to	  fit	  best	  with	  the	  leadership-­‐based	  approach.	  Bush’s	  statements	  of	  enthusiasm	  for	  Abbas	  and	  token	  financial	  assistance	  did	  little	   to	   bolster	   his	   ability	   or	   inclination	   to	   move	   against	   terrorist	   groups	   on	   the	  ground.	   	   Nor	   did	   it	   persuade	   the	   Palestinian	   people	   that	   he	   had	   the	   ability	   to	  improve	  their	  quality	  of	  life,	  as	  they	  had	  initially	  hoped.	  	  In	  time,	  his	  popularity	  fell	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as	   a	   reflection	   of	   this	   growing	   disillusionment	  with	  what	   he	  would	   achieve.	   	   The	  Bush	   team	  was	   extremely	   consistent	   in	   its	   language	   about	   Abbas,	   but	   its	   actions	  were	  not	  consistent	  with	  its	  language.	  Qadura	  Fares,	  a	  key	  Fatah	  legislator	  at	  the	  time,	  explained	  on	  the	  eve	  of	  the	  prime	  minister’s	   resignation	   that	   “instead	  of	   keep	   calling	  Abu	  Mazen	  a	   good	  man,	  the	  Americans	  should	  get	  the	  roadblocks	  removed.	  	  Then	  they	  could	  call	  him	  a	  bad	  man,	   and	   at	   least	   he	  would	   be	   popular…	   They	   have	   not	   put	   any	   pressure	   on	   the	  Israelis	  to	  change	  the	  policy	  on	  the	  ground	  to	  improve	  daily	  life	  for	  the	  Palestinians.	  	  The	  U.S.	  hasn’t	  realized	  how	  important	  this	  is	  to	  Abu	  Mazen”.123	  Similarly,	  a	  reformist	  minister	   in	  Abu	  Mazen’s	  government,	  Ghassan	  Khatib,	  explained	   that	   “Abu	   Mazen	   gave	   the	   impression	   that	   he	   was	   giving	   hope	   to	   the	  public	   and…	   bringing	   the	   ceasefire	   and	   reforms	   that	   the	   other	   side	   would	   be	  delivering.	  	  Unfortunately,	  that	  is	  not	  happening”.124	  Ali	   Jarbawi,	   a	   plugged	   in	   political	   scientist	   at	   Bir	   Zeit	   University	   near	  Ramallah	   who	   later	   became	   a	   PA	   minister,	   explained	   to	   the	   press	   that	   “we	   are	  witnessing	   now	   a	   return	   of	   Arafat	   to	   the	   centre…	   it’s	   clear	   that	   the	   failure	   of	   the	  roadmap	  and…	  the	  fact	  that	  we	  are	  back	  to	  square	  one	  shows	  that	  the	  argument	  that	  is	  the	  one	  to	  blame	  was	  not	  correct”.125	  	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   administration	   was	   much	   more	   consistent	   in	   its	  efforts	   at	   blacklisting	   Arafat.	   	   Despite	   repeated	   European	   attempts	   to	   find	   a	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workaround	  or	  to	  encourage	  Bush	  to	  retreat	  from	  his	  staunch	  position	  on	  the	  issue,	  the	  American	   administration	   refused	   to	   engage	  with	   the	   Palestinian	   president	   for	  the	   remainder	   of	   his	   days.	   	   Other	   a	   last-­‐ditch	   appeal	   from	   Powell	   for	   Arafat	   to	  empower	  Abbas,	  the	  administration	  even	  avoided	  appealing	  to	  Arafat	  by	  name.126	  	   In	  both	  instances,	  the	  best	  explanation	  for	  U.S.	  messaging	  had	  to	  do	  with	  the	  beliefs	   of	   top	   principals.	   	   The	   isolation	   of	   Arafat	   stuck	   because	   Bush	   remained	  convinced	   that	   Arafat	   was	   beyond	   the	   pale,	   despite	   pressures	   from	   international	  allies.	  	  Similarly,	  Bush	  continued	  to	  feel	  positively	  toward	  Abbas,	  but	  his	  interest	  in	  eliciting	   real	   changes	   on	   the	   ground	  was	   not	   consistently	   applied.	   	   And	   Rice	  was	  interested	   to	   help	   but	   caught	   by	   surprise	   when	   she	   “learn[ed]	   valuable	   lessons	  about	   how	   frustrating	   it	   can	   be	   to	   get	   the	   Israelis	   to	   actually	   carry	   through	   on	  promises	   related	   to	   the	   Palestinians,”	   including	   on	   outposts	   and	   roadblocks.127	  	  Neither	  one	  seemed	  ready	  to	  push	  the	  Israelis	  for	  dramatic	  concessions	  beyond	  that.	  	  7.	  Suitability	  of	  Message:	  	   The	  last	  area	  in	  which	  the	  theories	  diverge	  has	  to	  do	  with	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  message	  projected	  by	   the	   sender	   state	   fits	  with	   the	  dynamics	   of	   domestic	   politics	  within	  the	  target	  polity.	  	  National	  interests	  theory	  expects	  that	  messaging	  should	  be	  suitably	   targeted,	   while	   leadership	   theory	   holds	   that,	   if	   messaging	   is	   going	   to	   be	  poorly	  calibrated,	  it	  should	  be	  due	  to	  subjective	  biases	  of	  leaders	  in	  the	  sender	  state.	  	  Theories	   2	   and	   3	   hold	   that	   domestic	   structural	   forces	   in	   the	   sender	   state	   might	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interfere	  with	  the	  suitability	  of	  messaging	  due	  to	  institutional,	  rather	  than	  personal,	  biases.	  	   There	  seems	  little	  escaping	  the	  fact	  that	  American	  LSI	  during	  this	  period	  was	  too	  direct.	  	  Calling	  for	  Arafat’s	  ouster,	  even	  if	  Bush	  never	  technically	  said	  those	  exact	  words,	  was	   not	   a	   recipe	   for	   immediate	   success.	   	   Instead,	   the	  Rose	  Garden	   speech	  initially	  set	  up	  a	  dynamic	  by	  which	  the	  Palestinian	  public	  and	  elites	  were	  driven	  to	  rally	   around	   the	   flag.	   	   It	   is	   extremely	   difficult	   to	   explain	   why	   the	   American	  administration	   would	   take	   this	   unlikely	   step	   without	   recognizing	   the	   enormous	  impact	  that	  President	  Bush	  had	  in	  making	  this	  the	  policy	  of	  the	  United	  States.	  A	   slightly	   more	   nuanced	   operator,	   Condoleezza	   Rice	   tried	   to	   maintain	  pretense	  with	  regard	  to	  Palestinian	  politics,	  but	  Bush’s	  Rose	  Garden	  speech	  was	  not	  amenable	  to	  this	  sort	  of	  rhetorical	  flourish.	  	  Days	  after	  the	  speech,	  she	  tried	  to	  clarify	  the	  president’s	  message	  in	  an	  interview	  with	  Wolf	  Blitzer,	  and	  the	  results	  are	  almost	  comical:	  	  “Blitzer:	  The	  president	  wants	  a	  new	  Palestinian	  leadership.	  	  Who	  are	  the	  candidates,	  who	  are	  the	  alternatives	  to	  Yasser	  Arafat?	  	  Rice:	   The	   president	   is	   not	   trying	   to	   determine	   the	   character	   of	   the	   Palestinian	  leadership,	  its	  members.	  	  He’s	  only	  laying	  out	  what	  we	  consider	  to	  be	  the	  facts…	  	  Blitzer:	  Let’s	   go	   through	   some	  other	  Palestinian	   leaders	  and	  get	  your	   feedback	  on	  what	   you	   think	   about	   them.	   	   There	   have	   been	   some	   names	   floated	   out	   there	   as	  possible	  alternatives	  to	  Yasser	  Arafat.	  	  And	  we’ll	  put	  some	  of	  them	  on	  the	  screen.	  	  -­‐Abu	  Ala…	  -­‐Abu	  Mazen…	  -­‐Marwan	  Barghouti…	  -­‐Jibril	  Rajoub…	  -­‐Mohammed	  Dahlan…	  -­‐Sheik	  Ahmed	  Yassin….	  	  Are	  any	  of	  those	  individuals	  acceptable	  to	  the	  United	  States?	  	  Rice:	  We’re	  not	  going	  to	  try	  to	  determine	  what	  the	  new	  leadership	  should	  be…	  we’re	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not	  going	  to	  try	  and	  choose	  leaders.	  	  That’s	  what	  elections	  do.	  	  But	  the	  president	  was	  just	   putting	   forward	   a	   fact,	   which	   is	   that	   until	   there	   is	   a	   changed	   dynamic	   in	   the	  situation	  in	  the	  Middle	  East…	  it’s	  not	  going	  to	  be	  possible	  to	  move	  forward.	  	  Blitzer:	  Who	  are	  the	  other	  names	  that	  you’re	  thinking	  of	  that	  are	  out	  there?	  	  Give	  us	  a	  couple	  of	  them.	  	  Rice:	  Well,	   I	   –	  again,	  Wolf,	   I	   am	  not	  going	   to	   try	  and	   to	  promote	  particular	  people	  within	  the	  Palestinian	  leadership.	  	  That	  would	  be	  inappropriate”.128	  	  There	  was	  no	  way	  to	  spin	  Bush’s	  statement	  in	  a	  way	  that	  did	  not	  raise	  the	  hackles	  of	  the	   Palestinian	   public.	   	   Jarbawi	   explained	   that	   after	   Bush’s	   speech	   “his	   [Arafat’s]	  opponents	   stand	   alongside	   him	  because	   they	   felt	   that	   defending	   him	   is	   defending	  the	  national	  dignity”.129	  	  Another	  political	  observer	  based	  on	  Bethlehem	  complained	  that	   “if	   the	   Americans	   would	   not	   have	   interfered,	   there	   would	   have	   been	   a	   real	  chance”.130	  	  In	  the	  words	  of	  an	  unemployed	  laborer	  quoted	  by	  the	  Associated	  Press,	  now	  “the	  people	  only	  want	  Arafat	  –	  Arafat	  or	  nobody”.131	   	  The	  policy	  of	  calling	  for	  Arafat’s	   ouster	   was	   not	   a	   success.	   	   It	   did	   not	   remove	   him,	   it	   constrained	   U.S.	  negotiating	  strategy,	  and	  it	  boosted	  his	  popularity.	  	  Whereas	  Arafat’s	  popularity	  was	  stuck	  at	  35%	  in	  May	  before	  Bush’s	  speech,	  the	  number	  of	  Palestinians	  who	  said	  they	  would	  vote	  for	  him	  in	  hypothetical	  elections	  was	  up	  to	  60%	  by	  August.132	  	   However,	  Washington’s	  corollary	  policy	  of	  insisting	  on	  a	  prime	  minister	  post	  being	  created	  before	  it	  would	  reengage	  with	  the	  PA	  was	  far	  more	  effective	  because	  it	  was	  better	  suited	  to	  the	  dynamics	  of	  Palestinian	  politics.	   	  That	  was	  a	  message	  that	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could	  actually	  sell,	  since	  it	  did	  not	  force	  political	  elites	  to	  choose	  between	  national	  dignity	   and	   political	   reform.	   	   But	   expressing	   a	   desire	   for	   Arafat’s	   removal	   was	  probably	   a	   sub-­‐par	   way	   of	   getting	   bringing	   this	   about,	   precisely	   because	   of	   the	  misunderstanding	   it	  betrayed	  of	  Palestinian	  politics.	   	  This	  misreading	  was	  a	  direct	  consequence	  of	  Bush’s	  particular	  beliefs	  about	  Palestinian	  affairs.	  Another	  reason	  the	  American	  effort	  to	  marginalize	  Arafat	  failed	  probably	  has	  to	  do	  with	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  U.S.	  did	  not	  work	  hard	  enough	   to	  give	   the	  chairman	  a	  stake	  in	  his	  own	  disenfranchisement.	  	  There	  are	  echoes	  of	  the	  experiences	  of	  Baker	  and	  Shultz	  in	  this	  episode	  from	  the	  Bush	  era.	  	  Whereas	  Baker	  sought	  to	  get	  the	  PLO’s	  buy-­‐in	   for	  empowering	   local	  elites,	  partly	  at	   its	  own	  expense,	  Shultz	  devoted	   little	  attention	  to	  ensuring	  the	  PLO	  felt	  it	  had	  a	  role	  to	  play	  behind	  the	  scenes.	  	  Similarly,	  it	  seems	  Arafat’s	   thinking	  was	  key	   in	  bringing	  about	   the	   initial	   success	  and	  eventual	  failure	  of	  the	  Abu	  Mazen	  premiership.	  Arafat	  eventually	  accepted	  the	  idea	  of	  giving	  Abu	  Mazen	  the	  job	  because	  he	  was	   persuaded	   by	   his	   advisors	   that	   it	   was	   his	   only	   way	   to	   get	   the	   international	  community	   to	   reengage	   with	   the	   Palestinian	   Authority.	   	   He	   also	   believed	   that	   he	  would	  still	  retain	  an	  important	  leadership	  role.	  	  Thus,	  he	  even	  sent	  instructions	  the	  PLC	  to	  pass	  the	  new	  Basic	  Law	  to	  create	  the	  premier	  position.133	  However,	   Abu	   Mazen’s	   initial	   successes	   inspired	   Arafat’s	   jealousy,	   and	   he	  saw	  little	  role	  for	  himself	  in	  the	  new,	  emerging	  hierarchy,	  if	  Abu	  Mazen	  had	  his	  way.	  	  After	  Abu	  Mazen	  concluded	  a	  hudna	  with	  Islamist	  terror	  groups	  and	  was	  received	  in	  an	   international	   embrace	   at	   Sharm	   and	   Aqaba,	   Ziad	   Abu	   Amr	   and	   Nabil	   Sha’ath	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 Buttu, “Interview with the Author”; Bregman, Elusive Peace, 246, 248. 
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described	   the	   chairman’s	   jealously	   as	   quite	   palpable.134	   	   Arafat	   proceeded	   to	  undermine	   the	   new	   government	   and	   bring	   about	   its	   collapse;	   arguably,	   he	  might	  have	  been	  more	  amenable	   to	   cohabitation	   if	  he	   still	   felt	   that	  he	  had	  a	   role	   to	  play	  with	  Abbas	  as	  prime	  minister.	  However,	  given	  Bush	  and	  Sharon’s	  shared	  determination	  to	  write	  Arafat	  off	  entirely,	  there	  was	  little	  room	  for	  common	  ground.	  	  About	  a	  week	  after	  the	  August	  suicide	   bombing	   and	   a	  week	   before	   Abbas’s	   resignation,	   Colin	   Powell	   broke	  with	  administration	  procedure	  to	  mention	  Arafat	  by	  name,	  “call[in]g	  on	  Chairman	  Arafat	  to	  work	  with	  Prime	  Minister	  Abbas	  and	  to	  make	  available	  to	  Prime	  Minister	  Abbas	  those	   security	   elements	   that	   are	   under	   his	   control”.135	   	   Yet	   this	  message	  was	   too	  little,	  too	  late,	  and	  probably	  not	  backed	  more	  of	  widely	  within	  the	  administration.	  	  In	  order	  to	  explain	  why	  the	  line	  against	  Arafat	  left	  no	  room	  for	  a	  creative	  background	  role,	  the	  best	  explanation	  is	  probably	  President	  Bush	  himself.	  	  Thus,	  in	  this	  regard	  as	  well,	  the	  data	  seems	  to	  fit	  closest	  with	  Theory	  #4,	  the	  leadership-­‐based	  approach.	  	  
Palestine,	  Case	  #4:	  What	  Comes	  Next?,	  2005-­‐2006	  	  	  	   With	   Yasser	   Arafat’s	   death	   in	   November	   of	   2004,	   an	   era	   had	   ended	   in	  Palestinian	  politics.	  	  After	  a	  brief	  period	  of	  political	  wrangling,	  Mahmoud	  Abbas	  was	  selected	  as	   the	  new	  head	  of	   the	  PLO	  and	  Fatah’s	  candidate	   to	  succeed	  Arafat.	   	  His	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 Quoted in Bregman, Elusive Peace, 251, 256. 
135 Weisman, “U.S., in Shift, Asks Arafat for Help Powell Calls on Palestinian Leader to Use Forces on 
Militants.” 
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popularity	   jumped,	   almost	   overnight,	   from	   3%	   to	   40%.136	   	   Nomination	   by	   Fatah	  effectively	  made	  the	  result	  of	  the	  presidential	  elections	  in	  January	  2005	  a	  foregone	  conclusion.137	   	  Abbas	  was	  elected	  with	  63%	  of	   the	  popular	  vote	  compared	  to	  20%	  for	  his	  closest	  competitor.	  	   However,	   despite	   his	   sweeping	   electoral	   victory,	   Abbas’s	   personal	   political	  authority	  was	  still	  quite	  weak.138	  	  The	  Fatah	  organization	  and	  PA	  capacity	  had	  both	  been	  devastated	  during	  the	  recent	  intifada,	  and	  faction	  infighting	  proliferation	  with	  the	   passing	   of	   a	   unifying	   charismatic	   figurehead.	   	   Since	   Abbas	   was	   generally	  predisposed	   to	   governing	   by	   consensus	   rather	   than	   imposing	   his	  will	   or	   cracking	  heads,	  he	  sought	  to	  accumulate	  authority	  by	  soliciting	  outside	  political	  support	  and	  eventually	  reestablishing	  organizational	  unity	  through	  a	  new	  round	  of	  PLC	  elections.	  	   In	  the	  first	  line	  of	  his	  2005	  State	  of	  the	  Union	  address,	  President	  Bush	  hailed	  Abbas’s	   election,	   along	  with	   recent	  voting	   in	  Afghanistan,	  Ukraine,	   and	   Iraq,	   as	   an	  exciting	  sign	   that	  global	   freedom	  was	  on	   the	  march.139	   	  A	  week	   later,	  after	  Sharon	  and	   Abbas	   held	   a	   summit	   at	   Sharm	   el-­‐Sheikh	   at	   which	   they	   pledged	   an	   end	   to	  violence	  on	  both	  sides,	  Rice	  welcomed	  the	  new	  developments	  as	  “the	  best	  chance	  for	  peace	   we	   are	   likely	   to	   see	   for	   years	   to	   come,”	   promising	   to	   do	   her	   best	   to	   take	  advantage	  of	  that	  opportunity.140	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 “Analysis: Palestinian Voting Behavior,” NPR: Morning Edition (National Public Radio (NPR), 
December 17, 2004). 
137 Ali Jarbawi and Wendy Pearlman, “Struggle in a Post-Charisma Transition: Rethinking Palestinian 
Politics After Arafat,” Journal of Palestine Studies 36, no. 4 (6-21): 12. 
138 Graham Usher, “The Democratic Resistance: Hamas, Fatah, and the Palestinian Elections,” Journal of 
Palestine Studies 35, no. 3 (20-36): 2006 Spring; Jarbawi and Pearlman, “Post-Charisma Transition”; 
Dennis Ross, Statecraft: And How to Restore America’s Standing in the World (Macmillan, 2008), 265. 
139 The Public Papers of President George W. Bush, “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the 
State of the Union” (The American Presidency Project at UC Santa Barbara, February 2, 2005). 
140 “U.S. Warmly Welcomes Middle East Truce,” Agence France-Presse (AFP), February 8, 2005. 
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Coding	  the	  Dependent	  Variables	  (Occurrence	  and	  Efficacy)	  Did	  LSI	  Occur?	  	   Yes,	   extensively.	   	   After	   his	   election	   as	   president,	   the	  United	   States	   devoted	  extensive	  efforts	  during	  2005	  to	  building	  up	  his	  authority	  as	  head	  of	  the	  PA.	  	  Then,	  when	  his	  party	  faced	  parliamentary	  elections	  in	  January	  of	  2006,	  Washington	  took	  unprecedented	  efforts	  to	  burnish	  the	  image	  of	  the	  ruling	  party.	  
<Sub-­Case	  1:	  Backing	  President	  Abbas>	  	   In	   the	   year	   2005,	   Rice	   visited	   the	   region	   three	   times,	   and	   Bush	  welcomed	  Abbas	  to	  the	  White	  House	  twice.	  	  The	  United	  States	  made	  new	  pledges	  of	  support	  to	  the	  PA	  at	  a	  donor	  conference	   in	  December	  of	  2004,	   just	  after	  Arafat’s	  death.141	   	  Of	  this	  money,	  $20	  million	  went	  directly	  to	  the	  Palestinian	  Authority	  but	  was	  restricted	  for	   the	   purpose	   of	   paying	   outstanding	   bills	   that	   the	   PA	   owed	   to	   an	   Israeli	   utility	  firm.142	   	   In	   Bush’s	   2005	   State	   of	   the	   Union,	   he	   pledged	   an	   additional	   $350	   for	  Palestinian	   development	   and	   stabilization.143	   	   Condoleezza	   Rice	   writes	   that	  President	  Bush	  also	  started	  urging	  Gulf	  states	  to	  “dramatically	  increase	  their	  aid”	  in	  response	  to	  Abbas’s	  election.144	  	   The	  Americans	  also	  employed	  public	  rhetoric	  in	  these	  early	  days	  in	  support	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 “Donors Voice Support for New Palestinian Leadership,” Associated Press, December 8, 2004; “U.S. to 
Give $23.5 Million for Palestinians,” New York Times, December 9, 2004. 
142 Glenn Kessler, “Direct Aid to Palestinians Considered: Creation of a New State a Likely Topic as Abbas 
Visits Bush,” Washington Post, n.d., sec. 2005 May 26. 
143 The Public Papers of President George W. Bush, “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the 
State of the Union.” 
144 Condoleezza Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington (Random House, 2011), 
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of	  Abbas’s	  leadership.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  Bush’s	  State	  of	  the	  Union	  remarks,	  Rice	  urged	  Israel	   to	  make	   “hard	   choices”	   for	   peace	   in	   advance	   of	   Sharon’s	   February	   summit	  with	   Abbas	   at	   Sharm	   el-­‐Sheikh.145	   	   At	   the	   summit,	   Sharon	   promised	   confidence-­‐building	  measures	   such	   as	   eventually	   transferring	  more	   security	   authority	   to	   the	  Palestinians	  and	  setting	  up	  a	  committee	  to	  discuss	  prisoner	  releases.146	   	  Later	  that	  month,	   Bush	   called	   for	   an	   eventual	   Palestinian	   state	   to	   be	   “viable,”	   and	   soon	  afterward	   the	   Quartet	   expressed	   its	   support	   as	   well	   for	   a	   Palestinian	   state	   that	  would	  be	  “truly	  viable”.147	  	   Abbas	  was	  received	  at	  the	  White	  House	   in	  May	  of	  that	  year.	   	  News	  services	  reported	   that	  Palestinian	  officials	   “have	  sought	  a	  clear	  signal	  of	  support	   for	  Abbas	  from	   the	   president	   during	   the	   visit,”	   including	   direct	   aid	   and	   a	   letter	   like	   the	   one	  Sharon	  received	  in	  2004,	  laying	  out	  U.S.	  guarantees	  about	  the	  content	  of	  a	  possible	  final	  status	  agreement	  between	  the	  parties.148	  	  Bush	  granted	  the	  request	  for	  aid	  but	  not	  the	  letter,	  announcing	  a	  $50	  million	  financial	  package	  that	  would	  mark	  the	  first	  time	   the	   United	   States	   would	   provide	   budgetary	   support	   to	   the	   Palestinian	  Authority	  without	  earmarking	  the	  funds	  for	  specific	  projects.	  	  However,	  as	  a	  partial	  sop	  to	  the	  request	  for	  a	  letter	  on	  final	  status	  issues,	  the	  president	  did	  comment	  that	  Israel	  should	  not	  “prejudice	  final-­‐status	  negotiations	  with	  regard	  to	  Gaza,	  the	  West	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Bank,	   and	   Jerusalem”	   and	   that	   “changes	   to	   the	   1949	   armistice	   lines	   must	   be	  mutually	  agreed	  to”.149	  	  Bush	  also	  praised	  Abbas,	  calling	  him	  a	  “man	  of	  courage”	  and	  promising	  that:	  	  “we	   will	   stand	   with	   you,	   Mr.	   President,	   as	   you	   combat	   corruption,	   reform	   the	  Palestinian	   security	   services	   and	   your	   justice	   system,	   and	   revive	   your	   economy…	  Mr.	  President,	  you	  have	  made	  a	  new	  start	  on	  a	  difficult	   journey,	  requiring	  courage	  and	  leadership	  each	  day	  –	  and	  we	  will	  take	  that	  journey	  together”.150	  	   In	  advance	  of	  Sharon’s	  plan	  for	  disengagement	  from	  Gaza	  and	  some	  areas	  of	  the	  West	  Bank	   in	  August	  of	  2005,	   the	  United	  States	  did	  not,	  however,	  do	  much	   to	  strengthen	  Abbas.	  The	  administration	  was	  so	  concerned	  with	  helping	  Sharon	  get	  his	  way	  on	  disengagement	   from	  Gaza	   that	   it	   did	   little	   to	   ensure	   that	   the	  process	  was	  negotiated	  with	  or	  even	  properly	  coordinated	  with	  the	  Palestinian	  Authority.	  In	  the	  end,	  the	  Israelis	  left	  Gaza	  three	  days	  earlier	  than	  the	  PA	  was	  expecting,	  and	   the	   result	  was	   a	   security	   vacuum	   that	   allowed	  Hamas	   thugs	   to	   vandalize	   the	  evacuated	  settlements	  and	  to	  proclaim	  that	  disengagement	  was	  their	  victory	  rather	  than	   the	   Palestinian	   Authority’s.151	   	   Miller	   concludes	   the	   Bush	   administration	  “missed	   a	   chance”	   for	   the	  U.S.	   to	   “build	   on	   Sharon’s	   Gaza	   disengagement	   strategy	  and	  see	  how	   it	   could	  be	  used	   to	   strengthen	  Abu	  Mazen	   (and	  not,	   as	   it	   turned	  out,	  Hamas).	   	  Again,	  we	  didn’t	  try	  that	  hard.	   	  A	  senior	  administration	  official	  intimately	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involved	   in	   policy	   matters	   concedes	   it	   was	   a	   ‘blown	   opportunity’.”152	   	   Rice	  encouraged	   Sharon	   to	   coordinate	   with	   Abbas	   but	   apparently	   did	   not	   try	   very	  hard.153	  	   During	   Abu	   Mazen’s	   second	   visit	   to	   the	  White	   House,	   white	   took	   place	   in	  October,	  his	   focus	  was	  on	   trying	   to	  decrease	   the	   sense	  of	   siege	  around	  Gaza	  post-­‐disengagement	  and	  to	  diminish	  fears	  exacerbated	  by	  Israel’s	  barrier	  and	  settlement	  construction	   that	   “Gaza	   first”	  would	   become	   “Gaza	   last”.154	   	   He	   implicitly	  warned	  that	  Israeli	  policies	  was	  undermining	  his	  camp,	  even	  in	  the	  lead-­‐up	  to	  PA	  elections.	  	  He	  argued	  “Israel’s	  lack	  of	  regard	  for	  the	  Road	  Map,”	  especially	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  movement	  issues	  was:	  	  “having	  a	  powerfully	  negative	  effect	  on	  Palestinian	  society	  at	  an	  extremely	  critical	  time	   in	  our	  democratic	  development.	   	  There	   is	  a	  struggle	  underway	   for	   the	  hearts	  and	   minds	   of	   the	   Palestinian	   people	   between	   the	   moderates	   and	   the	  fundamentalists.	   	   I	   firmly	   believe	   that	   this	   struggle	   should	   be	   resolve	   to	   the	  advantage	  of	  the	  moderates	  via	  the	  democratic	  process”.155	  	  Bush	   responded	   at	   their	   joint	   news	   conference	   that	   “it’s	   important	   that	  we	  make	  quick	  progress	  on	  the	  issues	  that	  [Quartet	  envoy]	  Jim	  [Wolfensohn]	  has	  identified	  as	  most	  critical	  for	  the	  Palestinian	  economy,	  including	  opening	  [Gaza’s]	  Rafah	  crossing,	  connecting	  the	  West	  Bank	  and	  Gaza,	  improving	  the	  ability	  of	  Palestinians	  to	  travel	  in	  the	  West	  Bank,	  and	  beginning	  work	  on	  the	  Gaza	  seaport”	  and	  urged	  Israel	  to	  remove	  unauthorized	   outposts,	   stop	   settlement	   expansion,	   and	   ensure	   that	   the	   security	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barrier	   not	   be	   located	   in	   a	   way	   that	   takes	   on	   political	   undertones.156	   	   He	   also	  expressed	  effusive	  praise	  for	  Abbas,	  proclaiming	  that:	  	  “It’s	   my	   honor	   to	   welcome	   the	   democratically	   elected	   leader	   of	   the	   Palestinian	  Authority	   to	   the	  White	  House	   for	   the	  second	   time	   this	  year…	  President	  Abbas	   is	  a	  man	   devoted	   to	   peace	   and	   to	   his	   people’s	   aspirations…	   	   The	   president’s	   got	   an	  assignment	  and	  a	  job	  and	  that’s	  to	  establish	  trust	  with	  the	  Palestinian	  people…	  [and	  using	   security	   forces	   to	  make	   sure	   that	   armed	  gangs	  don’t	  disrupt	   the	  democratic	  process…	  and	  our	  job	  is	  to	  help	  him	  do	  that”.157	  	  A	   few	  weeks	   later,	  Secretary	  Rice	  stopped	   into	   Jerusalem	  and	  refused	   to	   leave	   the	  region	  until	  the	  two	  sides	  worked	  out	  a	  compromise	  agreement	  on	  traffic	  in	  and	  out	  of	   Gaza.158	   	   The	   parties	   eventually	   reached	   a	   deal	   and	   signed	   an	   Agreement	   on	  Movement	   and	   Access	   that	   entailed	   both	   immediate	   steps	   and	   freedom	   of	  movement	  and	  objectives	  for	  the	  longer	  term.	  	  Some	  seem	  to	  think	  her	  efforts	  on	  the	  AMA	  may	  have	  been	  implicitly	  aimed	  at	  affecting	  the	  upcoming	  PA	  elections.159	  
<Sub-­Case	  2:	  Through	  the	  PLC	  Elections>	  	   Although	  Mahmoud	  Abbas	  was	  technically	  not	  running	  in	  the	  scheduled	  PLC	  elections,	  his	  party	  certainly	  was,	  and	  he	  needed	  the	  vote	  in	  order	  to	  consolidate	  his	  political	   power.	   	   He	   envisioned	   the	   vote	   as	   an	   opportunity	   to	   contain	   Hamas	   by	  giving	  it	  an	  avenue	  for	  political	  participation	  in	  exchange	  for	  an	  ongoing	  suspension	  of	   its	  military	   operations.	   	   He	   did	   not	   expect	   them	   to	   actually	   threaten	   the	   PLO’s	  control	  over	   the	  Authority.	   	  Also,	  he	  used	   the	  elections	  as	   an	  effort	   to	   reverse	   the	  fragmentation	  within	  Fatah	   itself.	   	  His	   strategy	  was	   to	  use	   the	  elections	   to	  bolster	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the	  movement	  through	  public	  legitimation	  while	  forcing	  out	  his	  political	  opponents	  from	  seats	  in	  the	  PLC	  and	  official	  PLO	  organs.160	  	   These	  elections	  were	  originally	  scheduled	  to	  take	  place	  the	  previous	  July,	  but	  Mahmoud	  Abbas	  had	  cancelled	  them	  about	  a	  week	  after	  his	  first	  visit	  to	  the	  White	  House	   in	   2005.	   	   Although	   the	   cancellation	  was	   primarily	   due	   to	   pressure	   he	  was	  receiving	  from	  election	  skeptics	  and	  his	  opponents	  within	  Fatah,	  Palestinian	  officials	  reportedly	  told	  the	  press	  that	  it	  was	  due	  to	  pressure	  from	  Washington.161	  	  The	  U.S.	  administration	  mostly	  held	  its	  tongue,	  perhaps	  out	  of	  respect	  for	  Abbas.	  	   There	  was	   some	   consideration	  within	   the	  United	   States	   of	   demanding	   that	  Hamas	  be	  forbidden	  from	  running	  in	  the	  elections	  before	  it	  disarmed.162	  	  However,	  Abbas	   tapped	   into	   Bush	   and	   Rice’s	   desire	   to	   support	   his	   program	   and	   the	  president’s	   second	   term	   undertaking	   of	   promoting	   democratization	   around	   the	  world,	  persuading	  them	  that	  in	  order	  to	  bolster	  his	  standing	  the	  elections	  needed	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  genuine;	  thus,	  Hamas	  should	  not	  be	  excluded	  on	  these	  grounds.163	   	  Rice	  got	  the	  backing	  of	  all	  other	  Quartet	  members	  for	  excluding	  Hamas	  on	  this	  bases	  but	  then	  was	  persuaded	  to	  back	  off	  by	  Mahmoud	  Abbas	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  election	  was	  perceived	  as	  legitimate.164	  	  	   There	   is	   some	   speculation	   that	   the	   president’s	   fixation	   on	   democratization	  may	   have	   driven	   to	   him	   to	   pressure	   Abbas	   into	   carrying	   through	   with	   the	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elections.165	  	  Martin	  Indyk	  argues	  that:	  	  “Abu	  Mazen	  considered	  a	  further	  postponement.	  	  Sharon	  was	  willing	  to	  cooperate	  in	  this	  effort	  to	  deny	  Hamas	  a	  victory	  at	  the	  ballot	  box.	  	  They	  reached	  an	  understanding	  that	  Sharon	  would	  ban	  Hamas	  candidates	  from	  running	  in	  East	  Jerusalem	  and	  Abu	  Mazen	  would	  then	  declare	  that	  the	  elections	  could	  not	  proceed.	   	  Sharon	  was	  ready	  to	   do	   his	   part,	   provided	   Bush	   did	   not	   criticize	   him	   for	   disrupting	   a	   democratic	  process.	   	   Israeli	   and	   Palestinian	   envoys	   were	   dispatched	   to	   Washington	   and	  returned	   with	   a	   very	   clear	   message:	   the	   president	   himself	   had	   decided	   that	   the	  elections	  should	  go	  ahead	  as	  planned”.166	  	  Indeed,	   some	   Palestinians	   who	   thought	   Fatah	   might	   lose	   had	   seized	   on	   Israeli	  reluctance	  to	   let	  Hamas	  on	  the	  ballot	   in	  East	   Jerusalem,	  which	  the	   Israelis	  directly	  administered,	  as	  a	  basis	   for	  possibly	  calling	  off	   the	  elections.167	   	  NSC	  staffer	  Elliott	  Abrams	  has	  confirmed	  that	  the	  United	  States	  received	  such	  a	  request.168	  	   Rice	  confirms	  that	  the	  United	  States	  actually	  did	  consider	  encouraging	  Abbas	  to	  postpone	  but	  that	  they	  ultimately	  decided	  not	  to.	   	  She	  explains	  that	  “Elliott	  said	  what	  we	  were	  all	  thinking.	  	  ‘Fatah	  isn’t	  going	  to	  be	  in	  better	  shape	  six	  months	  from	  now’.”169	   	  Her	  counselor,	  Philip	  Zelikow,	   insists	  they	  considered	  postponement	  but	  concluded	  that	  “if	  you	  postpone	  the	  elections	  you	  don’t	  solve	  the	  problem,	  and	  you	  completely	   delegitimize	   Fatah”.170	   	   Thus,	   in	   response	   to	   some	   feelers	   from	  Palestinian	   officials	   who	   wanted	   the	   vote	   to	   be	   cancelled,	   Abrams	   explains	   that	  Washington	   turned	   down	   the	   request,	   explaining	   that	   “your	   job	   is	   to	   win	   the	  election,	   go	   out	   and	   work,	   and	   get	   your	   people	   to	   the	   polls	   and	   win	   the	   damn	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election”.171	   	   He	   says	   it	   helped	   that	   Abbas	   himself	   “was	   confident	   that	   he	   would	  win”.172	  	  Bush’s	  spokesperson	  discouraged	  rumors	  based	  around	  the	  East	  Jerusalem	  voting	  dispute	  by	  making	  clear	  that	  he	  wanted	  the	  vote	  to	  proceed	  as	  planned.173	  	   The	   Bush	   administration	   then	   took	   some	   unusual	   steps	   to	   help	   bolster	  Abbas’s	  standing	   in	  advance	  of	   the	  vote.	   	  First,	   the	  United	  States	  sent	  a	  number	  of	  high-­‐level	   media	   advisors	   over	   in	   order	   to	   help	   the	   PA	   frame	   its	   role	   in	   the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  disengagement	  from	  Gaza.174	  	  Secretary	  Rice	  explains	  she	  sent	  her	  senior	  communications	  advisor	   Jim	  Wilkinson	  to	  the	  PA	  before	  the	  vote	  “to	  advise	  Abbas	  on	  how	  to	  mount	  a	  vigorous	  defense	  of	  his	  leadership	  –	  even	  helping	  the	  PA	  to	   construct	   a	   proper	   press	   facility	   so	   that	   the	   still	   popular	   Abbas	   could	  communicate	   with	   his	   people”.175	   	   Her	   biographer	   claims	   that	   the	   project	   also	  involved	  creating	  a	  series	  of	  local	  PA	  media	  centers	  and	  cost	  a	  total	  of	  $1.2	  million	  in	  American	  funds.176	  	   Even	  more	   dramatic,	   the	   United	   States	   disbursed	   almost	   $2	  million,	   about	  twice	   Hamas’s	   estimated	   campaign	   budget,	   on	   last-­‐minute	   USAID	   development	  projects	   that	   were	   intended	   to	   influence	   the	   outcome	   of	   the	   election.	   	   The	   story,	  revealed	   in	   a	   major	   exposé	   by	   the	   Washington	   Post	   just	   three	   days	   before	   the	  election,	  is	  absolutely	  stunning.177	  	   When	   the	   program	  was	   disclosed,	   American	   officials	   tried	   to	  maintain	   the	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pretense	   that	   it	  was	   not	   an	   act	   of	   blatant	   political	  meddling.	   	   The	   USAID	  mission	  director	   for	  Gaza	  and	   the	  West	  Bank	  said	   that	   “we	  are	  not	   favoring	  any	  particular	  party…	  but	  we	  do	  not	  support	  parties	  that	  are	  on	  the	  terrorism	  list.	  	  We	  are	  here	  to	  support	  the	  democratic	  process,”	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  clearly	  that	  meant	  the	  US	  was	  favoring	  one	  main	  political	  force	  against	  the	  other.178	   	  A	  spokesperson	  for	  the	  East	  Jerusalem	   consulate	   claimed	   the	   program	  was	   simply	   designed	   “to	  work	  with	   the	  Palestinian	  Authority	  to	  enhance	  democratic	  institutions	  and	  to	  support	  democratic	  actors,	  not	  just	  Fatah”.179	  	  The	  Palestinian	  Authority	  official	  responsible	  for	  directing	  the	  funds,	  a	  chief	  of	  staff	  in	  Abbas’s	  own	  office,	  claimed	  that	  “campaigning	  may	  come	  into	  this,	  but	  only	  marginally…	  it	   is	  not	  political	  campaigning,	  but	  campaigning	  for	  the	  Palestinian	  national	  cause,	  as	  Mahmoud	  Abbas	  sees	  it”.180	  	   However,	   the	   manner	   in	   which	   the	   program	   was	   designed	   and	   handled	  clearly	  contradicts	  these	  specious	  claims.	  	  The	  money	  was	  spent	  by	  a	  department	  at	  USAID	  called	   the	  Office	  of	  Transition	   initiatives,	  which	   focuses	  on	  providing	  aid	   in	  order	   to	   stabilize	   new	   democracies	   during	   political	   transition	   periods	   such	   as	  elections.	  	  A	  Congressional	  Research	  Service	  report	  on	  OTI	  from	  2009	  states	  on	  the	  very	  first	  page	  that:	  	  “unlike	   its	   counterparts	   at	   USAID,	   its	   mission	   is	   neither	   humanitarian	   nor	  development-­‐oriented.	  	  OTI’s	  activities	  are	  overtly	  political,	  based	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  in	  the	  midst	   of	   political	   crisis	   and	   stability	   abroad	   there	   are	   local	   agents	   of	   changes	  whose	   efforts,	  when	   supported	   by	   timely	   and	   creative	   U.S.	   assistance,	   can	   tip	   the	  balance	  toward	  peaceful	  and	  democratic	  outcomes	  that	  advance	  U.S.	   foreign	  policy	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objectives”181	  	  Breaking	  with	  standard	  USAID	  procedure,	  most	  projects	  did	  not	  bear	  an	  American	  logo	   in	   order	   to	   ensure	   that	   credit	   accrued	   to	   the	   Palestinian	   Authority	   for	   the	  projects.	   	   The	   program	  was	   first	   contracted	   to	   a	  Washington	   firm	   that	   frequently	  partners	  with	  USAID,	  but	  then	  that	  group	  contracted	  it	  out	  to	  a	  company	  that	  had	  no	  experience	  with	  development	  assistance	  and	  had	  never	  before	  worked	  with	  USAID.	  	  The	  president	  of	   that	   firm,	  Amjad	  Atallah,	  said	  that	  he	  refused	  to	  be	   involved	  with	  the	  project	   until	   his	   partners	   agreed	   that	   it	  would	  be	   closely	   coordinated	  with	   an	  official	   in	   President	   Abbas’s	   office.182	   	   What	   the	  Washington	   Post	   report	   did	   not	  disclose	  was	   that	  Atallah,	   a	   prominent	   think	   tank	   analyst,	   had	   also	  been	   a	   former	  negotiator	  for	  the	  Palestinian	  Authority	  and	  only	  recently	  had	  served	  as	  an	  advisor	  to	  Mahmoud	  Abbas.183	  	   A	   progress	   report	   discussing	   the	   program’s	   implementation	   strategy	   that	  was	   released	   to	   the	   Washington	   Post	   stated	   that	   the	   plan	   was	   to	   have	   “events	  running	  every	  day	  of	   the	   coming	  week,	  beginning	  13	   January,	   such	   that	   there	   is	   a	  constant	   stream	   of	   announcements…	   in	   the	   critical	   week	   before	   the	   elections”.184	  	  Newspapers	   in	   the	   territories	  bore	  up	   to	   three	   ads	  on	   the	   same	  page	  highlighting	  various	  projects	  connected	  with	  the	  American	  OTI	  program.	  	  A	  consultancy	  hired	  to	  run	  these	  ads	  explained	  “why	  so	  many	  ads	  at	  the	  same	  time?...	  because	  we	  are	  in	  a	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very	  sensitive	   time,	   in	   the	  elections.	   	  That’s	  why	  now”.185	   	  A	   follow-­‐up	  analysis	  by	  the	  New	  York	  Times	   also	   found	   that	   geographic	   considerations	  were	   also	   given	   to	  how	   the	   funds	   were	   allocated:	   “the	   government	   had	   done	   a	   detailed	   political	  analysis	   to	   try	   to	   focus	   on	   constituencies	   where	   Hamas	   was	   doing	   well”	   in	  distributing	  the	  aid.186	  	  Did	  the	  Policy	  Succeed?	  	   No.	  	  Not	  only	  did	  Abbas’s	  party	  go	  down	  in	  a	  crushing	  defeat	  to	  Hamas	  during	  the	   2006	   PLC	   elections,	   but	   it	   is	   not	   clear	   that	   American	   support	   really	   gave	  Abu	  Mazen	  much	  of	  a	  boost	  at	  all.	  	  Although	  mass	  support	  for	  suicide	  bombings	  dropped	  and	  the	  public	  backed	  his	  call	  for	  a	  tahdiya,	  whereby	  armed	  groups	  would	  suspend	  their	  attacks	  against	  Israel,	  a	  whopping	  84%	  of	  the	  Palestinian	  public	  concluded	  that	  Gaza	  disengagement	  was	  a	  victory	  for	  armed	  resistance.187	  	  Fatah’s	  appeal	  was	  also	  diminished	  by	  Abu	  Mazen’s	  inability	  to	  deliver	  progress	  on	  the	  peace	  process	  or	  to	  root	   out	   corruption	   and	   provide	   law	   and	   order.188	   	   In	   many	   of	   the	   ways	   that	  mattered	  most	   to	  Abbas	  politically,	   the	  United	  States	  was	  not	  able	   to	  provide	  him	  support.	   	   Further,	   his	   requests	   that	   the	   U.S.	   turned	   down	  most	   likely	  would	   have	  been	  useful	  capacity-­‐	  and	  confidence-­‐building	  measures	  for	  the	  getting	  a	  meaningful	  peace	  process	  moving	  again.	   	  Thus,	  Washington’s	  efforts	   failed	   in	  both	  the	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and	   broader	   senses,	   failing	   to	   bolster	   Abbas	   and	   failing	   to	   advance	   the	   cause	   of	  peace.	  
<Sub-­Case	  1:	  Backing	  President	  Abbas>	  	   Abu	  Mazen’s	   first	  visit	   to	   the	  White	  House	   in	  2005	  seemed	   to	  put	  him	   in	  a	  positive	  state	  of	  mind.	  	  A	  consultant	  to	  the	  PA	  said	  that	  Abbas’s	  advisors	  were	  “not	  only	   pleased	   but	   surprised	   at	   how	   [well]	   it	   went”189	   	   However,	   the	   support	   he	  received	  was	  actually	  of	  somewhat	  limited	  value.	  	  Daniel	  Kurtzer	  and	  Scott	  Lasensky	  explain	  that:	  	  “the	  $20	  million	  promised	  during	  Abu	  Mazen’s	  2005	  visit	   to	  Washington,	   [sic]	  had	  little	   effect	   on	   his	   standing.	   	   Other	   issues,	   such	   as	   prisoner	   releases,	   lifting	   travel	  restrictions,	   and	   settlement	   expansion,	   all	   of	   which	   Abu	   Mazen	   had	   identified	   as	  being	  of	  great	  importance,	  did	  not	  receive	  much	  U.S.	  attention,	  even	  though	  progress	  in	   these	   areas	   would	   have	   done	   much	   more	   to	   bolster	   the	   post-­‐Arafat	  leadership”.190	  	   The	  second	  visit	  was	  less	  satisfying,	  however.	  	  There	  were	  limited	  results	  in	  terms	  of	  deliverables,	  and	  the	  president	  made	  a	  gaffe	  during	  the	  visit	  that	  seemed	  to	  confirm	   the	   Palestinians’	  worst	   fears	   that	   a	   real	   political	   process	   addressing	   final	  status	  issues	  might	  not	  follow	  Israel’s	  disengagement	  from	  Gaza.	  	  When	  pressed	  by	  a	  reporter	  about	  whether	  	  he	  still	  envisioned	  a	  Palestinian	  state	  within	  his	  presidency,	  Bush	  backtracked,	  stating	  that	  “I’d	  like	  to	  see	  two	  states.	  	  And	  if	  it	  happens	  before	  I	  get	  out	  of	  office,	  I’ll	  be	  there	  to	  witness	  the	  ceremony.	  	  And	  if	  it	  doesn’t,	  we	  will	  work	  hard	   to	   lay	   that	   foundation”.191	   	  Abbas	  was	   forced	   to	  do	  damage	   control,	   insisting	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that	   Bush’s	   off-­‐the-­‐cuff	   statement	   did	   not	   represent	   his	   true	   beliefs	   and	   that	   a	  Palestinian	  state	  could	  still	  be	  achieved	  in	  the	  next	  three	  years.192	  	   Just	  prior	  to	  Israel’s	  unilateral	  disengagement,	  the	  Christian	  Science	  Monitor	  wrote	   an	   editorial	   in	   which	   it	   expressed	   concern	   that	   “Abbas	   needs	   backup”	   and	  urged	   the	   secretary	   of	   state	   to	   use	   her	   upcoming	   visit	   to	   the	   region	   to	   reassure	  Palestinians	  that	  “there’s	  a	  ‘day	  after’	  plan	  for	  them	  post-­‐pullout	  and	  that	  final	  status	  talks	  are	  not	  far	  off”.193	  	  However,	  the	  main	  focus	  of	  her	  trip	  was	  on	  helping	  Sharon	  carry	   out	   his	   plan	   with	   a	   minimum	   of	   settler	   violence	   against	   the	   IDF	   and	  maintaining	  the	  status	  quo	  on	  the	  Palestinian	  side.194	  	  The	  United	  States	  did	  little	  to	  help	  Abbas	  convey	  that	  he	  had	  played	  a	  measurable	  role	  in	  producing	  Gaza	  for	  the	  Palestinians.	  	  Kurtzer	  et.	  al.	  conclude	  that	  “the	  effort	  to	  coordinate	  the	  withdrawal	  –	  once	  Arafat	  was	  out	  and	  Abbas	  was	  in,	  was	  never	  adequate.	  Without visible, effective 
steps at coordination, there was no way to empower Abbas; this left Hamas able to argue 
that its resistance, not Abbas’s diplomacy, forced Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza”.195 
 Despite insisting of Abbas that he forcible dismantle terrorist groups and collect 
their weapons, the United States offer him little in the way of concrete assistance for 
transforming his security environment.  The Ward mission, a general appointed by the 
U.S. administration to facilitate Palestinian security sector reform, was a joke.  He came 
with no physical assistance for the Palestinians, was not authorized to mediate between 
Israel and the PA over disengagement, and was given little direction or support from 
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Bush and Rice.  According to Glenn Kessler, even Rice’s number two at the State 
Department, Robert Zoellick, said he “didn’t think the effort was real – that Rice, having 
announced the appointment, was just letting it meander inconclusively”.196 	   Abbas	   explained	   on	   one	   of	   his	   White	   House	   visits	   that	   he	   really	   wanted	  American	   help	   before	   he	   felt	   capable	   of	   making	   gains	   on	   the	   security	   situation.	  	  Kessler	  says	  that	  	  “while	  words	  and	  money	  were	  nice,	  Abbas	  wanted	  bullets	  and	  rifles.	  	  The	  American	  and	  Israelis	  demanded	  Abbas	  confront	  Hamas,	  but	  the	  Israelis	  blocked	  the	  transfer	  of	   rifles,	   fearing	   the	   weapons	   would	   be	   turned	   on	   them	   if	   there	   was	   another	  outbreak	  of	  violence.	  	  Abbas	  called	  [General]	  Ward	  and	  [Assistant	  Secretary	  of	  Near	  Eastern	   Affairs]	   Welch,	   and	   pleaded	   that	   the	   Palestinian	   Authority	   be	   given	  something	  that	  would	  given	  him	  the	  upper	  hand”.197	  	  But	  Welch’s	   response	   to	   his	   request	   was	   that	   instead	   of	   pursuing	   a	   tahdiya	   with	  Hamas	  and	  other	   Islamist	  groups,	   “your	   job	   is	   to	   shoot	   them	  –	   the	  more	  dead	   the	  better”.198	  Kessler	   claims	   that	   Rice	   dismissed	   Abbas’s	   complaints	   on	   security	   sector	  support	   because	   she	   felt	   that	   “Abbas	   never	   had	   the	   will	   to	   act.	   	   You	   don’t	   get	  something	  for	  nothing”.199	  	  However,	  given	  Abbas’s	  weakness	  relative	  to	  the	  armed	  groups,	   it	   may	   have	   been	   unrealistic	   to	   expect	   him	   to	   take	   kinetic	   action	   against	  armed	  terrorists	  during	  a	  time	  in	  which	  he	  could	  not	  yet	  control	  even	  Fatah’s	  own	  militia,	  the	  Al-­‐Aqsa	  Martyr’s	  Brigade.200	  	  He	  made	  some	  symbolic	  troop	  deployments	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and	  negotiated	  a	  cessation	  of	  hostilities	  from	  Hamas,	  but	  he	  did	  not	  attack	  them.	  	   Nor	  was	  Abbas	  able	  to	  demonstrate	  economic	  growth	  in	  the	  Gaza	  Strip.	  	  The	  Quartet’s	   envoy	   for	   coordinating	   economic	   issues	   surrounding	   disengagement,	  James	  Wolfensohn,	   was	   only	   appointed	   two	  months	   before	   the	   Israeli	   evacuation	  despite	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   United	   States	   had	   known	   about	   Sharon’s	   intentions	   for	  roughly	   a	   year	   and	   a	   half.201	   	   He	   complained	   bitterly	   that	   U.S.	   officials	   were	   not	  giving	  him	  backup	  or	  involving	  him	  in	  their	  diplomatic	  efforts	  when	  in	  the	  region.202	  Although	  Rice	  devoted	  serious	  diplomatic	  capital	  to	  achieving	  the	  Agreement	  on	  Movement	  and	  Access	  in	  late	  2005,	  the	  results	  she	  had	  achieved	  fell	  apart	  even	  before	   the	  PLC	   election.	   	   The	  Gaza	   crossing	   point	   at	  Rafah	   stayed	   open	   to	   certain	  kinds	  of	  traffic	  but	  not	  others.	  	  The	  Karni	  crossing	  was	  closed	  until	  further	  notice	  in	  mid-­‐January	  by	  the	  IDF	  even	  though	  the	  Israeli	  government	  had	  pledged	  to	  keep	  it	  open	  on	  “an	  urgent	  basis”	  as	  part	  of	  the	  AMA.	  	  No	  West	  Bank-­‐Gaza	  safe	  passage	  was	  opened	  as	  had	  been	  pledged,	  and	  Gaza	  farmers	  were	  infuriated	  because	  they	  could	  not	   get	   their	   produce	   to	   market	   before	   it	   rotted.	   	   In	   shorts,	   the	   siege	   of	   Gaza	  continued,	  and	  the	  AMA	  was	  shown	  to	  be	  hollow.203	   	  Glenn	  Kessler	  concludes	  that	  this	   outcome	   was	   partly	   attributable	   to	   weak	   follow-­‐up	   from	   Rice	   and	   that	   “the	  stumbling	   implementation	   of	   the	   Rafah	   agreement	   would	   soon	   influence	   the	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Palestinian	  elections”.204	  
<Sub-­Case	  2:	  Through	  the	  PLC	  Elections>	  	   In	  retrospect,	  it	  probably	  would	  have	  been	  advisable	  for	  Washington	  to	  urge	  Abbas	   to	   either	   call	   of	   the	   2006	   PLC	   elections	   or	   to	   require	   that	   Hamas	   disarm	  before	  being	  allow	  to	  participate	  in	  Palestinian	  Authority	  elections.	   	  Now	  that	  they	  have	  been	  admitted	  to	  electoral	  politics,	  that	  opportunity	  and	  the	  leverage	  it	  would	  have	  offered	  are	  no	  longer	  available.	  	  However,	  given	  how	  firm	  Mahmoud	  Abbas	  was	  that	  letting	  Hamas	  participate	  in	  elections	  was	  essential	  to	  his	  political	  program,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  fault	  the	  Bush	  administration	  for	  deferring	  to	  his	  personal	  appeal.	  	  As	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Bill	  Clinton’s	  tendency	  to	  grant	  Ehud	  Barak’s	  requests	  for	  LSI	  even	  when	  U.S.	   officials	   doubted	   his	   plans	  would	   actually	   succeed,	   it	   seems	   to	   be	   difficult	   to	  bolster	  would-­‐be	  peacemakers	  when	  they	  themselves	  have	  faulty	  political	  instincts.	  	   One	  of	  the	  main	  reasons	  Fatah	  fell	  short	  at	  the	  polls	  had	  to	  do	  with	  something	  that	  was	  beyond	  the	  control	  of	  the	  United	  States:	  corruption	  and	  internal	  rivalries.	  	  Indeed,	  Abbas	  had	  difficulty	   carrying	  out	  Fatah	  primaries	   to	  advance	  his	  elections	  strategy	  because	   frustrated	  stakeholders	   lashed	  out	   in	  protest.	   	  Politicians	   formed	  rival	   lists	   and	   gunmen	   stormed	   polling	   stations	   demanding	   broader	   economic	   or	  political	   patronage,	   and	  Abbas	  was	   forced	   to	   call	   the	  primaries	   off.205	   	   Instead,	   he	  ignored	  glaring	  problems	  with	  Fatah’s	  appointed	  party	  list	  and	  did	  little	  to	  dissuade	  the	   losers	   from	   splitting	   the	   party’s	   district-­‐level	   votes	   by	   running	   as	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independents.206	   	   Funding	   for	   security	   sector	   reform	   might	   have	   mitigated	   this	  pressure,	   along	   with	   substantial	   progress	   on	   the	   peace	   process	   to	   soften	  recriminations	   against	   Abbas,	   but	   this	   was	   mainly	   a	   housecleaning	   issue	   beyond	  Washington’s	  sphere	  of	  influence.	  	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   America’s	   last-­‐minute,	   election-­‐oriented	   development	  projects,	  while	   comparatively	  massive	   compared	   to	   the	   parties’	   electoral	   budgets,	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  have	  made	  a	  major	  difference	  in	  the	  election	  outcome.	   	  The	  money	  spent	  on	  development	  projects	  was	  not	  directly	  allocated	   to	  electoral	  purposes,	   in	  spite	  of	  the	  high	  rate	  of	  spending	  on	  advertisements	  to	  publicize	  the	  projects.	   	  Nor	  did	  municipal	   targeting	   toward	  areas	  where	  Hamas	  was	   already	   trending	  popular	  seem	  to	  work,	  as	  the	  New	  York	  Times	  concluded	  that	  “the	  projects	  had	  little	  or	  no	  impact	  on	  municipal	  voting,	  where	  Hamas	  did	  very	  well”.207	   	  Nor	  did	  Abbas’s	  team	  make	  much	   use	   of	   the	   new	  American	  media	   centers	   or	   take	   Rice’s	  media	   advisor	  very	   seriously,	   since	   he	   seemed	   to	   have	   a	   weak	   grasp	   of	   the	   issues	   they	   were	  confronting.208	  	   Overall,	   the	  main	  reason	  why	  American	  support	  was	  so	  marginal,	  however,	  was	  that	  it	  never	  gave	  him	  the	  kind	  of	  diplomatic	  backing	  that	  would	  have	  offset	  his	  internal	  power	  struggles	  by	  enabling	  him	  to	  claim	  he	  had	  delivered	  from	  the	  United	  States	   and	   Israel	   on	   his	   biggest	   external	   agenda	   items.	   	   Ali	   Jarbawi	   and	   Wendy	  Pearlman	  explain	  his	  predicament	  as	  follows:	  	  “Abbas…	   looked	   for	   three	   badly	   needed	   kinds	   of	   cooperation	   from	   Israel	   and	   the	  United	   States:	   conciliatory	   gestures	   such	   as	   lifting	   checkpoints	   and	   releasing	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prisoners,	  a	  resumption	  of	  genuine	  negotiations	  toward	  a	  political	  settlement;	  and	  financial	  assistance	  to	  the	  PA…	  for	  carrying	  out	  a	  sweeping	  reform	  of	  the	  PA	  security	  sector,	   which	   would	   hinge	   on	   financially	   enticing	   senior	   officials	   to	   retire	   and	  intifada	  fighters	  to	  lay	  down	  their	  weapons”.209	  	  However,	  they	  conclude	  that:	  	  “Abbas’s	  hopes	   in	  each	  area	  went	  unfilled	   [sic].	   	   Israel	   removed	  some	  checkpoints	  but	  put	  others	  in	  place	  and	  released	  a	  fraction	  of	  Palestinian	  prisoners	  but	  detained	  far	   more	   new	   ones.	   	   Israel	   evacuated	   some	   8,000	   settlers	   in	   its	   unilateral	  disengagement	   from	  Gaza	  but	  moved	   forward	  with	  plans	   to	   confiscate	  Palestinian	  land	  and	  expand	  other	  settlements	  in	  the	  West	  Bank.	  	  Meanwhile,	  international	  aid	  to	  the	  PA	  fell	  short	  of	  its	  needs”.210	  	  	   These	  arguments	  are	  by	  and	  large	  valid.	  	  Despite	  providing	  detailed	  pledges	  to	   the	   United	   States	   in	   2004	   to	   contain	   various	   types	   of	   settlement	   activity,	   the	  Israeli	  government	  violated	  many	  of	  these	  commitments	  in	  this	  period.	  	  Indeed,	  the	  Israeli	  government	  had	  not	  evacuated	  a	  single	  major	  unauthorized	  outpost,	  and	  new	  settlements	  and	  expansions	  of	  existing	  settlements	  were	  both	  being	  built,	  even	  with	  state	  services,	   just	  without	   formal	  authorization.211	   	   Israel	  had	  released	  about	  400	  prisoners	   as	   part	   of	   a	   goodwill	   gesture	   that	   June,	   but	   Abbas	   had	   expected	  more.	  	  They	   left	   their	   meeting	   with	   Sharon	   that	   month	   “extremely	   depressed”	   at	   the	  negligible	  level	  of	  cooperation	  that	  emerged.212	  	  Aaron	  David	  Miller	  argues	  that	  the	  United	  States	  “never	  even	  tried”	  in	  2005	  to	  reinvigorate	  negotiating	  process	  based	  on	   the	  Road	  Map	  and	   that	   therefore	   “we	  and	  Sharon	  saw	  our	  expectations	  of	  Abu	  Mazen	  fulfilled”.213	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   Dennis	   Ross	   agrees	   that	   the	   U.S.	   failed	   to	   meet	   Abbas’s	   political	   needs,	  helping	  him	  at	   “showing	   that	  his	  way	  –	   the	  way	  of	  nonviolence	  –	  paid	  off”.214	   	  He	  argues	  that	  Abu	  Mazen	  	  	  “needed	   the	   financing	   to	   make	   [his	   plans]	   possible.	   	   Donor	   conferences	   were	  organized…	  but	  the	  efforts	  produced	  pledges	  that	  were	  very	  slow	  to	  be	  honor.	  	  Here	  again	   someone	  needed	   to	   spearhead	   the	  effort…	  unfortunately,	   the	  administration	  did	  very	  little.	   	   It	  approached	  the	  Saudis	  and	  others	  quietly	  but	  never	  pushed	  with	  any	  insistence	  or	  specificity”.215	  	  Ross	   explains	   that	   Abbas	   had	   to	   be	   seen	   delivering	   on	   economic	   growth	   through	  freedom	   of	  movement,	   getting	   Israel	   to	   turn	   negotiate	  with	   him	   over	  withdrawal	  from	  Gaza,	  and	  the	  stabilization	  of	  Gaza	  after	   the	   Israeli	  withdrawal.	   	  However,	  he	  concludes	  that	  “on	  all	  three	  measures,	  our	  efforts	  were	  too	  little	  and	  too	  late.	  	  This	  is	  not	  to	  excuse	  Abu	  Mazen,	  who	  did	  very	  little	  to	  help…	  but	  we	  had	  the	  means	  to	  do	  much	  more	  than	  we	  did”.216	  	  
Coding	  the	  Observable	  Implications	  
1.	  Perceptions	  of	  Sender	  Interests:	  	   The	  four	  theories	  tested	  by	  this	  dissertation	  offer	  divergent	  predictions	  with	  regard	   to	   perceptions	   of	   sender	   interests.	   	   National	   interests	   theory	   (Theory	   #1)	  expects	  that	  LSI	  should	  occur	  directly	  in	  accordance	  with	  objective,	  unitary	  interests	  of	   the	  potential	   sender	   state.	   	  The	   lobby-­‐legislative	  approach	   (Theory	  #2)	  expects	  that	  LSI	  should	  not	  occur	  often	  in	  the	  Palestine	  dyad	  because	  beliefs	  of	  the	  pro-­‐Israel	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community	   tend	   to	   believe	   that	   Palestinian	   moderates	   are	   not	   in	   fact	   moderate	  enough.	  	  The	  bureaucratic	  politics	  approach	  (Theory	  #3)	  expects	  LSI	  to	  be	  frequent	  in	   U.S.	   policy	   toward	   the	   Palestinians	   because	   working-­‐level	   officials	   tend	   to	   be	  highly	   interested	   in	   supporting	   Palestinian	   moderates.	   	   And	   leadership	   theory	  (Theory	  #4)	  expects	  that	  variation	  in	  LSI	  occurrence	  should	  be	  highly	  subject	  to	  the	  subjective	   beliefs	   that	   leaders	   in	   the	   sender	   state	   hold	   about	   their	   political	  counterparts	  abroad.	  	   Overall,	  the	  high	  levels	  of	  American	  LSI	  during	  this	  period	  seem	  incongruent	  with	  the	  lobby-­‐legislative	  approach.	   	  Indeed,	  AIPAC	  officials	  welcomed	  the	  election	  of	  Mahmoud	  Abbas	  but	  immediately	  laid	  out	  a	  list	  of	  immediate	  steps	  he	  had	  to	  take	  in	  order	  to	  be	  a	  suitable	  Palestinian	  partner.217	  	  Similarly,	  House	  Majority	  Whip	  Roy	  Blunt	   cautioned	   that	   Abbas	   “must	   now	   be	   prepared	   to	  make	   serious	   and	   difficult	  decisions	  following	  the	  end	  of	  the	  campaign”.218	  	   Although	   the	   occurrence	   of	   LSI	   would	   have	   been	   consonant	   with	   the	  bureaucratic	  approach,	  the	  preferences	  of	  these	  officials	  rarely	  had	  much	  impact	  on	  actual	  policy	  outcomes	  during	  this	  period.	  	  The	  administration	  delegated	  extensively	  to	   envoys	  on	   the	   ground,	   including	  General	  William	  Ward	  and	   James	  Wolfensohn,	  but	  neither	  of	  these	  individuals	  were	  given	  much	  authority	  to	  carry	  out	  their	  briefs.	  	  USAID	   projects	   played	   an	   important	   role	   in	   American	   efforts	   toward	   the	   PA,	   but	  these	  were	  a	  result	  of	  administration	  preferences,	  not	  a	  driver	  of	  them.	  	  Rice’s	  move	  to	   the	   State	   Department	   had	   increased	   the	   agency’s	   cachet	   within	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
217 “Election of Mahmoud Abbas Presents Opportunity Says AIPAC,” U.S. Newswire, January 10, 2005. 
218 “House Majority Whip Roy Blunt Statement on Today’s Palestinian Election,” U.S. Newswire, January 
9, 2005. 
	   732	  
administration,	   but	   its	   influence	   on	   the	   policy	   process	   was	   decidedly	   at	   Rice’s	  direction,	   not	   from	   any	   sort	   of	   impulse	   from	   farther	   down	   in	   the	   organization.	  	  Otherwise,	   one	  might	  have	   expected	   stronger	  pressure	   for	   Israeli	   concessions,	   for	  accepting	   Abu	   Mazen’s	   strategy	   of	   containing	   Hamas	   politically	   rather	   than	  militarily,	  and	  for	  restarting	  a	  substantive	  negotiating	  process	  between	  the	  parties,	  since	  the	  Near	  Eastern	  Affairs	  bureau	  tends	  to	  hold	  these	  sorts	  of	  views.	  	  However,	  Rice’s	  choice	  to	  head	  the	  bureau,	  C.	  David	  Welch,	  though	  not	  a	  believer	  in	  the	  2003	  Iraq	  War,	   was	   closely	   identified	   with	   the	   administration’s	   approach	   to	   the	   Arab-­‐Israeli	   conflict,	   and	   strongly	   rejected	   Abbas’s	   desire	   to	   cohabitate	   with	   the	  Islamists.219	  	   Meanwhile,	   the	   political	   understanding	   and	   counterpart	   assessments	   of	  administration	  principals	  seem	  to	  have	  played	  a	  major	  role	  in	  shaping	  America’s	  LSI	  behavior	   during	   this	   period.	   	   Rice’s	   skepticism	   about	   Abbas	   likely	   limited	   her	  willingness	   to	   really	   go	   to	   bat	   for	   him.	   	   She	   comments	   that	   “the	   Palestinians’	  behavior	   in	   response	   [to	   disengagement]	   did	   not,	   however,	   inspire	   confidence,”	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  she	  never	  really	  helped	  position	  Abbas	  to	  impose	  law	  and	  order	  in	  the	  area.220	  	  Kessler	  expands	  that	  “from	  Rice’s	  perspective,	  nothing	  seemed	  to	  be	  happening	   except	   complaints.	   	   She	   thought	  Abbas	  was	   a	   nice	  man	  but	   ineffective,	  and	   she	   soon	   became	   frustrated	   because	   he	   seemed	   to	  make	   little	   progress.	   	   The	  United	   States	   had	   invested	   in	   him,	   she	   thought,	   and	   he	   seemed	   incapable	   of	  delivering”.221	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   Indyk	   argues	   that	   the	   decision	   to	   force	   Sharon	   and	   Abbas	   to	   allow	   PLC	  elections	   in	   2006	   to	   proceed	   as	   planned	   came	   straight	   from	   the	   president.	   	   He	  explains	   how	   the	   decision	   factored	   into	   the	   president’s	   strategic	   thinking:	  “according	   to	   two	   of	   the	   senior	   American	   officials	   who	   discussed	   the	   issue	   with	  Bush,	   the	  president	  believed	  that	   it	  would	  be	  good	  for	  Hamas	  to	  participate	   in	  the	  elections	   because	   it	   would	   make	   them	   accountable	   to	   the	   people.	   	   The	   rest	   is	  history”.222	   	   Further,	   his	   lack	   of	   attunement	   to	   Palestinian	   politics	   led	   him	   to	  misunderstand	  Abbas’s	  political	  needs	  and	  to	  speak	  off-­‐message,	  suggesting	   that	  a	  peace	  deal	  within	  his	  presidency	   seemed	  no	   longer	   feasible.	   	  When	  Karen	  Hughes	  got	   a	   delegation	   of	   Abbas	   advisors	   into	   the	  White	   House	   to	   meet	   with	   President	  Bush	   just	   three	   months	   before	   PLC	   elections,	   he	   reportedly	   asked	   them	   what	   it	  meant	  to	  be	  member	  of	  Fatah.223	  	  2.	  Perceptions	  of	  Close	  Contests	  Another	   area	  where	   the	   theories	   offer	   divergent	   predictions	   is	  whether	   or	  not	  actors	  in	  the	  sender	  state	  think	  that	  a	  close	  leadership	  contest	  is	  imminent	  in	  the	  target	  polity.	   	  Theories	  2	  and	  3	  do	  not	  speak	  clearly	   in	   this	  regard,	  but	  Theories	  1	  and	   4	   do.	   	   Leadership	   theory	   stresses	   that	   top	   officials	   in	   the	   sender	   state	   often	  misperceive	  this	  situations	  based	  upon	  their	  subjective	  beliefs,	  biases,	  and	  personal	  distractions.	  	  National	  interests	  theory	  holds	  that	  these	  personal	  factors	  should	  not	  matter.	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As	   noted	   above,	   President	   Bush	  was	   personally	   influential	   in	   deciding	   that	  elections	  should	  go	  forward	  as	  scheduled	  in	  the	  territories	  and	  that	  Hamas	  should	  be	  allowed	  to	  participate.	  	  It	  is	  quite	  likely	  that	  his	  faith	  in	  the	  moderating	  power	  of	  democracy	   and	   his	   receptiveness	   to	   Abbas’s	   arguments	   led	   him	   to	   overlook	   the	  serious	  risks	  if	  Hamas	  were	  actually	  to	  win	  the	  PLC	  elections.	  	  When	  asked	  why	  the	  United	  States	   took	   the	  approach	   it	  did	   toward	   the	  2006	  PLC	  election,	  Dennis	  Ross	  concludes	   that	   “there	   the	   Bush	   administration	   got	   caught	   up	   in	   its	   own	   belief	   in	  democracy	  promotion	  without	  thinking	  about	  the	  context...	  I	  suspect	  but	  don’t	  know	  there	  was	  such	  a	  belief	   in	  the	  self-­‐correcting	  character	  of	  elections	  that	  this	  would	  vindicate	  itself	  one	  way	  or	  another”.224	  Indeed,	  Rice	  admits	  that	  she	  astounded	  upon	  finding	  out	  that	  Hamas	  had	  won	  the	  election,	  suggesting	  soon	  after	  that	  “nobody	  saw	  it	  coming”.225	  	  This	  was	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  intelligence	  had	  suggested	  the	  result	  was	  going	  to	  be	  a	  close	  call	  and	  that	   she	   had	   received	  warnings	   from	  both	   Palestinian	   and	   Israeli	   interlocutors.226	  	  Allegedly,	  Bush	  had	   long	  before	  encouraged	  Abbas	   to	  go	  ahead	  with	   the	   caveat	  of	  “don’t	  have	  an	  election	  if	  you	  think	  you	  will	  lose,”227	  suggesting	  that	  he	  never	  would	  have	  discouraged	  efforts	   to	  delay	   the	  vote	   if	  he	  had	   recognized	   that	   the	   results	  of	  Palestinian	   elections	   might	   actually	   be	   competitive.	   	   Furthermore,	   his	   intense	  preoccupation	  with	  Iraq	  during	  2005	  may	  help	  explain	  why	  American	  involvement	  in	  Palestinian	  politics	  was	  relatively	  weak	  on	  follow-­‐through.	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  3.	  Patterns	  of	  Domestic	  Debate:	  	   Leadership	   theory	   holds	   that	   practitioners	   of	   LSI	   face	   strong	   incentives	   to	  keep	   other	   domestic	   actors	   (Congress,	   lobbyists,	   and	   working-­‐level	   executive	  officials)	   in	   the	  dark	  about	   their	   true	   intentions	   and	   to	   avoid	   formal	  procedure	   in	  favor	   of	   unusual	   deliberative	   back	   channels.	   	   Meanwhile,	   Theories	   2	   and	   3	   argue	  that	   these	  domestic	   structural	   forces	   should	  be	   influential	   and	   included	  when	  U.S.	  officials	  set	  out	  to	  undertake	  leadership	  selection	  intervention	  abroad.	  	   The	  forms	  that	  gestures	  of	  LSI	  took	  in	  this	  episode	  were	  highly	  personalized	  according	   to	   the	   role	   of	   top	  American	  officials.	   	  Abbas’s	   visits	   to	   the	  White	  House	  became	  key	   junctures	   for	   affecting	  Palestinian	   internal	  politics,	   and	  Bush	   lavished	  praise	  upon	  him	  as	  a	  man	  of	  courage	  and	  a	  promoter	  of	  peace.	  	  	  America’s	  push	  for	  the	   initial	   Agreement	   on	   Movement	   and	   Access	   was	   highly	   identified	   with	   the	  person	  of	  Condoleezza	  Rice.	  	  When	  a	  key	  U.S.	  official	  went	  over	  to	  advise	  Abbas	  on	  his	   election	   message,	   he	   was	   Rice’s	   personal	   media	   advisor.	   	   When	   the	  administration	   gave	   funds	   to	   Palestinians	   in	   advance	   of	   the	   PLC	   vote,	   it	   was	  subcontracted	   to	   a	   former	   Abbas	   advisor	   and	   coordinated	   by	   him	   with	   Abbas’s	  personal	  chief	  of	  staff.	  	   This	  dynamic	   fits	   strongly	  with	   the	  expectations	  of	   leadership	   theory.	   	  One	  notable	  exception	   is	   that	  members	  of	  Congress	  –	  and,	  even,	   the	  pro-­‐Israel	   lobby	  –	  were	  occasionally	  informed	  about	  the	  administration’s	  intentions	  to	  provide	  packets	  of	  aid	  to	  the	  Palestinian	  Authority	  in	  support	  of	  Abbas.	  	  This	  exception	  is	  likely	  due	  to	  the	  unique	  statutory	  authority	  that	  Congress	  maintains	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  power	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of	  the	  purse.	  	  However,	  the	  administration	  typically	  got	  its	  way	  on	  PA	  aid	  during	  this	  period,	  even	  if	  consultations	  were	  sometimes	  exhausting.228	  Thus,	  Congressional	  influence	  on	  aid	  issues	  during	  this	  period	  tended	  not	  to	  be	  a	  matter	  of	  whether	  or	  not	   aid	  would	  get	   granted	  but	   rather	   a	   stakeholder	   for	  shaping	  its	  modalities	  somewhat,	  requiring	  greater	  measures	  for	  transparency	  and	  accountability.	   	   For	   instance,	   a	   State	   Department	   spokesperson	   remarked	   that	  American	  aid	   to	   the	  PA	   in	   late	  2004	  would	   likely	  be	  approved	  by	  Congress	   in	   the	  end,	   just	   subject	   to	   certain	   accountability	   requirements.229	   	   The	   administration	  engaged	   in	   extensive	   negotiations	  with	   the	   Hill	   before	   announcing	   $50	  million	   in	  direct,	   unrestricted	   aid	   to	   the	   PA	   in	   May	   of	   2005,	   but	   the	   main	   result	   of	   those	  negotiations	  was	   that	   the	  money	  would	  be	  handled	   in	  a	  special	  account	  under	   the	  supervision	   of	   Salam	   Fayyad	   to	   ensure	   Congress	   was	   satisfied	   with	   how	   it	   was	  administered.230	   	   This	   fits	   with	   the	   findings	   of	   Scott	   Lasensky,	   who	   argued	   that	  Congress’s	  impact	  on	  American	  aid	  to	  the	  Palestinian	  Authority	  in	  the	  1990s	  mainly	  affect	  the	  modalities	  of	  that	  aid,	  not	  whether	  or	  not	  it	  would	  provided.231	  	  4.	  Cycles	  of	  Domestic	  Power:	  	   The	  sender	  state’s	  political	  calendar	  offers	  another	  avenue	  for	  distinguishing	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between	   the	   causal	   importance	   of	   the	   various	   competing	   theories.	   	   Theory	   #2	  expects	   that	   lobbyists	   and	   members	   of	   Congress	   should	   be	   especially	   influential	  during	  periods	  of	  divided	  government	  or	   in	   the	   lead-­‐up	  to	  American	  elections	  and	  thus	   that	   LSI	   should	   be	   rarer	   during	   these	   periods.	   	   Theory	   #3	   predicts	   that	   LSI	  should	   be	   extremely	   frequent	   during	   the	   beginning	   of	   a	   president’s	   first	   year	   in	  office	  because	  bureaucrats	  should	  be	  especially	  influential	  over	  national	  policy	  then.	  	   Broadly	   speaking,	   the	   general	   timing	   of	   American	   LSI	   fits	  with	   a	   variety	   of	  different	   theories	   in	   this	   regard.	   	   The	   U.S.	   effort	   to	   bolster	   Mahmoud	   Abbas	  happened	   during	   the	   first	   year	   of	   Bush’s	   new	   term	   in	   office	   and	   decreased	  somewhat	   in	   intensity	  over	   time,	  both	  of	  which	  would	   fit	  with	   the	  expectations	  of	  the	  bureaucratic	  politics	  approach.	  	  It	  cannot	  explain	  why	  Bush	  did	  not	  pursue	  LSI	  of	  this	  sort	  during	  the	   first	  year	  of	  his	  previous	  term	  in	  office,	  but	  that	   is	  beyond	  the	  scope	   of	   this	   particular	   case	   episode.	   	   Further,	   the	   fact	   that	   LSI	   was	   taking	   place	  during	  a	  non-­‐election	  year	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  during	  a	  period	  of	  united	  control	  of	  the	  federal	  government	  would	  also	  be	  consonant	  with	  Theory	  #2	  (i.e.	  the	  lobby-­‐legislative	  approach),	  as	  well	  as	  theories	  1	  and	  4.	  However,	   one	   example	   of	   fine-­‐grained	   variation	   in	   the	   power	   of	   the	   pro-­‐Israel	   lobby	   over	   time	   is	   particularly	   telling.	   	   American	   support	   for	   Abbas	   was	  substantially	  higher	  during	  his	   first	  visit	   to	   the	  White	  House	  during	  2005,	   in	  May,	  than	  it	  was	  during	  his	  second	  visit	  that	  October.	   	  However,	  his	  May	  visit	  came	  less	  than	  a	  week	  after	  AIPAC’s	  annual	  policy	  conference	  that	  year.	  	  Despite	  the	  fact	  that	  administration	  support	  for	  Abbas	  was	  notably	  unpopular	  at	  the	  event,	  Rice	  got	  up	  in	  front	  of	  the	  group’s	  full	  plenary	  of	  backers	  come	  to	  lobby	  their	  representatives	  and	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proclaimed	   that	   the	   administration	   believed	   in	   Abbas	   and	   would	   extend	   tangible	  economic	   support	   to	   help	   him	   achieve	   his	   objectives.	   	   She	   even	   reiterated	  administration	   concerns	   that	   Israel	   must	   not	   “jeopardize	   the	   true	   viability	   of	   the	  Palestinian	  state”232	   	   If	  Theory	  #2	  were	  correct,	  we	  should	  expect	  LSI	   to	  decrease,	  not	   increase	   during	   this	   period,	   as	   the	   administration	   seeks	   to	   assure	   domestic	  support	  through	  blatant	  pandering.	  	  5.	  Bureaucratic	  Freelancing:	  	   Another	   area	   in	   which	   the	   theories	   diverge	   pertains	   to	   bureaucratic	  freelancing.	   	   If	  working-­‐level	  officials	   can	  pursue	   leadership	  selection	   intervention	  without	   the	   authorization	   of	   top	   leaders,	   that	   would	   provide	   strong	   support	   for	  Theory	  #3,	   the	  bureaucratic	  approach.	   	  Theory	  #4,	  on	   the	  other	  hand,	  argues	   that	  freelancing	  should	  be	  rare	  and	  occur	  only	  in	  instances	  of	  weak	  managerial	  oversight.	  	   President	   Bush	   was	   extremely	   detached	   from	   oversight	   during	   the	   latter	  period	  of	   this	   episode.	   	  After	  Rice	  negotiated	   the	  AMA	  and	  world	   leaders	   thanked	  him	  for	  “what	  you’ve	  achieved	  for	  Palestine,”	  he	  jokingly	  asked	  Rice	  “what	  did	  I	  do	  for	   Palestine,	   and	  what	   did	   you	   agree	   to?”233	   	   Rice	   was	   generally	   quite	   active	   on	  Israeli-­‐Palestinian	   issues	   at	   this	   time,	   but	   she	   was	   notably	   disengaged	   from	   the	  Ward	  mission	   for	   security	   sector	   reform.	   	   Jim	  Wolfensohn	  was	   so	   frustrated	  with	  American	   inability	   to	   broker	   a	   solution	   for	   preserving	   Gaza’s	   greenhouses	   after	  disengagement	   that	   he	   was	   forced	   to	   give	   money	   from	   his	   own	   pocket	   and	   to	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fundraise	  from	  some	  of	  his	  wealthy	  Jewish	  friends.234	  	  	   The	  Washington	   Post’s	   exposé	   on	   last-­‐minute	   campaign	   assistance	   to	   the	  Palestinian	   Authority	   by	   OTI	   was	   the	   probably	   the	   most	   pronounced	   instance	   of	  freelancing-­‐type	  behavior	  during	  this	  period.	  	  The	  article	  never	  would	  have	  been	  so	  comprehensive	  and	  compelling	  without	  participants	  being	  willing	  to	  do	  interviews	  with	  the	  authors	  and	  share	  strategic	  documentation.	   	  One	  major	  reason	  that	   likely	  underpinned	   this	   dynamic	  was	   that	   the	   project	  was	   sub-­‐contracted	   to	   such	   a	   low	  level	  that	  the	  participants	  were	  extremely	  removed	  from	  direct	  executive	  oversight.	  	  Thus,	   although	   there	   appears	   to	   be	   some	   freelancing	   behavior	   during	   this	   period,	  the	  data	  probably	  lies	  closer	  to	  Theory	  #4	  than	  the	  bureaucratic	  approach.	  	  6.	  Consistency	  of	  Message:	  Leadership	   selection	   intervention	   tends	   to	   be	   more	   effective	   when	   the	  message	  it	  conveys	  is	  projected	  in	  a	  clear	  and	  consistent	  manner	  abroad.	  	  One	  way	  in	  which	  this	  can	  be	  undermined	  is	  if	  domestic	  actors	  such	  as	  Congress,	  lobbyists,	  or	  bureaucrats	   have	   institutional	   preferences	   that	   conflict	  with	   this	  message,	   driving	  them	   to	   emit	   contradictory	   signals.	   	   This	  would	   be	   in	   fitting	  with	   Theory	  #2	   (the	  lobby-­‐legislative	   approach)	   or	   Theory	   #3	   (the	   bureaucratic	   approach).	  	  Alternatively,	  Theory	  #4	   (the	  agency	  –based	  approach)	  predicts	   that	  LSI	  might	  be	  weakened	   due	   to	   dissention	   or	   opinion	   changes	   strictly	   among	   top	   leaders	   in	   the	  sender	  state.	  	  Theory	  #1	  (national	  interests	  theory)	  holds	  that	  messaging	  should	  not	  face	  difficulty	  being	  consistent.	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However,	  American	  messaging	  in	  this	  case	  was	  largely	  consistent.	  	  American	  support	   for	  Abu	  Mazen	  persistently	  provide	   certain	   types	  of	   advantages	   (financial	  backing,	  public	  praise)	  but	  not	  others	  (diplomatic	  backing	  on	  peace	  process	  issues).	  	  Perhaps	  U.S.	  support	  weakened	  moderately	  over	  2005,	  but	  that	  was	  largely	  on	  the	  margins.	   	   If	   so,	   it	   was	   attributable	   mainly	   to	   Rice	   and	   Bush’s	   increasing	  disappointment	  with	  Abbas,	  evidence	  fitting	  with	  Theory	  #4.	  	  Congress	  occasionally	  threatened	   to	   impede	   presidential	   requests	   for	   aid	   to	   the	   Palestinians,	   something	  that	   would	   fit	   with	   Theory	   #2.	   	   However,	   as	   noted	   above	   the	   Hill	   rarely	   actually	  foiled	  administration	  requests,	  and	  its	  influence	  was	  mainly	  felt	  in	  terms	  of	  stronger	  requirements	  for	  accountability.	  	  7.	  Suitability	  of	  Message:	  	   The	  efficacy	  of	  leadership	  selection	  intervention	  also	  seems	  to	  depend	  upon	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  message	  that	  it	  conveys	  is	  suitable	  to	  the	  political	  exigencies	  of	  the	  favored	  faction	  overseas.	  	  Theory	  #1	  expects	  that	  suitable	  messaging	  should	  be	  relatively	  unproblematic.	  	  Theories	  2	  and	  3	  anticipate	  that	  suitability	  should	  depend	  upon	  whether	  the	  institutional	  biases	  of	  domestic	  stakeholders	  favor	  the	  projection	  of	  an	  appropriate	  message.	  	  Theory	  #4	  holds	  that	  suitability	  is	  mainly	  subject	  to	  the	  subjective	  biases	  of	  leaders	  in	  the	  sender	  state.	  	  	   In	  this	  regard,	  the	  data	  provides	  the	  strongest	  support	  for	  the	  agency-­‐based	  approach.	   	   President	   Bush	   and	   Secretary	  Rice	  were	   both	   interested	   in	   supporting	  Abbas.	   	   But	   their	   belief	   that	   he	   should	   be	   expected	   to	   deliver	   immediately	   on	  security	  issues	  decreased	  their	  willingness	  to	  directly	  boost	  his	  hand	  on	  the	  ground	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against	  rival	  power	  centers.	   	  And	  their	  unwillingness	  to	  expend	  political	  capital	  on	  extracting	   Israeli	   concessions	   or	   pushing	   for	   a	   resumption	   of	   substantive	  negotiations	   (either	   on	   disengagement	   or	   on	   final	   status	   issues)	   meant	   that	   the	  types	  of	  help	  that	  the	  United	  States	  offered	  did	  little	  for	  strengthening	  his	  standing.	  Former	   Abbas	   advisor	   Diana	   Buttu	   explains	   that	   in	   2005	   “most	   of	   the	  diplomatic	  work	  that	  the	  Americans	  did	  was	  tailored	  to	  trying	  to	  prop	  up	  Abu	  Mazen	  	  as	  the	  leader…	  (basically	  from)	  as	  soon	  as	  he	  was	  elected…	  They	  were	  giving	  him	  a	  lot	  of	  oral	  support	  –	   ‘we	   like	  you’	  –	  and	  there’s	  some	   financial	  support,	  but,	  again,	  not	   the	  political	  support”.235	   	  Hanan	  Ashrawi	  elaborates	  that	  Abu	  Mazen’s	  political	  fate	  was	   impacted	  by	  his	   inability	   to	   deliver	   on	   the	   issues	   that	   really	  mattered	   to	  Palestinians:	  “I	  mean,	  okay,	  Abu	  Mazen	  has	  an	  agenda	  for	  peace,	  of	  nonviolence,	  of	  reform,	  of	  moderation.	  	  How	  did	  they	  respond	  to	  this	  in	  Israel?	  	  Did	  they	  stop	  their	  policies?	  	  Did	  they	  stop	  their	  settlement	  activities?	  	  Did	  they	  stop	  the	  wall?	  	  Did	  they	  stop	  assassinations?	  	  No,	  they	  didn’t”.236	  	  As	  Ross	  argues,	  the	  American	  support	  that	  was	  provided	  did	  not	  do	  a	  very	  good	  job	  of	  helping	  Abu	  Mazen	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  way	  of	  nonviolence	  pays	  off	  for	  Palestinian	  national	  aspirations.	  	  
Palestine,	  Case	  #5:	  Benign	  Neglect	  through	  	  West	  Bank	  First,	  2006-­‐2009	  	  	  	   The	   January	   2006	   elections	   gave	   Hamas	   a	   majority	   in	   the	   Palestinian	  Legislative	   Council	   and	   the	   political	   power	   to	   nominate	   one	   of	   its	   own	   as	   prime	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
235 Buttu, “Interview with the Author.” 
236 Ashrawi, quoted in Robert Zelnick, Israel’s Unilateralism: Beyond Gaza (Hoover Press, 2006), 68. 
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minister.	   	  The	  creation	  of	   the	  premier	  post	   in	  2003	  meant	   that	  Hamas’s	  victory	   in	  the	   legislative	   arena	   translated	   into	   an	   opportunity	   to	   challenge	   President	   Abbas,	  Fatah,	  and	  the	  PLO	  for	  control	  of	  executive	  power	  in	  the	  Palestinian	  Authority.	  	  Both	  America	   and	   the	   European	   Union	   had	   long	   designated	   Hamas	   a	   terrorist	  organization,	  and	  it	  remained	  to	  be	  seen	  how	  the	  world	  community,	  let	  alone	  Israel,	  would	  grapple	  with	  the	  emergence	  of	  Hamas	  as	  a	  political	   force	  within	  the	  PA.	   	   In	  March	  of	  2006,	  Ismail	  Haniyeh	  of	  Hamas	  was	  appointed	  prime	  minister,	  putting	  the	  ball	  in	  the	  court	  of	  other	  actors	  to	  react.	  	  
Coding	  the	  Dependent	  Variables	  (Occurrence	  and	  Efficacy)	  Did	  LSI	  Occur?	  	   Yes,	   but	   in	   stages.	   	   First,	   from	   early	   2006	   through	   the	  middle	   of	   2007,	   the	  United	  States	   tried	   to	   topple	  Hamas	   in	   the	  context	  of	  political	   intrigues	  within	   the	  PA.	   	   Then,	   once	   the	   rivalry	   between	   Hamas	   and	   Fatah	   split	   the	   PA	   into	   separate	  governing	  authorities	  in	  Gaza	  and	  the	  West	  Bank,	  the	  United	  States	  sought	  to	  build	  up	   the	  Fatah-­‐PLO	  government	  based	  out	  of	  Ramallah	  as	  part	  of	  a	  West	  Bank	  First	  strategy	   that	   culminated	   in	   the	   Annapolis	   peace	   conference	   that	   November	  	  Although	  U.S.	  efforts	  qualify	  as	  LSI	  during	  both	  periods,	  in	  many	  ways	  they	  escalated	  after	   the	   June	   2007	  Hamas	   coup	   in	   Gaza.	   	   During	   the	   first	   period,	   the	   Bush	   team	  pursued	  LSI	  via	  a	  dramatic	  disengagement	   from	  the	  effort	   to	  achieve	  a	  Palestinian	  state	   through	  the	  Middle	  East	  peace	  process.	   	   In	   the	  second	  period,	   it	  pursued	  LSI	  through	  its	  most	  concerted	  effort	  to	  invigorate	  the	  peace	  process	  to	  date.	  
<Sub-­Case	  One:	  LSI	  through	  Disengagement>	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   During	   the	   period	   from	   late	   January	   2006	   through	   June	   2007,	   the	   Bush	  administration	  definitely	  sought	  to	  influence	  internal	  Palestinian	  politics.	  	  As	  former	  Consul	   General	   in	   East	   Jerusalem,	   Jacob	   Walles,	   explains:	   “we	   were	   trying	   to	  strengthen	   people,	   strengthen	   Abu	   Mazen	   working	   through	   people	   that	   he	   had	  designated	   to	   strengthen	   his	   position”.237	   	   The	   first	   salvo	   in	   this	   effort	   was	   the	  Quartet	   conditions	   of	   January	   30th,	   just	   days	   after	   the	   PLC	   vote.	   	   Quartet	   officials	  announced	   that	   “future	   assistance	   to	   any	   new	   government	  would	   be	   reviewed	   by	  donors	   against	   that	   government’s	   commitment	   to	   the	   principles	   of	   nonviolence,	  recognition	   of	   Israel,	   and	   acceptance	   of	   previous	   agreements	   and	   obligations,	  including	   the	   Roadmap”.238	   	   Rice,	   who	   played	   a	   major	   role	   in	   crafting	   the	  declaration,	  describes	  it	  as	  “a	  direct	  shot	  at	  Hamas”.239	  Few	  within	   the	   Bush	   administration	   expected	   Hamas	  would	   actually	   fulfill	  these	  requirements,	  and	  thus	  American	  officials	  exerted	  very	  little	  effort	  in	  actually	  trying	   to	   bring	   the	   group	   along.	   	   Instead,	   the	   de	   facto	   policy	   became	   one	   of	  confrontation.	  	  Rumors	  began	  to	  surface	  that	  the	  United	  States	  was	  exploring	  “ways	  to	  destabilize	  the	  Palestinian	  government	  so	  that	  newly	  elected	  Hamas	  officials	  will	  fail	  and	  elections	  will	  be	  called	  again...	  to	  starve	  the	  Palestinian	  Authority	  of	  money	  and	   international	   connections	   to	   the	   point	   where,	   some	   months	   from	   now,	   its	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
237 Walles interview quoted in Daniel C. Kurtzer et al., The Peace Puzzle: America’s Quest for Arab-Israeli 
Peace in the Post-Cold War Era [forthcoming] (US Institute of Peace & Cornell University Presses, 2012), 
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president,	  Mahmoud	  Abbas,	  is	  compelled	  to	  call	  a	  new	  election”.240	  This	  strategy	  required	  a	  broader	  diplomatic	  effort	   to	  persuade	  U.S.	  allies	   to	  keep	  Hamas	  isolated.	  	  Washington	  sought	  to	  persuade	  the	  Europeans	  to	  stop	  direct	  aid	   to	   the	   PA	   budget,	   and	   instead	   they	   established	   a	   Temporary	   International	  Mechanism	   that	   channeled	   roughly	   half	   a	   billion	   Euros	   directly	   through	   Abbas’s	  office,	  most	   of	  which	  was	   spent	   on	   public	   services	   or	   humanitarian	   assistance.241	  	  Rice	  explains	  that	  this	  effort	  involved	  Arab	  allies	  as	  well,	  and	  that	  Egypt	  and	  Saudi	  Arabia	  both	  countries	  agreed	  to	  restructure	  their	  Palestinian	  aid	  programs	  to	  avoid	  handing	  money	  over	  Haniyeh	  government.242	  Michael	  Singh,	  senior	  director	  for	  the	  Middle	  East	  at	  the	  NSC	  toward	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Bush	  period,	  elaborates:	  “as	  opposed	  to	  saying,	  well,	  if	  you’re	  Saudi	  Arabia,	  if	  you’re	  Egypt,	   you’re	   going	   to	   support	   all	   the	   factions,	  we	  wanted	   them	   to	   say,	   no,	  you’re	   going	   to	   support	   Abbas.	   	   And	   sort	   of	   leave	   him	   to	   decide	   his	   Palestinian	  strategy...	   that’s	   something	  we	   also	   tried	   to	   do.	   	   Trying	   to	   keep	   those	   states	   from	  trying	   to	  meddle	   too	  much	   inside	  Palestinian	  politics,	  and	   that	   I	   think	  was	  also	  an	  important	  way	  to	  ensure	  support	  for	  him”.243	  	   The	  U.S.	  also	  pressured	  Abbas	  to	  dismiss	  the	  PA	  government	  led	  by	  Haniyeh,	  either	  replacing	  it	  by	  fiat	  with	  an	  emergency	  government	  of	  non-­‐Hamas	  officials	  or	  calling	   new	   elections	   entirely.	   	   David	   Rose	   writes	   in	   a	   controversial	   and	   hotly	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contested	  Vanity	  Fair	  article	  that	  when	  Secretary	  Rice	  visited	  Abbas	  in	  Ramallah	  on	  October	   4th,	   2006,	   she	   told	   him	   that	   “isolating	   Hamas	   just	   wasn’t	   working...	   and	  America	  expected	  him	  to	  dissolve	  the	  Haniyeh	  government	  as	  soon	  as	  possible	  and	  hold	  fresh	  elections”.244	  	  Allegedly,	  he	  claims	  that	  Abbas	  agreed	  to	  do	  so	  within	  a	  few	  weeks	  but	  then	  repeatedly	  stalled	   in	  carrying	  out	  this	  pledge.245	   	  However,	   former	  Abbas	  advisor	  Diana	  Buttu	  has	  since	  confirmed	  these	  portions	  of	  Rose’s	  account.246	  	   She	   also	   confirmed	   his	   claim	   that	   at	   Rice’s	   request	   a	   few	   weeks	   later	   U.S.	  Consul	  General	  Walles	  followed	  up	  with	  Abbas,	  urging	  him	  to	  move	  ahead	  with	  the	  plan.247	   	   David	   Rose	   also	   posted	   on	   the	   Vanity	   Fair	   website	   a	   copy	   of	   Walles’s	  unofficial	  notes	  for	  the	  meeting	  which	  he	  claims	  Walles	  accidentally	  left	  behind.	  	  His	  untitled	  non-­‐paper	  read	  as	  follows:	  	  “President	  Bush	  wants	   to	   support	  you...	   but	  our	  ability	   to	  help	  depends	   to	  a	  great	  extent	  on	  you.	  	  We	  can	  do	  much	  more	  if	  there	  is	  a	  PA	  government	  in	  place	  that	  fully	  and	   clearly	   accepts	   the	  Quartet	   principles...	   You	   told	   Secretary	  Rice	   you	  would	   be	  prepared	  to	  move	  ahead	  within	  two	  to	  four	  weeks	  of	  your	  meeting.	  	  We	  believe	  the	  time	  has	  come	  for	  you	  to	  move	  quickly	  and	  decisively	  to	  resolve	  the	  governmental	  crisis...	  if	  you	  agree	  to	  this	  strategy,	  we	  will	  be	  there	  to	  support	  you”.248	  	  However,	  Abbas	  never	  moved	  ahead	  as	  intended.	  	   In	   the	  meantime,	   the	   Americans	   also	   tried	   to	   build	   up	   security	   forces	   that	  were	   loyal	   to	   Fatah,	   for	   fear	   that	   Hamas’s	   new	   control	   over	   the	   interior	  ministry	  would	  enable	  it	  to	  outcompete	  Fatah	  and	  impose	  its	  predominance	  by	  force.	   	  Rose	  claims	  that	  the	  Americans	  pushed	  Mohammed	  Dahlan	  and	  other	  Palestinian	  security	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chiefs	  to	  launch	  a	  coup	  against	  Hamas	  and	  that	  the	  June	  2007	  Islamist	  coup	  in	  Gaza	  was	  merely	  a	  reaction	  to	  an	  American	  plan	  for	  Haniyeh’s	  forcible	  overthrow.	   	  This	  certainly	   fits	   perceptions	   on	   the	   ground.	   	   For	   instance,	   Israeli	   journalist	   Danny	  Rubenstein	   says	   that	   there	   were	   prominent	   rumors	   at	   the	   time	   among	   the	  Palestinians	  that	  Dahlan	  was	  literally	  going	  to	  invade	  Gaza	  with	  an	  American-­‐backed	  army.249	  	   However,	  Rose’s	  argument	  seems	  to	  reflect	  an	  exaggerated	  impression	  of	  U.S.	  support.	  	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  United	  States	  sought	  to	  bolster	  Dahlan’s	  Fatah	  forces	  as	  a	  means	  of	  deterring	  Hamas,250	  and	  Washington’s	  posture	  certainly	  encouraged	  these	  forces	   to	   expand	   their	   control	   in	   ways	   that	   often	   escalated	   the	   confrontation	  through	  sporadic	  clashes	  on	  the	  ground.251	  	  Furthermore,	  Rose	  is	  one	  firm	  ground	  in	  claiming	   that	   the	   Bush	   administration	   turned	   in	   late	   2006	   to	   its	   Arab	   allies	   –	  including	  Egypt,	  Jordan,	  Saudi	  Arabia,	  and	  the	  United	  Arab	  Emirates	  –	  as	  a	  means	  of	  circumventing	   Congressional	   restrictions	   against	   using	   American	   security	  assistance	   to	   provide	   Dahlan	   with	   lethal	   armaments.252	   	   This	   program	   no	   doubt	  contributed	  to	  Palestinian	  arms	  racing	  and	  exacerbated	  existing	  fears	  by	  Hamas,	  but	  there	   is	   no	   compelling	   evidence	   that	   the	   effort	   aimed	   to	   go	   beyond	  deterrence	   to	  actually	   instigate	   an	   overthrow	   of	   Haniyeh	   and	   Hamas’s	   security	   cadres.	  	  Administration	   thinking	   was	   that	   “we	   do	   need	   to	   support	   the	   development	   of	  security	  forces	  that	  are	  loyal	  to	  those	  who	  accept	  the	  Quartet	  principles	  because	  I’m	  quite	   sure	   that	   those	   who	   do	   not	   accept	   it	   will	   continue	   to	   build	   their	   security	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forces”.253	  	   One	  consequence	  of	  the	  ongoing	  street	  battles	  between	  Fatah	  and	  Hamas	  was	  that	   they	   shocked	   King	   Abdallah	   of	   Saudi	   Arabia	   into	   pushing	   hard	   for	   a	   unity	  agreement	   among	   the	   Palestinians.	   	   The	   result	   was	   the	   Mecca	   Accords,	   in	   which	  leaders	   of	   both	   factions	  pledged	   to	   support	   a	   Fatah-­‐Hamas	  unity	   government	   and	  Riyadh	  pledged	  $1	  billion	  in	  aid	  to	  the	  Palestinian	  Authority.254	  	  Rice	  was	  described	  as	  “apoplectic,”	  and	  her	  aide	  Gamal	  Helal	  blurted	  out	  in	  her	  presence	  that	  the	  Saudi	  maneuver	   was	   “a	   piece	   of	   sh-­‐t!”.255	   	   She	   says	   she	   saw	   the	   deal	   as	   a	   “devastating	  blow”.256	  Again,	   after	   Gaza,	   the	   U.S.	   continued	   efforts	   with	   its	   allies	   to	   “enable	   Abu	  Mazen	  and	  his	  supporters	   to	  reach	  a	  defined	  endgame...	   [which]	  should	  produce	  a	  PA	   government	   through	   democratic	   means	   that	   accepts	   Quartet	   principles...	  undermine	   political	   strength	   of	   Hamas	   through	   continued	   international	   pressure	  and	  steps	  that	  accrue	  domestic	  political	  credit	  to	  Abbas,	  particularly	  in	  areas	  where	  Hamas	   cannot	   deliver”	   and	   explored	   such	   possible	   solutions	   as	   “early	   elections?	  	  Collapse	   unity	   government	   by	   withdrawing	   ministers?	   	   Technocrat	   government?	  	  Referendum?”257	  	   However,	  while	  Rice	  had	  been	  trying	  to	  sustain	  a	  trilateral	  series	  of	  meetings	  between	  herself,	  Olmert,	   and	  Abbas,	   the	  Mecca	  Agreement	   threw	  a	  wrench	   in	   this	  plan.	  	  Although	  Rice	  succeeded	  in	  keeping	  the	  talks	  going,	  she	  herself	  acknowledges	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that	   Fatah’s	   reinvigorated	   cohabitation	  with	  Hamas	  made	   it	   nearly	   impossible	   for	  Olmert	   to	   engage	   in	   a	   discussion	   of	   anything	   more	   ambitious	   than	   short-­‐term	  confidence	  building	  measures.258	  	   However,	  despite	  these	  talks	  the	  general	  direction	  of	  American	  policy	  during	  this	  period	  was	   to	  pursue	  LSI	   through	  disengagement	   from	  the	  peace	  process.	   	  As	  Glenn	   Kessler	   observes,	   “the	   Hamas	   [electoral]	   victory	   brought	   the	   campaign	   to	  establish	   a	   Palestinian	   state	   to	   a	   dead	   stop.	   	   The	   Bush	   administration	   once	   again	  disengaged”.259	  
<Sub-­Case	  Two:	  LSI	  through	  Reengagement>	  	   The	   Hamas-­‐led	   coup	   in	   Gaza	   in	   2007	   paved	   the	   way	   for	   much	   greater	  American	  support	  for	  the	  Palestinian	  Authority	  leadership	  of	  Abbas	  and	  Fayyad.	  	  For	  the	   U.S.	   administration,	   this	   development	   clarified	   the	   distinction	   between	  perceived	  moderates	   and	  hardliners	   in	   Palestinian	  politics	   and	   served	   as	   a	   call	   to	  action	  lest	  Hamas	  parlay	  its	  military	  gains	  into	  full-­‐fledged	  overthrow	  of	  the	  PA.	  	  As	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  below,	  U.S.	  efforts	  at	  LSI	  were	  surprisingly	  blatant	  and	  self-­‐admitted	  during	  this	  particular	  sub-­‐case,	  due	  to	  a	  perception	  caused	  by	  the	  Gaza	  coup	  that	  Palestinian	  politics	  were	  in	  a	  state	  of	  war	  and	  were	  not	  in	  a	  state	  of	  quasi-­‐competitive	  politics	  as	  usual.	  Although	  Rice’s	  former	  advisor	  on	  the	  peace	  process,	  Robert	  Danin,	  says	  that	  the	  administration	  officials	  did	  not	  use	  the	  term,	  he	  agrees	  that	  their	  policy	  during	  this	  period	  could	  accurately	  be	  characterized	  as	  a	  “West	  Bank	  First”	  strategy,	  aiming	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to	   weaken	   Hamas	   and	   strengthen	   Fatah	   by	   making	   the	   West	   Bank	   a	   paragon	   of	  development,	  peace,	  and	  national	  progress.260	  	  Top	  Mideast	  advisor	  to	  the	  president,	  Elliott	  Abrams,	  explained	  that	  “West	  Bank	  First	  is	  inevitable	  once	  you	  are	  where	  you	  are	  with	  Gaza	  after	  the	  coup”.261	  	  President	  Bush	  explains	  his	  own	  view	  as	  follows:	  	  “We	  redirected	  our	  economic	  aid	  and	  security	  assistance	  to	  Abbas’s	  government	  in	  the	  West	  Bank	  and	  supported	  an	  Israeli	  naval	  blockade	  of	  Gaza...	  the	  people	  of	  Gaza	  would	   see	   a	   vivid	   contrast	   between	   their	   living	   conditions	   and	   those	   under	   the	  democratic	  leader	  Abbas.	  	  Over	  time,	  I	  was	  confident	  they	  would	  demand	  change”.262	  	  The	   first	   elements	   of	   this	   strategy	   involved	   embracing	   the	   new	  Palestinian	  government	   in	   the	  West	  Bank	   that	  was	  announced	  by	  President	  Abbas	  and	   led	  by	  Salam	   Fayyad	   as	   prime	   minister.	   	   Within	   days	   after	   the	   fall	   of	   Gaza	   and	   the	  appointment	  of	  this	  emergency	  government,	  Rice	  announced	  that	  	  “this	  morning	  President	  Bush	  spoke	  with	  Palestinian	  Authority	  President	  Abbas.	  	  He	  told	   him	   that	   the	   United	   States	   supports	   his	   legitimate	   decision	   to	   form	   an	  emergency	   government	   of	   responsible	   Palestinians,	   and	   he	   welcomed	   the	  appointment	   of	   Salam	   Fayyad	   as	   Prime	  Minister.	   	   The	   President	   pledged	   the	   full	  support	  of	  the	  United	  States	  for	  the	  new	  Palestinian	  Government...	  we	  are	  going	  to	  support	  President	  Abbas	  and	  what	  he	  wants	   to	  do.	   	  We’re	  going	   to	  support	  Prime	  Minister	  Fayyad”.263	  	  She	  also	  noted	  that	  the	  United	  States	  would	  restart	  direct	  assistance	  to	  the	  main	  PA	  budget	   as	   well	   as	   aid	   for	   Palestinian	   political	   institutions,	   security	   forces,	   and	  humanitarian	  needs.	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   The	  United	  States	  also	  coordinated	  its	  strategy	  with	  the	  Olmert	  government	  in	   Israel	   to	   embrace	   the	   new	   emergency	   government	   under	   Fayyad.	   	   On	  Olmert’s	  visit	   to	   the	   White	   House,	   he	   announced	   Israeli	   plans	   to	   unfreeze	   some	   PA	   tax	  revenues	  and	   to	  consider	   lifting	   roadblocks	  and	  releasing	  Palestinian	  prisoners.264	  	  He	   also	   proclaimed	   alongside	   Bush	   that	   “like	   you,	   I	   want	   to	   strengthen	   the	  moderates”	  among	  the	  Palestinians.265	  	  Bush	  echoed	  during	  the	  event	  that	  “our	  hope	  is	  that	  President	  Abbas	  and	  the	  prime	  minister	  –	  Fayyad,	  who’s	  a	  good	  fella	  –	  will	  be	  strengthened	   to	   the	   point	   where	   they	   can	   lead	   the	   Palestinians	   in	   a	   different	  direction”.266	  	  Roughly	  a	  week	  later,	  Olmert	  met	  with	  Abbas	  in	  Egypt,	  where	  the	  two	  of	   them	   announce	   plans	   to	   proceed	   with	   substantive	   negotiations	   on	   the	   peace	  process;	   Olmert	   also	   followed	   through	   on	   recent	   pledges,	   offering	   to	   release	   250	  Palestinian	  prisoners	  and	  unfreezing	  some	  PA	  tax	  revenues.267	  	   This	   effort	   eventually	   escalated	   into	   a	   full-­‐fledged	   peace	   summit	   that	  November	   at	   the	   United	   States	   Naval	   Academy	   in	   Annapolis,	  Maryland.	   	   Rice,	   the	  main	  architect	  of	  the	  meeting,	  writes	  in	  her	  memoirs	  that	  her	  intention	  was	  “sustain	  
the	   good	   guys	   by	   giving	   international	   momentum	   to	   the	   process”.268	   	   A	   former	  official	  who	  worked	  at	   the	  State	  Department	  acknowledges	   that	   “for	   sure,	   yes,	  we	  were	  trying	  to	  bolster	  both”	  sides	  with	  Annapolis.269	  	  The	  official	  elaborates	  that	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  “on	   the	   Palestinian	   side...	   when	   it	   came	   to	   bolstering	   that	   side...	   yeah	   [we	   did]	  anything	  and	  everything	  we	  could	  do...	  we	  were	  dragging	  the	  whole	  world	  into	  this	  process,	   into	   bolstering	   these	   extremely	   weak	   guys	   to	   go	   forward...	   if	   we	   were	  serious	  about	  the	  peace	  process	  moving	  forward,	  we	  had	  to	  have	  this	  sort	  of	  impact.	  	  If	  they’re	  going	  to	  succeed,	  they	  need	  to	  be	  strong”.270	  	  Michael	  Singh	  confirms	  that,	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  the	  NSC:	  	  “The	   view	   was,	   and	   the	   view	   still	   is	   today,	   that	   you	   have	   to	   give	   the	   Palestinian	  people	  hope	   that	   if	   you’re	  asking	   them	   to	  eschew	  violence	   that	   they	  have	  another	  path	   forward	   to	  achieve	   their	  aspirations,	   and	   that’s	   the	  diplomatic	   route.	   	  And	   to	  the	  extent	  guys	  like	  Abbas	  and	  Fayyad	  were	  the	  champions	  of	  that	  diplomatic	  path,	  yes,	   there	  was	  a	  desire	  to	  strengthen	  them	  and	  support	  them	  and	  to	  support	  their	  efforts	  to	  walk	  that	  diplomatic	  path”.271	  	   Bush	   also	   praised	   Abu	   Mazen	   in	   his	   remarks	   in	   the	   following	   six	   months.	  	  During	  a	  trip	  to	  the	  Israel	  and	  the	  West	  Bank	  in	  January	  of	  2008,	  he	  wrapped	  up	  his	  remarks	  by	  saying	  “Mr.	  President...	  we	  want	  to	  help	  you.	   	   I	  appreciate	  your	  vision,	  and	   I	   appreciate	  your	   courage,	   and	   I	   appreciate	  your	  hospitality”.272	   	  When	  Abbas	  visited	   the	  White	  House	   in	  April,	  Bush	  called	  him	  a	   “man	  of	  peace”	  and	  a	   “man	  of	  vision,”	  telling	  Abbas	  that	  “I	  consider	  you	  a	  friend...	   [and]	  a	  courageous	  person”.273	  	  Then,	  when	  he	  met	  with	  Abbas	  in	  Sharm	  El-­‐Sheikh	  that	  May,	  he	  was	  photographed	  holding	   hands	   with	   the	   Palestinian	   president	   and	   also	   remarked	   in	   a	   joint	   press	  availability:	  	  	  “Mr.	   President,	   thank	   you	   for	   your	   time,	   and	   thank	   you	   for	   your	   courage...	   The	  President	  and	  his	  team	  are	  committed	  to	  peace.	  	  They	  stand	  squarely	  against	  those	  who	   use	   violence	   to	   stop	   the	   peace	   process.	   	   And	   for	   that	   I	   admire	   you	   and	   your	  team,	  Mr.	  President,	  and	  I	  commit	  to	  you	  once	  again	  that	  our	  government	  will	  help	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achieve...	  two	  states	  living	  side	  by	  side	  in	  peace”.274	  	   Furthermore,	  this	  language	  was	  backed	  with	  cash.	   	  The	  U.S.	  restarted	  direct	  aid	  after	  the	  June	  of	  2007	  collapse	  of	  the	  Palestinian	  unity	  government.	  	  It	  organized	  a	  December	   2007	  donor	   conference	   in	   Paris,	  where	   the	   Palestinians	   under	  Abbas	  raised	   $7	   billion	   in	   pledges	   of	   aid	   from	   foreign	   governments	   and	   international	  organizations,	   an	   event	   Hamas	   leaders	   criticized	   as	   an	   act	   of	   war.275	   	   The	   Bush	  administration	  also	  launched	  a	  U.S.-­‐Palestinian	  Partnership,	  leveraging	  pledges	  from	  private	  businesses	  and	  foundations	  to	  provide	  $1.4	  billion	  in	  proposed	  investment	  to	   the	  PA.276	   	   It	  supported	  the	  appointment	  of	   former	  British	  Prime	  Minister	  Tony	  Blair	   as	   Quartet	   envoy	   to	   the	   Palestinians,	   who	   organized	   major	   Palestinian	  investment	   conferences	   in	   Bethlehem	   and	   Nablus	   during	   2008.277	   	   Michael	   Singh	  explains	  the	  administration’s	  thinking	  at	  the	  time	  as	  follows:	  	  “We	  felt,	  and	  I	   think	  the	  Palestinians	  and	  I	   think	  the	  Palestinians	  and	  Israelis	  both	  felt	   that	   it	   was	   very	   important	   that	   the	   Palestinians	   sees	   improvements	   on	   the	  ground.	  	  Improvements	  in	  their	  lives	  as	  a	  result	  of	  this	  diplomatic	  process.	   	  And	  so	  that	   meant	   making	   sure	   that	   we	   were	   giving	   the	   Palestinians	   assistance	   with	  economic	  institution-­‐building,	  with	  law	  and	  order	  and	  the	  kind	  of	  financial	  aid	  that	  they	  need	  on	  a	  monthly	  basis.	  	  And	  we	  did	  do	  those	  things.	  	  Obviously,	  we	  put	  a	  lot	  of	   U.S.	   assistance	   into	   that	   effort,	   but	   I	   think	   even	   more	   importantly	   we	   led	   the	  diplomatic	  effort	  to	  get	  other	  states	  to	  contribute	  to	  that,	  to	  get	  the	  Europeans	  to	  do	  it,	  to	  get	  even	  more	  importantly	  the	  Arab	  states	  to	  do	  it,	  and	  that	  was	  a	  tough	  slog	  every	  time”.278	  	  Did	  the	  Policy	  Succeed?	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   Only	  briefly,	  around	   the	   time	  of	  Annapolis.	   	   Initial	  U.S.	  efforts	   to	   isolate	   the	  official	  PA	  cabinet	  under	  Hamas	  in	  2006	  and	  2007	  failed	  to	  achieve	  their	  objective	  because	  they	  did	  not	  undermine	  the	  group	  and	  did	  not	  goad	  Abbas	  into	  dismissing	  Haniyeh	   from	   office.	   	   Further,	   disengagement	   from	   the	   peace	   process	   was	   an	  ineffective	   strategy.	   	   Subsequent	   American	   efforts	   to	   undermine	   the	   contested	  Hamas	  government	  in	  Gaza	  by	  focusing	  on	  the	  West	  Bank	  helped	  consolidate	  Fatah	  control	   at	   first	   but	   failed	   to	   serve	   as	   a	   model	   for	   Palestinian	   reunification	   under	  Abbas.	   	  Still,	   reengagement	   in	   the	  peace	  process	  did	  give	  Abbas,	  Fayyad,	  and	   their	  allies	  a	   temporary	  boost	  while	   the	  Annapolis	  process	  still	   looking	   like	  a	  promising	  avenue	  for	  achieving	  Palestinian	  aspirations.	  
<Sub-­Case	  One:	  LSI	  through	  Disengagement>	  	   The	  aid	  cut-­‐off	  created	  the	  opposite	  intended	  effect.	  	  Although	  it	  ensured	  that	  the	   Hamas-­‐led	   government	   under	   Haniyeh	   was	   unable	   to	   pay	   salaries	   and	   was	  mired	   in	   financial	   hardship,	   it	   also	   gave	   Hamas	   a	   convenient	   pretense	   for	  why	   it	  failed	   at	   governance.	   	   Not	   only	  was	   it	   never	   given	   a	   true	   test	   of	   office,	   but	   it	  was	  enabled	  to	  play	  the	  role	  of	  national	  champion	  against	  the	  external	  oppressor.	   	  The	  authors	   of	   a	   recent	   study	   on	   American	   peace	   process	   diplomacy	   conclude	   that	  “although	   the	  United	  States	   intended	   to	   strengthen Abbas and those loyal to him, in 
many respects the aid cutoff made matters worse. In Gaza, for example, the inability to 
pay salaries and to maintain adequate operational support for the Fatah-affiliated PA 
security service [actually] weakened Abbas’s control and created opportunities for Hamas 
to step into the void”.279  Haim Malka concludes that the policy was “helping them 	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consolidate their rule instead of weakening it” because the aid embargo put the group in 
the domestically popular position by which it is seen “defend[ing] Palestinians and is 
steadfast in the face of the West’s boycott.  They posture and speechify”.280 
 American pressure on Abbas to consistently exclude Hamas also limited his room 
for political maneuver.  Although some officials within Fatah actually supported the 
Quartet conditions as a means of boosting their hand against Hamas, others opposed the 
idea.281  Kessler elaborates that over time “Abbas and his aides... were convinced that 
isolating Hamas would not work.  They pleaded with U.S. officials for leeway in dealing 
with Hamas, but the answer was always the same – no, Hamas is a terrorist group”.282 	   The	  aid	  cutoff	  also	  had	  institutional	  consequences	  that	  were	  not	  constructive	  for	  Palestinian	  democracy.	   	  Fayyad	  argues	  that	  the	  temporary	  mechanisms	  created	  by	   foreign	   governments	   to	   avoid	   sending	   money	   to	   Hamas	   were	   destroying	   the	  institutions	   he	   had	   built	   up	   for	   ensuring	   accountable	   PA	   budgets	   at	   the	   Finance	  Ministry	  and	  that	  the	  money	  being	  sent	  instead	  to	  Abbas’s	  office	  was	  not	  subject	  to	  safeguards	   against	   corruption.283	   	   Further,	   U.S.	   efforts	   to	   empower	   the	   president,	  making	  it	  the	  “center	  of	  gravity”	  in	  Palestinian	  politics	  in	  2006	  undermined	  the	  very	  reforms	  Bush	  had	   tried	   to	  promote	   in	  his	   first	   term	  by	   giving	   the	  PA	   a	   functional	  legislature	  and	  empowered	  prime	  minister.284	  	   Finally,	  U.S.	  efforts	  to	  empower	  Fatah	  to	  deter	  Hamas	  actually	  achieved	  just	  the	  opposite,	  creating	  a	  spiral	  of	  violence	  that	  resulted	  in	  the	  crushing	  defeat	  of	  U.S.-­‐	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sponsored	   forces	   in	  Gaza.	   	   This	   violence	   had	   been	   encouraged,	   not	   dampened,	   by	  U.S.	  diplomacy,	  with	  a	  keen	  observer	  pointing	  out	   just	  months	  before	   the	  collapse	  that	  the	  American	  mantra	  of	  supporting	  moderates	  actually	  translated	  into	  “seeking	  a	   decisive	   confrontation”	   between	   Hamas	   and	   Fatah	   and	   that	   America	   was	  “exacerbating this internal Palestinian power struggle by enticing Fatah with delusions of 
regaining power, along with shipments of equipment and cash... [in] a dangerous game 
that can only lead to more bloodshed”.285	  
<Sub-­Case	  Two:	  LSI	  through	  Reengagement>	  	   American	  efforts	  in	  the	  year	  that	  followed	  the	  Gaza	  coup	  were	  considerably	  more	   successful	   than	   before,	   arguably	   because	   the	   United	   States	   was	   finally	  demonstrating	   that	   Abbas	   could	   provide	   something	   that	   Hamas	   could	   not:	   a	  seemingly	  promising	  peace	  process	  involving	  Israel	  and	  the	  United	  States.	  	  Whereas	  disengagement	   failed	   abjectly,	   reengagement	   in	   the	  process	  with	   leaders	   based	   in	  the	  West	  Bank	  seemed	  to	  generate	  some	  initial	  success.	  	  However,	  when	  it	  became	  clear	  that	  this	  process	  would	  not	  produce	  lasting,	  tangible	  gains	  the	  edifice	  ground	  to	  a	  halt.	  	   Promises	  of	  aid	  and	  public	  praise	  were	   inconsistent	  and	  did	  not	   track	  with	  developments	   on	   the	   ground.	   	   Foreign	   aid	   to	   the	   PA	   increased	   substantially,	   but	  Arab	   states	   were	   often	   hesitant	   to	   follow	   through	   on	   their	   pledges.286	   	   American	  rhetorical	  support	  also	  began	  to	  waver.	  	  For	  instance,	  Bush’s	  speech	  to	  the	  Knesset	  that	   focused	  on	   Israeli	   threat	  perception	  without	  much	  consideration	  of	   the	  peace	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process	  or	  Palestinian	  aspirations	  in	  May	  of	  2008	  reportedly	  angered	  Abbas.287	  	  CRS	  analysis	   during	   this	   period	  observed	   that	   “international	   pledges	   of	   support...	   have	  proven	   insufficient	   to	   cover	   the	   PA’s	   monthly	   budgetary	   expenses,	   occasionally	  requiring	  last-­‐minute	  efforts	  by	  Fayyad	  and	  Blair	  to	  obtain	  outside	  assistance”.288	  The	  vast	  increase	  in	  PA	  budgets	  after	  Paris	  certainly	  improved	  the	  fiscal	  and	  economic	  outlook	  in	  the	  West	  Bank,	  turning	  growth	  from	  negative	  to	  positive	  after	  the	   first	   half	   of	   2007.	   	   However,	   the	  World	   Bank	  warned	   that	   GDP	   growth	   in	   the	  West	   Bank	   was	   still	   not	   be	   large	   enough	   to	   keep	   pace	   with	   population	   growth,	  resulting	  in	  falling	  income	  per	  capita.	   	  It	  concluded	  that	  “the	  contributing	  effects	  of	  the	  closures	  and	  movement	  restrictions	  cannot	  be	  overestimated”.289	  	  Indeed,	  Diana	  Buttu	  argues	  facts	  on	  the	  ground	  were	  not	  really	  improved	  during	  Annapolis;	  “there	  was	  no	  way	  you	  could	   really	   say	   that	   there	  were	  massive	  amounts	  of	   checkpoints	  that	   were	   removed	   or	   that	   conditions	   for	   Palestinians	   were	   improving”.290	   	   Of	  course,	  had	  Annapolis	  achieved	  results	  on	  the	  diplomatic	  track,	  this	  might	  have	  been	  overlooked.	  	  However,	  as	  Michael	  Singh	  acknowledges,	  “the	  Annapolis	  process...	  was	  an	   effort	   to	   create	   that	   kind	   of	   political	   path,	   to	   create	   that	   political	   horizon	   that	  Secretary	   Rice	   talked	   about.	   And	   to	   give	   the	   Palestinian	   people	   hope	   that	  negotiations	  and	  diplomacy	  could	  achieve	  their	  aspirations	  in	  a	  peaceful	  way	  and	  set	  up	  the	  possibility	  of	  peaceful	  coexistence	  with	  Israel.	  	  Now	  it	  didn’t	  work,	  you	  know	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obviously	  it	  didn’t	  work”.291	  	  Once	  the	  talks	  ground	  to	  a	  halt,	  it	  became	  increasingly	  evidence	   that	   problems	   on	   the	   ground	   were	   not	   going	   anywhere.	   	   Later,	   the	  prospects	  for	  economic	  development	  in	  the	  West	  Bank	  would	  further	  improve,	  but	  economic	   and	   political	   effects	   of	   restrictions	   on	   movement	   and	   access	   would	  continue	  to	  be	  felt.	  Finally,	   supporting	  an	  embargo	  on	   the	  Hamas-­‐controlled	  Gaza	  Strip	  did	  not	  accrue	   political	   benefits	   to	   Washington.	   	   In	   many	   ways,	   the	   sanctions	   actually	  boosted	   Hamas’s	   ability	   to	   consolidate	   its	   authority	   against	   potential	   challengers	  within	  the	  Gaza	  Strip	  by	  blocking	  other	  sources	  of	  commerce	  and	  revenue.	   	  Hamas	  not	   only	   took	   a	   leading	   role	   in	   the	   smuggling	   business	   near	   Rafah,	   but	   it	   was	  basically	   able	   to	   craft	   its	   institutional	   authority	   in	   Gaza	   de	   novo	   without	   serious	  competition	   from	   outside.292	   	   Nor	   did	   the	   external	   pressure	   produce	   a	   popular	  backlash	  that	  unseated	  Hamas.	  	  Hussein	  Agha	  reflects	  that,	  in	  this	  regard,	  “I’ve	  never	  heard	   a	   more	   daft	   misreading	   of	   Palestinian	   politics,	   and	   the	   blame	   accrues	   to	  Washington,	  not	  Hamas”.293	  	  Again,	  the	  isolation	  of	  Hamas	  succeeded	  in	  the	  limited	  sense	   to	   decreasing	   its	   contact	   with	   the	   outside	   world	   but	   failed	   in	   the	   sense	   of	  putting	   the	   movement	   in	   the	   populist	   position	   of	   advocating	   for	   national	   rights	  along	  with	  the	  basic	  humanitarian	  needs	  of	  their	  people.	  	   In	   their	   initial	  shock	  at	   the	   fall	  of	  Gaza	  and	  their	  sense	  that	  Hamas	  was	  not	  prepared	   to	   play	   by	   the	   ordinary	   rules	   of	   competitive	   democratic	   politics,	   during	  this	   period	   U.S.	   officials	   stepped	   considerably	   past	   traditional	   pretenses,	   making	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clear	  their	  desire	  to	  not	  just	  oust	  Hamas	  but	  also	  strengthen	  President	  Abbas.	  	  This	  was	  apparently	  driven	  by	  the	  events	  in	  Gaza,	  which	  fostered	  in	  the	  impression	  that	  Palestinian	   politics	   were	   in	   a	   state	   of	   war	   and	   were	   not	   undergoing	   a	   period	   of	  competitive	  politics	  as	  usual.	  	  As	  the	  dust	  settled	  and	  it	  became	  increasingly	  evident	  that	   the	   Annapolis	   process	   would	   not	   substantially	   change	   Palestinian	   political	  affairs	  or	  living	  conditions,	  this	  practice	  by	  the	  Bush	  team	  likely	  added	  to	  the	  sense	  that	  Abbas	  was	  a	  foreign	  quisling,	  decreasing	  his	  standing	  on	  the	  ground.	  Indeed,	   images	   of	   Mahmoud	   Abbas	   kissing	   American	   and	   Israeli	   officials	  continue	   to	   propagate	   on	   the	   Internet	   as	   a	   sign	   of	   public	   protest	   among	   many	  Palestinians	  at	  his	  closeness	  with	  disliked	  foreign	  officials	  when	  his	  people	  still	  have	  not	   yet	   achieved	   their	   aspirations.	   	   Further,	   Michele	   Dunne	   concludes	   that	   since	  Palestinian	  politics	  were	  frozen	  in	  2007	  “without	  a	  presidential	  election,	  legitimacy	  [has	   been]	   draining	   away	   from	   President	  Mahmoud	  Abbas;	  without	   a	   functioning	  Palestinian	   Legislative	   Council	   (PLC)	   and	   its	   ability	   to	   make	   laws,	   institution	  building	   is	   severely	   limited...	   while	   concerns	   about	   Hamas	   and	   terrorism	   are	   real	  and	  need	  to	  be	  taken	  seriously,	  it	  is	  time	  to	  consider	  that	  the	  organization	  cannot	  be	  pressured	  or	  starved	  out	  of	  existence	  or	  political	  relevance”.294	  One	  area	  which	  support	  for	  Fayyad	  and	  Abbas	  strengthened	  their	  standing	  in	  a	  more	  lasting	  manner	  involves	  concrete	  support	  to	  PA	  security	  forces,	  which	  vastly	  increased	   after	   the	  Gaza	   coup.	   	   As	   a	   result	   the	  Dayton	  mission	   finally	   being	   given	  firm	   political	   backing	   from	   Washington	   to	   pursue	   a	   comprehensive	   program	   of	  building	  up	  Palestinian	  security	  forces	  loyal	  to	  Fatah.	  	  Whereas	  his	  efforts	  received	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no	   operational	   funds	   before	   June	   of	   2007,	   afterwards	   his	  mission	   finally	   received	  funding	   for	   its	   programs	  and	  was	   able	   to	   cooperate	  not	   just	  with	   the	  Presidential	  Guard	  but	  all	  PA	  security	   forces	   in	   the	  West	  Bank.295	   	  He	  also	  engaged	   in	  a	  highly	  successful	  effort	  to	  coordinate	  a	  transfer	  for	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  security	  responsibilities	   in	  Palestinian	   population	   centers	   from	   the	   IDF	   to	   forces	   under	   the	   Palestinian	  Authority.	  	  This	  support	  has	  restored	  PA	  security	  forces	  in	  the	  West	  Bank	  to	  a	  level	  comparable	  to	  before	  the	  second	  intifada,	  when	  they	  were	  demolished	  by	  the	  IDF,	  a	  development	  which	  had	  contributed	  to	  their	  poor	  performance	  during	  2007	  in	  Gaza.	  	  
Coding	  the	  Observable	  Implications	  
1.	  Perceptions	  of	  Sender	  Interests:	  	   One	   area	   in	   which	   the	   theories	   tested	   by	   this	   dissertation	   offer	   divergent	  predictions	  involves	  the	  effect	  that	  perceptions	  of	  sender	  interests	  are	  predicted	  to	  have	  on	  variation	  in	  LSI	  occurrence.	  	  Theory	  #1	  (national	  interests	  theory)	  expects	  that	  the	  incidence	  of	  LSI	  occurrence	  should	  be	  driven	  by	  objective	  strategic	  realities.	  	  Theory	   #2	   (the	   lobby-­‐legislative	   approach)	   predicts	   that	   LSI	   should	   usually	   not	  occur	   on	   the	   Palestinian	   dyad	   because	   members	   of	   Congress	   and	   the	   pro-­‐Israel	  lobby	  tend	  to	  believe	  that	  relative	  Palestinian	  moderates	  are	  actually	  not	  moderate	  enough.	   	   Theory	   #3	   (the	   bureaucratic	   politics	   approach)	   argues	   that	   meddling	  should	  be	  frequent	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  members	  of	  the	  U.S.	  permanent	  bureaucracy	  that	   deal	   with	   Palestinian	   politics	   tend	   to	   prefer	   frequent,	   active	   engagement	   on	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behalf	   of	   relative	   moderates.	   	   Theory	   #4	   (leadership	   theory)	   anticipates	   that	  variation	   in	   the	   occurrence	   of	   meddling	   should	   depend	   primarily	   upon	   the	  preferences	   of	   top	   American	   officials.	   	   In	   this	   regard,	   the	   data	   provides	   much	  stronger	  evidence	  for	  leadership	  theory	  than	  its	  structural	  alternatives.	  	   Lobby-­‐legislative	   theory	  receives	  comparatively	   little	   in	   the	  way	  of	   support	  from	   the	   case	  material.	   	   LSI	   took	  place	  during	  both	   sub-­‐cases,	   a	   result	  which	   is	   in	  stark	  contrast	  to	  the	  expectations	  of	  the	  theory.	  	  Further,	  Michael	  Singh	  argues	  that	  Congress	   was	   actually	   supportive	   of	   American	   efforts	   to	   bolster	   Fatah,	   especially	  after	  the	  Gaza	  coup.	   	  When	  asked	  how	  the	  Hill	  reacted	  to	  administration	  efforts	  to	  build	  up	  Abbas,	  Singh	  reflects	  that	  “Congress	  I	  think	  bought	  into	  it.	  	  I	  think	  they	  were	  supportive.	   	   There	  were	   always	   concerns	   about	  who	   are	  we	   giving	   the	  money	   to,	  exactly	  where	  is	  it	  going,	  exactly	  what	  is	  it	  going	  for,	  I	  think	  that’s	  appropriate,	  that’s	  Congress’s	  role	  to	  exercise	  that	  oversight...	  [but]	  you	  still	  see	  basic	  support	  for	  this	  idea	   that	   we	   can’t	   walk	   away	   from	   responsible	   Palestinian	   leaders	   because	   the	  alternative	   is	   the	   extremist	   Palestinians”.296	   	   Members	   of	   Congress	   did	   press	   the	  administration	  to	  somewhat	  delay	  and	  modify	  its	  package	  of	  security	  assistance	  to	  PA	   forces	   under	   Dahlan	   during	   late	   2006	   and	   early	   2007,	   but	   as	   a	   firsthand	  participant	   in	   this	   episode	   I	   am	   confident	   that	   the	   revised	   package	  would	   almost	  certainly	   have	   been	   approved.	   	   Even	   AIPAC	   seemed	   to	   warm	   rather	  uncharacteristically	  to	  the	  possibility	  just	  after	  the	  Gaza	  coup	  that	  Abbas	  and	  Fayyad	  should	  be	  supported,	  provided	  they	  carried	   through	  meticulously	  on	   their	  pledges	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to	  help	  Israel	  and	  move	  against	  Hamas.297	  	   Further,	   the	  way	   in	  which	   the	  Bush	   administration	  pursued	  LSI	   during	   the	  first	   sub-­‐case	   strongly	   contradicts	   the	   expectations	   of	   the	   bureaucratic	   politics	  approach.	   	   Although	   working-­‐level	   officials	   were	   in	   favor	   of	   using	   American	  resources	   to	   bolster	   Abbas,	   their	   preferences	   did	   not	   line	   up	   with	   the	  administration’s	  policy	  of	  disengaging	  from	  the	  Mideast	  peace	  process	  at	  the	  time.	  	   Finally,	  objective	  circumstances	  also	  do	  not	  necessarily	  point	  in	  direction	  of	  the	  policy	  that	  the	  Bush	  administration	  pursued,	  especially	  in	  sub-­‐case	  number	  two.	  	  One	   can	   envision	   the	   events	   of	   June	   207	   being	   perceived	   in	   one	   of	   two	   different	  ways.	   	   In	   some	   ways,	   the	   coup	   justified	   the	   administration’s	   belief	   that	   the	   risk	  posed	  by	  Hamas	  was	  now	  higher	  and	  the	  opportunity	  to	  help	  Palestinian	  moderates	  was	   increased	  once	  PA	  cohabitation	   fell	  apart.	   	  However,	   the	   flipside	  was	  that	  any	  potential	   strategy	   for	   resolving	   the	   conflict	   would	   now	   have	   to	   be	   a	   three-­‐state	  solution.	   	   Also,	   Israeli	   hardliners	   could	   now	   say	   that	   they	   could	   not	  make	   a	   deal	  because	  Hamas	  would	  veto	  it	  or	  demand	  later	  renegotiation.	  	  The	  event	  was	  seen	  by	  the	   Bush	   team	   as	   a	   reason	   for	   reengaging,	   but	   one	   also	   could	   have	   seen	   it	   go	   a	  different	  way,	   especially	   if	   the	   Secretary	   of	   State	   had	   not	   been	   Condoleezza	   Rice,	  who	  was	  pivotal	  in	  convincing	  Bush.	  	  Indeed,	  it	  took	  repeated	  efforts	  by	  her	  over	  a	  series	   of	   months	   to	   actually	   persuade	   him	   that	   going	   to	   Annapolis	   was	   a	   good	  idea.298	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  2.	  Perceptions	  of	  Close	  Contests	  Another	   area	   in	   which	   the	   theories	   diverge	   has	   to	   do	   with	   the	   actors’	  perceptions	   of	   close	   political	   contests	   abroad.	   	   Although	   national	   interests	   theory	  anticipates	   that	   LSI	   should	   occur	   in	   lockstep	   with	   objective	   evidence	   of	  developments	   as	   they	   occur	   abroad,	   leadership	   theory	   argues	   that	   the	   subjective	  perceptions	   and	  personal	   distractions	   of	   top	   leaders	   in	   the	   sender	   state	   impose	   a	  mediating	  constraint	  on	  this	  relationship.	  In	   this	   regard,	   the	   balance	   of	   evidence	   seems	   to	   support	   the	   agency-­‐based	  approach.	   	  Hamas	  and	  Fatah	  were	   locked	   in	  effectively	  a	  zero-­‐sum	  battle	   from	  the	  moment	  the	  PLC	  election	  results	  showed	  that	  Hamas	  had	  been	  victorious.	  	  However,	  it	  was	  only	  after	  the	  fall	  of	  Gaza	  that	  Washington	  decided	  to	  use	  all	  of	  the	  tools	  at	  its	  disposal	   to	  adjudicate	  this	  dispute,	  not	   just	  retiring	   from	  the	  conflict	   in	  hopes	  that	  the	  results	  would	  somehow	  shake	  out	  in	  Washington’s	  favor.	   	  Furthermore,	  Bush’s	  intense	   preoccupation	   with	   Iraq	   into	   2006	   may	   also	   help	   explain	   American	  reluctance	  to	  seriously	  engage	  in	  Palestinian	  politics	  at	  the	  time.	  	  3.	  Patterns	  of	  Domestic	  Debate:	  	   Another	  area	  in	  which	  the	  theories	  diverge	  involves	  the	  patterns	  of	  domestic	  deliberation	   in	   advance	   of	   LSI.	   	   If	   domestic	   structural	   forces	   such	   as	   Congress,	  lobbyists,	   and	   bureaucrats	   are	   in	   the	   loop	   about	   administration	   plans,	   that	  would	  provide	  evidence	  for	  Theories	  2	  and/or	  3.	  	  However,	  if	  they	  are	  generally	  in	  the	  dark	  about	   administration	   initiatives	   until	   after	   the	   fact,	   that	   would	   provide	   greater	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support	  for	  the	  agency-­‐based	  approach.	  In	   this	   regard,	   the	   case	  provides	   strong	  evidence	   for	   the	   leadership	   theory.	  	  Although	  Jacob	  Walles	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  in	  on	  the	  strategy	  as	  a	  conduit	  between	  Rice	  and	  Abbas,	  the	  circle	  of	  knowledge	  seems	  to	  end	  around	  there.	  	  Most	  notably,	  a	  working-­‐level	  official	  at	  the	  State	  Department	  reflected	  “No,	  I	  can’t	  say	  someone	  said	  that	  or	  I	  saw	  it	  in	  a	  cable”.299	  	  The	  top	  official	  for	  USAID	  in	  the	  West	  Bank	  after	  the	  Gaza	  coup	  agrees	  that	  he	  never	  once	  saw	  anything	  in	  writing	  demonstrating	  that	  the	  administration	   was	   pursuing	   a	   West	   Bank	   First	   strategy	   to	   bolster	   Abbas	   and	  Fayyad,	  even	  though	  this	  was	  obviously	  an	  administration	  goal.300	  	  4.	  Cycles	  of	  Domestic	  Power:	  	   While	  Theory	  #2	  (the	  lobby-­‐legislative	  approach)	  expects	  that	  lobbyists	  and	  legislators	  should	  be	  especially	  powerful	  during	  periods	  of	  divided	  government	  or	  in	  the	  lead-­‐up	  to	  elections,	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  little	  support	  for	  this	  perspective	  in	  the	  data.	   	   Although	   LSI	   did	   seem	   to	  weaken	   toward	   the	   end	   of	   2008,	   at	   a	   time	  when	  American	   elections	   were	   approaching,	   the	   theory	   fares	   especially	   poorly	   with	  regard	   to	   the	   divided	   government	   prediction.	   	   These	   last	   two	   years	   of	   Bush’s	  presidency	   were	   the	   only	   period	   in	   his	   presidency	   in	   which	   the	   Democrats	   held	  clear-­‐cut	   majorities	   in	   either,	   let	   alone	   both,	   chambers	   of	   Congress.	   	   However,	  partisan	  intervention	  by	  the	  United	  States	  continued	  in	  Palestinian	  politics	  full	  bore.	  	  5.	  Bureaucratic	  Freelancing:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
299 Former US Official, “Interview with the Author.” 
300 Howard Sumka, “Interview with the Author”, November 3, 2011. 
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   Another	   area	   in	   which	   the	   theories	   diverge	   pertains	   to	   bureaucratic	  freelancing.	  	  Under	  Theory	  #3	  (the	  bureaucratic	  politics	  approach),	  pursuit	  of	  LSI	  by	  working-­‐level	   officials	  without	   senior	   authorization	   should	   be	   relatively	   frequent.	  	  	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   Theory	   #4	   (leadership	   theory)	   predicts	   that	   this	   should	   be	  relatively	   rare	   and	   conditioned	   upon	   a	   lack	   of	   oversight	   from	   top	   U.S.	   officials.	  	  However,	   the	   evidence	   in	   this	   case	   is	   relatively	   opaque.	   	   Generally	   speaking,	   both	  instances	   of	   America	   LSI	   (first	   from	   2006	   to	   2007	   and	   then	   from	   2007	   through	  2009)	  appear	   to	  have	  been	  approved	  by	  either	  Rice	  or	  Bush.	   	  Walles’s	  message	   to	  Abbas	  in	  late	  2006	  was	  a	  re-­‐articulation	  of	  Rice’s	  recent	  message,	  not	  an	  innovation	  of	  policy	  de	  novo.	  	  However,	  Bush	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  have	  been	  particularly	  involved	  in	  either	   the	   first	  effort	  or	   the	  second	  one	  after	   the	  Annapolis	   talks	  began	   to	  slow	  down.	  	  Yet	  his	  disengagement	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  have	  produced	  notable	  freelancing.	  	  	  	  6.	  Consistency	  of	  Message:	  One	  of	  the	  main	  determinants	  of	  efficacy	  for	  LSI	  seems	  to	  be	  whether	  or	  not	  the	   message	   conveyed	   by	   the	   sender	   state’s	   policies	   is	   expressed	   in	   a	   consistent	  manner	   or	   not.	   	   Theory	  #1	   anticipates	   that	   this	   should	   be	   the	   case,	   but	   the	   other	  theories	   emphasize	   institutional	   or	   personal	   biases	   that	   might	   undermine	   this	  consistency.	  However,	  the	  Bush	  administration’s	  message	  was	  notably	  split.	  	  On	  one	  hand,	  Bush	  promised	  and	  re-­‐promised	   that	  his	  administration	  would	  ensure	  a	   two-­‐state	  solution	  by	  the	  end	  of	  his	  term.	   	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  when	  it	  became	  clear	  that	  the	  Annapolis	  process	  was	  not	  yielding	  comprehensive	  agreement	  between	  the	  parties	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on	  their	  own	  he	  made	  clear	  that	  he	  was	  not	  going	  to	  exert	  American	  leverage	  to	  help	  bridge	  gaps	  between	  the	  parties,	   let	  alone	  get	  engaged	  in	  the	  specifics	  of	  the	  talks.	  	  His	  hesitancy	  to	  publicly	  exert	  American	  political	  capital	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  bringing	  home	   a	   deal,	   even	   an	   interim	   one	   codifying	   areas	   of	   agreement	   and	   progress	  between	  the	  parties,	  ultimately	  served	  to	  sap	  the	  effort	  to	  bolster	  Abbas	  of	  much	  of	  its	  vigor.	  	  7.	  Suitability	  of	  Message:	  	   Finally,	   the	   last	   area	   in	   which	   the	   theories	   diverge	   involves	   whether	   the	  message	   expressed	   by	   officials	   in	   the	   sender	   state	   is	   suitable	   to	   the	   political	  dynamics	   in	   the	   target	   state,	   including	   whether	   that	   message	   meets	   the	  requirements	  of	   the	  sender’s	   favored	  protégé.	   	  Theory	  #1	  expects	   that	   this	  should	  always	   be	   likely,	   but	   theories	   2	   through	   4	   expect	   that	   this	   appropriateness	   may	  often	  be	  skewed	  either	  by	  institutional	  or	  personal	  biases.	  	   The	   fact	   that	   the	   Bush	   team	   pursued	   a	   highly	   problematic	   strategy	   for	  strengthening	   Abbas	   during	   the	   earlier	   sub-­‐case,	   stretching	   form	   2006	   to	   2007,	  points	   in	  the	  direction	  of	   institutional	  or	  personal	  biases.	   	  Washington’s	   insistence	  on	  disengaging	  from	  the	  peace	  process	  entirely	  –	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  evidently	  worried	  even	  Abbas	  –	  contradicts	   the	  expectation	  of	  national	   interests	   theory	   that	  suitable	  messaging	   should	   be	   unproblematic.	   	   Further,	   the	   administration’s	   willingness	   to	  temporarily	   employ	   a	   more	   effective	   strategy	   in	   late	   2007	   seems	   to	   point	   in	   the	  direction	  of	  leadership	  theory	  and	  away	  from	  the	  lobby-­‐legislative	  approach.	  	  In	  all,	  the	  evidence	  on	  all	  seven	  observable	  implications	  in	  this	  case	  seems	  to	  point	  in	  the	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direction	  of	  Theory	  #4.	  	  
Conclusion	  
Upon	   review,	   the	   Bush	   administration’s	   repeated	   attempts	   to	   influence	  Palestinian	   politics	   were	   colored	   by	   the	   president’s	   reluctance	   to	   push	   for	   a	   full-­‐fledged,	   active	   peace	   process	   with	   America	   as	   a	   concerned	   participant.	   	   His	  willingness	   to	   countenance	   a	  Road	  Map	   for	  peace	  boosted	  Washington’s	   ability	   to	  get	   the	   moderate	   Mahmoud	   Abbas	   appointed	   prime	   minister	   of	   the	   Palestinian	  Authority	   in	   2003,	   but	   U.S.	   behavior	   also	   contributed	   to	   his	   resignation	   by	  withholding	   the	   sort	   of	   concrete	  political	   benefits	   that	   he	  was	   seeking	   to	  mitigate	  the	  occupation	  and	  then	  partially	  abandoning	  him	  that	  August.	  The	  Bush	  administration	  again	  weakened	  Abu	  Mazen’s	  standing	   in	  2005	  by	  refusing	   to	   push	   for	   final	   status	   talks	   before	   the	   PLC	   debacle	   and	   by	   devoting	  comparatively	   little	   political	   capital	   even	   to	   asking	   Sharon	   to	   “coordinate”	  disengagement	  with	  Abbas.	  	  Finally,	  although	  the	  Bush	  administration	  encountered	  greater	  success	  through	  reengaging	  with	  the	  peace	  process	  in	  starting	  in	  2007	  than	  disengaging	  from	  it	  in	  2006,	  American	  hesitancy	  to	  push	  for	  peace	  beyond	  what	  the	  parties	  will	  themselves	  offer	  and	  its	  unwillingness	  to	  float	  bridging	  proposals	  helped	  ensure	  that	  that	  process	  would	  yield	  little	  in	  the	  way	  of	  lasting	  political	  change.	  Since	  the	  fall	  of	  Gaza	  to	  Hamas,	  direct	  aid	  flows	  to	  the	  PA	  have	  resumed,	  and	  Secretary	  Rice	  launched	  a	  final	  status	  political	  process	  at	  Annapolis	  in	  2007	  that	  she	  admits	  was	  designed	  to	  sustain	  moderates.	   	  However,	  the	  stagnation	  of	  final	  status	  talks	  –	  which	  has	  been	  further	  locked	  in	  since	  the	  election	  of	  Netanyahu	  in	  Israel	  –	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has	  undermined	  this	  strategy	  to	  bolster	  Abu	  Mazen	  and	  Fayyad	  by	  removing	  one	  of	  its	   key	   conceptual	   pillars.	   	   Without	   meaningful	   peace	   talks	   or	   a	   functional	  Palestinian	   political	   sphere,	   Washington’s	   West	   Bank	   First	   strategy	   –	   which	  continues	   to	   this	  day	  –	  seems	  a	  dead	   letter,	   in	  place	  only	  because	   there	   is	  nothing	  ambitious	  with	  which	  it	  has	  been	  replaced.	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Chapter	  XI.	  
~	  
The	  Iran	  Shadow	  Case	  
(World	  War	  II	  to	  Present)	  	  
	  	   The	   following	   chapter	   describes	   U.S.	   efforts	   to	   influence	   Iranian	   internal	  politics	  from	  World	  War	  II	  to	  present.	   	  As	  such,	  it	  offers	  an	  important	  shadow	  case	  for	  exploring	  how	  the	  patterns	  derived	  in	  Chapters	  III	  through	  X	  apply	  beyond	  the	  Arab-­‐Israeli	   conflict	   and	  Mideast	  peace	  process.	   	   For,	   although	   Iran	   is	   yet	   another	  nation	   in	   the	   Middle	   East,	   it	   offers	   some	   useful	   comparative	   leverage	   on	   several	  different	  study	  variables.	  	  	  Iran	  is	  comprised	  of	  a	  different	  predominant	  ethnic	  group	  than	  either	  Israel	  or	  Palestine,	  and	  it	   is	   located	  in	  a	  part	  of	  the	  Mideast	  that	   is	   largely	  removed	  from	  the	   Arab-­‐Israeli	   conflict	   (despite	   recent	   efforts	   by	   Iran	   to	   shape	   that	   struggle	  through	  proxies	  in	  recent	  years).	  	  Its	  government	  has	  a	  different	  sort	  of	  relationship	  with	  Washington	  than	  either	  Israel	  or	  the	  Palestinian	  Authority	  does	  –	  as	  an	  avowed	  enemy	  rather	   than	  an	  ally	  or	  a	  disfavored	  client	  –	  but	   it	  also	  displays	  variation	  on	  this	   dimension	   over	   time,	   since	   the	   Iranian	   regime	   used	   to	   be	   extremely	   close	   to	  Washington	  before	  1979.	  Thus,	  looking	  at	  Iran	  before	  the	  revolution	  provides	  an	  instance	  of	  American	  intervention	   in	   the	  politics	  of	   a	  dictatorial	  Cold	  War	  ally;	   looking	  at	   Iran	  after	   the	  revolution	   offers	   and	   example	   of	   U.S.	   meddling	   in	   the	   politics	   of	   an	   opponent	  deemed	   beyond	   the	   pale,	   in	   which	   there	   are	   clear	   domestic	   incentives	   to	   being	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hawkish	   on	   issues	   regime	   change	   and	   government	   change.	   	   In	   both	   instances,	  Washington	   has	   shown	   little	   regard	   for	   the	   sanctity	   of	   Iran’s	   institutions	   of	  democracy	  (in	  much	  the	  same	  way	  its	  leaders	  have	  acted,	  for	  that	  matter).	  	  In	  both	  periods,	   the	   U.S.	   has	   often	   tried	   to	   tip	   the	   balance	   in	   Iran’s	   domestic	   political	  contests	  toward	  perceived	  moderates,	  and	  in	  both	  periods	  it	  has	  also	  adhered	  to	  the	  fiction	  that	  it	  does	  not	  meddle	  in	  Iran’s	  internal	  affairs.1	  
	  
The	  Case	  Studies	  
Roosevelt	  &	  Truman:	  
	   During	  World	  War	   II,	   the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  Great	  Britain	  occupied	   Iran	  and	  split	  it	  into	  two	  zones	  starting	  in	  1941,	  with	  the	  north	  going	  to	  the	  Soviets	  and	  the	  south	  going	  to	  the	  British.	  	  The	  United	  States	  acceded	  to	  Iran	  being	  carved	  up	  by	  its	  allies	  as	  an	  element	  of	  wartime	  necessity,	  but	  it	  nurtured	  hopes	  that	  Iran	  would	  be	  opened	  to	  American	  influence	  after	  the	  war.	  	  For	  instance,	  a	  1943	  State	  Department	  memo	  reflects	  that	  “although	  Russian	  policy	  ahs	  been	  fundamentally	  aggressive	  and	  British	   policy	   fundamentally	   defensive	   in	   character,	   the	   result	   in	   both	   cases	   has	  been	  interference	  with	  the	  internal	  affairs	  of	  Iran,	  amounting	  at	  times	  to	  a	  virtually	  complete	  negation	  of	  Iranian	  sovereignty	  and	  independent”.	  	  The	  document	  went	  on	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  This	  chapter	  employs	  somewhat	  looser	  standards	  of	  evidence,	  since	  its	  purpose	  is	  only	  to	  consider	  generalizability	   to	  a	  single	  context	  beyond	  the	  Arab-­‐Israeli	  peace	  process,	  not	   to	  write	  another	   full	  record	  of	  diplomatic	  history.	  I	  have	  only	  used	  openly	  published	  materials	  for	  coding	  episodes	  on	  the	  U.S.-­‐Iran	  directed	  dyad.	   	  These	   include	  scholarly	  publications,	  policy	  monographs,	  newspapers	  and	  memoirs	  by	   former	  officials.	  Rather	   than	  conducting	  a	  rigorous	   theory	   test	  at	   the	  end	  of	  each	  case	  history,	  the	  explicit	  comparison	  of	  theories	  according	  to	  seven	  dimensions	  of	  observable	  implication	  is	  omitted.	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to	  explore	  the	  idea	  that	  “so	  far,	  we	  have	  rested	  our	  response	  to	  this	  appeal	  primarily	  upon	   our	   interest	   in	   winning	   the	   war.	   	   I	   wonder	   if	   we	   should	   not	   also	   begin,	  privately,	  to	  base	  our	  response	  upon	  our	  interest	  in	  winning	  the	  peace?	  	  The	  United	  States,	  alone,	   is	   in	  a	  position	   to	  build	  up	   Iran	  to	   the	  point	  at	  which	   it	  will	   stand	   in	  need	  of	  neither	  British	  nor	  Russian	  assistance	  to	  maintain	  order	  in	  its	  own	  house”.2	  	  	  When	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  failed	  to	  remove	  its	  troops	  from	  Iran	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  war,	  Iranian	  officials	  elicited	  Truman’s	  diplomatic	  backing	  in	  1946	  to	  help	  produce	  Moscow’s	  eventual	  withdrawal.3	  	  In	  1947,	  the	  Shah	  tried	  to	  solicit	  American	  support	  for	  him	  to	  remove	  an	  activist	  prime	  minister,	  Ahmad	  Qavam.	  	  At	  first,	  the	  Americans	  rebuffed	   his	   request	   but	   later	   reconsidered.4	   	   Although	   in	   1947	   the	   Truman	  administration	  unveiled	  the	  president’s	  new	  doctrine	  for	  defending	  countries	  at	  risk	  of	  Soviet-­‐inspired	  insurrection	  but	  continued	  to	  give	  Iran	  only	  symbolic	  support,	  in	  part	   for	   fear	   of	   provoking	   Moscow.5	   	   However,	   mutual	   cooperation	   increased	  considerably	  after	  1950,	  as	  the	  U.S.	  began	  to	  consider	  broadening	  containment	  to	  a	  geographic	  area	  broader	  than	  strongpoint	  defense	  in	  only	  Europe	  and	  Japan.	  
	  
Eisenhower:	  
	   In	   their	   last	   months	   in	   office,	   Secretary	   of	   State	   Dean	   Acheson	   and,	  presumably,	  President	  Truman,	  adhered	  to	  the	  hope	  that	  tensions	  between	  the	  UK	  and	  Iran’s	  government	  under	  Mosaddeq	  could	  be	  resolved	  peaceably	  and	  therefore	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Memorandum is quoted in James A. Bill, The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian 
Relations (Yale University Press, 1989), 19. 
3 Ibid., 36–38. 
4 Abbas Milani, The Shah (Macmillan, 2012), 128–129. 
5 Mark J. Gasiorowski, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State in Iran (Cornell 
University Press, 1991), 52. 
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prevent	  an	  outbreak	  of	  chaos	  that	  would	  allow	  a	  possible	  takeover	  by	  the	  pro-­‐Soviet	  Tudeh	  Party.6	  	  However,	  a	  change	  in	  staffing	  on	  the	  U.S.	  side	  increased	  its	  openness	  to	  promoting	  a	  coup.	  	  As	  Mark	  Gasiorowski	  writes	  in	  a	  volume	  produced	  for	  a	  recent	  conference	  by	  the	  National	  Security	  Archive	  on	  the	  1953	  coup	  in	  Iran,	  perhaps	  the	  most	  comprehensive	  survey	  of	  U.S.	  decision-­‐making	  during	  the	  crisis:	  	  “top	  officials	  in	  the	  incoming	  Eisenhower	  administration	  favored	  a	  more	  aggressive	  approach	  toward	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	   its	  allies,	  both	  globally	  and	   in	   Iran.	   	  During	  the	  1952	  election	  campaign…	  John	  Foster	  Dulles	  and	  other	  Republicans	  called	  for	  a	  ‘rollback	  of	  the	  Iran	  Curtain’	  and	  accused	  Truman	  of	   letting	  Iran	  become	  ‘a	  second	  China’.	   	   Although	   their	   enthusiasm	   for	   ‘rollback’	   later	   waned,	   Dulles,	   his	   brother	  Allen,	   and	   other	   officials	   slated	   for	   top	   positions	   in	   the	   new	   administration	  were	  eager	  to	  take	  a	  more	  aggressive	  posture	  toward	  the	  Soviets…	  [and]	  were	  more	  eager	  than	   their	   predecessors	   to	   use	   the	   CIA’s	   covert	   political	   action	   capabilities.	   	   The	  Dulles	   brothers	  discussed	   the	  British	  proposal	   for	   a	   coup	   frequently	   in	   the	  weeks	  before	  Eisenhower	  was	  inaugurated”.7	  	  Thus,	   Eisenhower	  was	  much	  more	   open	   to	   using	   covert	   against	   in	   Iran,	  which	   he	  approved	   in	   March	   after	   Mosaddeq	   called	   off	   negotiations	   with	   the	   British.8	   	   Of	  course,	  the	  1953	  coup	  falls	  outside	  of	  this	  study’s	  scope	  conditions,	  since	  it	  primarily	  involves	  the	  use	  of	  force	  rather	  than	  the	  tools	  of	  diplomacy,	  but	  the	  decision-­‐making	  dynamics	  seem	  surprisingly	  analogous	  to	  instances	  of	  LSI.	  	  For	  the	  remainder	  of	  his	  term,	  he	   focused	  on	   strengthening	   the	   Iranian	   regime	  with	  economic	  and	  military	  aid,	  providing	  over	  $1	  billion	  by	  1960.9	  	  In	  a	  sign	  of	  growing	  ties,	  Iran	  received	  state	  visits	   by	   Vice	   President	   Nixon,	   Secretary	   of	   State	   Dulles,	   and	   eventually	   even	  President	  Eisenhower.10	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (W. W. Norton & Company, 
1987), 683–685; Mark J. Gasiorowski, “Coup d’Etat Against Mosaddeq,” in Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 
1953 Coup in Iran, ed. Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne (Syracuse University Press, 2004), 231. 
7 Gasiorowski, “Coup d’Etat Against Mosaddeq,” 231–232. 
8 Ibid., 232. 
9 Bill, The Eagle and the Lion, 113–114. 
10 Ibid., 118–120. 
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Kennedy	  &	  Johnson:	  
The	  new	  American	   administration	   came	   to	  office	  believing	   that	   the	   Iranian	  government,	  which	  was	  facing	  an	  economic	  crisis	  and	  major	  public	  protests,	  was	  at	  serious	  risk	  of	  collapse.	  	  The	  president	  was	  particularly	  disturbed	  by	  an	  April	  1961	  interview	  with	  Walter	  Lippman	  in	  which	  he	  heard	  Nikita	  Khrushchev	  single	  out	  Iran	  as	  an	  example	  of	  a	  country	  headed	  for	  a	  leftist	  revolution.11	   	  The	  Iran	  desk	  over	  at	  State	  even	  produced	  a	  no-­‐holds-­‐barred	  report	  weighing	  the	  risks	  of	  abandoning	  the	  Shah	  in	  favor	  of	  popularly-­‐based	  nationalist	  politicians	  instead,	  although	  the	  report	  rejected	  this	  option	  as	  too	  risky.12	  	   The	  new	  president	  organized	  a	  special	  task	  force	  to	  determine	  how	  he	  should	  respond	   to	   the	   turmoil	   in	  Tehran,	   to	  which	  he	   gave	   an	   extremely	  broad	  mandate,	  making	   clear	   that	   all	   options	   were	   on	   the	   table	   (which	   implicitly	   included	  abandoning	  the	  Shah).13	  	  The	  task	  force	  concluded	  that	  a	  “slide	  toward	  chaos	  in	  Iran	  could	  result	  in	  as	  grave	  a	  set-­‐back	  as	  in	  South	  Vietnam”	  unless	  the	  U.S.	  were	  to	  push	  the	   Shah	   into	   a	   “controlled	   revolution”	   of	   reform	   from	  above,	   in	   alliance	  with	   the	  country’s	  disaffected	  middle	  class.14	  	  	  Based	  on	   the	   task	   force’s	   recommendations,	  Kennedy	  ordered	  a	  new	  policy	  toward	   Tehran	   in	   an	   NSC	  meeting	   on	  May	   24,	   1961,	   which	   called	   for	   the	   U.S.	   to	  “make	  a	  major	  effort	  to	  back”	  Ali	  Amini,	  Iran’s	  new	  reformist	  prime	  minister,	  as	  the	  “best	   instrument	   in	   sight	   for	  promoting	  orderly	  political	   and	  economic,	   and	   social	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Ibid., 132. 
12 Ibid., 133. 
13 Milani, The Shah, 251. 
14 Ibid., 252. 
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revolution”	  in	  Iran.	  	  It	  said	  the	  U.S.	  “should	  be	  prepared	  to	  tolerate	  certain	  seemingly	  anti-­‐American	   actions	   by	   Amini	  which	   do	   not	   really	   damage	   any	  major	   American	  interest”	   and	   to	   “encourage	   the	   formation	   and	   growth	   of	   broadly	   based	   political	  parties	  in	  Iran”	  while	  “more	  actively	  encouraging	  the	  Shah	  to	  move	  toward	  a	  more	  constitutional	   role”.15	   	  The	  U.S.	  deterred	   the	  military	  overthrowing	  Amini,	   and	   the	  Shah	  later	  complained	  that	  Kennedy	  forced	  Amini	  upon	  him.16	  	  The	  Shah	  eventually	  outmaneuvered	  Amini	  and	  succeeded	  in	  dismissing	  him	  in	  July	  of	  1962,	  shortly	  after	  a	  trip	  to	  Washington	  in	  which	  Abbas	  Milani	  suspects	  –	  but	  is	  unable	  to	  prove	  –	  that	  President	  Kennedy	  agreed	  in	  a	  private	  meeting	  to	  abandon	  the	  premier	  in	  favor	  of	  Iran’s	  monarch.17	  	   After	   Kennedy’s	   assassination	   in	   1963,	   the	   U.S.	   devoted	   considerably	   less	  attention	   to	   Iranian	   domestic	   affairs.	   	   As	   Mark	   Gasiorowski	   explains,	   President	  Johnson’s	  team	  was	  	  “increasingly	  preoccupied	  with	  the	  Vietnam	  War	  and	  later	  the	  Arab-­‐Israeli	  conflict…	  distracting	   its	   attention	   from	   Iran	   and	   further	   reducing	   the	   salience	   of	   perimeter	  defence…	  together	  with	  U.S.	  policy	  makers’	  growing	  confidence	  in	  the	  shah’s	  ability	  to	   contain	   domestic	   unrest…	   Sharply	   declining	   U.S.	   military	   and	   economic	   aid	  reduced	   the	  ability	  of	  U.S.	  policy	  makers	   to	  pressure	   the	  shah	   for	   further	   reforms.	  	  The	   State	   Department	   and	   the	   CIA	   also	   drastically	   reduced	   their	   intelligence	  gathering	   capabilities	   in	   Iran	   in	   the	  mid-­‐	   and	   later	  1960s.	   	  The	   size	  of	   the	  Tehran	  embassy’s	  political	  section	  fell	  from	  twenty-­‐one	  in	  1963	  to	  ten	  in	  1969	  and	  only	  six	  in	  1972.	  	  The	  CIA	  dropped	  many	  of	  its	  Iranian	  agents”.18	  	  Additionally,	   the	   Shah,	   who	   was	   “still	   smarting	   from	   American	   pressures	   applied	  during	  the	  Kennedy	  administration…	  determined	  that	  he	  would	  use	  all	  means	  at	  his	  disposal	  to	  win	  the	  Johnson	  administration	  to	  his	  personal	  cause,”	  working	  hard	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Quotes are from Ibid., 265. 
16 Ibid., 267, 320. 
17 Ibid., 286–287. 
18 Gasiorowski, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah, 99. 
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build	  a	  close	  relationship	  with	  Kennedy’s	   replacement.19	   	  Burgeoning	  oil	   revenues	  also	  bolstered	  the	  monarch’s	  bargaining	  leverage.20	  	  
Nixon	  &	  Ford:	  
In	   the	   years	   that	   followed,	   the	   Shah’s	   leverage	   over	  Washington	   increased.	  	  With	   the	  Vietnam	  debacle	   reaching	   a	   crescendo,	   the	  United	   States	   looked	   to	   local	  allies	   to	   take	  up	   the	   slack	   in	  ensuring	   regional	   stability	  under	   the	  Nixon	  Doctrine.	  	  The	  Shah	  also	  had	  maintained	  a	  strong	  relationship	  with	  President	  Nixon	  going	  back	  to	  his	  days	  as	  vice	  president	  under	  Eisenhower,	  and	  he	  allegedly	  even	  tried	  to	  help	  Nixon	  get	  elected	  in	  1960	  and	  1968	  –	  for	  example,	  one	  of	  the	  Shah’s	  close	  confidants	  accuses	  him	  of	  giving	  illicit	  funds	  to	  Nixon’s	  campaigns.21	  	  	   The	  new	  administration	  also	  shared	  a	  common	  worldview	  with	  the	  Shah.	  	  As	  Henry	  Kissinger	  explains	  that	  	  	  “Under	  the	  shah’s	  	  leadership,	  the	  land	  bridge	  between	  Asia	  and	  Europe,	  so	  often	  the	  hinge	   of	   world	   history,	   was	   pro-­‐American	   and	   pro-­‐West	   beyond	   any	   challenge.	  	  Alone	  among	  the	  countries	  of	  the	  region	  –	  Israel	  aside	  –	  Iran	  made	  friendship	  with	  the	  United	  States	  the	  starting	  point	  of	   its	  policy.	   	  That	   it	  was	  based	  on	  a	  cold-­‐eyed	  assessment	  that	  a	   threat	   to	   Iran	  would	  most	   likely	  come	  from	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	   in	  combination	  with	  radical	  Arab	  states,	  is	  only	  another	  way	  of	  saying	  that	  the	  shah’s	  view	  of	  the	  realities	  of	  world	  politics	  paralleled	  our	  own”.22	  	  In	   response	   to	   a	   request	   from	   the	   Shah	   to	   “protect	  me,”	   Nixon	  made	   clear	   to	   his	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Bill, The Eagle and the Lion, 170. 
20 Gasiorowski, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah, 113. 
21 For this specific claim, see Milani, The Shah, 248. See also Bill, The Eagle and the Lion, 137. 
22 Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Simon and Schuster, 2011), 1262. 
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aides	   that	   Iranian	   arms	   requests	   “should	   not	   be	   second-­‐guessed”.23	   	   His	  administration	   proceeded	   to	   sell	   weapons	   to	   the	   Shah	   far	   in	   excess	   of	   what	  bureaucrats	  at	  the	  Defense	  and	  State	  Departments	  thought	  was	  advisable;	  over	  the	  next	   four	  years,	   Iranian	  orders	  made	  up	  more	   than	  half	  of	  all	  orders	   for	  U.S.	  arms	  sales	   abroad.24	   	  With	   Kissinger	   still	   holding	   the	   top	   office	   at	   Foggy	   Bottom,	   Ford	  administration	   largely	   maintained	   these	   patterns	   of	   relations.	   	   His	   government	  continued	   unfettered	   weapons	   sales	   to	   Iran,	   approved	   a	   major	   economic	   accord	  with	   Iran,	   and	   uttered	   little	   complaint	  when	   the	   Shah	   sold	   out	   America’s	   Kurdish	  allies	  it	  had	  previously	  been	  using	  to	  undermine	  Saddam	  Hussein.25	  	  
Carter:	  
Despite	   disagreements	   on	   arms	   sales	   and	   human	   rights	   issues,	   the	   Carter	  administration	   saw	   strong	   value	   in	   reinforcing	   the	   Shah.	   	   James	  Bill	   explains	   that	  “early	   in	   the	   Carter	   administration	   the	   shah	   had	   effectively	   convinced	   the	   new	  president	  that	  the	  Pahlavi	  regime	  was	  exceptionally	  important	  to	  the	  United	  States…	  the	  issue	  of	  human	  rights	  did	  not	  figure	  heavily	  in	  the	  political	  equation;	  it	  was	  far	  down	  on	  Carter’s	  list	  of	  issues	  concerning	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Iran”.26	  	  Indeed,	  the	  president	  had	  decided	  that	  “expression	  of	  concern	  would	  not	  change	  the	  policies	  of	  the	  shah”	  and	  should	  not	  get	  in	  the	  way	  of	  crucial	  ties.27	  	  He	  proclaimed	  near	  the	  end	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Gregory F. Treverton, “Iran, 1978-1979: Coping with the Unthinkable,” in Dealing with Dictators: 
Dilemmas of U.S. Diplomacy and Intelligence Analysis, 1945-1990, ed. Ernest R. May and Philip Zelikow 
(MIT Press, 2006), 112; Kissinger, White House Years, 1264. 
24 Treverton, “Iran, 1978-1979: Coping with the Unthinkable,” 112; Bill, The Eagle and the Lion, 201. 
25 Bill, The Eagle and the Lion, 204–207. 
26 Ibid., 232. 
27 Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (University of Arkansas Press, 1995), 437. 
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of	  1977	  that	  “Iran	  under	  the	  great	  leadership	  of	  the	  Shah	  is	  an	  island	  of	  stability	  in	  one	  of	  the	  most	  troubled	  areas	  of	  the	  world”.28	  	  As	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Vance	  explains,	  “we	  decided	  early	  on	  that	  it	  was	  in	  our	  national	  interest	  to	  support	  the	  Shah”.29	  Thus,	  when	  the	  revolution	  hit,	   the	  U.S.	  administration	  did	   its	  utmost	  before	  the	  Islamic	  Revolution	  to	  reinforce	  the	  shah	  against	  burgeoning	  unrest.	  	  For	  most	  of	  the	  crisis,	  Carter	  relied	  on	  his	  national	  security	  advisor,	  Zbigniew	  Brzezinski,	   	  who	  “simply	  wanted	  to	  see	  the	  shah’s	  regime	  remain,	  wanted	  to	  see	  us	  support	  him	  and	  wasn’t	  going	  to	  hear	  anything	  that	  contradicted	  that	  position”;	  his	  attitude	  was	  “tell	  me	  how	  to	  make	  it	  work”.30	  	  Some	  officials	  at	  the	  State	  Department	  came	  to	  believe	  that	   “only	   a	   political	   solution	   capitalizing	   on	   the	   ‘moderates	   of	   the	   center’	   could	  succeed,”	   but	   “without	   the	   support	   of	   the	   secretary	   of	   state	   they	   were	   unable	   to	  argue	  their	  views	  at	  the	  highest	  level”.31	  In	   early	   November,	   Brzezinski	   received	   Carter’s	   backing	   to	   have	   the	  ambassador	   in	   Tehran	   tell	   the	   Shah	   that	   America	   still	   supported	   him	   “without	  reservation”	   and	   that	   the	   time	  had	   come	   for	   “decisive	   action,”	  while	   liberalization	  could	   wait	   until	   calm	  was	   restored.32	   	   Even	   in	   his	   more	   uncertain	  moments	   that	  December,	   Carter	   admitted	   “we	   personally	   prefer	   that	   the	   shah	  maintain	   a	  major	  role	  in	  the	  government”.33	  	  	  A	  week	  after	  the	  Shah	  left	  Iran	  in	  January,	  the	  Americans	  tried	  to	  support	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Bill, The Eagle and the Lion, 233. 
29 Cyrus R. Vance, Hard Choices: Critical Years in America’s Foreign Policy (Simon and Schuster, 1983), 
317. 
30 Assessment of the State Department’s Iran desk officer, Henry Precht. Treverton, “Iran, 1978-1979: 
Coping with the Unthinkable,” 117. 
31 Gary Sick, All Fall Down: America’s Fateful Encounter in Iran (I.B. Tauris, 1985), 71–72. See also 
Vance, Hard Choices, 327–330. 
32 Sick, All Fall Down, 68. 
33 Treverton, “Iran, 1978-1979: Coping with the Unthinkable,” 126. 
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interim	  Bakhtiar	   government	   by	   sending	   a	  message	   to	  Ayatollah	  Khomeini	   via	   an	  aide.	   	   Using	   diplomatic	   language,	   the	   missive	   discouraged	   the	   ayatollah	   from	  returning	  to	  Iran	  lest	  the	  American-­‐backed	  armed	  forces	  arrest	  the	  political	  process	  with	  a	  coup.34	   	  Even	  after	  Khomeini	   flew	  to	  Tehran	  in	  February,	  Carter,	  Brzezinski	  and	  others	  within	  the	  administration	  continued	  to	  hold	  out	  hope	  in	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  supporting	  coup	  until	  it	  became	  evident	  that	  the	  military	  itself	  was	  no	  longer	  up	  to	  the	  task.35	  	   The	   case	   seems	   to	   fit	   the	   expectations	   of	   the	   dissertation’s	   theory	   quite	  strongly.	  	  This	  includes	  the	  matters	  of	  pretenses,	  secretive	  deliberation	  and	  aversion	  to	  widely	  distributed	  paper,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  importance	  of	  personal	  distractions.	  For	   instance,	   the	   U.S.	   letter	   through	   his	   aide,	   Yazdi,	   in	   which	   Washington	  implicitly	  threatened	  a	  coup	  if	  Khomeini	  came	  back,	  was	  cloaked	  in	  classic	  pretense	  language.	   	   In	   it,	   the	  U.S.	   emphasized	   the	   two	   sides’	  mutual	   interests	   in	   avoiding	   a	  coup,	  vowed	  that	  the	  U.S.	  opposed	  outside	  interference	  in	  Iran’s	  politics,	  and	  implied	  that	  Khomeini’s	  return	  to	  Iran	  would	  be	  “premature”	  at	  the	  present	  time	  because	  it	  would	  risk	  triggering	  an	  “extra-­‐constitutional	  confrontation,”	  that	  is,	  the	  U.S.	  would	  be	  inclined	  to	  give	  its	  allies	  in	  the	  Iranian	  military	  a	  green	  light	  to	  launch	  a	  coup.36	  The	   case	   also	   seems	   to	   demonstrate	   patterns	   of	   leaders	   operating	   in	   a	  manner	   designed	   to	   shield	   their	   true	   intentions	   from	   leaks.	   	   This	   includes	  preemptively	  taking	  steps	  during	  the	  deliberative	  process	  to	  avoid	  formal	  decision-­‐making	   channels,	   instead	   operating	   on	   a	   strict	   need-­‐to-­‐know	   basis	   and	   issuing	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Sick, All Fall Down, 146. 
35 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981 (Farrar 
Straus & Giroux, 1983), 391–393; Sick, All Fall Down, 152–156. 
36 Sick, All Fall Down, 146. 
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verbal	  orders	  instead	  of	  written	  directives	  whenever	  possible.	  	  	  For	  example,	  during	   the	  1978	   turmoil	   in	   Iran,	  American	  officials	  discussing	  LSI	   often	   communicated	   via	   telephone	   instead	   of	   in	   classified	   cables	   for	   fear	   that	  their	  words	  would	  “appear,	  almost	  verbatim,	   in	   the	  New	  York	  Times”.37	   	  When	  the	  desk	  officer	  for	  Iran	  wrote	  a	  memo	  to	  his	  bosses	  insisting	  that	  the	  Shah’s	  days	  were	  limited	  and	  that	  they	  should	  begin	  promoting	  a	  council	  of	  notables	  instead,	  his	  cover	  letter	  candidly	  vented	  that	  “I	  have	  probably	  confided	  more	  than	  I	  should	  to	  a	  piece	  of	  paper,	  but	  I	  doubt	  I	  have	  much	  of	  a	  future	  anyway”.38	  Ironically,	  Sick	  points	  out	  the	  author	  “was	  unaware	  that	  George	  Ball’s	  Council	  of	   Notables	   idea	   had	   already	   been	   floated	   to	   Sullivan	   and	   that	   he	   had	   rejected	   it.	  	  This	   is	  a	  measure	  of	   the	  degree	   to	  which	   the	  circle	  of	   information	  had	  contracted.	  	  Critical	   policy	   messages	   were	   no	   longer	   being	   distributed	   below	   the	   level	   of	   the	  assistant	   secretary”	   and	   points	   out	   that	   “despite	   [the	   author’s]	   verbal	   criticism	   of	  continued	  support	  for	  the	  shah,	  which	  was	  quite	  well	  known	  throughout	  the	  policy	  community…	  [he]	  had	  waited	  until	  December	  19	  to	  put	  his	  thoughts	  on	  paper”.39	  Officials	   used	   unusual	   back	   channels	   to	   coordinate	   meddling	   with	   their	  counterparts	   abroad.	   	   For	   instance,	   the	   administration’s	   November	   2nd	   private	  message	   of	   support	   to	   the	   Shah	  was	   technically	   described	   as	   a	   personal	  message	  from	   the	   national	   security	   advisor	   to	   the	   American	   ambassador	   in	   Tehran,	   and	  Brzezinski	   also	  was	   holding	   repeated	   backchannel	   conversations	  with	   the	   Iranian	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Treverton, “Iran, 1978-1979: Coping with the Unthinkable,” 131. 
38 Sick, All Fall Down, 121. 
39 Ibid. 
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ambassador	   to	   Washington	   without	   the	   State	   Department’s	   knowledge.40	   	   Vance	  reflects	   that	   he	  was	   only	   informed	   about	   Brzezinski’s	   back	   channel	   conversations	  through	  his	  own	  sources	  on	  the	  ground	  and	  that	  he	  confronted	  the	  national	  security	  advisor	  in	  front	  of	  President	  Carter	  about	  having	  been	  left	  out	  of	  the	  loop.41	  Finally,	  personal	  distractions	  seemed	  to	  matter	  a	  lot,	  which	  should	  not	  be	  the	  case	  if	  meddling	  were	  only	  driven	  by	  objective	  international	  circumstances.	  Carter’s	  efforts	  to	  shore	  up	  the	  Shah	  came	  too	  little,	  too	  late,	  in	  part	  because	  he	  was	  initially	  caught	  up	  with	  Arab-­‐Israeli	  issues.	  	  When	  protests	  against	  the	  Shah	  escalated	  into	  a	  rebellion	  in	  the	  fall	  of	  1978,	  he	  and	  his	  advisers	  were	  initially	  so	  fixated	  on	  Israeli-­‐Egyptian	   talks	   at	   Camp	   David	   that	   they	   failed	   to	   recognize	   the	   severity	   of	   the	  emerging	  rebellion	  against	  the	  regime.42	   	  He	  did	  take	  time	  out	  from	  the	  summit	  to	  place	   a	   phone	   call	   to	   the	   Shah	   to	   reiterate	   his	   personal	   support	   after	   the	   Black	  Friday	  massacre,	   but	   the	   action	  betrayed	   a	   grave	  underestimation	  of	   the	   regime’s	  problems	   and	   convinced	   the	   opposition	   that	  Washington	  would	   not	   support	   even	  measured	  liberalization.43	  	  
Reagan:	  
In	   1985	   and	   1986,	   the	   Reagan	   administration	   undertook	   	   the	   secret	   arms	  sales	  to	  Iran	  through	  Israel	   that	  ultimately	  became	  part	  of	   the	  Iran-­‐Contra	  scandal	  when	   some	   of	   the	   proceeds	  were	   redirected	   to	   support	   the	   Contras	   in	   Nicaragua	  against	  the	  intent	  of	  Congress.	  	  What	  many	  observers	  tend	  to	  forget	  is	  that	  the	  effort	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Ibid., 68; Treverton, “Iran, 1978-1979: Coping with the Unthinkable,” 128. 
41 Vance, Hard Choices, 328. 
42 Treverton, “Iran, 1978-1979: Coping with the Unthinkable,” 118–119. 
43 Bill, The Eagle and the Lion, 257–258. 
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first	  emerged	  as	  part	  of	  an	  ambitious	  American	  and	  Israeli	  effort	  to	  try	  and	  influence	  the	  internal	  power	  dynamics	  within	  the	  Iranian	  regime.	  	  	  Indeed,	   one	   of	   the	   very	   few	   documents	   bearing	   Reagan’s	   imprimatur	   from	  the	  debacle,	  a	  covert	  action	  finding	  that	  was	  withheld	  from	  Congress,	  explains	  that	  this	  was	   literally	   the	   administration’s	   number	   one	   objective	   for	   the	   arms	   sales:	   “I	  hereby	   find	   that	   the	   following	  operation…	   is	   important	   to	   the	  national	   security	   of	  the	   United	   States…	   for	   the	   purpose	   of:	   (1)	   establishing	   a	   more	   moderate	  government	   in	   Iran,	   (2)	   obtaining	   from	   them	   significant	   intelligence…	   and	   (3)	  furthering	  the	  release	  of	  the	  American	  hostages	  held	  in	  Beirut”.44	  At	   the	   time,	   American	   analysts	   were	   abuzz	   about	   rumors	   that	   Ayatollah	  Khomeini	  was	  ill	  and	  that	  the	  Iran-­‐Iraq	  War	  was	  creating	  new	  openings	  for	  possible	  encroachments	  by	  pro-­‐Soviet	  factions	  within	  the	  Iranian	  government.	  	  For	  instance,	  the	  Near	  East	  officer	  on	  the	  National	  Intelligence	  Council	  wrote	  at	  the	  time	  that	  “the	  Khomeini	  regime	  is	  faltering	  and…	  we	  will	  soon	  see	  a	  struggle	  for	  succession.	   	  The	  U.S.	   has	   almost	   no	   cards	   to	   play;	   the	   USSR	   has	   many…	   our	   urgent	   need	   is	   to	  develop…	  some	  leverage	  in	  the	  race	  for	  influence	  in	  Tehran”.45	  President	   Reagan	   suggests	   in	   his	   follow-­‐up	  memoir,	  An	   American	   Life,	   that	  these	  rumors	  did	  influence	  his	  receptivity	  to	  selling	  arms	  that	  might	  bolster	  Iranian	  moderates:	   “at	   that	   time,	   there	   were	   reports	   worldwide	   that	   the	   ayatollah	   was	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 “Memorandum from John M. Poindexter to President Ronald Reagan ‘Covert Action Finding Regarding 
Iran,’ with Attached Presidential Finding”, January 17, 1986, Document 16 - 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB210/index.htm, Digital National Security Archive. 
45 Graham E. Fuller, “Toward a Policy on Iran - Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence and 
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence”, May 17, 1985, 
www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0001341948/DOC_0001341948.pdf, CIA Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA) Electronic Reading Room. The document was also distributed to top Mideast officials at the NSC 
and Department of State. 
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extremely	  ill…	  and	  intelligence	  reports	  indicated	  that	  several	  factions	  had	  formed	  to	  jockey	   for	   control	   of	   Iran	   after	   the	   ayatollah’s	   death.	   	   From	   our	   point	   of	   view,	  reestablishing	  a	  friendly	  relationship	  with	  this	  strategically	  located	  country	  –	  while	  preventing	  the	  Soviets	  from	  doing	  the	  same	  thing	  –	  was	  very	  attractive…	  we	  wanted	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  next	  government	  in	  Teheran	  was	  moderate	  and	  friendly”.46	  The	  LSI	  element	  of	  the	  Iran	  arms	  deal	  was	  essential.	  	  Regan	  explains	  that	  Bud	  McFarlance	  had	  described	  the	  plan’s	   Iranian	  beneficiaries	  as	   “moderate,	  politically	  influential	  Iranians”	  who	  “wanted	  to	  establish	  a	  quiet	  relationship	  with	  U.S.	  leaders	  as	  a	  prelude	  to	  reestablishing	  formal	  relations	  between	  our	  countries	  following	  the	  death	  of	  the	  Ayatollah	  Khomeini”.47	   	  Henceforth,	  Reagan	  repeatedly	  refers	  to	  these	  Iranians	  ,	  in	  American	  Life	  as	  “the	  Iranian	  moderates”.	  Further,	  he	  makes	  clear	  that	  “here	  was	  a	  bona	  fide	  opportunity	  to	  shape	  the	  future	   in	   the	   Middle	   East,	   take	   the	   initiative,	   and	   preempt	   the	   Soviets	   in	   an	  important	   corner	   of	   the	   world.	   	   As	   I’ve	   said,	   we	   wanted	   moderates	   running	   the	  Iranian	   government.	   	   I	   would	   not	   have	   entertained	   the	   plan	   for	   a	   second	   if	   the	  Israelis	   had	   said	   they	  wanted	   to	   sell	  American	  weapons	   to	   the	   ayatollah	  or	   to	  his	  militia,	   which	   was	   operated	   separately	   from	   the	   Iranian	   army;	   it	   did	   not	   seem	  unreasonable	   that	   Iranian	   moderates	   who	   opposed	   the	   ayatollah’s	   authoritarian	  regime	  would	   ask	   for	  weapons	   in	   order	   to	   strengthen	   their	   position	   and	   enhance	  their	   credibility	   with	   Iran’s	  military	   leaders.	   	   Iran’s	  military	   forces	   were	   to	   some	  extent	  independent	  of	  the	  ayatollah.	  	  We	  knew	  of	  many	  cases	  where	  factions	  fighting	  for	  control	  of	  a	  country	  –	  often	   trying	   to	   introduce	  democracy	   to	   it	  –	  had	   found	   it	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Ronald Reagan, An American Life (Simon and Schuster, 2011), 504. 
47 Ibid. 
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necessary	  to	  get	  the	  country’s	  military	  on	  their	  side”.48	  In	   his	   address	   to	   the	   nation	   apologizing	   for	   the	   scandal,	   President	   Reagan	  reflected	  that	  “It	  was	  a	  mistake.	   	  I	  undertook	  the	  original	  Iran	  initiative	  in	  order	  to	  develop	   relations	   with	   those	   who	   might	   assume	   leadership	   in	   a	   post-­‐Khomeini	  government.	  	  It’s	  clear	  from	  the	  [Tower	  Commission]	  Board’s	  report,	  however,	  that	  I	  let	  my	  personal	  concern	  for	  the	  hostages	  spill	  over	  into	  the	  geopolitical	  strategy	  of	  reaching	   out	   to	   Iran”.49	   	   He	   writes	   that	   “looking	   back	   now…	   some	   of	   those	  ‘moderates’	   may	   have	   had	   links	   to	   the	   Ayatollah	   Khomeini’s	   government…	   or	  behaved	  at	  times	  like	  bait-­‐and-­‐switch	  con	  men”.50	   	  And	  even	  though	  “I	  still	  believe	  that	   the	   policy	   that	   led	   us	   to	   attempt	   to	   open	   up	   a	   channel	   to	  moderate	   Iranians	  wasn’t	   wrong…	   I	   may	   not	   have	   asked	   enough	   questions	   about	   how	   the	   Iranian	  initiative	  was	  being	  conducted”.51	  As	   I	   argue	   elsewhere	   in	   this	   project,	   the	   president’s	   style	   of	   management	  seems	   to	   be	   a	   critical	   determinant	   of	   whether	   or	   not	   bureaucratic	   freelancing	   is	  possible	  against	  his	  wishes.	   	  In	  his	  apology	  to	  the	  nation,	  Reagan	  noted	  that	  “much	  has	   been	   said	   about	   my	  management	   style…	  when	   it	   came	   to	   managing	   the	   NSC	  staff,	  let’s	  face	  it,	  my	  style	  didn’t	  match	  its	  previous	  track	  record.	  	  I’ve	  already	  begun	  correcting	  this…	  there’ll	  be	  no	  more	  freelancing	  by	  individuals	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  our	  national	  security”.52	  Because	   of	   the	   secretive	   nature	   of	   American	   behavior	   in	   selling	   arms	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Ibid., 506. 
49 Ronald Reagan, “Address to the Nation on Iran-Contra” (The Miller Center at Virginia University - 
Presidential Studies, March 4, 1987). 
50 Reagan, An American Life, 542. 
51 Ibid., 540–541. 
52 Reagan, “Address to the Nation on Iran-Contra.” 
	   784	  
Tehran,	   the	   Tower	   Commission’s	   report,	   specifically	   it’s	   chapter	   on	   “What	   Was	  Wrong”	  (Part	  IV),	  puts	  into	  focus	  many	  of	  the	  biggest	  challenges	  with	  LSI	  policy	  writ	  large,	  even	   though	  the	  scandal	  was	  a	  rather	  unique	  application	  of	  LSI.	   	  The	  report	  argues	  that	  “the	  arms	  transfers	  to	  Iran	  and	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  NSC	  staff	  in	  support	  of	  the	  Contras	  are	  case	  studies	  in	  the	  perils	  of	  policy	  pursued	  outside	  the	  constraints	  of	   orderly	   process…	   this	   pattern	   persisted	   in	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	   Iran	  initiative…	  the	  initiative	  fell	  within	  the	  traditional	  jurisdictions	  of	  the	  Departments	  of	  State,	  Defense,	  and	  CIA.	  	  Yet	  these	  agencies	  were	  largely	  ignored.	  	  Great	  reliance	  was	   placed	   on	   a	   network	   of	   private	   operators	   and	   intermediaries.	   	   How	   this	  initiative	   was	   to	   be	   carried	   out	   never	   received	   adequate	   attention	   from	   the	   NSC	  principals	  or	  a	  tough	  working-­‐level	  review…	  the	  result	  was	  an	  unprofessional	  and,	  in	  substantial	  part,	  unsatisfactory	  operation.	  	  In	  all	  this	  process,	  Congress	  was	  never	  notified”.53	  	  Although	  LSI	  typically	  does	  not	  involve	  the	  sort	  statutory	  violations	  that	  Reagan’s	   arms	   sales	   eventually	   incurred,	   the	   episode	   serves	   as	   a	   cautionary	   tale.	  	  Presidential	   diplomacy	   in	   the	   pursuit	   of	   leadership	   selection	   intervention	   can	   be	  astute	   and	   swift,	   but	   it	   can	   also	   run	   the	   risk	   of	   being	   unprofessional	   and	  counterproductive	  if	  the	  president	  is	  not	  guiding	  policy	  in	  the	  right	  direction.	  	   As	   in	   the	   broader	   arena	   of	   LSI,	   the	   Tower	   Commission	   report	   also	  emphasizes	  that	  “the	  whole	  decision	  process	  was	  too	  informal…	  no	  formal	  minutes	  seem	  to	  have	  been	  kept.	   	  Decisions	  subsequently	   taken	  by	   the	  President	  were	  not	  formally	   recorded.	   	   An	   exception	   was	   the	   January	   17	   Finding,	   but	   even	   this	   was	  apparently	  not	  circulated	  or	  shown	  to	  key	  U.S.	  officials.	  	  The	  effect	  of	  this	  informality	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 John Goodwin Tower, Edmund S. Muskie, and Brent Scowcroft, The Tower Commission Report: The 
Full Text of the President’s Special Review Board (Bantam Books, 1987), 62. 
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was	   that	   the	   initiative	   lacked	  a	   formal	   institutional	   record…	   	   It	  made	   it	  difficult	   to	  determine	   where	   the	   initiative	   stood,	   and	   to	   learn	   lessons	   from	   the	   record	   that	  could	   guide	   future	   action…	   the	   Board	   can	   attest	   first	   hand	   to	   the	   problem	   of	  conducting	  a	  review	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  such	  records”.54	  This	   author	   can	   also	   attest	   firsthand	   that	   conducting	   research	   on	   LSI	  behavior	  is	  extraordinarily	  difficult,	  even	  when	  it	  is	  not	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  an	  enormous	  legal	  and	  political	  scandal	  breaking	  out	  into	  the	  public	  realm.	  	  However,	  just	  because	  assembling	  a	  record	  of	  this	  behavior	  is	  difficult	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  it	  should	  not	  be	  done.	   	   In	   fact,	  often	   the	  most	  difficult	   topics	  of	   inquiry	  can	  be	   the	  most	   in	  need	  of	  serious	  study.	  	  Governments’	  natural	  inclinations	  in	  this	  issue	  area	  –	  neither	  keeping	  written	   records	   nor	   acknowledging	   such	   involvement	   retrospectively	   –	   makes	   it	  especially	  prone	  to	  non-­‐evaluative	  biases.55	  	  This	  heightens	  the	  risk	  of	  pathological	  foreign	   policy	   behavior	   in	   case	   after	   case	   and	   adds	   to	   the	   importance	   of	   serious	  outside	  analyses	  such	  as	  this	  study	  being	  conducted	  instead.	  	  
Bush	  41:	  
The	   George	   H.	   W.	   Bush	   administration	   explored	   the	   possibility	   of	   again	  working	   with	   moderate	   elements	   in	   Iran	   under	   President	   Hashemi	   Rafsanjani	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Ibid., 70–71. 
55 On a discussion of non-evaluation in international relations, see Stephen William Van Evera, “Causes of 
War” (Ph.D. Dissertation - University of California, Berkeley, 1984), chap. IX: Non–Evaluation, pp. 453–
499; Stephen Van Evera, “Why States Believe Foolish Ideas: Non-Self Evaluation by States and Societies,” 
in Perspectives in Structural Realism, ed. Andrew K. Hanami (Palgrave, 2003), 163–198. For application 
to a non-IR context, see also Aaron Wildavsky, “The Self-Evaluating Organization,” Public Administration 
Review 32, no. 5 (October 1972): 509–520. 
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secure	   the	  release	  of	  American	  hostages	  held	  by	  Shi’ite	  groups	   in	  Lebanon.56	   	  Ken	  Pollack	   believes	   that	   Rafsanjani’s	   inability	   to	   produce	   quick	   results	   and	   recent	  memory	  persuaded	  the	  president	  and	  his	  advisors	  “that	  the	  United	  States	  could	  not	  start	  a	  rapprochement	  with	  a	  faction	  inside	  the	  Iranian	  government;	  until	  Iran	  as	  a	  whole	   was	   ready,	   it	   would	   be	   a	   waste	   of	   America’s	   time	   –	   and	   a	   potentially	  embarrassing	   one,	   as	   their	   own	   experiences	   with	   Iran-­‐contra	   reminded	   them”.57	  	  However,	   it	   is	   also	   possible	   that	   this	   was	   an	   episode	   of	   American	   LSI;	   the	   data	  currently	  available	  is	  somewhat	  weak	  for	  either	  perspective.	  	   American	   outreach	   through	   the	   UN	   regarding	   the	   hostages	   was	   likely	  influenced	  by	  leadership	  changes	  in	  Tehran,	  since	  it	  started	  in	  early	  August	  of	  1989,	  just	   weeks	   after	   the	   death	   of	   Ayatollah	   Khomeini	   and	   the	   election	   of	   	   perceived	  moderate	  Rafsanjani	   as	   president.58	   	  UN	  officials	   agreed	   to	   frame	   a	  message	   from	  President	   Bush	   as	   UN	   Secretary	   General	   Javier	   Pérez	   de	   Cuéllar’s	   description	   of	  Bush’s	  thinking.	  	  The	  idea	  was	  to	  shield	  Rafsanjani	  from	  Iranian	  radicals	  if	  he	  were	  forced	   to	  admit	   receiving	   the	  message	  because	   “we	   felt	   that	  we	  needed	   to	  protect	  Rafsanjani	  as	  the	  new	  man	  in	  Teheran”.59	  	   One	   of	   the	   main	   intermediaries	   for	   the	   hostage	   quid	   pro	   quo	   was	  Giandomenico	  Picco,	  an	  aide	  to	  Cuéllar.	  	  As	  he	  explains,	  even	  this	  abortive	  non-­‐case	  seems	   to	   fit	   the	   dynamics	   of	   paper	   aversion	   described	   in	   the	   other	   episodes	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 In addition to the UN source cited below, for more on this period see Barbara Slavin, Bitter Friends, 
Bosom Enemies: Iran, the U.S., and the Twisted Path to Confrontation (Macmillan, 2009), 178–181; Ali 
M. Ansari, Confronting Iran: The Failure of American Foreign Policy and the Next Great Crisis in the 
Middle East (Basic Books, 2006), 131–132. 
57 Kenneth M. Pollack, The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict Between Iran and America (Random House, Inc., 
2005), 247. 
58 Giandomenico Picco, Man Without a Gun: One Diplomat’s Secret Struggle to Free the Hostages, Fight 
Terrorism, and End a War (Times Books, 1999), 111–112. 
59 Ibid., 111–2. 
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dyads,	  perhaps	  amplified	  in	  this	  instance	  because	  the	  lives	  of	  hostages	  hung	  in	  the	  balance.	   	   He	   writes	   in	   his	   memoirs	   that	   “I	   never	   mentioned	   the	   subject	   of	   the	  hostages	  in	  New	  York	  outside	  the	  most	  tightly	  restricted	  circles;	  success,	  if	  we	  were	  to	  have	  it,	  required	  complete	  secrecy	  within	  the	  United	  Nations	  itself	  –	  virtually	  an	  oxymoron.	  	  Even	  within	  the	  secretary-­‐general’s	  office	  we	  never	  discussed	  the	  case	  in	  ways	  that	  might	  reveal	  my	  involvement.	  	  Everything	  I	  did	  on	  the	  hostage	  issue	  was	  marked	  for	  the	  files,	  “No	  Distribution.	  	  Original	  1	  –	  Sec.	  Gen.,	  G.P.	  Copy.”	  	  It	  went	  into	  the	   “pink	   folder,”	   inviolable	   to	   everyone	   except	   my	   assistant…	   the	   entire	   affair	  became	  the	  exclusive	  province	  of	  Pérez	  de	  Cuéllar	  and	  myself…	  to	  this	  day,	  I	  regret	  that,	  during	  those	  years,	  it	  was	  necessary	  to	  deceive	  the	  secretary	  general’s	  chef	  de	  
cabinet,	  Virenda	  Dayal,	  who	  had	  no	  knowledge	  of	  the	  details	  of	  my	  operations	  –	  or	  even	  my	  whereabouts…	  my	  suspicion	  was	  that	  Dayal,	  an	  Indian	  national,	  tended	  to	  share	   information	   with	   diplomas	   of	   various	   countries	   in	   order	   to	   strengthen	   his	  bureaucratic	  position	  as	  somebody	  ‘in	  the	  know’.”60	  At	  one	  point,	  Baker	  conveyed	  that	  messages	  regarding	  Iran’s	  efforts	  over	  the	  hostage	  “should	  be	  conveyed	  personally	  to	  Bush,	  to	  Baker	  himself,	  or	  to	  Ambassador	  Pickering”	  at	  the	  UN,	  thus	  limiting	  the	  flow	  of	  information	  toward	  the	  American	  side	  as	  well.61	  	  And	  although	  Picco	  felt	  that	  the	  main	  reason	  the	  U.S.	  declined	  in	  April	  of	  1992	  to	  follow	  through	  on	  its	  plan	  whereby	  “goodwill	  beget	  goodwill”	  was	  probably	  the	   impending	   American	   election,62	   interpersonal	   dynamics	   seemed	   to	   drive	  behavior	   as	  well.	   	   He	   recalls	   that	   in	   July	   of	   1991,	   one	   of	   the	   reasons	   the	   Iranians	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Ibid., 107, 108, 109. 
61 Ibid., 124. 
62 Ibid., 4, 104–105. 
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were	  so	  eager	   to	  move	  ahead	  swiftly	  on	   the	  hostage	   issue	  was	   that	   they	  hoped	   to	  close	   the	   hostage	   file	   before	   the	   end	   of	   Cuéllar’s	   term	   in	   office.63	   	   The	   American	  government	   granted	   both	   Picco	   and	   Cuéllar	   medals	   for	   personal	   appreciation	   of	  their	  role	  in	  the	  episode.64	  However,	  Picco	  feels	   that	  the	  abortive	  nature	  of	   the	  American	  effort	  caused	  damage	  to	  Rafsanjani’s	  position	  that	  was	  palpable.	   	  The	  Iranian	  president	  told	  him	  “you	   understand,	   Mr.	   Picco,	   that	   you	   are	   putting	  me	   in	   a	   very	   difficult	   position…	  [and]	   I	   understood	   him	   loud	   and	   clear.	   	   Rafsanjani	   was	   Iran’s	   most	   pragmatic	  political	   leader,	   and	   he	   must	   have	   played	   a	   valuable	   chip	   convincing	   those	   in	  Teheran	   who	   opposed	   him	   that	   helping	   in	   Beirut	   would	   pay	   off	   in	   an	   American	  goodwill	   gesture”.	   	   Javad	  Zarif,	   an	   Iranian	  diplomat	   involved	   in	   the	  exchange,	   said	  after	  their	  meeting	  that	  “he	  was	  very	  worried	  about	  the	  domestic	  consequences	  for	  Iran’s	   president.	   	   My	   troubles	   might	   be	   over,	   but	   Rafsanjani’s	   and	   those	   other	  Iranian	  officials	  who	  had	  spent	  political	  capital	  to	  help	  free	  the	  Beirut	  hostages	  were	  just	  beginning”.65	  	  
Clinton:	  
Two	  periods	  are	  particularly	  notable	  during	  the	  Clinton	  administration	  with	  regard	  to	  American	  behavior	  with	  regard	  to	  LSI	  towards	  Iran.	  	  The	  first	  pertains	  to	  presidential	   efforts	   to	   keep	   Republican	   grandstanding	   in	   Congress	   from	   affecting	  Iranian	   internal	   political	   dynamics	   in	   a	   harmful	   manner.	   	   In	   late	   1995,	   House	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Ibid., 150. 
64 Marlene Cimons and Dara McLeod, “Former Hostages Honored at White House; Celebration: Five ‘True 
Heroes’ Join Bush in Lighting the National Christmas Tree,” Los Angeles Times, December 13, 1991. 
65 Picco, Man Without a Gun, 7. 
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Speaker	   Newt	   Gingrich	   held	   the	   entire	   intelligence	   budget	   hostage	   in	   hopes	   of	  forcing	  the	  administration	  to	  accept	  a	  provision	  allocating	  $18	  million	  to	  promoting	  change	  in	  Iran.66	  	  Yet	  even	  though	  Iran-­‐U.S.	  relations	  are	  such	  that	  President	  Clinton	  faced	   clear	   domestic	   incentives	   to	   endorse	   this	   promotion	   of	   changing	   Iran’s	  institutions,	   leadership,	   and	   policies	   altogether,	   his	   administration	   refused	   to	  consent	   until	   Gingrich	   agreed	   to	   change	   the	   language	   from	   regime	   change	   to	  behavior	   change,	   for	   fear	   that	   endorsing	   this	   inflammatory,	   if	   entirely	   symbolic,	  language	  would	  elicit	  a	  backlash	  within	  Iran	  against	  the	  administration’s	  goals.67	  	   This	   episode	   seems	   to	   provide	   especially	   striking	   evidence	   in	   favor	  maintaining	  pretenses	   in	   the	  course	  of	  LSI.	   	  The	   fact	   that	   the	  Clinton	  White	  House	  would	   even	   exert	   political	   capital	   to	   remove	   Gingrich’s	   “regime	   change”	   language	  from	   the	   administration’s	   Iran	   policy	   suggests	   that	   these	   pretenses	   matter	   even	  when	  presidents	  face	  strong	  incentives	  in	  the	  U.S.	  domestic	  arena	  to	  act	  otherwise.	  	   The	  second	  period	  of	  note	  involves	  the	  election	  of	  the	  conciliatory	  moderate	  Mohammad	   Khatami	   as	   president	   of	   Iran	   in	   1997.	   	   From	   that	   point	   forward,	  Clinton’s	   government	   repeatedly	   sought	   opportunities	   to	   create	   an	   opening	   for	  rapprochement	   in	   bilateral	   relations	   and	   to	   bolster	   Khatami	   at	   the	   expense	   of	  conservatives	   and	   the	   supreme	   leader	   in	   Iran.	   	   For	   instance,	   the	   administration	  sought	  to	  signal	  its	  enthusiasm	  for	  the	  election	  of	  a	  reformist	  parliament	  in	  2000	  by	  loosening	   sanctions	   to	   allow	   for	  bilateral	   trade	   in	   carpets,	   pistachios,	   and	  medical	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 David Rogers, “Gingrich Wants Funds Set Aside for Iran Action,” The Wall Street Journal, October 27, 
1995. 
67 R. Jeffrey Smith and Thomas W. Lippman, “White House Agrees to Bill Allowing Covert Action 
Against Iran,” Washington Post, December 22, 1995; Tim Weiner, “U.S. Plan to Change Iran Leaders Is an 
Open Secret Before It Begins,” New York Times, January 26, 1996. 
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products.	  	  As	  one	  official	  anonymously	  explained	  at	  the	  time	  “people	  here	  are	  aware	  that	  the	  Iranian	  moderates	  need	  something	  to	  work	  with”.68	  	  	  
Bush	  43:	  
The	  George	  W.	  Bush	  administration	  approached	  Iranian	  internal	  affairs	  in	  an	  entirely	   different	  manner,	   persuaded	   that	   the	   best	  way	   to	   empower	   reformists	   in	  Iran	  was	  to	  isolate	  rather	  than	  embrace	  its	  hard-­‐line	  government.	  	  Thus,	  it	  dismissed	  overtures	   from	   Iran’s	   moderates	   to	   talk	   and	   minimized	   the	   importance	   of	  unprecedented	  Iranian	  cooperation	  behind	  the	  scenes	  for	  overthrowing	  the	  Taliban	  in	  Afghanistan.69	  	  Instead,	  Bush	  excoriated	  Iran	  for	  being	  part	  of	  an	  axis	  of	  evil	  in	  his	  2002	  State	  of	  the	  Union	  speech,	  and	  called	  later	  that	  year	  for	  supporting	  reformists	  to	  achieve	  “a	  future	  defined	  by	  greater	  freedom,	  greater	  tolerance”	  in	  Iran.70	  	  	  Reformists	  in	  Iran	  report	  that	  Bush’s	  statements	  harmed	  them	  domestically	  by	  delegitimizing	  their	  effort	  to	  foster	  rapprochement	  and	  that	  “the	  authorities	  here	  –	   even	   some	  of	   the	   reformists	   –	   interpreted	   that	   as	   interference	   in	   Iran’s	   internal	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Quote is from Barbara Slavin, “U.S. Discusses Way to Reward Iran,” USA Today, February 22, 2000. 
See also Martin Indyk, Innocent Abroad: An Intimate Account of American Peace Diplomacy in the Middle 
East (Simon and Schuster, 2009), 227–228. 
69 Barbara Slavin, “U.S., Iran Could Benefit from Temporary Alliance,” USA Today, September 28, 2001; 
Steven Mufson and Marc Kaufman, “Longtime Foes U.S., Iran Explore Improved Relations,” Washington 
Post, October 29, 2001; Amy Waldman, “In Louder Voices, Iranians Talk of Dialogue with U.S.,” New 
York Times, December 10, 2001; Amb. James Dobbins et al., “Negotiating with the Iranians: Missed 
Opportunities and Paths Forward” (House Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs of the 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, November 7, 2007). 
70 Karl Vick, “Bush’s Support for Reformers Backfires in Iran: Speech Brings Conservative Crackdown,” 
Washington Post, August 3, 2002. See also Richard W. Stevenson, “Bush Appeals to Iran’s Public in Radio 
Talk,” New York Times, December 21, 2002; Colum Lynch, “Bush Lauds Protesters in Iran, Warns on 
Weapons,” Washington Post, June 19, 2003; Robin Wright and Michael A. Fletcher, “Bush Denounces 
Iran’s Election: President Vows to Stand by Citizenry in Struggle for Freedom,” Washington Post, June 17, 
2005. 
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affairs	  and	  condemned	  it”.71	  	  Millions	  of	  Iranians	  rallied	  in	  the	  streets	  against	  Bush’s	  axis	   of	   evil	   statement.72	   	   Also,	   in	   his	   second	   term	   he	   announced	   $75	   million	   for	  democracy	   promotion	   in	   Iran,	   a	   measure	   widely	   condemned	   there,	   including	   by	  reformists	   because	   it	   gave	   the	   security	   forces	   a	   pretense	   to	   interrogate	  moderate	  organizations	  it	  claimed	  might	  be	  taking	  funds.73	  	  	  
Conclusion	  	   The	   rudimentary	   state	   of	   the	   research	   agenda	   on	   leadership	   selection	  intervention	  necessitates	  putting	  greater	  emphasis	  on	  internal	  validity,	  in	  part	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  external	  validity.	  	  Thus,	  this	  study	  focuses	  on	  exploring	  and	  documenting	  the	  dynamics	  of	  LSI	   in	  a	  very	   limited	  number	  of	  dyads	   in	  order	   to	  ensure	   internal	  validity.	   	   However,	   as	   a	   work	   of	   political	   science	   it	   aims	   to	   establish	   not	   just	  idiographic	  knowledge	  but	  also	  nomothetic	  understanding.	   	  Therefore,	  after	   really	  drilling	  down	  on	  the	  case	  history	  (especially	  in	  the	  Israel	  cases	  covered	  in	  chapters	  three	  through	  seven)	  it	  pivots	  toward	  considering	  which	  patterns	  are	  idiosyncratic	  to	  particular	  contexts	  versus	  which	  ones	  apply	  more	  generally	  to	  multiple	  settings.	  This	   dissertation	   utilizes	   three	   different	   techniques	   for	   exploring	   how	   the	  themes	   that	   emerged	   from	   the	   U.S.-­‐Israel	   directed	   dyad	   also	   drive	   LSI	   in	   other	  contexts.	   	   First,	   it	   studied	   parallel	   instances	   of	   outside	   intervention	   into	   Israeli	  politics	  by	  societies	  other	  than	  the	  United	  States,	  including:	  France,	  Britain,	  Jordan,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Quote is from Vick, “Bush’s Support for Reformers Backfires in Iran: Speech Brings Conservative 
Crackdown.” For the damage caused by the ‘axis of evil statement,’ see also “Interview with Former Vice 
President of Iran Mohammad Ali Abtahi,” PBS Frontline, June 29, 2007. 
72 Neil MacFarquhar, “Millions in Iran Rally Against U.S.,” New York Times, February 12, 2002. 
73 “U.S. to Devote $75 Million to Promoting Democracy in Iran,” Agence France-Presse (AFP), February 
15, 2006; Robin Wright, “Iran on Guard over U.S. Funds,” Washington Post, April 28, 2007. 
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Egypt,	  and	  the	  Palestinians.	  	  Second,	  it	  documented	  another	  history,	  this	  one	  of	  U.S.	  intervention	  into	  the	  politics	  of	  Palestine,	  both	  before	  and	  after	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  Palestinian	  Authority	  in	  1994.	  	  Finally,	  this	  chapter	  briefly	  considered	  episodes	  of	  American	  intervention	  in	  the	  politics	  of	  Iran	  by	  way	  of	  a	  shadow	  case.	  Many	  of	  the	  patterns	  derived	  in	  Chapters	  III	  through	  X	  seemed	  to	  emerge	  in	  the	  Iran	  cases	  as	  well.	   	  Officials	  still	  seemed	  to	  operate	  under	  enormous	  incentives	  to	   employ	   pretense	  when	   intervening	   in	   another	   nation’s	   domestic	   politics.	   	   This	  applied	   when	   Iran	   was	   a	   friendly	   dictatorship	   as	   well	   as	   when	   it	   was	   a	   hostile	  theocracy.	   	   In	   both	   periods,	   U.S.	   officials	   went	   to	   pains	   to	   hide	   their	   intention	   to	  pursue	   LSI	   from	   public	   disclosure	   and	   seemed	   relatively	   capable	   of	   undertaking	  such	  a	  policy	  program	  free	  from	  domestic	  pressure	  or	  accountability.	  	  American	  LSI	  also	   changed	   across	   administrations	   according	   to	   top	   leaders’	   personal	  understanding	  of	  how	  Iranian	  politics	  work.	  	  In	  short,	  the	  theory	  of	  LSI	  derived	  from	  Israeli	   and	   Palestinian	   domestic	   politics	   seems	   to	   apply	   to	   Iranian	   affairs	   and	  perhaps	  beyond	  as	  well.	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Chapter	  XII.	  	  
~	  
Conclusion	  	  	   This	   dissertation	   has	   aimed	   to	   establish	   that	   leadership	   selection	  intervention	   is	   a	   recurring	   and	   consequential	   feature	   of	   America’s	   peace	   process	  diplomacy.	   	   It	   has	   also	   sought	   to	   understand	   and	   explain	   the	   dynamics	   of	   this	  remarkable	   behavior,	   building	   an	   agency-­‐based	   model	   of	   LSI	   that	   is	   designed	   to	  travel	   beyond	   the	   Arab-­‐Israeli	   conflict	   to	   the	   point	   where	   it	   can	   serve	   as	   a	  generalized	   theory	   of	   how	   great	   powers	   play	   favorites	   in	   the	   domestic	   politics	   of	  other	  nations.	   	  And	   it	  has	  sought	   to	  explain	  variation	   in	  not	   just	   the	  occurrence	  of	  LSI	  but	  also	  to	  address	  matters	  of	  efficacy,	  evaluating	  when	  and	  why	  these	  policies	  contribute	  to	  national	  interests	  and	  achieve	  their	  intended	  goals.	  	   This	  chapter	  offers	  some	   final	   thoughts	  as	   to	   the	   implications	  of	   this	   study.	  	  First,	  it	  lays	  out	  a	  summary	  of	  its	  findings,	  including:	  the	  persistence	  of	  presidential	  power,	   an	  explanation	  of	  why	  agency	  matters,	   and	   consideration	  of	   rival	   theories.	  	  Second,	  it	  discusses	  limitations	  of	  the	  present	  study	  and	  suggests	  some	  avenues	  for	  future	   research.	   	   Third,	   it	   offers	   ten	   lessons	   for	   policy-­‐makers	   that	   can	   be	  extrapolated	  from	  the	  case	  histories.	  	  
A.	  Summary	  of	  Findings	  
PRESIDENTIAL	  POWER	  	   Over	  and	  over	  again,	   a	   constant	   theme	   throughout	   these	  cases	   seems	   to	  be	  the	  importance	  of	  top	  leaders	  in	  the	  sender	  state	  –	  in	  this	  study,	  mostly	  the	  U.S.	  –	  for	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determining	  the	  dynamics	  of	  LSI	  behavior.	  	  In	  both	  cases	  and	  non-­‐cases,	  the	  reason	  for	   the	   occurrence	   or	   non-­‐occurrence	   of	   LSI	   can	   usually	   be	   traced	   back	   to	   the	  characteristic	  actions	  of	  either	  the	  president	  or	  one	  of	  his	  most	  trusted	  aides.	   	  And	  although	   efficacy	   is	   subject	   to	   less	   degrees	   of	   freedom	   than	   occurrence	   because	  foreign	  intervention	  can	  only	  change	  so	  much	  of	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  among	  social	  forces	   in	   the	   target	   state,	   efficacy	   also	   seems	   to	   be	   shaped	  most	   by	   the	   ability	   or	  inability	  of	  U.S.	  leaders	  to	  understand	  the	  dynamics	  of	  the	  target’s	  political	  system.	  Some	  important	  dimensions	  of	   leadership	  seem	  to	  be	  presidential	  passions,	  assessments	   about	   their	   foreign	   counterparts,	   personal	   distractions,	   styles	   of	  management	   and	   oversight,	   and	   even	   beliefs	   about	   specific	   political	   contests	  overseas.	   	  For	   instance,	  Carter’s	  passion	  for	   launching	  a	  multilateral	  peace	  process	  at	  the	  start	  of	  his	  term	  led	  him	  to	  overlook	  how	  urgent	  promotion	  of	  such	  a	  process	  would	  damage	  Yitzhak	  Rabin	  at	  the	  polls.	   	  Clinton’s	  eagerness	  to	  aid	  Shimon	  Peres	  led	  him	  to	  overstep	  the	  bounds	  of	  what	  his	  staff	  thought	  was	  judicious,	  causing	  him	  to	   elicit	   a	   partial	   backlash	   of	   nationalist	   voters	   who	   did	   not	   like	   such	   overt	   U.S.	  meddling.1	  	  In	  both	  instances,	  strong	  presidential	  desires	  overrode	  prudence	  and	  led	  to	  counterproductive	  results	  in	  terms	  of	  efficacy	  in	  the	  final	  count.	  Assessments	  of	  personal	  counterparts	  in	  the	  target	  state’s	  political	  elite	  also	  seem	  to	  matter.	  	  It	  is	  difficult	  to	  explain	  why	  Bush	  Senior	  backed	  Shamir	  in	  1989	  but	  then	  tried	  to	  oust	  him	  in	  1990	  and	  again	  in	  1992	  without	  the	  personal	  angle.	  	  In	  the	  end,	   it	  matters	   a	   great	   deal	   that	   Bush	   felt	   the	   prime	  minister	   had	   lied	   to	   him	   on	  settlement	   activity	   and	   that	   in	   time	   the	   president	   came	   to	   describe	   his	   Israeli	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Dennis Ross, The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace (Macmillan, 2004), 
257. 
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counterpart	  in	  private	  as	  “that	  little	  shit”.2	  	  Also,	  Rice	  and	  Bush’s	  belief	  that	  Fayyad	  “needed	  our	  help”	  but	  Abu	  Mazen	  needed	  to	  perform	  before	  getting	  meaningful	  U.S.	  support	   is	   in	   part	   explained	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   they	   had	   little	   faith	   that	   Abu	  Mazen	  would	  succeed	  but	  had	  strong	  rapport	  with	  Fayyad	  and	  trusted	  him	  to	  perform.3	  Styles	  of	  management	  seem	  to	  matter	  as	  well.	  	  The	  most	  prominent	  instances	  I	  have	  found	  of	  bureaucratic	  freelancing,	  pursuing	  LSI	  without	  clear	  authorization	  from	  the	  president,	   seem	   to	   occur	   under	   administrations	   where	   the	   president	   had	   an	  unusually	   detached	   approach	   to	   issues	   of	   management	   style	   and	   oversight,	  especially	   with	   regard	   to	   the	   particular	   bilateral	   relationship	   in	   question.	  	  Freelancing	  toward	  Israel	   flourished	  under	  Reagan	  and	  to	  a	   lesser	  extent	  Bush	  43,	  but	  was	  virtually	  nonexistent	  under	  Carter	  or	  Clinton,	  both	  of	  whom	  were	  so	  active	  on	  these	  issues	  as	  to	  be	  almost	  over-­‐involved	  on	  decision-­‐making	  and	  oversight.	  	   Personal	  distractions	  also	  seem	  to	  matter	  a	  lot,	  which	  should	  not	  be	  the	  case	  if	  meddling	  were	  only	  driven	  by	  objective	  international	  circumstances.	  	  For	  instance,	  Carter’s	   efforts	   to	   shore	   up	   the	   Shah	   came	   too	   little,	   too	   late,	   as	   he	   was	   initially	  consumed	   with	   Arab-­‐Israeli	   issues.	   	   Additionally,	   observers	   seem	   to	   believe	   that	  Clinton	   was	   forced	   to	   delay	   efforts	   to	   topple	   Netanyahu	   because	   of	   the	   Monica	  Lewinsky	  scandal	  until	  he	  was	  acquitted	  by	  the	  Senate	  in	  early	  1999.4	  Finally,	  even	  leaders’	  idiosyncratic	  beliefs	  about	  their	  counterparts’	  political	  contests	   can	  make	   the	   difference	   between	   successful	   LSI	   and	   either	   non-­‐LSI	   or	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Aaron David Miller, The Much Too Promised Land: America’s Elusive Search for Arab-Israeli Peace 
(Bantam Books, 2008), 210. 
3 Glenn Kessler, The Confidante: Condoleezza Rice and the Creation of the Bush Legacy (Macmillan, 
2007), 130. 
4 Yossi Beilin, The Path to Geneva: The Quest for a Permanent Agreement, 1996-2004 (Akashic Books, 
2004), 43–44; Benny Morris, Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-1999 
(Random House, Inc., 1999), 650. 
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failed	   attempt.	   	   For	   instance,	   before	   the	   Hamas	   victory	   in	   2006,	   President	   Bush	  reportedly	  told	  Mahmoud	  Abbas	  “don’t	  have	  an	  election	  if	  you	  think	  you	  will	  lose”.5	  	  He	  never	  would	  have	  pushed	  the	  elections	  to	  go	  forward	  if	  he	  did	  not	  think	  that	   it	  would	   boost	   Fatah’s	   existing	   standing.	   	   Similarly,	   Carter’s	   accidental	   boost	   to	   the	  Israeli	   right	   in	   1977	   never	   would	   have	   happened	   if	   not	   for	   his	   national	   security	  advisor’s	  misplaced	  confidence	  that	  Labor	  would	  almost	  certainly	  be	  reelected.	  	  WHY	  AGENCY	  MATTERS	  The	   sum	   total	   of	   these	   cases	   seems	   to	   support	   a	   view	  of	   LSI	   behavior	   that	  revolves	  considerably	  around	  the	  role	  of	  top	  leaders	   in	  the	  sender	  state.	   	  As	  best	  I	  can	  tell,	  the	  controversial	  nature	  of	  the	  subject	  matter	  –	  in	  essence,	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  global	  norm	  against	  meddling	  –	  conditions	  the	  behavior	  and	  capabilities	  of	  actors	  in	  the	  sender	  state	  such	  that	  they	  pursue	  leadership	  selection	  intervention	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  is	  unusually	  free	  from	  structural	  constraints.	  	   People	  tend	  to	  believe	  that	  conscious	  meddling,	  at	  least	  in	  their	  own	  nation’s	  sovereign	   leadership	   selection,	   violates	   the	   democratic	   rules	   of	   the	   game.	   	   As	   a	  result,	   especially	   obvious	   and	   self-­‐admitted	   partisan	   intervention	   tends	   to	   get	  penalized.	   	   Instead,	   sender	   state	   officials	   go	   to	   great	   lengths	   to	   erect	   alternative	  pretenses	   that	   mask	   their	   true	   intentions.	   	   They	   may	   express	   open	   support	   or	  opposition	   to	   the	   policies	   advocated	   by	   a	   leader	   in	   the	   target	   state,	   but	   they	  will	  almost	  always	  deny	  their	  effort	  is	  aimed	  at	  rescuing	  or	  removing	  that	  leader.	  	  James	  Baker	  still	  to	  this	  day	  denies	  that	  he	  used	  the	  dispute	  over	  housing	  loan	  guarantees	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Kessler, The Confidante, 135. 
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to	   help	   kick	   Yitzhak	   Shamir	   out	   of	   office,	   even	   though	   his	   own	   personal	   papers	  contradict	   this	   claim.	   	  The	   fact	   that	   the	  Clinton	  White	  House	  would	   exert	  political	  capital	  just	  to	  protect	  the	  administration’s	  Iran	  policy	  from	  Gingrich’s	  regime	  change	  language	   suggests	   that	   these	   pretenses	   matter	   even	   when	   presidents	   face	   strong	  incentives	  in	  the	  U.S.	  domestic	  arena	  to	  act	  otherwise.	  	   Of	  course,	  an	  important	  scope	  condition	  to	  this	  effect	  is	  that	  the	  pressure	  for	  pretenses	   is	   somewhat	   weaker	   in	   the	   presence	   of	   the	   one-­‐vote	   problematique.	  	  	  When	  officials	  feel	  that	  certain	  challengers	  in	  the	  target	  state	  are	  so	  beyond	  the	  pale	  that	   their	   victory	   would	   bring	   an	   end	   to	   competitive	   politics	   as	   a	   whole,	   those	  officials	  may	   be	  more	   inclined	   to	   announce	   that	   these	   actors	   should	   be	   excluded	  from	  competition	  altogether.	  	  However,	  even	  in	  those	  instances	  actors	  tend	  to	  dance	  around	   admitting	   when	   their	   actions	   are	   aimed	   at	   shaping	   the	   power	   balance	  between	   that	   group	   and	   other	   political	   actors.	   	   They	   may	   acknowledge	   their	  opposition	  to	  a	  radical	  challenger,	  such	  as	  Hamas,	  but	  still	  must	  cling	  to	  the	  fiction	  that	   the	   incumbent’s	   strength	   derives	   from	   public	   mandate,	   not	   outside	   backing.	  	  For	   example,	   American	   officials	   insisted	   that	   their	   decision	   to	   fund	   last-­‐minute	  development	   projects	   by	   the	   Palestinian	   Authority	   with	   an	   eye	   toward	   Fatah’s	  popularity	  had	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  marginalizing	  Hamas.	   	  They	  insisted	  that	  USAID	  simply	  chose	  to	  support	  all	  actors	  who	  respect	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  game,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	   one	   of	   the	   two	   major	   contenders	   was	   obviously	   excluded	   from	   this	  arrangement.	  	   In	  order	  to	  protect	  these	  pretenses,	  leaders	  operate	  in	  a	  manner	  designed	  to	  shield	   their	   true	   intentions	   from	   leaks.	   	   This	   includes	   preemptively	   taking	   steps	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during	   the	  deliberative	  process	   to	   avoid	   formal	  decision-­‐making	   channels,	   instead	  operating	   on	   a	   strict	   need-­‐to-­‐know	   basis	   and	   issuing	   verbal	   orders	   instead	   of	  written	  directives	  whenever	  possible.	  	  For	  instance,	  during	  the	  1978	  turmoil	  in	  Iran,	  American	   officials	   discussing	   LSI	   often	   communicated	   via	   telephone	   instead	   of	   in	  cables	   for	   fear	   that	   their	  words	  would	   “appear,	   almost	   verbatim,	   in	   the	  New	  York	  
Times”.6	   	  A	  participant	  in	  the	  1996	  effort	  to	  get	  Peres	  elected	  recalls	  that	  Secretary	  Christopher	  ensured	  no	  paper	  memo	  ever	  existed	  of	  their	  plans.7	  In	   both	   instances,	   officials	   used	   unusual	   back	   channels	   to	   coordinate	  meddling	  with	  their	  counterparts	  abroad.	  	  Brzezinski	  was	  communicating	  sensitive	  messages	  to	  the	  shah	  through	  an	  intermediary	  without	  actually	  informing	  officials	  at	  the	   State	   Department.	   Clinton’s	   team	   colluded	   with	   Peres’s	   aides	   through	   three	  separate	   informal	  channels,	   including	  through	  the	  prime	  minister’s	  campaign	  staff,	  and	  “all	  of	   this	  background	  coordination	  was	  not	   in	  cables”;	  often	  “it	  was	  done	  on	  the	  political	  side	  of	  the	  [White	  House]	  shop,	  not	  the	  policy	  side”.8	  It	   is	   especially	   striking	   that	   the	   top	   State	  Department	   bureaucrat	   for	  Arab-­‐Israeli	   issues	   in	  1992	  never	  saw	  a	  written	  memo	  or	  other	  proof	   that	  America	  was	  pursuing	  LSI	  even	  though	  he	  will	  “believe	  it	  forever”	  that	  this	  was	  Bush	  and	  Baker’s	  intent.9	   	   The	   head	   USAID	   official	   for	   Palestinian	   affairs	   in	   2007	   has	   a	   similar	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Gregory F. Treverton, “Iran, 1978-1979: Coping with the Unthinkable,” in Dealing with Dictators: 
Dilemmas of U.S. Diplomacy and Intelligence Analysis, 1945-1990, ed. Ernest R. May and Philip Zelikow 
(MIT Press, 2006), 131. 
7 Retired, Senior State Department Official, “Interview with the Author”, March 8, 2011. 
8 Amb. Martin S. Indyk, “Interview with the Author”, April 10, 2011. Those channels were Savir to Ross, 
Furst and Schoen to Emanuel, and Theumim to Indyk. Ross, The Missing Peace, 257; Martin Indyk, 
Innocent Abroad: An Intimate Account of American Peace Diplomacy in the Middle East (Simon and 
Schuster, 2009), 178; Moishe Theumim, “Interview with the Author”, July 3, 2011. 
9 Thomas M. DeFrank, “Transcript of Interview with Daniel Kurtzer”, August 4, 1994, Box 193 / Folder 3 / 
Chpt 29 – Baker Files, 1994, James A. Baker III Papers, Public Policy Papers, Department of Rare Books 
and Special Collections, Princeton University Library. 
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assessment	   of	   the	  West	   Bank	   First	   strategy;	   he	   knew	   it	   existed	   but	   never	   saw	   a	  memo	  laying	  out	  its	  principles.10	  Under	  such	  restrictive	  circumstances,	  the	  only	  way	  officials	  can	  approve	  this	  sort	   of	   policy	   is	   if	   they	   are	   senior	   enough	   to	   dispense	   with	   formal	   procedure,	  limiting	  the	  pool	  to	  the	  president	  and	  his	  most	  senior	  aides.	  	  And	  because	  presidents	  must	  not	   only	  decide	  on	  but	   also	   implement	  much	  of	   this	   policy	   themselves,	   they	  thrust	  themselves	  into	  attempts	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  unusually	  high	  resolve.	  	  For	  instance,	  when	  Bush	  and	  Baker	  worked	  to	  get	  Rabin	  elected,	   they	  already	  knew	  that	  linking	  the	   loan	   guarantees	   to	   a	   settlement	   freeze	   would	   stir	   up	   a	   major,	   “AWACs-­‐plus”	  domestic	   controversy.11	   	  However,	  Bush	  persuaded	  Congress	   to	  back	  down	   in	   the	  dispute	  in	  September	  of	  1991	  and	  again	  in	  March	  of	  1992,	  threatening	  members	  of	  Congress	  in	  public	  and	  private	  with	  a	  drawn-­‐out	  fight.12	  	  In	  fact,	  the	  administration’s	  legislative	   strategy	   was	   premised	   on	   getting	   in	   front	   of	   Congressional	   leadership	  and	  pressuring	  them	  to	  avoid	  such	  a	  fight.13	  	   These	  factors	  combine	  to	  diminish	  the	  impact	  of	  structural	  factors	  that	  might	  otherwise	   act	   to	   constrain	   the	   president’s	   freedom	   of	   action	   on	   foreign	   policy.	  	  Subjective	   perceptions	   take	   on	   added	   importance	   for	   motivating	   attempts	   at	   LSI,	  although	   they	   just	   as	   often	   seem	   to	   threaten	   the	   possibility	   that	   partisan	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Howard Sumka, “Interview with the Author”, November 3, 2011. 
11 Dennis Ross, “Approach to the $10 Billion and the Peace Process”, July 1, 1991, Box 193 / Folder 3 / 
Chpt 29 – Baker Files, 1994, James A. Baker III Papers, Public Policy Papers, Department of Rare Books 
and Special Collections, Princeton University Library. 
12 Thomas L. Friedman, “Bush Rejects Israel Loan Guarantees,” New York Times, March 18, 1992; James 
A. Baker, “Presentation to Leahy on Absorption Aid: Outline for President”, September 3, 1991, Box 193 / 
Folder 3 /Chpt 29 – Baker Files, 1994, James A. Baker III Papers, Public Policy Papers, Department of 
Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton University Library. 
13 Janet Mullin, “Note to the Secretary”, August 27, 1991, Box 193 / Folder 3 /Chpt 29 – Baker Files, 1994, 
James A. Baker III Papers, Public Policy Papers, Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, 
Princeton University Library. 
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intervention,	  when	  it	  is	  pursued,	  fails	  for	  lack	  of	  understanding	  of	  the	  target	  state’s	  policy	   dynamics.	   	   Members	   of	   Congress	   and	   lobby	   groups,	   which	   may	   be	   quite	  influential	   on	   other	   areas	   of	   bilateral	   relations,	   simply	   may	   not	   to	   learn	   the	  president’s	   true	   intentions	   and	   just	   as	   often	   find	   themselves	   outmaneuvered	   by	   a	  determined	   chief	   executive.	   	   Finally,	  members	  of	   the	  bureaucracy	   find	   themselves	  unable	  to	  initiate	  or	  block	  partisan	  intervention	  in	  contravention	  of	  the	  president’s	  desires	  because	  there	  is	  no	  formal	  arena	  for	  aggregating	  bureaucratic	  preferences.	  	  RIVAL	  THEORIES	  I	  initially	  set	  out	  to	  apply	  four	  basic	  paradigms	  of	  foreign	  policy	  behavior	  to	  this	   set	  of	   cases.	   	  What	   I	   found	  was	   that	   the	  agency	  of	   top	  political	  officials	   in	   the	  sender	   state	   seems	   to	   be	   exceptionally	   influential	   in	   the	   issue	   area	   of	   leadership	  selection	   intervention	   relative	   to	   rival	   theories	   that	   emphasize	   international	   or	  domestic	   structural	   forces.14	   	   The	   three	   other	   theories	   that	   were	   considered	  possible	  contenders	  for	  explaining	  behavior	  in	  this	  project	  were:	  national	  interests	  theory,	   the	   lobby-­‐legislative	   approach,	   and	   the	   bureaucratic	   politics	   approach.	  	  Before	  quickly	  concluding,	   I	  would	   like	   to	  note	  some	  evidence	   from	  the	  cases	   that	  militates	  against	  these	  structure-­‐based	  theories.	  National	   interests	   theory	   is	   a	   variant	   of	   structural	   realism	   that	   jettisons	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 The leadership approach argues that the main determinants of political outcomes are the contingent 
choices of top officials. Examples of work in this area include: Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, 
“Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In,” International Security 25, no. 4 (2001): 
107–146; Robert O. Keohane, “Disciplinary Schizophrenia: Implications for Graduate Education in 
Political Science,” Qualitative Methods: Newsletter of the American Political Science Association, 
Organized Section on Qualitative Methods 1, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 9–12; Richard J. Samuels, Machiavelli’s 
Children: Leaders and Their Legacies in Italy and Japan (Cornell University Press, 2005); Gautam 
Mukunda, “The Paths of Glory: Structure, Selection, and Leaders” (MIT Dissertation, 2010); Elizabeth N. 
Saunders, Leaders at War: How Presidents Shape Military Interventions (Cornell University Press, 2011). 
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certain	  elements	  of	  Waltzian	  neorealism	  to	  simply	  argue	   that	  states	  make	  unitary,	  self-­‐regarding	  decisions	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  objective	  international	  circumstances.15	  	  The	  lobby-­‐legislative	   politics	   approach	   is	   a	   variant	   of	   pluralist	   theory	   that	   emphasizes	  the	   tendency	   towards	   state	   capture	  by	  powerful	   lobbyists	  and	   the	   legislators	  who	  curry	   favor	   with	   them.16	   	   Finally,	   the	   bureaucratic	   politics	   approach	   argues	   that	  policy	   outcomes	   are	   driven	   by	   organizational	   interests	   and	   bargaining	   efforts	   of	  lower-­‐level	   officials	   in	   the	   sender	   state,	   with	   decisions	   bubbling	   up	   from	   below	  rather	  than	  being	  imposed	  in	  a	  top-­‐down	  manner	  by	  political	  leadership.17	  If	  national	   interests	   theory	  were	   true,	  we	  should	  expect	  different	  American	  officials	  to	  pursue	  similar	  LSI	  behavior	  under	  comparable	  circumstances.	  	  However,	  comparing	  Washington’s	   posture	   towards	   Israel	   in	   1987	   versus	   1990	   provides	   a	  fantastic	  natural	  experiment	  that	  contradicts	  this	  expectation	  of	  the	  theory.	  	  In	  both	  instances,	   America	  was	   faced	  with	   an	   Israeli	   national	   unity	   government	   in	  which	  Labor	  backed	  a	  peace	  plan	  with	  promising	  Arab	  support	  that	  Likud	  resisted.	  	  In	  one	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Thucydides, “Melian Dialogues,” in Essential Readings in World Politics, ed. Karen A. Mingst and Jack 
L. Snyder, trans. Suresht Bald (Norton, 2010), 2–3; Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The 
Struggle for Power and Peace (A. A. Knopf, 1948); Morton A. Kaplan, System and Process in 
International Politics (Wiley, 1957); Kenneth Neal Waltz, Theory of International Politics (McGraw-Hill, 
1979); John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (W. W. Norton & Company, 2001). 
16 Ross Y. Koen, The China Lobby in American Politics (Octagon Books, 1974); Theodore J. Lowi, The 
End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States (W. W. Norton & Company, 1979); Mancur 
Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations (Yale University Press, 1982); Tony Smith, Foreign Attachments: 
The Power of Ethnic Groups in the Making of American Foreign Policy (Harvard University Press, 2000); 
John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy (Macmillan, 2007); 
Ken Silverstein, “Their Men in Washington: Undercover with DC’s Lobbyists for Hire,” Harpers 1886 
(2007): 53; John Newhouse, “Diplomacy, Inc.: The Influence of Lobbies on US Foreign Policy,” Foreign 
Affairs 88 (2009): 73. 
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Review 63, no. 3 (September 1969): 689–718; William A. Niskanen, Bureaucracy & Representative 
Government (Aldine, Atherton, 1971); Ezra N. Suleiman, Politics, Power, and Bureaucracy in France: The 
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instance,	   Shultz	   and	  Reagan	   rejected	   requests	   for	   the	   American	   administration	   to	  back	  the	  London	  Accords,	  for	  fear	  of	  getting	  drawn	  into	  an	  internecine	  Israeli	  fight.	  	  In	  the	  other,	  Bush	  and	  Baker	  pushed	  for	  the	  	  adoption	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  Shamir	  Plan	  even	   though	  Shamir	  himself	  had	  abandoned	   it	  and	   they	  knew	  that	   to	  do	  so	  would	  risk	  the	  end	  of	  the	  NUG,	  which	  may	  or	  may	  not	  be	  replaced	  by	  a	  Labor	  government	  instead.	  The	   lobby-­‐legislative	   approach	   should	   get	   an	   especially	   favorable	   hearing	  with	  many	  of	  these	  cases	  given	  that	  the	  U.S.-­‐Israel	  relationship	  is	  considered	  a	  most	  likely	   case	   for	   government	   capture	   by	   a	   powerful	   ethnic	   lobby.18	   	   However	  much	  that	   perspective	   may	   or	   may	   not	   explain	   other	   aspects	   of	   U.S.-­‐Israel	   relations,	   it	  seems	   to	   hold	   little	   traction	   for	   understanding	   the	   dynamics	   of	   LSI.	   	   Not	   only	   do	  presidents	  frequently	  pursue	  LSI	  without	  regard	  for	  an	  impending	  election	  at	  home,	  they	   have	   even	   done	   so	   quite	   intensively	  when	   they	   themselves	   faced	   reelection.	  	  Notable	   instances	   include	   Bush	   41’s	   use	   of	   loan	   guarantees	   in	   1992,	   Clinton’s	  dramatic	   backing	   of	   Peres	   in	   1996,	   and	   also	   his	   efforts	   to	   help	   reelect	   Yeltsin	   in	  Russia	  that	  year.19	   	  Meddling	  is	  common	  not	  only	  in	  periods	  of	  united	  government	  but	  even	  in	  periods	  of	  divided	  government,	  and,	  as	  noted	  above,	  presidents	  tend	  to	  pre-­‐select	  into	  cases	  of	  LSI	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  high	  resolve.	  	  If	   the	   bureaucratic	   politics	   approach	  were	   driving	   LSI	   behavior,	  we	   should	  expect	   to	   see	   freelancing	   occur	   all	   of	   the	   time,	   but	   instead	   it	   only	   seems	   to	   occur	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, “The Israeli Lobby,” London Review of Books (March 10, 
2006); Mearsheimer and Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy. 
19 Strobe Talbott, The Russia Hand: A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy (Random House, 2003), 189–
215; Lee Marsden, Lessons from Russia: Clinton and U.S. Democracy Promotion (Ashgate Publishing, 
Ltd., 2005), 61–100. 
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under	  presidents	  who	  have	  an	  especially	  detached	  system	  of	  management	  and	  exert	  weak	  oversight	  when	  handling	  bilateral	  relations	  with	  the	  target	  country.	  	  Not	  only	  does	   intervention	   not	   consistently	   reflect	   bureaucratic	   preferences,	   sometimes	   it	  flies	  in	  the	  face	  of	  what	  the	  bureaucracy	  hopes	  to	  foster	  in	  the	  target	  state.	  Even	   though	   the	   State	   Department’s	   Bureau	   of	   Near	   Eastern	   Affairs	   has	  evinced	  a	  relatively	  steady	  preference	  at	  the	  working	  level	  for	  prioritizing	  the	  peace	  process	   in	   Israeli	  affairs,	  presidents	  have	  granted	  major	  concessions	  to	  strengthen	  Likud	  ministers	  rather	  than	  individuals	  from	  the	  Labor	  Party	  –	  for	  instance,	  Reagan	  backing	   Moshe	   Arens	   or	   Bush	   43	   backing	   Olmert	   and	   Sharon.	   	   Additionally,	  sometimes	  presidents	  use	  methods	  to	  achieve	  LSI	  that	  require	  overruling	  executive	  agencies,	   supporting	   the	  Lavi	   aircraft	   program	   to	  help	  Arens	  or	   the	  Nautilus	   anti-­‐missile	  laser	  system	  to	  help	  Peres.	  	  In	  both	  episodes,	  the	  weapons	  systems	  had	  been	  opposed	   by	   the	   Pentagon	   for	   being	   dysfunctional	   and	   not	   cost-­‐effective,	   and	   both	  programs	  were	  suspended	  years	  later	  for	  exactly	  those	  reasons.20	  These	  theories	  were	  given	  a	  relatively	  fair	  hearing.	  	  They	  were	  considered	  in	  every	  case	  or	  non-­‐case	  of	  peace	  process	  LSI	  examined	  by	  this	  dissertation.	  	  Not	  only	  that,	   but	   they	   were	   parsed	   according	   to	   seven	   different	   dimensions	   of	   their	  observable	   implications,	   on	  which	   they	   pose	  mutually	   exclusive	   predictions.	   	   The	  effort	   verged	   on	   being	   a	   bit	   mind-­‐numbing	   at	   times,	   but	   being	   methodical	   also	  helped	  ensure	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  project’s	  findings.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Dov S. Zakheim, Flight of the Lavi: Inside a U.S.-Israeli Crisis (Brassey’s, 1996); Philip Shenon, 
“Boosting Israel’s Defenses, U.S. Will Provide Anti-missile Aid,” New York Times, April 29, 1996; 
William J. Broad, “U.S. and Israel Shelved Laser as Defense,” New York Times, July 30, 2006; Bruce O. 
Riedel, “Interview with the Author”, April 9, 2011. 
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B.	  Limitations	  &	  Future	  Directions	  
	   Every	   study	   involves	   certain	   methodological	   tradeoffs.	   	   Although	   each	  technique	   adopted	   opens	   certain	   doors,	   it	   inevitably	   closes	   others.	   	   This	   section	  reviews	  some	  of	  the	  research	  design	  choices	  made	  in	  this	  dissertation	  in	  order	  to	  be	  conscientious	  about	  ways	  future	  studies	  might	  address	  some	  of	  its	  shortcomings.	  	   Because	   of	   the	   rudimentary	   state	   of	   the	   present	   research	   agenda	   about	  leadership	  selection	  intervention,	   this	  study	  adopted	  a	  deep-­‐dive	  approach	  to	  data	  analysis,	   examining	  episodes	  of	  LSI	   from	  a	  very	   limited	  number	  of	   country	  dyads.	  	  Thus,	   it	   offers	   an	   extremely	   in-­‐depth	   explanation	   of	   LSI	   behavior	   in	   a	   limited	  number	   of	   target	   polities.	   	   Additionally,	   in	   nearly	   every	   case	   examined	   by	   this	  dissertation,	  the	  sender	  country	  is	  the	  United	  States	  (except	  in	  the	  ten	  or	  so	  cases	  of	  third-­‐party	  intervention	  covered	  in	  the	  Israel	  chapters).	  	   Therefore,	   one	   avenue	   for	   future	   research	  would	   be	   to	   expand	   the	   sample	  population	  of	  episodes	  to	  examine	  the	  dynamics	  of	  leadership	  selection	  intervention	  in	  other	  contexts.	  	  What	  are	  some	  instances	  of	  LSI	  beyond	  the	  Middle	  East,	  and	  how	  do	   they	  compare	   to	   the	  cases	  examined	   in	   this	  dissertation?	   	  Do	  similar	  dynamics	  apply	   to	   instances	   of	   LSI	   by	   other	   senders,	   including	   with	   different	   regime	  institutions?	  	  For	  example,	  it	  would	  be	  fascinating	  to	  see	  if	  the	  dynamics	  described	  in	  this	  project	  apply	  when	  an	  authoritarian	  regime	  is	  the	  one	  pursuing	  LSI.	  	  It	  would	  also	  be	  useful	  to	  check	  and	  confirm	  that	  the	  same	  patterns	  observed	  in	  the	  postwar	  era	   in	   this	   study	   apply	   during	   earlier	   periods	   in	   history,	   such	   as	   in	   the	   interwar	  years	  or	  even	  before.	  	   Another	   approach	   would	   be	   to	   employ	   different	   analytical	   techniques	   in	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place	  of	  qualitative	  historical	  methods.	  	  Although	  I	  avoided	  statistical	  techniques	  in	  this	   dissertation,	   large-­‐n	   analysis	   will	   be	   increasingly	   efficient	   once	   researchers	  have	   compiled	   sets	   of	   observations	   about	   LSI	   that,	   like	   this	   one,	   are	   relatively	  comprehensive	   in	  nature.	   	  Daniel	  Corstange	  and	  Nikolay	  Marinov	  have	  even	  found	  creative	  ways	  to	  examine	  the	  dynamics	  of	  LSI	  in	  an	  experimental	  research	  setting.21	  	   This	   study	   focused	   on	   two	   particular	   research	   questions	   –	   explaining	  variation	  in	  both	  occurrence	  and	  efficacy	  –	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  explicitly	  considering	  many	  other	  ones.	   	  Why	  do	  states	  adopt	  specific	   tools	   in	  the	  pursuit	  of	  LSI	  at	  some	  times	  but	  not	  others?	   	  Do	  different	   tools	  yield	  different	   rates	  of	   success?	   	  Why	  do	  states	  choose	  LSI	  over	  other	  possible	  forms	  of	  foreign	  policy	  intervention,	  and	  when	  do	   they	   choose	   to	   hybridize	   them?	   	   Which	   sorts	   of	   states	   are	   more	   prone	   to	  conducting	  LSI	  or	  finding	  themselves	  on	  the	  other	  end	  of	  it?	  	  How	  do	  regime	  type	  or	  electoral	   institutions	   shape	   the	   environment	   in	   which	   LSI	   operates?	   	   These	  questions	  offer	  a	  vast	  terrain	  for	  future	  research	  that	  still	  has	  yet	  to	  be	  explored.	  	   Finally,	   there	   are	   limitations	   of	   this	   study	   that	   are	   simply	   impossible	   to	  overcome.	   	   	   Studying	   efficacy	   is	   inherently	   tricky,	   since	   practitioners	   of	   LSI	   are	  trying	   to	   influence	   leadership	   selection	   outcomes	   on	   the	   margins	   of	   domestic	  political	  contests.	  	  Thus,	  it	  is	  extremely	  difficult	  to	  sort	  out	  possible	  causal	  effects	  in	  this	  regard	  from	  meaningless	  background	  noise.	  Second,	   even	   taking	   a	   deep-­‐dive	   approach	   to	   data	   collection	   cannot	   fully	  overcome	  the	  missing	  data	  problem	  due	  to	   the	  secretive	  nature	  of	  LSI	  behavior	   in	  many	  cases.	  	  I	  have	  sought	  in	  this	  study	  to	  mitigate	  the	  risk	  of	  false	  negative	  or	  false	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Daniel Corstange and Nikolay Marinov, “Does Taking Sides Encourage Radicalization?: The US and 
Iranian Messages in the 2009 Elections in Lebanon”, January 28, 2010. 
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positive	  observations,	  and	  hopefully	  there	  is	  not	  systematic	  bias	  in	  my	  codings,	  but	  finding	  conclusive	  proof	  one	  way	  or	  another	  in	  a	  realm	  of	  conspiracies	  and	  whispers	  is	  simply	  not	  always	  possible.	  Third,	  it	  can	  sometimes	  be	  difficult	  to	  falsify	  an	  explanation	  that	  is	  premised	  upon	   leadership	   factors.	   	   If	   leadership	   is	   only	   epiphenomenal,	   serving	   as	   a	  proximate	   trigger	  but	  not	  a	   true	  underlying	  cause,	   then	   it	  might	  appear	  as	   though	  agency	   is	   important	   when	   in	   fact	   there	   are	   deeper,	   structural	   issues	   that	   are	  determining	   the	   variation	   across	   cases.	   	   However,	   this	   dissertation	   has	   sought	   to	  minimize	   the	   chances	   that	   such	   problems	   are	   occurring	   by	   conducting	   both	   two-­‐cornered	  and	  three-­‐cornered	  tests,	  evaluating	  leadership	  theory	  against	  not	  just	  the	  null	  hypothesis	  but	  also	  prominent	  rival	  theories.22	  	  If	  leadership	  theory	  provides	  a	  powerful	  stylized	  explanation	  of	  the	  data	  and	  it	  stacks	  up	  impressively	  against	  the	  rival	  theories,	  we	  should	  have	  some	  confidence	  that	  the	  leadership-­‐based	  approach	  is	  not	  epiphenomenal.	  	   Finally,	   there	   is	   a	   certain	  unavoidable	   risk	  of	   a	  voluntarist,	  pro-­‐agency	  bias	  based	  on	  the	  data	  that	  is	  available	  for	  explaining	  the	  cases.	  	  The	  case	  histories	  I	  have	  accumulated	  may	  feel	  as	   though	  I	  am	  telling	  a	  stylized	  narrative	  that	   is	   tailored	  to	  advance	   my	   pet	   theory,	   and	   some	   of	   the	   available	   data	   sources	   –	   presidential	  libraries,	  interviews	  with	  former	  officials,	  memoirs	  –	  might	  over-­‐privilege	  the	  role	  of	  leadership	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  other	  causal	  factors.	  	  I	  have	  tried	  to	  minimize	  this	  in	  a	  number	   of	   ways:	   applying	   all	   four	   theories	   to	   the	   various	   cases,	   evaluating	   each	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 For an explanation of two-cornered versus three-cornered theory testing, see Imre Lakatos, “Falsification 
and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes,” in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, ed. 
Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1970); Stephen 
Van_Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Cornell University Press, 1997), 38, 83. 
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theory	   according	   to	   seven	   categories	   of	  mutually	   observable	   implications	   in	   each	  episode,	  looking	  for	  data	  from	  other	  sources	  that	  might	  confirm	  rival	  theories	  if	  they	  were	  true	  (such	  as	  interviewing	  members	  of	  the	  bureaucracy	  and	  relevant	  lobbies),	  and	   not	   just	   telling	   a	   stylized	   story	   but	   also	   seeking	   to	   falsify	   arguments	   from	  alternative	  explanations.	  	  However,	  to	  a	  certain	  extent	  this	  is	  a	  hazard	  of	  the	  terrain	  based	  on	  data	  availability	  and	  prevailing	  narratives	  that	  cannot	  be	  avoided	  entirely.	  	   However,	   none	   of	   these	   limitations	   are	   reasons	   to	   discard	   the	   findings	  produced	   by	   the	   present	   study.	   	   Instead,	   they	   are	   risks,	   pitfalls,	   shortcomings,	   or	  challenges	   that	   should	   inform	   our	   understanding	   of	   those	   findings.	   	   Good	   social	  science	  research	  tackles	  questions	  because	  they	  are	  important,	  not	  because	  they	  are	  easy.	  	  
C.	  Implications	  for	  Policy	  
	   One	   of	   the	   reasons	   that	   I	   adopted	   this	   research	   topic	   was	   that	   it	   directly	  bears	  upon	  current	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy.	  	  Addressing	  real-­‐world	  problems	  necessarily	  entails	  generating	  usable	  knowledge	  that	  is	  expressly	  policy-­‐relevant.	  	  This	  requires	  findings	   to	   address	   particular	   sorts	   of	   factors	   (i.e.	   ones	   that	   are	   manipulable	   by	  policy-­‐makers)	   and	   to	   be	   framed	   in	   certain	  ways	   rather	   than	   others	   (in	   terms	   of	  precise	  causal	  predictions	  instead	  of	  generalized	  conditional	  probabilities).23	  	  Thus,	  this	  project	   seeks	   to	   explain	   fine-­‐grained	  variation	   in	   the	   study	  variables	  within	   a	  given	   bilateral	   relationship	   rather	   than	   gross	   variation	   across	   large	   spans	   of	   time	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences 
(MIT Press, 2005), 279–282. 
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and	  space.24	   	   In	   this	  regard,	   I	  have	  sought	   to	  produce	  a	  specified	  theory	  of	   foreign	  policy,	   not	   an	   abstract	   theory	   of	   international	   politics.25	   	   Further,	   the	   tendency	   of	  states	  not	  to	  keep	  comprehensive	  records	  or	  evaluate	  their	  behavior	  retroactively	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  LSI	  makes	  it	  especially	  important	  to	  conduct	  an	  outside	  audit.	  	   The	  section	  below	  offers	  a	  list	  of	  ten	  major	  takeaways	  from	  this	  dissertation	  that	  are	  intended	  to	  be	  policy	  relevant.	   	  However,	  first,	  a	  disclaimer	  is	  in	  order.	   	  In	  this	   dissertation,	   I	   have	   not	   touched	   at	   all	   on	   the	   normative	   debate	   of	   whether	  foreign	  intervention	  is	  a	  good	  or	  a	  bad	  thing.26	  	  I	  only	  address	  the	  empirical	  debate.	  	  Therefore,	   I	   cannot	   advise	   for	   or	   against	   the	   pursuit	   of	   LSI	   except	   on	   a	   purely	  empirical	  basis.	  	  If	  an	  individual	  believes	  that	  LSI	  is	  morally	  untenable,	  no	  amount	  of	  material	  gains	  should	  justify	  its	  use.	  	  
Lesson	  #1:	  LSI	  is	  an	  Effective	  Tool	  of	  Statecraft	  	   Meddling	   is	   a	   fact	   of	   life.	   	   At	   some	   points,	   policy-­‐makers	   in	   a	   relatively	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 For the distinction between fine-grained and gross variation (applied to the context of state power in 
international relations) see Stephen Van_Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (Cornell 
University Press, 1999). 
25 Waltz, Theory of International Politics; Colin Elman, “Horses for Courses: Why Not Neorealist Theories 
of Foreign Policy?,” Security Studies 6, no. 1 (1996): 7–53; Kenneth N. Waltz, “International Politics Is 
Not Foreign Policy,” Security Studies 6, no. 1 (1996): 54. 
26 Some examples of this literature include Stanley Hoffmann, Robert C. Johansen, and James P. Sterba, 
The Ethics and Politics of Humanitarian Intervention (University of Notre Dame Press, 1996); James A. 
Barry, The Sword of Justice: Ethics and Coercion in International Politics (Greenwood Publishing Group, 
1998); John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Harvard University Press, 2001); J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert 
Owen Keohane, eds., Humanitarian Intervention (Cambridge University Press, 2003); Deen K. Chatterjee 
and Don E. Scheid, Ethics and Foreign Intervention (Cambridge University Press, 2003); Deen K. 
Chatterjee, The Ethics of Assistance (Cambridge University Press, 2004); Gareth J. Evans, The 
Responsibility to Protect (Brookings Institution Press, 2008); Michael J. Smith, “Humanitarian 
Intervention: An Overview of the Ethical Issues,” in Ethics and International Affairs, ed. Joel H. Rosenthal 
and Christian Barry (Georgetown University Press, 2009), 67–84; Terry Nardin, “The Moral Basis of 
Humanitarian Intervention,” in Ethics and International Affairs, ed. Joel H. Rosenthal and Christian Barry 
(Georgetown University Press, 2009), 85–102; Alex J. Bellamy, “Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse: 
The Crisis in Darfur and Humanitarian Intervention After Iraq,” in Ethics and International Affairs, ed. Joel 
H. Rosenthal and Christian Barry (Georgetown University Press, 2009), 103–130. 
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powerful	  country	  will	  undoubtedly	  conclude	  that	  their	  nation’s	  interests	  are	  served	  by	  interfering	  in	  domestic	  leadership	  contests	  in	  another	  political	  system.	  	  Not	  only	  that,	   but	   LSI	   is	   often	   successful.	   	   There	   are	   no	   shortage	   of	   cases	   in	  which	   its	   use	  produced	  little	  effect	  or	  was	  counterproductive,	  but	  more	  often	  than	  not	  it	  seems	  to	  be	   an	   appealing	  means	   for	   achieving	   national	   interests.	   	   And	   LSI	   rarely	   seems	   to	  result	   in	   score-­‐settling	   after	   the	   fact	   if	   disfavored	   leaders	   in	   the	   target	   polity	  ultimately	  win	  office.	  	  
Lesson	  #2:	  Don’t	  Go	  It	  Alone	  	   Freedom	  from	  domestic	  accountability	  can	  be	  liberating	  for	  presidents	  when	  they	   seek	   to	   employ	   LSI.	   	   However,	   the	   absence	   of	   interagency	   consultation	   or	  checks	  and	  balances	  can	  also	  make	  for	  bad	  policy	  concepts	  or	  bad	  implementation	  –	  the	  Iran	  Contra	  debacle	  being	  an	  especially	  worrisome	  worst	  case	  example.	  	  As	  Yossi	  Beilin	   reflects,	   “people	  are	  very	  careful	  not	   to	  speak	  about	   it,	   even	  with	   their	  own	  advisors...	  because	  they	  are	  afraid	  of	  leaks,	  and	  they	  are	  afraid	  that	  it	  will	  be	  shown,	  and	  they	  always	  have	  to	  deny	  it.	  	  So	  it	  is	  not	  done	  professionally,	  and	  what	  you	  get	  is	  something	  which	  is	  so	  amateurish	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  day”.27	  	  Leadership	  selection	  intervention	  naturally	  lends	  itself	  to	  secrecy,	  but	  policy-­‐makers	  should	  resist	  these	   incentives	  at	   least	  enough	  to	  ensure	  that	  they	  have	  the	  necessary	   support	   to	   craft	   an	   effective	   strategy	   and	   to	   carry	   it	   through	   to	  completion.	  	  Going	  on	  gut	  instinct	  has	  led	  leaders	  to	  either	  go	  off	  message	  in	  harmful	  ways	   (Bush’s	   comments	   on	   East	   Jerusalem	   in	   1990	   or	   Carter’s	   comments	   about	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Former Minister Yossi Beilin, “Interview with the Author,” June 26, 2011. 
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borders	  and	  the	  PLO	  in	  1977)	  or	  to	  go	  overboard	  when	  they	  feel	  passionate	  about	  helping	   a	   comrade	   overseas	   (Clinton’s	   backing	   for	   Peres	   in	   1996).	   	   The	   most	  effective	   instances	   of	   LSI	   have	   often	   benefitted	   from	   having	   a	   team	   of	   committed	  officials	  onboard	  with	  the	  same	  plan	  (for	  example,	  the	  Clinton	  administration’s	  full-­‐spectrum	  effort	  to	  get	  Ehud	  Barak	  elected	  in	  1999).	  	  
Lesson	  #3:	  Preserve	  Pretense	  	   Practitioners	  of	  LSI	  employ	  pretenses	  for	  a	  reason:	  they	  work.	   	   Instances	   in	  which	   pretenses	   strained	   credibility,	   such	   as	   Clinton’s	   all-­‐out	   push	   to	   get	   Peres	  elected	  in	  1996,	  seem	  to	  produce	  more	  of	  a	  backlash.	  	  American	  officials	  also	  tend	  to	  feel	  a	   somewhat	  weaker	  pressure	   to	  use	  pretenses	  when	   they	  believe	   that	   certain	  political	   actors	   in	   the	   target	   polity	   are	   beyond	   the	   pale,	   such	   as	   groups	   that	   use	  terrorism	  or	  are	  sponsors	  of	   terror.	   	  This	  tendency	   is	  also	  greater	   for	   leaders	  who	  have	   a	   particularly	   black-­‐and-­‐white	   view	  of	   other	   political	   actors	   overseas.	   	   Thus,	  Reagan	  and	  Shultz	  were	  more	  open	  about	  their	  desire	  to	  marginalize	  the	  PLO	  than	  Bush	  or	  Baker;	  George	  W.	  Bush	  was	  more	  open	  about	  his	  use	  of	  LSI	  against	  Yasser	  Arafat	  and	  Hamas	  in	  Palestine	  as	  well	  as	  against	  the	  ruling	  clique	  in	  Iran.	  	  However,	  these	  statements	  rarely	  pay	  off	  in	  terms	  of	  effective	  policy.	  	  
Lesson	  #4:	  Don’t	  Forget	  Institutions	  	   American	  intervention	  in	  Palestinian	  politics	  gradually	  degraded	  the	  quality	  of	   democratic	   institutions,	   allowing	   Arafat	   to	   set	   up	   an	   autocracy	   in	   the	   1990s,	  destroying	   PA	   governance	   during	   the	   second	   intifada,	   and	  warping	   institutions	   to	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disadvantage	   in	   the	   aftermath	   of	   its	   electoral	   victory	   in	   2006.	   	   This	   fits	   with	   a	  broader	   class	   of	   activities	   observed	   by	   scholars	   who	   study	   American	   support	   for	  dictators	  during	  the	  Cold	  War.28	   	  Propping	  up	  dictators	  often	  necessitates	  allowing	  them	  to	  manipulate	  representative	  and	  administrative	  institutions	  to	  their	  personal	  benefit.	  	  In	  the	  short	  run,	  this	  actions	  are	  appealing,	  but	  in	  the	  long	  run,	  the	  costs	  are	  extremely	   high.	   	   The	   Shah	   consistently	   outmaneuvered	   and	   outlasted	   American	  efforts	   to	   force	   him	   to	   cohabitate	  with	   reformists,	   but	   the	   eventual	   result	  was	   far	  worse	   for	   U.S.	   interests	   than	   holding	   firm	   against	   his	   demands	   in	   the	   first	   place.	  America’s	  longstanding	  support	  for	  the	  Shah	  did	  help	  instigate	  revolutionary	  change	  by	  closing	  off	  alternative	  options.	   	  And,	  although	  anti-­‐Americanism	  in	  Iran	  seemed	  to	   emerge	  more	   from	   the	  1953	   coup	   than	   instances	   of	  meddling	   that	   fell	   short	   of	  force,	  Washington’s	   long	   legacy	  of	   LSI	   toward	  Tehran	  did	  not	  help	   in	   the	   court	   of	  public	  opinion	  either.	  	  
Lesson	  #5:	  Missing	  Opportunities	  Can	  Be	  Costly	  	   Former	   National	   Security	   Advisor	   McGeorge	   Bundy	   purportedly	   once	  remarked	  that	  “Pleikus	  are	  like	  streetcars”:	  if	  you	  miss	  one,	  another	  will	  soon	  come	  along;	  in	  short,	  he	  was	  suggesting	  that	  if	  the	  Viet	  Cong	  had	  not	  attacked	  the	  U.S.	  base	  near	   Pleiku,	   South	   Vietnam,	   in	   February	   of	   1965,	   the	   Johnson	   administration	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Mark J. Gasiorowski, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State in Iran (Cornell 
University Press, 1991); Noam Chomsky, Deterring Democracy (Macmillan, 1992); Ernest R. May et al., 
Dealing with Dictators: Dilemmas of U.S. Diplomacy and Intelligence Analysis, 1945-1990 (MIT Press, 
2006); Julia Sweig, Friendly Fire: Losing Friends and Making Enemies in the Anti-American Century 
(Public Affairs, 2006); Hilton L. Root, Alliance Curse: How America Lost the Third World (Brookings 
Institution Press, 2008); Jason Brownlee, Democracy Prevention: The Politics of the U.S.-Egyptian 
Alliance [Forthcoming] (Cambridge University Press, 2012). This was also the topic of Nikolay Marinov’s 
recent conference paper on LSI in emerging democracies: http://www.yale.edu/leitner/democracyEdge.html 
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probably	  would	  have	   found	   some	  other	   trigger	   to	   escalate	   its	   involvement	   in	   that	  conflict.29	   	  However,	  leadership	  contests	  are	  not	  like	  Pleikus;	  they	  only	  come	  along	  infrequently,	   and	   missing	   opportunities	   for	   LSI	   can	   therefore	   be	   costly.	   	   This	  appears	   to	   be	   the	   case	   even	   in	   regimes	   with	   flexible-­‐term	   electoral	   institutions,	  fractious	  coalitions,	  and	  frequent	  leadership	  contests	  such	  as	  Israel.	  One	   reason	  actors	  miss	  opportunities	   is	   that	   they	  are	  personally	  distracted	  by	  other	  pressing	  agenda	  items.	  	  Another	  reason	  is	  that	  they	  may	  be	  dissuaded	  from	  LSI	   because	   they	   want	   to	   ensure	   calm	   bilateral	   relations	   and	   their	   least	   favored	  party	   holds	   the	   incumbency	   in	   the	   target	   polity.	   	   However,	   this	   tactic	   prioritizes	  short-­‐term	   gains	   at	   the	   cost	   of	   long-­‐term	   headaches.	   	   American	   presidents	   who	  shied	  away	  from	  disagreements	  with	  Likud	  incumbents	  in	  Israel	  (Reagan,	  Bush	  43)	  ended	   up	   with	   their	   diplomatic	   initiatives	   frustrated	   by	   a	   long	   era	   of	   Likud	  dominance,	  whereas	  those	  who	  did	  not	  hide	  their	  disagreements	  (Bush	  41,	  Clinton)	  were	  eventually	  rewarded	  with	  Labor	  electoral	  victories	  and	  breakthroughs	  on	  the	  peace	  process.	   	  There	   is	  a	  reason	  we	  remember	  Bush	  41’s	  Madrid	  Conference	  and	  Clinton’s	  Oslo	  process	  today	  much	  better	  than	  the	  Reagan	  Plan,	  the	  Shultz	  Initiative,	  and	  Bush’s	  Road	  Map.	  	  
Lesson	  #6:	  Avoid	  Marriages	  of	  Convenience	  	   Even	   more	   costly	   than	   missing	   opportunities	   to	   foster	   leadership	   change	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 For the original quote, see David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (Barrie and Jenkins, 1972), 533. 
Ironically, recent diplomatic history suggests that even the Viet Cong did not attribute much importance to 
their attack on Camp Holloway near Pleiku at the time, despite American intelligence assessments to the 
contrary. See Robert S. McNamara, James Blight, Robert K. Brigham, Thomas J. Biersteker, and Col. 
Herbert Schandler, Argument without End: In Search of Answers to the Vietnam Tragedy (Public Affairs, 
1999), 170-174. 
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abroad	   are	   instances	   in	   which	   policy-­‐makers	   actively	   throw	   their	   lot	   in	   with	   an	  ideologically	   incompatible	  political	   faction	  in	  the	  target	  polity.	   	  These	  marriages	  of	  convenience	  are	  also	  sometimes	  activated	  by	  the	  perks	  of	  incumbency	  or	  by	  unusual	  counterpart	   assessments	   in	  which	   officials	   are	   particularly	   impressed	   or	   repulsed	  with	   politicians	   in	   another	   country.	   	   This	   is	   almost	   always	   a	  mistake	   that	   leaders	  come	  to	  regret	  later	  on.	  	  Notable	  examples	  include	  King	  Hussein	  of	  Jordan’s	  implicit	  endorsement	  of	  Binyamin	  Netanyahu	  in	  1996	  or	  Anwar	  Sadat’s	  embrace	  of	  Begin	  in	  1981.	  	  These	  leaders	  also	  were	  going	  against	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  public	  opinion	  and	  elite	  sentiment	  within	  their	  countries	  in	  favor	  of	  dubious	  strategic	  gambles.	  	  
Lesson	  #7:	  Follow-­Through	  is	  Essential	  	   James	   Baker	   succeeded	   at	   empowering	   local	   Palestinian	   leaders	   at	   the	  expense	  of	  the	  PLO,	  while	  George	  Shultz	  did	  not.	   	  One	  major	  reason	  has	  to	  do	  with	  practical	  follow-­‐through.	  	  Once	  Baker	  set	  his	  goal	  for	  Palestinian	  politics	  in	  1991,	  he	  doggedly	  mustered	   U.S.	   assets	   to	   achieve	   that	   goal,	   meeting	   a	   remarkable	   eleven	  times	   with	   his	   preferred	   Palestinian	   interlocutors	   (mostly	   in	   the	   region)	   and	  mustering	   a	   diplomatic	   campaign	   to	   keep	   Arab	   states	   supportive	   of	   his	   efforts.	  	  Shultz	  mainly	  sought	  to	  use	  cash	  to	  backstop	  anti-­‐PLO	  forces	  in	  the	  West	  Bank,	  but	  even	  that	  he	  did	  not	  persistently	  deliver.	  	  Reagan’s	  White	  House,	  not	  exactly	  reputed	  for	   its	  managerial	  prowess,	  had	   to	  remind	  him	  solicit	  money	   from	  the	  Hill	   to	   fund	  his	  programs	  for	  encouraging	  moderation	  in	  Palestinian	  politics.	  	  
Lesson	  #8:	  People	  Can	  Smell	  a	  Fraud,	  Don’t	  Bother	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   One	   of	   my	   Palestinian	   interlocutors,	   in	   trying	   to	   explain	   the	   difference	  between	   effective	   and	   ineffective	  American	   LSI,	   emphasized	   the	   importance	   of	   an	  Arabic	  concept	  called	  ‘Abathiyya.30	  	  As	  best	  I	  understand	  it,	  the	  word	  entails	  shades	  of	  absurdity,	  manipulation,	  tampering,	   fraud,	  and	  a	  frivolous	  act.31	   	  He	  argued	  that	  empty	  gestures	  of	  American	  backing	  for	  Palestinian	  leaders	  –	  major	  speeches	  in	  the	  territories,	  calling	  somebody	  as	  “man	  of	  peace,”	  and	  brandishing	  new	  tranches	  of	  aid	  –	  rarely	  register	  with	  the	  Palestinian	  public	  and,	   if	  so,	  do	  not	  provide	  more	  than	  a	  temporary	  bump.	  	  People	  can	  usually	  tell	  if	  America’s	  promises	  to	  reward	  the	  path	  of	  peace	  and	  moderation	  are	  not	  backed	  up	  tangible	  change	  on	  the	  ground	  –	  or	  at	  least	  some	  concrete	  steps	  that	  really	  seem	  to	  matter.	  	  Thus,	  Yossi	  Beilin	  argues	  that	  the	  global	  anti-­‐terrorism	  conference	  at	  Sharm	  el-­‐Sheikh	  had	  only	  a	   limited	   impact	  because,	  after	  another	  wave	  of	  terrorist	  attacks,	  “the	  gap	  between	  the	  situation	  on	  the	   ground…	   and	   the	   ceremonies”	   was	   seen	   by	   most	   Israelis	   “as	   something	   very	  artificial	   effort	   to	   gain	   some	   votes	   in	   the	   last	   moment”.32	   	   Dennis	   Ross	   concurs,	  explaining	   that	   “the	   key	   to	   helping	   a	   Palestinian	   moderate	   is	   to	   be	   in	   a	   position	  where	   you	   put	   them	   in	   a	   position	   where	   they	   can	   show	   that	   they	   are	   delivering	  something,	  and	  they	  are	  delivering	  what	  matters	  to	  the	  Palestinian	  public.	  	  Anything	  short	  of	  that,	  and	  it’s	  more	  rhetorical	  than	  real”.33	  	  
Lesson	  #9:	  No	  Kiss	  of	  Death?	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Kamel Husseini, “Interview with the Author”, July 2011. 
31 Hans Wehr, Arabic-English Dictionary: The Hans Wehr Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic, ed. J. 
Milton Cowan, 4th ed. (Spoken Language Services, 1993), 685. 
32 Beilin, “Interview with the Author”. 
33 Dennis Ross, “Interview with the Author,” March 23, 2012. 
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   The	  positive	  flip	  side	  of	  this	  effect	  is	  that	  the	  fabled	  American	  “kiss	  of	  death”	  may	  not	  actually	  be	  so	  deadly,	  provided	   that	  Washington’s	   support	  actually	  yields	  benefits.	   	   Perhaps	   an	   implicit	   underpinning	   of	   this	   folk	   theory,	   which	   holds	   that	  anybody	  America	   supports	   in	   the	  Muslim	  world	  will	   fail,	   is	   that	  people	   inherently	  expect	  America	  is	  not	  willing	  to	  provide	  the	  sort	  of	  benefits	  that	  matter	  to	  Arabs	  or	  Iranians.	  	  However,	  when	  favored	  leaders	  actually	  deliver,	  the	  kiss	  of	  death	  is	  not	  so	  deadly.	   	   For	   example,	   Salam	   Fayyad	   has	   sustained	   a	   decade-­‐long	   career	   in	  Palestinian	  politics	  without	  a	  domestic	  political	  constituency	  because	  he	  is	  the	  goose	  that	  lays	  the	  golden	  aid.	  	  He	  is	  not	  a	  Fatah	  member,	  and	  in	  the	  last	  PLC	  election	  his	  party	  won	  a	  piddling	  two	  seats,	  yet	  somehow	  he	  remains	  the	  Palestinian	  Authority	  prime	  minister.	  	  An	  exchange	  in	  the	  Palestine	  Papers	  highlights	  this	  discrepancy:	  	  “[Israeli	  general	  #1]:	  You	  have	  internal	  factional	  problems	  with	  Fayyad.	  [Israeli	  general	  #2]:	  This	  is	  between	  us,	  don’t	  write	  it	  down.	  [Palestinian	  negotiator]:	  These	  notes	  are	  confidential.	  [Palestinian	  general]:	  At	  first	  there	  were	  some	  problems,	  but	  since	  he	  started	  getting	  results,	   opposition	   to	   him	   is	   down.	   	   The	   bottom	   line	   is	   performance	   –	   how	   he	  delivers”.34	  	  Similarly,	   former	   Abbas	   advisor	   Ghaith	   al-­‐Omari	   reflected	   that	   Abu	   Mazen	   might	  have	  been	  able	  to	  succeed	  as	  prime	  minister	  if	  the	  American	  endorsement	  had	  come	  with	  the	  sort	  of	  support	  that	  he	  had	  actually	  been	  seeking	  from	  abroad:	  	  	  “the	  U.S.	  hug	  is	  negative	  in	  the	  region,	  but	  it’s	  not	  a	  killer.	  	  It	  all	  depends	  on	  whether	  it	   comes	  with	   real	   and	  visible	  benefits…	   there	  was	   an	  American	  bear	  hug	   for	  Abu	  Mazen.	  	  I	  think	  it	  would	  have	  worked	  though	  if	  it	  came	  with	  deliverables”.35	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Clayton E. Swisher and Ghada Karmi, The Palestine Papers: The End of the Road? (Hesperus Press, 
2011), 154. Descriptors in brackets added to contextualize the individuals. They are Amos Gilad, Yoav 
“Poly” Mordechai, Rami Dajani, and Hazem Atallah. 
35 Ghaith al-Omari, “Interview with the Author”, February 2011. 
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Lesson	  #10:	  Know	  your	  World	  Politics	  	   Although	   all	   it	   takes	   is	   willpower	   to	   generate	   LSI	   occurrence,	   it	   requires	  genuine	  understanding	  to	  achieve	  success.	   	  Leaders	  do	  not	  need	  deep	  area	  studies	  expertise,	  but	  it	  does	  not	  hurt.	  	  Mainly,	  they	  need	  to	  have	  a	  knack	  for	  understanding	  the	  political	  ethos	  of	  the	  society	  in	  which	  they	  hope	  to	  affect	  leadership	  selection.	  	   George	  W.	  Bush	  was	  able	  to	  bolster	  Israeli	  leaders	  at	  times	  because	  he	  deeply	  empathized	  with	   Israel’s	   security	   predicament.	   	   Yet	   he	   never	   really	   reaped	  major	  gains	   on	   the	   peace	   process	   because	   he	   could	   not	   fully	   tap	   into	   their	   other	   main	  political	  drive:	  the	  desire	  for	  peace.	  	  His	  speech	  to	  the	  Knesset	  in	  May	  of	  2008,	  meant	  in	   part	   to	   bolster	   Olmert,	   exemplified	   this	   dilemma	   because	   he	   focused	  more	   on	  rejecting	  appeasement	  than	  inspiring	  Israelis	  to	  pursue	  peace	  with	  their	  neighbors.	  	  Nor	  did	  he	  have	  much	  success	  in	  engineering	  outcomes	  in	  Palestinian	  politics,	  even	  in	   the	  narrow	  sense	  of	  affecting	   immediate	   leadership	  struggles,	   since	  he	   failed	   to	  grasp	  the	  value	  that	  the	  Palestinian	  people	  attach	  to	  substantive	  concessions	  on	  the	  ground	  from	  Israel	  and	  substantive	  negotiations	  moving	  toward	  final	  status	  issues.	  	  Thus,	   although	   he	   pursued	   LSI	   with	   remarkable	   frequency	   toward	   Palestinian	  affairs,	  these	  efforts	  rarely	  achieved	  much	  in	  terms	  of	  lasting	  American	  interests.	  	   Bill	   Clinton,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   achieve	   relative	   success	   in	   both	   Israeli	  and	  Palestinian	  politics	  because	  people	  on	  both	  sides	  felt	  that	  he	  better	  understood	  their	  aspirations,	  fears,	  and	  needs.	  	  His	  empathy	  was	  also	  backstopped	  by	  an	  encyclopedic	  knowledge	  of	  the	  points	  of	  negotiation	  and	  specific	  political	  contests	  in	  both	  Israel	  and	   Palestine.	   	   He	  won	   Israeli	   hearts	   and	  minds	  with	   two	   simple	  words	   “shalom,	  
chaver”	  (Hebrew	  for	  “goodbye,	  friend”)	  on	  Yitzhak	  Rabin’s	  passing,	  and	  he	  brought	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the	   house	   down	   when	   he	   flew	   to	   Gaza	   and	   spoke	   to	   the	   PNC	   on	   Yasser	   Arafat’s	  behalf.	   	   In	   this	   regard,	   his	   reputation	   as	   the	   most	   pro-­‐Israel	   and	   pro-­‐Palestinian	  president	   in	   recent	   memory	   is	   probably	   well	   deserved	   because	   he	   really	  comprehended	  the	  politics	  of	  these	  two	  fractious	  societies.	  	  
Conclusion:	  
	   	  James	   Baker	   used	   to	   call	   his	   advisors	   on	   Arab-­‐Israeli	   affairs	   “food	  processors”	   for	   their	   wearisome	   focus	   on	   procedure	   and	   for	   their	   permanent	  employability,	   as	   though	   they	   had	   chosen	   to	   work	   on	   an	   intractable	   conflict	   to	  ensure	  that	  they	  always	  made	  a	  steady	  paycheck.36	  	  As	  long	  as	  the	  conflict	  between	  Israelis	   and	   Palestinians	   persists,	   there	   will	   be	   outsiders	   interested	   in	   trying	   to	  resolve	  it,	  or	  at	  least	  manage	  it.	  	  And	  a	  part	  of	  that	  impetus	  is	  that	  world	  leaders	  will	  try	   to	   influence	   these	   developments	   by	   bolstering	   perceived	   pro-­‐peace	   leaders	   in	  the	  politics	  of	  Palestine	  and	  in	  the	  politics	  of	  Israel,	  part	  of	  a	  broader	  class	  of	  foreign	  policy	  behavior	  known	  as	  leadership	  selection	  intervention.	  	  Because	  typically	  most	  everybody	  has	  their	  preferences,	  but	  the	  president	  actually	  decides	  to	  play	  favorites.	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